6f6174a762
naming by renaming certain "proc" entry points to "cred" entry points, reflecting their manipulation of credentials. For some entry points, the process was passed into the framework but not into policies; in these cases, stop passing in the process since we don't need it. mac_proc_check_setaudit -> mac_cred_check_setaudit mac_proc_check_setaudit_addr -> mac_cred_check_setaudit_addr mac_proc_check_setauid -> mac_cred_check_setauid mac_proc_check_setegid -> mac_cred_check_setegid mac_proc_check_seteuid -> mac_cred_check_seteuid mac_proc_check_setgid -> mac_cred_check_setgid mac_proc_check_setgroups -> mac_cred_ceck_setgroups mac_proc_check_setregid -> mac_cred_check_setregid mac_proc_check_setresgid -> mac_cred_check_setresgid mac_proc_check_setresuid -> mac_cred_check_setresuid mac_proc_check_setreuid -> mac_cred_check_setreuid mac_proc_check_setuid -> mac_cred_check_setuid Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
353 lines
8.5 KiB
C
353 lines
8.5 KiB
C
/*-
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* Copyright (c) 1999-2002, 2008-2009 Robert N. M. Watson
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* Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin
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* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
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* Copyright (c) 2005 Samy Al Bahra
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* Copyright (c) 2006 SPARTA, Inc.
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* Copyright (c) 2008 Apple Inc.
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the
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* TrustedBSD Project.
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*
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* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
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* Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
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* Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
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* as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
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*
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* This software was enhanced by SPARTA ISSO under SPAWAR contract
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* N66001-04-C-6019 ("SEFOS").
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*
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* This software was developed at the University of Cambridge Computer
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* Laboratory with support from a grant from Google, Inc.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include "opt_kdtrace.h"
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#include "opt_mac.h"
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/condvar.h>
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#include <sys/imgact.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/lock.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
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#include <sys/mutex.h>
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#include <sys/mac.h>
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#include <sys/proc.h>
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#include <sys/sbuf.h>
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#include <sys/sdt.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/vnode.h>
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#include <sys/mount.h>
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#include <sys/file.h>
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#include <sys/namei.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <vm/vm.h>
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#include <vm/pmap.h>
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#include <vm/vm_map.h>
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#include <vm/vm_object.h>
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#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
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#include <security/mac/mac_internal.h>
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#include <security/mac/mac_policy.h>
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struct label *
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mac_cred_label_alloc(void)
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{
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struct label *label;
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label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK);
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_init_label, label);
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return (label);
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}
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void
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mac_cred_init(struct ucred *cred)
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{
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if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_CRED)
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cred->cr_label = mac_cred_label_alloc();
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else
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cred->cr_label = NULL;
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}
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void
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mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_destroy_label, label);
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mac_labelzone_free(label);
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}
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void
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mac_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred)
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{
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if (cred->cr_label != NULL) {
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mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label);
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cred->cr_label = NULL;
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}
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}
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/*
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* When a thread becomes an NFS server daemon, its credential may need to be
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* updated to reflect this so that policies can recognize when file system
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* operations originate from the network.
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*
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* At some point, it would be desirable if the credential used for each NFS
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* RPC could be set based on the RPC context (i.e., source system, etc) to
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* provide more fine-grained access control.
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*/
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void
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mac_cred_associate_nfsd(struct ucred *cred)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_associate_nfsd, cred);
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}
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/*
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* Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other kernel
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* processes and threads are spawned.
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*/
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void
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mac_cred_create_swapper(struct ucred *cred)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_swapper, cred);
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}
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/*
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* Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other
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* userland processes and threads are spawned.
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*/
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void
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mac_cred_create_init(struct ucred *cred)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_init, cred);
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}
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int
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mac_cred_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *elements,
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char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
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return (error);
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}
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int
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mac_cred_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *string)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string);
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return (error);
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}
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/*
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* When a new process is created, its label must be initialized. Generally,
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* this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible deltas.
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* This function allows that processing to take place.
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*/
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void
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mac_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_copy_label, src->cr_label, dest->cr_label);
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}
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/*
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* When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege
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* to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified
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* buffer cache.
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*/
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void
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mac_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
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{
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MAC_PERFORM(cred_relabel, cred, newlabel);
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}
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(cred_check_relabel, "struct ucred *",
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"struct label *");
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int
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mac_cred_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_CHECK(cred_check_relabel, cred, newlabel);
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(cred_check_relabel, error, cred, newlabel);
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return (error);
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}
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(cred_check_setuid, "struct ucred *", "uid_t");
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int
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mac_cred_check_setuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t uid)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_CHECK(cred_check_setuid, cred, uid);
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(cred_check_setuid, error, cred, uid);
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return (error);
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}
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(cred_check_seteuid, "struct ucred *", "uid_t");
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int
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mac_cred_check_seteuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t euid)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_CHECK(cred_check_seteuid, cred, euid);
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(cred_check_seteuid, error, cred, euid);
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return (error);
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}
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(cred_check_setgid, "struct ucred *", "gid_t");
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int
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mac_cred_check_setgid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t gid)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_CHECK(cred_check_setgid, cred, gid);
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(cred_check_setgid, error, cred, gid);
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return (error);
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}
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(cred_check_setegid, "struct ucred *", "gid_t");
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int
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mac_cred_check_setegid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t egid)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_CHECK(cred_check_setegid, cred, egid);
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(cred_check_setegid, error, cred, egid);
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return (error);
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}
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE3(cred_check_setgroups, "struct ucred *", "int",
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"gid_t *");
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int
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mac_cred_check_setgroups(struct ucred *cred, int ngroups, gid_t *gidset)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_CHECK(cred_check_setgroups, cred, ngroups, gidset);
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE3(cred_check_setgroups, error, cred, ngroups, gidset);
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return (error);
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}
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE3(cred_check_setreuid, "struct ucred *", "uid_t",
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"uid_t");
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int
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mac_cred_check_setreuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_CHECK(cred_check_setreuid, cred, ruid, euid);
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE3(cred_check_setreuid, error, cred, ruid, euid);
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return (error);
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}
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE3(cred_check_setregid, "struct ucred *", "gid_t",
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"gid_t");
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int
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mac_cred_check_setregid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_CHECK(cred_check_setregid, cred, rgid, egid);
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE3(cred_check_setregid, error, cred, rgid, egid);
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return (error);
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}
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE4(cred_check_setresuid, "struct ucred *", "uid_t",
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"uid_t", "uid_t");
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int
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mac_cred_check_setresuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid, uid_t euid,
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uid_t suid)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_CHECK(cred_check_setresuid, cred, ruid, euid, suid);
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE4(cred_check_setresuid, error, cred, ruid, euid,
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suid);
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return (error);
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}
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE4(cred_check_setresgid, "struct ucred *", "gid_t",
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"gid_t", "gid_t");
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int
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mac_cred_check_setresgid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid, gid_t egid,
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gid_t sgid)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_CHECK(cred_check_setresgid, cred, rgid, egid, sgid);
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE4(cred_check_setresgid, error, cred, rgid, egid,
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sgid);
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return (error);
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}
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(cred_check_visible, "struct ucred *",
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"struct ucred *");
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int
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mac_cred_check_visible(struct ucred *cr1, struct ucred *cr2)
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{
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int error;
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MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, cr1, cr2);
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MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(cred_check_visible, error, cr1, cr2);
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return (error);
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}
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