ea5eee641e
In integrity mode, a larger logical sector (e.g., 4096 bytes) spans several physical sectors (e.g., 512 bytes) on the backing device. Due to hash overhead, a 4096 byte logical sector takes 8.5625 512-byte physical sectors. This means that only 288 bytes (256 data + 32 hash) of the last 512 byte sector are used. The memory allocation used to store the encrypted data to be written to the physical sectors comes from malloc(9) and does not use M_ZERO. Previously, nothing initialized the final physical sector backing each logical sector, aside from the hash + encrypted data portion. So 224 bytes of kernel heap memory was leaked to every block :-(. This patch addresses the issue by initializing the trailing portion of the physical sector in every logical sector to zeros before use. A much simpler but higher overhead fix would be to tag the entire allocation M_ZERO. PR: 222077 Reported by: Maxim Khitrov <max AT mxcrypt.com> Reviewed by: emaste Security: yes Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12272 |
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| .. | ||
| g_eli_crypto.c | ||
| g_eli_ctl.c | ||
| g_eli_hmac.c | ||
| g_eli_integrity.c | ||
| g_eli_key_cache.c | ||
| g_eli_key.c | ||
| g_eli_privacy.c | ||
| g_eli.c | ||
| g_eli.h | ||
| pkcs5v2.c | ||
| pkcs5v2.h | ||