freebsd-nq/sys/dev/random/random_infra.c
Conrad Meyer 3782136ff1 random(4): Restore availability tradeoff prior to r346250
As discussed in that commit message, it is a dangerous default.  But the
safe default causes enough pain on a variety of platforms that for now,
restore the prior default.

Some of this is self-induced pain we should/could do better about; for
example, programmatic CI systems and VM managers should introduce entropy
from the host for individual VM instances.  This is considered a future work
item.

On modern x86 and Power9 systems, this may be wholly unnecessary after
D19928 lands (even in the non-ideal case where early /boot/entropy is
unavailable), because they have fast hardware random sources available early
in boot.  But D19928 is not yet landed and we have a host of architectures
which do not provide fast random sources.

This change adds several tunables and diagnostic sysctls, documented
thoroughly in UPDATING and sys/dev/random/random_infra.c.

PR:		230875 (reopens)
Reported by:	adrian, jhb, imp, and probably others
Reviewed by:	delphij, imp (earlier version), markm (earlier version)
Discussed with:	adrian
Approved by:	secteam(delphij)
Relnotes:	yeah
Security:	related
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19944
2019-04-18 20:48:54 +00:00

208 lines
6.7 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2015 Mark R V Murray
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
* in this position and unchanged.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/random.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#if defined(RANDOM_LOADABLE)
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/sx.h>
#endif
#include <dev/random/randomdev.h>
/* Set up the sysctl root node for the entropy device */
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern, OID_AUTO, random, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
"Cryptographically Secure Random Number Generator");
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_random, OID_AUTO, initial_seeding, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
"Initial seeding control and information");
/*
* N.B., this is a dangerous default, but it matches the behavior prior to
* r346250 (and, say, OpenBSD -- although they get some guaranteed saved
* entropy from the prior boot because of their KARL system, on RW media).
*/
bool random_bypass_before_seeding = true;
SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_random_initial_seeding, OID_AUTO,
bypass_before_seeding, CTLFLAG_RDTUN, &random_bypass_before_seeding,
0, "If set non-zero, bypass the random device in requests for random "
"data when the random device is not yet seeded. This is considered "
"dangerous. Ordinarily, the random device will block requests until "
"it is seeded by sufficient entropy.");
/*
* This is a read-only diagnostic that reports the combination of the former
* tunable and actual bypass. It is intended for programmatic inspection by
* userspace administrative utilities after boot.
*/
bool read_random_bypassed_before_seeding = false;
SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_random_initial_seeding, OID_AUTO,
read_random_bypassed_before_seeding, CTLFLAG_RD,
&read_random_bypassed_before_seeding, 0, "If non-zero, the random device "
"was bypassed because the 'bypass_before_seeding' knob was enabled and a "
"request was submitted prior to initial seeding.");
/*
* This is a read-only diagnostic that reports the combination of the former
* tunable and actual bypass for arc4random initial seeding. It is intended
* for programmatic inspection by userspace administrative utilities after
* boot.
*/
bool arc4random_bypassed_before_seeding = false;
SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_random_initial_seeding, OID_AUTO,
arc4random_bypassed_before_seeding, CTLFLAG_RD,
&arc4random_bypassed_before_seeding, 0, "If non-zero, the random device "
"was bypassed when initially seeding the kernel arc4random(9), because "
"the 'bypass_before_seeding' knob was enabled and a request was submitted "
"prior to initial seeding.");
/*
* This knob is for users who do not want additional warnings in their logs
* because they intend to handle bypass by inspecting the status of the
* diagnostic sysctls.
*/
bool random_bypass_disable_warnings = false;
SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_random_initial_seeding, OID_AUTO,
disable_bypass_warnings, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
&random_bypass_disable_warnings, 0, "If non-zero, do not log a warning "
"if the 'bypass_before_seeding' knob is enabled and a request is "
"submitted prior to initial seeding.");
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_ENTROPY, "entropy", "Entropy harvesting buffers and data structures");
struct sources_head source_list = LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(source_list);
#if defined(RANDOM_LOADABLE)
struct random_algorithm *p_random_alg_context = NULL;
#else /* !defined(RANDOM_LOADABLE) */
struct random_algorithm *p_random_alg_context = &random_alg_context;
#endif /* defined(RANDOM_LOADABLE) */
#if defined(RANDOM_LOADABLE)
static void
null_read_random(void *dummy __unused, u_int dummy2 __unused)
{
panic("%s: no random module is loaded", __func__);
}
static bool
null_is_random_seeded(void)
{
return (false);
}
struct random_readers {
int (*read_random_uio)(struct uio *, bool);
void (*read_random)(void *, u_int);
bool (*is_random_seeded)(void);
} random_reader_context = {
(int (*)(struct uio *, bool))nullop,
null_read_random,
null_is_random_seeded,
};
struct sx randomdev_config_lock;
static void
random_infra_sysinit(void *dummy __unused)
{
RANDOM_CONFIG_INIT_LOCK();
}
SYSINIT(random_device_h_init, SI_SUB_RANDOM, SI_ORDER_FIRST, random_infra_sysinit, NULL);
void
random_infra_init(int (*p_random_read_uio)(struct uio *, bool),
void (*p_random_read)(void *, u_int),
bool (*p_is_random_seeded)(void))
{
RANDOM_CONFIG_X_LOCK();
random_reader_context.read_random_uio = p_random_read_uio;
random_reader_context.read_random = p_random_read;
random_reader_context.is_random_seeded = p_is_random_seeded;
RANDOM_CONFIG_X_UNLOCK();
}
void
random_infra_uninit(void)
{
RANDOM_CONFIG_X_LOCK();
random_reader_context.read_random_uio = (int (*)(struct uio *, bool))nullop;
random_reader_context.read_random = null_read_random;
random_reader_context.is_random_seeded = null_is_random_seeded;
RANDOM_CONFIG_X_UNLOCK();
}
static void
random_infra_sysuninit(void *dummy __unused)
{
RANDOM_CONFIG_DEINIT_LOCK();
}
SYSUNINIT(random_device_h_init, SI_SUB_RANDOM, SI_ORDER_FIRST, random_infra_sysuninit, NULL);
int
read_random_uio(struct uio *uio, bool nonblock)
{
int retval;
RANDOM_CONFIG_S_LOCK();
retval = random_reader_context.read_random_uio(uio, nonblock);
RANDOM_CONFIG_S_UNLOCK();
return (retval);
}
void
read_random(void *buf, u_int len)
{
RANDOM_CONFIG_S_LOCK();
random_reader_context.read_random(buf, len);
RANDOM_CONFIG_S_UNLOCK();
}
bool
is_random_seeded(void)
{
RANDOM_CONFIG_S_LOCK();
random_reader_context.is_random_seeded();
RANDOM_CONFIG_S_UNLOCK();
}
#endif /* defined(RANDOM_LOADABLE) */