freebsd-nq/sys/security/mac/mac_system.c
Robert Watson 4020272933 Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to
improve performance:

- Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor
  threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead
  and behaved badly in the face of contention.

- Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock,
  which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework
  depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep
  or not.

- Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive
  access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks,
  which occurs only when policies are attached or detached.

- Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring
  any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are
  loaded; this a race we can afford to lose.

- For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is
  permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition
  macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock.  In some
  cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the
  MAC Framework entry point.

As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness
warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all
acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions
for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire
other locks.

Sponsored by:	Google, Inc.
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Discussed with:	csjp (idea, not specific patch)
2009-03-14 16:06:06 +00:00

237 lines
6.3 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2002-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2006 SPARTA, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2007, 2009 Robert N. M. Watson
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
* Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
* Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
* as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
*
* Portions of this software were developed by Robert Watson for the
* TrustedBSD Project.
*
* This software was enhanced by SPARTA ISSO under SPAWAR contract
* N66001-04-C-6019 ("SEFOS").
*
* This software was developed at the University of Cambridge Computer
* Laboratory with support from a grant from Google, Inc.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* MAC Framework entry points relating to overall operation of system,
* including global services such as the kernel environment and loadable
* modules.
*
* System checks often align with existing privilege checks, but provide
* additional security context that may be relevant to policies, such as the
* specific object being operated on.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "opt_kdtrace.h"
#include "opt_mac.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/module.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/sdt.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_internal.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_policy.h>
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE1(kenv_check_dump, "struct ucred *");
int
mac_kenv_check_dump(struct ucred *cred)
{
int error;
MAC_CHECK_NOSLEEP(kenv_check_dump, cred);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE1(kenv_check_dump, error, cred);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(kenv_check_get, "struct ucred *", "char *");
int
mac_kenv_check_get(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
{
int error;
MAC_CHECK_NOSLEEP(kenv_check_get, cred, name);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(kenv_check_get, error, cred, name);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE3(kenv_check_set, "struct ucred *", "char *",
"char *");
int
mac_kenv_check_set(struct ucred *cred, char *name, char *value)
{
int error;
MAC_CHECK_NOSLEEP(kenv_check_set, cred, name, value);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE3(kenv_check_set, error, cred, name, value);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(kenv_check_unset, "struct ucred *", "char *");
int
mac_kenv_check_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
{
int error;
MAC_CHECK_NOSLEEP(kenv_check_unset, cred, name);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(kenv_check_unset, error, cred, name);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(kld_check_load, "struct ucred *", "struct vnode *");
int
mac_kld_check_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_kld_check_load");
MAC_CHECK(kld_check_load, cred, vp, vp->v_label);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(kld_check_load, error, cred, vp);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE1(kld_check_stat, "struct ucred *");
int
mac_kld_check_stat(struct ucred *cred)
{
int error;
MAC_CHECK_NOSLEEP(kld_check_stat, cred);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE1(kld_check_stat, error, cred);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(system_check_acct, "struct ucred *",
"struct vnode *");
int
mac_system_check_acct(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
if (vp != NULL) {
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_system_check_acct");
}
MAC_CHECK(system_check_acct, cred, vp,
vp != NULL ? vp->v_label : NULL);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(system_check_acct, error, cred, vp);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(system_check_reboot, "struct ucred *", "int");
int
mac_system_check_reboot(struct ucred *cred, int howto)
{
int error;
MAC_CHECK_NOSLEEP(system_check_reboot, cred, howto);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(system_check_reboot, error, cred, howto);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(system_check_swapon, "struct ucred *",
"struct vnode *");
int
mac_system_check_swapon(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_system_check_swapon");
MAC_CHECK(system_check_swapon, cred, vp, vp->v_label);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(system_check_swapon, error, cred, vp);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(system_check_swapoff, "struct ucred *",
"struct vnode *");
int
mac_system_check_swapoff(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_system_check_swapoff");
MAC_CHECK(system_check_swapoff, cred, vp, vp->v_label);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(system_check_swapoff, error, cred, vp);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE3(system_check_sysctl, "struct ucred *",
"struct sysctl_oid *", "struct sysctl_req *");
int
mac_system_check_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, struct sysctl_oid *oidp,
void *arg1, int arg2, struct sysctl_req *req)
{
int error;
/*
* XXXMAC: We would very much like to assert the SYSCTL_LOCK here,
* but since it's not exported from kern_sysctl.c, we can't.
*/
MAC_CHECK_NOSLEEP(system_check_sysctl, cred, oidp, arg1, arg2, req);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE3(system_check_sysctl, error, cred, oidp, req);
return (error);
}