4361c4eb6e
The tag length is included as one of the values in the flags byte of block 0 passed to CBC_MAC, so merely copying the first N bytes is insufficient. To avoid adding more sideband data to the CBC MAC software context, pull the generation of block 0, the AAD length, and AAD padding out of cbc_mac.c and into cryptosoft.c. This matches how GCM/GMAC are handled where the length block is constructed in cryptosoft.c and passed as an input to the Update callback. As a result, the CBC MAC Update() routine is now much simpler and simply performs the XOR-and-encrypt step on each input block. While here, avoid a copy to the staging block in the Update routine when one or more full blocks are passed as input to the Update callback. Reviewed by: sef Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D32120
169 lines
4.6 KiB
C
169 lines
4.6 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2018-2019 iXsystems Inc. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
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* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
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* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
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* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/endian.h>
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#include <opencrypto/cbc_mac.h>
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#include <opencrypto/xform_auth.h>
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/*
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* Given two CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN blocks, xor
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* them into dst, and then encrypt dst.
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*/
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static void
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xor_and_encrypt(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx,
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const uint8_t *src, uint8_t *dst)
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{
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const uint64_t *b1;
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uint64_t *b2;
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uint64_t temp_block[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN/sizeof(uint64_t)];
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b1 = (const uint64_t*)src;
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b2 = (uint64_t*)dst;
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for (size_t count = 0;
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count < CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN/sizeof(uint64_t);
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count++) {
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temp_block[count] = b1[count] ^ b2[count];
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}
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rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->keysched, ctx->rounds, (void*)temp_block, dst);
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}
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void
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AES_CBC_MAC_Init(void *vctx)
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{
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struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx;
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ctx = vctx;
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bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
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}
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void
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AES_CBC_MAC_Setkey(void *vctx, const uint8_t *key, u_int klen)
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{
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struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx;
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ctx = vctx;
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ctx->rounds = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ctx->keysched, key, klen * 8);
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}
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/*
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* This is called to set the nonce, aka IV.
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*
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* Note that the caller is responsible for constructing b0 as well
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* as the length and padding around the AAD and passing that data
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* to _Update.
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*/
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void
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AES_CBC_MAC_Reinit(void *vctx, const uint8_t *nonce, u_int nonceLen)
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{
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struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx = vctx;
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ctx->nonce = nonce;
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ctx->nonceLength = nonceLen;
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ctx->blockIndex = 0;
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/* XOR b0 with all 0's on first call to _Update. */
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memset(ctx->block, 0, CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN);
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}
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int
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AES_CBC_MAC_Update(void *vctx, const void *vdata, u_int length)
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{
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struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx;
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const uint8_t *data;
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size_t copy_amt;
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ctx = vctx;
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data = vdata;
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/*
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* _Update can be called with non-aligned update lengths. Use
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* the staging block when necessary.
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*/
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while (length != 0) {
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uint8_t *ptr;
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/*
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* If there is no partial block and the length is at
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* least a full block, encrypt the full block without
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* copying to the staging block.
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*/
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if (ctx->blockIndex == 0 && length >= CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN) {
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xor_and_encrypt(ctx, data, ctx->block);
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length -= CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN;
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data += CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN;
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continue;
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}
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copy_amt = MIN(sizeof(ctx->staging_block) - ctx->blockIndex,
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length);
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ptr = ctx->staging_block + ctx->blockIndex;
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bcopy(data, ptr, copy_amt);
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data += copy_amt;
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ctx->blockIndex += copy_amt;
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length -= copy_amt;
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if (ctx->blockIndex == sizeof(ctx->staging_block)) {
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/* We've got a full block */
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xor_and_encrypt(ctx, ctx->staging_block, ctx->block);
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ctx->blockIndex = 0;
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}
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}
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return (0);
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}
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void
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AES_CBC_MAC_Final(uint8_t *buf, void *vctx)
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{
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struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx;
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uint8_t s0[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN];
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ctx = vctx;
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/*
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* We first need to check to see if we've got any data
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* left over to encrypt.
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*/
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if (ctx->blockIndex != 0) {
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memset(ctx->staging_block + ctx->blockIndex, 0,
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CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN - ctx->blockIndex);
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xor_and_encrypt(ctx, ctx->staging_block, ctx->block);
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}
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explicit_bzero(ctx->staging_block, sizeof(ctx->staging_block));
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bzero(s0, sizeof(s0));
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s0[0] = (15 - ctx->nonceLength) - 1;
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bcopy(ctx->nonce, s0 + 1, ctx->nonceLength);
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rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->keysched, ctx->rounds, s0, s0);
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for (size_t indx = 0; indx < AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN; indx++)
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buf[indx] = ctx->block[indx] ^ s0[indx];
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explicit_bzero(s0, sizeof(s0));
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}
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