1577 lines
52 KiB
C
1577 lines
52 KiB
C
/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#define USE_SOCKETS
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
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unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
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static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
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int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
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{
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/*
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* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
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* packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
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* s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
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* s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
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* s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
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*/
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int i, len, left;
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long align = 0;
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unsigned char *pkt;
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SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
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if (n <= 0)
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return n;
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rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
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if (rb->buf == NULL)
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if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
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return -1;
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left = rb->left;
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#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
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align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
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align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
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#endif
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if (!extend) {
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/* start with empty packet ... */
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if (left == 0)
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rb->offset = align;
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else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
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/*
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* check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
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* alignment...
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*/
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pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
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if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
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&& (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
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/*
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* Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
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* is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
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* whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
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* effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
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* overrun can be triggered.
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*/
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memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
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rb->offset = align;
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}
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}
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s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
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s->packet_length = 0;
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/* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
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}
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/*
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* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
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* operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
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* the buffer).
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*/
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if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
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if (left == 0 && extend)
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return 0;
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if (left > 0 && n > left)
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n = left;
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}
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/* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
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if (left >= n) {
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s->packet_length += n;
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rb->left = left - n;
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rb->offset += n;
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return (n);
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}
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/* else we need to read more data */
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len = s->packet_length;
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pkt = rb->buf + align;
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/*
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* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
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* pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
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*/
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if (s->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */
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memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left);
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s->packet = pkt;
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rb->offset = len + align;
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}
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if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return -1;
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}
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/* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
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if (!s->read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
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/* ignore max parameter */
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max = n;
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else {
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if (max < n)
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max = n;
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if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
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max = rb->len - rb->offset;
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}
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while (left < n) {
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/*
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* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
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* need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
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* possible)
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*/
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clear_sys_error();
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if (s->rbio != NULL) {
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s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
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i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
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} else {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
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i = -1;
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}
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if (i <= 0) {
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rb->left = left;
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if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
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SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION
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&& SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
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if (len + left == 0)
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ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
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return (i);
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}
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left += i;
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/*
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* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
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* underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
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* byte oriented as in the TLS case.
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*/
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if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION
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|| SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
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if (n > left)
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n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
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}
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}
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/* done reading, now the book-keeping */
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rb->offset += n;
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rb->left = left - n;
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s->packet_length += n;
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s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
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return (n);
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}
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/*
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* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
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* will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
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* attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
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* cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
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*/
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#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
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/*-
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* Call this to get a new input record.
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* It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
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* or non-blocking IO.
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* When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
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* ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
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* ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
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* ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
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*/
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/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
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static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
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{
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int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
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int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
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SSL3_RECORD *rr;
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SSL_SESSION *sess;
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unsigned char *p;
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unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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short version;
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unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
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size_t extra;
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unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
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rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
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sess = s->session;
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if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
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extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
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else
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extra = 0;
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if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) {
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/*
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* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
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* ssl3_setup_buffers() was done
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*/
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return -1;
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}
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again:
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/* check if we have the header */
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if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
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(s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
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n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
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if (n <= 0)
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return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
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s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
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p = s->packet;
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/* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
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rr->type = *(p++);
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ssl_major = *(p++);
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ssl_minor = *(p++);
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version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
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n2s(p, rr->length);
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#if 0
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fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
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#endif
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/* Lets check version */
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if (!s->first_packet) {
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if (version != s->version) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
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if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
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&& !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
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if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
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/*
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* The record is using an incorrect version number, but
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* what we've got appears to be an alert. We haven't
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* read the body yet to check whether its a fatal or
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* not - but chances are it is. We probably shouldn't
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* send a fatal alert back. We'll just end.
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*/
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goto err;
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}
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/*
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* Send back error using their minor version number :-)
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*/
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s->version = (unsigned short)version;
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}
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al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
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goto f_err;
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}
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}
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if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
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goto err;
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}
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|
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if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
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al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
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goto f_err;
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}
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|
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/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
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}
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|
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/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
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|
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if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
|
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/* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
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i = rr->length;
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n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
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if (n <= 0)
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return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */
|
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/*
|
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* now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
|
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* + rr->length
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*/
|
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}
|
|
|
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s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
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* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
|
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* and we have that many bytes in s->packet
|
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*/
|
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rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
|
|
|
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/*
|
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* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
|
|
* at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
|
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* the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
|
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* the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
|
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*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
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* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
|
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* bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* check is not needed I believe */
|
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if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) {
|
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al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
|
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
|
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rr->data = rr->input;
|
|
|
|
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
|
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/*-
|
|
* enc_err is:
|
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* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
|
|
* 1: if the padding is valid
|
|
* -1: if the padding is invalid
|
|
*/
|
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if (enc_err == 0) {
|
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al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int z;
|
|
for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
|
|
printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
|
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}
|
|
printf("\n");
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
|
|
if ((sess != NULL) &&
|
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(s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
|
|
/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
|
|
unsigned char *mac = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type
|
|
*/
|
|
orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
|
|
* removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
|
|
* therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
|
|
* of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (orig_len < mac_size ||
|
|
/* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
|
|
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
|
|
orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
|
|
* constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
|
|
* constant time from within the record, without leaking the
|
|
* contents of the padding bytes.
|
|
*/
|
|
mac = mac_tmp;
|
|
ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
|
|
rr->length -= mac_size;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals
|
|
* |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
|
|
* |mac_size| above.
|
|
*/
|
|
rr->length -= mac_size;
|
|
mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
|
|
if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
|
|
|| CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
|
|
enc_err = -1;
|
|
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size)
|
|
enc_err = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (enc_err < 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
|
|
* SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
|
|
* failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
|
|
* not reveal which kind of error occured -- this might become
|
|
* visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
|
|
*/
|
|
al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
|
|
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* r->length is now just compressed */
|
|
if (s->expand != NULL) {
|
|
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rr->off = 0;
|
|
/*-
|
|
* So at this point the following is true
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
|
|
* after use :-).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
|
|
s->packet_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* just read a 0 length packet */
|
|
if (rr->length == 0) {
|
|
empty_record_count++;
|
|
if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
goto again;
|
|
}
|
|
#if 0
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type,
|
|
rr->length);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
int i;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
|
|
|
|
rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
|
|
i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
|
|
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data,
|
|
(int)rr->length);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
else
|
|
rr->length = i;
|
|
rr->data = rr->comp;
|
|
#endif
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
int i;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *wr;
|
|
|
|
wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
|
|
i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
|
|
SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
|
|
wr->input, (int)wr->length);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
else
|
|
wr->length = i;
|
|
|
|
wr->input = wr->data;
|
|
#endif
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
|
|
* not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
|
|
unsigned int n, nw;
|
|
int i, tot;
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
|
|
tot = s->s3->wnum;
|
|
s->s3->wnum = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
|
|
i = s->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return (i);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
|
|
* than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
|
|
* non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
|
|
* this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
|
|
* possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
|
|
* promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
|
|
* report the error in a way the user will notice
|
|
*/
|
|
if (len < tot) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n = (len - tot);
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
|
|
nw = s->max_send_fragment;
|
|
else
|
|
nw = n;
|
|
|
|
i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
|
|
if (i <= 0) {
|
|
s->s3->wnum = tot;
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((i == (int)n) ||
|
|
(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
|
|
(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
|
|
* in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
|
|
|
|
return tot + i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n -= i;
|
|
tot += i;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p, *plen;
|
|
int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
|
|
int prefix_len = 0;
|
|
int eivlen;
|
|
long align = 0;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *wr;
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
|
|
* will happen with non blocking IO
|
|
*/
|
|
if (wb->left != 0)
|
|
return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
|
|
|
|
/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
|
|
if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
|
|
i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
|
|
if (i <= 0)
|
|
return (i);
|
|
/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wb->buf == NULL)
|
|
if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
wr = &(s->s3->wrec);
|
|
sess = s->session;
|
|
|
|
if ((sess == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
|
|
(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
|
|
#if 1
|
|
clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
|
|
#else
|
|
clear = 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
mac_size = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
|
|
if (mac_size < 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
|
|
* http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
|
|
* prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
|
|
* 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
|
|
* payload)
|
|
*/
|
|
prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
|
|
if (prefix_len <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (prefix_len >
|
|
(SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
|
|
{
|
|
/* insufficient space */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (create_empty_fragment) {
|
|
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
|
|
/*
|
|
* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
|
|
* multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
|
|
* payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
|
|
*/
|
|
align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
|
|
#endif
|
|
p = wb->buf + align;
|
|
wb->offset = align;
|
|
} else if (prefix_len) {
|
|
p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
|
|
} else {
|
|
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
|
|
align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
|
|
#endif
|
|
p = wb->buf + align;
|
|
wb->offset = align;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* write the header */
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = type & 0xff;
|
|
wr->type = type;
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
|
|
* and record version number > TLS 1.0
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
|
|
&& !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
|
|
*(p++) = 0x1;
|
|
else
|
|
*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
/* field where we are to write out packet length */
|
|
plen = p;
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
/* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
|
|
if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
|
|
int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
|
|
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
|
|
eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
|
|
if (eivlen <= 1)
|
|
eivlen = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
|
|
else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
|
|
eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
|
else
|
|
eivlen = 0;
|
|
} else
|
|
eivlen = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* lets setup the record stuff. */
|
|
wr->data = p + eivlen;
|
|
wr->length = (int)len;
|
|
wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* first we compress */
|
|
if (s->compress != NULL) {
|
|
if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
|
|
wr->input = wr->data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
|
|
* wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
|
|
* wb->buf
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (mac_size != 0) {
|
|
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
wr->length += mac_size;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wr->input = p;
|
|
wr->data = p;
|
|
|
|
if (eivlen) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
|
|
*/
|
|
wr->length += eivlen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* record length after mac and block padding */
|
|
s2n(wr->length, plen);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
|
|
* wr->length long
|
|
*/
|
|
wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
|
|
wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
if (create_empty_fragment) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
|
|
* out anything here
|
|
*/
|
|
return wr->length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* now let's set up wb */
|
|
wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
|
|
* retries later
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
|
|
s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
|
|
s->s3->wpend_type = type;
|
|
s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
|
|
|
|
/* we now just need to write the buffer */
|
|
return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
|
|
err:
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
|
|
int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
unsigned int len)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
|
|
|
|
/* XXXX */
|
|
if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
|
|
|| ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
|
|
!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
|
|
|| (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
clear_sys_error();
|
|
if (s->wbio != NULL) {
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
|
|
i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
|
|
(char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
|
|
(unsigned int)wb->left);
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
|
|
i = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i == wb->left) {
|
|
wb->left = 0;
|
|
wb->offset += i;
|
|
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
|
|
SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION
|
|
&& SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
|
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
|
|
} else if (i <= 0) {
|
|
if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
|
|
* using a datagram service
|
|
*/
|
|
wb->left = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return (i);
|
|
}
|
|
wb->offset += i;
|
|
wb->left -= i;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
|
|
* 'type' is one of the following:
|
|
*
|
|
* - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
|
|
* - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
|
|
* - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
|
|
*
|
|
* If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
|
|
* (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
|
|
*
|
|
* This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
|
|
* Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
|
|
* a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
|
|
* Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
|
|
* them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
|
|
* may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
|
|
* Change cipher spec protocol
|
|
* just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
|
|
* Alert protocol
|
|
* 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
|
|
* Handshake protocol
|
|
* 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
|
|
* to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
|
|
* here, anything else is handled by higher layers
|
|
* Application data protocol
|
|
* none of our business
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
|
|
{
|
|
int al, i, j, ret;
|
|
unsigned int n;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
|
|
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
|
|
if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
|
|
&& (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
|
|
&& (type !=
|
|
SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
|
|
/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
|
|
unsigned char *dst = buf;
|
|
unsigned int k;
|
|
|
|
/* peek == 0 */
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
|
|
*dst++ = *src++;
|
|
len--;
|
|
s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
|
|
n++;
|
|
}
|
|
/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
|
|
for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
|
|
s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
|
|
return n;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
|
|
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
|
|
i = s->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return (i);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
start:
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
|
|
* s->s3->rrec.data, - data
|
|
* s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
|
|
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
|
|
*/
|
|
rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
|
|
|
|
/* get new packet if necessary */
|
|
if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
|
|
ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
|
|
* reset by ssl3_get_finished */
|
|
&& (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
|
|
* 'peek' mode)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
|
|
* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
|
|
/*
|
|
* make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
|
|
* doing a handshake for the first time
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
|
|
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len <= 0)
|
|
return (len);
|
|
|
|
if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
|
|
n = rr->length;
|
|
else
|
|
n = (unsigned int)len;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
|
|
if (!peek) {
|
|
rr->length -= n;
|
|
rr->off += n;
|
|
if (rr->length == 0) {
|
|
s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
|
|
rr->off = 0;
|
|
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
|
|
&& s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
|
|
ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return (n);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
|
|
* then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
|
|
* that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
|
|
*/
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
|
|
unsigned char *dest = NULL;
|
|
unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
|
|
dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
|
|
dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
|
|
} else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
|
|
dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
|
|
dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
|
|
dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
|
|
else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
|
|
tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
|
|
|
|
/* Exit and notify application to read again */
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
|
|
n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
|
|
if (rr->length < n)
|
|
n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
|
|
|
|
/* now move 'n' bytes: */
|
|
while (n-- > 0) {
|
|
dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
|
|
rr->length--;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
|
|
goto start; /* fragment was too small */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
* s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
|
|
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
|
|
if ((!s->server) &&
|
|
(s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
|
|
(s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
|
|
(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
|
|
s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
|
|
(s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
|
|
(s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback)
|
|
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
|
|
s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
|
|
s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
|
|
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
|
|
!s->s3->renegotiate) {
|
|
ssl3_renegotiate(s);
|
|
if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
|
|
i = s->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return (i);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
|
|
SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
|
|
if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
|
|
BIO *bio;
|
|
/*
|
|
* In the case where we try to read application data,
|
|
* but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
|
|
* the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
|
|
* cause nasty problems in the blocking world
|
|
*/
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
|
|
* again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
|
|
*/
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
|
|
* allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
|
|
* experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->server &&
|
|
SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
|
|
!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
|
|
(s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
|
|
(s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
|
|
(s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
|
|
(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
|
|
!(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
|
|
*/
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
|
|
int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
|
|
int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
|
|
|
|
s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback)
|
|
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
|
|
s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb = s->info_callback;
|
|
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL) {
|
|
j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
|
|
s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
|
|
if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
|
|
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
|
|
* renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
|
|
* alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
|
|
* presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
|
|
* future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
|
|
* the peer refused it where we carry on.
|
|
*/
|
|
else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
|
|
else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
|
|
char tmp[16];
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
|
|
BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
|
|
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
} else {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
|
|
* shutdown */
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
|
|
* what the record payload has to look like
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
|
|
(rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check we have a cipher to change to */
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
|
|
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback)
|
|
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
|
|
rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
|
|
if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
else
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) {
|
|
if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
|
|
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
|
|
#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences
|
|
* are not as expected (and because this is
|
|
* not really needed for clients except for
|
|
* detecting protocol violations): */
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server)
|
|
? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
|
|
#else
|
|
s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->renegotiate = 1;
|
|
s->new_session = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
i = s->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return (i);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
|
|
if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
|
|
BIO *bio;
|
|
/*
|
|
* In the case where we try to read application data, but we
|
|
* trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
|
|
* option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
|
|
* problems in the blocking world
|
|
*/
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (rr->type) {
|
|
default:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
|
|
/*
|
|
* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
|
|
* an unexpected message alert.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
|
|
case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
|
|
case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
|
|
/*
|
|
* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
|
|
* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
|
|
* happen when type != rr->type
|
|
*/
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
|
|
/*
|
|
* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
|
|
* application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
|
|
* (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
|
|
* application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
|
|
* started), we will indulge it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
|
|
(s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
|
|
(((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
|
|
(s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
|
|
(s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
|
|
) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
|
|
(s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
|
|
(s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
|
|
)
|
|
)) {
|
|
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
} else {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* not reached */
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
const char *sender;
|
|
int slen;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
|
|
i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
|
|
else
|
|
i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
|
|
if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
|
|
/* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
|
|
SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it
|
|
* before we read the finished message
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
|
|
sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
|
|
slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
|
|
} else {
|
|
sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
|
|
slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
|
|
sender, slen,
|
|
s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
|
|
desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
|
|
desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
|
|
* protocol_version alerts */
|
|
if (desc < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
/* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
|
|
if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
|
|
|
|
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
|
|
s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
|
|
s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
|
|
if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
|
|
return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
|
|
/*
|
|
* else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
|
|
* the future
|
|
*/
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
|
|
i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
|
|
if (i <= 0) {
|
|
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the
|
|
* message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not
|
|
* worry too much.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
|
|
(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback)
|
|
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
|
|
2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb = s->info_callback;
|
|
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL) {
|
|
j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return (i);
|
|
}
|