a09221f83c
(instead of just mitigating through connection limits) the Bleichenbacher attack which can lead to guessing of the server key (not host key) by regenerating it when an RSA failure is detected. Reviewed by: rwatson
1053 lines
30 KiB
C
1053 lines
30 KiB
C
/*
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* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
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* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
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* All rights reserved
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* Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the
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* login (authentication) dialog.
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*
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* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
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* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
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* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
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* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
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* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.8 2000/10/12 09:59:19 markus Exp $");
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RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/dsa.h>
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include "xmalloc.h"
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#include "rsa.h"
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#include "ssh.h"
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#include "buffer.h"
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#include "packet.h"
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#include "mpaux.h"
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#include "uidswap.h"
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#include "readconf.h"
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#include "key.h"
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#include "authfd.h"
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#include "sshconnect.h"
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#include "authfile.h"
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/* Session id for the current session. */
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unsigned char session_id[16];
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unsigned int supported_authentications = 0;
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extern Options options;
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extern char *__progname;
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/*
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* Checks if the user has an authentication agent, and if so, tries to
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* authenticate using the agent.
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*/
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int
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try_agent_authentication()
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{
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int type;
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char *comment;
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AuthenticationConnection *auth;
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unsigned char response[16];
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unsigned int i;
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int plen, clen;
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Key *key;
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BIGNUM *challenge;
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/* Get connection to the agent. */
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auth = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
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if (!auth)
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return 0;
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challenge = BN_new();
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key = key_new(KEY_RSA);
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/* Loop through identities served by the agent. */
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for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(auth, &comment, 1);
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key != NULL;
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key = ssh_get_next_identity(auth, &comment, 1)) {
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/* Try this identity. */
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debug("Trying RSA authentication via agent with '%.100s'", comment);
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xfree(comment);
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/* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
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packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
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packet_put_bignum(key->rsa->n);
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packet_send();
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packet_write_wait();
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/* Wait for server's response. */
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type = packet_read(&plen);
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/* The server sends failure if it doesn\'t like our key or
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does not support RSA authentication. */
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if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
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debug("Server refused our key.");
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key_free(key);
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continue;
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}
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/* Otherwise it should have sent a challenge. */
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if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
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packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d",
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type);
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packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen);
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packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type);
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debug("Received RSA challenge from server.");
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/* Ask the agent to decrypt the challenge. */
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if (!ssh_decrypt_challenge(auth, key, challenge, session_id, 1, response)) {
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/*
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* The agent failed to authenticate this identifier
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* although it advertised it supports this. Just
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* return a wrong value.
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*/
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log("Authentication agent failed to decrypt challenge.");
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memset(response, 0, sizeof(response));
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}
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key_free(key);
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debug("Sending response to RSA challenge.");
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/* Send the decrypted challenge back to the server. */
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packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
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for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
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packet_put_char(response[i]);
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packet_send();
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packet_write_wait();
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/* Wait for response from the server. */
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type = packet_read(&plen);
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/* The server returns success if it accepted the authentication. */
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if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
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BN_clear_free(challenge);
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debug("RSA authentication accepted by server.");
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return 1;
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}
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/* Otherwise it should return failure. */
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if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
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packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d",
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type);
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}
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BN_clear_free(challenge);
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debug("RSA authentication using agent refused.");
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Computes the proper response to a RSA challenge, and sends the response to
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* the server.
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*/
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void
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respond_to_rsa_challenge(BIGNUM * challenge, RSA * prv)
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{
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unsigned char buf[32], response[16];
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MD5_CTX md;
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int i, len;
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/* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */
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/* XXX think about Bleichenbacher, too */
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if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, prv) <= 0)
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packet_disconnect(
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"respond_to_rsa_challenge: rsa_private_decrypt failed");
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/* Compute the response. */
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/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
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len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
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if (len <= 0 || len > sizeof(buf))
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packet_disconnect(
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"respond_to_rsa_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len);
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memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
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BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + sizeof(buf) - len);
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MD5_Init(&md);
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MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
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MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
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MD5_Final(response, &md);
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debug("Sending response to host key RSA challenge.");
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/* Send the response back to the server. */
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packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
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for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
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packet_put_char(response[i]);
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packet_send();
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packet_write_wait();
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memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
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memset(response, 0, sizeof(response));
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memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
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}
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/*
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* Checks if the user has authentication file, and if so, tries to authenticate
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* the user using it.
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*/
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int
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try_rsa_authentication(const char *authfile)
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{
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BIGNUM *challenge;
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Key *public;
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Key *private;
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char *passphrase, *comment;
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int type, i;
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int plen, clen;
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/* Try to load identification for the authentication key. */
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public = key_new(KEY_RSA);
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if (!load_public_key(authfile, public, &comment)) {
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key_free(public);
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/* Could not load it. Fail. */
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return 0;
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}
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debug("Trying RSA authentication with key '%.100s'", comment);
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/* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
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packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
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packet_put_bignum(public->rsa->n);
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packet_send();
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packet_write_wait();
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/* We no longer need the public key. */
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key_free(public);
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/* Wait for server's response. */
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type = packet_read(&plen);
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/*
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* The server responds with failure if it doesn\'t like our key or
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* doesn\'t support RSA authentication.
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*/
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if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
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debug("Server refused our key.");
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xfree(comment);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */
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if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
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packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type);
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/* Get the challenge from the packet. */
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challenge = BN_new();
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packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen);
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packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type);
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debug("Received RSA challenge from server.");
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private = key_new(KEY_RSA);
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/*
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* Load the private key. Try first with empty passphrase; if it
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* fails, ask for a passphrase.
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*/
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if (!load_private_key(authfile, "", private, NULL)) {
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char buf[300];
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snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ",
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comment);
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if (!options.batch_mode)
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passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0);
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else {
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debug("Will not query passphrase for %.100s in batch mode.",
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comment);
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passphrase = xstrdup("");
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}
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/* Load the authentication file using the pasphrase. */
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if (!load_private_key(authfile, passphrase, private, NULL)) {
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memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
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xfree(passphrase);
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error("Bad passphrase.");
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/* Send a dummy response packet to avoid protocol error. */
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packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
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for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
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packet_put_char(0);
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packet_send();
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packet_write_wait();
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/* Expect the server to reject it... */
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packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
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xfree(comment);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Destroy the passphrase. */
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memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
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xfree(passphrase);
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}
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/* We no longer need the comment. */
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xfree(comment);
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/* Compute and send a response to the challenge. */
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respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, private->rsa);
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/* Destroy the private key. */
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key_free(private);
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/* We no longer need the challenge. */
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BN_clear_free(challenge);
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/* Wait for response from the server. */
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type = packet_read(&plen);
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if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
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debug("RSA authentication accepted by server.");
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return 1;
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}
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if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
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packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type);
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debug("RSA authentication refused.");
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Tries to authenticate the user using combined rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv
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* authentication and RSA host authentication.
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*/
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int
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try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(const char *local_user, RSA * host_key)
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{
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int type;
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BIGNUM *challenge;
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int plen, clen;
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debug("Trying rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication.");
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/* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
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packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
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packet_put_string(local_user, strlen(local_user));
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packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(host_key->n));
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packet_put_bignum(host_key->e);
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packet_put_bignum(host_key->n);
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packet_send();
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packet_write_wait();
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/* Wait for server's response. */
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type = packet_read(&plen);
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/* The server responds with failure if it doesn't admit our
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.rhosts authentication or doesn't know our host key. */
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if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
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debug("Server refused our rhosts authentication or host key.");
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return 0;
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}
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/* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */
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if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
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packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type);
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/* Get the challenge from the packet. */
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challenge = BN_new();
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packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen);
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packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type);
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debug("Received RSA challenge for host key from server.");
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/* Compute a response to the challenge. */
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respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, host_key);
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/* We no longer need the challenge. */
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BN_clear_free(challenge);
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/* Wait for response from the server. */
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type = packet_read(&plen);
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if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
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debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication accepted by server.");
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return 1;
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}
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if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
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packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type);
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debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication refused.");
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return 0;
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}
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#ifdef KRB4
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int
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try_krb4_authentication()
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{
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KTEXT_ST auth; /* Kerberos data */
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char *reply;
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char inst[INST_SZ];
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char *realm;
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CREDENTIALS cred;
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int r, type, plen;
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socklen_t slen;
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Key_schedule schedule;
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u_long checksum, cksum;
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MSG_DAT msg_data;
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struct sockaddr_in local, foreign;
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struct stat st;
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/* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */
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if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0)
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return 0;
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strncpy(inst, (char *) krb_get_phost(get_canonical_hostname()), INST_SZ);
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realm = (char *) krb_realmofhost(get_canonical_hostname());
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if (!realm) {
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debug("Kerberos V4: no realm for %s", get_canonical_hostname());
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return 0;
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}
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/* This can really be anything. */
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checksum = (u_long) getpid();
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r = krb_mk_req(&auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, inst, realm, checksum);
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if (r != KSUCCESS) {
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debug("Kerberos V4 krb_mk_req failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Get session key to decrypt the server's reply with. */
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r = krb_get_cred(KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, inst, realm, &cred);
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if (r != KSUCCESS) {
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debug("get_cred failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
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return 0;
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}
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des_key_sched((des_cblock *) cred.session, schedule);
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/* Send authentication info to server. */
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packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KRB4);
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packet_put_string((char *) auth.dat, auth.length);
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packet_send();
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packet_write_wait();
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/* Zero the buffer. */
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(void) memset(auth.dat, 0, MAX_KTXT_LEN);
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slen = sizeof(local);
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memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local));
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if (getsockname(packet_get_connection_in(),
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(struct sockaddr *) & local, &slen) < 0)
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debug("getsockname failed: %s", strerror(errno));
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slen = sizeof(foreign);
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memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign));
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if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
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(struct sockaddr *) & foreign, &slen) < 0) {
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debug("getpeername failed: %s", strerror(errno));
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fatal_cleanup();
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}
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/* Get server reply. */
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type = packet_read(&plen);
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switch (type) {
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case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE:
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/* Should really be SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KRB4_FAILURE */
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debug("Kerberos V4 authentication failed.");
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return 0;
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break;
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case SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KRB4_RESPONSE:
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/* SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KRB4_SUCCESS */
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debug("Kerberos V4 authentication accepted.");
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/* Get server's response. */
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reply = packet_get_string((unsigned int *) &auth.length);
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memcpy(auth.dat, reply, auth.length);
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xfree(reply);
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packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + auth.length, type);
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/*
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* If his response isn't properly encrypted with the session
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* key, and the decrypted checksum fails to match, he's
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* bogus. Bail out.
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*/
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r = krb_rd_priv(auth.dat, auth.length, schedule, &cred.session,
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&foreign, &local, &msg_data);
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if (r != KSUCCESS) {
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debug("Kerberos V4 krb_rd_priv failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
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packet_disconnect("Kerberos V4 challenge failed!");
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}
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/* Fetch the (incremented) checksum that we supplied in the request. */
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(void) memcpy((char *) &cksum, (char *) msg_data.app_data, sizeof(cksum));
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cksum = ntohl(cksum);
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/* If it matches, we're golden. */
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if (cksum == checksum + 1) {
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debug("Kerberos V4 challenge successful.");
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return 1;
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} else
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packet_disconnect("Kerberos V4 challenge failed!");
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break;
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default:
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packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos V4 response: %d", type);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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#endif /* KRB4 */
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#ifdef AFS
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int
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send_krb4_tgt()
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{
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CREDENTIALS *creds;
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char pname[ANAME_SZ], pinst[INST_SZ], prealm[REALM_SZ];
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int r, type, plen;
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char buffer[8192];
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struct stat st;
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/* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */
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if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0)
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return 0;
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creds = xmalloc(sizeof(*creds));
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if ((r = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, pname, pinst, prealm)) != KSUCCESS) {
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debug("Kerberos V4 tf_fullname failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
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return 0;
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}
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if ((r = krb_get_cred("krbtgt", prealm, prealm, creds)) != GC_OK) {
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debug("Kerberos V4 get_cred failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
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return 0;
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}
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if (time(0) > krb_life_to_time(creds->issue_date, creds->lifetime)) {
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debug("Kerberos V4 ticket expired: %s", TKT_FILE);
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return 0;
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}
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creds_to_radix(creds, (unsigned char *)buffer, sizeof buffer);
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xfree(creds);
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packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KRB4_TGT);
|
|
packet_put_string(buffer, strlen(buffer));
|
|
packet_send();
|
|
packet_write_wait();
|
|
|
|
type = packet_read(&plen);
|
|
|
|
if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
|
|
debug("Kerberos TGT for realm %s rejected.", prealm);
|
|
else if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
|
|
packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos TGT response: %d", type);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
send_afs_tokens(void)
|
|
{
|
|
CREDENTIALS creds;
|
|
struct ViceIoctl parms;
|
|
struct ClearToken ct;
|
|
int i, type, len, plen;
|
|
char buf[2048], *p, *server_cell;
|
|
char buffer[8192];
|
|
|
|
/* Move over ktc_GetToken, here's something leaner. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) { /* just in case */
|
|
parms.in = (char *) &i;
|
|
parms.in_size = sizeof(i);
|
|
parms.out = buf;
|
|
parms.out_size = sizeof(buf);
|
|
if (k_pioctl(0, VIOCGETTOK, &parms, 0) != 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
p = buf;
|
|
|
|
/* Get secret token. */
|
|
memcpy(&creds.ticket_st.length, p, sizeof(unsigned int));
|
|
if (creds.ticket_st.length > MAX_KTXT_LEN)
|
|
break;
|
|
p += sizeof(unsigned int);
|
|
memcpy(creds.ticket_st.dat, p, creds.ticket_st.length);
|
|
p += creds.ticket_st.length;
|
|
|
|
/* Get clear token. */
|
|
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
|
|
if (len != sizeof(struct ClearToken))
|
|
break;
|
|
p += sizeof(len);
|
|
memcpy(&ct, p, len);
|
|
p += len;
|
|
p += sizeof(len); /* primary flag */
|
|
server_cell = p;
|
|
|
|
/* Flesh out our credentials. */
|
|
strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof creds.service);
|
|
creds.instance[0] = '\0';
|
|
strlcpy(creds.realm, server_cell, REALM_SZ);
|
|
memcpy(creds.session, ct.HandShakeKey, DES_KEY_SZ);
|
|
creds.issue_date = ct.BeginTimestamp;
|
|
creds.lifetime = krb_time_to_life(creds.issue_date, ct.EndTimestamp);
|
|
creds.kvno = ct.AuthHandle;
|
|
snprintf(creds.pname, sizeof(creds.pname), "AFS ID %d", ct.ViceId);
|
|
creds.pinst[0] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
/* Encode token, ship it off. */
|
|
if (creds_to_radix(&creds, (unsigned char*) buffer, sizeof buffer) <= 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN);
|
|
packet_put_string(buffer, strlen(buffer));
|
|
packet_send();
|
|
packet_write_wait();
|
|
|
|
/* Roger, Roger. Clearance, Clarence. What's your vector,
|
|
Victor? */
|
|
type = packet_read(&plen);
|
|
|
|
if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
|
|
debug("AFS token for cell %s rejected.", server_cell);
|
|
else if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
|
|
packet_disconnect("Protocol error on AFS token response: %d", type);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* AFS */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Tries to authenticate with any string-based challenge/response system.
|
|
* Note that the client code is not tied to s/key or TIS.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
try_skey_authentication()
|
|
{
|
|
int type, i;
|
|
int payload_len;
|
|
unsigned int clen;
|
|
char *challenge, *response;
|
|
|
|
debug("Doing skey authentication.");
|
|
|
|
/* request a challenge */
|
|
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
|
|
packet_send();
|
|
packet_write_wait();
|
|
|
|
type = packet_read(&payload_len);
|
|
if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE &&
|
|
type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
|
|
packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response "
|
|
"to skey-auth", type);
|
|
}
|
|
if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
|
|
debug("No challenge for skey authentication.");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
challenge = packet_get_string(&clen);
|
|
packet_integrity_check(payload_len, (4 + clen), type);
|
|
if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
|
|
log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! "
|
|
"Reponse will be transmitted in clear text.");
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", challenge);
|
|
xfree(challenge);
|
|
fflush(stderr);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
|
|
if (i != 0)
|
|
error("Permission denied, please try again.");
|
|
response = read_passphrase("Response: ", 0);
|
|
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
|
|
packet_put_string(response, strlen(response));
|
|
memset(response, 0, strlen(response));
|
|
xfree(response);
|
|
packet_send();
|
|
packet_write_wait();
|
|
type = packet_read(&payload_len);
|
|
if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
|
|
packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response "
|
|
"to skey-auth-reponse", type);
|
|
}
|
|
/* failure */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Tries to authenticate with plain passwd authentication.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
try_password_authentication(char *prompt)
|
|
{
|
|
int type, i, payload_len;
|
|
char *password;
|
|
|
|
debug("Doing password authentication.");
|
|
if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
|
|
log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Password will be transmitted in clear text.");
|
|
for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
|
|
if (i != 0)
|
|
error("Permission denied, please try again.");
|
|
password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
|
|
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
|
|
packet_put_string(password, strlen(password));
|
|
memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
|
|
xfree(password);
|
|
packet_send();
|
|
packet_write_wait();
|
|
|
|
type = packet_read(&payload_len);
|
|
if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
|
|
packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to passwd auth", type);
|
|
}
|
|
/* failure */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* SSH1 key exchange
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
BIGNUM *key;
|
|
RSA *host_key;
|
|
RSA *public_key;
|
|
Key k;
|
|
int bits, rbits;
|
|
int ssh_cipher_default = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
|
|
unsigned char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char cookie[8];
|
|
unsigned int supported_ciphers;
|
|
unsigned int server_flags, client_flags;
|
|
int payload_len, clen, sum_len = 0;
|
|
u_int32_t rand = 0;
|
|
|
|
debug("Waiting for server public key.");
|
|
|
|
/* Wait for a public key packet from the server. */
|
|
packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
|
|
|
|
/* Get cookie from the packet. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
|
|
cookie[i] = packet_get_char();
|
|
|
|
/* Get the public key. */
|
|
public_key = RSA_new();
|
|
bits = packet_get_int();/* bits */
|
|
public_key->e = BN_new();
|
|
packet_get_bignum(public_key->e, &clen);
|
|
sum_len += clen;
|
|
public_key->n = BN_new();
|
|
packet_get_bignum(public_key->n, &clen);
|
|
sum_len += clen;
|
|
|
|
rbits = BN_num_bits(public_key->n);
|
|
if (bits != rbits) {
|
|
log("Warning: Server lies about size of server public key: "
|
|
"actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
|
|
log("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
|
|
}
|
|
/* Get the host key. */
|
|
host_key = RSA_new();
|
|
bits = packet_get_int();/* bits */
|
|
host_key->e = BN_new();
|
|
packet_get_bignum(host_key->e, &clen);
|
|
sum_len += clen;
|
|
host_key->n = BN_new();
|
|
packet_get_bignum(host_key->n, &clen);
|
|
sum_len += clen;
|
|
|
|
rbits = BN_num_bits(host_key->n);
|
|
if (bits != rbits) {
|
|
log("Warning: Server lies about size of server host key: "
|
|
"actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
|
|
log("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get protocol flags. */
|
|
server_flags = packet_get_int();
|
|
packet_set_protocol_flags(server_flags);
|
|
|
|
supported_ciphers = packet_get_int();
|
|
supported_authentications = packet_get_int();
|
|
|
|
debug("Received server public key (%d bits) and host key (%d bits).",
|
|
BN_num_bits(public_key->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->n));
|
|
|
|
packet_integrity_check(payload_len,
|
|
8 + 4 + sum_len + 0 + 4 + 0 + 0 + 4 + 4 + 4,
|
|
SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
|
|
k.type = KEY_RSA;
|
|
k.rsa = host_key;
|
|
check_host_key(host, hostaddr, &k,
|
|
options.user_hostfile, options.system_hostfile);
|
|
|
|
client_flags = SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER | SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN;
|
|
|
|
compute_session_id(session_id, cookie, host_key->n, public_key->n);
|
|
|
|
/* Generate a session key. */
|
|
arc4random_stir();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Generate an encryption key for the session. The key is a 256 bit
|
|
* random number, interpreted as a 32-byte key, with the least
|
|
* significant 8 bits being the first byte of the key.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
|
|
if (i % 4 == 0)
|
|
rand = arc4random();
|
|
session_key[i] = rand & 0xff;
|
|
rand >>= 8;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* According to the protocol spec, the first byte of the session key
|
|
* is the highest byte of the integer. The session key is xored with
|
|
* the first 16 bytes of the session id.
|
|
*/
|
|
key = BN_new();
|
|
BN_set_word(key, 0);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
|
|
BN_lshift(key, key, 8);
|
|
if (i < 16)
|
|
BN_add_word(key, session_key[i] ^ session_id[i]);
|
|
else
|
|
BN_add_word(key, session_key[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Encrypt the integer using the public key and host key of the
|
|
* server (key with smaller modulus first).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (BN_cmp(public_key->n, host_key->n) < 0) {
|
|
/* Public key has smaller modulus. */
|
|
if (BN_num_bits(host_key->n) <
|
|
BN_num_bits(public_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
|
|
fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: host_key %d < public_key %d + "
|
|
"SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
|
|
BN_num_bits(host_key->n),
|
|
BN_num_bits(public_key->n),
|
|
SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
|
|
}
|
|
rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, public_key);
|
|
rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Host key has smaller modulus (or they are equal). */
|
|
if (BN_num_bits(public_key->n) <
|
|
BN_num_bits(host_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
|
|
fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: public_key %d < host_key %d + "
|
|
"SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
|
|
BN_num_bits(public_key->n),
|
|
BN_num_bits(host_key->n),
|
|
SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
|
|
}
|
|
rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key);
|
|
rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, public_key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Destroy the public keys since we no longer need them. */
|
|
RSA_free(public_key);
|
|
RSA_free(host_key);
|
|
|
|
if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_ILLEGAL) {
|
|
log("No valid SSH1 cipher, using %.100s instead.",
|
|
cipher_name(ssh_cipher_default));
|
|
options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default;
|
|
} else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET) {
|
|
if (cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & supported_ciphers & (1 << ssh_cipher_default))
|
|
options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check that the selected cipher is supported. */
|
|
if (!(supported_ciphers & (1 << options.cipher)))
|
|
fatal("Selected cipher type %.100s not supported by server.",
|
|
cipher_name(options.cipher));
|
|
|
|
debug("Encryption type: %.100s", cipher_name(options.cipher));
|
|
|
|
/* Send the encrypted session key to the server. */
|
|
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
|
|
packet_put_char(options.cipher);
|
|
|
|
/* Send the cookie back to the server. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
|
|
packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
|
|
|
|
/* Send and destroy the encrypted encryption key integer. */
|
|
packet_put_bignum(key);
|
|
BN_clear_free(key);
|
|
|
|
/* Send protocol flags. */
|
|
packet_put_int(client_flags);
|
|
|
|
/* Send the packet now. */
|
|
packet_send();
|
|
packet_write_wait();
|
|
|
|
debug("Sent encrypted session key.");
|
|
|
|
/* Set the encryption key. */
|
|
packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, options.cipher);
|
|
|
|
/* We will no longer need the session key here. Destroy any extra copies. */
|
|
memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Expect a success message from the server. Note that this message
|
|
* will be received in encrypted form.
|
|
*/
|
|
packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
|
|
|
|
debug("Received encrypted confirmation.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Authenticate user
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
ssh_userauth(
|
|
const char* local_user,
|
|
const char* server_user,
|
|
char *host,
|
|
int host_key_valid, RSA *own_host_key)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, type;
|
|
int payload_len;
|
|
|
|
if (supported_authentications == 0)
|
|
fatal("ssh_userauth: server supports no auth methods");
|
|
|
|
/* Send the name of the user to log in as on the server. */
|
|
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_USER);
|
|
packet_put_string(server_user, strlen(server_user));
|
|
packet_send();
|
|
packet_write_wait();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The server should respond with success if no authentication is
|
|
* needed (the user has no password). Otherwise the server responds
|
|
* with failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
type = packet_read(&payload_len);
|
|
|
|
/* check whether the connection was accepted without authentication. */
|
|
if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
|
|
return;
|
|
if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
|
|
packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to SSH_CMSG_USER",
|
|
type);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef AFS
|
|
/* Try Kerberos tgt passing if the server supports it. */
|
|
if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_KRB4_TGT)) &&
|
|
options.krb4_tgt_passing) {
|
|
if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
|
|
log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Ticket will be transmitted in the clear!");
|
|
(void) send_krb4_tgt();
|
|
}
|
|
/* Try AFS token passing if the server supports it. */
|
|
if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN)) &&
|
|
options.afs_token_passing && k_hasafs()) {
|
|
if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
|
|
log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Token will be transmitted in the clear!");
|
|
send_afs_tokens();
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* AFS */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KRB4
|
|
if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_KRB4)) &&
|
|
options.krb4_authentication) {
|
|
debug("Trying Kerberos authentication.");
|
|
if (try_krb4_authentication()) {
|
|
/* The server should respond with success or failure. */
|
|
type = packet_read(&payload_len);
|
|
if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
|
|
return;
|
|
if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
|
|
packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to Kerberos auth", type);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* KRB4 */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KRB5
|
|
if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_KRB5)) &&
|
|
options.krb5_authentication){
|
|
krb5_context ssh_context = NULL;
|
|
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
|
|
|
|
debug("Trying Kerberos V5 authentication.");
|
|
|
|
if (try_krb5_authentication(&ssh_context, &auth_context)) {
|
|
type = packet_read(&payload_len);
|
|
if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
|
|
if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_KRB5_TGT)) &&
|
|
options.krb5_tgt_passing) {
|
|
if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
|
|
log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Ticket will be transmitted in the clear!");
|
|
send_krb5_tgt(ssh_context, auth_context);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_auth_con_free(ssh_context, auth_context);
|
|
krb5_free_context(ssh_context);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
|
|
packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to Kerberos5 auth", type);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* KRB5 */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Use rhosts authentication if running in privileged socket and we
|
|
* do not wish to remain anonymous.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS)) &&
|
|
options.rhosts_authentication) {
|
|
debug("Trying rhosts authentication.");
|
|
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS);
|
|
packet_put_string(local_user, strlen(local_user));
|
|
packet_send();
|
|
packet_write_wait();
|
|
|
|
/* The server should respond with success or failure. */
|
|
type = packet_read(&payload_len);
|
|
if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
|
|
return;
|
|
if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
|
|
packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to rhosts auth",
|
|
type);
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Try .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication with RSA host
|
|
* authentication.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA)) &&
|
|
options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && host_key_valid) {
|
|
if (try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(local_user, own_host_key))
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Try RSA authentication if the server supports it. */
|
|
if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA)) &&
|
|
options.rsa_authentication) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Try RSA authentication using the authentication agent. The
|
|
* agent is tried first because no passphrase is needed for
|
|
* it, whereas identity files may require passphrases.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (try_agent_authentication())
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* Try RSA authentication for each identity. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++)
|
|
if (try_rsa_authentication(options.identity_files[i]))
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Try skey authentication if the server supports it. */
|
|
if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS)) &&
|
|
options.skey_authentication && !options.batch_mode) {
|
|
if (try_skey_authentication())
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Try password authentication if the server supports it. */
|
|
if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD)) &&
|
|
options.password_authentication && !options.batch_mode) {
|
|
char prompt[80];
|
|
|
|
snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.40s's password: ",
|
|
server_user, host);
|
|
if (try_password_authentication(prompt))
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/* All authentication methods have failed. Exit with an error message. */
|
|
fatal("Permission denied.");
|
|
/* NOTREACHED */
|
|
}
|