119 lines
3.8 KiB
Groff
119 lines
3.8 KiB
Groff
.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
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.\" All rights reserved.
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.\"
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.\" This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Chris Costello
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.\" at Safeport Network Services and Network Associates Laboratories, the
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.\" Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
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.\" DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
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.\" DARPA CHATS research program.
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.\"
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.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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.\" are met:
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.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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.\"
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.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
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.\"
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.\" $FreeBSD$
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.Dd DECEMBER 8, 2002
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.Os
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.Dt MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS 4
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.Sh NAME
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.Nm mac_seeotheruids
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.Nd simple policy controlling whether users see other users
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.Sh SYNOPSIS
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To compile the mac_seeotheruids
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policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel
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configuration file:
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.Cd "options MAC"
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.Cd "options MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS"
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.Pp
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Alternately, to load the module at boot time, place the following line
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in your kernel configuration file:
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.Cd "options MAC"
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.Pp
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and in
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.Xr loader.conf.5 :
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.Cd mac_seeotheruids_load= Ns \&"YES"
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.Sh DESCRIPTION
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The
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.Nm
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policy module, when enabled, denies users to see processes or sockets owned
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by other users.
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.Pp
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To enable
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.Nm ,
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set the sysctl OID
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.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled
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to
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.Li 1 .
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.Pp
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To allow users to see processes and sockets owned by the same primary group,
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set the sysctl OID
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.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.primarygroup_enabled
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to
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.Li 1 .
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.Pp
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To allow processes with a specific group ID to be exempt from the policy,
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set the sysctl OID
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.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid_enabled
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to
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.Li 1 ,
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and
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.Va security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid
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to the gid to be exempted.
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.Ss Label Format
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No labels are defined for
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.Nm .
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.Sh SEE ALSO
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.Xr mac 4 ,
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.Xr mac_biba 4 ,
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.Xr mac_bsdextended 4 ,
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.Xr mac_ifoff 4 ,
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.Xr mac_lomac 4 ,
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.Xr mac_mls 4 ,
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.Xr mac_partition 4 ,
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.Xr mac_portacl 4 ,
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.Xr mac_none 4 ,
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.Xr mac_test 4 ,
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.Xr mac 9
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.Sh HISTORY
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The
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.Nm
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policy module first appeared in
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.Fx 5.0
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and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
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.Sh AUTHORS
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This software was contributed to the
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.Fx
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Project by Network Associates Labs,
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the Security Research Division of Network Associates
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Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
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as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
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.Sh BUGS
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See
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.Xr mac 9
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concerning appropriateness for production use.
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The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in
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.Fx .
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.Pp
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While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
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the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
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point checks.
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As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation,
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to protect against a malicious privileged user.
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