freebsd-nq/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/allow_other.cc
Alan Somers 61b0a927cb fusefs: use effective gid, not real gid, for FUSE operations
This is the gid used for stuff like setting the group of a newly created
file.

Reported by:	pjdfstest
Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation
2019-05-04 02:11:28 +00:00

307 lines
7.8 KiB
C++

/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD
*
* Copyright (c) 2019 The FreeBSD Foundation
*
* This software was developed by BFF Storage Systems, LLC under sponsorship
* from the FreeBSD Foundation.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* Tests for the "allow_other" mount option. They must be in their own
* file so they can be run as root
*/
extern "C" {
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/extattr.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
}
#include "mockfs.hh"
#include "utils.hh"
using namespace testing;
const static char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
const static char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
class NoAllowOther: public FuseTest {
public:
/* Unprivileged user id */
int m_uid;
virtual void SetUp() {
if (geteuid() != 0) {
GTEST_SKIP() << "This test must be run as root";
}
FuseTest::SetUp();
}
};
class AllowOther: public NoAllowOther {
public:
virtual void SetUp() {
m_allow_other = true;
NoAllowOther::SetUp();
}
};
TEST_F(AllowOther, allowed)
{
int status;
fork(true, &status, [&] {
uint64_t ino = 42;
expect_lookup(RELPATH, ino, S_IFREG | 0644, 0, 1);
expect_open(ino, 0, 1);
expect_flush(ino, 1, ReturnErrno(0));
expect_release(ino, FH);
}, []() {
int fd;
fd = open(FULLPATH, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("open");
return(1);
}
return 0;
}
);
ASSERT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
/* Check that fusefs uses the correct credentials for FUSE operations */
TEST_F(AllowOther, creds)
{
int status;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
get_unprivileged_id(&uid, &gid);
fork(true, &status, [=] {
EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process( ResultOf([=](auto in) {
return (in->header.opcode == FUSE_LOOKUP &&
in->header.uid == uid &&
in->header.gid == gid);
}, Eq(true)),
_)
).Times(1)
.WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT)));
}, []() {
eaccess(FULLPATH, F_OK);
return 0;
}
);
ASSERT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
/*
* A variation of the Open.multiple_creds test showing how the bug can lead to a
* privilege elevation. The first process is privileged and opens a file only
* visible to root. The second process is unprivileged and shouldn't be able
* to open the file, but does thanks to the bug
*/
TEST_F(AllowOther, privilege_escalation)
{
const static char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";
const static char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt";
int fd1, status;
const static uint64_t ino = 42;
const static uint64_t fh = 100;
/* Fork a child to open the file with different credentials */
fork(true, &status, [&] {
expect_lookup(RELPATH, ino, S_IFREG | 0600, 0, 2);
EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
ResultOf([=](auto in) {
return (in->header.opcode == FUSE_OPEN &&
in->header.pid == (uint32_t)getpid() &&
in->header.uid == (uint32_t)geteuid() &&
in->header.nodeid == ino);
}, Eq(true)),
_)
).WillOnce(Invoke(
ReturnImmediate([](auto in __unused, auto out) {
out->body.open.fh = fh;
out->header.len = sizeof(out->header);
SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, open);
})));
EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
ResultOf([=](auto in) {
return (in->header.opcode == FUSE_OPEN &&
in->header.pid != (uint32_t)getpid() &&
in->header.uid != (uint32_t)geteuid() &&
in->header.nodeid == ino);
}, Eq(true)),
_)
).Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(Invoke(ReturnErrno(EPERM)));
fd1 = open(FULLPATH, O_RDONLY);
EXPECT_LE(0, fd1) << strerror(errno);
}, [] {
int fd0;
fd0 = open(FULLPATH, O_RDONLY);
if (fd0 >= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Privilege escalation!\n");
return 1;
}
if (errno != EPERM) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected error %s\n",
strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
);
ASSERT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
/* Deliberately leak fd1. close(2) will be tested in release.cc */
}
TEST_F(NoAllowOther, disallowed)
{
int status;
fork(true, &status, [] {
}, []() {
int fd;
fd = open(FULLPATH, O_RDONLY);
if (fd >= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "open should've failed\n");
return(1);
} else if (errno != EPERM) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected error: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
return(1);
}
return 0;
}
);
ASSERT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
/*
* When -o allow_other is not used, users other than the owner aren't allowed
* to open anything inside of the mount point, not just the mountpoint itself
* This is a regression test for bug 237052
*/
TEST_F(NoAllowOther, disallowed_beneath_root)
{
const static char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_dir";
const static char RELPATH[] = "some_dir";
const static char RELPATH2[] = "other_dir";
const static uint64_t ino = 42;
const static uint64_t ino2 = 43;
int dfd, status;
expect_lookup(RELPATH, ino, S_IFDIR | 0755, 0, 1);
EXPECT_LOOKUP(ino, RELPATH2)
.WillRepeatedly(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto out) {
SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, entry);
out->body.entry.attr.mode = S_IFREG | 0644;
out->body.entry.nodeid = ino2;
out->body.entry.attr.nlink = 1;
out->body.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
})));
expect_opendir(ino);
dfd = open(FULLPATH, O_DIRECTORY);
ASSERT_LE(0, dfd) << strerror(errno);
fork(true, &status, [] {
}, [&]() {
int fd;
fd = openat(dfd, RELPATH2, O_RDONLY);
if (fd >= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "openat should've failed\n");
return(1);
} else if (errno != EPERM) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected error: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
return(1);
}
return 0;
}
);
ASSERT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
/*
* Provide coverage for the extattr methods, which have a slightly different
* code path
*/
TEST_F(NoAllowOther, setextattr)
{
int ino = 42, status;
fork(true, &status, [&] {
EXPECT_LOOKUP(1, RELPATH)
.WillOnce(Invoke(
ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto out) {
SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, entry);
out->body.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
out->body.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX;
out->body.entry.attr.mode = S_IFREG | 0644;
out->body.entry.nodeid = ino;
})));
/*
* lookup the file to get it into the cache.
* Otherwise, the unprivileged lookup will fail with
* EACCES
*/
ASSERT_EQ(0, access(FULLPATH, F_OK)) << strerror(errno);
}, [&]() {
const char value[] = "whatever";
ssize_t value_len = strlen(value) + 1;
int ns = EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_USER;
ssize_t r;
r = extattr_set_file(FULLPATH, ns, "foo",
(void*)value, value_len);
if (r >= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "should've failed\n");
return(1);
} else if (errno != EPERM) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected error: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
return(1);
}
return 0;
}
);
ASSERT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
}