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c031391bd5
freebsd-nq/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
Robert Watson 177142e458 Pass active_cred and file_cred into the MAC framework explicitly 
for mac_check_vnode_{poll,read,stat,write}().  Pass in fp->f_cred
when calling these checks with a struct file available.  Otherwise,
pass NOCRED.  All currently MAC policies use active_cred, but
could now offer the cached credential semantic used for the base
system security model.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00

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/*-
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Robert N. M. Watson
* Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
*
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by NAI Labs,
* the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
* DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA
* CHATS research program.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $FreeBSD$
*/
/*
* Userland/kernel interface for Mandatory Access Control.
*
* The POSIX.1e implementation page may be reached at:
* http://www.trustedbsd.org/
*/
#ifndef _SYS_MAC_H
#define _SYS_MAC_H
#include <sys/_label.h>
#ifndef _POSIX_MAC
#define _POSIX_MAC
#endif
/*
* XXXMAC: The single MAC extended attribute will be deprecated once
* compound EA writes on a single target file can be performed cleanly
* with UFS2.
*/
#define FREEBSD_MAC_EXTATTR_NAME "freebsd.mac"
#define FREEBSD_MAC_EXTATTR_NAMESPACE EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM
/*
* MAC framework-related constants and limits.
*/
#define MAC_MAX_POLICY_NAME 32
/*
* XXXMAC: Per-policy structures will be moved from mac.h to per-policy
* include files once the revised user interface is available.
*/
/*
* Structures and constants associated with a Biba Integrity policy.
* mac_biba represents a Biba label, with mb_type determining its properties,
* and mb_grade represents the hierarchal grade if valid for the current
* mb_type. These structures will move to mac_biba.h once we have dymamic
* labels exposed to userland.
*/
struct mac_biba_element {
u_short mbe_type;
u_short mbe_grade;
};
/*
* Biba labels consist of two components: a single label, and a label
* range. Depending on the context, one or both may be used; the mb_flags
* field permits the provider to indicate what fields are intended for
* use.
*/
struct mac_biba {
int mb_flags;
struct mac_biba_element mb_single;
struct mac_biba_element mb_rangelow, mb_rangehigh;
};
/*
* Structures and constants associated with a Multi-Level Security policy.
* mac_mls represents an MLS label, with mm_type determining its properties,
* and mm_level represents the hierarchal sensitivity level if valid for the
* current mm_type. These structures will move to mac_mls.h once we have
* dynamic labels exposed to userland.
*/
struct mac_mls_element {
u_short mme_type;
u_short mme_level;
};
/*
* MLS labels consist of two components: a single label, and a label
* range. Depending on the context, one or both may be used; the mb_flags
* field permits the provider to indicate what fields are intended for
* use.
*/
struct mac_mls {
int mm_flags;
struct mac_mls_element mm_single;
struct mac_mls_element mm_rangelow, mm_rangehigh;
};
/*
* Structures and constants associated with a Type Enforcement policy.
* mac_te represents a Type Enforcement label.
*/
#define MAC_TE_TYPE_MAXLEN 32
struct mac_te {
char mt_type[MAC_TE_TYPE_MAXLEN+1]; /* TE type */
};
struct mac_sebsd {
uint32_t ms_psid; /* persistent sid storage */
};
/*
* Composite structures and constants which combine the various policy
* elements into common structures to be associated with subjects and
* objects.
*/
struct mac {
int m_macflags;
struct mac_biba m_biba;
struct mac_mls m_mls;
struct mac_te m_te;
struct mac_sebsd m_sebsd;
};
typedef struct mac *mac_t;
#define MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED 0x00000001 /* Is initialized. */
#ifndef _KERNEL
/*
* POSIX.1e functions visible in the application namespace.
*/
int mac_dominate(const mac_t _labela, const mac_t _labelb);
int mac_equal(const mac_t labela, const mac_t _labelb);
int mac_free(void *_buf_p);
mac_t mac_from_text(const char *_text_p);
mac_t mac_get_fd(int _fildes);
mac_t mac_get_file(const char *_path_p);
mac_t mac_get_proc(void);
mac_t mac_glb(const mac_t _labela, const mac_t _labelb);
mac_t mac_lub(const mac_t _labela, const mac_t _labelb);
int mac_set_fd(int _fildes, const mac_t _label);
int mac_set_file(const char *_path_p, mac_t _label);
int mac_set_proc(const mac_t _label);
ssize_t mac_size(mac_t _label);
char * mac_to_text(const mac_t _label, size_t *_len_p);
int mac_valid(const mac_t _label);
/*
* Extensions to POSIX.1e visible in the application namespace.
*/
int mac_is_present_np(const char *_policyname);
int mac_syscall(const char *_policyname, int call, void *arg);
/*
* System calls wrapped by some POSIX.1e functions.
*/
int __mac_get_fd(int _fd, struct mac *_mac_p);
int __mac_get_file(const char *_path_p, struct mac *_mac_p);
int __mac_get_proc(struct mac *_mac_p);
int __mac_set_fd(int fd, struct mac *_mac_p);
int __mac_set_file(const char *_path_p, struct mac *_mac_p);
int __mac_set_proc(struct mac *_mac_p);
#else /* _KERNEL */
/*
* Kernel functions to manage and evaluate labels.
*/
struct bpf_d;
struct componentname;
struct devfs_dirent;
struct ifnet;
struct ifreq;
struct ipq;
struct mbuf;
struct mount;
struct proc;
struct sockaddr;
struct socket;
struct pipe;
struct timespec;
struct ucred;
struct uio;
struct vattr;
struct vnode;
#include <sys/acl.h> /* XXX acl_type_t */
struct vop_refreshlabel_args;
struct vop_setlabel_args;
/*
* Label operations.
*/
void mac_init_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *);
void mac_init_cred(struct ucred *);
void mac_init_devfsdirent(struct devfs_dirent *);
void mac_init_ifnet(struct ifnet *);
void mac_init_ipq(struct ipq *);
void mac_init_socket(struct socket *);
void mac_init_pipe(struct pipe *);
int mac_init_mbuf(struct mbuf *m, int how);
void mac_init_mount(struct mount *);
void mac_init_vnode(struct vnode *);
void mac_destroy_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *);
void mac_destroy_cred(struct ucred *);
void mac_destroy_devfsdirent(struct devfs_dirent *);
void mac_destroy_ifnet(struct ifnet *);
void mac_destroy_ipq(struct ipq *);
void mac_destroy_socket(struct socket *);
void mac_destroy_pipe(struct pipe *);
void mac_destroy_mbuf(struct mbuf *);
void mac_destroy_mount(struct mount *);
void mac_destroy_vnode(struct vnode *);
/*
* Labeling event operations: file system objects, and things that
* look a lot like file system objects.
*/
void mac_create_devfs_device(dev_t dev, struct devfs_dirent *de);
void mac_create_devfs_directory(char *dirname, int dirnamelen,
struct devfs_dirent *de);
void mac_create_devfs_vnode(struct devfs_dirent *de, struct vnode *vp);
void mac_create_vnode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *parent,
struct vnode *child);
void mac_create_mount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp);
void mac_create_root_mount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp);
void mac_relabel_vnode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *newlabel);
void mac_update_devfsdirent(struct devfs_dirent *de, struct vnode *vp);
void mac_update_procfsvnode(struct vnode *vp, struct ucred *cred);
void mac_update_vnode_from_mount(struct vnode *vp, struct mount *mp);
/*
* Labeling event operations: IPC objects.
*/
void mac_create_mbuf_from_socket(struct socket *so, struct mbuf *m);
void mac_create_socket(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket);
void mac_create_socket_from_socket(struct socket *oldsocket,
struct socket *newsocket);
void mac_set_socket_peer_from_mbuf(struct mbuf *mbuf,
struct socket *socket);
void mac_set_socket_peer_from_socket(struct socket *oldsocket,
struct socket *newsocket);
void mac_create_pipe(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe);
/*
* Labeling event operations: network objects.
*/
void mac_create_bpfdesc(struct ucred *cred, struct bpf_d *bpf_d);
void mac_create_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifp);
void mac_create_ipq(struct mbuf *fragment, struct ipq *ipq);
void mac_create_datagram_from_ipq(struct ipq *ipq, struct mbuf *datagram);
void mac_create_fragment(struct mbuf *datagram, struct mbuf *fragment);
void mac_create_mbuf_from_mbuf(struct mbuf *oldmbuf, struct mbuf *newmbuf);
void mac_create_mbuf_linklayer(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct mbuf *m);
void mac_create_mbuf_from_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *bpf_d, struct mbuf *m);
void mac_create_mbuf_from_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct mbuf *m);
void mac_create_mbuf_multicast_encap(struct mbuf *oldmbuf,
struct ifnet *ifnet, struct mbuf *newmbuf);
void mac_create_mbuf_netlayer(struct mbuf *oldmbuf, struct mbuf *newmbuf);
int mac_fragment_match(struct mbuf *fragment, struct ipq *ipq);
void mac_update_ipq(struct mbuf *fragment, struct ipq *ipq);
/*
* Labeling event operations: processes.
*/
void mac_create_cred(struct ucred *cred_parent, struct ucred *cred_child);
void mac_execve_transition(struct ucred *old, struct ucred *new,
struct vnode *vp);
int mac_execve_will_transition(struct ucred *old, struct vnode *vp);
void mac_create_proc0(struct ucred *cred);
void mac_create_proc1(struct ucred *cred);
/* Access control checks. */
int mac_check_bpfdesc_receive(struct bpf_d *bpf_d, struct ifnet *ifnet);
int mac_check_cred_visible(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2);
int mac_check_ifnet_transmit(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct mbuf *m);
int mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp);
int mac_check_pipe_ioctl(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
unsigned long cmd, void *data);
int mac_check_pipe_poll(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe);
int mac_check_pipe_read(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe);
int mac_check_pipe_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe);
int mac_check_pipe_write(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe);
int mac_check_proc_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc);
int mac_check_proc_sched(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc);
int mac_check_proc_signal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc,
int signum);
int mac_check_socket_bind(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct sockaddr *sockaddr);
int mac_check_socket_connect(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct sockaddr *sockaddr);
int mac_check_socket_deliver(struct socket *so, struct mbuf *m);
int mac_check_socket_listen(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so);
int mac_check_socket_visible(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so);
int mac_check_vnode_access(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
int flags);
int mac_check_vnode_chdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp);
int mac_check_vnode_chroot(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp);
int mac_check_vnode_create(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct componentname *cnp, struct vattr *vap);
int mac_check_vnode_delete(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct vnode *vp, struct componentname *cnp);
int mac_check_vnode_deleteacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
acl_type_t type);
int mac_check_vnode_exec(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp);
int mac_check_vnode_getacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
acl_type_t type);
int mac_check_vnode_getextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
int attrnamespace, const char *name, struct uio *uio);
int mac_check_vnode_lookup(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct componentname *cnp);
/* XXX This u_char should be vm_prot_t! */
u_char mac_check_vnode_mmap_prot(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
int newmapping);
int mac_check_vnode_open(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
mode_t acc_mode);
int mac_check_vnode_poll(struct ucred *active_cred,
struct ucred *file_cred, struct vnode *vp);
int mac_check_vnode_read(struct ucred *active_cred,
struct ucred *file_cred, struct vnode *vp);
int mac_check_vnode_readdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp);
int mac_check_vnode_readlink(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp);
int mac_check_vnode_rename_from(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct vnode *vp, struct componentname *cnp);
int mac_check_vnode_rename_to(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct vnode *vp, int samedir, struct componentname *cnp);
int mac_check_vnode_revoke(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp);
int mac_check_vnode_setacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
acl_type_t type, struct acl *acl);
int mac_check_vnode_setextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
int attrnamespace, const char *name, struct uio *uio);
int mac_check_vnode_setflags(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
u_long flags);
int mac_check_vnode_setmode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
mode_t mode);
int mac_check_vnode_setowner(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
uid_t uid, gid_t gid);
int mac_check_vnode_setutimes(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct timespec atime, struct timespec mtime);
int mac_check_vnode_stat(struct ucred *active_cred,
struct ucred *file_cred, struct vnode *vp);
int mac_check_vnode_write(struct ucred *active_cred,
struct ucred *file_cred, struct vnode *vp);
int mac_getsockopt_label_get(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct mac *extmac);
int mac_getsockopt_peerlabel_get(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct mac *extmac);
int mac_ioctl_ifnet_get(struct ucred *cred, struct ifreq *ifr,
struct ifnet *ifnet);
int mac_ioctl_ifnet_set(struct ucred *cred, struct ifreq *ifr,
struct ifnet *ifnet);
int mac_setsockopt_label_set(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct mac *extmac);
int mac_pipe_label_set(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
struct label *label);
/*
* Calls to help various file systems implement labeling functionality
* using their existing EA implementation.
*/
int vop_stdcreatevnode_ea(struct vnode *dvp, struct vnode *tvp,
struct ucred *cred);
int vop_stdrefreshlabel_ea(struct vop_refreshlabel_args *ap);
int vop_stdsetlabel_ea(struct vop_setlabel_args *ap);
#endif /* _KERNEL */
#endif /* !_SYS_MAC_H */
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