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I edited the original change to retain the use of arc4random() as a seed for the hashing as a very basic defense against intentional lagg port selection. The author's original commit message (edited slightly): sys/net/ieee8023ad_lacp.c sys/net/if_lagg.c In lagg_hashmbuf, use the FNV hash instead of the old hash32_buf. The hash32 family of functions operate one octet at a time, and when run on a string s of length n, their output is equivalent to : ----- i=n-1 \ n \ (n-i-1) 32 ( seed^ + / 33^ * s[i] ) % 2^ / ----- i=0 The problem is that the last five bytes of input don't get multiplied by sufficiently many powers of 33 to rollover 2^32. That means that changing the last few bytes (but obviously not the very last) of input will always change the value of the hash by a multiple of 33. In the case of lagg_hashmbuf() with ipv4 input, the last four bytes are the TCP or UDP port numbers. Since the output of lagg_hashmbuf is always taken modulo the port count, and 3 is a common port count for a lagg, that's bad. It means that the UDP or TCP source port will never affect which lagg member is selected on a 3-port lagg. At 10Gbps, I was not able to measure any difference in CPU consumption between the old and new hash. Submitted by: asomers (original commit) Reviewed by: emaste, glebius MFC after: 1 week Sponsored by: Spectra Logic MFSpectraBSD: 1001723 on 2013/08/28 (original) 1114258 on 2015/01/22 (edit)