freebsd-nq/sys/netinet6/ah_aesxcbcmac.c
Colin Percival 1fcc990954 Correct a buffer overflow which can occur when decompressing a
carefully crafted deflated data stream. [1]

Correct problems in the AES-XCBC-MAC IPsec authentication algorithm. [2]

Submitted by:	suz [2]
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-05:18.zlib [1], FreeBSD-SA-05:19.ipsec [2]
2005-07-27 08:41:17 +00:00

193 lines
5.6 KiB
C

/* $KAME: ah_aesxcbcmac.c,v 1.6 2003/07/22 02:30:54 itojun Exp $ */
/*-
* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 2003 WIDE Project.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $FreeBSD$
*/
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/queue.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/syslog.h>
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet6/ipsec.h>
#include <netinet6/ah.h>
#include <netinet6/ah_aesxcbcmac.h>
#include <netkey/key.h>
#include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael.h>
#include <net/net_osdep.h>
#define AES_BLOCKSIZE 16
typedef struct {
u_int8_t e[AES_BLOCKSIZE];
u_int8_t buf[AES_BLOCKSIZE];
size_t buflen;
u_int32_t r_k1s[(RIJNDAEL_MAXNR+1)*4];
u_int32_t r_k2s[(RIJNDAEL_MAXNR+1)*4];
u_int32_t r_k3s[(RIJNDAEL_MAXNR+1)*4];
int r_nr; /* key-length-dependent number of rounds */
u_int8_t k2[AES_BLOCKSIZE];
u_int8_t k3[AES_BLOCKSIZE];
} aesxcbc_ctx;
int
ah_aes_xcbc_mac_init(state, sav)
struct ah_algorithm_state *state;
struct secasvar *sav;
{
u_int8_t k1seed[AES_BLOCKSIZE] = { 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 };
u_int8_t k2seed[AES_BLOCKSIZE] = { 2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2 };
u_int8_t k3seed[AES_BLOCKSIZE] = { 3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3 };
u_int32_t r_ks[(RIJNDAEL_MAXNR+1)*4];
aesxcbc_ctx *ctx;
u_int8_t k1[AES_BLOCKSIZE];
if (!state)
panic("ah_aes_xcbc_mac_init: what?");
state->sav = sav;
state->foo = (void *)malloc(sizeof(aesxcbc_ctx), M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT);
if (!state->foo)
return ENOBUFS;
bzero(state->foo, sizeof(aesxcbc_ctx));
ctx = (aesxcbc_ctx *)state->foo;
if ((ctx->r_nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(r_ks,
(char *)_KEYBUF(sav->key_auth), AES_BLOCKSIZE * 8)) == 0)
return -1;
rijndaelEncrypt(r_ks, ctx->r_nr, k1seed, k1);
rijndaelEncrypt(r_ks, ctx->r_nr, k2seed, ctx->k2);
rijndaelEncrypt(r_ks, ctx->r_nr, k3seed, ctx->k3);
if (rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ctx->r_k1s, k1, AES_BLOCKSIZE * 8) == 0)
return -1;
if (rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ctx->r_k2s, ctx->k2, AES_BLOCKSIZE * 8) == 0)
return -1;
if (rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ctx->r_k3s, ctx->k3, AES_BLOCKSIZE * 8) == 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
void
ah_aes_xcbc_mac_loop(state, addr, len)
struct ah_algorithm_state *state;
u_int8_t *addr;
size_t len;
{
u_int8_t buf[AES_BLOCKSIZE];
aesxcbc_ctx *ctx;
u_int8_t *ep;
int i;
if (!state || !state->foo)
panic("ah_aes_xcbc_mac_loop: what?");
ctx = (aesxcbc_ctx *)state->foo;
ep = addr + len;
if (ctx->buflen == sizeof(ctx->buf)) {
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ctx->e); i++)
ctx->buf[i] ^= ctx->e[i];
rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->r_k1s, ctx->r_nr, ctx->buf, ctx->e);
ctx->buflen = 0;
}
if (ctx->buflen + len < sizeof(ctx->buf)) {
bcopy(addr, ctx->buf + ctx->buflen, len);
ctx->buflen += len;
return;
}
if (ctx->buflen && ctx->buflen + len > sizeof(ctx->buf)) {
bcopy(addr, ctx->buf + ctx->buflen,
sizeof(ctx->buf) - ctx->buflen);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ctx->e); i++)
ctx->buf[i] ^= ctx->e[i];
rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->r_k1s, ctx->r_nr, ctx->buf, ctx->e);
addr += sizeof(ctx->buf) - ctx->buflen;
ctx->buflen = 0;
}
/* due to the special processing for M[n], "=" case is not included */
while (addr + AES_BLOCKSIZE < ep) {
bcopy(addr, buf, AES_BLOCKSIZE);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++)
buf[i] ^= ctx->e[i];
rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->r_k1s, ctx->r_nr, buf, ctx->e);
addr += AES_BLOCKSIZE;
}
if (addr < ep) {
bcopy(addr, ctx->buf + ctx->buflen, ep - addr);
ctx->buflen += ep - addr;
}
}
void
ah_aes_xcbc_mac_result(state, addr, l)
struct ah_algorithm_state *state;
u_int8_t *addr;
size_t l;
{
u_char digest[AES_BLOCKSIZE];
aesxcbc_ctx *ctx;
int i;
ctx = (aesxcbc_ctx *)state->foo;
if (ctx->buflen == sizeof(ctx->buf)) {
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ctx->buf); i++) {
ctx->buf[i] ^= ctx->e[i];
ctx->buf[i] ^= ctx->k2[i];
}
rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->r_k1s, ctx->r_nr, ctx->buf, digest);
} else {
for (i = ctx->buflen; i < sizeof(ctx->buf); i++)
ctx->buf[i] = (i == ctx->buflen) ? 0x80 : 0x00;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ctx->buf); i++) {
ctx->buf[i] ^= ctx->e[i];
ctx->buf[i] ^= ctx->k3[i];
}
rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->r_k1s, ctx->r_nr, ctx->buf, digest);
}
bcopy(digest, addr, sizeof(digest) > l ? l : sizeof(digest));
free(state->foo, M_TEMP);
}