freebsd-nq/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c
Robert Watson a9d2f8d84f Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD
kernel for FreeBSD 9.0:

Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system
call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file
descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *.  With options
CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability
protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op.

Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve
information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory
map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by
narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar
purposes with file permissions.

In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability
mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there.
This will follow in a later commit.

Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become
CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they
represent.

Approved by:	re (bz)
Submitted by:	jonathan
Sponsored by:	Google Inc
2011-08-11 12:30:23 +00:00

913 lines
18 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 1999-2005 Apple Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of
* its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
* IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/filedesc.h>
#include <sys/ipc.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/protosw.h>
#include <sys/domain.h>
#include <sys/sbuf.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
#include <security/audit/audit.h>
#include <security/audit/audit_private.h>
/*
* Calls to manipulate elements of the audit record structure from system
* call code. Macro wrappers will prevent this functions from being entered
* if auditing is disabled, avoiding the function call cost. We check the
* thread audit record pointer anyway, as the audit condition could change,
* and pre-selection may not have allocated an audit record for this event.
*
* XXXAUDIT: Should we assert, in each case, that this field of the record
* hasn't already been filled in?
*/
void
audit_arg_addr(void *addr)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_addr = addr;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ADDR);
}
void
audit_arg_exit(int status, int retval)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_exitstatus = status;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_exitretval = retval;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_EXIT);
}
void
audit_arg_len(int len)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_len = len;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_LEN);
}
void
audit_arg_atfd1(int atfd)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_atfd1 = atfd;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ATFD1);
}
void
audit_arg_atfd2(int atfd)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_atfd2 = atfd;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ATFD2);
}
void
audit_arg_fd(int fd)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fd = fd;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_FD);
}
void
audit_arg_fflags(int fflags)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags = fflags;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_FFLAGS);
}
void
audit_arg_gid(gid_t gid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_gid = gid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_GID);
}
void
audit_arg_uid(uid_t uid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_uid = uid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UID);
}
void
audit_arg_egid(gid_t egid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_egid = egid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_EGID);
}
void
audit_arg_euid(uid_t euid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_euid = euid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_EUID);
}
void
audit_arg_rgid(gid_t rgid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rgid = rgid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_RGID);
}
void
audit_arg_ruid(uid_t ruid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ruid = ruid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_RUID);
}
void
audit_arg_sgid(gid_t sgid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sgid = sgid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SGID);
}
void
audit_arg_suid(uid_t suid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_suid = suid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SUID);
}
void
audit_arg_groupset(gid_t *gidset, u_int gidset_size)
{
u_int i;
struct kaudit_record *ar;
KASSERT(gidset_size <= ngroups_max + 1,
("audit_arg_groupset: gidset_size > (kern.ngroups + 1)"));
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_groups.gidset == NULL)
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_groups.gidset = malloc(
sizeof(gid_t) * gidset_size, M_AUDITGIDSET, M_WAITOK);
for (i = 0; i < gidset_size; i++)
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_groups.gidset[i] = gidset[i];
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_groups.gidset_size = gidset_size;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_GROUPSET);
}
void
audit_arg_login(char *login)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
strlcpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_login, login, MAXLOGNAME);
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_LOGIN);
}
void
audit_arg_ctlname(int *name, int namelen)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
bcopy(name, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ctlname, namelen * sizeof(int));
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_len = namelen;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_CTLNAME | ARG_LEN);
}
void
audit_arg_mask(int mask)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mask = mask;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_MASK);
}
void
audit_arg_mode(mode_t mode)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mode = mode;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_MODE);
}
void
audit_arg_dev(int dev)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_dev = dev;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_DEV);
}
void
audit_arg_value(long value)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_value = value;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_VALUE);
}
void
audit_arg_owner(uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_uid = uid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_gid = gid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UID | ARG_GID);
}
void
audit_arg_pid(pid_t pid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pid = pid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_PID);
}
void
audit_arg_process(struct proc *p)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
struct ucred *cred;
KASSERT(p != NULL, ("audit_arg_process: p == NULL"));
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
cred = p->p_ucred;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = cred->cr_audit.ai_auid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_euid = cred->cr_uid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_egid = cred->cr_groups[0];
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ruid = cred->cr_ruid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rgid = cred->cr_rgid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = cred->cr_audit.ai_asid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr = cred->cr_audit.ai_termid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pid = p->p_pid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID | ARG_EUID | ARG_EGID | ARG_RUID |
ARG_RGID | ARG_ASID | ARG_TERMID_ADDR | ARG_PID | ARG_PROCESS);
}
void
audit_arg_signum(u_int signum)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_signum = signum;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SIGNUM);
}
void
audit_arg_socket(int sodomain, int sotype, int soprotocol)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_domain = sodomain;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_type = sotype;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_protocol = soprotocol;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SOCKINFO);
}
void
audit_arg_sockaddr(struct thread *td, struct sockaddr *sa)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
KASSERT(td != NULL, ("audit_arg_sockaddr: td == NULL"));
KASSERT(sa != NULL, ("audit_arg_sockaddr: sa == NULL"));
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
bcopy(sa, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockaddr, sa->sa_len);
switch (sa->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SADDRINET);
break;
case AF_INET6:
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SADDRINET6);
break;
case AF_UNIX:
audit_arg_upath1(td, ((struct sockaddr_un *)sa)->sun_path);
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SADDRUNIX);
break;
/* XXXAUDIT: default:? */
}
}
void
audit_arg_auid(uid_t auid)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = auid;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID);
}
void
audit_arg_auditinfo(struct auditinfo *au_info)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = au_info->ai_auid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = au_info->ai_asid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_success = au_info->ai_mask.am_success;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_failure = au_info->ai_mask.am_failure;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid.port = au_info->ai_termid.port;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid.machine = au_info->ai_termid.machine;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID | ARG_ASID | ARG_AMASK | ARG_TERMID);
}
void
audit_arg_auditinfo_addr(struct auditinfo_addr *au_info)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = au_info->ai_auid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = au_info->ai_asid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_success = au_info->ai_mask.am_success;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_failure = au_info->ai_mask.am_failure;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_type = au_info->ai_termid.at_type;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_port = au_info->ai_termid.at_port;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_addr[0] = au_info->ai_termid.at_addr[0];
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_addr[1] = au_info->ai_termid.at_addr[1];
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_addr[2] = au_info->ai_termid.at_addr[2];
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid_addr.at_addr[3] = au_info->ai_termid.at_addr[3];
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID | ARG_ASID | ARG_AMASK | ARG_TERMID_ADDR);
}
void
audit_arg_text(char *text)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
KASSERT(text != NULL, ("audit_arg_text: text == NULL"));
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
/* Invalidate the text string */
ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_TEXT);
if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text == NULL)
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITTEXT,
M_WAITOK);
strncpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text, text, MAXPATHLEN);
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_TEXT);
}
void
audit_arg_cmd(int cmd)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_cmd = cmd;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_CMD);
}
void
audit_arg_svipc_cmd(int cmd)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_cmd = cmd;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_CMD);
}
void
audit_arg_svipc_perm(struct ipc_perm *perm)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
bcopy(perm, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_perm,
sizeof(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_perm));
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_PERM);
}
void
audit_arg_svipc_id(int id)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_id = id;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_ID);
}
void
audit_arg_svipc_addr(void * addr)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_addr = addr;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_ADDR);
}
void
audit_arg_posix_ipc_perm(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pipc_perm.pipc_uid = uid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pipc_perm.pipc_gid = gid;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pipc_perm.pipc_mode = mode;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_POSIX_IPC_PERM);
}
void
audit_arg_auditon(union auditon_udata *udata)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
bcopy((void *)udata, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auditon,
sizeof(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auditon));
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUDITON);
}
/*
* Audit information about a file, either the file's vnode info, or its
* socket address info.
*/
void
audit_arg_file(struct proc *p, struct file *fp)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
struct socket *so;
struct inpcb *pcb;
struct vnode *vp;
int vfslocked;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
switch (fp->f_type) {
case DTYPE_VNODE:
case DTYPE_FIFO:
/*
* XXXAUDIT: Only possibly to record as first vnode?
*/
vp = fp->f_vnode;
vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(vp->v_mount);
vn_lock(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
audit_arg_vnode1(vp);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
break;
case DTYPE_SOCKET:
so = (struct socket *)fp->f_data;
if (INP_CHECK_SOCKAF(so, PF_INET)) {
SOCK_LOCK(so);
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_type =
so->so_type;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_domain =
INP_SOCKAF(so);
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_protocol =
so->so_proto->pr_protocol;
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
pcb = (struct inpcb *)so->so_pcb;
INP_RLOCK(pcb);
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_raddr =
pcb->inp_faddr.s_addr;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_laddr =
pcb->inp_laddr.s_addr;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_rport =
pcb->inp_fport;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_lport =
pcb->inp_lport;
INP_RUNLOCK(pcb);
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SOCKINFO);
}
break;
default:
/* XXXAUDIT: else? */
break;
}
}
/*
* Store a path as given by the user process for auditing into the audit
* record stored on the user thread. This function will allocate the memory
* to store the path info if not already available. This memory will be
* freed when the audit record is freed.
*/
static void
audit_arg_upath(struct thread *td, char *upath, char **pathp)
{
if (*pathp == NULL)
*pathp = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITPATH, M_WAITOK);
audit_canon_path(td, upath, *pathp);
}
void
audit_arg_upath1(struct thread *td, char *upath)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
audit_arg_upath(td, upath, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1);
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UPATH1);
}
void
audit_arg_upath2(struct thread *td, char *upath)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
audit_arg_upath(td, upath, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath2);
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UPATH2);
}
/*
* Function to save the path and vnode attr information into the audit
* record.
*
* It is assumed that the caller will hold any vnode locks necessary to
* perform a VOP_GETATTR() on the passed vnode.
*
* XXX: The attr code is very similar to vfs_vnops.c:vn_stat(), but always
* provides access to the generation number as we need that to construct the
* BSM file ID.
*
* XXX: We should accept the process argument from the caller, since it's
* very likely they already have a reference.
*
* XXX: Error handling in this function is poor.
*
* XXXAUDIT: Possibly KASSERT the path pointer is NULL?
*/
static int
audit_arg_vnode(struct vnode *vp, struct vnode_au_info *vnp)
{
struct vattr vattr;
int error;
/*
* Assume that if the caller is calling audit_arg_vnode() on a
* non-MPSAFE vnode, then it will have acquired Giant.
*/
VFS_ASSERT_GIANT(vp->v_mount);
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "audit_arg_vnode");
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vattr, curthread->td_ucred);
if (error) {
/* XXX: How to handle this case? */
return (error);
}
vnp->vn_mode = vattr.va_mode;
vnp->vn_uid = vattr.va_uid;
vnp->vn_gid = vattr.va_gid;
vnp->vn_dev = vattr.va_rdev;
vnp->vn_fsid = vattr.va_fsid;
vnp->vn_fileid = vattr.va_fileid;
vnp->vn_gen = vattr.va_gen;
return (0);
}
void
audit_arg_vnode1(struct vnode *vp)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
int error;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ARG_CLEAR_VALID(ar, ARG_VNODE1);
error = audit_arg_vnode(vp, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_vnode1);
if (error == 0)
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_VNODE1);
}
void
audit_arg_vnode2(struct vnode *vp)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
int error;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ARG_CLEAR_VALID(ar, ARG_VNODE2);
error = audit_arg_vnode(vp, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_vnode2);
if (error == 0)
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_VNODE2);
}
/*
* Audit the argument strings passed to exec.
*/
void
audit_arg_argv(char *argv, int argc, int length)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
if (audit_argv == 0)
return;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv = malloc(length, M_AUDITTEXT, M_WAITOK);
bcopy(argv, ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv, length);
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argc = argc;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ARGV);
}
/*
* Audit the environment strings passed to exec.
*/
void
audit_arg_envv(char *envv, int envc, int length)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
if (audit_arge == 0)
return;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv = malloc(length, M_AUDITTEXT, M_WAITOK);
bcopy(envv, ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv, length);
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envc = envc;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ENVV);
}
void
audit_arg_rights(cap_rights_t rights)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rights = rights;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_RIGHTS);
}
/*
* The close() system call uses it's own audit call to capture the path/vnode
* information because those pieces are not easily obtained within the system
* call itself.
*/
void
audit_sysclose(struct thread *td, int fd)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
struct vnode *vp;
struct file *fp;
int vfslocked;
KASSERT(td != NULL, ("audit_sysclose: td == NULL"));
ar = currecord();
if (ar == NULL)
return;
audit_arg_fd(fd);
if (getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, fd, 0, &fp) != 0)
return;
vp = fp->f_vnode;
vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(vp->v_mount);
vn_lock(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
audit_arg_vnode1(vp);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
fdrop(fp, td);
}