de240d1013
and remove all O(N) sequences from kernel critical sections in ipfw. In detail: 1. introduce a IPFW_UH_LOCK to arbitrate requests from the upper half of the kernel. Some things, such as 'ipfw show', can be done holding this lock in read mode, whereas insert and delete require IPFW_UH_WLOCK. 2. introduce a mapping structure to keep rules together. This replaces the 'next' chain currently used in ipfw rules. At the moment the map is a simple array (sorted by rule number and then rule_id), so we can find a rule quickly instead of having to scan the list. This reduces many expensive lookups from O(N) to O(log N). 3. when an expensive operation (such as insert or delete) is done by userland, we grab IPFW_UH_WLOCK, create a new copy of the map without blocking the bottom half of the kernel, then acquire IPFW_WLOCK and quickly update pointers to the map and related info. After dropping IPFW_LOCK we can then continue the cleanup protected by IPFW_UH_LOCK. So userland still costs O(N) but the kernel side is only blocked for O(1). 4. do not pass pointers to rules through dummynet, netgraph, divert etc, but rather pass a <slot, chain_id, rulenum, rule_id> tuple. We validate the slot index (in the array of #2) with chain_id, and if successful do a O(1) dereference; otherwise, we can find the rule in O(log N) through <rulenum, rule_id> All the above does not change the userland/kernel ABI, though there are some disgusting casts between pointers and uint32_t Operation costs now are as follows: Function Old Now Planned ------------------------------------------------------------------- + skipto X, non cached O(N) O(log N) + skipto X, cached O(1) O(1) XXX dynamic rule lookup O(1) O(log N) O(1) + skipto tablearg O(N) O(1) + reinject, non cached O(N) O(log N) + reinject, cached O(1) O(1) + kernel blocked during setsockopt() O(N) O(1) ------------------------------------------------------------------- The only (very small) regression is on dynamic rule lookup and this will be fixed in a day or two, without changing the userland/kernel ABI Supported by: Valeria Paoli MFC after: 1 month
2491 lines
65 KiB
C
2491 lines
65 KiB
C
/*-
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2002-2009 Luigi Rizzo, Universita` di Pisa
|
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*
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
* are met:
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
*
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
|
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
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|
*/
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|
|
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
|
|
|
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/*
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* The FreeBSD IP packet firewall, main file
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|
*/
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|
|
|
#if !defined(KLD_MODULE)
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#include "opt_ipfw.h"
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#include "opt_ipdivert.h"
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#include "opt_ipdn.h"
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#include "opt_inet.h"
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#ifndef INET
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#error IPFIREWALL requires INET.
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#endif /* INET */
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#endif
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#include "opt_inet6.h"
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|
#include "opt_ipsec.h"
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|
|
|
#include <sys/param.h>
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|
#include <sys/systm.h>
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|
#include <sys/condvar.h>
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|
#include <sys/eventhandler.h>
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|
#include <sys/malloc.h>
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|
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
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|
#include <sys/kernel.h>
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|
#include <sys/lock.h>
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|
#include <sys/jail.h>
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|
#include <sys/module.h>
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|
#include <sys/priv.h>
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|
#include <sys/proc.h>
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|
#include <sys/rwlock.h>
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|
#include <sys/socket.h>
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|
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
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|
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <sys/syslog.h>
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#include <sys/ucred.h>
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#include <net/ethernet.h> /* for ETHERTYPE_IP */
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#include <net/if.h>
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#include <net/route.h>
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#include <net/pf_mtag.h>
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#include <net/vnet.h>
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|
|
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <netinet/in_var.h>
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#include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
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#include <netinet/ip.h>
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#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
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#include <netinet/ip_icmp.h>
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#include <netinet/ip_fw.h>
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#include <netinet/ipfw/ip_fw_private.h>
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#include <netinet/ip_divert.h>
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#include <netinet/ip_dummynet.h>
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#include <netinet/ip_carp.h>
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#include <netinet/pim.h>
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|
#include <netinet/tcp_var.h>
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#include <netinet/udp.h>
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#include <netinet/udp_var.h>
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#include <netinet/sctp.h>
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|
|
|
#include <netgraph/ng_ipfw.h>
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|
|
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#include <netinet/ip6.h>
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#include <netinet/icmp6.h>
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#ifdef INET6
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#include <netinet6/scope6_var.h>
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#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
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#endif
|
|
|
|
#include <machine/in_cksum.h> /* XXX for in_cksum */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
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|
#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
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#endif
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|
|
|
/*
|
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* static variables followed by global ones.
|
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* All ipfw global variables are here.
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|
*/
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|
|
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/* ipfw_vnet_ready controls when we are open for business */
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static VNET_DEFINE(int, ipfw_vnet_ready) = 0;
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#define V_ipfw_vnet_ready VNET(ipfw_vnet_ready)
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|
|
static VNET_DEFINE(int, fw_deny_unknown_exthdrs);
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#define V_fw_deny_unknown_exthdrs VNET(fw_deny_unknown_exthdrs)
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|
|
|
#ifdef IPFIREWALL_DEFAULT_TO_ACCEPT
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static int default_to_accept = 1;
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#else
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|
static int default_to_accept;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
VNET_DEFINE(int, autoinc_step);
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|
|
|
/*
|
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* Each rule belongs to one of 32 different sets (0..31).
|
|
* The variable set_disable contains one bit per set.
|
|
* If the bit is set, all rules in the corresponding set
|
|
* are disabled. Set RESVD_SET(31) is reserved for the default rule
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* and rules that are not deleted by the flush command,
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* and CANNOT be disabled.
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|
* Rules in set RESVD_SET can only be deleted individually.
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*/
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|
VNET_DEFINE(u_int32_t, set_disable);
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|
#define V_set_disable VNET(set_disable)
|
|
|
|
VNET_DEFINE(int, fw_verbose);
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/* counter for ipfw_log(NULL...) */
|
|
VNET_DEFINE(u_int64_t, norule_counter);
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VNET_DEFINE(int, verbose_limit);
|
|
|
|
/* layer3_chain contains the list of rules for layer 3 */
|
|
VNET_DEFINE(struct ip_fw_chain, layer3_chain);
|
|
|
|
ipfw_nat_t *ipfw_nat_ptr = NULL;
|
|
struct cfg_nat *(*lookup_nat_ptr)(struct nat_list *, int);
|
|
ipfw_nat_cfg_t *ipfw_nat_cfg_ptr;
|
|
ipfw_nat_cfg_t *ipfw_nat_del_ptr;
|
|
ipfw_nat_cfg_t *ipfw_nat_get_cfg_ptr;
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ipfw_nat_cfg_t *ipfw_nat_get_log_ptr;
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|
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#ifdef SYSCTL_NODE
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SYSCTL_NODE(_net_inet_ip, OID_AUTO, fw, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "Firewall");
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SYSCTL_VNET_INT(_net_inet_ip_fw, OID_AUTO, one_pass,
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CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_SECURE3, &VNET_NAME(fw_one_pass), 0,
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"Only do a single pass through ipfw when using dummynet(4)");
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|
SYSCTL_VNET_INT(_net_inet_ip_fw, OID_AUTO, autoinc_step,
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CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(autoinc_step), 0,
|
|
"Rule number auto-increment step");
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|
SYSCTL_VNET_INT(_net_inet_ip_fw, OID_AUTO, verbose,
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CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_SECURE3, &VNET_NAME(fw_verbose), 0,
|
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"Log matches to ipfw rules");
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|
SYSCTL_VNET_INT(_net_inet_ip_fw, OID_AUTO, verbose_limit,
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CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(verbose_limit), 0,
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"Set upper limit of matches of ipfw rules logged");
|
|
SYSCTL_UINT(_net_inet_ip_fw, OID_AUTO, default_rule, CTLFLAG_RD,
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NULL, IPFW_DEFAULT_RULE,
|
|
"The default/max possible rule number.");
|
|
SYSCTL_UINT(_net_inet_ip_fw, OID_AUTO, tables_max, CTLFLAG_RD,
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NULL, IPFW_TABLES_MAX,
|
|
"The maximum number of tables.");
|
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SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ip_fw, OID_AUTO, default_to_accept, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
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&default_to_accept, 0,
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"Make the default rule accept all packets.");
|
|
TUNABLE_INT("net.inet.ip.fw.default_to_accept", &default_to_accept);
|
|
SYSCTL_VNET_INT(_net_inet_ip_fw, OID_AUTO, static_count,
|
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CTLFLAG_RD, &VNET_NAME(layer3_chain.n_rules), 0,
|
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"Number of static rules");
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
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|
SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet6_ip6);
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SYSCTL_NODE(_net_inet6_ip6, OID_AUTO, fw, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "Firewall");
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SYSCTL_VNET_INT(_net_inet6_ip6_fw, OID_AUTO, deny_unknown_exthdrs,
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CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_SECURE, &VNET_NAME(fw_deny_unknown_exthdrs), 0,
|
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"Deny packets with unknown IPv6 Extension Headers");
|
|
#endif /* INET6 */
|
|
|
|
#endif /* SYSCTL_NODE */
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some macros used in the various matching options.
|
|
* L3HDR maps an ipv4 pointer into a layer3 header pointer of type T
|
|
* Other macros just cast void * into the appropriate type
|
|
*/
|
|
#define L3HDR(T, ip) ((T *)((u_int32_t *)(ip) + (ip)->ip_hl))
|
|
#define TCP(p) ((struct tcphdr *)(p))
|
|
#define SCTP(p) ((struct sctphdr *)(p))
|
|
#define UDP(p) ((struct udphdr *)(p))
|
|
#define ICMP(p) ((struct icmphdr *)(p))
|
|
#define ICMP6(p) ((struct icmp6_hdr *)(p))
|
|
|
|
static __inline int
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|
icmptype_match(struct icmphdr *icmp, ipfw_insn_u32 *cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
int type = icmp->icmp_type;
|
|
|
|
return (type <= ICMP_MAXTYPE && (cmd->d[0] & (1<<type)) );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define TT ( (1 << ICMP_ECHO) | (1 << ICMP_ROUTERSOLICIT) | \
|
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(1 << ICMP_TSTAMP) | (1 << ICMP_IREQ) | (1 << ICMP_MASKREQ) )
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
is_icmp_query(struct icmphdr *icmp)
|
|
{
|
|
int type = icmp->icmp_type;
|
|
|
|
return (type <= ICMP_MAXTYPE && (TT & (1<<type)) );
|
|
}
|
|
#undef TT
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The following checks use two arrays of 8 or 16 bits to store the
|
|
* bits that we want set or clear, respectively. They are in the
|
|
* low and high half of cmd->arg1 or cmd->d[0].
|
|
*
|
|
* We scan options and store the bits we find set. We succeed if
|
|
*
|
|
* (want_set & ~bits) == 0 && (want_clear & ~bits) == want_clear
|
|
*
|
|
* The code is sometimes optimized not to store additional variables.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
flags_match(ipfw_insn *cmd, u_int8_t bits)
|
|
{
|
|
u_char want_clear;
|
|
bits = ~bits;
|
|
|
|
if ( ((cmd->arg1 & 0xff) & bits) != 0)
|
|
return 0; /* some bits we want set were clear */
|
|
want_clear = (cmd->arg1 >> 8) & 0xff;
|
|
if ( (want_clear & bits) != want_clear)
|
|
return 0; /* some bits we want clear were set */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
ipopts_match(struct ip *ip, ipfw_insn *cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
int optlen, bits = 0;
|
|
u_char *cp = (u_char *)(ip + 1);
|
|
int x = (ip->ip_hl << 2) - sizeof (struct ip);
|
|
|
|
for (; x > 0; x -= optlen, cp += optlen) {
|
|
int opt = cp[IPOPT_OPTVAL];
|
|
|
|
if (opt == IPOPT_EOL)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (opt == IPOPT_NOP)
|
|
optlen = 1;
|
|
else {
|
|
optlen = cp[IPOPT_OLEN];
|
|
if (optlen <= 0 || optlen > x)
|
|
return 0; /* invalid or truncated */
|
|
}
|
|
switch (opt) {
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPOPT_LSRR:
|
|
bits |= IP_FW_IPOPT_LSRR;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPOPT_SSRR:
|
|
bits |= IP_FW_IPOPT_SSRR;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPOPT_RR:
|
|
bits |= IP_FW_IPOPT_RR;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPOPT_TS:
|
|
bits |= IP_FW_IPOPT_TS;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return (flags_match(cmd, bits));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
tcpopts_match(struct tcphdr *tcp, ipfw_insn *cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
int optlen, bits = 0;
|
|
u_char *cp = (u_char *)(tcp + 1);
|
|
int x = (tcp->th_off << 2) - sizeof(struct tcphdr);
|
|
|
|
for (; x > 0; x -= optlen, cp += optlen) {
|
|
int opt = cp[0];
|
|
if (opt == TCPOPT_EOL)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (opt == TCPOPT_NOP)
|
|
optlen = 1;
|
|
else {
|
|
optlen = cp[1];
|
|
if (optlen <= 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (opt) {
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TCPOPT_MAXSEG:
|
|
bits |= IP_FW_TCPOPT_MSS;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TCPOPT_WINDOW:
|
|
bits |= IP_FW_TCPOPT_WINDOW;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TCPOPT_SACK_PERMITTED:
|
|
case TCPOPT_SACK:
|
|
bits |= IP_FW_TCPOPT_SACK;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP:
|
|
bits |= IP_FW_TCPOPT_TS;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return (flags_match(cmd, bits));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
iface_match(struct ifnet *ifp, ipfw_insn_if *cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ifp == NULL) /* no iface with this packet, match fails */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Check by name or by IP address */
|
|
if (cmd->name[0] != '\0') { /* match by name */
|
|
/* Check name */
|
|
if (cmd->p.glob) {
|
|
if (fnmatch(cmd->name, ifp->if_xname, 0) == 0)
|
|
return(1);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (strncmp(ifp->if_xname, cmd->name, IFNAMSIZ) == 0)
|
|
return(1);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
struct ifaddr *ia;
|
|
|
|
if_addr_rlock(ifp);
|
|
TAILQ_FOREACH(ia, &ifp->if_addrhead, ifa_link) {
|
|
if (ia->ifa_addr->sa_family != AF_INET)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (cmd->p.ip.s_addr == ((struct sockaddr_in *)
|
|
(ia->ifa_addr))->sin_addr.s_addr) {
|
|
if_addr_runlock(ifp);
|
|
return(1); /* match */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if_addr_runlock(ifp);
|
|
}
|
|
return(0); /* no match, fail ... */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The verify_path function checks if a route to the src exists and
|
|
* if it is reachable via ifp (when provided).
|
|
*
|
|
* The 'verrevpath' option checks that the interface that an IP packet
|
|
* arrives on is the same interface that traffic destined for the
|
|
* packet's source address would be routed out of.
|
|
* The 'versrcreach' option just checks that the source address is
|
|
* reachable via any route (except default) in the routing table.
|
|
* These two are a measure to block forged packets. This is also
|
|
* commonly known as "anti-spoofing" or Unicast Reverse Path
|
|
* Forwarding (Unicast RFP) in Cisco-ese. The name of the knobs
|
|
* is purposely reminiscent of the Cisco IOS command,
|
|
*
|
|
* ip verify unicast reverse-path
|
|
* ip verify unicast source reachable-via any
|
|
*
|
|
* which implements the same functionality. But note that the syntax
|
|
* is misleading, and the check may be performed on all IP packets
|
|
* whether unicast, multicast, or broadcast.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
verify_path(struct in_addr src, struct ifnet *ifp, u_int fib)
|
|
{
|
|
struct route ro;
|
|
struct sockaddr_in *dst;
|
|
|
|
bzero(&ro, sizeof(ro));
|
|
|
|
dst = (struct sockaddr_in *)&(ro.ro_dst);
|
|
dst->sin_family = AF_INET;
|
|
dst->sin_len = sizeof(*dst);
|
|
dst->sin_addr = src;
|
|
in_rtalloc_ign(&ro, 0, fib);
|
|
|
|
if (ro.ro_rt == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If ifp is provided, check for equality with rtentry.
|
|
* We should use rt->rt_ifa->ifa_ifp, instead of rt->rt_ifp,
|
|
* in order to pass packets injected back by if_simloop():
|
|
* if useloopback == 1 routing entry (via lo0) for our own address
|
|
* may exist, so we need to handle routing assymetry.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ifp != NULL && ro.ro_rt->rt_ifa->ifa_ifp != ifp) {
|
|
RTFREE(ro.ro_rt);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if no ifp provided, check if rtentry is not default route */
|
|
if (ifp == NULL &&
|
|
satosin(rt_key(ro.ro_rt))->sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_ANY) {
|
|
RTFREE(ro.ro_rt);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* or if this is a blackhole/reject route */
|
|
if (ifp == NULL && ro.ro_rt->rt_flags & (RTF_REJECT|RTF_BLACKHOLE)) {
|
|
RTFREE(ro.ro_rt);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* found valid route */
|
|
RTFREE(ro.ro_rt);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
/*
|
|
* ipv6 specific rules here...
|
|
*/
|
|
static __inline int
|
|
icmp6type_match (int type, ipfw_insn_u32 *cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
return (type <= ICMP6_MAXTYPE && (cmd->d[type/32] & (1<<(type%32)) ) );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
flow6id_match( int curr_flow, ipfw_insn_u32 *cmd )
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
for (i=0; i <= cmd->o.arg1; ++i )
|
|
if (curr_flow == cmd->d[i] )
|
|
return 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* support for IP6_*_ME opcodes */
|
|
static int
|
|
search_ip6_addr_net (struct in6_addr * ip6_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ifnet *mdc;
|
|
struct ifaddr *mdc2;
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *fdm;
|
|
struct in6_addr copia;
|
|
|
|
TAILQ_FOREACH(mdc, &V_ifnet, if_link) {
|
|
if_addr_rlock(mdc);
|
|
TAILQ_FOREACH(mdc2, &mdc->if_addrhead, ifa_link) {
|
|
if (mdc2->ifa_addr->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
|
|
fdm = (struct in6_ifaddr *)mdc2;
|
|
copia = fdm->ia_addr.sin6_addr;
|
|
/* need for leaving scope_id in the sock_addr */
|
|
in6_clearscope(&copia);
|
|
if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(ip6_addr, &copia)) {
|
|
if_addr_runlock(mdc);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if_addr_runlock(mdc);
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
verify_path6(struct in6_addr *src, struct ifnet *ifp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct route_in6 ro;
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 *dst;
|
|
|
|
bzero(&ro, sizeof(ro));
|
|
|
|
dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 * )&(ro.ro_dst);
|
|
dst->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
|
|
dst->sin6_len = sizeof(*dst);
|
|
dst->sin6_addr = *src;
|
|
/* XXX MRT 0 for ipv6 at this time */
|
|
rtalloc_ign((struct route *)&ro, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (ro.ro_rt == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* if ifp is provided, check for equality with rtentry
|
|
* We should use rt->rt_ifa->ifa_ifp, instead of rt->rt_ifp,
|
|
* to support the case of sending packets to an address of our own.
|
|
* (where the former interface is the first argument of if_simloop()
|
|
* (=ifp), the latter is lo0)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ifp != NULL && ro.ro_rt->rt_ifa->ifa_ifp != ifp) {
|
|
RTFREE(ro.ro_rt);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if no ifp provided, check if rtentry is not default route */
|
|
if (ifp == NULL &&
|
|
IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&satosin6(rt_key(ro.ro_rt))->sin6_addr)) {
|
|
RTFREE(ro.ro_rt);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* or if this is a blackhole/reject route */
|
|
if (ifp == NULL && ro.ro_rt->rt_flags & (RTF_REJECT|RTF_BLACKHOLE)) {
|
|
RTFREE(ro.ro_rt);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* found valid route */
|
|
RTFREE(ro.ro_rt);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
is_icmp6_query(int icmp6_type)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((icmp6_type <= ICMP6_MAXTYPE) &&
|
|
(icmp6_type == ICMP6_ECHO_REQUEST ||
|
|
icmp6_type == ICMP6_MEMBERSHIP_QUERY ||
|
|
icmp6_type == ICMP6_WRUREQUEST ||
|
|
icmp6_type == ICMP6_FQDN_QUERY ||
|
|
icmp6_type == ICMP6_NI_QUERY))
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
send_reject6(struct ip_fw_args *args, int code, u_int hlen, struct ip6_hdr *ip6)
|
|
{
|
|
struct mbuf *m;
|
|
|
|
m = args->m;
|
|
if (code == ICMP6_UNREACH_RST && args->f_id.proto == IPPROTO_TCP) {
|
|
struct tcphdr *tcp;
|
|
tcp = (struct tcphdr *)((char *)ip6 + hlen);
|
|
|
|
if ((tcp->th_flags & TH_RST) == 0) {
|
|
struct mbuf *m0;
|
|
m0 = ipfw_send_pkt(args->m, &(args->f_id),
|
|
ntohl(tcp->th_seq), ntohl(tcp->th_ack),
|
|
tcp->th_flags | TH_RST);
|
|
if (m0 != NULL)
|
|
ip6_output(m0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
} else if (code != ICMP6_UNREACH_RST) { /* Send an ICMPv6 unreach. */
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/*
|
|
* Unlike above, the mbufs need to line up with the ip6 hdr,
|
|
* as the contents are read. We need to m_adj() the
|
|
* needed amount.
|
|
* The mbuf will however be thrown away so we can adjust it.
|
|
* Remember we did an m_pullup on it already so we
|
|
* can make some assumptions about contiguousness.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (args->L3offset)
|
|
m_adj(m, args->L3offset);
|
|
#endif
|
|
icmp6_error(m, ICMP6_DST_UNREACH, code, 0);
|
|
} else
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
|
|
args->m = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* INET6 */
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* sends a reject message, consuming the mbuf passed as an argument.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
send_reject(struct ip_fw_args *args, int code, int ip_len, struct ip *ip)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/* XXX When ip is not guaranteed to be at mtod() we will
|
|
* need to account for this */
|
|
* The mbuf will however be thrown away so we can adjust it.
|
|
* Remember we did an m_pullup on it already so we
|
|
* can make some assumptions about contiguousness.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (args->L3offset)
|
|
m_adj(m, args->L3offset);
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (code != ICMP_REJECT_RST) { /* Send an ICMP unreach */
|
|
/* We need the IP header in host order for icmp_error(). */
|
|
if (args->eh != NULL) {
|
|
ip->ip_len = ntohs(ip->ip_len);
|
|
ip->ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);
|
|
}
|
|
icmp_error(args->m, ICMP_UNREACH, code, 0L, 0);
|
|
} else if (args->f_id.proto == IPPROTO_TCP) {
|
|
struct tcphdr *const tcp =
|
|
L3HDR(struct tcphdr, mtod(args->m, struct ip *));
|
|
if ( (tcp->th_flags & TH_RST) == 0) {
|
|
struct mbuf *m;
|
|
m = ipfw_send_pkt(args->m, &(args->f_id),
|
|
ntohl(tcp->th_seq), ntohl(tcp->th_ack),
|
|
tcp->th_flags | TH_RST);
|
|
if (m != NULL)
|
|
ip_output(m, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
m_freem(args->m);
|
|
} else
|
|
m_freem(args->m);
|
|
args->m = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Support for uid/gid/jail lookup. These tests are expensive
|
|
* (because we may need to look into the list of active sockets)
|
|
* so we cache the results. ugid_lookupp is 0 if we have not
|
|
* yet done a lookup, 1 if we succeeded, and -1 if we tried
|
|
* and failed. The function always returns the match value.
|
|
* We could actually spare the variable and use *uc, setting
|
|
* it to '(void *)check_uidgid if we have no info, NULL if
|
|
* we tried and failed, or any other value if successful.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
check_uidgid(ipfw_insn_u32 *insn, int proto, struct ifnet *oif,
|
|
struct in_addr dst_ip, u_int16_t dst_port, struct in_addr src_ip,
|
|
u_int16_t src_port, struct ucred **uc, int *ugid_lookupp,
|
|
struct inpcb *inp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inpcbinfo *pi;
|
|
int wildcard;
|
|
struct inpcb *pcb;
|
|
int match;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check to see if the UDP or TCP stack supplied us with
|
|
* the PCB. If so, rather then holding a lock and looking
|
|
* up the PCB, we can use the one that was supplied.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (inp && *ugid_lookupp == 0) {
|
|
INP_LOCK_ASSERT(inp);
|
|
if (inp->inp_socket != NULL) {
|
|
*uc = crhold(inp->inp_cred);
|
|
*ugid_lookupp = 1;
|
|
} else
|
|
*ugid_lookupp = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we have already been here and the packet has no
|
|
* PCB entry associated with it, then we can safely
|
|
* assume that this is a no match.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (*ugid_lookupp == -1)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
if (proto == IPPROTO_TCP) {
|
|
wildcard = 0;
|
|
pi = &V_tcbinfo;
|
|
} else if (proto == IPPROTO_UDP) {
|
|
wildcard = INPLOOKUP_WILDCARD;
|
|
pi = &V_udbinfo;
|
|
} else
|
|
return 0;
|
|
match = 0;
|
|
if (*ugid_lookupp == 0) {
|
|
INP_INFO_RLOCK(pi);
|
|
pcb = (oif) ?
|
|
in_pcblookup_hash(pi,
|
|
dst_ip, htons(dst_port),
|
|
src_ip, htons(src_port),
|
|
wildcard, oif) :
|
|
in_pcblookup_hash(pi,
|
|
src_ip, htons(src_port),
|
|
dst_ip, htons(dst_port),
|
|
wildcard, NULL);
|
|
if (pcb != NULL) {
|
|
*uc = crhold(pcb->inp_cred);
|
|
*ugid_lookupp = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
INP_INFO_RUNLOCK(pi);
|
|
if (*ugid_lookupp == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We tried and failed, set the variable to -1
|
|
* so we will not try again on this packet.
|
|
*/
|
|
*ugid_lookupp = -1;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (insn->o.opcode == O_UID)
|
|
match = ((*uc)->cr_uid == (uid_t)insn->d[0]);
|
|
else if (insn->o.opcode == O_GID)
|
|
match = groupmember((gid_t)insn->d[0], *uc);
|
|
else if (insn->o.opcode == O_JAIL)
|
|
match = ((*uc)->cr_prison->pr_id == (int)insn->d[0]);
|
|
return match;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Helper function to write the matching rule into args
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline void
|
|
set_match(struct ip_fw_args *args, int slot,
|
|
struct ip_fw_chain *chain)
|
|
{
|
|
args->chain_id = chain->id;
|
|
args->slot = slot + 1; /* we use 0 as a marker */
|
|
args->rule_id = chain->map[slot]->id;
|
|
args->rulenum = chain->map[slot]->rulenum;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The main check routine for the firewall.
|
|
*
|
|
* All arguments are in args so we can modify them and return them
|
|
* back to the caller.
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters:
|
|
*
|
|
* args->m (in/out) The packet; we set to NULL when/if we nuke it.
|
|
* Starts with the IP header.
|
|
* args->eh (in) Mac header if present, NULL for layer3 packet.
|
|
* args->L3offset Number of bytes bypassed if we came from L2.
|
|
* e.g. often sizeof(eh) ** NOTYET **
|
|
* args->oif Outgoing interface, NULL if packet is incoming.
|
|
* The incoming interface is in the mbuf. (in)
|
|
* args->divert_rule (in/out)
|
|
* Skip up to the first rule past this rule number;
|
|
* upon return, non-zero port number for divert or tee.
|
|
*
|
|
* args->rule Pointer to the last matching rule (in/out)
|
|
* args->next_hop Socket we are forwarding to (out).
|
|
* args->f_id Addresses grabbed from the packet (out)
|
|
* args->cookie a cookie depending on rule action
|
|
*
|
|
* Return value:
|
|
*
|
|
* IP_FW_PASS the packet must be accepted
|
|
* IP_FW_DENY the packet must be dropped
|
|
* IP_FW_DIVERT divert packet, port in m_tag
|
|
* IP_FW_TEE tee packet, port in m_tag
|
|
* IP_FW_DUMMYNET to dummynet, pipe in args->cookie
|
|
* IP_FW_NETGRAPH into netgraph, cookie args->cookie
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
ipfw_chk(struct ip_fw_args *args)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Local variables holding state while processing a packet:
|
|
*
|
|
* IMPORTANT NOTE: to speed up the processing of rules, there
|
|
* are some assumption on the values of the variables, which
|
|
* are documented here. Should you change them, please check
|
|
* the implementation of the various instructions to make sure
|
|
* that they still work.
|
|
*
|
|
* args->eh The MAC header. It is non-null for a layer2
|
|
* packet, it is NULL for a layer-3 packet.
|
|
* **notyet**
|
|
* args->L3offset Offset in the packet to the L3 (IP or equiv.) header.
|
|
*
|
|
* m | args->m Pointer to the mbuf, as received from the caller.
|
|
* It may change if ipfw_chk() does an m_pullup, or if it
|
|
* consumes the packet because it calls send_reject().
|
|
* XXX This has to change, so that ipfw_chk() never modifies
|
|
* or consumes the buffer.
|
|
* ip is the beginning of the ip(4 or 6) header.
|
|
* Calculated by adding the L3offset to the start of data.
|
|
* (Until we start using L3offset, the packet is
|
|
* supposed to start with the ip header).
|
|
*/
|
|
struct mbuf *m = args->m;
|
|
struct ip *ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* For rules which contain uid/gid or jail constraints, cache
|
|
* a copy of the users credentials after the pcb lookup has been
|
|
* executed. This will speed up the processing of rules with
|
|
* these types of constraints, as well as decrease contention
|
|
* on pcb related locks.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct ucred *ucred_cache = NULL;
|
|
int ucred_lookup = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* divinput_flags If non-zero, set to the IP_FW_DIVERT_*_FLAG
|
|
* associated with a packet input on a divert socket. This
|
|
* will allow to distinguish traffic and its direction when
|
|
* it originates from a divert socket.
|
|
*/
|
|
u_int divinput_flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* oif | args->oif If NULL, ipfw_chk has been called on the
|
|
* inbound path (ether_input, ip_input).
|
|
* If non-NULL, ipfw_chk has been called on the outbound path
|
|
* (ether_output, ip_output).
|
|
*/
|
|
struct ifnet *oif = args->oif;
|
|
|
|
int f_pos = 0; /* index of current rule in the array */
|
|
int retval = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* hlen The length of the IP header.
|
|
*/
|
|
u_int hlen = 0; /* hlen >0 means we have an IP pkt */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* offset The offset of a fragment. offset != 0 means that
|
|
* we have a fragment at this offset of an IPv4 packet.
|
|
* offset == 0 means that (if this is an IPv4 packet)
|
|
* this is the first or only fragment.
|
|
* For IPv6 offset == 0 means there is no Fragment Header.
|
|
* If offset != 0 for IPv6 always use correct mask to
|
|
* get the correct offset because we add IP6F_MORE_FRAG
|
|
* to be able to dectect the first fragment which would
|
|
* otherwise have offset = 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
u_short offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Local copies of addresses. They are only valid if we have
|
|
* an IP packet.
|
|
*
|
|
* proto The protocol. Set to 0 for non-ip packets,
|
|
* or to the protocol read from the packet otherwise.
|
|
* proto != 0 means that we have an IPv4 packet.
|
|
*
|
|
* src_port, dst_port port numbers, in HOST format. Only
|
|
* valid for TCP and UDP packets.
|
|
*
|
|
* src_ip, dst_ip ip addresses, in NETWORK format.
|
|
* Only valid for IPv4 packets.
|
|
*/
|
|
u_int8_t proto;
|
|
u_int16_t src_port = 0, dst_port = 0; /* NOTE: host format */
|
|
struct in_addr src_ip, dst_ip; /* NOTE: network format */
|
|
u_int16_t ip_len=0;
|
|
int pktlen;
|
|
u_int16_t etype = 0; /* Host order stored ether type */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* dyn_dir = MATCH_UNKNOWN when rules unchecked,
|
|
* MATCH_NONE when checked and not matched (q = NULL),
|
|
* MATCH_FORWARD or MATCH_REVERSE otherwise (q != NULL)
|
|
*/
|
|
int dyn_dir = MATCH_UNKNOWN;
|
|
ipfw_dyn_rule *q = NULL;
|
|
struct ip_fw_chain *chain = &V_layer3_chain;
|
|
struct m_tag *mtag;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We store in ulp a pointer to the upper layer protocol header.
|
|
* In the ipv4 case this is easy to determine from the header,
|
|
* but for ipv6 we might have some additional headers in the middle.
|
|
* ulp is NULL if not found.
|
|
*/
|
|
void *ulp = NULL; /* upper layer protocol pointer. */
|
|
/* XXX ipv6 variables */
|
|
int is_ipv6 = 0;
|
|
u_int16_t ext_hd = 0; /* bits vector for extension header filtering */
|
|
/* end of ipv6 variables */
|
|
int is_ipv4 = 0;
|
|
|
|
int done = 0; /* flag to exit the outer loop */
|
|
|
|
if (m->m_flags & M_SKIP_FIREWALL || (! V_ipfw_vnet_ready))
|
|
return (IP_FW_PASS); /* accept */
|
|
|
|
dst_ip.s_addr = 0; /* make sure it is initialized */
|
|
src_ip.s_addr = 0; /* make sure it is initialized */
|
|
pktlen = m->m_pkthdr.len;
|
|
args->f_id.fib = M_GETFIB(m); /* note mbuf not altered) */
|
|
proto = args->f_id.proto = 0; /* mark f_id invalid */
|
|
/* XXX 0 is a valid proto: IP/IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Option */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* PULLUP_TO(len, p, T) makes sure that len + sizeof(T) is contiguous,
|
|
* then it sets p to point at the offset "len" in the mbuf. WARNING: the
|
|
* pointer might become stale after other pullups (but we never use it
|
|
* this way).
|
|
*/
|
|
#define PULLUP_TO(_len, p, T) \
|
|
do { \
|
|
int x = (_len) + sizeof(T); \
|
|
if ((m)->m_len < x) { \
|
|
args->m = m = m_pullup(m, x); \
|
|
if (m == NULL) \
|
|
goto pullup_failed; \
|
|
} \
|
|
p = (mtod(m, char *) + (_len)); \
|
|
} while (0)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* if we have an ether header,
|
|
*/
|
|
if (args->eh)
|
|
etype = ntohs(args->eh->ether_type);
|
|
|
|
/* Identify IP packets and fill up variables. */
|
|
if (pktlen >= sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) &&
|
|
(args->eh == NULL || etype == ETHERTYPE_IPV6) && ip->ip_v == 6) {
|
|
struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = (struct ip6_hdr *)ip;
|
|
is_ipv6 = 1;
|
|
args->f_id.addr_type = 6;
|
|
hlen = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
|
|
proto = ip6->ip6_nxt;
|
|
|
|
/* Search extension headers to find upper layer protocols */
|
|
while (ulp == NULL) {
|
|
switch (proto) {
|
|
case IPPROTO_ICMPV6:
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct icmp6_hdr);
|
|
args->f_id.flags = ICMP6(ulp)->icmp6_type;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_TCP:
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct tcphdr);
|
|
dst_port = TCP(ulp)->th_dport;
|
|
src_port = TCP(ulp)->th_sport;
|
|
args->f_id.flags = TCP(ulp)->th_flags;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_SCTP:
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct sctphdr);
|
|
src_port = SCTP(ulp)->src_port;
|
|
dst_port = SCTP(ulp)->dest_port;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_UDP:
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct udphdr);
|
|
dst_port = UDP(ulp)->uh_dport;
|
|
src_port = UDP(ulp)->uh_sport;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS: /* RFC 2460 */
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct ip6_hbh);
|
|
ext_hd |= EXT_HOPOPTS;
|
|
hlen += (((struct ip6_hbh *)ulp)->ip6h_len + 1) << 3;
|
|
proto = ((struct ip6_hbh *)ulp)->ip6h_nxt;
|
|
ulp = NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_ROUTING: /* RFC 2460 */
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct ip6_rthdr);
|
|
switch (((struct ip6_rthdr *)ulp)->ip6r_type) {
|
|
case 0:
|
|
ext_hd |= EXT_RTHDR0;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 2:
|
|
ext_hd |= EXT_RTHDR2;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
printf("IPFW2: IPV6 - Unknown Routing "
|
|
"Header type(%d)\n",
|
|
((struct ip6_rthdr *)ulp)->ip6r_type);
|
|
if (V_fw_deny_unknown_exthdrs)
|
|
return (IP_FW_DENY);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
ext_hd |= EXT_ROUTING;
|
|
hlen += (((struct ip6_rthdr *)ulp)->ip6r_len + 1) << 3;
|
|
proto = ((struct ip6_rthdr *)ulp)->ip6r_nxt;
|
|
ulp = NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_FRAGMENT: /* RFC 2460 */
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct ip6_frag);
|
|
ext_hd |= EXT_FRAGMENT;
|
|
hlen += sizeof (struct ip6_frag);
|
|
proto = ((struct ip6_frag *)ulp)->ip6f_nxt;
|
|
offset = ((struct ip6_frag *)ulp)->ip6f_offlg &
|
|
IP6F_OFF_MASK;
|
|
/* Add IP6F_MORE_FRAG for offset of first
|
|
* fragment to be != 0. */
|
|
offset |= ((struct ip6_frag *)ulp)->ip6f_offlg &
|
|
IP6F_MORE_FRAG;
|
|
if (offset == 0) {
|
|
printf("IPFW2: IPV6 - Invalid Fragment "
|
|
"Header\n");
|
|
if (V_fw_deny_unknown_exthdrs)
|
|
return (IP_FW_DENY);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
args->f_id.frag_id6 =
|
|
ntohl(((struct ip6_frag *)ulp)->ip6f_ident);
|
|
ulp = NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS: /* RFC 2460 */
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct ip6_hbh);
|
|
ext_hd |= EXT_DSTOPTS;
|
|
hlen += (((struct ip6_hbh *)ulp)->ip6h_len + 1) << 3;
|
|
proto = ((struct ip6_hbh *)ulp)->ip6h_nxt;
|
|
ulp = NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_AH: /* RFC 2402 */
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct ip6_ext);
|
|
ext_hd |= EXT_AH;
|
|
hlen += (((struct ip6_ext *)ulp)->ip6e_len + 2) << 2;
|
|
proto = ((struct ip6_ext *)ulp)->ip6e_nxt;
|
|
ulp = NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_ESP: /* RFC 2406 */
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, uint32_t); /* SPI, Seq# */
|
|
/* Anything past Seq# is variable length and
|
|
* data past this ext. header is encrypted. */
|
|
ext_hd |= EXT_ESP;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_NONE: /* RFC 2460 */
|
|
/*
|
|
* Packet ends here, and IPv6 header has
|
|
* already been pulled up. If ip6e_len!=0
|
|
* then octets must be ignored.
|
|
*/
|
|
ulp = ip; /* non-NULL to get out of loop. */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_OSPFIGP:
|
|
/* XXX OSPF header check? */
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct ip6_ext);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_PIM:
|
|
/* XXX PIM header check? */
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct pim);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_CARP:
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct carp_header);
|
|
if (((struct carp_header *)ulp)->carp_version !=
|
|
CARP_VERSION)
|
|
return (IP_FW_DENY);
|
|
if (((struct carp_header *)ulp)->carp_type !=
|
|
CARP_ADVERTISEMENT)
|
|
return (IP_FW_DENY);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_IPV6: /* RFC 2893 */
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct ip6_hdr);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_IPV4: /* RFC 2893 */
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct ip);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
printf("IPFW2: IPV6 - Unknown Extension "
|
|
"Header(%d), ext_hd=%x\n", proto, ext_hd);
|
|
if (V_fw_deny_unknown_exthdrs)
|
|
return (IP_FW_DENY);
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct ip6_ext);
|
|
break;
|
|
} /*switch */
|
|
}
|
|
ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
|
|
ip6 = (struct ip6_hdr *)ip;
|
|
args->f_id.src_ip6 = ip6->ip6_src;
|
|
args->f_id.dst_ip6 = ip6->ip6_dst;
|
|
args->f_id.src_ip = 0;
|
|
args->f_id.dst_ip = 0;
|
|
args->f_id.flow_id6 = ntohl(ip6->ip6_flow);
|
|
} else if (pktlen >= sizeof(struct ip) &&
|
|
(args->eh == NULL || etype == ETHERTYPE_IP) && ip->ip_v == 4) {
|
|
is_ipv4 = 1;
|
|
hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2;
|
|
args->f_id.addr_type = 4;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Collect parameters into local variables for faster matching.
|
|
*/
|
|
proto = ip->ip_p;
|
|
src_ip = ip->ip_src;
|
|
dst_ip = ip->ip_dst;
|
|
if (args->eh != NULL) { /* layer 2 packets are as on the wire */
|
|
offset = ntohs(ip->ip_off) & IP_OFFMASK;
|
|
ip_len = ntohs(ip->ip_len);
|
|
} else {
|
|
offset = ip->ip_off & IP_OFFMASK;
|
|
ip_len = ip->ip_len;
|
|
}
|
|
pktlen = ip_len < pktlen ? ip_len : pktlen;
|
|
|
|
if (offset == 0) {
|
|
switch (proto) {
|
|
case IPPROTO_TCP:
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct tcphdr);
|
|
dst_port = TCP(ulp)->th_dport;
|
|
src_port = TCP(ulp)->th_sport;
|
|
args->f_id.flags = TCP(ulp)->th_flags;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_UDP:
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct udphdr);
|
|
dst_port = UDP(ulp)->uh_dport;
|
|
src_port = UDP(ulp)->uh_sport;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_ICMP:
|
|
PULLUP_TO(hlen, ulp, struct icmphdr);
|
|
args->f_id.flags = ICMP(ulp)->icmp_type;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
|
|
args->f_id.src_ip = ntohl(src_ip.s_addr);
|
|
args->f_id.dst_ip = ntohl(dst_ip.s_addr);
|
|
}
|
|
#undef PULLUP_TO
|
|
if (proto) { /* we may have port numbers, store them */
|
|
args->f_id.proto = proto;
|
|
args->f_id.src_port = src_port = ntohs(src_port);
|
|
args->f_id.dst_port = dst_port = ntohs(dst_port);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
IPFW_RLOCK(chain);
|
|
if (! V_ipfw_vnet_ready) { /* shutting down, leave NOW. */
|
|
IPFW_RUNLOCK(chain);
|
|
return (IP_FW_PASS); /* accept */
|
|
}
|
|
mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_DIVERT, NULL);
|
|
if (args->slot) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Packet has already been tagged as a result of a previous
|
|
* match on rule args->rule aka args->rule_id (PIPE, QUEUE,
|
|
* REASS, NETGRAPH and similar, never a skipto).
|
|
* Validate the slot and continue from the next one
|
|
* if still present, otherwise do a lookup.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (V_fw_one_pass) {
|
|
IPFW_RUNLOCK(chain);
|
|
return (IP_FW_PASS);
|
|
}
|
|
f_pos = (args->chain_id == chain->id) ?
|
|
args->slot /* already incremented */ :
|
|
ipfw_find_rule(chain, args->rulenum, args->rule_id+1);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Find the starting rule. It can be either the first
|
|
* one, or the one after divert_rule if asked so.
|
|
*/
|
|
int skipto = mtag ? divert_cookie(mtag) : 0;
|
|
|
|
f_pos = 0;
|
|
if (args->eh == NULL && skipto != 0) {
|
|
if (skipto >= IPFW_DEFAULT_RULE) {
|
|
IPFW_RUNLOCK(chain);
|
|
return (IP_FW_DENY); /* invalid */
|
|
}
|
|
f_pos = ipfw_find_rule(chain, skipto, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* reset divert rule to avoid confusion later */
|
|
if (mtag) {
|
|
divinput_flags = divert_info(mtag) &
|
|
(IP_FW_DIVERT_OUTPUT_FLAG | IP_FW_DIVERT_LOOPBACK_FLAG);
|
|
m_tag_delete(m, mtag);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now scan the rules, and parse microinstructions for each rule.
|
|
* We have two nested loops and an inner switch. Sometimes we
|
|
* need to break out of one or both loops, or re-enter one of
|
|
* the loops with updated variables. Loop variables are:
|
|
*
|
|
* f_pos (outer loop) points to the current rule.
|
|
* On output it points to the matching rule.
|
|
* done (outer loop) is used as a flag to break the loop.
|
|
* l (inner loop) residual length of current rule.
|
|
* cmd points to the current microinstruction.
|
|
*
|
|
* We break the inner loop by setting l=0 and possibly
|
|
* cmdlen=0 if we don't want to advance cmd.
|
|
* We break the outer loop by setting done=1
|
|
* We can restart the inner loop by setting l>0 and f_pos, f, cmd
|
|
* as needed.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (; f_pos < chain->n_rules; f_pos++) {
|
|
ipfw_insn *cmd;
|
|
uint32_t tablearg = 0;
|
|
int l, cmdlen, skip_or; /* skip rest of OR block */
|
|
struct ip_fw *f;
|
|
|
|
f = chain->map[f_pos];
|
|
if (V_set_disable & (1 << f->set) )
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
skip_or = 0;
|
|
for (l = f->cmd_len, cmd = f->cmd ; l > 0 ;
|
|
l -= cmdlen, cmd += cmdlen) {
|
|
int match;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* check_body is a jump target used when we find a
|
|
* CHECK_STATE, and need to jump to the body of
|
|
* the target rule.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* check_body: */
|
|
cmdlen = F_LEN(cmd);
|
|
/*
|
|
* An OR block (insn_1 || .. || insn_n) has the
|
|
* F_OR bit set in all but the last instruction.
|
|
* The first match will set "skip_or", and cause
|
|
* the following instructions to be skipped until
|
|
* past the one with the F_OR bit clear.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (skip_or) { /* skip this instruction */
|
|
if ((cmd->len & F_OR) == 0)
|
|
skip_or = 0; /* next one is good */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
match = 0; /* set to 1 if we succeed */
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd->opcode) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The first set of opcodes compares the packet's
|
|
* fields with some pattern, setting 'match' if a
|
|
* match is found. At the end of the loop there is
|
|
* logic to deal with F_NOT and F_OR flags associated
|
|
* with the opcode.
|
|
*/
|
|
case O_NOP:
|
|
match = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_FORWARD_MAC:
|
|
printf("ipfw: opcode %d unimplemented\n",
|
|
cmd->opcode);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_GID:
|
|
case O_UID:
|
|
case O_JAIL:
|
|
/*
|
|
* We only check offset == 0 && proto != 0,
|
|
* as this ensures that we have a
|
|
* packet with the ports info.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (offset!=0)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (is_ipv6) /* XXX to be fixed later */
|
|
break;
|
|
if (proto == IPPROTO_TCP ||
|
|
proto == IPPROTO_UDP)
|
|
match = check_uidgid(
|
|
(ipfw_insn_u32 *)cmd,
|
|
proto, oif,
|
|
dst_ip, dst_port,
|
|
src_ip, src_port, &ucred_cache,
|
|
&ucred_lookup, args->inp);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_RECV:
|
|
match = iface_match(m->m_pkthdr.rcvif,
|
|
(ipfw_insn_if *)cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_XMIT:
|
|
match = iface_match(oif, (ipfw_insn_if *)cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_VIA:
|
|
match = iface_match(oif ? oif :
|
|
m->m_pkthdr.rcvif, (ipfw_insn_if *)cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_MACADDR2:
|
|
if (args->eh != NULL) { /* have MAC header */
|
|
u_int32_t *want = (u_int32_t *)
|
|
((ipfw_insn_mac *)cmd)->addr;
|
|
u_int32_t *mask = (u_int32_t *)
|
|
((ipfw_insn_mac *)cmd)->mask;
|
|
u_int32_t *hdr = (u_int32_t *)args->eh;
|
|
|
|
match =
|
|
( want[0] == (hdr[0] & mask[0]) &&
|
|
want[1] == (hdr[1] & mask[1]) &&
|
|
want[2] == (hdr[2] & mask[2]) );
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_MAC_TYPE:
|
|
if (args->eh != NULL) {
|
|
u_int16_t *p =
|
|
((ipfw_insn_u16 *)cmd)->ports;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = cmdlen - 1; !match && i>0;
|
|
i--, p += 2)
|
|
match = (etype >= p[0] &&
|
|
etype <= p[1]);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_FRAG:
|
|
match = (offset != 0);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IN: /* "out" is "not in" */
|
|
match = (oif == NULL);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_LAYER2:
|
|
match = (args->eh != NULL);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_DIVERTED:
|
|
match = (cmd->arg1 & 1 && divinput_flags &
|
|
IP_FW_DIVERT_LOOPBACK_FLAG) ||
|
|
(cmd->arg1 & 2 && divinput_flags &
|
|
IP_FW_DIVERT_OUTPUT_FLAG);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_PROTO:
|
|
/*
|
|
* We do not allow an arg of 0 so the
|
|
* check of "proto" only suffices.
|
|
*/
|
|
match = (proto == cmd->arg1);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IP_SRC:
|
|
match = is_ipv4 &&
|
|
(((ipfw_insn_ip *)cmd)->addr.s_addr ==
|
|
src_ip.s_addr);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IP_SRC_LOOKUP:
|
|
case O_IP_DST_LOOKUP:
|
|
if (is_ipv4) {
|
|
uint32_t a =
|
|
(cmd->opcode == O_IP_DST_LOOKUP) ?
|
|
dst_ip.s_addr : src_ip.s_addr;
|
|
uint32_t v = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (cmdlen > F_INSN_SIZE(ipfw_insn_u32)) {
|
|
/* generic lookup */
|
|
v = ((ipfw_insn_u32 *)cmd)->d[1];
|
|
if (v == 0)
|
|
a = dst_ip.s_addr;
|
|
else if (v == 1)
|
|
a = src_ip.s_addr;
|
|
else if (offset != 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
else if (proto != IPPROTO_TCP &&
|
|
proto != IPPROTO_UDP)
|
|
break;
|
|
else if (v == 2)
|
|
a = dst_port;
|
|
else if (v == 3)
|
|
a = src_port;
|
|
else if (v == 4 || v == 5) {
|
|
check_uidgid(
|
|
(ipfw_insn_u32 *)cmd,
|
|
proto, oif,
|
|
dst_ip, dst_port,
|
|
src_ip, src_port, &ucred_cache,
|
|
&ucred_lookup, args->inp);
|
|
if (v == 4 /* O_UID */)
|
|
a = ucred_cache->cr_uid;
|
|
else if (v == 5 /* O_JAIL */)
|
|
a = ucred_cache->cr_prison->pr_id;
|
|
} else
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
match = ipfw_lookup_table(chain, cmd->arg1, a,
|
|
&v);
|
|
if (!match)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (cmdlen == F_INSN_SIZE(ipfw_insn_u32))
|
|
match =
|
|
((ipfw_insn_u32 *)cmd)->d[0] == v;
|
|
else
|
|
tablearg = v;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IP_SRC_MASK:
|
|
case O_IP_DST_MASK:
|
|
if (is_ipv4) {
|
|
uint32_t a =
|
|
(cmd->opcode == O_IP_DST_MASK) ?
|
|
dst_ip.s_addr : src_ip.s_addr;
|
|
uint32_t *p = ((ipfw_insn_u32 *)cmd)->d;
|
|
int i = cmdlen-1;
|
|
|
|
for (; !match && i>0; i-= 2, p+= 2)
|
|
match = (p[0] == (a & p[1]));
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IP_SRC_ME:
|
|
if (is_ipv4) {
|
|
struct ifnet *tif;
|
|
|
|
INADDR_TO_IFP(src_ip, tif);
|
|
match = (tif != NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IP_DST_SET:
|
|
case O_IP_SRC_SET:
|
|
if (is_ipv4) {
|
|
u_int32_t *d = (u_int32_t *)(cmd+1);
|
|
u_int32_t addr =
|
|
cmd->opcode == O_IP_DST_SET ?
|
|
args->f_id.dst_ip :
|
|
args->f_id.src_ip;
|
|
|
|
if (addr < d[0])
|
|
break;
|
|
addr -= d[0]; /* subtract base */
|
|
match = (addr < cmd->arg1) &&
|
|
( d[ 1 + (addr>>5)] &
|
|
(1<<(addr & 0x1f)) );
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IP_DST:
|
|
match = is_ipv4 &&
|
|
(((ipfw_insn_ip *)cmd)->addr.s_addr ==
|
|
dst_ip.s_addr);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IP_DST_ME:
|
|
if (is_ipv4) {
|
|
struct ifnet *tif;
|
|
|
|
INADDR_TO_IFP(dst_ip, tif);
|
|
match = (tif != NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IP_SRCPORT:
|
|
case O_IP_DSTPORT:
|
|
/*
|
|
* offset == 0 && proto != 0 is enough
|
|
* to guarantee that we have a
|
|
* packet with port info.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((proto==IPPROTO_UDP || proto==IPPROTO_TCP)
|
|
&& offset == 0) {
|
|
u_int16_t x =
|
|
(cmd->opcode == O_IP_SRCPORT) ?
|
|
src_port : dst_port ;
|
|
u_int16_t *p =
|
|
((ipfw_insn_u16 *)cmd)->ports;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = cmdlen - 1; !match && i>0;
|
|
i--, p += 2)
|
|
match = (x>=p[0] && x<=p[1]);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_ICMPTYPE:
|
|
match = (offset == 0 && proto==IPPROTO_ICMP &&
|
|
icmptype_match(ICMP(ulp), (ipfw_insn_u32 *)cmd) );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
case O_ICMP6TYPE:
|
|
match = is_ipv6 && offset == 0 &&
|
|
proto==IPPROTO_ICMPV6 &&
|
|
icmp6type_match(
|
|
ICMP6(ulp)->icmp6_type,
|
|
(ipfw_insn_u32 *)cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* INET6 */
|
|
|
|
case O_IPOPT:
|
|
match = (is_ipv4 &&
|
|
ipopts_match(ip, cmd) );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IPVER:
|
|
match = (is_ipv4 &&
|
|
cmd->arg1 == ip->ip_v);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IPID:
|
|
case O_IPLEN:
|
|
case O_IPTTL:
|
|
if (is_ipv4) { /* only for IP packets */
|
|
uint16_t x;
|
|
uint16_t *p;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (cmd->opcode == O_IPLEN)
|
|
x = ip_len;
|
|
else if (cmd->opcode == O_IPTTL)
|
|
x = ip->ip_ttl;
|
|
else /* must be IPID */
|
|
x = ntohs(ip->ip_id);
|
|
if (cmdlen == 1) {
|
|
match = (cmd->arg1 == x);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/* otherwise we have ranges */
|
|
p = ((ipfw_insn_u16 *)cmd)->ports;
|
|
i = cmdlen - 1;
|
|
for (; !match && i>0; i--, p += 2)
|
|
match = (x >= p[0] && x <= p[1]);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IPPRECEDENCE:
|
|
match = (is_ipv4 &&
|
|
(cmd->arg1 == (ip->ip_tos & 0xe0)) );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IPTOS:
|
|
match = (is_ipv4 &&
|
|
flags_match(cmd, ip->ip_tos));
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_TCPDATALEN:
|
|
if (proto == IPPROTO_TCP && offset == 0) {
|
|
struct tcphdr *tcp;
|
|
uint16_t x;
|
|
uint16_t *p;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
tcp = TCP(ulp);
|
|
x = ip_len -
|
|
((ip->ip_hl + tcp->th_off) << 2);
|
|
if (cmdlen == 1) {
|
|
match = (cmd->arg1 == x);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/* otherwise we have ranges */
|
|
p = ((ipfw_insn_u16 *)cmd)->ports;
|
|
i = cmdlen - 1;
|
|
for (; !match && i>0; i--, p += 2)
|
|
match = (x >= p[0] && x <= p[1]);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_TCPFLAGS:
|
|
match = (proto == IPPROTO_TCP && offset == 0 &&
|
|
flags_match(cmd, TCP(ulp)->th_flags));
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_TCPOPTS:
|
|
match = (proto == IPPROTO_TCP && offset == 0 &&
|
|
tcpopts_match(TCP(ulp), cmd));
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_TCPSEQ:
|
|
match = (proto == IPPROTO_TCP && offset == 0 &&
|
|
((ipfw_insn_u32 *)cmd)->d[0] ==
|
|
TCP(ulp)->th_seq);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_TCPACK:
|
|
match = (proto == IPPROTO_TCP && offset == 0 &&
|
|
((ipfw_insn_u32 *)cmd)->d[0] ==
|
|
TCP(ulp)->th_ack);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_TCPWIN:
|
|
match = (proto == IPPROTO_TCP && offset == 0 &&
|
|
cmd->arg1 == TCP(ulp)->th_win);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_ESTAB:
|
|
/* reject packets which have SYN only */
|
|
/* XXX should i also check for TH_ACK ? */
|
|
match = (proto == IPPROTO_TCP && offset == 0 &&
|
|
(TCP(ulp)->th_flags &
|
|
(TH_RST | TH_ACK | TH_SYN)) != TH_SYN);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_ALTQ: {
|
|
struct pf_mtag *at;
|
|
ipfw_insn_altq *altq = (ipfw_insn_altq *)cmd;
|
|
|
|
match = 1;
|
|
at = pf_find_mtag(m);
|
|
if (at != NULL && at->qid != 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
at = pf_get_mtag(m);
|
|
if (at == NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Let the packet fall back to the
|
|
* default ALTQ.
|
|
*/
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
at->qid = altq->qid;
|
|
if (is_ipv4)
|
|
at->af = AF_INET;
|
|
else
|
|
at->af = AF_LINK;
|
|
at->hdr = ip;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case O_LOG:
|
|
ipfw_log(f, hlen, args, m,
|
|
oif, offset, tablearg, ip);
|
|
match = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_PROB:
|
|
match = (random()<((ipfw_insn_u32 *)cmd)->d[0]);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_VERREVPATH:
|
|
/* Outgoing packets automatically pass/match */
|
|
match = ((oif != NULL) ||
|
|
(m->m_pkthdr.rcvif == NULL) ||
|
|
(
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
is_ipv6 ?
|
|
verify_path6(&(args->f_id.src_ip6),
|
|
m->m_pkthdr.rcvif) :
|
|
#endif
|
|
verify_path(src_ip, m->m_pkthdr.rcvif,
|
|
args->f_id.fib)));
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_VERSRCREACH:
|
|
/* Outgoing packets automatically pass/match */
|
|
match = (hlen > 0 && ((oif != NULL) ||
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
is_ipv6 ?
|
|
verify_path6(&(args->f_id.src_ip6),
|
|
NULL) :
|
|
#endif
|
|
verify_path(src_ip, NULL, args->f_id.fib)));
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_ANTISPOOF:
|
|
/* Outgoing packets automatically pass/match */
|
|
if (oif == NULL && hlen > 0 &&
|
|
( (is_ipv4 && in_localaddr(src_ip))
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|| (is_ipv6 &&
|
|
in6_localaddr(&(args->f_id.src_ip6)))
|
|
#endif
|
|
))
|
|
match =
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
is_ipv6 ? verify_path6(
|
|
&(args->f_id.src_ip6),
|
|
m->m_pkthdr.rcvif) :
|
|
#endif
|
|
verify_path(src_ip,
|
|
m->m_pkthdr.rcvif,
|
|
args->f_id.fib);
|
|
else
|
|
match = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IPSEC:
|
|
#ifdef IPSEC
|
|
match = (m_tag_find(m,
|
|
PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_DONE, NULL) != NULL);
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* otherwise no match */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
case O_IP6_SRC:
|
|
match = is_ipv6 &&
|
|
IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&args->f_id.src_ip6,
|
|
&((ipfw_insn_ip6 *)cmd)->addr6);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IP6_DST:
|
|
match = is_ipv6 &&
|
|
IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&args->f_id.dst_ip6,
|
|
&((ipfw_insn_ip6 *)cmd)->addr6);
|
|
break;
|
|
case O_IP6_SRC_MASK:
|
|
case O_IP6_DST_MASK:
|
|
if (is_ipv6) {
|
|
int i = cmdlen - 1;
|
|
struct in6_addr p;
|
|
struct in6_addr *d =
|
|
&((ipfw_insn_ip6 *)cmd)->addr6;
|
|
|
|
for (; !match && i > 0; d += 2,
|
|
i -= F_INSN_SIZE(struct in6_addr)
|
|
* 2) {
|
|
p = (cmd->opcode ==
|
|
O_IP6_SRC_MASK) ?
|
|
args->f_id.src_ip6:
|
|
args->f_id.dst_ip6;
|
|
APPLY_MASK(&p, &d[1]);
|
|
match =
|
|
IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&d[0],
|
|
&p);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IP6_SRC_ME:
|
|
match= is_ipv6 && search_ip6_addr_net(&args->f_id.src_ip6);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IP6_DST_ME:
|
|
match= is_ipv6 && search_ip6_addr_net(&args->f_id.dst_ip6);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_FLOW6ID:
|
|
match = is_ipv6 &&
|
|
flow6id_match(args->f_id.flow_id6,
|
|
(ipfw_insn_u32 *) cmd);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_EXT_HDR:
|
|
match = is_ipv6 &&
|
|
(ext_hd & ((ipfw_insn *) cmd)->arg1);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_IP6:
|
|
match = is_ipv6;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case O_IP4:
|
|
match = is_ipv4;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_TAG: {
|
|
uint32_t tag = (cmd->arg1 == IP_FW_TABLEARG) ?
|
|
tablearg : cmd->arg1;
|
|
|
|
/* Packet is already tagged with this tag? */
|
|
mtag = m_tag_locate(m, MTAG_IPFW, tag, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* We have `untag' action when F_NOT flag is
|
|
* present. And we must remove this mtag from
|
|
* mbuf and reset `match' to zero (`match' will
|
|
* be inversed later).
|
|
* Otherwise we should allocate new mtag and
|
|
* push it into mbuf.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (cmd->len & F_NOT) { /* `untag' action */
|
|
if (mtag != NULL)
|
|
m_tag_delete(m, mtag);
|
|
} else if (mtag == NULL) {
|
|
if ((mtag = m_tag_alloc(MTAG_IPFW,
|
|
tag, 0, M_NOWAIT)) != NULL)
|
|
m_tag_prepend(m, mtag);
|
|
}
|
|
match = (cmd->len & F_NOT) ? 0: 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case O_FIB: /* try match the specified fib */
|
|
if (args->f_id.fib == cmd->arg1)
|
|
match = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_TAGGED: {
|
|
uint32_t tag = (cmd->arg1 == IP_FW_TABLEARG) ?
|
|
tablearg : cmd->arg1;
|
|
|
|
if (cmdlen == 1) {
|
|
match = m_tag_locate(m, MTAG_IPFW,
|
|
tag, NULL) != NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* we have ranges */
|
|
for (mtag = m_tag_first(m);
|
|
mtag != NULL && !match;
|
|
mtag = m_tag_next(m, mtag)) {
|
|
uint16_t *p;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (mtag->m_tag_cookie != MTAG_IPFW)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
p = ((ipfw_insn_u16 *)cmd)->ports;
|
|
i = cmdlen - 1;
|
|
for(; !match && i > 0; i--, p += 2)
|
|
match =
|
|
mtag->m_tag_id >= p[0] &&
|
|
mtag->m_tag_id <= p[1];
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The second set of opcodes represents 'actions',
|
|
* i.e. the terminal part of a rule once the packet
|
|
* matches all previous patterns.
|
|
* Typically there is only one action for each rule,
|
|
* and the opcode is stored at the end of the rule
|
|
* (but there are exceptions -- see below).
|
|
*
|
|
* In general, here we set retval and terminate the
|
|
* outer loop (would be a 'break 3' in some language,
|
|
* but we need to set l=0, done=1)
|
|
*
|
|
* Exceptions:
|
|
* O_COUNT and O_SKIPTO actions:
|
|
* instead of terminating, we jump to the next rule
|
|
* (setting l=0), or to the SKIPTO target (setting
|
|
* f/f_len, cmd and l as needed), respectively.
|
|
*
|
|
* O_TAG, O_LOG and O_ALTQ action parameters:
|
|
* perform some action and set match = 1;
|
|
*
|
|
* O_LIMIT and O_KEEP_STATE: these opcodes are
|
|
* not real 'actions', and are stored right
|
|
* before the 'action' part of the rule.
|
|
* These opcodes try to install an entry in the
|
|
* state tables; if successful, we continue with
|
|
* the next opcode (match=1; break;), otherwise
|
|
* the packet must be dropped (set retval,
|
|
* break loops with l=0, done=1)
|
|
*
|
|
* O_PROBE_STATE and O_CHECK_STATE: these opcodes
|
|
* cause a lookup of the state table, and a jump
|
|
* to the 'action' part of the parent rule
|
|
* if an entry is found, or
|
|
* (CHECK_STATE only) a jump to the next rule if
|
|
* the entry is not found.
|
|
* The result of the lookup is cached so that
|
|
* further instances of these opcodes become NOPs.
|
|
* The jump to the next rule is done by setting
|
|
* l=0, cmdlen=0.
|
|
*/
|
|
case O_LIMIT:
|
|
case O_KEEP_STATE:
|
|
if (ipfw_install_state(f,
|
|
(ipfw_insn_limit *)cmd, args, tablearg)) {
|
|
/* error or limit violation */
|
|
retval = IP_FW_DENY;
|
|
l = 0; /* exit inner loop */
|
|
done = 1; /* exit outer loop */
|
|
}
|
|
match = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_PROBE_STATE:
|
|
case O_CHECK_STATE:
|
|
/*
|
|
* dynamic rules are checked at the first
|
|
* keep-state or check-state occurrence,
|
|
* with the result being stored in dyn_dir.
|
|
* The compiler introduces a PROBE_STATE
|
|
* instruction for us when we have a
|
|
* KEEP_STATE (because PROBE_STATE needs
|
|
* to be run first).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (dyn_dir == MATCH_UNKNOWN &&
|
|
(q = ipfw_lookup_dyn_rule(&args->f_id,
|
|
&dyn_dir, proto == IPPROTO_TCP ?
|
|
TCP(ulp) : NULL))
|
|
!= NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Found dynamic entry, update stats
|
|
* and jump to the 'action' part of
|
|
* the parent rule by setting
|
|
* f, cmd, l and clearing cmdlen.
|
|
*/
|
|
q->pcnt++;
|
|
q->bcnt += pktlen;
|
|
/* XXX we would like to have f_pos
|
|
* readily accessible in the dynamic
|
|
* rule, instead of having to
|
|
* lookup q->rule.
|
|
*/
|
|
f = q->rule;
|
|
f_pos = ipfw_find_rule(chain,
|
|
f->rulenum, f->id);
|
|
cmd = ACTION_PTR(f);
|
|
l = f->cmd_len - f->act_ofs;
|
|
ipfw_dyn_unlock();
|
|
cmdlen = 0;
|
|
match = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Dynamic entry not found. If CHECK_STATE,
|
|
* skip to next rule, if PROBE_STATE just
|
|
* ignore and continue with next opcode.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (cmd->opcode == O_CHECK_STATE)
|
|
l = 0; /* exit inner loop */
|
|
match = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_ACCEPT:
|
|
retval = 0; /* accept */
|
|
l = 0; /* exit inner loop */
|
|
done = 1; /* exit outer loop */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_PIPE:
|
|
case O_QUEUE:
|
|
set_match(args, f_pos, chain);
|
|
args->cookie = (cmd->arg1 == IP_FW_TABLEARG) ?
|
|
tablearg : cmd->arg1;
|
|
if (cmd->opcode == O_QUEUE)
|
|
args->cookie |= 0x80000000;
|
|
retval = IP_FW_DUMMYNET;
|
|
l = 0; /* exit inner loop */
|
|
done = 1; /* exit outer loop */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_DIVERT:
|
|
case O_TEE:
|
|
if (args->eh) /* not on layer 2 */
|
|
break;
|
|
/* otherwise this is terminal */
|
|
l = 0; /* exit inner loop */
|
|
done = 1; /* exit outer loop */
|
|
mtag = m_tag_get(PACKET_TAG_DIVERT,
|
|
sizeof(struct divert_tag),
|
|
M_NOWAIT);
|
|
if (mtag == NULL) {
|
|
retval = IP_FW_DENY;
|
|
} else {
|
|
struct divert_tag *dt;
|
|
dt = (struct divert_tag *)(mtag+1);
|
|
dt->cookie = f->rulenum;
|
|
if (cmd->arg1 == IP_FW_TABLEARG)
|
|
dt->info = tablearg;
|
|
else
|
|
dt->info = cmd->arg1;
|
|
m_tag_prepend(m, mtag);
|
|
retval = (cmd->opcode == O_DIVERT) ?
|
|
IP_FW_DIVERT : IP_FW_TEE;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_COUNT:
|
|
f->pcnt++; /* update stats */
|
|
f->bcnt += pktlen;
|
|
f->timestamp = time_uptime;
|
|
l = 0; /* exit inner loop */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_SKIPTO:
|
|
f->pcnt++; /* update stats */
|
|
f->bcnt += pktlen;
|
|
f->timestamp = time_uptime;
|
|
/* If possible use cached f_pos (in f->next_rule),
|
|
* whose version is written in f->next_rule
|
|
* (horrible hacks to avoid changing the ABI).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (cmd->arg1 != IP_FW_TABLEARG &&
|
|
(uint32_t)f->x_next == chain->id) {
|
|
f_pos = (uint32_t)f->next_rule;
|
|
} else {
|
|
int i = (cmd->arg1 == IP_FW_TABLEARG) ?
|
|
tablearg : cmd->arg1;
|
|
/* make sure we do not jump backward */
|
|
if (i <= f->rulenum)
|
|
i = f->rulenum + 1;
|
|
f_pos = ipfw_find_rule(chain, i, 0);
|
|
/* update the cache */
|
|
if (cmd->arg1 != IP_FW_TABLEARG) {
|
|
f->next_rule =
|
|
(void *)(uintptr_t)f_pos;
|
|
f->x_next =
|
|
(void *)(uintptr_t)chain->id;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Skip disabled rules, and re-enter
|
|
* the inner loop with the correct
|
|
* f_pos, f, l and cmd.
|
|
* Also clear cmdlen and skip_or
|
|
*/
|
|
for (; f_pos < chain->n_rules - 1 &&
|
|
(V_set_disable &
|
|
(1 << chain->map[f_pos]->set));
|
|
f_pos++)
|
|
;
|
|
/* prepare to enter the inner loop */
|
|
f = chain->map[f_pos];
|
|
l = f->cmd_len;
|
|
cmd = f->cmd;
|
|
match = 1;
|
|
cmdlen = 0;
|
|
skip_or = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_REJECT:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Drop the packet and send a reject notice
|
|
* if the packet is not ICMP (or is an ICMP
|
|
* query), and it is not multicast/broadcast.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (hlen > 0 && is_ipv4 && offset == 0 &&
|
|
(proto != IPPROTO_ICMP ||
|
|
is_icmp_query(ICMP(ulp))) &&
|
|
!(m->m_flags & (M_BCAST|M_MCAST)) &&
|
|
!IN_MULTICAST(ntohl(dst_ip.s_addr))) {
|
|
send_reject(args, cmd->arg1, ip_len, ip);
|
|
m = args->m;
|
|
}
|
|
/* FALLTHROUGH */
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
case O_UNREACH6:
|
|
if (hlen > 0 && is_ipv6 &&
|
|
((offset & IP6F_OFF_MASK) == 0) &&
|
|
(proto != IPPROTO_ICMPV6 ||
|
|
(is_icmp6_query(args->f_id.flags) == 1)) &&
|
|
!(m->m_flags & (M_BCAST|M_MCAST)) &&
|
|
!IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&args->f_id.dst_ip6)) {
|
|
send_reject6(
|
|
args, cmd->arg1, hlen,
|
|
(struct ip6_hdr *)ip);
|
|
m = args->m;
|
|
}
|
|
/* FALLTHROUGH */
|
|
#endif
|
|
case O_DENY:
|
|
retval = IP_FW_DENY;
|
|
l = 0; /* exit inner loop */
|
|
done = 1; /* exit outer loop */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_FORWARD_IP:
|
|
if (args->eh) /* not valid on layer2 pkts */
|
|
break;
|
|
if (!q || dyn_dir == MATCH_FORWARD) {
|
|
struct sockaddr_in *sa;
|
|
sa = &(((ipfw_insn_sa *)cmd)->sa);
|
|
if (sa->sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_ANY) {
|
|
bcopy(sa, &args->hopstore,
|
|
sizeof(*sa));
|
|
args->hopstore.sin_addr.s_addr =
|
|
htonl(tablearg);
|
|
args->next_hop = &args->hopstore;
|
|
} else {
|
|
args->next_hop = sa;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
retval = IP_FW_PASS;
|
|
l = 0; /* exit inner loop */
|
|
done = 1; /* exit outer loop */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_NETGRAPH:
|
|
case O_NGTEE:
|
|
set_match(args, f_pos, chain);
|
|
args->cookie = (cmd->arg1 == IP_FW_TABLEARG) ?
|
|
tablearg : cmd->arg1;
|
|
retval = (cmd->opcode == O_NETGRAPH) ?
|
|
IP_FW_NETGRAPH : IP_FW_NGTEE;
|
|
l = 0; /* exit inner loop */
|
|
done = 1; /* exit outer loop */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_SETFIB:
|
|
f->pcnt++; /* update stats */
|
|
f->bcnt += pktlen;
|
|
f->timestamp = time_uptime;
|
|
M_SETFIB(m, cmd->arg1);
|
|
args->f_id.fib = cmd->arg1;
|
|
l = 0; /* exit inner loop */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_NAT:
|
|
if (!IPFW_NAT_LOADED) {
|
|
retval = IP_FW_DENY;
|
|
} else {
|
|
struct cfg_nat *t;
|
|
int nat_id;
|
|
|
|
set_match(args, f_pos, chain);
|
|
t = ((ipfw_insn_nat *)cmd)->nat;
|
|
if (t == NULL) {
|
|
nat_id = (cmd->arg1 == IP_FW_TABLEARG) ?
|
|
tablearg : cmd->arg1;
|
|
t = (*lookup_nat_ptr)(&chain->nat, nat_id);
|
|
|
|
if (t == NULL) {
|
|
retval = IP_FW_DENY;
|
|
l = 0; /* exit inner loop */
|
|
done = 1; /* exit outer loop */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (cmd->arg1 != IP_FW_TABLEARG)
|
|
((ipfw_insn_nat *)cmd)->nat = t;
|
|
}
|
|
retval = ipfw_nat_ptr(args, t, m);
|
|
}
|
|
l = 0; /* exit inner loop */
|
|
done = 1; /* exit outer loop */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_REASS: {
|
|
int ip_off;
|
|
|
|
f->pcnt++;
|
|
f->bcnt += pktlen;
|
|
l = 0; /* in any case exit inner loop */
|
|
|
|
ip_off = (args->eh != NULL) ?
|
|
ntohs(ip->ip_off) : ip->ip_off;
|
|
/* if not fragmented, go to next rule */
|
|
if ((ip_off & (IP_MF | IP_OFFMASK)) == 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
/*
|
|
* ip_reass() expects len & off in host
|
|
* byte order: fix them in case we come
|
|
* from layer2.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (args->eh != NULL) {
|
|
ip->ip_len = ntohs(ip->ip_len);
|
|
ip->ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
args->m = m = ip_reass(m);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* IP header checksum fixup after
|
|
* reassembly and leave header
|
|
* in network byte order.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (m == NULL) { /* fragment got swallowed */
|
|
retval = IP_FW_DENY;
|
|
} else { /* good, packet complete */
|
|
int hlen;
|
|
|
|
ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
|
|
hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2;
|
|
/* revert len & off for layer2 pkts */
|
|
if (args->eh != NULL)
|
|
ip->ip_len = htons(ip->ip_len);
|
|
ip->ip_sum = 0;
|
|
if (hlen == sizeof(struct ip))
|
|
ip->ip_sum = in_cksum_hdr(ip);
|
|
else
|
|
ip->ip_sum = in_cksum(m, hlen);
|
|
retval = IP_FW_REASS;
|
|
set_match(args, f_pos, chain);
|
|
}
|
|
done = 1; /* exit outer loop */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
panic("-- unknown opcode %d\n", cmd->opcode);
|
|
} /* end of switch() on opcodes */
|
|
/*
|
|
* if we get here with l=0, then match is irrelevant.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (cmd->len & F_NOT)
|
|
match = !match;
|
|
|
|
if (match) {
|
|
if (cmd->len & F_OR)
|
|
skip_or = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!(cmd->len & F_OR)) /* not an OR block, */
|
|
break; /* try next rule */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} /* end of inner loop, scan opcodes */
|
|
|
|
if (done)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/* next_rule:; */ /* try next rule */
|
|
|
|
} /* end of outer for, scan rules */
|
|
|
|
if (done) {
|
|
struct ip_fw *rule = chain->map[f_pos];
|
|
/* Update statistics */
|
|
rule->pcnt++;
|
|
rule->bcnt += pktlen;
|
|
rule->timestamp = time_uptime;
|
|
} else {
|
|
retval = IP_FW_DENY;
|
|
printf("ipfw: ouch!, skip past end of rules, denying packet\n");
|
|
}
|
|
IPFW_RUNLOCK(chain);
|
|
if (ucred_cache != NULL)
|
|
crfree(ucred_cache);
|
|
return (retval);
|
|
|
|
pullup_failed:
|
|
if (V_fw_verbose)
|
|
printf("ipfw: pullup failed\n");
|
|
return (IP_FW_DENY);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Module and VNET glue
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Stuff that must be initialised only on boot or module load
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
ipfw_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
ipfw_dyn_attach();
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only print out this stuff the first time around,
|
|
* when called from the sysinit code.
|
|
*/
|
|
printf("ipfw2 "
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
"(+ipv6) "
|
|
#endif
|
|
"initialized, divert %s, nat %s, "
|
|
"rule-based forwarding "
|
|
#ifdef IPFIREWALL_FORWARD
|
|
"enabled, "
|
|
#else
|
|
"disabled, "
|
|
#endif
|
|
"default to %s, logging ",
|
|
#ifdef IPDIVERT
|
|
"enabled",
|
|
#else
|
|
"loadable",
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef IPFIREWALL_NAT
|
|
"enabled",
|
|
#else
|
|
"loadable",
|
|
#endif
|
|
default_to_accept ? "accept" : "deny");
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note: V_xxx variables can be accessed here but the vnet specific
|
|
* initializer may not have been called yet for the VIMAGE case.
|
|
* Tuneables will have been processed. We will print out values for
|
|
* the default vnet.
|
|
* XXX This should all be rationalized AFTER 8.0
|
|
*/
|
|
if (V_fw_verbose == 0)
|
|
printf("disabled\n");
|
|
else if (V_verbose_limit == 0)
|
|
printf("unlimited\n");
|
|
else
|
|
printf("limited to %d packets/entry by default\n",
|
|
V_verbose_limit);
|
|
|
|
ipfw_log_bpf(1); /* init */
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Called for the removal of the last instance only on module unload.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
ipfw_destroy(void)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ipfw_log_bpf(0); /* uninit */
|
|
ipfw_dyn_detach();
|
|
printf("IP firewall unloaded\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Stuff that must be initialized for every instance
|
|
* (including the first of course).
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
vnet_ipfw_init(const void *unused)
|
|
{
|
|
int error;
|
|
struct ip_fw *rule = NULL;
|
|
struct ip_fw_chain *chain;
|
|
|
|
chain = &V_layer3_chain;
|
|
|
|
/* First set up some values that are compile time options */
|
|
V_autoinc_step = 100; /* bounded to 1..1000 in add_rule() */
|
|
V_fw_deny_unknown_exthdrs = 1;
|
|
#ifdef IPFIREWALL_VERBOSE
|
|
V_fw_verbose = 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef IPFIREWALL_VERBOSE_LIMIT
|
|
V_verbose_limit = IPFIREWALL_VERBOSE_LIMIT;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef IPFIREWALL_NAT
|
|
LIST_INIT(&chain->nat);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* insert the default rule and create the initial map */
|
|
chain->n_rules = 1;
|
|
chain->static_len = sizeof(struct ip_fw);
|
|
chain->map = malloc(sizeof(struct ip_fw *), M_IPFW, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
|
|
if (chain->map)
|
|
rule = malloc(chain->static_len, M_IPFW, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
|
|
if (rule == NULL) {
|
|
if (chain->map)
|
|
free(chain->map, M_IPFW);
|
|
printf("ipfw2: ENOSPC initializing default rule "
|
|
"(support disabled)\n");
|
|
return (ENOSPC);
|
|
}
|
|
error = ipfw_init_tables(chain);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
panic("init_tables"); /* XXX Marko fix this ! */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* fill and insert the default rule */
|
|
rule->act_ofs = 0;
|
|
rule->rulenum = IPFW_DEFAULT_RULE;
|
|
rule->cmd_len = 1;
|
|
rule->set = RESVD_SET;
|
|
rule->cmd[0].len = 1;
|
|
rule->cmd[0].opcode = default_to_accept ? O_ACCEPT : O_DENY;
|
|
chain->rules = chain->default_rule = chain->map[0] = rule;
|
|
chain->id = rule->id = 1;
|
|
|
|
IPFW_LOCK_INIT(chain);
|
|
ipfw_dyn_init();
|
|
|
|
/* First set up some values that are compile time options */
|
|
V_ipfw_vnet_ready = 1; /* Open for business */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Hook the sockopt handler, and the layer2 (V_ip_fw_chk_ptr)
|
|
* and pfil hooks for ipv4 and ipv6. Even if the latter two fail
|
|
* we still keep the module alive because the sockopt and
|
|
* layer2 paths are still useful.
|
|
* ipfw[6]_hook return 0 on success, ENOENT on failure,
|
|
* so we can ignore the exact return value and just set a flag.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that V_fw[6]_enable are manipulated by a SYSCTL_PROC so
|
|
* changes in the underlying (per-vnet) variables trigger
|
|
* immediate hook()/unhook() calls.
|
|
* In layer2 we have the same behaviour, except that V_ether_ipfw
|
|
* is checked on each packet because there are no pfil hooks.
|
|
*/
|
|
V_ip_fw_ctl_ptr = ipfw_ctl;
|
|
V_ip_fw_chk_ptr = ipfw_chk;
|
|
error = ipfw_attach_hooks();
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Called for the removal of each instance.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
vnet_ipfw_uninit(const void *unused)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ip_fw *reap, *rule;
|
|
struct ip_fw_chain *chain = &V_layer3_chain;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
V_ipfw_vnet_ready = 0; /* tell new callers to go away */
|
|
/*
|
|
* disconnect from ipv4, ipv6, layer2 and sockopt.
|
|
* Then grab, release and grab again the WLOCK so we make
|
|
* sure the update is propagated and nobody will be in.
|
|
*/
|
|
ipfw_unhook();
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
ipfw6_unhook();
|
|
#endif
|
|
V_ip_fw_chk_ptr = NULL;
|
|
V_ip_fw_ctl_ptr = NULL;
|
|
IPFW_UH_WLOCK(chain);
|
|
IPFW_UH_WUNLOCK(chain);
|
|
IPFW_UH_WLOCK(chain);
|
|
|
|
IPFW_WLOCK(chain);
|
|
IPFW_WUNLOCK(chain);
|
|
IPFW_WLOCK(chain);
|
|
|
|
ipfw_dyn_uninit(0); /* run the callout_drain */
|
|
ipfw_flush_tables(chain);
|
|
reap = NULL;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < chain->n_rules; i++) {
|
|
rule = chain->map[i];
|
|
rule->x_next = reap;
|
|
reap = rule;
|
|
}
|
|
if (chain->map)
|
|
free(chain->map, M_IPFW);
|
|
IPFW_WUNLOCK(chain);
|
|
IPFW_UH_WUNLOCK(chain);
|
|
if (reap != NULL)
|
|
ipfw_reap_rules(reap);
|
|
IPFW_LOCK_DESTROY(chain);
|
|
ipfw_dyn_uninit(1); /* free the remaining parts */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Module event handler.
|
|
* In general we have the choice of handling most of these events by the
|
|
* event handler or by the (VNET_)SYS(UN)INIT handlers. I have chosen to
|
|
* use the SYSINIT handlers as they are more capable of expressing the
|
|
* flow of control during module and vnet operations, so this is just
|
|
* a skeleton. Note there is no SYSINIT equivalent of the module
|
|
* SHUTDOWN handler, but we don't have anything to do in that case anyhow.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
ipfw_modevent(module_t mod, int type, void *unused)
|
|
{
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
case MOD_LOAD:
|
|
/* Called once at module load or
|
|
* system boot if compiled in. */
|
|
break;
|
|
case MOD_QUIESCE:
|
|
/* Called before unload. May veto unloading. */
|
|
break;
|
|
case MOD_UNLOAD:
|
|
/* Called during unload. */
|
|
break;
|
|
case MOD_SHUTDOWN:
|
|
/* Called during system shutdown. */
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
err = EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static moduledata_t ipfwmod = {
|
|
"ipfw",
|
|
ipfw_modevent,
|
|
0
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* Define startup order. */
|
|
#define IPFW_SI_SUB_FIREWALL SI_SUB_PROTO_IFATTACHDOMAIN
|
|
#define IPFW_MODEVENT_ORDER (SI_ORDER_ANY - 255) /* On boot slot in here. */
|
|
#define IPFW_MODULE_ORDER (IPFW_MODEVENT_ORDER + 1) /* A little later. */
|
|
#define IPFW_VNET_ORDER (IPFW_MODEVENT_ORDER + 2) /* Later still. */
|
|
|
|
DECLARE_MODULE(ipfw, ipfwmod, IPFW_SI_SUB_FIREWALL, IPFW_MODEVENT_ORDER);
|
|
MODULE_VERSION(ipfw, 2);
|
|
/* should declare some dependencies here */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Starting up. Done in order after ipfwmod() has been called.
|
|
* VNET_SYSINIT is also called for each existing vnet and each new vnet.
|
|
*/
|
|
SYSINIT(ipfw_init, IPFW_SI_SUB_FIREWALL, IPFW_MODULE_ORDER,
|
|
ipfw_init, NULL);
|
|
VNET_SYSINIT(vnet_ipfw_init, IPFW_SI_SUB_FIREWALL, IPFW_VNET_ORDER,
|
|
vnet_ipfw_init, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Closing up shop. These are done in REVERSE ORDER, but still
|
|
* after ipfwmod() has been called. Not called on reboot.
|
|
* VNET_SYSUNINIT is also called for each exiting vnet as it exits.
|
|
* or when the module is unloaded.
|
|
*/
|
|
SYSUNINIT(ipfw_destroy, IPFW_SI_SUB_FIREWALL, IPFW_MODULE_ORDER,
|
|
ipfw_destroy, NULL);
|
|
VNET_SYSUNINIT(vnet_ipfw_uninit, IPFW_SI_SUB_FIREWALL, IPFW_VNET_ORDER,
|
|
vnet_ipfw_uninit, NULL);
|
|
/* end of file */
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