d903306a26
work present in FreeBSD 7.0 to refine the kernel privilege model: - Introduce support for jail as a testing variable, in order to confirm that privileges are properly restricted in the jail environment. - Restructure overall testing approach so that privilege and jail conditions are set in the testing infrastructure before tests are invoked, and done so in a custom-created process to isolate the impact of tests from each other in a more consistent way. - Tests now provide setup and cleanup hooks that occur before and after the test runs. - New privilege tests are now present for several audit privileges, several credential management privileges, dmesg buffer reading privilege, and netinet raw socket creation. - Other existing tests are restructured and generally improved as a result of better framework structure and jail as a variable. For exampe, we now test that certain sysctls are writable only outside jail, while others are writable within jail. On a similar note, privileges relating to setting UFS file flags are now better exercised, as with the right to chmod and utimes files. Approved by: re (bmah) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
153 lines
4.6 KiB
C
153 lines
4.6 KiB
C
/*-
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* Copyright (c) 2006 nCircle Network Security, Inc.
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* Copyright (c) 2007 Robert N. M. Watson
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This software was developed by Robert N. M. Watson for the TrustedBSD
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* Project under contract to nCircle Network Security, Inc.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR, NCIRCLE NETWORK SECURITY,
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* INC., OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
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* TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
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* PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
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* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
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* NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
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* SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* $FreeBSD$
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*/
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/*
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* There are three cases in which the file system will clear the setuid or
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* setgid bits on a file when running unprivileged:
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*
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* - When the file is chown()'d and either of the uid or the gid is changed.
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* (currently, only changing the file gid applies, as privilege is required
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* to change the uid).
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*
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* - The file is written to successfully.
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*
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* - An extended attribute of the file is written to successfully.
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*
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* In each case, check that the flags are cleared if unprivileged, and that
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* they aren't cleared if privileged.
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*
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* We can't use expect() as we're looking for side-effects rather than
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* success/failure of the system call.
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*/
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/extattr.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <err.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include "main.h"
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static char fpath[1024];
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static int fpath_initialized;
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/*
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* If running as root, check that SUID is still set; otherwise, check that it
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* is not.
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*/
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static void
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confirm_sugid(char *test_case, int asroot, int injail)
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{
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struct stat sb;
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if (stat(fpath, &sb) < 0) {
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warn("%s stat(%s)", test_case, fpath);
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return;
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}
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if (asroot) {
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if (!(sb.st_mode & S_ISUID))
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warnx("%s(root, %s): !SUID", test_case, injail ?
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"jail" : "!jail");
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} else {
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if (sb.st_mode & S_ISUID)
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warnx("%s(!root, %s): SUID", test_case, injail ?
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"jail" : "!jail");
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}
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}
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int
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priv_vfs_clearsugid_setup(int asroot, int injail, struct test *test)
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{
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setup_file("priv_vfs_clearsugid_setup: fpath", fpath, UID_OWNER,
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GID_OTHER, 0600 | S_ISUID);
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fpath_initialized = 1;
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return (0);
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}
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void
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priv_vfs_clearsugid_chgrp(int asroot, int injail, struct test *test)
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{
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if (chown(fpath, -1, asroot ? GID_WHEEL : GID_OWNER) < 0)
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err(-1, "priv_vfs_clearsugid_chgrp(%s, %s): chrgrp",
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asroot ? "root" : "!root", injail ? "jail" : "!jail");
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confirm_sugid("priv_vfs_clearsugid_chgrp", asroot, injail);
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}
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#define EA_NAMESPACE EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_USER
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#define EA_NAME "clearsugid"
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#define EA_DATA "test"
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#define EA_SIZE (strlen(EA_DATA))
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void
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priv_vfs_clearsugid_extattr(int asroot, int injail, struct test *test)
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{
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if (extattr_set_file(fpath, EA_NAMESPACE, EA_NAME, EA_DATA, EA_SIZE)
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< 0)
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err(-1,
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"priv_vfs_clearsugid_extattr(%s, %s): extattr_set_file",
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asroot ? "root" : "!root", injail ? "jail" : "!jail");
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confirm_sugid("priv_vfs_clearsugid_extattr", asroot, injail);
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}
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void
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priv_vfs_clearsugid_write(int asroot, int injail, struct test *test)
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{
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int fd;
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fd = open(fpath, O_RDWR);
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if (fd < 0)
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err(-1, "priv_vfs_clearsugid_write(%s, %s): open",
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asroot ? "root" : "!root", injail ? "jail" : "!jail");
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if (write(fd, EA_DATA, EA_SIZE) < 0)
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err(-1, "priv_vfs_clearsugid_write(%s, %s): write",
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asroot ? "root" : "!root", injail ? "jail" : "!jail");
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(void)close(fd);
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confirm_sugid("priv_vfs_clearsugid_write", asroot, injail);
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}
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void
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priv_vfs_clearsugid_cleanup(int asroot, int injail, struct test *test)
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{
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if (fpath_initialized) {
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(void)unlink(fpath);
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fpath_initialized = 0;
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}
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}
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