558 lines
15 KiB
C
558 lines
15 KiB
C
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-jpake.c,v 1.2 2008/11/07 23:34:48 dtucker Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
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* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
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* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
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* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
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*/
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/*
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* Server side of zero-knowledge password auth using J-PAKE protocol
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* as described in:
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*
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* F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling",
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* 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008
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*
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* http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/Research/contributions/hao-ryan-2008.pdf
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*/
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#ifdef JPAKE
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <pwd.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <login_cap.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include "xmalloc.h"
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#include "ssh2.h"
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#include "key.h"
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#include "hostfile.h"
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#include "buffer.h"
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#include "auth.h"
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#include "packet.h"
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#include "dispatch.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "servconf.h"
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#include "auth-options.h"
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#include "canohost.h"
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#ifdef GSSAPI
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#include "ssh-gss.h"
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#endif
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#include "monitor_wrap.h"
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#include "jpake.h"
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/*
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* XXX options->permit_empty_passwd (at the moment, they will be refused
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* anyway because they will mismatch on fake salt.
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*/
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/* Dispatch handlers */
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static void input_userauth_jpake_client_step1(int, u_int32_t, void *);
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static void input_userauth_jpake_client_step2(int, u_int32_t, void *);
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static void input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *);
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static int auth2_jpake_start(Authctxt *);
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/* import */
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extern ServerOptions options;
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extern u_char *session_id2;
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extern u_int session_id2_len;
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/*
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* Attempt J-PAKE authentication.
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*/
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static int
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userauth_jpake(Authctxt *authctxt)
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{
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int authenticated = 0;
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packet_check_eom();
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debug("jpake-01@openssh.com requested");
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if (authctxt->user != NULL) {
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if (authctxt->jpake_ctx == NULL)
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authctxt->jpake_ctx = jpake_new();
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if (options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
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authenticated = auth2_jpake_start(authctxt);
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}
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return authenticated;
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}
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Authmethod method_jpake = {
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"jpake-01@openssh.com",
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userauth_jpake,
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&options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication
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};
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/* Clear context and callbacks */
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void
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auth2_jpake_stop(Authctxt *authctxt)
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{
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/* unregister callbacks */
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dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1, NULL);
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dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2, NULL);
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dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM, NULL);
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if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
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jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
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authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
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}
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}
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/* Returns 1 if 'c' is a valid crypt(3) salt character, 0 otherwise */
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static int
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valid_crypt_salt(int c)
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{
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if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
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return 1;
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if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
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return 1;
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if (c >= '.' && c <= '9')
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Derive fake salt as H(username || first_private_host_key)
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* This provides relatively stable fake salts for non-existent
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* users and avoids the jpake method becoming an account validity
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* oracle.
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*/
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static void
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derive_rawsalt(const char *username, u_char *rawsalt, u_int len)
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{
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u_char *digest;
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u_int digest_len;
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Buffer b;
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Key *k;
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buffer_init(&b);
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buffer_put_cstring(&b, username);
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if ((k = get_hostkey_by_index(0)) == NULL ||
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(k->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT))
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fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
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switch (k->type) {
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case KEY_RSA1:
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case KEY_RSA:
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if (k->rsa->p == NULL || k->rsa->q == NULL)
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fatal("%s: RSA key missing p and/or q", __func__);
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buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->rsa->p);
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buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->rsa->q);
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break;
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case KEY_DSA:
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if (k->dsa->priv_key == NULL)
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fatal("%s: DSA key missing priv_key", __func__);
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buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->dsa->priv_key);
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break;
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default:
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fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, k->type);
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}
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if (hash_buffer(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), EVP_sha256(),
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&digest, &digest_len) != 0)
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fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
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buffer_free(&b);
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if (len > digest_len)
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fatal("%s: not enough bytes for rawsalt (want %u have %u)",
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__func__, len, digest_len);
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memcpy(rawsalt, digest, len);
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bzero(digest, digest_len);
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xfree(digest);
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}
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/* ASCII an integer [0, 64) for inclusion in a password/salt */
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static char
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pw_encode64(u_int i64)
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{
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const u_char e64[] =
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"./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
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return e64[i64 % 64];
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}
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/* Generate ASCII salt bytes for user */
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static char *
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makesalt(u_int want, const char *user)
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{
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u_char rawsalt[32];
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static char ret[33];
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u_int i;
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if (want > sizeof(ret) - 1)
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fatal("%s: want %u", __func__, want);
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derive_rawsalt(user, rawsalt, sizeof(rawsalt));
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bzero(ret, sizeof(ret));
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for (i = 0; i < want; i++)
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ret[i] = pw_encode64(rawsalt[i]);
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bzero(rawsalt, sizeof(rawsalt));
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Select the system's default password hashing scheme and generate
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* a stable fake salt under it for use by a non-existent account.
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* Prevents jpake method being used to infer the validity of accounts.
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*/
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static void
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fake_salt_and_scheme(Authctxt *authctxt, char **salt, char **scheme)
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{
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char *rounds_s, *style;
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long long rounds;
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login_cap_t *lc;
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if ((lc = login_getclass(authctxt->pw->pw_class)) == NULL &&
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(lc = login_getclass(NULL)) == NULL)
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fatal("%s: login_getclass failed", __func__);
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style = login_getcapstr(lc, "localcipher", NULL, NULL);
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if (style == NULL)
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style = xstrdup("blowfish,6");
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login_close(lc);
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if ((rounds_s = strchr(style, ',')) != NULL)
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*rounds_s++ = '\0';
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rounds = strtonum(rounds_s, 1, 1<<31, NULL);
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if (strcmp(style, "md5") == 0) {
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xasprintf(salt, "$1$%s$", makesalt(8, authctxt->user));
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*scheme = xstrdup("md5");
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} else if (strcmp(style, "old") == 0) {
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*salt = xstrdup(makesalt(2, authctxt->user));
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*scheme = xstrdup("crypt");
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} else if (strcmp(style, "newsalt") == 0) {
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rounds = MAX(rounds, 7250);
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rounds = MIN(rounds, (1<<24) - 1);
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xasprintf(salt, "_%c%c%c%c%s",
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pw_encode64(rounds), pw_encode64(rounds >> 6),
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pw_encode64(rounds >> 12), pw_encode64(rounds >> 18),
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makesalt(4, authctxt->user));
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*scheme = xstrdup("crypt-extended");
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} else {
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/* Default to blowfish */
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rounds = MAX(rounds, 3);
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rounds = MIN(rounds, 31);
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xasprintf(salt, "$2a$%02lld$%s", rounds,
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makesalt(22, authctxt->user));
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*scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
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}
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xfree(style);
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debug3("%s: fake %s salt for user %s: %s",
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__func__, *scheme, authctxt->user, *salt);
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}
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/*
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* Fetch password hashing scheme, password salt and derive shared secret
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* for user. If user does not exist, a fake but stable and user-unique
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* salt will be returned.
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*/
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void
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auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM **s,
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char **hash_scheme, char **salt)
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{
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char *cp;
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u_char *secret;
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u_int secret_len, salt_len;
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#ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
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debug3("%s: valid %d pw %.5s...", __func__,
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authctxt->valid, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd);
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#endif
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*salt = NULL;
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*hash_scheme = NULL;
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if (authctxt->valid) {
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if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$2$", 3) == 0 &&
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strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 28) {
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/*
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* old-variant bcrypt:
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* "$2$", 2 digit rounds, "$", 22 bytes salt
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*/
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salt_len = 3 + 2 + 1 + 22 + 1;
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*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
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strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
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*hash_scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
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} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$2a$", 4) == 0 &&
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strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 29) {
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/*
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* current-variant bcrypt:
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* "$2a$", 2 digit rounds, "$", 22 bytes salt
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*/
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salt_len = 4 + 2 + 1 + 22 + 1;
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*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
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strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
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*hash_scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
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} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$1$", 3) == 0 &&
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strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 5) {
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/*
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* md5crypt:
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* "$1$", salt until "$"
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*/
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cp = strchr(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd + 3, '$');
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if (cp != NULL) {
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salt_len = (cp - authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) + 1;
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*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
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strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd,
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salt_len);
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*hash_scheme = xstrdup("md5crypt");
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}
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} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "_", 1) == 0 &&
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strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 9) {
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/*
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* BSDI extended crypt:
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* "_", 4 digits count, 4 chars salt
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*/
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salt_len = 1 + 4 + 4 + 1;
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*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
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strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
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*hash_scheme = xstrdup("crypt-extended");
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} else if (strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) == 13 &&
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valid_crypt_salt(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd[0]) &&
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valid_crypt_salt(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd[1])) {
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/*
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* traditional crypt:
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* 2 chars salt
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*/
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salt_len = 2 + 1;
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*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
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strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
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*hash_scheme = xstrdup("crypt");
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}
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if (*salt == NULL) {
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debug("%s: unrecognised crypt scheme for user %s",
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__func__, authctxt->pw->pw_name);
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}
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}
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if (*salt == NULL)
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fake_salt_and_scheme(authctxt, salt, hash_scheme);
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if (hash_buffer(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd,
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strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd), EVP_sha256(),
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&secret, &secret_len) != 0)
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fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
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if ((*s = BN_bin2bn(secret, secret_len, NULL)) == NULL)
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fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn (secret)", __func__);
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#ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
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debug3("%s: salt = %s (len %u)", __func__,
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*salt, (u_int)strlen(*salt));
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debug3("%s: scheme = %s", __func__, *hash_scheme);
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JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((*s, "%s: s = ", __func__));
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#endif
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bzero(secret, secret_len);
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xfree(secret);
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}
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/*
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* Being authentication attempt.
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* Note, sets authctxt->postponed while in subprotocol
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*/
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static int
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auth2_jpake_start(Authctxt *authctxt)
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{
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struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
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u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
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u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
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char *salt, *hash_scheme;
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debug("%s: start", __func__);
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PRIVSEP(jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
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&pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
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&pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
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&x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
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&x4_proof, &x4_proof_len));
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PRIVSEP(auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s,
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&hash_scheme, &salt));
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if (!use_privsep)
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JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 sending in %s", __func__));
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packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1);
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packet_put_cstring(hash_scheme);
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packet_put_cstring(salt);
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packet_put_string(pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
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packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x3);
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packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x4);
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packet_put_string(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
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packet_put_string(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
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packet_send();
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packet_write_wait();
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bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
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bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
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xfree(hash_scheme);
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xfree(salt);
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bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
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bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
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xfree(x3_proof);
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xfree(x4_proof);
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/* Expect step 1 packet from peer */
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dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1,
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input_userauth_jpake_client_step1);
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authctxt->postponed = 1;
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return 0;
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}
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/* ARGSUSED */
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static void
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input_userauth_jpake_client_step1(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
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{
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Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
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struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
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u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
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u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
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/* Disable this message */
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dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1, NULL);
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/* Fetch step 1 values */
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if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
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(pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
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fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
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pctx->client_id = packet_get_string(&pctx->client_id_len);
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packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x1);
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packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x2);
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x1_proof = packet_get_string(&x1_proof_len);
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x2_proof = packet_get_string(&x2_proof_len);
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packet_check_eom();
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if (!use_privsep)
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JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 received in %s", __func__));
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PRIVSEP(jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
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pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
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pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
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pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
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x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
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x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
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&pctx->b,
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&x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len));
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bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
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bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
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xfree(x1_proof);
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xfree(x2_proof);
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if (!use_privsep)
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JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 sending in %s", __func__));
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/* Send values for step 2 */
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packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2);
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packet_put_bignum2(pctx->b);
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packet_put_string(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
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packet_send();
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packet_write_wait();
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bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
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xfree(x4_s_proof);
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/* Expect step 2 packet from peer */
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dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2,
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input_userauth_jpake_client_step2);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ARGSUSED */
|
|
static void
|
|
input_userauth_jpake_client_step2(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
|
|
{
|
|
Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
|
|
struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
|
|
u_char *x2_s_proof;
|
|
u_int x2_s_proof_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Disable this message */
|
|
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
|
|
fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
|
|
|
|
/* Fetch step 2 values */
|
|
packet_get_bignum2(pctx->a);
|
|
x2_s_proof = packet_get_string(&x2_s_proof_len);
|
|
packet_check_eom();
|
|
|
|
if (!use_privsep)
|
|
JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 received in %s", __func__));
|
|
|
|
/* Derive shared key and calculate confirmation hash */
|
|
PRIVSEP(jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
|
|
pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
|
|
pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
|
|
pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
|
|
session_id2, session_id2_len,
|
|
x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
|
|
&pctx->k,
|
|
&pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len));
|
|
|
|
bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
|
|
xfree(x2_s_proof);
|
|
|
|
if (!use_privsep)
|
|
JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm sending in %s", __func__));
|
|
|
|
/* Send key confirmation proof */
|
|
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM);
|
|
packet_put_string(pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
|
|
packet_send();
|
|
packet_write_wait();
|
|
|
|
/* Expect confirmation from peer */
|
|
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM,
|
|
input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ARGSUSED */
|
|
static void
|
|
input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
|
|
{
|
|
Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
|
|
struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
|
|
int authenticated = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Disable this message */
|
|
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM, NULL);
|
|
|
|
pctx->h_k_cid_sessid = packet_get_string(&pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
|
|
packet_check_eom();
|
|
|
|
if (!use_privsep)
|
|
JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm received in %s", __func__));
|
|
|
|
/* Verify expected confirmation hash */
|
|
if (PRIVSEP(jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
|
|
pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
|
|
session_id2, session_id2_len,
|
|
pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len)) == 1)
|
|
authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0;
|
|
else
|
|
debug("%s: confirmation mismatch", __func__);
|
|
|
|
/* done */
|
|
authctxt->postponed = 0;
|
|
jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
|
|
authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
|
|
userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method_jpake.name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* JPAKE */
|
|
|