2016-09-23 12:34:54 +00:00
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/*-
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* Copyright (c) 2016 The FreeBSD Foundation
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This software was developed by Konstantin Belousov <kib@FreeBSD.org>
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* under sponsorship from the FreeBSD Foundation.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include <sys/procctl.h>
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#include <err.h>
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#include <stdbool.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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enum {
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Implement Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
With this change, randomization can be enabled for all non-fixed
mappings. It means that the base address for the mapping is selected
with a guaranteed amount of entropy (bits). If the mapping was
requested to be superpage aligned, the randomization honours the
superpage attributes.
Although the value of ASLR is diminshing over time as exploit authors
work out simple ASLR bypass techniques, it elimintates the trivial
exploitation of certain vulnerabilities, at least in theory. This
implementation is relatively small and happens at the correct
architectural level. Also, it is not expected to introduce
regressions in existing cases when turned off (default for now), or
cause any significant maintaince burden.
The randomization is done on a best-effort basis - that is, the
allocator falls back to a first fit strategy if fragmentation prevents
entropy injection. It is trivial to implement a strong mode where
failure to guarantee the requested amount of entropy results in
mapping request failure, but I do not consider that to be usable.
I have not fine-tuned the amount of entropy injected right now. It is
only a quantitive change that will not change the implementation. The
current amount is controlled by aslr_pages_rnd.
To not spoil coalescing optimizations, to reduce the page table
fragmentation inherent to ASLR, and to keep the transient superpage
promotion for the malloced memory, locality clustering is implemented
for anonymous private mappings, which are automatically grouped until
fragmentation kicks in. The initial location for the anon group range
is, of course, randomized. This is controlled by vm.cluster_anon,
enabled by default.
The default mode keeps the sbrk area unpopulated by other mappings,
but this can be turned off, which gives much more breathing bits on
architectures with small address space, such as i386. This is tied
with the question of following an application's hint about the mmap(2)
base address. Testing shows that ignoring the hint does not affect the
function of common applications, but I would expect more demanding
code could break. By default sbrk is preserved and mmap hints are
satisfied, which can be changed by using the
kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk sysctl.
ASLR is enabled on per-ABI basis, and currently it is only allowed on
FreeBSD native i386 and amd64 (including compat 32bit) ABIs. Support
for additional architectures will be added after further testing.
Both per-process and per-image controls are implemented:
- procctl(2) adds PROC_ASLR_CTL/PROC_ASLR_STATUS;
- NT_FREEBSD_FCTL_ASLR_DISABLE feature control note bit makes it possible
to force ASLR off for the given binary. (A tool to edit the feature
control note is in development.)
Global controls are:
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.enable - for non-fixed mappings done by mmap(2);
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.pie_enable - for PIE image activation mappings;
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk - allow to use sbrk area for mmap(2);
- vm.cluster_anon - enables anon mapping clustering.
PR: 208580 (exp runs)
Exp-runs done by: antoine
Reviewed by: markj (previous version)
Discussed with: emaste
Tested by: pho
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D5603
2019-02-10 17:19:45 +00:00
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MODE_ASLR,
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2016-09-23 12:34:54 +00:00
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MODE_INVALID,
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MODE_TRACE,
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MODE_TRAPCAP,
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2019-07-02 19:12:02 +00:00
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MODE_PROTMAX,
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2019-09-03 18:58:48 +00:00
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MODE_STACKGAP,
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2019-03-16 11:46:48 +00:00
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#ifdef PROC_KPTI_CTL
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MODE_KPTI,
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#endif
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2020-08-23 20:44:15 +00:00
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#ifdef PROC_LA_CTL
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MODE_LA57,
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MODE_LA48,
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#endif
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2016-09-23 12:34:54 +00:00
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};
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static pid_t
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str2pid(const char *str)
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{
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pid_t res;
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char *tail;
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res = strtol(str, &tail, 0);
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if (*tail != '\0') {
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warnx("non-numeric pid");
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return (-1);
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}
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return (res);
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}
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2019-03-16 11:46:48 +00:00
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#ifdef PROC_KPTI_CTL
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#define KPTI_USAGE "|kpti"
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#else
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#define KPTI_USAGE
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#endif
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2020-08-23 20:44:15 +00:00
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#ifdef PROC_LA_CTL
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#define LA_USAGE "|la48|la57"
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#else
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#define LA_USAGE
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#endif
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2019-03-16 11:46:48 +00:00
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2016-09-23 12:34:54 +00:00
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static void __dead2
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usage(void)
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{
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2019-09-03 18:58:48 +00:00
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fprintf(stderr, "Usage: proccontrol -m (aslr|protmax|trace|trapcap|"
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2020-08-23 20:44:15 +00:00
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"stackgap"KPTI_USAGE LA_USAGE") [-q] "
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2016-09-23 12:34:54 +00:00
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"[-s (enable|disable)] [-p pid | command]\n");
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exit(1);
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}
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int
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main(int argc, char *argv[])
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{
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int arg, ch, error, mode;
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pid_t pid;
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bool enable, do_command, query;
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mode = MODE_INVALID;
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enable = true;
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pid = -1;
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query = false;
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while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "m:qs:p:")) != -1) {
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switch (ch) {
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case 'm':
|
Implement Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
With this change, randomization can be enabled for all non-fixed
mappings. It means that the base address for the mapping is selected
with a guaranteed amount of entropy (bits). If the mapping was
requested to be superpage aligned, the randomization honours the
superpage attributes.
Although the value of ASLR is diminshing over time as exploit authors
work out simple ASLR bypass techniques, it elimintates the trivial
exploitation of certain vulnerabilities, at least in theory. This
implementation is relatively small and happens at the correct
architectural level. Also, it is not expected to introduce
regressions in existing cases when turned off (default for now), or
cause any significant maintaince burden.
The randomization is done on a best-effort basis - that is, the
allocator falls back to a first fit strategy if fragmentation prevents
entropy injection. It is trivial to implement a strong mode where
failure to guarantee the requested amount of entropy results in
mapping request failure, but I do not consider that to be usable.
I have not fine-tuned the amount of entropy injected right now. It is
only a quantitive change that will not change the implementation. The
current amount is controlled by aslr_pages_rnd.
To not spoil coalescing optimizations, to reduce the page table
fragmentation inherent to ASLR, and to keep the transient superpage
promotion for the malloced memory, locality clustering is implemented
for anonymous private mappings, which are automatically grouped until
fragmentation kicks in. The initial location for the anon group range
is, of course, randomized. This is controlled by vm.cluster_anon,
enabled by default.
The default mode keeps the sbrk area unpopulated by other mappings,
but this can be turned off, which gives much more breathing bits on
architectures with small address space, such as i386. This is tied
with the question of following an application's hint about the mmap(2)
base address. Testing shows that ignoring the hint does not affect the
function of common applications, but I would expect more demanding
code could break. By default sbrk is preserved and mmap hints are
satisfied, which can be changed by using the
kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk sysctl.
ASLR is enabled on per-ABI basis, and currently it is only allowed on
FreeBSD native i386 and amd64 (including compat 32bit) ABIs. Support
for additional architectures will be added after further testing.
Both per-process and per-image controls are implemented:
- procctl(2) adds PROC_ASLR_CTL/PROC_ASLR_STATUS;
- NT_FREEBSD_FCTL_ASLR_DISABLE feature control note bit makes it possible
to force ASLR off for the given binary. (A tool to edit the feature
control note is in development.)
Global controls are:
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.enable - for non-fixed mappings done by mmap(2);
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.pie_enable - for PIE image activation mappings;
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk - allow to use sbrk area for mmap(2);
- vm.cluster_anon - enables anon mapping clustering.
PR: 208580 (exp runs)
Exp-runs done by: antoine
Reviewed by: markj (previous version)
Discussed with: emaste
Tested by: pho
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D5603
2019-02-10 17:19:45 +00:00
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if (strcmp(optarg, "aslr") == 0)
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mode = MODE_ASLR;
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2019-07-02 19:12:02 +00:00
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else if (strcmp(optarg, "protmax") == 0)
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mode = MODE_PROTMAX;
|
Implement Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
With this change, randomization can be enabled for all non-fixed
mappings. It means that the base address for the mapping is selected
with a guaranteed amount of entropy (bits). If the mapping was
requested to be superpage aligned, the randomization honours the
superpage attributes.
Although the value of ASLR is diminshing over time as exploit authors
work out simple ASLR bypass techniques, it elimintates the trivial
exploitation of certain vulnerabilities, at least in theory. This
implementation is relatively small and happens at the correct
architectural level. Also, it is not expected to introduce
regressions in existing cases when turned off (default for now), or
cause any significant maintaince burden.
The randomization is done on a best-effort basis - that is, the
allocator falls back to a first fit strategy if fragmentation prevents
entropy injection. It is trivial to implement a strong mode where
failure to guarantee the requested amount of entropy results in
mapping request failure, but I do not consider that to be usable.
I have not fine-tuned the amount of entropy injected right now. It is
only a quantitive change that will not change the implementation. The
current amount is controlled by aslr_pages_rnd.
To not spoil coalescing optimizations, to reduce the page table
fragmentation inherent to ASLR, and to keep the transient superpage
promotion for the malloced memory, locality clustering is implemented
for anonymous private mappings, which are automatically grouped until
fragmentation kicks in. The initial location for the anon group range
is, of course, randomized. This is controlled by vm.cluster_anon,
enabled by default.
The default mode keeps the sbrk area unpopulated by other mappings,
but this can be turned off, which gives much more breathing bits on
architectures with small address space, such as i386. This is tied
with the question of following an application's hint about the mmap(2)
base address. Testing shows that ignoring the hint does not affect the
function of common applications, but I would expect more demanding
code could break. By default sbrk is preserved and mmap hints are
satisfied, which can be changed by using the
kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk sysctl.
ASLR is enabled on per-ABI basis, and currently it is only allowed on
FreeBSD native i386 and amd64 (including compat 32bit) ABIs. Support
for additional architectures will be added after further testing.
Both per-process and per-image controls are implemented:
- procctl(2) adds PROC_ASLR_CTL/PROC_ASLR_STATUS;
- NT_FREEBSD_FCTL_ASLR_DISABLE feature control note bit makes it possible
to force ASLR off for the given binary. (A tool to edit the feature
control note is in development.)
Global controls are:
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.enable - for non-fixed mappings done by mmap(2);
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.pie_enable - for PIE image activation mappings;
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk - allow to use sbrk area for mmap(2);
- vm.cluster_anon - enables anon mapping clustering.
PR: 208580 (exp runs)
Exp-runs done by: antoine
Reviewed by: markj (previous version)
Discussed with: emaste
Tested by: pho
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D5603
2019-02-10 17:19:45 +00:00
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else if (strcmp(optarg, "trace") == 0)
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2016-09-23 12:34:54 +00:00
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mode = MODE_TRACE;
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else if (strcmp(optarg, "trapcap") == 0)
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mode = MODE_TRAPCAP;
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2019-09-03 18:58:48 +00:00
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else if (strcmp(optarg, "stackgap") == 0)
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mode = MODE_STACKGAP;
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2019-03-16 11:46:48 +00:00
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#ifdef PROC_KPTI_CTL
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else if (strcmp(optarg, "kpti") == 0)
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mode = MODE_KPTI;
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2020-08-23 20:44:15 +00:00
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#endif
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#ifdef PROC_LA_CTL
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else if (strcmp(optarg, "la57") == 0)
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mode = MODE_LA57;
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else if (strcmp(optarg, "la48") == 0)
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mode = MODE_LA48;
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2019-03-16 11:46:48 +00:00
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#endif
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2016-09-23 12:34:54 +00:00
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else
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usage();
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break;
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case 's':
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if (strcmp(optarg, "enable") == 0)
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enable = true;
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else if (strcmp(optarg, "disable") == 0)
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enable = false;
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else
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usage();
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break;
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case 'p':
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pid = str2pid(optarg);
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break;
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case 'q':
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query = true;
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break;
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case '?':
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default:
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usage();
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break;
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}
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}
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argc -= optind;
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argv += optind;
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|
do_command = argc != 0;
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if (do_command) {
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if (pid != -1 || query)
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usage();
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pid = getpid();
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} else if (pid == -1) {
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pid = getpid();
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}
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|
|
|
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if (query) {
|
|
|
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switch (mode) {
|
Implement Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
With this change, randomization can be enabled for all non-fixed
mappings. It means that the base address for the mapping is selected
with a guaranteed amount of entropy (bits). If the mapping was
requested to be superpage aligned, the randomization honours the
superpage attributes.
Although the value of ASLR is diminshing over time as exploit authors
work out simple ASLR bypass techniques, it elimintates the trivial
exploitation of certain vulnerabilities, at least in theory. This
implementation is relatively small and happens at the correct
architectural level. Also, it is not expected to introduce
regressions in existing cases when turned off (default for now), or
cause any significant maintaince burden.
The randomization is done on a best-effort basis - that is, the
allocator falls back to a first fit strategy if fragmentation prevents
entropy injection. It is trivial to implement a strong mode where
failure to guarantee the requested amount of entropy results in
mapping request failure, but I do not consider that to be usable.
I have not fine-tuned the amount of entropy injected right now. It is
only a quantitive change that will not change the implementation. The
current amount is controlled by aslr_pages_rnd.
To not spoil coalescing optimizations, to reduce the page table
fragmentation inherent to ASLR, and to keep the transient superpage
promotion for the malloced memory, locality clustering is implemented
for anonymous private mappings, which are automatically grouped until
fragmentation kicks in. The initial location for the anon group range
is, of course, randomized. This is controlled by vm.cluster_anon,
enabled by default.
The default mode keeps the sbrk area unpopulated by other mappings,
but this can be turned off, which gives much more breathing bits on
architectures with small address space, such as i386. This is tied
with the question of following an application's hint about the mmap(2)
base address. Testing shows that ignoring the hint does not affect the
function of common applications, but I would expect more demanding
code could break. By default sbrk is preserved and mmap hints are
satisfied, which can be changed by using the
kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk sysctl.
ASLR is enabled on per-ABI basis, and currently it is only allowed on
FreeBSD native i386 and amd64 (including compat 32bit) ABIs. Support
for additional architectures will be added after further testing.
Both per-process and per-image controls are implemented:
- procctl(2) adds PROC_ASLR_CTL/PROC_ASLR_STATUS;
- NT_FREEBSD_FCTL_ASLR_DISABLE feature control note bit makes it possible
to force ASLR off for the given binary. (A tool to edit the feature
control note is in development.)
Global controls are:
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.enable - for non-fixed mappings done by mmap(2);
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.pie_enable - for PIE image activation mappings;
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk - allow to use sbrk area for mmap(2);
- vm.cluster_anon - enables anon mapping clustering.
PR: 208580 (exp runs)
Exp-runs done by: antoine
Reviewed by: markj (previous version)
Discussed with: emaste
Tested by: pho
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D5603
2019-02-10 17:19:45 +00:00
|
|
|
case MODE_ASLR:
|
|
|
|
error = procctl(P_PID, pid, PROC_ASLR_STATUS, &arg);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2016-09-23 12:34:54 +00:00
|
|
|
case MODE_TRACE:
|
|
|
|
error = procctl(P_PID, pid, PROC_TRACE_STATUS, &arg);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MODE_TRAPCAP:
|
|
|
|
error = procctl(P_PID, pid, PROC_TRAPCAP_STATUS, &arg);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-07-02 19:12:02 +00:00
|
|
|
case MODE_PROTMAX:
|
|
|
|
error = procctl(P_PID, pid, PROC_PROTMAX_STATUS, &arg);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-09-03 18:58:48 +00:00
|
|
|
case MODE_STACKGAP:
|
|
|
|
error = procctl(P_PID, pid, PROC_STACKGAP_STATUS, &arg);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-03-16 11:46:48 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef PROC_KPTI_CTL
|
|
|
|
case MODE_KPTI:
|
|
|
|
error = procctl(P_PID, pid, PROC_KPTI_STATUS, &arg);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2020-08-23 20:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef PROC_LA_CTL
|
|
|
|
case MODE_LA57:
|
|
|
|
case MODE_LA48:
|
|
|
|
error = procctl(P_PID, pid, PROC_LA_STATUS, &arg);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-03-16 11:46:48 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2016-09-23 12:34:54 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
usage();
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
|
|
err(1, "procctl status");
|
|
|
|
switch (mode) {
|
Implement Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
With this change, randomization can be enabled for all non-fixed
mappings. It means that the base address for the mapping is selected
with a guaranteed amount of entropy (bits). If the mapping was
requested to be superpage aligned, the randomization honours the
superpage attributes.
Although the value of ASLR is diminshing over time as exploit authors
work out simple ASLR bypass techniques, it elimintates the trivial
exploitation of certain vulnerabilities, at least in theory. This
implementation is relatively small and happens at the correct
architectural level. Also, it is not expected to introduce
regressions in existing cases when turned off (default for now), or
cause any significant maintaince burden.
The randomization is done on a best-effort basis - that is, the
allocator falls back to a first fit strategy if fragmentation prevents
entropy injection. It is trivial to implement a strong mode where
failure to guarantee the requested amount of entropy results in
mapping request failure, but I do not consider that to be usable.
I have not fine-tuned the amount of entropy injected right now. It is
only a quantitive change that will not change the implementation. The
current amount is controlled by aslr_pages_rnd.
To not spoil coalescing optimizations, to reduce the page table
fragmentation inherent to ASLR, and to keep the transient superpage
promotion for the malloced memory, locality clustering is implemented
for anonymous private mappings, which are automatically grouped until
fragmentation kicks in. The initial location for the anon group range
is, of course, randomized. This is controlled by vm.cluster_anon,
enabled by default.
The default mode keeps the sbrk area unpopulated by other mappings,
but this can be turned off, which gives much more breathing bits on
architectures with small address space, such as i386. This is tied
with the question of following an application's hint about the mmap(2)
base address. Testing shows that ignoring the hint does not affect the
function of common applications, but I would expect more demanding
code could break. By default sbrk is preserved and mmap hints are
satisfied, which can be changed by using the
kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk sysctl.
ASLR is enabled on per-ABI basis, and currently it is only allowed on
FreeBSD native i386 and amd64 (including compat 32bit) ABIs. Support
for additional architectures will be added after further testing.
Both per-process and per-image controls are implemented:
- procctl(2) adds PROC_ASLR_CTL/PROC_ASLR_STATUS;
- NT_FREEBSD_FCTL_ASLR_DISABLE feature control note bit makes it possible
to force ASLR off for the given binary. (A tool to edit the feature
control note is in development.)
Global controls are:
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.enable - for non-fixed mappings done by mmap(2);
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.pie_enable - for PIE image activation mappings;
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk - allow to use sbrk area for mmap(2);
- vm.cluster_anon - enables anon mapping clustering.
PR: 208580 (exp runs)
Exp-runs done by: antoine
Reviewed by: markj (previous version)
Discussed with: emaste
Tested by: pho
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D5603
2019-02-10 17:19:45 +00:00
|
|
|
case MODE_ASLR:
|
|
|
|
switch (arg & ~PROC_ASLR_ACTIVE) {
|
|
|
|
case PROC_ASLR_FORCE_ENABLE:
|
|
|
|
printf("force enabled");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROC_ASLR_FORCE_DISABLE:
|
|
|
|
printf("force disabled");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROC_ASLR_NOFORCE:
|
|
|
|
printf("not forced");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((arg & PROC_ASLR_ACTIVE) != 0)
|
|
|
|
printf(", active\n");
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
printf(", not active\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2016-09-23 12:34:54 +00:00
|
|
|
case MODE_TRACE:
|
|
|
|
if (arg == -1)
|
|
|
|
printf("disabled\n");
|
|
|
|
else if (arg == 0)
|
|
|
|
printf("enabled, no debugger\n");
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
printf("enabled, traced by %d\n", arg);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MODE_TRAPCAP:
|
|
|
|
switch (arg) {
|
|
|
|
case PROC_TRAPCAP_CTL_ENABLE:
|
|
|
|
printf("enabled\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROC_TRAPCAP_CTL_DISABLE:
|
|
|
|
printf("disabled\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-07-02 19:12:02 +00:00
|
|
|
case MODE_PROTMAX:
|
|
|
|
switch (arg & ~PROC_PROTMAX_ACTIVE) {
|
|
|
|
case PROC_PROTMAX_FORCE_ENABLE:
|
|
|
|
printf("force enabled");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROC_PROTMAX_FORCE_DISABLE:
|
|
|
|
printf("force disabled");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROC_PROTMAX_NOFORCE:
|
|
|
|
printf("not forced");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((arg & PROC_PROTMAX_ACTIVE) != 0)
|
|
|
|
printf(", active\n");
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
printf(", not active\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-09-03 18:58:48 +00:00
|
|
|
case MODE_STACKGAP:
|
|
|
|
switch (arg & (PROC_STACKGAP_ENABLE |
|
|
|
|
PROC_STACKGAP_DISABLE)) {
|
|
|
|
case PROC_STACKGAP_ENABLE:
|
|
|
|
printf("enabled\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROC_STACKGAP_DISABLE:
|
|
|
|
printf("disabled\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (arg & (PROC_STACKGAP_ENABLE_EXEC |
|
|
|
|
PROC_STACKGAP_DISABLE_EXEC)) {
|
|
|
|
case PROC_STACKGAP_ENABLE_EXEC:
|
|
|
|
printf("enabled after exec\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROC_STACKGAP_DISABLE_EXEC:
|
|
|
|
printf("disabled after exec\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-03-16 11:46:48 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef PROC_KPTI_CTL
|
|
|
|
case MODE_KPTI:
|
|
|
|
switch (arg & ~PROC_KPTI_STATUS_ACTIVE) {
|
|
|
|
case PROC_KPTI_CTL_ENABLE_ON_EXEC:
|
|
|
|
printf("enabled");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROC_KPTI_CTL_DISABLE_ON_EXEC:
|
|
|
|
printf("disabled");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((arg & PROC_KPTI_STATUS_ACTIVE) != 0)
|
|
|
|
printf(", active\n");
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
printf(", not active\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2020-08-23 20:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef PROC_LA_CTL
|
|
|
|
case MODE_LA57:
|
|
|
|
case MODE_LA48:
|
|
|
|
switch (arg & ~(PROC_LA_STATUS_LA48 |
|
|
|
|
PROC_LA_STATUS_LA57)) {
|
|
|
|
case PROC_LA_CTL_LA48_ON_EXEC:
|
|
|
|
printf("la48 on exec");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROC_LA_CTL_LA57_ON_EXEC:
|
|
|
|
printf("la57 on exec");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PROC_LA_CTL_DEFAULT_ON_EXEC:
|
|
|
|
printf("default on exec");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((arg & PROC_LA_STATUS_LA48) != 0)
|
|
|
|
printf(", la48 active\n");
|
|
|
|
else if ((arg & PROC_LA_STATUS_LA57) != 0)
|
|
|
|
printf(", la57 active\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-03-16 11:46:48 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2016-09-23 12:34:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
switch (mode) {
|
Implement Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
With this change, randomization can be enabled for all non-fixed
mappings. It means that the base address for the mapping is selected
with a guaranteed amount of entropy (bits). If the mapping was
requested to be superpage aligned, the randomization honours the
superpage attributes.
Although the value of ASLR is diminshing over time as exploit authors
work out simple ASLR bypass techniques, it elimintates the trivial
exploitation of certain vulnerabilities, at least in theory. This
implementation is relatively small and happens at the correct
architectural level. Also, it is not expected to introduce
regressions in existing cases when turned off (default for now), or
cause any significant maintaince burden.
The randomization is done on a best-effort basis - that is, the
allocator falls back to a first fit strategy if fragmentation prevents
entropy injection. It is trivial to implement a strong mode where
failure to guarantee the requested amount of entropy results in
mapping request failure, but I do not consider that to be usable.
I have not fine-tuned the amount of entropy injected right now. It is
only a quantitive change that will not change the implementation. The
current amount is controlled by aslr_pages_rnd.
To not spoil coalescing optimizations, to reduce the page table
fragmentation inherent to ASLR, and to keep the transient superpage
promotion for the malloced memory, locality clustering is implemented
for anonymous private mappings, which are automatically grouped until
fragmentation kicks in. The initial location for the anon group range
is, of course, randomized. This is controlled by vm.cluster_anon,
enabled by default.
The default mode keeps the sbrk area unpopulated by other mappings,
but this can be turned off, which gives much more breathing bits on
architectures with small address space, such as i386. This is tied
with the question of following an application's hint about the mmap(2)
base address. Testing shows that ignoring the hint does not affect the
function of common applications, but I would expect more demanding
code could break. By default sbrk is preserved and mmap hints are
satisfied, which can be changed by using the
kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk sysctl.
ASLR is enabled on per-ABI basis, and currently it is only allowed on
FreeBSD native i386 and amd64 (including compat 32bit) ABIs. Support
for additional architectures will be added after further testing.
Both per-process and per-image controls are implemented:
- procctl(2) adds PROC_ASLR_CTL/PROC_ASLR_STATUS;
- NT_FREEBSD_FCTL_ASLR_DISABLE feature control note bit makes it possible
to force ASLR off for the given binary. (A tool to edit the feature
control note is in development.)
Global controls are:
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.enable - for non-fixed mappings done by mmap(2);
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.pie_enable - for PIE image activation mappings;
- kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk - allow to use sbrk area for mmap(2);
- vm.cluster_anon - enables anon mapping clustering.
PR: 208580 (exp runs)
Exp-runs done by: antoine
Reviewed by: markj (previous version)
Discussed with: emaste
Tested by: pho
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D5603
2019-02-10 17:19:45 +00:00
|
|
|
case MODE_ASLR:
|
|
|
|
arg = enable ? PROC_ASLR_FORCE_ENABLE :
|
|
|
|
PROC_ASLR_FORCE_DISABLE;
|
|
|
|
error = procctl(P_PID, pid, PROC_ASLR_CTL, &arg);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2016-09-23 12:34:54 +00:00
|
|
|
case MODE_TRACE:
|
|
|
|
arg = enable ? PROC_TRACE_CTL_ENABLE :
|
|
|
|
PROC_TRACE_CTL_DISABLE;
|
|
|
|
error = procctl(P_PID, pid, PROC_TRACE_CTL, &arg);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MODE_TRAPCAP:
|
|
|
|
arg = enable ? PROC_TRAPCAP_CTL_ENABLE :
|
|
|
|
PROC_TRAPCAP_CTL_DISABLE;
|
|
|
|
error = procctl(P_PID, pid, PROC_TRAPCAP_CTL, &arg);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-07-02 19:12:02 +00:00
|
|
|
case MODE_PROTMAX:
|
|
|
|
arg = enable ? PROC_PROTMAX_FORCE_ENABLE :
|
|
|
|
PROC_PROTMAX_FORCE_DISABLE;
|
|
|
|
error = procctl(P_PID, pid, PROC_PROTMAX_CTL, &arg);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-09-03 18:58:48 +00:00
|
|
|
case MODE_STACKGAP:
|
|
|
|
arg = enable ? PROC_STACKGAP_ENABLE_EXEC :
|
|
|
|
(PROC_STACKGAP_DISABLE |
|
|
|
|
PROC_STACKGAP_DISABLE_EXEC);
|
|
|
|
error = procctl(P_PID, pid, PROC_STACKGAP_CTL, &arg);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-03-16 11:46:48 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef PROC_KPTI_CTL
|
|
|
|
case MODE_KPTI:
|
|
|
|
arg = enable ? PROC_KPTI_CTL_ENABLE_ON_EXEC :
|
|
|
|
PROC_KPTI_CTL_DISABLE_ON_EXEC;
|
|
|
|
error = procctl(P_PID, pid, PROC_KPTI_CTL, &arg);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2020-08-23 20:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef PROC_LA_CTL
|
|
|
|
case MODE_LA57:
|
|
|
|
arg = enable ? PROC_LA_CTL_LA57_ON_EXEC :
|
|
|
|
PROC_LA_CTL_DEFAULT_ON_EXEC;
|
|
|
|
error = procctl(P_PID, pid, PROC_LA_CTL, &arg);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MODE_LA48:
|
|
|
|
arg = enable ? PROC_LA_CTL_LA48_ON_EXEC :
|
|
|
|
PROC_LA_CTL_DEFAULT_ON_EXEC;
|
|
|
|
error = procctl(P_PID, pid, PROC_LA_CTL, &arg);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-03-16 11:46:48 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2016-09-23 12:34:54 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
usage();
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
|
|
err(1, "procctl ctl");
|
|
|
|
if (do_command) {
|
|
|
|
error = execvp(argv[0], argv);
|
|
|
|
err(1, "exec");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
exit(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|