freebsd-skq/sys/security/mac/mac_net.c

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/*-
* Copyright (c) 1999-2002, 2009 Robert N. M. Watson
* Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2006 SPARTA, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Apple Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the
* TrustedBSD Project.
*
* This software was enhanced by SPARTA ISSO under SPAWAR contract
* N66001-04-C-6019 ("SEFOS").
*
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
* Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
* Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
* as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
*
* This software was developed at the University of Cambridge Computer
* Laboratory with support from a grant from Google, Inc.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
2003-06-11 00:56:59 +00:00
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "opt_kdtrace.h"
#include "opt_mac.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/mac.h>
#include <sys/priv.h>
#include <sys/sbuf.h>
#include <sys/sdt.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/namei.h>
#include <sys/protosw.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <net/bpfdesc.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/if_var.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_internal.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_policy.h>
/*
* XXXRW: struct ifnet locking is incomplete in the network code, so we use
* our own global mutex for struct ifnet. Non-ideal, but should help in the
* SMP environment.
*/
struct mtx mac_ifnet_mtx;
MTX_SYSINIT(mac_ifnet_mtx, &mac_ifnet_mtx, "mac_ifnet", MTX_DEF);
/*
* Retrieve the label associated with an mbuf by searching for the tag.
* Depending on the value of mac_labelmbufs, it's possible that a label will
* not be present, in which case NULL is returned. Policies must handle the
* possibility of an mbuf not having label storage if they do not enforce
* early loading.
*/
struct label *
mac_mbuf_to_label(struct mbuf *m)
{
Move MAC label storage for mbufs into m_tags from the m_pkthdr structure, returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this: - Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not found. - Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an mbuf. - Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke mac_init_mbuf_tag(). - Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d. - Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related notions. - Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!). - Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(), tag destruction takes care of it for us now. - Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() -- the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf, rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's. - Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the new storage and do a deep copy of the label. - Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places having to do with mbuf header copies previously. - When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the m_tag code now. - No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during header copies. - Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test. In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be dynamically loaded. In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs. Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified. - mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags(). The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons. This might change if it causes problems. - Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update function to assert appropriate locks. - This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag. Reviewed by: sam Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-14 20:39:06 +00:00
struct m_tag *tag;
struct label *label;
if (m == NULL)
return (NULL);
tag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_MACLABEL, NULL);
if (tag == NULL)
return (NULL);
Move MAC label storage for mbufs into m_tags from the m_pkthdr structure, returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this: - Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not found. - Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an mbuf. - Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke mac_init_mbuf_tag(). - Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d. - Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related notions. - Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!). - Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(), tag destruction takes care of it for us now. - Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() -- the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf, rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's. - Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the new storage and do a deep copy of the label. - Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places having to do with mbuf header copies previously. - When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the m_tag code now. - No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during header copies. - Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test. In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be dynamically loaded. In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs. Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified. - mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags(). The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons. This might change if it causes problems. - Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update function to assert appropriate locks. - This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag. Reviewed by: sam Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-14 20:39:06 +00:00
label = (struct label *)(tag+1);
return (label);
}
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
static struct label *
mac_bpfdesc_label_alloc(void)
{
struct label *label;
label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK);
MAC_PERFORM(bpfdesc_init_label, label);
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
return (label);
}
void
mac_bpfdesc_init(struct bpf_d *d)
{
if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_BPFDESC)
d->bd_label = mac_bpfdesc_label_alloc();
else
d->bd_label = NULL;
}
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
static struct label *
mac_ifnet_label_alloc(void)
{
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
struct label *label;
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK);
MAC_PERFORM(ifnet_init_label, label);
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
return (label);
}
void
mac_ifnet_init(struct ifnet *ifp)
{
if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_IFNET)
ifp->if_label = mac_ifnet_label_alloc();
else
ifp->if_label = NULL;
}
int
mac_mbuf_tag_init(struct m_tag *tag, int flag)
{
Move MAC label storage for mbufs into m_tags from the m_pkthdr structure, returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this: - Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not found. - Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an mbuf. - Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke mac_init_mbuf_tag(). - Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d. - Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related notions. - Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!). - Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(), tag destruction takes care of it for us now. - Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() -- the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf, rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's. - Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the new storage and do a deep copy of the label. - Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places having to do with mbuf header copies previously. - When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the m_tag code now. - No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during header copies. - Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test. In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be dynamically loaded. In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs. Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified. - mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags(). The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons. This might change if it causes problems. - Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update function to assert appropriate locks. - This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag. Reviewed by: sam Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-14 20:39:06 +00:00
struct label *label;
int error;
Move MAC label storage for mbufs into m_tags from the m_pkthdr structure, returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this: - Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not found. - Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an mbuf. - Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke mac_init_mbuf_tag(). - Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d. - Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related notions. - Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!). - Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(), tag destruction takes care of it for us now. - Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() -- the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf, rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's. - Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the new storage and do a deep copy of the label. - Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places having to do with mbuf header copies previously. - When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the m_tag code now. - No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during header copies. - Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test. In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be dynamically loaded. In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs. Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified. - mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags(). The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons. This might change if it causes problems. - Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update function to assert appropriate locks. - This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag. Reviewed by: sam Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-14 20:39:06 +00:00
label = (struct label *) (tag + 1);
mac_init_label(label);
Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to improve performance: - Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead and behaved badly in the face of contention. - Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock, which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep or not. - Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks, which occurs only when policies are attached or detached. - Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are loaded; this a race we can afford to lose. - For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the MAC Framework entry point. As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire other locks. Sponsored by: Google, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
2009-03-14 16:06:06 +00:00
if (flag & M_WAITOK)
MAC_CHECK(mbuf_init_label, label, flag);
else
MAC_CHECK_NOSLEEP(mbuf_init_label, label, flag);
if (error) {
Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to improve performance: - Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead and behaved badly in the face of contention. - Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock, which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep or not. - Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks, which occurs only when policies are attached or detached. - Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are loaded; this a race we can afford to lose. - For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the MAC Framework entry point. As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire other locks. Sponsored by: Google, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
2009-03-14 16:06:06 +00:00
MAC_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(mbuf_destroy_label, label);
Move MAC label storage for mbufs into m_tags from the m_pkthdr structure, returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this: - Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not found. - Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an mbuf. - Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke mac_init_mbuf_tag(). - Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d. - Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related notions. - Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!). - Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(), tag destruction takes care of it for us now. - Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() -- the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf, rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's. - Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the new storage and do a deep copy of the label. - Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places having to do with mbuf header copies previously. - When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the m_tag code now. - No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during header copies. - Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test. In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be dynamically loaded. In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs. Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified. - mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags(). The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons. This might change if it causes problems. - Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update function to assert appropriate locks. - This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag. Reviewed by: sam Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-14 20:39:06 +00:00
mac_destroy_label(label);
}
return (error);
}
Move MAC label storage for mbufs into m_tags from the m_pkthdr structure, returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this: - Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not found. - Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an mbuf. - Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke mac_init_mbuf_tag(). - Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d. - Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related notions. - Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!). - Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(), tag destruction takes care of it for us now. - Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() -- the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf, rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's. - Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the new storage and do a deep copy of the label. - Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places having to do with mbuf header copies previously. - When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the m_tag code now. - No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during header copies. - Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test. In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be dynamically loaded. In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs. Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified. - mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags(). The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons. This might change if it causes problems. - Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update function to assert appropriate locks. - This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag. Reviewed by: sam Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-14 20:39:06 +00:00
int
mac_mbuf_init(struct mbuf *m, int flag)
Move MAC label storage for mbufs into m_tags from the m_pkthdr structure, returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this: - Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not found. - Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an mbuf. - Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke mac_init_mbuf_tag(). - Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d. - Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related notions. - Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!). - Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(), tag destruction takes care of it for us now. - Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() -- the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf, rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's. - Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the new storage and do a deep copy of the label. - Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places having to do with mbuf header copies previously. - When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the m_tag code now. - No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during header copies. - Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test. In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be dynamically loaded. In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs. Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified. - mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags(). The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons. This might change if it causes problems. - Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update function to assert appropriate locks. - This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag. Reviewed by: sam Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-14 20:39:06 +00:00
{
struct m_tag *tag;
int error;
M_ASSERTPKTHDR(m);
if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_MBUF) {
tag = m_tag_get(PACKET_TAG_MACLABEL, sizeof(struct label),
flag);
if (tag == NULL)
return (ENOMEM);
error = mac_mbuf_tag_init(tag, flag);
if (error) {
m_tag_free(tag);
return (error);
}
m_tag_prepend(m, tag);
Move MAC label storage for mbufs into m_tags from the m_pkthdr structure, returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this: - Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not found. - Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an mbuf. - Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke mac_init_mbuf_tag(). - Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d. - Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related notions. - Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!). - Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(), tag destruction takes care of it for us now. - Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() -- the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf, rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's. - Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the new storage and do a deep copy of the label. - Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places having to do with mbuf header copies previously. - When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the m_tag code now. - No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during header copies. - Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test. In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be dynamically loaded. In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs. Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified. - mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags(). The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons. This might change if it causes problems. - Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update function to assert appropriate locks. - This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag. Reviewed by: sam Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-14 20:39:06 +00:00
}
return (0);
}
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
static void
mac_bpfdesc_label_free(struct label *label)
{
Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to improve performance: - Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead and behaved badly in the face of contention. - Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock, which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep or not. - Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks, which occurs only when policies are attached or detached. - Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are loaded; this a race we can afford to lose. - For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the MAC Framework entry point. As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire other locks. Sponsored by: Google, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
2009-03-14 16:06:06 +00:00
MAC_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(bpfdesc_destroy_label, label);
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
mac_labelzone_free(label);
}
void
mac_bpfdesc_destroy(struct bpf_d *d)
{
if (d->bd_label != NULL) {
mac_bpfdesc_label_free(d->bd_label);
d->bd_label = NULL;
}
}
static void
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
mac_ifnet_label_free(struct label *label)
{
Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to improve performance: - Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead and behaved badly in the face of contention. - Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock, which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep or not. - Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks, which occurs only when policies are attached or detached. - Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are loaded; this a race we can afford to lose. - For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the MAC Framework entry point. As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire other locks. Sponsored by: Google, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
2009-03-14 16:06:06 +00:00
MAC_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(ifnet_destroy_label, label);
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
mac_labelzone_free(label);
}
void
mac_ifnet_destroy(struct ifnet *ifp)
{
if (ifp->if_label != NULL) {
mac_ifnet_label_free(ifp->if_label);
ifp->if_label = NULL;
}
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
}
void
mac_mbuf_tag_destroy(struct m_tag *tag)
{
Move MAC label storage for mbufs into m_tags from the m_pkthdr structure, returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this: - Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not found. - Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an mbuf. - Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke mac_init_mbuf_tag(). - Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d. - Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related notions. - Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!). - Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(), tag destruction takes care of it for us now. - Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() -- the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf, rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's. - Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the new storage and do a deep copy of the label. - Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places having to do with mbuf header copies previously. - When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the m_tag code now. - No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during header copies. - Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test. In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be dynamically loaded. In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs. Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified. - mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags(). The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons. This might change if it causes problems. - Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update function to assert appropriate locks. - This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag. Reviewed by: sam Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-14 20:39:06 +00:00
struct label *label;
Move MAC label storage for mbufs into m_tags from the m_pkthdr structure, returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this: - Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not found. - Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an mbuf. - Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke mac_init_mbuf_tag(). - Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d. - Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related notions. - Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!). - Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(), tag destruction takes care of it for us now. - Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() -- the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf, rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's. - Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the new storage and do a deep copy of the label. - Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places having to do with mbuf header copies previously. - When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the m_tag code now. - No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during header copies. - Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test. In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be dynamically loaded. In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs. Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified. - mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags(). The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons. This might change if it causes problems. - Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update function to assert appropriate locks. - This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag. Reviewed by: sam Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-14 20:39:06 +00:00
label = (struct label *)(tag+1);
Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to improve performance: - Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead and behaved badly in the face of contention. - Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock, which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep or not. - Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks, which occurs only when policies are attached or detached. - Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are loaded; this a race we can afford to lose. - For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the MAC Framework entry point. As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire other locks. Sponsored by: Google, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
2009-03-14 16:06:06 +00:00
MAC_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(mbuf_destroy_label, label);
Move MAC label storage for mbufs into m_tags from the m_pkthdr structure, returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this: - Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not found. - Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an mbuf. - Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke mac_init_mbuf_tag(). - Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d. - Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related notions. - Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!). - Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(), tag destruction takes care of it for us now. - Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() -- the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf, rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's. - Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the new storage and do a deep copy of the label. - Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places having to do with mbuf header copies previously. - When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the m_tag code now. - No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during header copies. - Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test. In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be dynamically loaded. In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs. Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified. - mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags(). The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons. This might change if it causes problems. - Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update function to assert appropriate locks. - This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag. Reviewed by: sam Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-14 20:39:06 +00:00
mac_destroy_label(label);
}
/*
* mac_mbuf_tag_copy is called when an mbuf header is duplicated, in which
* case the labels must also be duplicated.
*/
Move MAC label storage for mbufs into m_tags from the m_pkthdr structure, returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this: - Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not found. - Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an mbuf. - Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke mac_init_mbuf_tag(). - Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d. - Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related notions. - Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!). - Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(), tag destruction takes care of it for us now. - Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() -- the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf, rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's. - Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the new storage and do a deep copy of the label. - Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places having to do with mbuf header copies previously. - When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the m_tag code now. - No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during header copies. - Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test. In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be dynamically loaded. In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs. Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified. - mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags(). The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons. This might change if it causes problems. - Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update function to assert appropriate locks. - This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag. Reviewed by: sam Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-14 20:39:06 +00:00
void
mac_mbuf_tag_copy(struct m_tag *src, struct m_tag *dest)
Move MAC label storage for mbufs into m_tags from the m_pkthdr structure, returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this: - Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not found. - Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an mbuf. - Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke mac_init_mbuf_tag(). - Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d. - Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related notions. - Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!). - Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(), tag destruction takes care of it for us now. - Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() -- the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf, rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's. - Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the new storage and do a deep copy of the label. - Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places having to do with mbuf header copies previously. - When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the m_tag code now. - No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during header copies. - Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test. In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be dynamically loaded. In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs. Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified. - mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags(). The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons. This might change if it causes problems. - Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update function to assert appropriate locks. - This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag. Reviewed by: sam Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-14 20:39:06 +00:00
{
struct label *src_label, *dest_label;
src_label = (struct label *)(src+1);
dest_label = (struct label *)(dest+1);
/*
* mac_mbuf_tag_init() is called on the target tag in m_tag_copy(),
* so we don't need to call it here.
Move MAC label storage for mbufs into m_tags from the m_pkthdr structure, returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this: - Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not found. - Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an mbuf. - Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke mac_init_mbuf_tag(). - Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d. - Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related notions. - Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!). - Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(), tag destruction takes care of it for us now. - Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() -- the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf, rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's. - Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the new storage and do a deep copy of the label. - Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places having to do with mbuf header copies previously. - When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the m_tag code now. - No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during header copies. - Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test. In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be dynamically loaded. In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs. Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified. - mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags(). The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons. This might change if it causes problems. - Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update function to assert appropriate locks. - This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag. Reviewed by: sam Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-14 20:39:06 +00:00
*/
Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to improve performance: - Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead and behaved badly in the face of contention. - Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock, which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep or not. - Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks, which occurs only when policies are attached or detached. - Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are loaded; this a race we can afford to lose. - For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the MAC Framework entry point. As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire other locks. Sponsored by: Google, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
2009-03-14 16:06:06 +00:00
MAC_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(mbuf_copy_label, src_label, dest_label);
Move MAC label storage for mbufs into m_tags from the m_pkthdr structure, returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this: - Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not found. - Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an mbuf. - Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke mac_init_mbuf_tag(). - Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d. - Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related notions. - Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!). - Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(), tag destruction takes care of it for us now. - Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() -- the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf, rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's. - Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the new storage and do a deep copy of the label. - Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places having to do with mbuf header copies previously. - When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the m_tag code now. - No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during header copies. - Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test. In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be dynamically loaded. In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs. Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified. - mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags(). The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons. This might change if it causes problems. - Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update function to assert appropriate locks. - This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag. Reviewed by: sam Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-14 20:39:06 +00:00
}
void
mac_mbuf_copy(struct mbuf *m_from, struct mbuf *m_to)
{
struct label *src_label, *dest_label;
src_label = mac_mbuf_to_label(m_from);
dest_label = mac_mbuf_to_label(m_to);
Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to improve performance: - Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead and behaved badly in the face of contention. - Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock, which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep or not. - Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks, which occurs only when policies are attached or detached. - Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are loaded; this a race we can afford to lose. - For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the MAC Framework entry point. As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire other locks. Sponsored by: Google, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
2009-03-14 16:06:06 +00:00
MAC_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(mbuf_copy_label, src_label, dest_label);
}
static void
mac_ifnet_copy_label(struct label *src, struct label *dest)
{
Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to improve performance: - Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead and behaved badly in the face of contention. - Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock, which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep or not. - Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks, which occurs only when policies are attached or detached. - Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are loaded; this a race we can afford to lose. - For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the MAC Framework entry point. As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire other locks. Sponsored by: Google, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
2009-03-14 16:06:06 +00:00
MAC_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(ifnet_copy_label, src, dest);
}
static int
mac_ifnet_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *elements,
char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen)
{
int error;
MAC_EXTERNALIZE(ifnet, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
return (error);
}
static int
mac_ifnet_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *string)
{
int error;
MAC_INTERNALIZE(ifnet, label, string);
return (error);
}
void
mac_ifnet_create(struct ifnet *ifp)
{
MAC_IFNET_LOCK(ifp);
Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to improve performance: - Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead and behaved badly in the face of contention. - Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock, which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep or not. - Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks, which occurs only when policies are attached or detached. - Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are loaded; this a race we can afford to lose. - For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the MAC Framework entry point. As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire other locks. Sponsored by: Google, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
2009-03-14 16:06:06 +00:00
MAC_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(ifnet_create, ifp, ifp->if_label);
MAC_IFNET_UNLOCK(ifp);
}
void
mac_bpfdesc_create(struct ucred *cred, struct bpf_d *d)
{
Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to improve performance: - Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead and behaved badly in the face of contention. - Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock, which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep or not. - Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks, which occurs only when policies are attached or detached. - Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are loaded; this a race we can afford to lose. - For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the MAC Framework entry point. As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire other locks. Sponsored by: Google, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
2009-03-14 16:06:06 +00:00
MAC_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(bpfdesc_create, cred, d, d->bd_label);
}
void
mac_bpfdesc_create_mbuf(struct bpf_d *d, struct mbuf *m)
{
struct label *label;
BPFD_LOCK_ASSERT(d);
label = mac_mbuf_to_label(m);
Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to improve performance: - Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead and behaved badly in the face of contention. - Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock, which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep or not. - Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks, which occurs only when policies are attached or detached. - Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are loaded; this a race we can afford to lose. - For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the MAC Framework entry point. As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire other locks. Sponsored by: Google, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
2009-03-14 16:06:06 +00:00
MAC_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(bpfdesc_create_mbuf, d, d->bd_label, m, label);
}
void
mac_ifnet_create_mbuf(struct ifnet *ifp, struct mbuf *m)
{
struct label *label;
label = mac_mbuf_to_label(m);
MAC_IFNET_LOCK(ifp);
Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to improve performance: - Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead and behaved badly in the face of contention. - Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock, which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep or not. - Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks, which occurs only when policies are attached or detached. - Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are loaded; this a race we can afford to lose. - For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the MAC Framework entry point. As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire other locks. Sponsored by: Google, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
2009-03-14 16:06:06 +00:00
MAC_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(ifnet_create_mbuf, ifp, ifp->if_label, m, label);
MAC_IFNET_UNLOCK(ifp);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(bpfdesc_check_receive, "struct bpf_d *",
"struct ifnet *");
int
mac_bpfdesc_check_receive(struct bpf_d *d, struct ifnet *ifp)
{
int error;
BPFD_LOCK_ASSERT(d);
MAC_IFNET_LOCK(ifp);
Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to improve performance: - Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead and behaved badly in the face of contention. - Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock, which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep or not. - Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks, which occurs only when policies are attached or detached. - Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are loaded; this a race we can afford to lose. - For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the MAC Framework entry point. As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire other locks. Sponsored by: Google, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
2009-03-14 16:06:06 +00:00
MAC_CHECK_NOSLEEP(bpfdesc_check_receive, d, d->bd_label, ifp,
ifp->if_label);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(bpfdesc_check_receive, error, d, ifp);
MAC_IFNET_UNLOCK(ifp);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK_PROBE_DEFINE2(ifnet_check_transmit, "struct ifnet *",
"struct mbuf *");
int
mac_ifnet_check_transmit(struct ifnet *ifp, struct mbuf *m)
{
struct label *label;
int error;
M_ASSERTPKTHDR(m);
label = mac_mbuf_to_label(m);
MAC_IFNET_LOCK(ifp);
Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to improve performance: - Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead and behaved badly in the face of contention. - Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock, which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep or not. - Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks, which occurs only when policies are attached or detached. - Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are loaded; this a race we can afford to lose. - For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the MAC Framework entry point. As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire other locks. Sponsored by: Google, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
2009-03-14 16:06:06 +00:00
MAC_CHECK_NOSLEEP(ifnet_check_transmit, ifp, ifp->if_label, m,
label);
MAC_CHECK_PROBE2(ifnet_check_transmit, error, ifp, m);
MAC_IFNET_UNLOCK(ifp);
return (error);
}
int
mac_ifnet_ioctl_get(struct ucred *cred, struct ifreq *ifr,
struct ifnet *ifp)
{
char *elements, *buffer;
struct label *intlabel;
struct mac mac;
int error;
if (!(mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_IFNET))
return (EINVAL);
error = copyin(ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, &mac, sizeof(mac));
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
if (error)
return (error);
elements = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, elements, mac.m_buflen, NULL);
if (error) {
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
intlabel = mac_ifnet_label_alloc();
MAC_IFNET_LOCK(ifp);
mac_ifnet_copy_label(ifp->if_label, intlabel);
MAC_IFNET_UNLOCK(ifp);
error = mac_ifnet_externalize_label(intlabel, elements, buffer,
mac.m_buflen);
mac_ifnet_label_free(intlabel);
if (error == 0)
error = copyout(buffer, mac.m_string, strlen(buffer)+1);
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
int
mac_ifnet_ioctl_set(struct ucred *cred, struct ifreq *ifr, struct ifnet *ifp)
{
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
struct label *intlabel;
struct mac mac;
char *buffer;
int error;
if (!(mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_IFNET))
return (EINVAL);
error = copyin(ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, &mac, sizeof(mac));
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
if (error)
return (error);
buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, buffer, mac.m_buflen, NULL);
if (error) {
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
intlabel = mac_ifnet_label_alloc();
error = mac_ifnet_internalize_label(intlabel, buffer);
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
if (error) {
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
mac_ifnet_label_free(intlabel);
return (error);
}
/*
* XXX: Note that this is a redundant privilege check, since policies
* impose this check themselves if required by the policy
* Eventually, this should go away.
*/
error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_NET_SETIFMAC, 0);
if (error) {
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
mac_ifnet_label_free(intlabel);
return (error);
}
MAC_IFNET_LOCK(ifp);
Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to improve performance: - Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead and behaved badly in the face of contention. - Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock, which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep or not. - Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks, which occurs only when policies are attached or detached. - Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are loaded; this a race we can afford to lose. - For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the MAC Framework entry point. As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire other locks. Sponsored by: Google, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
2009-03-14 16:06:06 +00:00
MAC_CHECK_NOSLEEP(ifnet_check_relabel, cred, ifp, ifp->if_label,
intlabel);
if (error) {
MAC_IFNET_UNLOCK(ifp);
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
mac_ifnet_label_free(intlabel);
return (error);
}
Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to improve performance: - Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead and behaved badly in the face of contention. - Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock, which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep or not. - Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks, which occurs only when policies are attached or detached. - Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are loaded; this a race we can afford to lose. - For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the MAC Framework entry point. As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire other locks. Sponsored by: Google, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
2009-03-14 16:06:06 +00:00
MAC_PERFORM_NOSLEEP(ifnet_relabel, cred, ifp, ifp->if_label,
intlabel);
MAC_IFNET_UNLOCK(ifp);
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
mac_ifnet_label_free(intlabel);
return (0);
}