freebsd-skq/sys/amd64/ia32/ia32_exception.S

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/*-
* Copyright (c) 2003 Peter Wemm
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $FreeBSD$
*/
#include <machine/asmacros.h>
#include "assym.inc"
.text
/*
* Call gate entry for FreeBSD ELF and Linux/NetBSD syscall (int 0x80)
*
* This is a SDT_SYSIDT entry point (unlike the i386 port) so that we
* can do a swapgs before enabling interrupts. This is critical because
* if we took an interrupt before swapgs, the interrupt code would see
* that it originated in supervisor mode and skip the swapgs.
*/
SUPERALIGN_TEXT
PTI for amd64. The implementation of the Kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI) for amd64, first version. It provides a workaround for the 'meltdown' vulnerability. PTI is turned off by default for now, enable with the loader tunable vm.pmap.pti=1. The pmap page table is split into kernel-mode table and user-mode table. Kernel-mode table is identical to the non-PTI table, while usermode table is obtained from kernel table by leaving userspace mappings intact, but only leaving the following parts of the kernel mapped: kernel text (but not modules text) PCPU GDT/IDT/user LDT/task structures IST stacks for NMI and doublefault handlers. Kernel switches to user page table before returning to usermode, and restores full kernel page table on the entry. Initial kernel-mode stack for PTI trampoline is allocated in PCPU, it is only 16 qwords. Kernel entry trampoline switches page tables. then the hardware trap frame is copied to the normal kstack, and execution continues. IST stacks are kept mapped and no trampoline is needed for NMI/doublefault, but of course page table switch is performed. On return to usermode, the trampoline is used again, iret frame is copied to the trampoline stack, page tables are switched and iretq is executed. The case of iretq faulting due to the invalid usermode context is tricky, since the frame for fault is appended to the trampoline frame. Besides copying the fault frame and original (corrupted) frame to kstack, the fault frame must be patched to make it look as if the fault occured on the kstack, see the comment in doret_iret detection code in trap(). Currently kernel pages which are mapped during trampoline operation are identical for all pmaps. They are registered using pmap_pti_add_kva(). Besides initial registrations done during boot, LDT and non-common TSS segments are registered if user requested their use. In principle, they can be installed into kernel page table per pmap with some work. Similarly, PCPU can be hidden from userspace mapping using trampoline PCPU page, but again I do not see much benefits besides complexity. PDPE pages for the kernel half of the user page tables are pre-allocated during boot because we need to know pml4 entries which are copied to the top-level paging structure page, in advance on a new pmap creation. I enforce this to avoid iterating over the all existing pmaps if a new PDPE page is needed for PTI kernel mappings. The iteration is a known problematic operation on i386. The need to flush hidden kernel translations on the switch to user mode make global tables (PG_G) meaningless and even harming, so PG_G use is disabled for PTI case. Our existing use of PCID is incompatible with PTI and is automatically disabled if PTI is enabled. PCID can be forced on only for developer's benefit. MCE is known to be broken, it requires IST stack to operate completely correctly even for non-PTI case, and absolutely needs dedicated IST stack because MCE delivery while trampoline did not switched from PTI stack is fatal. The fix is pending. Reviewed by: markj (partially) Tested by: pho (previous version) Discussed with: jeff, jhb Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 2 weeks
2018-01-17 11:44:21 +00:00
IDTVEC(int0x80_syscall_pti)
PTI_UENTRY has_err=0
jmp int0x80_syscall_common
SUPERALIGN_TEXT
IDTVEC(int0x80_syscall)
swapgs
PTI for amd64. The implementation of the Kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI) for amd64, first version. It provides a workaround for the 'meltdown' vulnerability. PTI is turned off by default for now, enable with the loader tunable vm.pmap.pti=1. The pmap page table is split into kernel-mode table and user-mode table. Kernel-mode table is identical to the non-PTI table, while usermode table is obtained from kernel table by leaving userspace mappings intact, but only leaving the following parts of the kernel mapped: kernel text (but not modules text) PCPU GDT/IDT/user LDT/task structures IST stacks for NMI and doublefault handlers. Kernel switches to user page table before returning to usermode, and restores full kernel page table on the entry. Initial kernel-mode stack for PTI trampoline is allocated in PCPU, it is only 16 qwords. Kernel entry trampoline switches page tables. then the hardware trap frame is copied to the normal kstack, and execution continues. IST stacks are kept mapped and no trampoline is needed for NMI/doublefault, but of course page table switch is performed. On return to usermode, the trampoline is used again, iret frame is copied to the trampoline stack, page tables are switched and iretq is executed. The case of iretq faulting due to the invalid usermode context is tricky, since the frame for fault is appended to the trampoline frame. Besides copying the fault frame and original (corrupted) frame to kstack, the fault frame must be patched to make it look as if the fault occured on the kstack, see the comment in doret_iret detection code in trap(). Currently kernel pages which are mapped during trampoline operation are identical for all pmaps. They are registered using pmap_pti_add_kva(). Besides initial registrations done during boot, LDT and non-common TSS segments are registered if user requested their use. In principle, they can be installed into kernel page table per pmap with some work. Similarly, PCPU can be hidden from userspace mapping using trampoline PCPU page, but again I do not see much benefits besides complexity. PDPE pages for the kernel half of the user page tables are pre-allocated during boot because we need to know pml4 entries which are copied to the top-level paging structure page, in advance on a new pmap creation. I enforce this to avoid iterating over the all existing pmaps if a new PDPE page is needed for PTI kernel mappings. The iteration is a known problematic operation on i386. The need to flush hidden kernel translations on the switch to user mode make global tables (PG_G) meaningless and even harming, so PG_G use is disabled for PTI case. Our existing use of PCID is incompatible with PTI and is automatically disabled if PTI is enabled. PCID can be forced on only for developer's benefit. MCE is known to be broken, it requires IST stack to operate completely correctly even for non-PTI case, and absolutely needs dedicated IST stack because MCE delivery while trampoline did not switched from PTI stack is fatal. The fix is pending. Reviewed by: markj (partially) Tested by: pho (previous version) Discussed with: jeff, jhb Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 2 weeks
2018-01-17 11:44:21 +00:00
int0x80_syscall_common:
pushq $2 /* sizeof "int 0x80" */
subq $TF_ERR,%rsp /* skip over tf_trapno */
movq %rdi,TF_RDI(%rsp)
movq PCPU(CURPCB),%rdi
andl $~PCB_FULL_IRET,PCB_FLAGS(%rdi)
PTI for amd64. The implementation of the Kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI) for amd64, first version. It provides a workaround for the 'meltdown' vulnerability. PTI is turned off by default for now, enable with the loader tunable vm.pmap.pti=1. The pmap page table is split into kernel-mode table and user-mode table. Kernel-mode table is identical to the non-PTI table, while usermode table is obtained from kernel table by leaving userspace mappings intact, but only leaving the following parts of the kernel mapped: kernel text (but not modules text) PCPU GDT/IDT/user LDT/task structures IST stacks for NMI and doublefault handlers. Kernel switches to user page table before returning to usermode, and restores full kernel page table on the entry. Initial kernel-mode stack for PTI trampoline is allocated in PCPU, it is only 16 qwords. Kernel entry trampoline switches page tables. then the hardware trap frame is copied to the normal kstack, and execution continues. IST stacks are kept mapped and no trampoline is needed for NMI/doublefault, but of course page table switch is performed. On return to usermode, the trampoline is used again, iret frame is copied to the trampoline stack, page tables are switched and iretq is executed. The case of iretq faulting due to the invalid usermode context is tricky, since the frame for fault is appended to the trampoline frame. Besides copying the fault frame and original (corrupted) frame to kstack, the fault frame must be patched to make it look as if the fault occured on the kstack, see the comment in doret_iret detection code in trap(). Currently kernel pages which are mapped during trampoline operation are identical for all pmaps. They are registered using pmap_pti_add_kva(). Besides initial registrations done during boot, LDT and non-common TSS segments are registered if user requested their use. In principle, they can be installed into kernel page table per pmap with some work. Similarly, PCPU can be hidden from userspace mapping using trampoline PCPU page, but again I do not see much benefits besides complexity. PDPE pages for the kernel half of the user page tables are pre-allocated during boot because we need to know pml4 entries which are copied to the top-level paging structure page, in advance on a new pmap creation. I enforce this to avoid iterating over the all existing pmaps if a new PDPE page is needed for PTI kernel mappings. The iteration is a known problematic operation on i386. The need to flush hidden kernel translations on the switch to user mode make global tables (PG_G) meaningless and even harming, so PG_G use is disabled for PTI case. Our existing use of PCID is incompatible with PTI and is automatically disabled if PTI is enabled. PCID can be forced on only for developer's benefit. MCE is known to be broken, it requires IST stack to operate completely correctly even for non-PTI case, and absolutely needs dedicated IST stack because MCE delivery while trampoline did not switched from PTI stack is fatal. The fix is pending. Reviewed by: markj (partially) Tested by: pho (previous version) Discussed with: jeff, jhb Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 2 weeks
2018-01-17 11:44:21 +00:00
SAVE_SEGS
movq %rax,TF_RAX(%rsp)
movq %rdx,TF_RDX(%rsp)
movq %rcx,TF_RCX(%rsp)
call handle_ibrs_entry
sti
movq %rsi,TF_RSI(%rsp)
movq %r8,TF_R8(%rsp)
movq %r9,TF_R9(%rsp)
movq %rbx,TF_RBX(%rsp)
movq %rbp,TF_RBP(%rsp)
movq %r10,TF_R10(%rsp)
movq %r11,TF_R11(%rsp)
movq %r12,TF_R12(%rsp)
movq %r13,TF_R13(%rsp)
movq %r14,TF_R14(%rsp)
movq %r15,TF_R15(%rsp)
movl $TF_HASSEGS,TF_FLAGS(%rsp)
pushfq
andq $~(PSL_D | PSL_AC),(%rsp)
popfq
FAKE_MCOUNT(TF_RIP(%rsp))
movq %rsp, %rdi
call ia32_syscall
MEXITCOUNT
jmp doreti