1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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/*-
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* Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993
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* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
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*
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* This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
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* Mike Karels at Berkeley Software Design, Inc.
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*
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* Quite extensively rewritten by Poul-Henning Kamp of the FreeBSD
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* project, to make these variables more userfriendly.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* This product includes software developed by the University of
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* California, Berkeley and its contributors.
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* 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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* without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* @(#)kern_sysctl.c 8.4 (Berkeley) 4/14/94
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1999-08-28 01:08:13 +00:00
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* $FreeBSD$
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1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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*/
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2001-11-08 15:31:19 +00:00
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#include "opt_posix.h"
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2001-10-07 03:51:22 +00:00
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1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <sys/proc.h>
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o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to
use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
accessing struct prison.
Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
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#include <sys/lock.h>
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#include <sys/mutex.h>
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This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
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#include <sys/jail.h>
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2001-04-27 19:28:25 +00:00
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#include <sys/smp.h>
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1997-08-30 02:52:04 +00:00
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1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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SYSCTL_NODE(, 0, sysctl, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
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"Sysctl internal magic");
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SYSCTL_NODE(, CTL_KERN, kern, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
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"High kernel, proc, limits &c");
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SYSCTL_NODE(, CTL_VM, vm, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
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"Virtual memory");
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1997-03-04 18:31:56 +00:00
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SYSCTL_NODE(, CTL_VFS, vfs, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
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1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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"File system");
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SYSCTL_NODE(, CTL_NET, net, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
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"Network, (see socket.h)");
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SYSCTL_NODE(, CTL_DEBUG, debug, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
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"Debugging");
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1999-07-19 09:13:12 +00:00
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SYSCTL_NODE(_debug, OID_AUTO, sizeof, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
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"Sizeof various things");
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1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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SYSCTL_NODE(, CTL_HW, hw, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
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"hardware");
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SYSCTL_NODE(, CTL_MACHDEP, machdep, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
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"machine dependent");
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SYSCTL_NODE(, CTL_USER, user, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
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"user-level");
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1998-03-28 11:51:01 +00:00
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SYSCTL_NODE(, CTL_P1003_1B, p1003_1b, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
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"p1003_1b, (see p1003_1b.h)");
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1998-03-04 10:25:55 +00:00
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1999-08-27 19:47:41 +00:00
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SYSCTL_NODE(, OID_AUTO, compat, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
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"Compatibility code");
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2001-11-08 15:31:19 +00:00
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#ifdef REGRESSION
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SYSCTL_NODE(, OID_AUTO, regression, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
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"Regression test MIB");
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#endif
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1999-08-27 19:47:41 +00:00
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2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
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SYSCTL_STRING(_kern, KERN_OSRELEASE, osrelease, CTLFLAG_RD,
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2001-12-16 16:07:20 +00:00
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osrelease, 0, "Operating system release");
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1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
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SYSCTL_INT(_kern, KERN_OSREV, osrevision, CTLFLAG_RD,
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1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
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0, BSD, "Operating system revision");
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1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
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SYSCTL_STRING(_kern, KERN_VERSION, version, CTLFLAG_RD,
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1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
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version, 0, "Kernel version");
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1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
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SYSCTL_STRING(_kern, KERN_OSTYPE, ostype, CTLFLAG_RD,
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1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
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ostype, 0, "Operating system type");
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1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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extern int osreldate;
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2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
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SYSCTL_INT(_kern, KERN_OSRELDATE, osreldate, CTLFLAG_RD,
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1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
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&osreldate, 0, "Operating system release date");
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1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
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SYSCTL_INT(_kern, KERN_MAXPROC, maxproc, CTLFLAG_RD,
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1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
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&maxproc, 0, "Maximum number of processes");
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1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
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SYSCTL_INT(_kern, KERN_MAXPROCPERUID, maxprocperuid, CTLFLAG_RW,
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1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
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&maxprocperuid, 0, "Maximum processes allowed per userid");
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1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
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SYSCTL_INT(_kern, OID_AUTO, maxusers, CTLFLAG_RD,
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2001-07-26 23:04:03 +00:00
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&maxusers, 0, "Hint for kernel tuning");
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2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
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SYSCTL_INT(_kern, KERN_ARGMAX, argmax, CTLFLAG_RD,
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1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
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0, ARG_MAX, "Maximum bytes of argument to execve(2)");
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1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
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SYSCTL_INT(_kern, KERN_POSIX1, posix1version, CTLFLAG_RD,
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1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
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0, _KPOSIX_VERSION, "Version of POSIX attempting to comply to");
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1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
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SYSCTL_INT(_kern, KERN_NGROUPS, ngroups, CTLFLAG_RD,
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1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
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0, NGROUPS_MAX, "Maximum number of groups a user can belong to");
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1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
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SYSCTL_INT(_kern, KERN_JOB_CONTROL, job_control, CTLFLAG_RD,
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1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
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0, 1, "Whether job control is available");
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1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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#ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS
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2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
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SYSCTL_INT(_kern, KERN_SAVED_IDS, saved_ids, CTLFLAG_RD,
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1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
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0, 1, "Whether saved set-group/user ID is available");
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1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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#else
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
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SYSCTL_INT(_kern, KERN_SAVED_IDS, saved_ids, CTLFLAG_RD,
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1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
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0, 0, "Whether saved set-group/user ID is available");
|
1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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#endif
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char kernelname[MAXPATHLEN] = "/kernel"; /* XXX bloat */
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2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
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SYSCTL_STRING(_kern, KERN_BOOTFILE, bootfile, CTLFLAG_RW,
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1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
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kernelname, sizeof kernelname, "Name of kernel file booted");
|
1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
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1997-12-25 13:14:21 +00:00
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|
#ifdef SMP
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
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SYSCTL_INT(_hw, HW_NCPU, ncpu, CTLFLAG_RD,
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1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
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&mp_ncpus, 0, "Number of active CPUs");
|
1997-12-25 13:14:21 +00:00
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#else
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
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SYSCTL_INT(_hw, HW_NCPU, ncpu, CTLFLAG_RD,
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1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
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0, 1, "Number of active CPUs");
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1997-12-25 13:14:21 +00:00
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#endif
|
1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
|
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|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
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|
SYSCTL_INT(_hw, HW_BYTEORDER, byteorder, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
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0, BYTE_ORDER, "System byte order");
|
1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
|
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|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
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|
SYSCTL_INT(_hw, HW_PAGESIZE, pagesize, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
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|
0, PAGE_SIZE, "System memory page size");
|
1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
|
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|
1997-08-29 09:03:40 +00:00
|
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|
static char machine_arch[] = MACHINE_ARCH;
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SYSCTL_STRING(_hw, HW_MACHINE_ARCH, machine_arch, CTLFLAG_RD,
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1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
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|
machine_arch, 0, "System architecture");
|
1997-08-29 09:03:40 +00:00
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|
1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
|
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|
char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
|
|
|
|
|
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2000-07-04 11:25:35 +00:00
|
|
|
sysctl_hostname(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
|
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-11-28 21:22:05 +00:00
|
|
|
struct prison *pr;
|
o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to
use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
accessing struct prison.
Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
|
|
|
char tmphostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
|
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-11-28 21:22:05 +00:00
|
|
|
pr = req->td->td_proc->p_ucred->cr_prison;
|
|
|
|
if (pr != NULL) {
|
2000-02-12 13:41:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!jail_set_hostname_allowed && req->newptr)
|
2001-11-08 15:31:19 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to
use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
accessing struct prison.
Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Process is in jail, so make a local copy of jail
|
|
|
|
* hostname to get/set so we don't have to hold the jail
|
|
|
|
* mutex during the sysctl copyin/copyout activities.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
|
|
bcopy(pr->pr_host, tmphostname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN);
|
|
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = sysctl_handle_string(oidp, tmphostname,
|
2001-11-28 21:22:05 +00:00
|
|
|
sizeof pr->pr_host, req);
|
o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to
use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
accessing struct prison.
Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (req->newptr != NULL && error == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Copy the locally set hostname to the jail, if
|
|
|
|
* appropriate.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
|
|
bcopy(tmphostname, pr->pr_host, MAXHOSTNAMELEN);
|
|
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-02-10 05:32:03 +00:00
|
|
|
} else
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
error = sysctl_handle_string(oidp,
|
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
|
|
|
hostname, sizeof hostname, req);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_PROC(_kern, KERN_HOSTNAME, hostname,
|
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
|
|
|
CTLTYPE_STRING|CTLFLAG_RW|CTLFLAG_PRISON,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, sysctl_hostname, "A", "Hostname");
|
1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-11-08 15:31:19 +00:00
|
|
|
static int regression_securelevel_nonmonotonic = 0;
|
2001-10-07 03:51:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-11-28 21:22:05 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef REGRESSION
|
2001-10-07 03:51:22 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_regression, OID_AUTO, securelevel_nonmonotonic, CTLFLAG_RW,
|
|
|
|
®ression_securelevel_nonmonotonic, 0, "securelevel may be lowered");
|
2001-11-08 15:31:19 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-10-07 03:51:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
|
|
|
int securelevel = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2000-07-04 11:25:35 +00:00
|
|
|
sysctl_kern_securelvl(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
|
1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-11-06 20:09:33 +00:00
|
|
|
struct prison *pr;
|
2001-11-06 19:56:58 +00:00
|
|
|
int error, level;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-11-08 02:13:18 +00:00
|
|
|
pr = req->td->td_proc->p_ucred->cr_prison;
|
2001-11-06 20:09:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-11-06 19:56:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the process is in jail, return the maximum of the global and
|
|
|
|
* local levels; otherwise, return the global level.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to
use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
accessing struct prison.
Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pr != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
2001-11-06 20:09:33 +00:00
|
|
|
level = imax(securelevel, pr->pr_securelevel);
|
o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to
use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
accessing struct prison.
Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
|
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
|
|
} else
|
2001-11-06 19:56:58 +00:00
|
|
|
level = securelevel;
|
|
|
|
error = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &level, 0, req);
|
|
|
|
if (error || !req->newptr)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Permit update only if the new securelevel exceeds the
|
|
|
|
* global level, and local level if any.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2001-11-06 20:09:33 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pr != NULL) {
|
o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to
use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
accessing struct prison.
Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
2001-11-28 21:22:05 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!regression_securelevel_nonmonotonic &&
|
o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to
use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
accessing struct prison.
Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
|
|
|
(level < imax(securelevel, pr->pr_securelevel))) {
|
|
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
2001-11-06 19:56:58 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to
use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
accessing struct prison.
Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-11-06 20:09:33 +00:00
|
|
|
pr->pr_securelevel = level;
|
o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to
use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
accessing struct prison.
Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
|
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
2001-11-06 19:56:58 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2001-11-28 21:22:05 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!regression_securelevel_nonmonotonic &&
|
|
|
|
(level < securelevel))
|
2001-11-06 19:56:58 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
securelevel = level;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-09-26 20:39:48 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_PROC(_kern, KERN_SECURELVL, securelevel,
|
|
|
|
CTLTYPE_INT|CTLFLAG_RW|CTLFLAG_PRISON, 0, 0, sysctl_kern_securelvl,
|
|
|
|
"I", "Current secure level");
|
2000-06-07 18:54:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
|
|
|
char domainname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
|
1996-07-25 18:02:40 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_STRING(_kern, KERN_NISDOMAINNAME, domainname, CTLFLAG_RW,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
&domainname, sizeof(domainname), "Name of the current YP/NIS domain");
|
1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-11-08 15:31:19 +00:00
|
|
|
u_long hostid;
|
2001-06-22 16:03:14 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_ULONG(_kern, KERN_HOSTID, hostid, CTLFLAG_RW, &hostid, 0, "Host ID");
|
1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This is really cheating. These actually live in the libc, something
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
* which I'm not quite sure is a good idea anyway, but in order for
|
1996-04-07 13:03:06 +00:00
|
|
|
* getnext and friends to actually work, we define dummies here.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_STRING(_user, USER_CS_PATH, cs_path, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
"", 0, "PATH that finds all the standard utilities");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_BC_BASE_MAX, bc_base_max, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, "Max ibase/obase values in bc(1)");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_BC_DIM_MAX, bc_dim_max, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, "Max array size in bc(1)");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_BC_SCALE_MAX, bc_scale_max, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, "Max scale value in bc(1)");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_BC_STRING_MAX, bc_string_max, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, "Max string length in bc(1)");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_COLL_WEIGHTS_MAX, coll_weights_max, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, "Maximum number of weights assigned to an LC_COLLATE locale entry");
|
1996-09-28 15:53:30 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_EXPR_NEST_MAX, expr_nest_max, CTLFLAG_RD, 0, 0, "");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_LINE_MAX, line_max, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, "Max length (bytes) of a text-processing utility's input line");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_RE_DUP_MAX, re_dup_max, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, "Maximum number of repeats of a regexp permitted");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_POSIX2_VERSION, posix2_version, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
"The version of POSIX 1003.2 with which the system attempts to comply");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_POSIX2_C_BIND, posix2_c_bind, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, "Whether C development supports the C bindings option");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_POSIX2_C_DEV, posix2_c_dev, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, "Whether system supports the C development utilities option");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_POSIX2_CHAR_TERM, posix2_char_term, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, "");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_POSIX2_FORT_DEV, posix2_fort_dev, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, "Whether system supports FORTRAN development utilities");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_POSIX2_FORT_RUN, posix2_fort_run, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, "Whether system supports FORTRAN runtime utilities");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_POSIX2_LOCALEDEF, posix2_localedef, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, "Whether system supports creation of locales");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_POSIX2_SW_DEV, posix2_sw_dev, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, "Whether system supports software development utilities");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_POSIX2_UPE, posix2_upe, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, "Whether system supports the user portability utilities");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_STREAM_MAX, stream_max, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, "Min Maximum number of streams a process may have open at one time");
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_user, USER_TZNAME_MAX, tzname_max, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, "Min Maximum number of types supported for timezone names");
|
1999-07-19 09:13:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/vnode.h>
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_debug_sizeof, OID_AUTO, vnode, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-07-19 09:13:12 +00:00
|
|
|
0, sizeof(struct vnode), "sizeof(struct vnode)");
|
|
|
|
|
2001-11-08 15:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_debug_sizeof, OID_AUTO, proc, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1999-07-19 09:13:12 +00:00
|
|
|
0, sizeof(struct proc), "sizeof(struct proc)");
|
1999-07-20 07:19:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-08-08 18:43:05 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/conf.h>
|
1999-07-20 07:19:32 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_debug_sizeof, OID_AUTO, specinfo, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
|
|
|
0, sizeof(struct specinfo), "sizeof(struct specinfo)");
|
2000-04-02 09:26:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2000-05-05 09:59:14 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/bio.h>
|
2000-04-02 09:26:51 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/buf.h>
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_debug_sizeof, OID_AUTO, bio, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
|
|
|
0, sizeof(struct bio), "sizeof(struct bio)");
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_debug_sizeof, OID_AUTO, buf, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
|
|
|
0, sizeof(struct buf), "sizeof(struct buf)");
|
2001-02-12 00:20:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/user.h>
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_debug_sizeof, OID_AUTO, kinfo_proc, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
|
|
|
0, sizeof(struct kinfo_proc), "sizeof(struct kinfo_proc)");
|