freebsd-skq/sys/netinet/tcp_usrreq.c

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/*-
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* Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1988, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* From: @(#)tcp_usrreq.c 8.2 (Berkeley) 1/3/94
1999-08-28 01:08:13 +00:00
* $FreeBSD$
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
Initial import of RFC 2385 (TCP-MD5) digest support. This is the first of two commits; bringing in the kernel support first. This can be enabled by compiling a kernel with options TCP_SIGNATURE and FAST_IPSEC. For the uninitiated, this is a TCP option which provides for a means of authenticating TCP sessions which came into being before IPSEC. It is still relevant today, however, as it is used by many commercial router vendors, particularly with BGP, and as such has become a requirement for interconnect at many major Internet points of presence. Several parts of the TCP and IP headers, including the segment payload, are digested with MD5, including a shared secret. The PF_KEY interface is used to manage the secrets using security associations in the SADB. There is a limitation here in that as there is no way to map a TCP flow per-port back to an SPI without polluting tcpcb or using the SPD; the code to do the latter is unstable at this time. Therefore this code only supports per-host keying granularity. Whilst FAST_IPSEC is mutually exclusive with KAME IPSEC (and thus IPv6), TCP_SIGNATURE applies only to IPv4. For the vast majority of prospective users of this feature, this will not pose any problem. This implementation is output-only; that is, the option is honoured when responding to a host initiating a TCP session, but no effort is made [yet] to authenticate inbound traffic. This is, however, sufficient to interwork with Cisco equipment. Tested with a Cisco 2501 running IOS 12.0(27), and Quagga 0.96.4 with local patches. Patches for tcpdump to validate TCP-MD5 sessions are also available from me upon request. Sponsored by: sentex.net
2004-02-11 04:26:04 +00:00
#include "opt_inet.h"
#include "opt_inet6.h"
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#include "opt_tcpdebug.h"
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#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#ifdef INET6
#include <sys/domain.h>
#endif /* INET6 */
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#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/protosw.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/jail.h>
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#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#ifdef INET6
#include <netinet/ip6.h>
#endif
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#include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
#ifdef INET6
#include <netinet6/in6_pcb.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in_var.h>
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#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
#ifdef INET6
#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
#include <netinet6/scope6_var.h>
#endif
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#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#include <netinet/tcp_fsm.h>
#include <netinet/tcp_seq.h>
#include <netinet/tcp_timer.h>
#include <netinet/tcp_var.h>
#include <netinet/tcpip.h>
#ifdef TCPDEBUG
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#include <netinet/tcp_debug.h>
#endif
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* TCP protocol interface to socket abstraction.
*/
extern char *tcpstates[]; /* XXX ??? */
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
2004-03-28 15:48:00 +00:00
static int tcp_attach(struct socket *);
static int tcp_connect(struct tcpcb *, struct sockaddr *,
struct thread *td);
#ifdef INET6
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static int tcp6_connect(struct tcpcb *, struct sockaddr *,
struct thread *td);
#endif /* INET6 */
static struct tcpcb *
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tcp_disconnect(struct tcpcb *);
static struct tcpcb *
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tcp_usrclosed(struct tcpcb *);
static void tcp_fill_info(struct tcpcb *, struct tcp_info *);
#ifdef TCPDEBUG
2001-03-12 02:57:42 +00:00
#define TCPDEBUG0 int ostate = 0
#define TCPDEBUG1() ostate = tp ? tp->t_state : 0
#define TCPDEBUG2(req) if (tp && (so->so_options & SO_DEBUG)) \
tcp_trace(TA_USER, ostate, tp, 0, 0, req)
#else
#define TCPDEBUG0
#define TCPDEBUG1()
#define TCPDEBUG2(req)
#endif
/*
* TCP attaches to socket via pru_attach(), reserving space,
* and an internet control block.
*/
static int
tcp_usr_attach(struct socket *so, int proto, struct thread *td)
{
int error;
struct inpcb *inp;
struct tcpcb *tp = 0;
TCPDEBUG0;
INP_INFO_WLOCK(&tcbinfo);
TCPDEBUG1();
inp = sotoinpcb(so);
if (inp) {
error = EISCONN;
goto out;
}
2004-03-28 15:48:00 +00:00
error = tcp_attach(so);
if (error)
goto out;
if ((so->so_options & SO_LINGER) && so->so_linger == 0)
so->so_linger = TCP_LINGERTIME;
inp = sotoinpcb(so);
tp = intotcpcb(inp);
out:
TCPDEBUG2(PRU_ATTACH);
INP_INFO_WUNLOCK(&tcbinfo);
return error;
}
/*
* pru_detach() detaches the TCP protocol from the socket.
* If the protocol state is non-embryonic, then can't
* do this directly: have to initiate a pru_disconnect(),
* which may finish later; embryonic TCB's can just
* be discarded here.
*/
static int
tcp_usr_detach(struct socket *so)
{
int error = 0;
struct inpcb *inp;
struct tcpcb *tp;
TCPDEBUG0;
INP_INFO_WLOCK(&tcbinfo);
inp = sotoinpcb(so);
if (inp == NULL) {
INP_INFO_WUNLOCK(&tcbinfo);
return error;
}
INP_LOCK(inp);
tp = intotcpcb(inp);
TCPDEBUG1();
tp = tcp_disconnect(tp);
TCPDEBUG2(PRU_DETACH);
if (tp)
INP_UNLOCK(inp);
INP_INFO_WUNLOCK(&tcbinfo);
return error;
}
#define INI_NOLOCK 0
#define INI_READ 1
#define INI_WRITE 2
#define COMMON_START() \
TCPDEBUG0; \
do { \
if (inirw == INI_READ) \
INP_INFO_RLOCK(&tcbinfo); \
else if (inirw == INI_WRITE) \
INP_INFO_WLOCK(&tcbinfo); \
inp = sotoinpcb(so); \
if (inp == 0) { \
if (inirw == INI_READ) \
INP_INFO_RUNLOCK(&tcbinfo); \
else if (inirw == INI_WRITE) \
INP_INFO_WUNLOCK(&tcbinfo); \
return EINVAL; \
} \
INP_LOCK(inp); \
if (inirw == INI_READ) \
INP_INFO_RUNLOCK(&tcbinfo); \
tp = intotcpcb(inp); \
TCPDEBUG1(); \
} while(0)
#define COMMON_END(req) \
out: TCPDEBUG2(req); \
do { \
if (tp) \
INP_UNLOCK(inp); \
if (inirw == INI_WRITE) \
INP_INFO_WUNLOCK(&tcbinfo); \
return error; \
goto out; \
} while(0)
/*
* Give the socket an address.
*/
static int
tcp_usr_bind(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct thread *td)
{
int error = 0;
struct inpcb *inp;
struct tcpcb *tp;
struct sockaddr_in *sinp;
const int inirw = INI_WRITE;
sinp = (struct sockaddr_in *)nam;
if (nam->sa_len != sizeof (*sinp))
return (EINVAL);
/*
* Must check for multicast addresses and disallow binding
* to them.
*/
if (sinp->sin_family == AF_INET &&
IN_MULTICAST(ntohl(sinp->sin_addr.s_addr)))
return (EAFNOSUPPORT);
COMMON_START();
error = in_pcbbind(inp, nam, td->td_ucred);
if (error)
goto out;
COMMON_END(PRU_BIND);
}
#ifdef INET6
static int
tcp6_usr_bind(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct thread *td)
{
int error = 0;
struct inpcb *inp;
struct tcpcb *tp;
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6p;
const int inirw = INI_WRITE;
sin6p = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)nam;
if (nam->sa_len != sizeof (*sin6p))
return (EINVAL);
/*
* Must check for multicast addresses and disallow binding
* to them.
*/
if (sin6p->sin6_family == AF_INET6 &&
IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&sin6p->sin6_addr))
return (EAFNOSUPPORT);
COMMON_START();
inp->inp_vflag &= ~INP_IPV4;
inp->inp_vflag |= INP_IPV6;
if ((inp->inp_flags & IN6P_IPV6_V6ONLY) == 0) {
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&sin6p->sin6_addr))
inp->inp_vflag |= INP_IPV4;
else if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sin6p->sin6_addr)) {
struct sockaddr_in sin;
in6_sin6_2_sin(&sin, sin6p);
inp->inp_vflag |= INP_IPV4;
inp->inp_vflag &= ~INP_IPV6;
error = in_pcbbind(inp, (struct sockaddr *)&sin,
td->td_ucred);
goto out;
}
}
error = in6_pcbbind(inp, nam, td->td_ucred);
if (error)
goto out;
COMMON_END(PRU_BIND);
}
#endif /* INET6 */
/*
* Prepare to accept connections.
*/
static int
tcp_usr_listen(struct socket *so, int backlog, struct thread *td)
{
int error = 0;
struct inpcb *inp;
struct tcpcb *tp;
const int inirw = INI_WRITE;
COMMON_START();
In the current world order, solisten() implements the state transition of a socket from a regular socket to a listening socket able to accept new connections. As part of this state transition, solisten() calls into the protocol to update protocol-layer state. There were several bugs in this implementation that could result in a race wherein a TCP SYN received in the interval between the protocol state transition and the shortly following socket layer transition would result in a panic in the TCP code, as the socket would be in the TCPS_LISTEN state, but the socket would not have the SO_ACCEPTCONN flag set. This change does the following: - Pushes the socket state transition from the socket layer solisten() to to socket "library" routines called from the protocol. This permits the socket routines to be called while holding the protocol mutexes, preventing a race exposing the incomplete socket state transition to TCP after the TCP state transition has completed. The check for a socket layer state transition is performed by solisten_proto_check(), and the actual transition is performed by solisten_proto(). - Holds the socket lock for the duration of the socket state test and set, and over the protocol layer state transition, which is now possible as the socket lock is acquired by the protocol layer, rather than vice versa. This prevents additional state related races in the socket layer. This permits the dual transition of socket layer and protocol layer state to occur while holding locks for both layers, making the two changes atomic with respect to one another. Similar changes are likely require elsewhere in the socket/protocol code. Reported by: Peter Holm <peter@holm.cc> Review and fixes from: emax, Antoine Brodin <antoine.brodin@laposte.net> Philosophical head nod: gnn
2005-02-21 21:58:17 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK(so);
error = solisten_proto_check(so);
if (error == 0 && inp->inp_lport == 0)
error = in_pcbbind(inp, (struct sockaddr *)0, td->td_ucred);
In the current world order, solisten() implements the state transition of a socket from a regular socket to a listening socket able to accept new connections. As part of this state transition, solisten() calls into the protocol to update protocol-layer state. There were several bugs in this implementation that could result in a race wherein a TCP SYN received in the interval between the protocol state transition and the shortly following socket layer transition would result in a panic in the TCP code, as the socket would be in the TCPS_LISTEN state, but the socket would not have the SO_ACCEPTCONN flag set. This change does the following: - Pushes the socket state transition from the socket layer solisten() to to socket "library" routines called from the protocol. This permits the socket routines to be called while holding the protocol mutexes, preventing a race exposing the incomplete socket state transition to TCP after the TCP state transition has completed. The check for a socket layer state transition is performed by solisten_proto_check(), and the actual transition is performed by solisten_proto(). - Holds the socket lock for the duration of the socket state test and set, and over the protocol layer state transition, which is now possible as the socket lock is acquired by the protocol layer, rather than vice versa. This prevents additional state related races in the socket layer. This permits the dual transition of socket layer and protocol layer state to occur while holding locks for both layers, making the two changes atomic with respect to one another. Similar changes are likely require elsewhere in the socket/protocol code. Reported by: Peter Holm <peter@holm.cc> Review and fixes from: emax, Antoine Brodin <antoine.brodin@laposte.net> Philosophical head nod: gnn
2005-02-21 21:58:17 +00:00
if (error == 0) {
tp->t_state = TCPS_LISTEN;
solisten_proto(so, backlog);
In the current world order, solisten() implements the state transition of a socket from a regular socket to a listening socket able to accept new connections. As part of this state transition, solisten() calls into the protocol to update protocol-layer state. There were several bugs in this implementation that could result in a race wherein a TCP SYN received in the interval between the protocol state transition and the shortly following socket layer transition would result in a panic in the TCP code, as the socket would be in the TCPS_LISTEN state, but the socket would not have the SO_ACCEPTCONN flag set. This change does the following: - Pushes the socket state transition from the socket layer solisten() to to socket "library" routines called from the protocol. This permits the socket routines to be called while holding the protocol mutexes, preventing a race exposing the incomplete socket state transition to TCP after the TCP state transition has completed. The check for a socket layer state transition is performed by solisten_proto_check(), and the actual transition is performed by solisten_proto(). - Holds the socket lock for the duration of the socket state test and set, and over the protocol layer state transition, which is now possible as the socket lock is acquired by the protocol layer, rather than vice versa. This prevents additional state related races in the socket layer. This permits the dual transition of socket layer and protocol layer state to occur while holding locks for both layers, making the two changes atomic with respect to one another. Similar changes are likely require elsewhere in the socket/protocol code. Reported by: Peter Holm <peter@holm.cc> Review and fixes from: emax, Antoine Brodin <antoine.brodin@laposte.net> Philosophical head nod: gnn
2005-02-21 21:58:17 +00:00
}
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
COMMON_END(PRU_LISTEN);
}
#ifdef INET6
static int
tcp6_usr_listen(struct socket *so, int backlog, struct thread *td)
{
int error = 0;
struct inpcb *inp;
struct tcpcb *tp;
const int inirw = INI_WRITE;
COMMON_START();
In the current world order, solisten() implements the state transition of a socket from a regular socket to a listening socket able to accept new connections. As part of this state transition, solisten() calls into the protocol to update protocol-layer state. There were several bugs in this implementation that could result in a race wherein a TCP SYN received in the interval between the protocol state transition and the shortly following socket layer transition would result in a panic in the TCP code, as the socket would be in the TCPS_LISTEN state, but the socket would not have the SO_ACCEPTCONN flag set. This change does the following: - Pushes the socket state transition from the socket layer solisten() to to socket "library" routines called from the protocol. This permits the socket routines to be called while holding the protocol mutexes, preventing a race exposing the incomplete socket state transition to TCP after the TCP state transition has completed. The check for a socket layer state transition is performed by solisten_proto_check(), and the actual transition is performed by solisten_proto(). - Holds the socket lock for the duration of the socket state test and set, and over the protocol layer state transition, which is now possible as the socket lock is acquired by the protocol layer, rather than vice versa. This prevents additional state related races in the socket layer. This permits the dual transition of socket layer and protocol layer state to occur while holding locks for both layers, making the two changes atomic with respect to one another. Similar changes are likely require elsewhere in the socket/protocol code. Reported by: Peter Holm <peter@holm.cc> Review and fixes from: emax, Antoine Brodin <antoine.brodin@laposte.net> Philosophical head nod: gnn
2005-02-21 21:58:17 +00:00
SOCK_LOCK(so);
error = solisten_proto_check(so);
if (error == 0 && inp->inp_lport == 0) {
inp->inp_vflag &= ~INP_IPV4;
if ((inp->inp_flags & IN6P_IPV6_V6ONLY) == 0)
inp->inp_vflag |= INP_IPV4;
error = in6_pcbbind(inp, (struct sockaddr *)0, td->td_ucred);
}
In the current world order, solisten() implements the state transition of a socket from a regular socket to a listening socket able to accept new connections. As part of this state transition, solisten() calls into the protocol to update protocol-layer state. There were several bugs in this implementation that could result in a race wherein a TCP SYN received in the interval between the protocol state transition and the shortly following socket layer transition would result in a panic in the TCP code, as the socket would be in the TCPS_LISTEN state, but the socket would not have the SO_ACCEPTCONN flag set. This change does the following: - Pushes the socket state transition from the socket layer solisten() to to socket "library" routines called from the protocol. This permits the socket routines to be called while holding the protocol mutexes, preventing a race exposing the incomplete socket state transition to TCP after the TCP state transition has completed. The check for a socket layer state transition is performed by solisten_proto_check(), and the actual transition is performed by solisten_proto(). - Holds the socket lock for the duration of the socket state test and set, and over the protocol layer state transition, which is now possible as the socket lock is acquired by the protocol layer, rather than vice versa. This prevents additional state related races in the socket layer. This permits the dual transition of socket layer and protocol layer state to occur while holding locks for both layers, making the two changes atomic with respect to one another. Similar changes are likely require elsewhere in the socket/protocol code. Reported by: Peter Holm <peter@holm.cc> Review and fixes from: emax, Antoine Brodin <antoine.brodin@laposte.net> Philosophical head nod: gnn
2005-02-21 21:58:17 +00:00
if (error == 0) {
tp->t_state = TCPS_LISTEN;
solisten_proto(so, backlog);
In the current world order, solisten() implements the state transition of a socket from a regular socket to a listening socket able to accept new connections. As part of this state transition, solisten() calls into the protocol to update protocol-layer state. There were several bugs in this implementation that could result in a race wherein a TCP SYN received in the interval between the protocol state transition and the shortly following socket layer transition would result in a panic in the TCP code, as the socket would be in the TCPS_LISTEN state, but the socket would not have the SO_ACCEPTCONN flag set. This change does the following: - Pushes the socket state transition from the socket layer solisten() to to socket "library" routines called from the protocol. This permits the socket routines to be called while holding the protocol mutexes, preventing a race exposing the incomplete socket state transition to TCP after the TCP state transition has completed. The check for a socket layer state transition is performed by solisten_proto_check(), and the actual transition is performed by solisten_proto(). - Holds the socket lock for the duration of the socket state test and set, and over the protocol layer state transition, which is now possible as the socket lock is acquired by the protocol layer, rather than vice versa. This prevents additional state related races in the socket layer. This permits the dual transition of socket layer and protocol layer state to occur while holding locks for both layers, making the two changes atomic with respect to one another. Similar changes are likely require elsewhere in the socket/protocol code. Reported by: Peter Holm <peter@holm.cc> Review and fixes from: emax, Antoine Brodin <antoine.brodin@laposte.net> Philosophical head nod: gnn
2005-02-21 21:58:17 +00:00
}
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
COMMON_END(PRU_LISTEN);
}
#endif /* INET6 */
/*
* Initiate connection to peer.
* Create a template for use in transmissions on this connection.
* Enter SYN_SENT state, and mark socket as connecting.
* Start keep-alive timer, and seed output sequence space.
* Send initial segment on connection.
*/
static int
tcp_usr_connect(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct thread *td)
{
int error = 0;
struct inpcb *inp;
struct tcpcb *tp;
struct sockaddr_in *sinp;
const int inirw = INI_WRITE;
sinp = (struct sockaddr_in *)nam;
if (nam->sa_len != sizeof (*sinp))
return (EINVAL);
/*
* Must disallow TCP ``connections'' to multicast addresses.
*/
if (sinp->sin_family == AF_INET
&& IN_MULTICAST(ntohl(sinp->sin_addr.s_addr)))
return (EAFNOSUPPORT);
if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
prison_remote_ip(td->td_ucred, 0, &sinp->sin_addr.s_addr);
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
COMMON_START();
if ((error = tcp_connect(tp, nam, td)) != 0)
goto out;
error = tcp_output(tp);
COMMON_END(PRU_CONNECT);
}
#ifdef INET6
static int
tcp6_usr_connect(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct thread *td)
{
int error = 0;
struct inpcb *inp;
struct tcpcb *tp;
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6p;
const int inirw = INI_WRITE;
sin6p = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)nam;
if (nam->sa_len != sizeof (*sin6p))
return (EINVAL);
/*
* Must disallow TCP ``connections'' to multicast addresses.
*/
if (sin6p->sin6_family == AF_INET6
&& IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&sin6p->sin6_addr))
return (EAFNOSUPPORT);
COMMON_START();
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sin6p->sin6_addr)) {
struct sockaddr_in sin;
if ((inp->inp_flags & IN6P_IPV6_V6ONLY) != 0) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
in6_sin6_2_sin(&sin, sin6p);
inp->inp_vflag |= INP_IPV4;
inp->inp_vflag &= ~INP_IPV6;
if ((error = tcp_connect(tp, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, td)) != 0)
goto out;
error = tcp_output(tp);
goto out;
}
inp->inp_vflag &= ~INP_IPV4;
inp->inp_vflag |= INP_IPV6;
inp->inp_inc.inc_isipv6 = 1;
if ((error = tcp6_connect(tp, nam, td)) != 0)
goto out;
error = tcp_output(tp);
COMMON_END(PRU_CONNECT);
}
#endif /* INET6 */
/*
* Initiate disconnect from peer.
* If connection never passed embryonic stage, just drop;
* else if don't need to let data drain, then can just drop anyways,
* else have to begin TCP shutdown process: mark socket disconnecting,
* drain unread data, state switch to reflect user close, and
* send segment (e.g. FIN) to peer. Socket will be really disconnected
* when peer sends FIN and acks ours.
*
* SHOULD IMPLEMENT LATER PRU_CONNECT VIA REALLOC TCPCB.
*/
static int
tcp_usr_disconnect(struct socket *so)
{
int error = 0;
struct inpcb *inp;
struct tcpcb *tp;
const int inirw = INI_WRITE;
COMMON_START();
tp = tcp_disconnect(tp);
COMMON_END(PRU_DISCONNECT);
}
/*
* Accept a connection. Essentially all the work is
* done at higher levels; just return the address
* of the peer, storing through addr.
*/
static int
tcp_usr_accept(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr **nam)
{
int error = 0;
struct inpcb *inp = NULL;
2001-03-12 02:57:42 +00:00
struct tcpcb *tp = NULL;
struct in_addr addr;
in_port_t port = 0;
2001-03-12 02:57:42 +00:00
TCPDEBUG0;
if (so->so_state & SS_ISDISCONNECTED) {
error = ECONNABORTED;
goto out;
}
INP_INFO_RLOCK(&tcbinfo);
inp = sotoinpcb(so);
if (!inp) {
INP_INFO_RUNLOCK(&tcbinfo);
2001-03-12 02:57:42 +00:00
return (EINVAL);
}
INP_LOCK(inp);
INP_INFO_RUNLOCK(&tcbinfo);
2001-03-12 02:57:42 +00:00
tp = intotcpcb(inp);
TCPDEBUG1();
/*
* We inline in_setpeeraddr and COMMON_END here, so that we can
* copy the data of interest and defer the malloc until after we
* release the lock.
*/
port = inp->inp_fport;
addr = inp->inp_faddr;
out: TCPDEBUG2(PRU_ACCEPT);
if (tp)
INP_UNLOCK(inp);
if (error == 0)
*nam = in_sockaddr(port, &addr);
return error;
}
#ifdef INET6
static int
tcp6_usr_accept(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr **nam)
{
struct inpcb *inp = NULL;
int error = 0;
2001-03-12 02:57:42 +00:00
struct tcpcb *tp = NULL;
struct in_addr addr;
struct in6_addr addr6;
in_port_t port = 0;
int v4 = 0;
2001-03-12 02:57:42 +00:00
TCPDEBUG0;
if (so->so_state & SS_ISDISCONNECTED) {
error = ECONNABORTED;
goto out;
}
INP_INFO_RLOCK(&tcbinfo);
inp = sotoinpcb(so);
2001-03-12 02:57:42 +00:00
if (inp == 0) {
INP_INFO_RUNLOCK(&tcbinfo);
2001-03-12 02:57:42 +00:00
return (EINVAL);
}
INP_LOCK(inp);
INP_INFO_RUNLOCK(&tcbinfo);
2001-03-12 02:57:42 +00:00
tp = intotcpcb(inp);
TCPDEBUG1();
/*
* We inline in6_mapped_peeraddr and COMMON_END here, so that we can
* copy the data of interest and defer the malloc until after we
* release the lock.
*/
if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV4) {
v4 = 1;
port = inp->inp_fport;
addr = inp->inp_faddr;
} else {
port = inp->inp_fport;
addr6 = inp->in6p_faddr;
}
out: TCPDEBUG2(PRU_ACCEPT);
if (tp)
INP_UNLOCK(inp);
if (error == 0) {
if (v4)
*nam = in6_v4mapsin6_sockaddr(port, &addr);
else
*nam = in6_sockaddr(port, &addr6);
}
return error;
}
#endif /* INET6 */
/*
* This is the wrapper function for in_setsockaddr. We just pass down
* the pcbinfo for in_setsockaddr to lock. We don't want to do the locking
* here because in_setsockaddr will call malloc and can block.
*/
static int
tcp_sockaddr(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr **nam)
{
return (in_setsockaddr(so, nam, &tcbinfo));
}
/*
* This is the wrapper function for in_setpeeraddr. We just pass down
* the pcbinfo for in_setpeeraddr to lock.
*/
static int
tcp_peeraddr(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr **nam)
{
return (in_setpeeraddr(so, nam, &tcbinfo));
}
/*
* Mark the connection as being incapable of further output.
*/
static int
tcp_usr_shutdown(struct socket *so)
{
int error = 0;
struct inpcb *inp;
struct tcpcb *tp;
const int inirw = INI_WRITE;
COMMON_START();
socantsendmore(so);
tp = tcp_usrclosed(tp);
if (tp)
error = tcp_output(tp);
COMMON_END(PRU_SHUTDOWN);
}
/*
* After a receive, possibly send window update to peer.
*/
static int
tcp_usr_rcvd(struct socket *so, int flags)
{
int error = 0;
struct inpcb *inp;
struct tcpcb *tp;
const int inirw = INI_READ;
COMMON_START();
tcp_output(tp);
COMMON_END(PRU_RCVD);
}
/*
* Do a send by putting data in output queue and updating urgent
* marker if URG set. Possibly send more data. Unlike the other
* pru_*() routines, the mbuf chains are our responsibility. We
* must either enqueue them or free them. The other pru_* routines
* generally are caller-frees.
*/
static int
tcp_usr_send(struct socket *so, int flags, struct mbuf *m,
struct sockaddr *nam, struct mbuf *control, struct thread *td)
{
int error = 0;
struct inpcb *inp;
struct tcpcb *tp;
int unlocked = 0;
#ifdef INET6
int isipv6;
#endif
TCPDEBUG0;
/*
* Need write lock here because this function might call
* tcp_connect or tcp_usrclosed.
* We really want to have to this function upgrade from read lock
* to write lock. XXX
*/
INP_INFO_WLOCK(&tcbinfo);
inp = sotoinpcb(so);
if (inp == NULL) {
/*
* OOPS! we lost a race, the TCP session got reset after
* we checked SBS_CANTSENDMORE, eg: while doing uiomove or a
* network interrupt in the non-splnet() section of sosend().
*/
if (m)
m_freem(m);
if (control)
m_freem(control);
error = ECONNRESET; /* XXX EPIPE? */
tp = NULL;
TCPDEBUG1();
goto out;
}
INP_LOCK(inp);
#ifdef INET6
isipv6 = nam && nam->sa_family == AF_INET6;
#endif /* INET6 */
tp = intotcpcb(inp);
TCPDEBUG1();
if (control) {
/* TCP doesn't do control messages (rights, creds, etc) */
if (control->m_len) {
m_freem(control);
if (m)
m_freem(m);
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
m_freem(control); /* empty control, just free it */
}
if (!(flags & PRUS_OOB)) {
sbappendstream(&so->so_snd, m);
if (nam && tp->t_state < TCPS_SYN_SENT) {
/*
* Do implied connect if not yet connected,
* initialize window to default value, and
* initialize maxseg/maxopd using peer's cached
* MSS.
*/
#ifdef INET6
if (isipv6)
error = tcp6_connect(tp, nam, td);
else
#endif /* INET6 */
error = tcp_connect(tp, nam, td);
if (error)
goto out;
tp->snd_wnd = TTCP_CLIENT_SND_WND;
tcp_mss(tp, -1);
}
if (flags & PRUS_EOF) {
/*
* Close the send side of the connection after
* the data is sent.
*/
socantsendmore(so);
tp = tcp_usrclosed(tp);
}
INP_INFO_WUNLOCK(&tcbinfo);
unlocked = 1;
if (tp != NULL) {
if (flags & PRUS_MORETOCOME)
tp->t_flags |= TF_MORETOCOME;
error = tcp_output(tp);
if (flags & PRUS_MORETOCOME)
tp->t_flags &= ~TF_MORETOCOME;
}
} else {
SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_snd);
if (sbspace(&so->so_snd) < -512) {
SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
m_freem(m);
error = ENOBUFS;
goto out;
}
/*
* According to RFC961 (Assigned Protocols),
* the urgent pointer points to the last octet
* of urgent data. We continue, however,
* to consider it to indicate the first octet
* of data past the urgent section.
* Otherwise, snd_up should be one lower.
*/
sbappendstream_locked(&so->so_snd, m);
SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
if (nam && tp->t_state < TCPS_SYN_SENT) {
/*
* Do implied connect if not yet connected,
* initialize window to default value, and
* initialize maxseg/maxopd using peer's cached
* MSS.
*/
#ifdef INET6
if (isipv6)
error = tcp6_connect(tp, nam, td);
else
#endif /* INET6 */
error = tcp_connect(tp, nam, td);
if (error)
goto out;
tp->snd_wnd = TTCP_CLIENT_SND_WND;
tcp_mss(tp, -1);
}
INP_INFO_WUNLOCK(&tcbinfo);
unlocked = 1;
tp->snd_up = tp->snd_una + so->so_snd.sb_cc;
tp->t_flags |= TF_FORCEDATA;
error = tcp_output(tp);
tp->t_flags &= ~TF_FORCEDATA;
}
out:
TCPDEBUG2((flags & PRUS_OOB) ? PRU_SENDOOB :
((flags & PRUS_EOF) ? PRU_SEND_EOF : PRU_SEND));
if (tp)
INP_UNLOCK(inp);
if (!unlocked)
INP_INFO_WUNLOCK(&tcbinfo);
return (error);
}
/*
* Abort the TCP.
*/
static int
tcp_usr_abort(struct socket *so)
{
int error = 0;
struct inpcb *inp;
struct tcpcb *tp;
const int inirw = INI_WRITE;
COMMON_START();
tp = tcp_drop(tp, ECONNABORTED);
COMMON_END(PRU_ABORT);
}
/*
* Receive out-of-band data.
*/
static int
tcp_usr_rcvoob(struct socket *so, struct mbuf *m, int flags)
{
int error = 0;
struct inpcb *inp;
struct tcpcb *tp;
const int inirw = INI_READ;
COMMON_START();
if ((so->so_oobmark == 0 &&
(so->so_rcv.sb_state & SBS_RCVATMARK) == 0) ||
so->so_options & SO_OOBINLINE ||
tp->t_oobflags & TCPOOB_HADDATA) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if ((tp->t_oobflags & TCPOOB_HAVEDATA) == 0) {
error = EWOULDBLOCK;
goto out;
}
m->m_len = 1;
*mtod(m, caddr_t) = tp->t_iobc;
if ((flags & MSG_PEEK) == 0)
tp->t_oobflags ^= (TCPOOB_HAVEDATA | TCPOOB_HADDATA);
COMMON_END(PRU_RCVOOB);
}
struct pr_usrreqs tcp_usrreqs = {
.pru_abort = tcp_usr_abort,
.pru_accept = tcp_usr_accept,
.pru_attach = tcp_usr_attach,
.pru_bind = tcp_usr_bind,
.pru_connect = tcp_usr_connect,
.pru_control = in_control,
.pru_detach = tcp_usr_detach,
.pru_disconnect = tcp_usr_disconnect,
.pru_listen = tcp_usr_listen,
.pru_peeraddr = tcp_peeraddr,
.pru_rcvd = tcp_usr_rcvd,
.pru_rcvoob = tcp_usr_rcvoob,
.pru_send = tcp_usr_send,
.pru_shutdown = tcp_usr_shutdown,
.pru_sockaddr = tcp_sockaddr,
.pru_sosetlabel = in_pcbsosetlabel
};
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
#ifdef INET6
struct pr_usrreqs tcp6_usrreqs = {
.pru_abort = tcp_usr_abort,
.pru_accept = tcp6_usr_accept,
.pru_attach = tcp_usr_attach,
.pru_bind = tcp6_usr_bind,
.pru_connect = tcp6_usr_connect,
.pru_control = in6_control,
.pru_detach = tcp_usr_detach,
.pru_disconnect = tcp_usr_disconnect,
.pru_listen = tcp6_usr_listen,
.pru_peeraddr = in6_mapped_peeraddr,
.pru_rcvd = tcp_usr_rcvd,
.pru_rcvoob = tcp_usr_rcvoob,
.pru_send = tcp_usr_send,
.pru_shutdown = tcp_usr_shutdown,
.pru_sockaddr = in6_mapped_sockaddr,
.pru_sosetlabel = in_pcbsosetlabel
};
#endif /* INET6 */
/*
* Common subroutine to open a TCP connection to remote host specified
* by struct sockaddr_in in mbuf *nam. Call in_pcbbind to assign a local
* port number if needed. Call in_pcbconnect_setup to do the routing and
* to choose a local host address (interface). If there is an existing
* incarnation of the same connection in TIME-WAIT state and if the remote
* host was sending CC options and if the connection duration was < MSL, then
* truncate the previous TIME-WAIT state and proceed.
* Initialize connection parameters and enter SYN-SENT state.
*/
static int
tcp_connect(tp, nam, td)
register struct tcpcb *tp;
struct sockaddr *nam;
struct thread *td;
{
struct inpcb *inp = tp->t_inpcb, *oinp;
struct socket *so = inp->inp_socket;
struct in_addr laddr;
u_short lport;
Improved connection establishment performance by doing local port lookups via a hashed port list. In the new scheme, in_pcblookup() goes away and is replaced by a new routine, in_pcblookup_local() for doing the local port check. Note that this implementation is space inefficient in that the PCB struct is now too large to fit into 128 bytes. I might deal with this in the future by using the new zone allocator, but I wanted these changes to be extensively tested in their current form first. Also: 1) Fixed off-by-one errors in the port lookup loops in in_pcbbind(). 2) Got rid of some unneeded rehashing. Adding a new routine, in_pcbinshash() to do the initialial hash insertion. 3) Renamed in_pcblookuphash() to in_pcblookup_hash() for easier readability. 4) Added a new routine, in_pcbremlists() to remove the PCB from the various hash lists. 5) Added/deleted comments where appropriate. 6) Removed unnecessary splnet() locking. In general, the PCB functions should be called at splnet()...there are unfortunately a few exceptions, however. 7) Reorganized a few structs for better cache line behavior. 8) Killed my TCP_ACK_HACK kludge. It may come back in a different form in the future, however. These changes have been tested on wcarchive for more than a month. In tests done here, connection establishment overhead is reduced by more than 50 times, thus getting rid of one of the major networking scalability problems. Still to do: make tcp_fastimo/tcp_slowtimo scale well for systems with a large number of connections. tcp_fastimo is easy; tcp_slowtimo is difficult. WARNING: Anything that knows about inpcb and tcpcb structs will have to be recompiled; at the very least, this includes netstat(1).
1998-01-27 09:15:13 +00:00
int error;
if (inp->inp_lport == 0) {
error = in_pcbbind(inp, (struct sockaddr *)0, td->td_ucred);
if (error)
return error;
}
1995-05-30 08:16:23 +00:00
/*
* Cannot simply call in_pcbconnect, because there might be an
* earlier incarnation of this same connection still in
* TIME_WAIT state, creating an ADDRINUSE error.
*/
laddr = inp->inp_laddr;
lport = inp->inp_lport;
error = in_pcbconnect_setup(inp, nam, &laddr.s_addr, &lport,
&inp->inp_faddr.s_addr, &inp->inp_fport, &oinp, td->td_ucred);
if (error && oinp == NULL)
1995-06-11 19:33:05 +00:00
return error;
if (oinp)
return EADDRINUSE;
inp->inp_laddr = laddr;
in_pcbrehash(inp);
/* Compute window scaling to request. */
while (tp->request_r_scale < TCP_MAX_WINSHIFT &&
(TCP_MAXWIN << tp->request_r_scale) < so->so_rcv.sb_hiwat)
tp->request_r_scale++;
soisconnecting(so);
tcpstat.tcps_connattempt++;
tp->t_state = TCPS_SYN_SENT;
callout_reset(tp->tt_keep, tcp_keepinit, tcp_timer_keep, tp);
tp->iss = tcp_new_isn(tp);
tp->t_bw_rtseq = tp->iss;
tcp_sendseqinit(tp);
return 0;
}
#ifdef INET6
static int
tcp6_connect(tp, nam, td)
register struct tcpcb *tp;
struct sockaddr *nam;
struct thread *td;
{
struct inpcb *inp = tp->t_inpcb, *oinp;
struct socket *so = inp->inp_socket;
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)nam;
struct in6_addr *addr6;
int error;
if (inp->inp_lport == 0) {
error = in6_pcbbind(inp, (struct sockaddr *)0, td->td_ucred);
if (error)
return error;
}
/*
* Cannot simply call in_pcbconnect, because there might be an
* earlier incarnation of this same connection still in
* TIME_WAIT state, creating an ADDRINUSE error.
* in6_pcbladdr() also handles scope zone IDs.
*/
error = in6_pcbladdr(inp, nam, &addr6);
if (error)
return error;
oinp = in6_pcblookup_hash(inp->inp_pcbinfo,
&sin6->sin6_addr, sin6->sin6_port,
IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&inp->in6p_laddr)
? addr6
: &inp->in6p_laddr,
inp->inp_lport, 0, NULL);
if (oinp)
return EADDRINUSE;
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&inp->in6p_laddr))
inp->in6p_laddr = *addr6;
inp->in6p_faddr = sin6->sin6_addr;
inp->inp_fport = sin6->sin6_port;
/* update flowinfo - draft-itojun-ipv6-flowlabel-api-00 */
inp->in6p_flowinfo &= ~IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK;
if (inp->in6p_flags & IN6P_AUTOFLOWLABEL)
inp->in6p_flowinfo |=
(htonl(ip6_randomflowlabel()) & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK);
in_pcbrehash(inp);
/* Compute window scaling to request. */
while (tp->request_r_scale < TCP_MAX_WINSHIFT &&
(TCP_MAXWIN << tp->request_r_scale) < so->so_rcv.sb_hiwat)
tp->request_r_scale++;
soisconnecting(so);
tcpstat.tcps_connattempt++;
tp->t_state = TCPS_SYN_SENT;
callout_reset(tp->tt_keep, tcp_keepinit, tcp_timer_keep, tp);
tp->iss = tcp_new_isn(tp);
tp->t_bw_rtseq = tp->iss;
tcp_sendseqinit(tp);
return 0;
}
#endif /* INET6 */
/*
* Export TCP internal state information via a struct tcp_info, based on the
* Linux 2.6 API. Not ABI compatible as our constants are mapped differently
* (TCP state machine, etc). We export all information using FreeBSD-native
* constants -- for example, the numeric values for tcpi_state will differ
* from Linux.
*/
static void
tcp_fill_info(tp, ti)
struct tcpcb *tp;
struct tcp_info *ti;
{
INP_LOCK_ASSERT(tp->t_inpcb);
bzero(ti, sizeof(*ti));
ti->tcpi_state = tp->t_state;
if ((tp->t_flags & TF_REQ_TSTMP) && (tp->t_flags & TF_RCVD_TSTMP))
ti->tcpi_options |= TCPI_OPT_TIMESTAMPS;
if (tp->sack_enable)
ti->tcpi_options |= TCPI_OPT_SACK;
if ((tp->t_flags & TF_REQ_SCALE) && (tp->t_flags & TF_RCVD_SCALE)) {
ti->tcpi_options |= TCPI_OPT_WSCALE;
ti->tcpi_snd_wscale = tp->snd_scale;
ti->tcpi_rcv_wscale = tp->rcv_scale;
}
ti->tcpi_snd_ssthresh = tp->snd_ssthresh;
ti->tcpi_snd_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd;
/*
* FreeBSD-specific extension fields for tcp_info.
*/
ti->tcpi_rcv_space = tp->rcv_wnd;
ti->tcpi_snd_wnd = tp->snd_wnd;
ti->tcpi_snd_bwnd = tp->snd_bwnd;
}
/*
* The new sockopt interface makes it possible for us to block in the
* copyin/out step (if we take a page fault). Taking a page fault at
* splnet() is probably a Bad Thing. (Since sockets and pcbs both now
* use TSM, there probably isn't any need for this function to run at
* splnet() any more. This needs more examination.)
*
* XXXRW: The locking here is wrong; we may take a page fault while holding
* the inpcb lock.
*/
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
int
tcp_ctloutput(so, sopt)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
struct socket *so;
struct sockopt *sopt;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
{
int error, opt, optval;
struct inpcb *inp;
struct tcpcb *tp;
struct tcp_info ti;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
error = 0;
INP_INFO_RLOCK(&tcbinfo);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
inp = sotoinpcb(so);
if (inp == NULL) {
INP_INFO_RUNLOCK(&tcbinfo);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
return (ECONNRESET);
}
INP_LOCK(inp);
INP_INFO_RUNLOCK(&tcbinfo);
if (sopt->sopt_level != IPPROTO_TCP) {
INP_UNLOCK(inp);
#ifdef INET6
if (INP_CHECK_SOCKAF(so, AF_INET6))
error = ip6_ctloutput(so, sopt);
else
#endif /* INET6 */
error = ip_ctloutput(so, sopt);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
return (error);
}
tp = intotcpcb(inp);
switch (sopt->sopt_dir) {
case SOPT_SET:
switch (sopt->sopt_name) {
Initial import of RFC 2385 (TCP-MD5) digest support. This is the first of two commits; bringing in the kernel support first. This can be enabled by compiling a kernel with options TCP_SIGNATURE and FAST_IPSEC. For the uninitiated, this is a TCP option which provides for a means of authenticating TCP sessions which came into being before IPSEC. It is still relevant today, however, as it is used by many commercial router vendors, particularly with BGP, and as such has become a requirement for interconnect at many major Internet points of presence. Several parts of the TCP and IP headers, including the segment payload, are digested with MD5, including a shared secret. The PF_KEY interface is used to manage the secrets using security associations in the SADB. There is a limitation here in that as there is no way to map a TCP flow per-port back to an SPI without polluting tcpcb or using the SPD; the code to do the latter is unstable at this time. Therefore this code only supports per-host keying granularity. Whilst FAST_IPSEC is mutually exclusive with KAME IPSEC (and thus IPv6), TCP_SIGNATURE applies only to IPv4. For the vast majority of prospective users of this feature, this will not pose any problem. This implementation is output-only; that is, the option is honoured when responding to a host initiating a TCP session, but no effort is made [yet] to authenticate inbound traffic. This is, however, sufficient to interwork with Cisco equipment. Tested with a Cisco 2501 running IOS 12.0(27), and Quagga 0.96.4 with local patches. Patches for tcpdump to validate TCP-MD5 sessions are also available from me upon request. Sponsored by: sentex.net
2004-02-11 04:26:04 +00:00
#ifdef TCP_SIGNATURE
case TCP_MD5SIG:
Initial import of RFC 2385 (TCP-MD5) digest support. This is the first of two commits; bringing in the kernel support first. This can be enabled by compiling a kernel with options TCP_SIGNATURE and FAST_IPSEC. For the uninitiated, this is a TCP option which provides for a means of authenticating TCP sessions which came into being before IPSEC. It is still relevant today, however, as it is used by many commercial router vendors, particularly with BGP, and as such has become a requirement for interconnect at many major Internet points of presence. Several parts of the TCP and IP headers, including the segment payload, are digested with MD5, including a shared secret. The PF_KEY interface is used to manage the secrets using security associations in the SADB. There is a limitation here in that as there is no way to map a TCP flow per-port back to an SPI without polluting tcpcb or using the SPD; the code to do the latter is unstable at this time. Therefore this code only supports per-host keying granularity. Whilst FAST_IPSEC is mutually exclusive with KAME IPSEC (and thus IPv6), TCP_SIGNATURE applies only to IPv4. For the vast majority of prospective users of this feature, this will not pose any problem. This implementation is output-only; that is, the option is honoured when responding to a host initiating a TCP session, but no effort is made [yet] to authenticate inbound traffic. This is, however, sufficient to interwork with Cisco equipment. Tested with a Cisco 2501 running IOS 12.0(27), and Quagga 0.96.4 with local patches. Patches for tcpdump to validate TCP-MD5 sessions are also available from me upon request. Sponsored by: sentex.net
2004-02-11 04:26:04 +00:00
error = sooptcopyin(sopt, &optval, sizeof optval,
sizeof optval);
if (error)
break;
if (optval > 0)
tp->t_flags |= TF_SIGNATURE;
else
tp->t_flags &= ~TF_SIGNATURE;
break;
#endif /* TCP_SIGNATURE */
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
case TCP_NODELAY:
case TCP_NOOPT:
error = sooptcopyin(sopt, &optval, sizeof optval,
sizeof optval);
if (error)
break;
switch (sopt->sopt_name) {
case TCP_NODELAY:
opt = TF_NODELAY;
break;
case TCP_NOOPT:
opt = TF_NOOPT;
break;
default:
opt = 0; /* dead code to fool gcc */
break;
}
if (optval)
tp->t_flags |= opt;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
else
tp->t_flags &= ~opt;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
break;
case TCP_NOPUSH:
error = sooptcopyin(sopt, &optval, sizeof optval,
sizeof optval);
if (error)
break;
if (optval)
tp->t_flags |= TF_NOPUSH;
else {
tp->t_flags &= ~TF_NOPUSH;
error = tcp_output(tp);
}
break;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
case TCP_MAXSEG:
error = sooptcopyin(sopt, &optval, sizeof optval,
sizeof optval);
if (error)
break;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
Limiters and sanity checks for TCP MSS (maximum segement size) resource exhaustion attacks. For network link optimization TCP can adjust its MSS and thus packet size according to the observed path MTU. This is done dynamically based on feedback from the remote host and network components along the packet path. This information can be abused to pretend an extremely low path MTU. The resource exhaustion works in two ways: o during tcp connection setup the advertized local MSS is exchanged between the endpoints. The remote endpoint can set this arbitrarily low (except for a minimum MTU of 64 octets enforced in the BSD code). When the local host is sending data it is forced to send many small IP packets instead of a large one. For example instead of the normal TCP payload size of 1448 it forces TCP payload size of 12 (MTU 64) and thus we have a 120 times increase in workload and packets. On fast links this quickly saturates the local CPU and may also hit pps processing limites of network components along the path. This type of attack is particularly effective for servers where the attacker can download large files (WWW and FTP). We mitigate it by enforcing a minimum MTU settable by sysctl net.inet.tcp.minmss defaulting to 256 octets. o the local host is reveiving data on a TCP connection from the remote host. The local host has no control over the packet size the remote host is sending. The remote host may chose to do what is described in the first attack and send the data in packets with an TCP payload of at least one byte. For each packet the tcp_input() function will be entered, the packet is processed and a sowakeup() is signalled to the connected process. For example an attack with 2 Mbit/s gives 4716 packets per second and the same amount of sowakeup()s to the process (and context switches). This type of attack is particularly effective for servers where the attacker can upload large amounts of data. Normally this is the case with WWW server where large POSTs can be made. We mitigate this by calculating the average MSS payload per second. If it goes below 'net.inet.tcp.minmss' and the pps rate is above 'net.inet.tcp.minmssoverload' defaulting to 1000 this particular TCP connection is resetted and dropped. MITRE CVE: CAN-2004-0002 Reviewed by: sam (mentor) MFC after: 1 day
2004-01-08 17:40:07 +00:00
if (optval > 0 && optval <= tp->t_maxseg &&
optval + 40 >= tcp_minmss)
tp->t_maxseg = optval;
else
error = EINVAL;
break;
case TCP_INFO:
error = EINVAL;
break;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
default:
error = ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
break;
case SOPT_GET:
switch (sopt->sopt_name) {
Initial import of RFC 2385 (TCP-MD5) digest support. This is the first of two commits; bringing in the kernel support first. This can be enabled by compiling a kernel with options TCP_SIGNATURE and FAST_IPSEC. For the uninitiated, this is a TCP option which provides for a means of authenticating TCP sessions which came into being before IPSEC. It is still relevant today, however, as it is used by many commercial router vendors, particularly with BGP, and as such has become a requirement for interconnect at many major Internet points of presence. Several parts of the TCP and IP headers, including the segment payload, are digested with MD5, including a shared secret. The PF_KEY interface is used to manage the secrets using security associations in the SADB. There is a limitation here in that as there is no way to map a TCP flow per-port back to an SPI without polluting tcpcb or using the SPD; the code to do the latter is unstable at this time. Therefore this code only supports per-host keying granularity. Whilst FAST_IPSEC is mutually exclusive with KAME IPSEC (and thus IPv6), TCP_SIGNATURE applies only to IPv4. For the vast majority of prospective users of this feature, this will not pose any problem. This implementation is output-only; that is, the option is honoured when responding to a host initiating a TCP session, but no effort is made [yet] to authenticate inbound traffic. This is, however, sufficient to interwork with Cisco equipment. Tested with a Cisco 2501 running IOS 12.0(27), and Quagga 0.96.4 with local patches. Patches for tcpdump to validate TCP-MD5 sessions are also available from me upon request. Sponsored by: sentex.net
2004-02-11 04:26:04 +00:00
#ifdef TCP_SIGNATURE
case TCP_MD5SIG:
Initial import of RFC 2385 (TCP-MD5) digest support. This is the first of two commits; bringing in the kernel support first. This can be enabled by compiling a kernel with options TCP_SIGNATURE and FAST_IPSEC. For the uninitiated, this is a TCP option which provides for a means of authenticating TCP sessions which came into being before IPSEC. It is still relevant today, however, as it is used by many commercial router vendors, particularly with BGP, and as such has become a requirement for interconnect at many major Internet points of presence. Several parts of the TCP and IP headers, including the segment payload, are digested with MD5, including a shared secret. The PF_KEY interface is used to manage the secrets using security associations in the SADB. There is a limitation here in that as there is no way to map a TCP flow per-port back to an SPI without polluting tcpcb or using the SPD; the code to do the latter is unstable at this time. Therefore this code only supports per-host keying granularity. Whilst FAST_IPSEC is mutually exclusive with KAME IPSEC (and thus IPv6), TCP_SIGNATURE applies only to IPv4. For the vast majority of prospective users of this feature, this will not pose any problem. This implementation is output-only; that is, the option is honoured when responding to a host initiating a TCP session, but no effort is made [yet] to authenticate inbound traffic. This is, however, sufficient to interwork with Cisco equipment. Tested with a Cisco 2501 running IOS 12.0(27), and Quagga 0.96.4 with local patches. Patches for tcpdump to validate TCP-MD5 sessions are also available from me upon request. Sponsored by: sentex.net
2004-02-11 04:26:04 +00:00
optval = (tp->t_flags & TF_SIGNATURE) ? 1 : 0;
error = sooptcopyout(sopt, &optval, sizeof optval);
Initial import of RFC 2385 (TCP-MD5) digest support. This is the first of two commits; bringing in the kernel support first. This can be enabled by compiling a kernel with options TCP_SIGNATURE and FAST_IPSEC. For the uninitiated, this is a TCP option which provides for a means of authenticating TCP sessions which came into being before IPSEC. It is still relevant today, however, as it is used by many commercial router vendors, particularly with BGP, and as such has become a requirement for interconnect at many major Internet points of presence. Several parts of the TCP and IP headers, including the segment payload, are digested with MD5, including a shared secret. The PF_KEY interface is used to manage the secrets using security associations in the SADB. There is a limitation here in that as there is no way to map a TCP flow per-port back to an SPI without polluting tcpcb or using the SPD; the code to do the latter is unstable at this time. Therefore this code only supports per-host keying granularity. Whilst FAST_IPSEC is mutually exclusive with KAME IPSEC (and thus IPv6), TCP_SIGNATURE applies only to IPv4. For the vast majority of prospective users of this feature, this will not pose any problem. This implementation is output-only; that is, the option is honoured when responding to a host initiating a TCP session, but no effort is made [yet] to authenticate inbound traffic. This is, however, sufficient to interwork with Cisco equipment. Tested with a Cisco 2501 running IOS 12.0(27), and Quagga 0.96.4 with local patches. Patches for tcpdump to validate TCP-MD5 sessions are also available from me upon request. Sponsored by: sentex.net
2004-02-11 04:26:04 +00:00
break;
2004-02-13 18:21:45 +00:00
#endif
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
case TCP_NODELAY:
optval = tp->t_flags & TF_NODELAY;
error = sooptcopyout(sopt, &optval, sizeof optval);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
break;
case TCP_MAXSEG:
optval = tp->t_maxseg;
error = sooptcopyout(sopt, &optval, sizeof optval);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
break;
case TCP_NOOPT:
optval = tp->t_flags & TF_NOOPT;
error = sooptcopyout(sopt, &optval, sizeof optval);
break;
case TCP_NOPUSH:
optval = tp->t_flags & TF_NOPUSH;
error = sooptcopyout(sopt, &optval, sizeof optval);
break;
case TCP_INFO:
tcp_fill_info(tp, &ti);
error = sooptcopyout(sopt, &ti, sizeof ti);
break;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
default:
error = ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
break;
}
INP_UNLOCK(inp);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
return (error);
}
/*
* tcp_sendspace and tcp_recvspace are the default send and receive window
* sizes, respectively. These are obsolescent (this information should
* be set by the route).
*/
u_long tcp_sendspace = 1024*32;
SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp, TCPCTL_SENDSPACE, sendspace, CTLFLAG_RW,
&tcp_sendspace , 0, "Maximum outgoing TCP datagram size");
u_long tcp_recvspace = 1024*64;
SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp, TCPCTL_RECVSPACE, recvspace, CTLFLAG_RW,
&tcp_recvspace , 0, "Maximum incoming TCP datagram size");
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Attach TCP protocol to socket, allocating
* internet protocol control block, tcp control block,
* bufer space, and entering LISTEN state if to accept connections.
*/
static int
2004-03-28 15:48:00 +00:00
tcp_attach(so)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
struct socket *so;
{
register struct tcpcb *tp;
struct inpcb *inp;
int error;
#ifdef INET6
int isipv6 = INP_CHECK_SOCKAF(so, AF_INET6) != 0;
#endif
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
INP_INFO_WLOCK_ASSERT(&tcbinfo);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
if (so->so_snd.sb_hiwat == 0 || so->so_rcv.sb_hiwat == 0) {
error = soreserve(so, tcp_sendspace, tcp_recvspace);
if (error)
return (error);
}
error = in_pcballoc(so, &tcbinfo, "tcpinp");
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
if (error)
return (error);
inp = sotoinpcb(so);
#ifdef INET6
if (isipv6) {
inp->inp_vflag |= INP_IPV6;
inp->in6p_hops = -1; /* use kernel default */
}
else
#endif
inp->inp_vflag |= INP_IPV4;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
tp = tcp_newtcpcb(inp);
if (tp == 0) {
int nofd = so->so_state & SS_NOFDREF; /* XXX */
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
so->so_state &= ~SS_NOFDREF; /* don't free the socket yet */
INP_LOCK(inp);
#ifdef INET6
if (isipv6)
in6_pcbdetach(inp);
else
#endif
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
in_pcbdetach(inp);
so->so_state |= nofd;
return (ENOBUFS);
}
tp->t_state = TCPS_CLOSED;
return (0);
}
/*
* Initiate (or continue) disconnect.
* If embryonic state, just send reset (once).
* If in ``let data drain'' option and linger null, just drop.
* Otherwise (hard), mark socket disconnecting and drop
* current input data; switch states based on user close, and
* send segment to peer (with FIN).
*/
static struct tcpcb *
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
tcp_disconnect(tp)
register struct tcpcb *tp;
{
struct inpcb *inp = tp->t_inpcb;
struct socket *so = inp->inp_socket;
INP_INFO_WLOCK_ASSERT(&tcbinfo);
INP_LOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
if (tp->t_state < TCPS_ESTABLISHED)
tp = tcp_close(tp);
else if ((so->so_options & SO_LINGER) && so->so_linger == 0)
tp = tcp_drop(tp, 0);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
else {
soisdisconnecting(so);
sbflush(&so->so_rcv);
tp = tcp_usrclosed(tp);
if (tp)
(void) tcp_output(tp);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
return (tp);
}
/*
* User issued close, and wish to trail through shutdown states:
* if never received SYN, just forget it. If got a SYN from peer,
* but haven't sent FIN, then go to FIN_WAIT_1 state to send peer a FIN.
* If already got a FIN from peer, then almost done; go to LAST_ACK
* state. In all other cases, have already sent FIN to peer (e.g.
* after PRU_SHUTDOWN), and just have to play tedious game waiting
* for peer to send FIN or not respond to keep-alives, etc.
* We can let the user exit from the close as soon as the FIN is acked.
*/
static struct tcpcb *
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
tcp_usrclosed(tp)
register struct tcpcb *tp;
{
INP_INFO_WLOCK_ASSERT(&tcbinfo);
INP_LOCK_ASSERT(tp->t_inpcb);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
switch (tp->t_state) {
case TCPS_CLOSED:
case TCPS_LISTEN:
tp->t_state = TCPS_CLOSED;
tp = tcp_close(tp);
break;
case TCPS_SYN_SENT:
case TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED:
tp->t_flags |= TF_NEEDFIN;
break;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
case TCPS_ESTABLISHED:
tp->t_state = TCPS_FIN_WAIT_1;
break;
case TCPS_CLOSE_WAIT:
tp->t_state = TCPS_LAST_ACK;
break;
}
if (tp && tp->t_state >= TCPS_FIN_WAIT_2) {
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
soisdisconnected(tp->t_inpcb->inp_socket);
/* To prevent the connection hanging in FIN_WAIT_2 forever. */
if (tp->t_state == TCPS_FIN_WAIT_2)
callout_reset(tp->tt_2msl, tcp_maxidle,
tcp_timer_2msl, tp);
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
return (tp);
}