freebsd-skq/sys/kern/kern_proc.c

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/*
* Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1991, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* This product includes software developed by the University of
* California, Berkeley and its contributors.
* 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* @(#)kern_proc.c 8.7 (Berkeley) 2/14/95
1999-08-28 01:08:13 +00:00
* $FreeBSD$
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*/
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/filedesc.h>
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#include <sys/tty.h>
#include <sys/signalvar.h>
#include <sys/sx.h>
#include <sys/user.h>
#include <sys/jail.h>
#include <vm/vm.h>
#include <vm/pmap.h>
#include <vm/vm_map.h>
#include <vm/uma.h>
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MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PGRP, "pgrp", "process group header");
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_SESSION, "session", "session header");
static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PROC, "proc", "Proc structures");
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_SUBPROC, "subproc", "Proc sub-structures");
static struct proc *dopfind(register pid_t);
static void doenterpgrp(struct proc *, struct pgrp *);
static void pgdelete(struct pgrp *);
static void orphanpg(struct pgrp *pg);
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/*
* Other process lists
*/
struct pidhashhead *pidhashtbl;
u_long pidhash;
struct pgrphashhead *pgrphashtbl;
u_long pgrphash;
struct proclist allproc;
struct proclist zombproc;
struct sx allproc_lock;
struct sx proctree_lock;
struct sx pgrpsess_lock;
struct mtx pargs_ref_lock;
uma_zone_t proc_zone;
uma_zone_t ithread_zone;
/*
* Initialize global process hashing structures.
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*/
void
procinit()
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{
int i, j;
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sx_init(&allproc_lock, "allproc");
sx_init(&proctree_lock, "proctree");
sx_init(&pgrpsess_lock, "pgrpsess");
mtx_init(&pargs_ref_lock, "struct pargs.ref", MTX_DEF);
LIST_INIT(&allproc);
LIST_INIT(&zombproc);
pidhashtbl = hashinit(maxproc / 4, M_PROC, &pidhash);
pgrphashtbl = hashinit(maxproc / 4, M_PROC, &pgrphash);
proc_zone = uma_zcreate("PROC", sizeof (struct proc), NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, UMA_ALIGN_PTR, UMA_ZONE_NOFREE);
uihashinit();
/*
* This should really be a compile time warning, but I do
* not know of any way to do that...
*/
if (sizeof(struct kinfo_proc) != KINFO_PROC_SIZE) {
printf("This message will repeat for the next 20 seconds\n");
for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
printf("WARNING: size of kinfo_proc (%ld) should be %d!!!\n",
(long)sizeof(struct kinfo_proc), KINFO_PROC_SIZE);
printf("The kinfo_proc structure was changed ");
printf("incorrectly in <sys/user.h>\n");
for (j = 0; j < 0x7ffffff; j++);
}
}
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}
/*
* Note that we do not link to the proc's ucred here
* The thread is linked as if running but no KSE assigned
*/
static void
thread_link(struct thread *td, struct ksegrp *kg)
{
struct proc *p = kg->kg_proc;
td->td_proc = p;
td->td_ksegrp = kg;
td->td_last_kse = &p->p_kse;
TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&p->p_threads, td, td_plist);
TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&kg->kg_threads, td, td_kglist);
td->td_critnest = 0;
td->td_kse = NULL;
cpu_thread_link(td);
}
/*
* KSE is linked onto the idle queue.
*/
static void
kse_link(struct kse *ke, struct ksegrp *kg)
{
struct proc *p = kg->kg_proc;
TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&kg->kg_kseq, ke, ke_kglist);
kg->kg_kses++;
TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&kg->kg_iq, ke, ke_kgrlist);
ke->ke_proc = p;
ke->ke_ksegrp = kg;
ke->ke_thread = NULL;
ke->ke_oncpu = NOCPU;
}
static void
ksegrp_link(struct ksegrp *kg, struct proc *p)
{
TAILQ_INIT(&kg->kg_threads);
TAILQ_INIT(&kg->kg_runq); /* links with td_runq */
TAILQ_INIT(&kg->kg_slpq); /* links with td_runq */
TAILQ_INIT(&kg->kg_kseq); /* all kses in ksegrp */
TAILQ_INIT(&kg->kg_iq); /* all kses in ksegrp */
kg->kg_proc = p;
/* the following counters are in the -zero- section and may not need clearing */
kg->kg_runnable = 0;
kg->kg_kses = 0;
kg->kg_runq_kses = 0; /* XXXKSE change name */
/* link it in now that it's consitant */
TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&p->p_ksegrps, kg, kg_ksegrp);
}
/*
* for a newly created process,
* link up a the structure and its initial threads etc.
*/
void
proc_linkup(struct proc *p, struct ksegrp *kg,
struct kse *ke, struct thread *td)
{
TAILQ_INIT(&p->p_ksegrps); /* all ksegrps in proc */
TAILQ_INIT(&p->p_threads); /* all threads in proc */
ksegrp_link(kg, p);
kse_link(ke, kg);
thread_link(td, kg);
/* link them together for 1:1 */
td->td_kse = ke;
ke->ke_thread = td;
}
/* temporary version is ultra simple while we are in 1:1 mode */
struct thread *
thread_get(struct proc *p)
{
struct thread *td = &p->p_xxthread;
return (td);
}
/*********************
* STUB KSE syscalls
*********************/
/* struct thread_wakeup_args { struct thread_mailbox *tmbx; }; */
int
thread_wakeup(struct thread *td, struct thread_wakeup_args *uap)
{
return(ENOSYS);
}
int
kse_exit(struct thread *td, struct kse_exit_args *uap)
{
return(ENOSYS);
}
int
kse_yield(struct thread *td, struct kse_yield_args *uap)
{
return(ENOSYS);
}
int kse_wakeup(struct thread *td, struct kse_wakeup_args *uap)
{
return(ENOSYS);
}
int
kse_new(struct thread *td, struct kse_new_args *uap)
/* struct kse_new_args {
struct kse_mailbox *mbx;
int new_grp_flag;
}; */
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
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/*
* Is p an inferior of the current process?
*/
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int
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inferior(p)
register struct proc *p;
{
sx_assert(&proctree_lock, SX_LOCKED);
for (; p != curproc; p = p->p_pptr)
if (p->p_pid == 0)
return (0);
return (1);
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}
/*
* Locate a process by number
*/
struct proc *
pfind(pid)
register pid_t pid;
{
register struct proc *p;
sx_slock(&allproc_lock);
p = dopfind(pid);
sx_sunlock(&allproc_lock);
return (p);
}
static struct proc *
dopfind(pid)
register pid_t pid;
{
register struct proc *p;
sx_assert(&allproc_lock, SX_LOCKED);
LIST_FOREACH(p, PIDHASH(pid), p_hash)
if (p->p_pid == pid) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
break;
}
return (p);
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}
/*
* Locate a process group by number.
* The caller must hold pgrpsess_lock.
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*/
struct pgrp *
pgfind(pgid)
register pid_t pgid;
{
register struct pgrp *pgrp;
PGRPSESS_LOCK_ASSERT(SX_LOCKED);
LIST_FOREACH(pgrp, PGRPHASH(pgid), pg_hash) {
if (pgrp->pg_id == pgid) {
PGRP_LOCK(pgrp);
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return (pgrp);
}
}
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return (NULL);
}
/*
* Create a new process group.
* pgid must be equal to the pid of p.
* Begin a new session if required.
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*/
int
enterpgrp(p, pgid, pgrp, sess)
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register struct proc *p;
pid_t pgid;
struct pgrp *pgrp;
struct session *sess;
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{
struct pgrp *pgrp2;
PGRPSESS_LOCK_ASSERT(SX_XLOCKED);
KASSERT(pgrp != NULL, ("enterpgrp: pgrp == NULL"));
KASSERT(p->p_pid == pgid,
("enterpgrp: new pgrp and pid != pgid"));
pgrp2 = pgfind(pgid);
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KASSERT(pgrp2 == NULL,
("enterpgrp: pgrp with pgid exists"));
KASSERT(!SESS_LEADER(p),
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("enterpgrp: session leader attempted setpgrp"));
mtx_init(&pgrp->pg_mtx, "process group", MTX_DEF|MTX_DUPOK);
if (sess != NULL) {
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/*
* new session
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*/
mtx_init(&sess->s_mtx, "session", MTX_DEF);
PROC_LOCK(p);
p->p_flag &= ~P_CONTROLT;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
PGRP_LOCK(pgrp);
sess->s_leader = p;
sess->s_sid = p->p_pid;
sess->s_count = 1;
sess->s_ttyvp = NULL;
sess->s_ttyp = NULL;
bcopy(p->p_session->s_login, sess->s_login,
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sizeof(sess->s_login));
pgrp->pg_session = sess;
KASSERT(p == curproc,
("enterpgrp: mksession and p != curproc"));
} else {
pgrp->pg_session = p->p_session;
SESS_LOCK(pgrp->pg_session);
pgrp->pg_session->s_count++;
SESS_UNLOCK(pgrp->pg_session);
PGRP_LOCK(pgrp);
}
pgrp->pg_id = pgid;
LIST_INIT(&pgrp->pg_members);
/*
* As we have an exclusive lock of pgrpsess_lock,
* this should not deadlock.
*/
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(PGRPHASH(pgid), pgrp, pg_hash);
pgrp->pg_jobc = 0;
SLIST_INIT(&pgrp->pg_sigiolst);
PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp);
doenterpgrp(p, pgrp);
return (0);
}
/*
* Move p to an existing process group
*/
int
enterthispgrp(p, pgrp)
register struct proc *p;
struct pgrp *pgrp;
{
PGRPSESS_LOCK_ASSERT(SX_XLOCKED);
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_NOTOWNED);
PGRP_LOCK_ASSERT(pgrp, MA_NOTOWNED);
PGRP_LOCK_ASSERT(p->p_pgrp, MA_NOTOWNED);
SESS_LOCK_ASSERT(p->p_session, MA_NOTOWNED);
KASSERT(pgrp->pg_session == p->p_session,
("%s: pgrp's session %p, p->p_session %p.\n",
__func__,
pgrp->pg_session,
p->p_session));
KASSERT(pgrp != p->p_pgrp,
("%s: p belongs to pgrp.", __func__));
doenterpgrp(p, pgrp);
return (0);
}
/*
* Move p to a process group
*/
static void
doenterpgrp(p, pgrp)
struct proc *p;
struct pgrp *pgrp;
{
struct pgrp *savepgrp;
PGRPSESS_LOCK_ASSERT(SX_XLOCKED);
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_NOTOWNED);
PGRP_LOCK_ASSERT(pgrp, MA_NOTOWNED);
PGRP_LOCK_ASSERT(p->p_pgrp, MA_NOTOWNED);
SESS_LOCK_ASSERT(p->p_session, MA_NOTOWNED);
savepgrp = p->p_pgrp;
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/*
* Adjust eligibility of affected pgrps to participate in job control.
* Increment eligibility counts before decrementing, otherwise we
* could reach 0 spuriously during the first call.
*/
fixjobc(p, pgrp, 1);
fixjobc(p, p->p_pgrp, 0);
PGRP_LOCK(pgrp);
PGRP_LOCK(savepgrp);
PROC_LOCK(p);
LIST_REMOVE(p, p_pglist);
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p->p_pgrp = pgrp;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&pgrp->pg_members, p, p_pglist);
PGRP_UNLOCK(savepgrp);
PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp);
if (LIST_EMPTY(&savepgrp->pg_members))
pgdelete(savepgrp);
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}
/*
* remove process from process group
*/
int
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leavepgrp(p)
register struct proc *p;
{
struct pgrp *savepgrp;
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PGRPSESS_XLOCK();
savepgrp = p->p_pgrp;
PGRP_LOCK(savepgrp);
PROC_LOCK(p);
LIST_REMOVE(p, p_pglist);
p->p_pgrp = NULL;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
PGRP_UNLOCK(savepgrp);
if (LIST_EMPTY(&savepgrp->pg_members))
pgdelete(savepgrp);
PGRPSESS_XUNLOCK();
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return (0);
}
/*
* delete a process group
*/
static void
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pgdelete(pgrp)
register struct pgrp *pgrp;
{
struct session *savesess;
PGRPSESS_LOCK_ASSERT(SX_XLOCKED);
PGRP_LOCK_ASSERT(pgrp, MA_NOTOWNED);
SESS_LOCK_ASSERT(pgrp->pg_session, MA_NOTOWNED);
PGRP_LOCK(pgrp);
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/*
* Reset any sigio structures pointing to us as a result of
* F_SETOWN with our pgid.
*/
funsetownlst(&pgrp->pg_sigiolst);
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if (pgrp->pg_session->s_ttyp != NULL &&
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pgrp->pg_session->s_ttyp->t_pgrp == pgrp)
pgrp->pg_session->s_ttyp->t_pgrp = NULL;
LIST_REMOVE(pgrp, pg_hash);
savesess = pgrp->pg_session;
SESS_LOCK(savesess);
savesess->s_count--;
SESS_UNLOCK(savesess);
PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp);
if (savesess->s_count == 0) {
mtx_destroy(&savesess->s_mtx);
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FREE(pgrp->pg_session, M_SESSION);
}
mtx_destroy(&pgrp->pg_mtx);
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FREE(pgrp, M_PGRP);
}
/*
* Adjust pgrp jobc counters when specified process changes process group.
* We count the number of processes in each process group that "qualify"
* the group for terminal job control (those with a parent in a different
* process group of the same session). If that count reaches zero, the
* process group becomes orphaned. Check both the specified process'
* process group and that of its children.
* entering == 0 => p is leaving specified group.
* entering == 1 => p is entering specified group.
*/
void
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fixjobc(p, pgrp, entering)
register struct proc *p;
register struct pgrp *pgrp;
int entering;
{
register struct pgrp *hispgrp;
register struct session *mysession;
PGRPSESS_LOCK_ASSERT(SX_LOCKED);
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_NOTOWNED);
PGRP_LOCK_ASSERT(pgrp, MA_NOTOWNED);
SESS_LOCK_ASSERT(pgrp->pg_session, MA_NOTOWNED);
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/*
* Check p's parent to see whether p qualifies its own process
* group; if so, adjust count for p's process group.
*/
mysession = pgrp->pg_session;
sx_slock(&proctree_lock);
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if ((hispgrp = p->p_pptr->p_pgrp) != pgrp &&
hispgrp->pg_session == mysession) {
PGRP_LOCK(pgrp);
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if (entering)
pgrp->pg_jobc++;
else {
--pgrp->pg_jobc;
if (pgrp->pg_jobc == 0)
orphanpg(pgrp);
}
PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp);
}
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/*
* Check this process' children to see whether they qualify
* their process groups; if so, adjust counts for children's
* process groups.
*/
LIST_FOREACH(p, &p->p_children, p_sibling) {
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if ((hispgrp = p->p_pgrp) != pgrp &&
hispgrp->pg_session == mysession &&
p->p_stat != SZOMB) {
PGRP_LOCK(hispgrp);
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if (entering)
hispgrp->pg_jobc++;
else {
--hispgrp->pg_jobc;
if (hispgrp->pg_jobc == 0)
orphanpg(hispgrp);
}
PGRP_UNLOCK(hispgrp);
}
}
sx_sunlock(&proctree_lock);
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}
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/*
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* A process group has become orphaned;
* if there are any stopped processes in the group,
* hang-up all process in that group.
*/
static void
orphanpg(pg)
struct pgrp *pg;
{
register struct proc *p;
PGRP_LOCK_ASSERT(pg, MA_OWNED);
mtx_lock_spin(&sched_lock);
LIST_FOREACH(p, &pg->pg_members, p_pglist) {
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if (p->p_stat == SSTOP) {
mtx_unlock_spin(&sched_lock);
LIST_FOREACH(p, &pg->pg_members, p_pglist) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
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psignal(p, SIGHUP);
psignal(p, SIGCONT);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
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}
return;
}
}
mtx_unlock_spin(&sched_lock);
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}
#include "opt_ddb.h"
#ifdef DDB
#include <ddb/ddb.h>
DB_SHOW_COMMAND(pgrpdump, pgrpdump)
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{
register struct pgrp *pgrp;
register struct proc *p;
register int i;
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for (i = 0; i <= pgrphash; i++) {
if (!LIST_EMPTY(&pgrphashtbl[i])) {
printf("\tindx %d\n", i);
LIST_FOREACH(pgrp, &pgrphashtbl[i], pg_hash) {
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printf(
"\tpgrp %p, pgid %ld, sess %p, sesscnt %d, mem %p\n",
(void *)pgrp, (long)pgrp->pg_id,
(void *)pgrp->pg_session,
pgrp->pg_session->s_count,
(void *)LIST_FIRST(&pgrp->pg_members));
LIST_FOREACH(p, &pgrp->pg_members, p_pglist) {
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printf("\t\tpid %ld addr %p pgrp %p\n",
(long)p->p_pid, (void *)p,
(void *)p->p_pgrp);
}
}
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}
}
}
#endif /* DDB */
/*
* Fill in an kinfo_proc structure for the specified process.
*/
void
fill_kinfo_proc(p, kp)
struct proc *p;
struct kinfo_proc *kp;
{
struct thread *td;
struct tty *tp;
struct session *sp;
struct timeval tv;
bzero(kp, sizeof(*kp));
kp->ki_structsize = sizeof(*kp);
kp->ki_paddr = p;
PROC_LOCK(p);
kp->ki_addr =/* p->p_addr; */0; /* XXXKSE */
kp->ki_args = p->p_args;
kp->ki_tracep = p->p_tracep;
kp->ki_textvp = p->p_textvp;
kp->ki_fd = p->p_fd;
kp->ki_vmspace = p->p_vmspace;
o Merge contents of struct pcred into struct ucred. Specifically, add the real uid, saved uid, real gid, and saved gid to ucred, as well as the pcred->pc_uidinfo, which was associated with the real uid, only rename it to cr_ruidinfo so as not to conflict with cr_uidinfo, which corresponds to the effective uid. o Remove p_cred from struct proc; add p_ucred to struct proc, replacing original macro that pointed. p->p_ucred to p->p_cred->pc_ucred. o Universally update code so that it makes use of ucred instead of pcred, p->p_ucred instead of p->p_pcred, cr_ruidinfo instead of p_uidinfo, cr_{r,sv}{u,g}id instead of p_*, etc. o Remove pcred0 and its initialization from init_main.c; initialize cr_ruidinfo there. o Restruction many credential modification chunks to always crdup while we figure out locking and optimizations; generally speaking, this means moving to a structure like this: newcred = crdup(oldcred); ... p->p_ucred = newcred; crfree(oldcred); It's not race-free, but better than nothing. There are also races in sys_process.c, all inter-process authorization, fork, exec, and exit. o Remove sigio->sio_ruid since sigio->sio_ucred now contains the ruid; remove comments indicating that the old arrangement was a problem. o Restructure exec1() a little to use newcred/oldcred arrangement, and use improved uid management primitives. o Clean up exit1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup due to pcred removal. o Clean up fork1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup and allocation. o Clean up ktrcanset() to take into account changes, and move to using suser_xxx() instead of performing a direct uid==0 comparision. o Improve commenting in various kern_prot.c credential modification calls to better document current behavior. In a couple of places, current behavior is a little questionable and we need to check POSIX.1 to make sure it's "right". More commenting work still remains to be done. o Update credential management calls, such as crfree(), to take into account new ruidinfo reference. o Modify or add the following uid and gid helper routines: change_euid() change_egid() change_ruid() change_rgid() change_svuid() change_svgid() In each case, the call now acts on a credential not a process, and as such no longer requires more complicated process locking/etc. They now assume the caller will do any necessary allocation of an exclusive credential reference. Each is commented to document its reference requirements. o CANSIGIO() is simplified to require only credentials, not processes and pcreds. o Remove lots of (p_pcred==NULL) checks. o Add an XXX to authorization code in nfs_lock.c, since it's questionable, and needs to be considered carefully. o Simplify posix4 authorization code to require only credentials, not processes and pcreds. Note that this authorization, as well as CANSIGIO(), needs to be updated to use the p_cansignal() and p_cansched() centralized authorization routines, as they currently do not take into account some desirable restrictions that are handled by the centralized routines, as well as being inconsistent with other similar authorization instances. o Update libkvm to take these changes into account. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Reviewed by: green, bde, jhb, freebsd-arch, freebsd-audit
2001-05-25 16:59:11 +00:00
if (p->p_ucred) {
kp->ki_uid = p->p_ucred->cr_uid;
kp->ki_ruid = p->p_ucred->cr_ruid;
kp->ki_svuid = p->p_ucred->cr_svuid;
/* XXX bde doesn't like KI_NGROUPS */
kp->ki_ngroups = min(p->p_ucred->cr_ngroups, KI_NGROUPS);
o Merge contents of struct pcred into struct ucred. Specifically, add the real uid, saved uid, real gid, and saved gid to ucred, as well as the pcred->pc_uidinfo, which was associated with the real uid, only rename it to cr_ruidinfo so as not to conflict with cr_uidinfo, which corresponds to the effective uid. o Remove p_cred from struct proc; add p_ucred to struct proc, replacing original macro that pointed. p->p_ucred to p->p_cred->pc_ucred. o Universally update code so that it makes use of ucred instead of pcred, p->p_ucred instead of p->p_pcred, cr_ruidinfo instead of p_uidinfo, cr_{r,sv}{u,g}id instead of p_*, etc. o Remove pcred0 and its initialization from init_main.c; initialize cr_ruidinfo there. o Restruction many credential modification chunks to always crdup while we figure out locking and optimizations; generally speaking, this means moving to a structure like this: newcred = crdup(oldcred); ... p->p_ucred = newcred; crfree(oldcred); It's not race-free, but better than nothing. There are also races in sys_process.c, all inter-process authorization, fork, exec, and exit. o Remove sigio->sio_ruid since sigio->sio_ucred now contains the ruid; remove comments indicating that the old arrangement was a problem. o Restructure exec1() a little to use newcred/oldcred arrangement, and use improved uid management primitives. o Clean up exit1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup due to pcred removal. o Clean up fork1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup and allocation. o Clean up ktrcanset() to take into account changes, and move to using suser_xxx() instead of performing a direct uid==0 comparision. o Improve commenting in various kern_prot.c credential modification calls to better document current behavior. In a couple of places, current behavior is a little questionable and we need to check POSIX.1 to make sure it's "right". More commenting work still remains to be done. o Update credential management calls, such as crfree(), to take into account new ruidinfo reference. o Modify or add the following uid and gid helper routines: change_euid() change_egid() change_ruid() change_rgid() change_svuid() change_svgid() In each case, the call now acts on a credential not a process, and as such no longer requires more complicated process locking/etc. They now assume the caller will do any necessary allocation of an exclusive credential reference. Each is commented to document its reference requirements. o CANSIGIO() is simplified to require only credentials, not processes and pcreds. o Remove lots of (p_pcred==NULL) checks. o Add an XXX to authorization code in nfs_lock.c, since it's questionable, and needs to be considered carefully. o Simplify posix4 authorization code to require only credentials, not processes and pcreds. Note that this authorization, as well as CANSIGIO(), needs to be updated to use the p_cansignal() and p_cansched() centralized authorization routines, as they currently do not take into account some desirable restrictions that are handled by the centralized routines, as well as being inconsistent with other similar authorization instances. o Update libkvm to take these changes into account. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Reviewed by: green, bde, jhb, freebsd-arch, freebsd-audit
2001-05-25 16:59:11 +00:00
bcopy(p->p_ucred->cr_groups, kp->ki_groups,
kp->ki_ngroups * sizeof(gid_t));
o Merge contents of struct pcred into struct ucred. Specifically, add the real uid, saved uid, real gid, and saved gid to ucred, as well as the pcred->pc_uidinfo, which was associated with the real uid, only rename it to cr_ruidinfo so as not to conflict with cr_uidinfo, which corresponds to the effective uid. o Remove p_cred from struct proc; add p_ucred to struct proc, replacing original macro that pointed. p->p_ucred to p->p_cred->pc_ucred. o Universally update code so that it makes use of ucred instead of pcred, p->p_ucred instead of p->p_pcred, cr_ruidinfo instead of p_uidinfo, cr_{r,sv}{u,g}id instead of p_*, etc. o Remove pcred0 and its initialization from init_main.c; initialize cr_ruidinfo there. o Restruction many credential modification chunks to always crdup while we figure out locking and optimizations; generally speaking, this means moving to a structure like this: newcred = crdup(oldcred); ... p->p_ucred = newcred; crfree(oldcred); It's not race-free, but better than nothing. There are also races in sys_process.c, all inter-process authorization, fork, exec, and exit. o Remove sigio->sio_ruid since sigio->sio_ucred now contains the ruid; remove comments indicating that the old arrangement was a problem. o Restructure exec1() a little to use newcred/oldcred arrangement, and use improved uid management primitives. o Clean up exit1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup due to pcred removal. o Clean up fork1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup and allocation. o Clean up ktrcanset() to take into account changes, and move to using suser_xxx() instead of performing a direct uid==0 comparision. o Improve commenting in various kern_prot.c credential modification calls to better document current behavior. In a couple of places, current behavior is a little questionable and we need to check POSIX.1 to make sure it's "right". More commenting work still remains to be done. o Update credential management calls, such as crfree(), to take into account new ruidinfo reference. o Modify or add the following uid and gid helper routines: change_euid() change_egid() change_ruid() change_rgid() change_svuid() change_svgid() In each case, the call now acts on a credential not a process, and as such no longer requires more complicated process locking/etc. They now assume the caller will do any necessary allocation of an exclusive credential reference. Each is commented to document its reference requirements. o CANSIGIO() is simplified to require only credentials, not processes and pcreds. o Remove lots of (p_pcred==NULL) checks. o Add an XXX to authorization code in nfs_lock.c, since it's questionable, and needs to be considered carefully. o Simplify posix4 authorization code to require only credentials, not processes and pcreds. Note that this authorization, as well as CANSIGIO(), needs to be updated to use the p_cansignal() and p_cansched() centralized authorization routines, as they currently do not take into account some desirable restrictions that are handled by the centralized routines, as well as being inconsistent with other similar authorization instances. o Update libkvm to take these changes into account. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Reviewed by: green, bde, jhb, freebsd-arch, freebsd-audit
2001-05-25 16:59:11 +00:00
kp->ki_rgid = p->p_ucred->cr_rgid;
kp->ki_svgid = p->p_ucred->cr_svgid;
}
if (p->p_procsig) {
kp->ki_sigignore = p->p_procsig->ps_sigignore;
kp->ki_sigcatch = p->p_procsig->ps_sigcatch;
}
Change and clean the mutex lock interface. mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes: mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks) mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized) similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have: mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN. We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the extra `type' argument. The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind. Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two: MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers: mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN locks, respectively. Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used (i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we inline recursion for this case. Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared if WITNESS is enabled. Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the "optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently need those. Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code. Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
mtx_lock_spin(&sched_lock);
if (p->p_stat != SIDL && p->p_stat != SZOMB && p->p_vmspace != NULL) {
struct vmspace *vm = p->p_vmspace;
kp->ki_size = vm->vm_map.size;
kp->ki_rssize = vmspace_resident_count(vm); /*XXX*/
if (p->p_sflag & PS_INMEM)
kp->ki_rssize += UAREA_PAGES;
FOREACH_THREAD_IN_PROC(p, td) /* XXXKSE: thread swapout check */
kp->ki_rssize += KSTACK_PAGES;
kp->ki_swrss = vm->vm_swrss;
kp->ki_tsize = vm->vm_tsize;
kp->ki_dsize = vm->vm_dsize;
kp->ki_ssize = vm->vm_ssize;
}
if ((p->p_sflag & PS_INMEM) && p->p_stats) {
kp->ki_start = p->p_stats->p_start;
kp->ki_rusage = p->p_stats->p_ru;
kp->ki_childtime.tv_sec = p->p_stats->p_cru.ru_utime.tv_sec +
p->p_stats->p_cru.ru_stime.tv_sec;
kp->ki_childtime.tv_usec = p->p_stats->p_cru.ru_utime.tv_usec +
p->p_stats->p_cru.ru_stime.tv_usec;
}
td = FIRST_THREAD_IN_PROC(p);
if (td->td_wmesg != NULL)
strncpy(kp->ki_wmesg, td->td_wmesg, sizeof(kp->ki_wmesg) - 1);
if (p->p_stat == SMTX) {
kp->ki_kiflag |= KI_MTXBLOCK;
strncpy(kp->ki_mtxname, td->td_mtxname,
sizeof(kp->ki_mtxname) - 1);
}
kp->ki_stat = p->p_stat;
kp->ki_sflag = p->p_sflag;
kp->ki_swtime = p->p_swtime;
kp->ki_traceflag = p->p_traceflag;
kp->ki_pid = p->p_pid;
/* vvv XXXKSE */
bintime2timeval(&p->p_runtime, &tv);
kp->ki_runtime = tv.tv_sec * (u_int64_t)1000000 + tv.tv_usec;
kp->ki_pctcpu = p->p_kse.ke_pctcpu;
kp->ki_estcpu = td->td_ksegrp->kg_estcpu;
kp->ki_slptime = td->td_ksegrp->kg_slptime;
kp->ki_wchan = td->td_wchan;
kp->ki_pri.pri_level = td->td_priority;
kp->ki_pri.pri_user = td->td_ksegrp->kg_user_pri;
kp->ki_pri.pri_class = td->td_ksegrp->kg_pri_class;
kp->ki_pri.pri_native = td->td_base_pri;
kp->ki_nice = td->td_ksegrp->kg_nice;
kp->ki_rqindex = p->p_kse.ke_rqindex;
kp->ki_oncpu = p->p_kse.ke_oncpu;
kp->ki_lastcpu = td->td_lastcpu;
kp->ki_tdflags = td->td_flags;
kp->ki_pcb = td->td_pcb;
kp->ki_kstack = (void *)td->td_kstack;
/* ^^^ XXXKSE */
Change and clean the mutex lock interface. mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes: mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks) mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized) similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have: mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN. We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the extra `type' argument. The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind. Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two: MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers: mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN locks, respectively. Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used (i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we inline recursion for this case. Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared if WITNESS is enabled. Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the "optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently need those. Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code. Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
mtx_unlock_spin(&sched_lock);
sp = NULL;
tp = NULL;
if (p->p_pgrp) {
kp->ki_pgid = p->p_pgrp->pg_id;
kp->ki_jobc = p->p_pgrp->pg_jobc;
sp = p->p_pgrp->pg_session;
if (sp != NULL) {
kp->ki_sid = sp->s_sid;
SESS_LOCK(sp);
strncpy(kp->ki_login, sp->s_login,
sizeof(kp->ki_login) - 1);
if (sp->s_ttyvp)
kp->ki_kiflag |= KI_CTTY;
if (SESS_LEADER(p))
kp->ki_kiflag |= KI_SLEADER;
tp = sp->s_ttyp;
SESS_UNLOCK(sp);
}
}
if ((p->p_flag & P_CONTROLT) && tp != NULL) {
kp->ki_tdev = dev2udev(tp->t_dev);
kp->ki_tpgid = tp->t_pgrp ? tp->t_pgrp->pg_id : NO_PID;
if (tp->t_session)
kp->ki_tsid = tp->t_session->s_sid;
} else
kp->ki_tdev = NOUDEV;
if (p->p_comm[0] != '\0') {
strncpy(kp->ki_comm, p->p_comm, sizeof(kp->ki_comm) - 1);
strncpy(kp->ki_ocomm, p->p_comm, sizeof(kp->ki_ocomm) - 1);
}
kp->ki_siglist = p->p_siglist;
kp->ki_sigmask = p->p_sigmask;
kp->ki_xstat = p->p_xstat;
kp->ki_acflag = p->p_acflag;
kp->ki_flag = p->p_flag;
/* If jailed(p->p_ucred), emulate the old P_JAILED flag. */
if (jailed(p->p_ucred))
kp->ki_flag |= P_JAILED;
kp->ki_lock = p->p_lock;
if (p->p_pptr)
kp->ki_ppid = p->p_pptr->p_pid;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
}
/*
* Locate a zombie process by number
*/
struct proc *
zpfind(pid_t pid)
{
struct proc *p;
sx_slock(&allproc_lock);
LIST_FOREACH(p, &zombproc, p_list)
if (p->p_pid == pid) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
break;
}
sx_sunlock(&allproc_lock);
return (p);
}
static int
sysctl_out_proc(struct proc *p, struct sysctl_req *req, int doingzomb)
{
struct kinfo_proc kinfo_proc;
int error;
struct proc *np;
pid_t pid = p->p_pid;
fill_kinfo_proc(p, &kinfo_proc);
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, (caddr_t)&kinfo_proc, sizeof(kinfo_proc));
if (error)
return (error);
if (doingzomb)
np = zpfind(pid);
else {
if (pid == 0)
return (0);
np = pfind(pid);
}
if (np == NULL)
return EAGAIN;
if (np != p) {
PROC_UNLOCK(np);
return EAGAIN;
}
PROC_UNLOCK(np);
return (0);
}
static int
sysctl_kern_proc(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
int *name = (int*) arg1;
u_int namelen = arg2;
struct proc *p;
int doingzomb;
int error = 0;
if (oidp->oid_number == KERN_PROC_PID) {
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
p = pfind((pid_t)name[0]);
if (!p)
return (0);
if (p_cansee(curproc, p)) {
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
return (0);
}
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
error = sysctl_out_proc(p, req, 0);
return (error);
}
if (oidp->oid_number == KERN_PROC_ALL && !namelen)
;
else if (oidp->oid_number != KERN_PROC_ALL && namelen == 1)
;
else
return (EINVAL);
if (!req->oldptr) {
/* overestimate by 5 procs */
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, 0, sizeof (struct kinfo_proc) * 5);
if (error)
return (error);
}
sx_slock(&allproc_lock);
for (doingzomb=0 ; doingzomb < 2 ; doingzomb++) {
if (!doingzomb)
p = LIST_FIRST(&allproc);
else
p = LIST_FIRST(&zombproc);
for (; p != 0; p = LIST_NEXT(p, p_list)) {
/*
o Centralize inter-process access control, introducing: int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused) which allows specification of subject process, object process, inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL, and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not be invoked directly. o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks. o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and kern.ps_showallprocs. o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies process flags due to the disabling of ASU. o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(), procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by bde). o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic. Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others Approved by: bde Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2000-08-30 04:49:09 +00:00
* Show a user only appropriate processes.
*/
if (p_cansee(curproc, p))
continue;
/*
* Skip embryonic processes.
*/
if (p->p_stat == SIDL)
continue;
/*
* TODO - make more efficient (see notes below).
* do by session.
*/
switch (oidp->oid_number) {
case KERN_PROC_PGRP:
/* could do this by traversing pgrp */
PROC_LOCK(p);
if (p->p_pgrp == NULL ||
p->p_pgrp->pg_id != (pid_t)name[0]) {
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
continue;
}
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
break;
case KERN_PROC_TTY:
PROC_LOCK(p);
if ((p->p_flag & P_CONTROLT) == 0 ||
p->p_session == NULL) {
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
continue;
}
SESS_LOCK(p->p_session);
if (p->p_session->s_ttyp == NULL ||
dev2udev(p->p_session->s_ttyp->t_dev) !=
(udev_t)name[0]) {
SESS_UNLOCK(p->p_session);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
continue;
}
SESS_UNLOCK(p->p_session);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
break;
case KERN_PROC_UID:
if (p->p_ucred == NULL ||
p->p_ucred->cr_uid != (uid_t)name[0])
continue;
break;
case KERN_PROC_RUID:
if (p->p_ucred == NULL ||
o Merge contents of struct pcred into struct ucred. Specifically, add the real uid, saved uid, real gid, and saved gid to ucred, as well as the pcred->pc_uidinfo, which was associated with the real uid, only rename it to cr_ruidinfo so as not to conflict with cr_uidinfo, which corresponds to the effective uid. o Remove p_cred from struct proc; add p_ucred to struct proc, replacing original macro that pointed. p->p_ucred to p->p_cred->pc_ucred. o Universally update code so that it makes use of ucred instead of pcred, p->p_ucred instead of p->p_pcred, cr_ruidinfo instead of p_uidinfo, cr_{r,sv}{u,g}id instead of p_*, etc. o Remove pcred0 and its initialization from init_main.c; initialize cr_ruidinfo there. o Restruction many credential modification chunks to always crdup while we figure out locking and optimizations; generally speaking, this means moving to a structure like this: newcred = crdup(oldcred); ... p->p_ucred = newcred; crfree(oldcred); It's not race-free, but better than nothing. There are also races in sys_process.c, all inter-process authorization, fork, exec, and exit. o Remove sigio->sio_ruid since sigio->sio_ucred now contains the ruid; remove comments indicating that the old arrangement was a problem. o Restructure exec1() a little to use newcred/oldcred arrangement, and use improved uid management primitives. o Clean up exit1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup due to pcred removal. o Clean up fork1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup and allocation. o Clean up ktrcanset() to take into account changes, and move to using suser_xxx() instead of performing a direct uid==0 comparision. o Improve commenting in various kern_prot.c credential modification calls to better document current behavior. In a couple of places, current behavior is a little questionable and we need to check POSIX.1 to make sure it's "right". More commenting work still remains to be done. o Update credential management calls, such as crfree(), to take into account new ruidinfo reference. o Modify or add the following uid and gid helper routines: change_euid() change_egid() change_ruid() change_rgid() change_svuid() change_svgid() In each case, the call now acts on a credential not a process, and as such no longer requires more complicated process locking/etc. They now assume the caller will do any necessary allocation of an exclusive credential reference. Each is commented to document its reference requirements. o CANSIGIO() is simplified to require only credentials, not processes and pcreds. o Remove lots of (p_pcred==NULL) checks. o Add an XXX to authorization code in nfs_lock.c, since it's questionable, and needs to be considered carefully. o Simplify posix4 authorization code to require only credentials, not processes and pcreds. Note that this authorization, as well as CANSIGIO(), needs to be updated to use the p_cansignal() and p_cansched() centralized authorization routines, as they currently do not take into account some desirable restrictions that are handled by the centralized routines, as well as being inconsistent with other similar authorization instances. o Update libkvm to take these changes into account. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Reviewed by: green, bde, jhb, freebsd-arch, freebsd-audit
2001-05-25 16:59:11 +00:00
p->p_ucred->cr_ruid != (uid_t)name[0])
continue;
break;
}
if (p_cansee(curproc, p))
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
continue;
error = sysctl_out_proc(p, req, doingzomb);
if (error) {
sx_sunlock(&allproc_lock);
return (error);
}
}
}
sx_sunlock(&allproc_lock);
return (0);
}
struct pargs *
pargs_alloc(int len)
{
struct pargs *pa;
MALLOC(pa, struct pargs *, sizeof(struct pargs) + len, M_PARGS,
M_WAITOK);
pa->ar_ref = 1;
pa->ar_length = len;
return (pa);
}
void
pargs_free(struct pargs *pa)
{
FREE(pa, M_PARGS);
}
void
pargs_hold(struct pargs *pa)
{
if (pa == NULL)
return;
PARGS_LOCK(pa);
pa->ar_ref++;
PARGS_UNLOCK(pa);
}
void
pargs_drop(struct pargs *pa)
{
if (pa == NULL)
return;
PARGS_LOCK(pa);
if (--pa->ar_ref == 0) {
PARGS_UNLOCK(pa);
pargs_free(pa);
} else
PARGS_UNLOCK(pa);
}
/*
* This sysctl allows a process to retrieve the argument list or process
* title for another process without groping around in the address space
* of the other process. It also allow a process to set its own "process
* title to a string of its own choice.
*/
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_args(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
int *name = (int*) arg1;
u_int namelen = arg2;
struct proc *p;
struct pargs *pa;
int error = 0;
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
p = pfind((pid_t)name[0]);
if (!p)
return (0);
if ((!ps_argsopen) && p_cansee(curproc, p)) {
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
return (0);
}
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
if (req->newptr && curproc != p)
return (EPERM);
PROC_LOCK(p);
pa = p->p_args;
pargs_hold(pa);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
if (req->oldptr && pa != NULL) {
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, pa->ar_args, pa->ar_length);
}
if (req->newptr == NULL) {
pargs_drop(pa);
return (error);
}
PROC_LOCK(p);
pa = p->p_args;
p->p_args = NULL;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
pargs_drop(pa);
if (req->newlen + sizeof(struct pargs) > ps_arg_cache_limit)
return (error);
pa = pargs_alloc(req->newlen);
error = SYSCTL_IN(req, pa->ar_args, req->newlen);
if (!error) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
p->p_args = pa;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
} else
pargs_free(pa);
return (error);
}
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern, KERN_PROC, proc, CTLFLAG_RD, 0, "Process table");
SYSCTL_PROC(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_ALL, all, CTLFLAG_RD|CTLTYPE_STRUCT,
0, 0, sysctl_kern_proc, "S,proc", "Return entire process table");
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_PGRP, pgrp, CTLFLAG_RD,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_TTY, tty, CTLFLAG_RD,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_UID, uid, CTLFLAG_RD,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_RUID, ruid, CTLFLAG_RD,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_PID, pid, CTLFLAG_RD,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_ARGS, args, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_ANYBODY,
sysctl_kern_proc_args, "Process argument list");