2005-01-06 18:10:42 +00:00
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/*-
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2017-11-20 19:43:44 +00:00
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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*
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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* Copyright (c) 1993 Jan-Simon Pendry
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* Copyright (c) 1993
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* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
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*
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* This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
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* Jan-Simon Pendry.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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2017-02-28 23:42:47 +00:00
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* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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* without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
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* @(#)procfs_status.c 8.4 (Berkeley) 6/15/94
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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*
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1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
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* From:
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2002-02-16 05:59:26 +00:00
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* $Id: procfs_status.c,v 3.1 1993/12/15 09:40:17 jsp Exp $
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1999-08-28 01:08:13 +00:00
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* $FreeBSD$
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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*/
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#include <sys/param.h>
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2003-05-01 16:59:23 +00:00
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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2001-05-01 08:13:21 +00:00
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#include <sys/exec.h>
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#include <sys/lock.h>
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#include <sys/mutex.h>
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o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to
use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
accessing struct prison.
Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
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#include <sys/jail.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
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2002-02-23 11:12:57 +00:00
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#include <sys/mutex.h>
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#include <sys/sx.h>
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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#include <sys/proc.h>
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#include <sys/resourcevar.h>
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2001-12-04 01:35:06 +00:00
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#include <sys/sbuf.h>
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2002-09-21 22:07:17 +00:00
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#include <sys/sysent.h>
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2001-05-01 08:13:21 +00:00
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#include <sys/tty.h>
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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1999-08-19 19:41:08 +00:00
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#include <vm/vm.h>
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#include <vm/pmap.h>
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#include <vm/vm_param.h>
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2001-05-01 08:13:21 +00:00
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2001-12-04 01:35:06 +00:00
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#include <fs/pseudofs/pseudofs.h>
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2001-05-23 09:42:29 +00:00
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#include <fs/procfs/procfs.h>
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1999-08-19 19:41:08 +00:00
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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int
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2001-12-04 01:35:06 +00:00
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procfs_doprocstatus(PFS_FILL_ARGS)
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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{
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struct session *sess;
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2002-02-16 05:59:26 +00:00
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struct thread *tdfirst;
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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struct tty *tp;
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struct ucred *cr;
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2003-04-17 22:16:58 +00:00
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const char *wmesg;
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2001-12-04 01:35:06 +00:00
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char *pc;
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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char *sep;
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2016-07-27 11:08:59 +00:00
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struct timeval boottime;
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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int pid, ppid, pgid, sid;
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int i;
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pid = p->p_pid;
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2001-03-07 03:10:20 +00:00
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PROC_LOCK(p);
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1999-12-27 16:03:38 +00:00
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ppid = p->p_pptr ? p->p_pptr->p_pid : 0;
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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pgid = p->p_pgrp->pg_id;
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sess = p->p_pgrp->pg_session;
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2002-02-23 11:12:57 +00:00
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SESS_LOCK(sess);
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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sid = sess->s_leader ? sess->s_leader->p_pid : 0;
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2005-03-15 11:05:11 +00:00
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/* comm pid ppid pgid sid tty ctty,sldr start ut st wmsg
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2010-01-09 23:23:52 +00:00
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euid ruid rgid,egid,groups[1 .. ngroups]
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1996-02-02 05:19:20 +00:00
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*/
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2000-11-08 21:53:05 +00:00
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2001-09-25 04:42:40 +00:00
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pc = p->p_comm;
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do {
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if (*pc < 33 || *pc > 126 || *pc == '\\')
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2001-12-04 01:35:06 +00:00
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sbuf_printf(sb, "\\%03o", *pc);
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2001-09-25 04:42:40 +00:00
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else
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2001-12-04 01:35:06 +00:00
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sbuf_putc(sb, *pc);
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} while (*++pc);
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sbuf_printf(sb, " %d %d %d %d ", pid, ppid, pgid, sid);
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2003-04-17 22:16:58 +00:00
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if ((p->p_flag & P_CONTROLT) && (tp = sess->s_ttyp))
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2005-03-15 11:05:11 +00:00
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sbuf_printf(sb, "%s ", devtoname(tp->t_dev));
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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else
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2005-03-15 11:05:11 +00:00
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sbuf_printf(sb, "- ");
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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sep = "";
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if (sess->s_ttyvp) {
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2001-12-04 01:35:06 +00:00
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sbuf_printf(sb, "%sctty", sep);
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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sep = ",";
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}
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if (SESS_LEADER(p)) {
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2001-12-04 01:35:06 +00:00
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sbuf_printf(sb, "%ssldr", sep);
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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sep = ",";
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2000-11-08 21:53:05 +00:00
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}
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2002-02-23 11:12:57 +00:00
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SESS_UNLOCK(sess);
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2000-11-08 21:53:05 +00:00
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if (*sep != ',') {
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2001-12-04 01:35:06 +00:00
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sbuf_printf(sb, "noflags");
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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}
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2008-03-12 10:12:01 +00:00
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tdfirst = FIRST_THREAD_IN_PROC(p);
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2011-11-09 17:15:51 +00:00
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thread_lock(tdfirst);
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2008-03-12 10:12:01 +00:00
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if (tdfirst->td_wchan != NULL) {
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KASSERT(tdfirst->td_wmesg != NULL,
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("wchan %p has no wmesg", tdfirst->td_wchan));
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wmesg = tdfirst->td_wmesg;
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} else
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wmesg = "nochan";
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2011-11-09 17:15:51 +00:00
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thread_unlock(tdfirst);
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2003-04-17 22:16:58 +00:00
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2007-09-17 05:31:39 +00:00
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if (p->p_flag & P_INMEM) {
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2003-05-01 16:59:23 +00:00
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struct timeval start, ut, st;
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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2014-11-26 14:10:00 +00:00
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PROC_STATLOCK(p);
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2004-10-05 18:51:11 +00:00
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calcru(p, &ut, &st);
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2014-11-26 14:10:00 +00:00
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PROC_STATUNLOCK(p);
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2003-05-01 16:59:23 +00:00
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start = p->p_stats->p_start;
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2016-07-27 11:08:59 +00:00
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getboottime(&boottime);
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2003-05-01 16:59:23 +00:00
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timevaladd(&start, &boottime);
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2005-12-24 22:22:17 +00:00
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sbuf_printf(sb, " %jd,%ld %jd,%ld %jd,%ld",
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(intmax_t)start.tv_sec, start.tv_usec,
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(intmax_t)ut.tv_sec, ut.tv_usec,
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(intmax_t)st.tv_sec, st.tv_usec);
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2007-09-17 05:31:39 +00:00
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} else
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2001-12-04 01:35:06 +00:00
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sbuf_printf(sb, " -1,-1 -1,-1 -1,-1");
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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2003-04-17 22:16:58 +00:00
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sbuf_printf(sb, " %s", wmesg);
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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cr = p->p_ucred;
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2001-12-04 01:35:06 +00:00
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sbuf_printf(sb, " %lu %lu %lu",
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1998-07-11 07:46:16 +00:00
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(u_long)cr->cr_uid,
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o Merge contents of struct pcred into struct ucred. Specifically, add the
real uid, saved uid, real gid, and saved gid to ucred, as well as the
pcred->pc_uidinfo, which was associated with the real uid, only rename
it to cr_ruidinfo so as not to conflict with cr_uidinfo, which
corresponds to the effective uid.
o Remove p_cred from struct proc; add p_ucred to struct proc, replacing
original macro that pointed.
p->p_ucred to p->p_cred->pc_ucred.
o Universally update code so that it makes use of ucred instead of pcred,
p->p_ucred instead of p->p_pcred, cr_ruidinfo instead of p_uidinfo,
cr_{r,sv}{u,g}id instead of p_*, etc.
o Remove pcred0 and its initialization from init_main.c; initialize
cr_ruidinfo there.
o Restruction many credential modification chunks to always crdup while
we figure out locking and optimizations; generally speaking, this
means moving to a structure like this:
newcred = crdup(oldcred);
...
p->p_ucred = newcred;
crfree(oldcred);
It's not race-free, but better than nothing. There are also races
in sys_process.c, all inter-process authorization, fork, exec, and
exit.
o Remove sigio->sio_ruid since sigio->sio_ucred now contains the ruid;
remove comments indicating that the old arrangement was a problem.
o Restructure exec1() a little to use newcred/oldcred arrangement, and
use improved uid management primitives.
o Clean up exit1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup due to
pcred removal.
o Clean up fork1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup and
allocation.
o Clean up ktrcanset() to take into account changes, and move to using
suser_xxx() instead of performing a direct uid==0 comparision.
o Improve commenting in various kern_prot.c credential modification
calls to better document current behavior. In a couple of places,
current behavior is a little questionable and we need to check
POSIX.1 to make sure it's "right". More commenting work still
remains to be done.
o Update credential management calls, such as crfree(), to take into
account new ruidinfo reference.
o Modify or add the following uid and gid helper routines:
change_euid()
change_egid()
change_ruid()
change_rgid()
change_svuid()
change_svgid()
In each case, the call now acts on a credential not a process, and as
such no longer requires more complicated process locking/etc. They
now assume the caller will do any necessary allocation of an
exclusive credential reference. Each is commented to document its
reference requirements.
o CANSIGIO() is simplified to require only credentials, not processes
and pcreds.
o Remove lots of (p_pcred==NULL) checks.
o Add an XXX to authorization code in nfs_lock.c, since it's
questionable, and needs to be considered carefully.
o Simplify posix4 authorization code to require only credentials, not
processes and pcreds. Note that this authorization, as well as
CANSIGIO(), needs to be updated to use the p_cansignal() and
p_cansched() centralized authorization routines, as they currently
do not take into account some desirable restrictions that are handled
by the centralized routines, as well as being inconsistent with other
similar authorization instances.
o Update libkvm to take these changes into account.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Reviewed by: green, bde, jhb, freebsd-arch, freebsd-audit
2001-05-25 16:59:11 +00:00
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(u_long)cr->cr_ruid,
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(u_long)cr->cr_rgid);
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1996-02-02 05:19:20 +00:00
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2003-12-07 17:40:00 +00:00
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/* egid (cr->cr_svgid) is equal to cr_ngroups[0]
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1996-02-02 05:19:20 +00:00
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see also getegid(2) in /sys/kern/kern_prot.c */
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2000-11-08 21:53:05 +00:00
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for (i = 0; i < cr->cr_ngroups; i++) {
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2001-12-04 01:35:06 +00:00
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sbuf_printf(sb, ",%lu", (u_long)cr->cr_groups[i]);
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2000-11-08 21:53:05 +00:00
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}
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This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
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2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
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if (jailed(cr)) {
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mtx_lock(&cr->cr_prison->pr_mtx);
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sbuf_printf(sb, " %s",
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prison_name(td->td_ucred->cr_prison, cr->cr_prison));
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mtx_unlock(&cr->cr_prison->pr_mtx);
|
o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to
use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
accessing struct prison.
Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
|
|
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} else {
|
2001-12-04 01:35:06 +00:00
|
|
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sbuf_printf(sb, " -");
|
o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to
use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
accessing struct prison.
Reviewed by: jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
|
|
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}
|
2002-04-13 23:09:41 +00:00
|
|
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PROC_UNLOCK(p);
|
2001-12-04 01:35:06 +00:00
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sbuf_printf(sb, "\n");
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2000-11-08 21:53:05 +00:00
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2001-12-04 01:35:06 +00:00
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return (0);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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}
|
1999-01-05 03:53:06 +00:00
|
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int
|
2001-12-04 01:35:06 +00:00
|
|
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procfs_doproccmdline(PFS_FILL_ARGS)
|
1999-01-05 03:53:06 +00:00
|
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{
|
1999-08-19 19:41:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-01-05 03:53:06 +00:00
|
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/*
|
1999-11-17 21:35:07 +00:00
|
|
|
* If we are using the ps/cmdline caching, use that. Otherwise
|
2011-11-22 20:43:03 +00:00
|
|
|
* read argv from the process space.
|
1999-08-19 19:41:08 +00:00
|
|
|
* Note that if the argv is no longer available, we deliberately
|
|
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|
* don't fall back on p->p_comm or return an error: the authentic
|
|
|
|
* Linux behaviour is to return zero-length in this case.
|
1999-01-05 03:53:06 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
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|
2002-04-13 23:09:41 +00:00
|
|
|
PROC_LOCK(p);
|
2004-04-01 00:04:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (p->p_args && p_cansee(td, p) == 0) {
|
2002-04-13 23:09:41 +00:00
|
|
|
sbuf_bcpy(sb, p->p_args->ar_args, p->p_args->ar_length);
|
|
|
|
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-11-22 20:43:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((p->p_flag & P_SYSTEM) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
1999-08-19 19:41:08 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-01-05 03:53:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-11-22 20:43:03 +00:00
|
|
|
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
|
|
|
|
|
2012-01-15 18:47:24 +00:00
|
|
|
return (proc_getargv(td, p, sb));
|
1999-01-05 03:53:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|