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freebsd-skq/sys/security/mac_stub/mac_stub.c

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Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
/*-
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Robert N. M. Watson
* Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
*
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by NAI Labs,
* the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
* DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA
* CHATS research program.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $FreeBSD$
*/
/*
* Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
* Generic mandatory access module that does nothing.
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/acl.h>
#include <sys/conf.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/mac.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <sys/sysent.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/pipe.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <fs/devfs/devfs.h>
#include <net/bpfdesc.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/if_types.h>
#include <net/if_var.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
#include <vm/vm.h>
#include <sys/mac_policy.h>
SYSCTL_DECL(_security_mac);
SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, none, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
"TrustedBSD mac_none policy controls");
static int mac_none_enabled = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_none, OID_AUTO, enabled, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_none_enabled, 0, "Enforce none policy");
/*
* Policy module operations.
*/
static void
mac_none_destroy(struct mac_policy_conf *conf)
{
}
static void
mac_none_init(struct mac_policy_conf *conf)
{
}
Provide stub mpo_syscall() implementations for mac_none and mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-20 02:53:35 +00:00
static int
mac_none_syscall(struct thread *td, int call, void *arg)
{
return (0);
}
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
/*
* Label operations.
*/
static void
mac_none_init_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *bpf_d, struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_init_cred(struct ucred *ucred, struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_init_devfsdirent(struct devfs_dirent *devfs_dirent,
struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_init_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_init_ipq(struct ipq *ipq, struct label *ipqlabel)
{
}
static int
mac_none_init_mbuf(struct mbuf *mbuf, int how, struct label *label)
{
return (0);
}
static void
mac_none_init_mount(struct mount *mount, struct label *mntlabel,
struct label *fslabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_init_socket(struct socket *socket, struct label *label,
struct label *peerlabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_init_pipe(struct pipe *pipe, struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_init_temp(struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_init_vnode(struct vnode *vp, struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_destroy_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *bpf_d, struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_destroy_cred(struct ucred *ucred, struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_destroy_devfsdirent(struct devfs_dirent *devfs_dirent,
struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_destroy_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_destroy_ipq(struct ipq *ipq, struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_destroy_mbuf(struct mbuf *mbuf, struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_destroy_mount(struct mount *mount, struct label *mntlabel,
struct label *fslabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_destroy_socket(struct socket *socket, struct label *label,
struct label *peerlabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_destroy_pipe(struct pipe *pipe, struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_destroy_temp(struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_destroy_vnode(struct vnode *vp, struct label *label)
{
}
static int
mac_none_externalize(struct label *label, struct mac *extmac)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_internalize(struct label *label, struct mac *extmac)
{
return (0);
}
/*
* Labeling event operations: file system objects, and things that look
* a lot like file system objects.
*/
static void
mac_none_create_devfs_device(dev_t dev, struct devfs_dirent *devfs_dirent,
struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_devfs_directory(char *dirname, int dirnamelen,
struct devfs_dirent *devfs_dirent, struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_devfs_vnode(struct devfs_dirent *devfs_dirent,
struct label *direntlabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *vnodelabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_vnode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *parent,
struct label *parentlabel, struct vnode *child,
struct label *childlabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_mount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
struct label *mntlabel, struct label *fslabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_root_mount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
struct label *mntlabel, struct label *fslabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_relabel_vnode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vnodelabel, struct label *label)
{
}
static void
mac_none_update_devfsdirent(struct devfs_dirent *devfs_dirent,
struct label *direntlabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *vnodelabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_update_procfsvnode(struct vnode *vp, struct label *vnodelabel,
struct ucred *cred)
{
}
static int
mac_none_update_vnode_from_externalized(struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vnodelabel, struct mac *extmac)
{
return (0);
}
static void
mac_none_update_vnode_from_mount(struct vnode *vp, struct label *vnodelabel,
struct mount *mp, struct label *fslabel)
{
}
/*
* Labeling event operations: IPC object.
*/
static void
mac_none_create_mbuf_from_socket(struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel,
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mbuflabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_socket(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
struct label *socketlabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_pipe(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
struct label *pipelabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_socket_from_socket(struct socket *oldsocket,
struct label *oldsocketlabel, struct socket *newsocket,
struct label *newsocketlabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_relabel_socket(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
struct label *socketlabel, struct label *newlabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_relabel_pipe(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
struct label *pipelabel, struct label *newlabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_set_socket_peer_from_mbuf(struct mbuf *mbuf, struct label *mbuflabel,
struct socket *socket, struct label *socketpeerlabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_set_socket_peer_from_socket(struct socket *oldsocket,
struct label *oldsocketlabel, struct socket *newsocket,
struct label *newsocketpeerlabel)
{
}
/*
* Labeling event operations: network objects.
*/
static void
mac_none_create_bpfdesc(struct ucred *cred, struct bpf_d *bpf_d,
struct label *bpflabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_datagram_from_ipq(struct ipq *ipq, struct label *ipqlabel,
struct mbuf *datagram, struct label *datagramlabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_fragment(struct mbuf *datagram, struct label *datagramlabel,
struct mbuf *fragment, struct label *fragmentlabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct label *ifnetlabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_ipq(struct mbuf *fragment, struct label *fragmentlabel,
struct ipq *ipq, struct label *ipqlabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_mbuf_from_mbuf(struct mbuf *oldmbuf,
struct label *oldmbuflabel, struct mbuf *newmbuf,
struct label *newmbuflabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_mbuf_linklayer(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct label *ifnetlabel,
struct mbuf *mbuf, struct label *mbuflabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_mbuf_from_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *bpf_d, struct label *bpflabel,
struct mbuf *mbuf, struct label *mbuflabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_mbuf_from_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct label *ifnetlabel,
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mbuflabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_mbuf_multicast_encap(struct mbuf *oldmbuf,
struct label *oldmbuflabel, struct ifnet *ifnet, struct label *ifnetlabel,
struct mbuf *newmbuf, struct label *newmbuflabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_mbuf_netlayer(struct mbuf *oldmbuf,
struct label *oldmbuflabel, struct mbuf *newmbuf, struct label *newmbuflabel)
{
}
static int
mac_none_fragment_match(struct mbuf *fragment, struct label *fragmentlabel,
struct ipq *ipq, struct label *ipqlabel)
{
return (1);
}
static void
mac_none_relabel_ifnet(struct ucred *cred, struct ifnet *ifnet,
struct label *ifnetlabel, struct label *newlabel)
{
}
static void
mac_none_update_ipq(struct mbuf *fragment, struct label *fragmentlabel,
struct ipq *ipq, struct label *ipqlabel)
{
}
/*
* Labeling event operations: processes.
*/
static void
mac_none_create_cred(struct ucred *cred_parent, struct ucred *cred_child)
{
}
static void
mac_none_execve_transition(struct ucred *old, struct ucred *new,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *vnodelabel)
{
}
static int
mac_none_execve_will_transition(struct ucred *old, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vnodelabel)
{
return (0);
}
static void
mac_none_create_proc0(struct ucred *cred)
{
}
static void
mac_none_create_proc1(struct ucred *cred)
{
}
static void
mac_none_relabel_cred(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
{
}
/*
* Access control checks.
*/
static int
mac_none_check_bpfdesc_receive(struct bpf_d *bpf_d, struct label *bpflabel,
struct ifnet *ifnet, struct label *ifnet_label)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_cred_visible(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_ifnet_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct ifnet *ifnet,
struct label *newlabel)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_ifnet_transmit(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct label *ifnetlabel,
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mbuflabel)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
struct label *mntlabel)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_pipe_ioctl(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
struct label *pipelabel, unsigned long cmd, void /* caddr_t */ *data)
{
return (0);
}
static int
Break out mac_check_pipe_op() into component check entry points: mac_check_pipe_poll(), mac_check_pipe_read(), mac_check_pipe_stat(), and mac_check_pipe_write(). This is improves consistency with other access control entry points and permits security modules to only control the object methods that they are interested in, avoiding switch statements. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
mac_none_check_pipe_poll(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
struct label *pipelabel)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_pipe_read(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
struct label *pipelabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_pipe_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
struct label *pipelabel, struct label *newlabel)
{
return (0);
}
Break out mac_check_pipe_op() into component check entry points: mac_check_pipe_poll(), mac_check_pipe_read(), mac_check_pipe_stat(), and mac_check_pipe_write(). This is improves consistency with other access control entry points and permits security modules to only control the object methods that they are interested in, avoiding switch statements. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
static int
mac_none_check_pipe_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
struct label *pipelabel)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_pipe_write(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
struct label *pipelabel)
{
return (0);
}
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
mac_none_check_proc_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_proc_sched(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_proc_signal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc, int signum)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_socket_bind(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
struct label *socketlabel, struct sockaddr *sockaddr)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_socket_connect(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
struct label *socketlabel, struct sockaddr *sockaddr)
{
return (0);
}
static int
Rename mac_check_socket_receive() to mac_check_socket_deliver() so that we can use the names _receive() and _send() for the receive() and send() checks. Rename related constants, policy implementations, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-15 18:51:27 +00:00
mac_none_check_socket_deliver(struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel,
struct mbuf *m, struct label *mbuflabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
return (0);
}
static int
Rename mac_check_socket_receive() to mac_check_socket_deliver() so that we can use the names _receive() and _send() for the receive() and send() checks. Rename related constants, policy implementations, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-15 18:51:27 +00:00
mac_none_check_socket_listen(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *socketlabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_socket_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
struct label *socketlabel, struct label *newlabel)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_socket_visible(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
struct label *socketlabel)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_access(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, mode_t flags)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_chdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct label *dlabel)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_chroot(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct label *dlabel)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_create(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct label *dlabel, struct componentname *cnp, struct vattr *vap)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_delete(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct label *dlabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *label,
struct componentname *cnp)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_deleteacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, acl_type_t type)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_exec(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_getacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, acl_type_t type)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_getextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, int attrnamespace, const char *name, struct uio *uio)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_lookup(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct label *dlabel, struct componentname *cnp)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_open(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *filelabel, mode_t acc_mode)
{
return (0);
}
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
static int
Pass active_cred and file_cred into the MAC framework explicitly for mac_check_vnode_{poll,read,stat,write}(). Pass in fp->f_cred when calling these checks with a struct file available. Otherwise, pass NOCRED. All currently MAC policies use active_cred, but could now offer the cached credential semantic used for the base system security model. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
mac_none_check_vnode_poll(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label)
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
{
return (0);
}
static int
Pass active_cred and file_cred into the MAC framework explicitly for mac_check_vnode_{poll,read,stat,write}(). Pass in fp->f_cred when calling these checks with a struct file available. Otherwise, pass NOCRED. All currently MAC policies use active_cred, but could now offer the cached credential semantic used for the base system security model. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
mac_none_check_vnode_read(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label)
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
{
return (0);
}
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_readdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *dlabel)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_readlink(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vnodelabel)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vnodelabel, struct label *newlabel)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_rename_from(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct label *dlabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *label,
struct componentname *cnp)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_rename_to(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct label *dlabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, int samedir,
struct componentname *cnp)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_revoke(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_setacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, acl_type_t type, struct acl *acl)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_setextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, int attrnamespace, const char *name, struct uio *uio)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_setflags(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, u_long flags)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_setmode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, mode_t mode)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_setowner(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
return (0);
}
static int
mac_none_check_vnode_setutimes(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, struct timespec atime, struct timespec mtime)
{
return (0);
}
static int
Pass active_cred and file_cred into the MAC framework explicitly for mac_check_vnode_{poll,read,stat,write}(). Pass in fp->f_cred when calling these checks with a struct file available. Otherwise, pass NOCRED. All currently MAC policies use active_cred, but could now offer the cached credential semantic used for the base system security model. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
mac_none_check_vnode_stat(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
return (0);
}
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
static int
Pass active_cred and file_cred into the MAC framework explicitly for mac_check_vnode_{poll,read,stat,write}(). Pass in fp->f_cred when calling these checks with a struct file available. Otherwise, pass NOCRED. All currently MAC policies use active_cred, but could now offer the cached credential semantic used for the base system security model. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
mac_none_check_vnode_write(struct ucred *active_cred,
struct ucred *file_cred, struct vnode *vp, struct label *label)
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
{
return (0);
}
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static struct mac_policy_op_entry mac_none_ops[] =
{
{ MAC_DESTROY,
(macop_t)mac_none_destroy },
{ MAC_INIT,
(macop_t)mac_none_init },
Provide stub mpo_syscall() implementations for mac_none and mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-20 02:53:35 +00:00
{ MAC_SYSCALL,
(macop_t)mac_none_syscall },
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{ MAC_INIT_BPFDESC,
(macop_t)mac_none_init_bpfdesc },
{ MAC_INIT_CRED,
(macop_t)mac_none_init_cred },
{ MAC_INIT_DEVFSDIRENT,
(macop_t)mac_none_init_devfsdirent },
{ MAC_INIT_IFNET,
(macop_t)mac_none_init_ifnet },
{ MAC_INIT_IPQ,
(macop_t)mac_none_init_ipq },
{ MAC_INIT_MBUF,
(macop_t)mac_none_init_mbuf },
{ MAC_INIT_MOUNT,
(macop_t)mac_none_init_mount },
{ MAC_INIT_PIPE,
(macop_t)mac_none_init_pipe },
{ MAC_INIT_SOCKET,
(macop_t)mac_none_init_socket },
{ MAC_INIT_TEMP,
(macop_t)mac_none_init_temp },
{ MAC_INIT_VNODE,
(macop_t)mac_none_init_vnode },
{ MAC_DESTROY_BPFDESC,
(macop_t)mac_none_destroy_bpfdesc },
{ MAC_DESTROY_CRED,
(macop_t)mac_none_destroy_cred },
{ MAC_DESTROY_DEVFSDIRENT,
(macop_t)mac_none_destroy_devfsdirent },
{ MAC_DESTROY_IFNET,
(macop_t)mac_none_destroy_ifnet },
{ MAC_DESTROY_IPQ,
(macop_t)mac_none_destroy_ipq },
{ MAC_DESTROY_MBUF,
(macop_t)mac_none_destroy_mbuf },
{ MAC_DESTROY_MOUNT,
(macop_t)mac_none_destroy_mount },
{ MAC_DESTROY_PIPE,
(macop_t)mac_none_destroy_pipe },
{ MAC_DESTROY_SOCKET,
(macop_t)mac_none_destroy_socket },
{ MAC_DESTROY_TEMP,
(macop_t)mac_none_destroy_temp },
{ MAC_DESTROY_VNODE,
(macop_t)mac_none_destroy_vnode },
{ MAC_EXTERNALIZE,
(macop_t)mac_none_externalize },
{ MAC_INTERNALIZE,
(macop_t)mac_none_internalize },
{ MAC_CREATE_DEVFS_DEVICE,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_devfs_device },
{ MAC_CREATE_DEVFS_DIRECTORY,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_devfs_directory },
{ MAC_CREATE_DEVFS_VNODE,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_devfs_vnode },
{ MAC_CREATE_VNODE,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_vnode },
{ MAC_CREATE_MOUNT,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_mount },
{ MAC_CREATE_ROOT_MOUNT,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_root_mount },
{ MAC_RELABEL_VNODE,
(macop_t)mac_none_relabel_vnode },
{ MAC_UPDATE_DEVFSDIRENT,
(macop_t)mac_none_update_devfsdirent },
{ MAC_UPDATE_PROCFSVNODE,
(macop_t)mac_none_update_procfsvnode },
{ MAC_UPDATE_VNODE_FROM_EXTERNALIZED,
(macop_t)mac_none_update_vnode_from_externalized },
{ MAC_UPDATE_VNODE_FROM_MOUNT,
(macop_t)mac_none_update_vnode_from_mount },
{ MAC_CREATE_MBUF_FROM_SOCKET,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_mbuf_from_socket },
{ MAC_CREATE_PIPE,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_pipe },
{ MAC_CREATE_SOCKET,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_socket },
{ MAC_CREATE_SOCKET_FROM_SOCKET,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_socket_from_socket },
{ MAC_RELABEL_PIPE,
(macop_t)mac_none_relabel_pipe },
{ MAC_RELABEL_SOCKET,
(macop_t)mac_none_relabel_socket },
{ MAC_SET_SOCKET_PEER_FROM_MBUF,
(macop_t)mac_none_set_socket_peer_from_mbuf },
{ MAC_SET_SOCKET_PEER_FROM_SOCKET,
(macop_t)mac_none_set_socket_peer_from_socket },
{ MAC_CREATE_BPFDESC,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_bpfdesc },
{ MAC_CREATE_IFNET,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_ifnet },
{ MAC_CREATE_IPQ,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_ipq },
{ MAC_CREATE_DATAGRAM_FROM_IPQ,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_datagram_from_ipq },
{ MAC_CREATE_FRAGMENT,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_fragment },
{ MAC_CREATE_IPQ,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_ipq },
{ MAC_CREATE_MBUF_FROM_MBUF,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_mbuf_from_mbuf },
{ MAC_CREATE_MBUF_LINKLAYER,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_mbuf_linklayer },
{ MAC_CREATE_MBUF_FROM_BPFDESC,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_mbuf_from_bpfdesc },
{ MAC_CREATE_MBUF_FROM_IFNET,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_mbuf_from_ifnet },
{ MAC_CREATE_MBUF_MULTICAST_ENCAP,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_mbuf_multicast_encap },
{ MAC_CREATE_MBUF_NETLAYER,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_mbuf_netlayer },
{ MAC_FRAGMENT_MATCH,
(macop_t)mac_none_fragment_match },
{ MAC_RELABEL_IFNET,
(macop_t)mac_none_relabel_ifnet },
{ MAC_UPDATE_IPQ,
(macop_t)mac_none_update_ipq },
{ MAC_CREATE_CRED,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_cred },
{ MAC_EXECVE_TRANSITION,
(macop_t)mac_none_execve_transition },
{ MAC_EXECVE_WILL_TRANSITION,
(macop_t)mac_none_execve_will_transition },
{ MAC_CREATE_PROC0,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_proc0 },
{ MAC_CREATE_PROC1,
(macop_t)mac_none_create_proc1 },
{ MAC_RELABEL_CRED,
(macop_t)mac_none_relabel_cred },
{ MAC_CHECK_BPFDESC_RECEIVE,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_bpfdesc_receive },
{ MAC_CHECK_CRED_RELABEL,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_cred_relabel },
{ MAC_CHECK_CRED_VISIBLE,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_cred_visible },
{ MAC_CHECK_IFNET_RELABEL,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_ifnet_relabel },
{ MAC_CHECK_IFNET_TRANSMIT,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_ifnet_transmit },
{ MAC_CHECK_MOUNT_STAT,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_mount_stat },
{ MAC_CHECK_PIPE_IOCTL,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_pipe_ioctl },
Break out mac_check_pipe_op() into component check entry points: mac_check_pipe_poll(), mac_check_pipe_read(), mac_check_pipe_stat(), and mac_check_pipe_write(). This is improves consistency with other access control entry points and permits security modules to only control the object methods that they are interested in, avoiding switch statements. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
{ MAC_CHECK_PIPE_POLL,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_pipe_poll },
{ MAC_CHECK_PIPE_READ,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_pipe_read },
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{ MAC_CHECK_PIPE_RELABEL,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_pipe_relabel },
Break out mac_check_pipe_op() into component check entry points: mac_check_pipe_poll(), mac_check_pipe_read(), mac_check_pipe_stat(), and mac_check_pipe_write(). This is improves consistency with other access control entry points and permits security modules to only control the object methods that they are interested in, avoiding switch statements. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
{ MAC_CHECK_PIPE_STAT,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_pipe_stat },
{ MAC_CHECK_PIPE_WRITE,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_pipe_write },
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{ MAC_CHECK_PROC_DEBUG,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_proc_debug },
{ MAC_CHECK_PROC_SCHED,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_proc_sched },
{ MAC_CHECK_PROC_SIGNAL,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_proc_signal },
{ MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_BIND,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_socket_bind },
{ MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_CONNECT,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_socket_connect },
Rename mac_check_socket_receive() to mac_check_socket_deliver() so that we can use the names _receive() and _send() for the receive() and send() checks. Rename related constants, policy implementations, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-15 18:51:27 +00:00
{ MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_DELIVER,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_socket_deliver },
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{ MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_LISTEN,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_socket_listen },
{ MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_RELABEL,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_socket_relabel },
{ MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_VISIBLE,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_socket_visible },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_ACCESS,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_access },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_CHDIR,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_chdir },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_CHROOT,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_chroot },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_CREATE,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_create },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_DELETE,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_delete },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_DELETEACL,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_deleteacl },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_EXEC,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_exec },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_GETACL,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_getacl },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_GETEXTATTR,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_getextattr },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_LOOKUP,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_lookup },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_OPEN,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_open },
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_POLL,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_poll },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_READ,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_read },
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_READDIR,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_readdir },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_READLINK,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_readlink },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_RELABEL,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_relabel },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_RENAME_FROM,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_rename_from },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_RENAME_TO,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_rename_to },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_REVOKE,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_revoke },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETACL,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_setacl },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETEXTATTR,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_setextattr },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETFLAGS,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_setflags },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETMODE,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_setmode },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETOWNER,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_setowner },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETUTIMES,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_setutimes },
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_STAT,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_stat },
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
{ MAC_CHECK_VNODE_WRITE,
(macop_t)mac_none_check_vnode_write },
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{ MAC_OP_LAST, NULL }
};
MAC_POLICY_SET(mac_none_ops, trustedbsd_mac_none, "TrustedBSD MAC/None",
MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK, 0);
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