2005-01-06 23:35:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/*-
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
|
|
|
|
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
|
|
|
|
* (c) UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
|
|
|
|
* All or some portions of this file are derived from material licensed
|
|
|
|
* to the University of California by American Telephone and Telegraph
|
|
|
|
* Co. or Unix System Laboratories, Inc. and are reproduced herein with
|
|
|
|
* the permission of UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
|
|
* are met:
|
|
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
2016-09-15 13:16:20 +00:00
|
|
|
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
|
|
|
|
* without specific prior written permission.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
|
|
|
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
|
|
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
|
|
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
|
|
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
|
|
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
|
|
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
|
|
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
|
|
|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @(#)vfs_syscalls.c 8.13 (Berkeley) 4/15/94
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2003-06-11 00:56:59 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
|
|
|
|
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
|
|
|
|
|
2011-08-11 12:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "opt_capsicum.h"
|
1997-12-16 17:40:42 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "opt_compat.h"
|
2008-02-23 01:01:49 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "opt_ktrace.h"
|
1997-12-16 17:40:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/param.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/systm.h>
|
2000-05-05 09:59:14 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/bio.h>
|
1999-02-25 15:54:06 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/buf.h>
|
2014-03-16 10:55:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/capsicum.h>
|
2010-03-03 16:18:04 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/disk.h>
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/sysent.h>
|
2002-08-01 17:47:56 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/malloc.h>
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/mount.h>
|
2000-10-20 07:58:15 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/mutex.h>
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/namei.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/filedesc.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/kernel.h>
|
1997-03-23 03:37:54 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/file.h>
|
2007-04-05 21:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/filio.h>
|
2003-04-29 13:36:06 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/limits.h>
|
1998-11-03 14:29:09 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/linker.h>
|
2013-02-20 10:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/rwlock.h>
|
2008-11-05 19:40:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/sdt.h>
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/stat.h>
|
2001-03-28 11:52:56 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/sx.h>
|
1996-09-03 14:25:27 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/unistd.h>
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/vnode.h>
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/priv.h>
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/proc.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/dirent.h>
|
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/jail.h>
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/syscallsubr.h>
|
2001-08-23 13:51:17 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
|
2008-02-23 01:01:49 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef KTRACE
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/ktrace.h>
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-03-26 15:33:44 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <machine/stdarg.h>
|
2001-08-23 13:51:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Add pathname and/or vnode argument auditing for the following system calls:
quotactl, statfs, fstatfs, fchdir, chdir, chroot, open, mknod, mkfifo,
link, symlink, undelete, unlink, access, eaccess, stat, lstat, pathconf,
readlink, chflags, lchflags, fchflags, chmod, lchmod, fchmod, chown,
lchown, fchown, utimes, lutimes, futimes, truncate, ftruncate, fsync,
rename, mkdir, rmdir, getdirentries, revoke, lgetfh, getfh, extattrctl,
extattr_set_file, extattr_set_link, extattr_get_file, extattr_get_link,
extattr_delete_file, extattr_delete_link, extattr_list_file, extattr_list_link.
In many cases the pathname and vnode auditing is done within namei lookup
instead of directly in the system call.
Audit the remaining arguments to these system calls:
fstatfs, fchdir, open, mknod, chflags, lchflags, fchflags, chmod, lchmod,
fchmod, chown, lchown, fchown, futimes, ftruncate, fsync, mkdir,
getdirentries.
2006-02-22 16:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <security/audit/audit.h>
|
2006-10-22 11:52:19 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
|
Add pathname and/or vnode argument auditing for the following system calls:
quotactl, statfs, fstatfs, fchdir, chdir, chroot, open, mknod, mkfifo,
link, symlink, undelete, unlink, access, eaccess, stat, lstat, pathconf,
readlink, chflags, lchflags, fchflags, chmod, lchmod, fchmod, chown,
lchown, fchown, utimes, lutimes, futimes, truncate, ftruncate, fsync,
rename, mkdir, rmdir, getdirentries, revoke, lgetfh, getfh, extattrctl,
extattr_set_file, extattr_set_link, extattr_get_file, extattr_get_link,
extattr_delete_file, extattr_delete_link, extattr_list_file, extattr_list_link.
In many cases the pathname and vnode auditing is done within namei lookup
instead of directly in the system call.
Audit the remaining arguments to these system calls:
fstatfs, fchdir, open, mknod, chflags, lchflags, fchflags, chmod, lchmod,
fchmod, chown, lchown, fchown, futimes, ftruncate, fsync, mkdir,
getdirentries.
2006-02-22 16:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <vm/vm.h>
|
1995-12-07 12:48:31 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <vm/vm_object.h>
|
2000-11-18 21:01:04 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <vm/vm_page.h>
|
2002-03-20 04:09:59 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <vm/uma.h>
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-01-08 23:06:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <ufs/ufs/quota.h>
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-08 20:34:13 +00:00
|
|
|
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_FADVISE, "fadvise", "posix_fadvise(2) information");
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-11-05 19:40:36 +00:00
|
|
|
SDT_PROVIDER_DEFINE(vfs);
|
2013-11-26 08:46:27 +00:00
|
|
|
SDT_PROBE_DEFINE2(vfs, , stat, mode, "char *", "int");
|
|
|
|
SDT_PROBE_DEFINE2(vfs, , stat, reg, "char *", "int");
|
2008-11-05 19:40:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-03-21 22:59:01 +00:00
|
|
|
static int kern_chflagsat(struct thread *td, int fd, const char *path,
|
|
|
|
enum uio_seg pathseg, u_long flags, int atflag);
|
2013-03-21 22:44:33 +00:00
|
|
|
static int setfflags(struct thread *td, struct vnode *, u_long);
|
2015-01-23 21:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
static int getutimes(const struct timeval *, enum uio_seg, struct timespec *);
|
|
|
|
static int getutimens(const struct timespec *, enum uio_seg,
|
|
|
|
struct timespec *, int *);
|
2002-03-19 21:25:46 +00:00
|
|
|
static int setutimes(struct thread *td, struct vnode *,
|
2002-07-17 02:03:19 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct timespec *, int, int);
|
2002-03-19 21:25:46 +00:00
|
|
|
static int vn_access(struct vnode *vp, int user_flags, struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
struct thread *td);
|
1997-10-23 09:29:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Sync each mounted filesystem.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1995-10-08 00:06:22 +00:00
|
|
|
struct sync_args {
|
2004-01-11 19:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
int dummy;
|
1995-10-08 00:06:22 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/* ARGSUSED */
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_sync(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct sync_args *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp, *nmp;
|
2012-10-22 17:50:54 +00:00
|
|
|
int save;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Change and clean the mutex lock interface.
mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes:
mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks)
mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized)
similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have:
mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN.
We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks
because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this
makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the
extra `type' argument.
The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea
that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind.
Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the
lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two:
MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH
The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed
to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers:
mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and
mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN
locks, respectively.
Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only
inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code
fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and
actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change
has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks
and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used
(i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce
function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we
inline recursion for this case.
Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using
the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared
if WITNESS is enabled.
Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the
"optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN
and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently
need those.
Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code.
Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&mountlist_mtx);
|
1999-11-20 10:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
for (mp = TAILQ_FIRST(&mountlist); mp != NULL; mp = nmp) {
|
2008-11-02 10:15:42 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vfs_busy(mp, MBF_NOWAIT | MBF_MNTLSTLOCK)) {
|
1999-11-20 10:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
nmp = TAILQ_NEXT(mp, mnt_list);
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((mp->mnt_flag & MNT_RDONLY) == 0 &&
|
|
|
|
vn_start_write(NULL, &mp, V_NOWAIT) == 0) {
|
2012-02-06 11:04:36 +00:00
|
|
|
save = curthread_pflags_set(TDP_SYNCIO);
|
1995-05-21 21:39:31 +00:00
|
|
|
vfs_msync(mp, MNT_NOWAIT);
|
2009-05-11 15:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
VFS_SYNC(mp, MNT_NOWAIT);
|
2012-02-06 11:04:36 +00:00
|
|
|
curthread_pflags_restore(save);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
Change and clean the mutex lock interface.
mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes:
mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks)
mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized)
similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have:
mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN.
We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks
because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this
makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the
extra `type' argument.
The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea
that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind.
Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the
lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two:
MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH
The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed
to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers:
mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and
mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN
locks, respectively.
Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only
inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code
fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and
actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change
has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks
and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used
(i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce
function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we
inline recursion for this case.
Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using
the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared
if WITNESS is enabled.
Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the
"optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN
and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently
need those.
Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code.
Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&mountlist_mtx);
|
1999-11-20 10:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
nmp = TAILQ_NEXT(mp, mnt_list);
|
2008-08-31 14:26:08 +00:00
|
|
|
vfs_unbusy(mp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
Change and clean the mutex lock interface.
mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes:
mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks)
mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized)
similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have:
mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN.
We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks
because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this
makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the
extra `type' argument.
The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea
that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind.
Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the
lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two:
MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH
The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed
to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers:
mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and
mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN
locks, respectively.
Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only
inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code
fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and
actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change
has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks
and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used
(i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce
function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we
inline recursion for this case.
Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using
the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared
if WITNESS is enabled.
Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the
"optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN
and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently
need those.
Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code.
Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
|
|
|
mtx_unlock(&mountlist_mtx);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Change filesystem quotas.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct quotactl_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int cmd;
|
|
|
|
int uid;
|
|
|
|
caddr_t arg;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_quotactl(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct quotactl_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int cmd;
|
|
|
|
int uid;
|
|
|
|
caddr_t arg;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-03-14 08:45:55 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_CMD(uap->cmd);
|
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_UID(uap->uid);
|
2009-05-27 14:11:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!prison_allow(td->td_ucred, PR_ALLOW_QUOTAS))
|
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
2013-01-31 22:20:05 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNODE1, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->path, td);
|
2006-03-21 23:58:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2004-04-26 15:44:42 +00:00
|
|
|
mp = nd.ni_vp->v_mount;
|
2008-12-18 12:01:19 +00:00
|
|
|
vfs_ref(mp);
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_vp);
|
|
|
|
error = vfs_busy(mp, 0);
|
|
|
|
vfs_rel(mp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2007-03-14 08:45:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2009-05-11 15:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VFS_QUOTACTL(mp, uap->cmd, uap->uid, uap->arg);
|
2012-01-08 23:06:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Since quota on operation typically needs to open quota
|
|
|
|
* file, the Q_QUOTAON handler needs to unbusy the mount point
|
|
|
|
* before calling into namei. Otherwise, unmount might be
|
|
|
|
* started between two vfs_busy() invocations (first is our,
|
|
|
|
* second is from mount point cross-walk code in lookup()),
|
|
|
|
* causing deadlock.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Require that Q_QUOTAON handles the vfs_busy() reference on
|
|
|
|
* its own, always returning with ubusied mount point.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((uap->cmd >> SUBCMDSHIFT) != Q_QUOTAON)
|
|
|
|
vfs_unbusy(mp);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-28 20:28:12 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Used by statfs conversion routines to scale the block size up if
|
|
|
|
* necessary so that all of the block counts are <= 'max_size'. Note
|
|
|
|
* that 'max_size' should be a bitmask, i.e. 2^n - 1 for some non-zero
|
|
|
|
* value of 'n'.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
statfs_scale_blocks(struct statfs *sf, long max_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint64_t count;
|
|
|
|
int shift;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(powerof2(max_size + 1), ("%s: invalid max_size", __func__));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Attempt to scale the block counts to give a more accurate
|
|
|
|
* overview to userland of the ratio of free space to used
|
|
|
|
* space. To do this, find the largest block count and compute
|
|
|
|
* a divisor that lets it fit into a signed integer <= max_size.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (sf->f_bavail < 0)
|
|
|
|
count = -sf->f_bavail;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
count = sf->f_bavail;
|
|
|
|
count = MAX(sf->f_blocks, MAX(sf->f_bfree, count));
|
|
|
|
if (count <= max_size)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
count >>= flsl(max_size);
|
|
|
|
shift = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (count > 0) {
|
|
|
|
shift++;
|
|
|
|
count >>=1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sf->f_bsize <<= shift;
|
|
|
|
sf->f_blocks >>= shift;
|
|
|
|
sf->f_bfree >>= shift;
|
|
|
|
sf->f_bavail >>= shift;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get filesystem statistics.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct statfs_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct statfs *buf;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_statfs(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct statfs_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct statfs *buf;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct statfs sf;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = kern_statfs(td, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE, &sf);
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
error = copyout(&sf, uap->buf, sizeof(sf));
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_statfs(struct thread *td, char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg,
|
|
|
|
struct statfs *buf)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
|
|
|
struct statfs *sp, sb;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-31 22:20:05 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKSHARED | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNODE1,
|
|
|
|
pathseg, path, td);
|
2005-05-27 19:15:46 +00:00
|
|
|
error = namei(&nd);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
mp = nd.ni_vp->v_mount;
|
2006-02-23 05:18:07 +00:00
|
|
|
vfs_ref(mp);
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2006-02-23 05:18:07 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_vp);
|
2008-12-18 12:01:19 +00:00
|
|
|
error = vfs_busy(mp, 0);
|
|
|
|
vfs_rel(mp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2008-12-18 12:01:19 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2002-07-31 01:27:33 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_mount_check_stat(td->td_ucred, mp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2006-03-21 23:58:37 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2002-07-31 01:27:33 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set these in case the underlying filesystem fails to do so.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-02-23 05:18:07 +00:00
|
|
|
sp = &mp->mnt_stat;
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
sp->f_version = STATFS_VERSION;
|
|
|
|
sp->f_namemax = NAME_MAX;
|
|
|
|
sp->f_flags = mp->mnt_flag & MNT_VISFLAGMASK;
|
2009-05-11 15:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VFS_STATFS(mp, sp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2006-03-21 23:58:37 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_GENERATION)) {
|
2002-06-28 23:02:38 +00:00
|
|
|
bcopy(sp, &sb, sizeof(sb));
|
1997-03-23 20:08:22 +00:00
|
|
|
sb.f_fsid.val[0] = sb.f_fsid.val[1] = 0;
|
2005-06-09 18:49:19 +00:00
|
|
|
prison_enforce_statfs(td->td_ucred, mp, &sb);
|
1997-03-23 20:08:22 +00:00
|
|
|
sp = &sb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
*buf = *sp;
|
2006-03-21 23:58:37 +00:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2008-12-18 12:01:19 +00:00
|
|
|
vfs_unbusy(mp);
|
2006-03-21 23:58:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get filesystem statistics.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct fstatfs_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
struct statfs *buf;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_fstatfs(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct fstatfs_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
struct statfs *buf;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct statfs sf;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = kern_fstatfs(td, uap->fd, &sf);
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
error = copyout(&sf, uap->buf, sizeof(sf));
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_fstatfs(struct thread *td, int fd, struct statfs *buf)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
struct statfs *sp, sb;
|
2006-02-06 10:15:27 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd);
|
2015-06-16 13:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
error = getvnode(td, fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_FSTATFS), &fp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2006-02-06 10:15:27 +00:00
|
|
|
vp = fp->f_vnode;
|
Use shared vnode locks instead of exclusive vnode locks for the access(),
chdir(), chroot(), eaccess(), fpathconf(), fstat(), fstatfs(), lseek()
(when figuring out the current size of the file in the SEEK_END case),
pathconf(), readlink(), and statfs() system calls.
Submitted by: ups (mostly)
Tested by: pho
MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 20:31:00 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_lock(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
|
2006-02-23 05:18:07 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef AUDIT
|
2009-07-28 21:52:24 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_VNODE1(vp);
|
Add pathname and/or vnode argument auditing for the following system calls:
quotactl, statfs, fstatfs, fchdir, chdir, chroot, open, mknod, mkfifo,
link, symlink, undelete, unlink, access, eaccess, stat, lstat, pathconf,
readlink, chflags, lchflags, fchflags, chmod, lchmod, fchmod, chown,
lchown, fchown, utimes, lutimes, futimes, truncate, ftruncate, fsync,
rename, mkdir, rmdir, getdirentries, revoke, lgetfh, getfh, extattrctl,
extattr_set_file, extattr_set_link, extattr_get_file, extattr_get_link,
extattr_delete_file, extattr_delete_link, extattr_list_file, extattr_list_link.
In many cases the pathname and vnode auditing is done within namei lookup
instead of directly in the system call.
Audit the remaining arguments to these system calls:
fstatfs, fchdir, open, mknod, chflags, lchflags, fchflags, chmod, lchmod,
fchmod, chown, lchown, fchown, futimes, ftruncate, fsync, mkdir,
getdirentries.
2006-02-22 16:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2006-02-22 09:52:25 +00:00
|
|
|
mp = vp->v_mount;
|
2006-02-23 05:18:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mp)
|
|
|
|
vfs_ref(mp);
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
2009-02-05 08:46:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mp == NULL) {
|
2006-03-21 23:58:37 +00:00
|
|
|
error = EBADF;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2006-02-23 05:18:07 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-12-18 12:01:19 +00:00
|
|
|
error = vfs_busy(mp, 0);
|
|
|
|
vfs_rel(mp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2009-02-05 08:46:18 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2002-07-31 01:27:33 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_mount_check_stat(td->td_ucred, mp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2006-03-21 23:58:37 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2002-07-31 01:27:33 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set these in case the underlying filesystem fails to do so.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-02-23 05:18:07 +00:00
|
|
|
sp = &mp->mnt_stat;
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
sp->f_version = STATFS_VERSION;
|
|
|
|
sp->f_namemax = NAME_MAX;
|
|
|
|
sp->f_flags = mp->mnt_flag & MNT_VISFLAGMASK;
|
2009-05-11 15:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VFS_STATFS(mp, sp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2006-03-21 23:58:37 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_GENERATION)) {
|
2002-06-28 23:02:38 +00:00
|
|
|
bcopy(sp, &sb, sizeof(sb));
|
1997-03-23 20:08:22 +00:00
|
|
|
sb.f_fsid.val[0] = sb.f_fsid.val[1] = 0;
|
2005-06-09 18:49:19 +00:00
|
|
|
prison_enforce_statfs(td->td_ucred, mp, &sb);
|
1997-03-23 20:08:22 +00:00
|
|
|
sp = &sb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
*buf = *sp;
|
2006-03-21 23:58:37 +00:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2006-08-02 15:27:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mp)
|
2008-12-18 12:01:19 +00:00
|
|
|
vfs_unbusy(mp);
|
2006-03-21 23:58:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get statistics on all filesystems.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct getfsstat_args {
|
|
|
|
struct statfs *buf;
|
|
|
|
long bufsize;
|
|
|
|
int flags;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_getfsstat(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct getfsstat_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
struct statfs *buf;
|
|
|
|
long bufsize;
|
|
|
|
int flags;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-04-15 09:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t count;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
2005-06-09 17:44:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-20 14:08:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (uap->bufsize < 0 || uap->bufsize > SIZE_MAX)
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
2015-04-15 09:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
error = kern_getfsstat(td, &uap->buf, uap->bufsize, &count,
|
|
|
|
UIO_USERSPACE, uap->flags);
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
td->td_retval[0] = count;
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2005-06-09 17:44:46 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-11 14:58:20 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If (bufsize > 0 && bufseg == UIO_SYSSPACE)
|
2013-03-16 22:37:30 +00:00
|
|
|
* The caller is responsible for freeing memory which will be allocated
|
2005-06-11 14:58:20 +00:00
|
|
|
* in '*buf'.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-09 17:44:46 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2005-06-11 14:58:20 +00:00
|
|
|
kern_getfsstat(struct thread *td, struct statfs **buf, size_t bufsize,
|
2015-04-15 09:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t *countp, enum uio_seg bufseg, int flags)
|
2005-06-09 17:44:46 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp, *nmp;
|
2005-06-09 17:44:46 +00:00
|
|
|
struct statfs *sfsp, *sp, sb;
|
|
|
|
size_t count, maxcount;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-09 17:44:46 +00:00
|
|
|
maxcount = bufsize / sizeof(struct statfs);
|
2005-06-11 14:58:20 +00:00
|
|
|
if (bufsize == 0)
|
|
|
|
sfsp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
else if (bufseg == UIO_USERSPACE)
|
|
|
|
sfsp = *buf;
|
|
|
|
else /* if (bufseg == UIO_SYSSPACE) */ {
|
|
|
|
count = 0;
|
2005-06-12 07:03:23 +00:00
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&mountlist_mtx);
|
2005-06-11 14:58:20 +00:00
|
|
|
TAILQ_FOREACH(mp, &mountlist, mnt_list) {
|
|
|
|
count++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-12 07:03:23 +00:00
|
|
|
mtx_unlock(&mountlist_mtx);
|
2005-06-11 14:58:20 +00:00
|
|
|
if (maxcount > count)
|
|
|
|
maxcount = count;
|
|
|
|
sfsp = *buf = malloc(maxcount * sizeof(struct statfs), M_TEMP,
|
|
|
|
M_WAITOK);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
count = 0;
|
2005-06-12 07:03:23 +00:00
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&mountlist_mtx);
|
1999-11-20 10:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
for (mp = TAILQ_FIRST(&mountlist); mp != NULL; mp = nmp) {
|
2005-06-09 18:49:19 +00:00
|
|
|
if (prison_canseemount(td->td_ucred, mp) != 0) {
|
2004-02-14 18:31:11 +00:00
|
|
|
nmp = TAILQ_NEXT(mp, mnt_list);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-07-31 01:27:33 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mac_mount_check_stat(td->td_ucred, mp) != 0) {
|
2002-07-31 01:27:33 +00:00
|
|
|
nmp = TAILQ_NEXT(mp, mnt_list);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2008-11-02 10:15:42 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vfs_busy(mp, MBF_NOWAIT | MBF_MNTLSTLOCK)) {
|
1999-11-20 10:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
nmp = TAILQ_NEXT(mp, mnt_list);
|
1996-01-16 13:07:14 +00:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (sfsp && count < maxcount) {
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
sp = &mp->mnt_stat;
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set these in case the underlying filesystem
|
|
|
|
* fails to do so.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
sp->f_version = STATFS_VERSION;
|
|
|
|
sp->f_namemax = NAME_MAX;
|
|
|
|
sp->f_flags = mp->mnt_flag & MNT_VISFLAGMASK;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
1998-03-08 09:59:44 +00:00
|
|
|
* If MNT_NOWAIT or MNT_LAZY is specified, do not
|
2016-10-29 12:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
* refresh the fsstat cache.
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-10-29 12:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (flags != MNT_LAZY && flags != MNT_NOWAIT) {
|
|
|
|
error = VFS_STATFS(mp, sp);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&mountlist_mtx);
|
|
|
|
nmp = TAILQ_NEXT(mp, mnt_list);
|
|
|
|
vfs_unbusy(mp);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1996-01-16 13:07:14 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_GENERATION)) {
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
bcopy(sp, &sb, sizeof(sb));
|
|
|
|
sb.f_fsid.val[0] = sb.f_fsid.val[1] = 0;
|
2005-06-09 18:49:19 +00:00
|
|
|
prison_enforce_statfs(td->td_ucred, mp, &sb);
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
sp = &sb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-11 14:58:20 +00:00
|
|
|
if (bufseg == UIO_SYSSPACE)
|
|
|
|
bcopy(sp, sfsp, sizeof(*sp));
|
|
|
|
else /* if (bufseg == UIO_USERSPACE) */ {
|
2005-06-09 17:44:46 +00:00
|
|
|
error = copyout(sp, sfsp, sizeof(*sp));
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
2008-08-31 14:26:08 +00:00
|
|
|
vfs_unbusy(mp);
|
2005-06-09 17:44:46 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-11 14:58:20 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-09 17:44:46 +00:00
|
|
|
sfsp++;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
count++;
|
Change and clean the mutex lock interface.
mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes:
mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks)
mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized)
similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have:
mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN.
We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks
because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this
makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the
extra `type' argument.
The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea
that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind.
Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the
lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two:
MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH
The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed
to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers:
mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and
mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN
locks, respectively.
Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only
inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code
fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and
actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change
has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks
and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used
(i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce
function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we
inline recursion for this case.
Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using
the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared
if WITNESS is enabled.
Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the
"optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN
and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently
need those.
Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code.
Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&mountlist_mtx);
|
1999-11-20 10:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
nmp = TAILQ_NEXT(mp, mnt_list);
|
2008-08-31 14:26:08 +00:00
|
|
|
vfs_unbusy(mp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
Change and clean the mutex lock interface.
mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes:
mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks)
mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized)
similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have:
mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN.
We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks
because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this
makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the
extra `type' argument.
The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea
that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind.
Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the
lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two:
MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH
The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed
to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers:
mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and
mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN
locks, respectively.
Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only
inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code
fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and
actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change
has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks
and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used
(i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce
function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we
inline recursion for this case.
Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using
the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared
if WITNESS is enabled.
Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the
"optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN
and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently
need those.
Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code.
Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
|
|
|
mtx_unlock(&mountlist_mtx);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (sfsp && count > maxcount)
|
2015-04-15 09:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
*countp = maxcount;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
2015-04-15 09:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
*countp = count;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD4
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get old format filesystem statistics.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-05-27 19:23:48 +00:00
|
|
|
static void cvtstatfs(struct statfs *, struct ostatfs *);
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct freebsd4_statfs_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct ostatfs *buf;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
freebsd4_statfs(td, uap)
|
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
|
|
|
struct freebsd4_statfs_args /* {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct ostatfs *buf;
|
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ostatfs osb;
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
struct statfs sf;
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
error = kern_statfs(td, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE, &sf);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2005-05-27 19:23:48 +00:00
|
|
|
cvtstatfs(&sf, &osb);
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
return (copyout(&osb, uap->buf, sizeof(osb)));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get filesystem statistics.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct freebsd4_fstatfs_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
struct ostatfs *buf;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
freebsd4_fstatfs(td, uap)
|
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
|
|
|
struct freebsd4_fstatfs_args /* {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
struct ostatfs *buf;
|
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ostatfs osb;
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
struct statfs sf;
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
error = kern_fstatfs(td, uap->fd, &sf);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2005-05-27 19:23:48 +00:00
|
|
|
cvtstatfs(&sf, &osb);
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
return (copyout(&osb, uap->buf, sizeof(osb)));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get statistics on all filesystems.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct freebsd4_getfsstat_args {
|
|
|
|
struct ostatfs *buf;
|
|
|
|
long bufsize;
|
|
|
|
int flags;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
freebsd4_getfsstat(td, uap)
|
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
|
|
|
register struct freebsd4_getfsstat_args /* {
|
|
|
|
struct ostatfs *buf;
|
|
|
|
long bufsize;
|
|
|
|
int flags;
|
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-09 17:44:46 +00:00
|
|
|
struct statfs *buf, *sp;
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ostatfs osb;
|
2005-06-09 17:44:46 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t count, size;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-20 14:08:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (uap->bufsize < 0)
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
2005-06-09 17:44:46 +00:00
|
|
|
count = uap->bufsize / sizeof(struct ostatfs);
|
2015-11-20 14:08:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (count > SIZE_MAX / sizeof(struct statfs))
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
2005-06-09 17:44:46 +00:00
|
|
|
size = count * sizeof(struct statfs);
|
2015-04-15 09:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
error = kern_getfsstat(td, &buf, size, &count, UIO_SYSSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->flags);
|
2015-11-20 14:08:12 +00:00
|
|
|
td->td_retval[0] = count;
|
|
|
|
if (size != 0) {
|
2005-06-09 17:44:46 +00:00
|
|
|
sp = buf;
|
2015-11-20 14:08:12 +00:00
|
|
|
while (count != 0 && error == 0) {
|
2005-05-27 19:23:48 +00:00
|
|
|
cvtstatfs(sp, &osb);
|
2005-06-09 17:44:46 +00:00
|
|
|
error = copyout(&osb, uap->buf, sizeof(osb));
|
|
|
|
sp++;
|
|
|
|
uap->buf++;
|
|
|
|
count--;
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-09 17:44:46 +00:00
|
|
|
free(buf, M_TEMP);
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-09 17:44:46 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Implement fstatfs() for (NFS) file handles.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct freebsd4_fhstatfs_args {
|
|
|
|
struct fhandle *u_fhp;
|
|
|
|
struct ostatfs *buf;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
freebsd4_fhstatfs(td, uap)
|
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
|
|
|
struct freebsd4_fhstatfs_args /* {
|
|
|
|
struct fhandle *u_fhp;
|
|
|
|
struct ostatfs *buf;
|
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ostatfs osb;
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
struct statfs sf;
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
fhandle_t fh;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-05-27 19:15:46 +00:00
|
|
|
error = copyin(uap->u_fhp, &fh, sizeof(fhandle_t));
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
error = kern_fhstatfs(td, fh, &sf);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2005-05-27 19:23:48 +00:00
|
|
|
cvtstatfs(&sf, &osb);
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
return (copyout(&osb, uap->buf, sizeof(osb)));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Convert a new format statfs structure to an old format statfs structure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2005-05-27 19:23:48 +00:00
|
|
|
cvtstatfs(nsp, osp)
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
struct statfs *nsp;
|
|
|
|
struct ostatfs *osp;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-28 20:28:12 +00:00
|
|
|
statfs_scale_blocks(nsp, LONG_MAX);
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
bzero(osp, sizeof(*osp));
|
2007-08-28 20:28:12 +00:00
|
|
|
osp->f_bsize = nsp->f_bsize;
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
osp->f_iosize = MIN(nsp->f_iosize, LONG_MAX);
|
2007-08-28 20:28:12 +00:00
|
|
|
osp->f_blocks = nsp->f_blocks;
|
|
|
|
osp->f_bfree = nsp->f_bfree;
|
|
|
|
osp->f_bavail = nsp->f_bavail;
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
osp->f_files = MIN(nsp->f_files, LONG_MAX);
|
|
|
|
osp->f_ffree = MIN(nsp->f_ffree, LONG_MAX);
|
|
|
|
osp->f_owner = nsp->f_owner;
|
|
|
|
osp->f_type = nsp->f_type;
|
|
|
|
osp->f_flags = nsp->f_flags;
|
|
|
|
osp->f_syncwrites = MIN(nsp->f_syncwrites, LONG_MAX);
|
|
|
|
osp->f_asyncwrites = MIN(nsp->f_asyncwrites, LONG_MAX);
|
|
|
|
osp->f_syncreads = MIN(nsp->f_syncreads, LONG_MAX);
|
|
|
|
osp->f_asyncreads = MIN(nsp->f_asyncreads, LONG_MAX);
|
2006-03-04 00:09:09 +00:00
|
|
|
strlcpy(osp->f_fstypename, nsp->f_fstypename,
|
|
|
|
MIN(MFSNAMELEN, OMFSNAMELEN));
|
|
|
|
strlcpy(osp->f_mntonname, nsp->f_mntonname,
|
2006-03-03 07:20:54 +00:00
|
|
|
MIN(MNAMELEN, OMNAMELEN));
|
2006-03-04 00:09:09 +00:00
|
|
|
strlcpy(osp->f_mntfromname, nsp->f_mntfromname,
|
2006-03-03 07:20:54 +00:00
|
|
|
MIN(MNAMELEN, OMNAMELEN));
|
2005-05-22 21:52:30 +00:00
|
|
|
osp->f_fsid = nsp->f_fsid;
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* COMPAT_FREEBSD4 */
|
|
|
|
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Change current working directory to a given file descriptor.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct fchdir_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_fchdir(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
struct fchdir_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int fd;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-07-11 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, *tdp;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_FD(uap->fd);
|
2015-06-16 13:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
error = getvnode(td, uap->fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_FCHDIR),
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
&fp);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2003-06-22 08:41:43 +00:00
|
|
|
vp = fp->f_vnode;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
VREF(vp);
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
2009-01-23 22:13:30 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_lock(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
|
2009-07-28 21:52:24 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_VNODE1(vp);
|
2006-07-19 18:30:33 +00:00
|
|
|
error = change_dir(vp, td);
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
while (!error && (mp = vp->v_mountedhere) != NULL) {
|
2008-11-02 10:15:42 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vfs_busy(mp, 0))
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2009-05-11 15:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VFS_ROOT(mp, LK_SHARED, &tdp);
|
2008-08-31 14:26:08 +00:00
|
|
|
vfs_unbusy(mp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
|
|
|
vp = tdp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
2015-07-11 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
pwd_chdir(td, vp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Change current working directory (``.'').
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct chdir_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_chdir(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
struct chdir_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_chdir(td, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_chdir(struct thread *td, char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-10-22 17:50:54 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKSHARED | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNODE1,
|
|
|
|
pathseg, path, td);
|
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
if ((error = change_dir(nd.ni_vp, td)) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_vp);
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(nd.ni_vp, 0);
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2015-07-11 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
pwd_chdir(td, nd.ni_vp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Change notion of root (``/'') directory.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct chroot_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_chroot(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
struct chroot_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-06-12 00:12:01 +00:00
|
|
|
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_CHROOT);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2013-01-31 22:20:05 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKSHARED | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNODE1,
|
|
|
|
UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
|
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
|
|
|
error = namei(&nd);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2002-07-13 04:07:12 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
error = change_dir(nd.ni_vp, td);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
|
|
|
goto e_vunlock;
|
2002-08-01 03:50:08 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_chroot(td->td_ucred, nd.ni_vp);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
|
|
|
goto e_vunlock;
|
2002-08-01 03:50:08 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(nd.ni_vp, 0);
|
2015-07-11 16:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
error = pwd_chroot(td, nd.ni_vp);
|
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
|
2002-07-13 04:07:12 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
e_vunlock:
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_vp);
|
2002-07-13 04:07:12 +00:00
|
|
|
error:
|
2003-01-31 18:57:04 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2002-07-13 04:07:12 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
|
|
|
* Common routine for chroot and chdir. Callers must provide a locked vnode
|
|
|
|
* instance.
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
change_dir(vp, td)
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
|
|
|
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "change_dir(): vp not locked");
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vp->v_type != VDIR)
|
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
|
|
|
return (ENOTDIR);
|
2002-08-01 03:50:08 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_chdir(td->td_ucred, vp);
|
2013-09-05 09:36:19 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2003-04-09 02:55:18 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
return (VOP_ACCESS(vp, VEXEC, td->td_ucred, td));
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
static __inline void
|
|
|
|
flags_to_rights(int flags, cap_rights_t *rightsp)
|
2011-08-13 09:21:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
2012-09-25 20:48:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (flags & O_EXEC) {
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_set(rightsp, CAP_FEXECVE);
|
2012-09-25 20:48:49 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
switch ((flags & O_ACCMODE)) {
|
|
|
|
case O_RDONLY:
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_set(rightsp, CAP_READ);
|
2012-09-25 20:48:49 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case O_RDWR:
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_set(rightsp, CAP_READ);
|
2012-09-25 20:48:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/* FALLTHROUGH */
|
|
|
|
case O_WRONLY:
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_set(rightsp, CAP_WRITE);
|
2013-03-16 23:19:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(flags & (O_APPEND | O_TRUNC)))
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_set(rightsp, CAP_SEEK);
|
2012-09-25 20:48:49 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-08-13 09:21:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (flags & O_CREAT)
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_set(rightsp, CAP_CREATE);
|
2011-08-13 09:21:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (flags & O_TRUNC)
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_set(rightsp, CAP_FTRUNCATE);
|
2011-08-13 09:21:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-17 11:53:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (flags & (O_SYNC | O_FSYNC))
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_set(rightsp, CAP_FSYNC);
|
2013-02-17 11:53:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (flags & (O_EXLOCK | O_SHLOCK))
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_set(rightsp, CAP_FLOCK);
|
2011-08-13 09:21:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2007-03-05 13:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
* Check permissions, allocate an open file structure, and call the device
|
|
|
|
* open routine if any.
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct open_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int flags;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_open(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct open_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int flags;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_openat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->flags, uap->mode));
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct openat_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int flag;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_openat(struct thread *td, struct openat_args *uap)
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-10 09:50:21 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_FD(uap->fd);
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_openat(td, uap->fd, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->flag,
|
|
|
|
uap->mode));
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_openat(struct thread *td, int fd, char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg,
|
|
|
|
int flags, int mode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
|
2000-07-04 03:34:11 +00:00
|
|
|
struct filedesc *fdp = p->p_fd;
|
|
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int cmode, error, indx;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
indx = -1;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_FFLAGS(flags);
|
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_MODE(mode);
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP);
|
|
|
|
flags_to_rights(flags, &rights);
|
2008-03-31 11:57:18 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2010-03-11 13:16:06 +00:00
|
|
|
* Only one of the O_EXEC, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY and O_RDWR flags
|
|
|
|
* may be specified.
|
2008-03-31 11:57:18 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (flags & O_EXEC) {
|
|
|
|
if (flags & O_ACCMODE)
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
2012-06-13 21:11:58 +00:00
|
|
|
} else if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_ACCMODE) {
|
1997-10-22 07:28:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
2012-06-13 21:13:18 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2008-03-31 11:57:18 +00:00
|
|
|
flags = FFLAGS(flags);
|
2012-06-13 21:11:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-03-31 11:57:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-08-11 12:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2016-02-07 01:04:47 +00:00
|
|
|
* Allocate a file structure. The descriptor to reference it
|
|
|
|
* is allocated and set by finstall() below.
|
2011-08-11 12:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-06-13 21:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
error = falloc_noinstall(td, &fp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2012-06-13 21:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* An extra reference on `fp' has been held for us by
|
|
|
|
* falloc_noinstall().
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-12-30 01:42:15 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Set the flags early so the finit in devfs can pick them up. */
|
|
|
|
fp->f_flag = flags & FMASK;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
cmode = ((mode & ~fdp->fd_cmask) & ALLPERMS) & ~S_ISTXT;
|
2013-01-31 22:20:05 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | AUDITVNODE1, pathseg, path, fd,
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
&rights, td);
|
2003-08-07 17:08:26 +00:00
|
|
|
td->td_dupfd = -1; /* XXX check for fdopen */
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
error = vn_open(&nd, &flags, cmode, fp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
2003-07-27 20:09:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the vn_open replaced the method vector, something
|
|
|
|
* wonderous happened deep below and we just pass it up
|
|
|
|
* pretending we know what we do.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2011-08-13 09:21:16 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == ENXIO && fp->f_ops != &badfileops)
|
|
|
|
goto success;
|
2003-07-27 20:09:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2000-11-18 21:01:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2012-06-13 21:32:35 +00:00
|
|
|
* Handle special fdopen() case. bleh.
|
2011-08-13 09:21:16 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Don't do this for relative (capability) lookups; we don't
|
|
|
|
* understand exactly what would happen, and we don't think
|
|
|
|
* that it ever should.
|
2000-11-18 21:01:04 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-06-13 21:11:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (nd.ni_strictrelative == 0 &&
|
2011-08-13 09:21:16 +00:00
|
|
|
(error == ENODEV || error == ENXIO) &&
|
2012-06-13 21:11:58 +00:00
|
|
|
td->td_dupfd >= 0) {
|
2012-06-13 21:32:35 +00:00
|
|
|
error = dupfdopen(td, fdp, td->td_dupfd, flags, error,
|
|
|
|
&indx);
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
2011-08-11 12:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
goto success;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-06-13 21:32:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-31 22:15:41 +00:00
|
|
|
goto bad;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
td->td_dupfd = 0;
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
vp = nd.ni_vp;
|
1996-12-19 19:42:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-04-13 08:45:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Store the vnode, for any f_type. Typically, the vnode use
|
|
|
|
* count is decremented by direct call to vn_closefile() for
|
|
|
|
* files that switched type in the cdevsw fdopen() method.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
fp->f_vnode = vp;
|
2007-12-30 01:42:15 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the file wasn't claimed by devfs bind it to the normal
|
|
|
|
* vnode operations here.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (fp->f_ops == &badfileops) {
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(vp->v_type != VFIFO, ("Unexpected fifo."));
|
|
|
|
fp->f_seqcount = 1;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
finit(fp, (flags & FMASK) | (fp->f_flag & FHASLOCK),
|
|
|
|
DTYPE_VNODE, vp, &vnops);
|
2007-12-30 01:42:15 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-06-19 04:10:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
2000-07-04 03:34:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (flags & O_TRUNC) {
|
2010-04-13 08:52:20 +00:00
|
|
|
error = fo_truncate(fp, 0, td->td_ucred, td);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2000-07-04 03:34:11 +00:00
|
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-08-11 12:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
success:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we haven't already installed the FD (for dupfdopen), do so now.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2011-08-13 09:21:16 +00:00
|
|
|
if (indx == -1) {
|
Merge Capsicum overhaul:
- Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor
has set of its own capability rights.
- The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and
should not be used in new code.
- The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of
cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor
without creating a new one.
- The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2).
- If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed
ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed
ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall.
- If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls
that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive
them with cap_fcntls_get(2).
- To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was
heavly modified.
- The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to
recognize new syscalls.
- Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide
backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes
that are described in detail below:
CAP_CREATE old behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
- Allow for linkat(2).
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
CAP_CREATE new behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
Added CAP_LINKAT:
- Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit.
- Allow to be target for renameat(2).
Added CAP_SYMLINKAT:
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object.
- Allow to be source for renameat(2).
Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory.
Added CAP_RENAMEAT:
- Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall.
Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR):
- Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object.
- Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this
call.
Removed CAP_MAPEXEC.
CAP_MMAP old behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and
PROT_WRITE.
CAP_MMAP new behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE.
Added CAP_MMAP_R:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ).
Added CAP_MMAP_W:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_X:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RW:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_RX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_WX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RWX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT.
Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT.
Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT.
CAP_READ old behaviour:
- Allow pread(2).
- Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_READ new behaviour:
- Allow read(2), readv(2).
- Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
CAP_WRITE old behaviour:
- Allow pwrite(2).
- Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_WRITE new behaviour:
- Allow write(2), writev(2).
- Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
Added convinient defines:
#define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL)
#define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W)
#define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_RECV CAP_READ
#define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE
#define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \
(CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \
CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
#define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \
(CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \
CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \
CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
Added defines for backward API compatibility:
#define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X
#define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT
#define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT
#define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT
#define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de>
Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan
ABI compatibility discussed with: kib
2013-03-02 00:53:12 +00:00
|
|
|
struct filecaps *fcaps;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-08-13 09:21:16 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CAPABILITIES
|
Merge Capsicum overhaul:
- Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor
has set of its own capability rights.
- The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and
should not be used in new code.
- The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of
cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor
without creating a new one.
- The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2).
- If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed
ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed
ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall.
- If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls
that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive
them with cap_fcntls_get(2).
- To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was
heavly modified.
- The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to
recognize new syscalls.
- Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide
backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes
that are described in detail below:
CAP_CREATE old behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
- Allow for linkat(2).
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
CAP_CREATE new behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
Added CAP_LINKAT:
- Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit.
- Allow to be target for renameat(2).
Added CAP_SYMLINKAT:
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object.
- Allow to be source for renameat(2).
Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory.
Added CAP_RENAMEAT:
- Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall.
Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR):
- Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object.
- Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this
call.
Removed CAP_MAPEXEC.
CAP_MMAP old behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and
PROT_WRITE.
CAP_MMAP new behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE.
Added CAP_MMAP_R:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ).
Added CAP_MMAP_W:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_X:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RW:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_RX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_WX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RWX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT.
Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT.
Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT.
CAP_READ old behaviour:
- Allow pread(2).
- Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_READ new behaviour:
- Allow read(2), readv(2).
- Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
CAP_WRITE old behaviour:
- Allow pwrite(2).
- Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_WRITE new behaviour:
- Allow write(2), writev(2).
- Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
Added convinient defines:
#define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL)
#define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W)
#define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_RECV CAP_READ
#define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE
#define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \
(CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \
CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
#define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \
(CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \
CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \
CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
Added defines for backward API compatibility:
#define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X
#define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT
#define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT
#define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT
#define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de>
Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan
ABI compatibility discussed with: kib
2013-03-02 00:53:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (nd.ni_strictrelative == 1)
|
|
|
|
fcaps = &nd.ni_filecaps;
|
|
|
|
else
|
2011-08-13 09:21:16 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
Merge Capsicum overhaul:
- Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor
has set of its own capability rights.
- The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and
should not be used in new code.
- The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of
cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor
without creating a new one.
- The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2).
- If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed
ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed
ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall.
- If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls
that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive
them with cap_fcntls_get(2).
- To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was
heavly modified.
- The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to
recognize new syscalls.
- Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide
backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes
that are described in detail below:
CAP_CREATE old behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
- Allow for linkat(2).
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
CAP_CREATE new behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
Added CAP_LINKAT:
- Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit.
- Allow to be target for renameat(2).
Added CAP_SYMLINKAT:
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object.
- Allow to be source for renameat(2).
Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory.
Added CAP_RENAMEAT:
- Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall.
Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR):
- Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object.
- Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this
call.
Removed CAP_MAPEXEC.
CAP_MMAP old behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and
PROT_WRITE.
CAP_MMAP new behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE.
Added CAP_MMAP_R:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ).
Added CAP_MMAP_W:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_X:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RW:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_RX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_WX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RWX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT.
Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT.
Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT.
CAP_READ old behaviour:
- Allow pread(2).
- Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_READ new behaviour:
- Allow read(2), readv(2).
- Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
CAP_WRITE old behaviour:
- Allow pwrite(2).
- Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_WRITE new behaviour:
- Allow write(2), writev(2).
- Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
Added convinient defines:
#define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL)
#define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W)
#define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_RECV CAP_READ
#define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE
#define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \
(CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \
CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
#define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \
(CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \
CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \
CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
Added defines for backward API compatibility:
#define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X
#define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT
#define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT
#define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT
#define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de>
Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan
ABI compatibility discussed with: kib
2013-03-02 00:53:12 +00:00
|
|
|
fcaps = NULL;
|
|
|
|
error = finstall(td, fp, &indx, flags, fcaps);
|
|
|
|
/* On success finstall() consumes fcaps. */
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
|
|
filecaps_free(&nd.ni_filecaps);
|
|
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
filecaps_free(&nd.ni_filecaps);
|
2011-08-13 09:21:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-08-11 12:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2000-11-18 21:01:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Release our private reference, leaving the one associated with
|
|
|
|
* the descriptor table intact.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
|
|
|
td->td_retval[0] = indx;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
2000-07-04 03:34:11 +00:00
|
|
|
bad:
|
2012-06-13 21:38:07 +00:00
|
|
|
KASSERT(indx == -1, ("indx=%d, should be -1", indx));
|
2002-10-07 20:49:22 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
2000-07-04 03:34:11 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef COMPAT_43
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Create a file.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ocreat_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
ocreat(td, uap)
|
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct ocreat_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_openat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
2004-03-16 10:46:42 +00:00
|
|
|
O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, uap->mode));
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* COMPAT_43 */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Create a special file.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mknod_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
|
|
|
int dev;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_mknod(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct mknod_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
|
|
|
int dev;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_mknodat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->mode, uap->dev));
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct mknodat_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
mode_t mode;
|
|
|
|
dev_t dev;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_mknodat(struct thread *td, struct mknodat_args *uap)
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_mknodat(td, uap->fd, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->mode,
|
|
|
|
uap->dev));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_mknodat(struct thread *td, int fd, char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg,
|
|
|
|
int mode, int dev)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vattr vattr;
|
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int error, whiteout = 0;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_MODE(mode);
|
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_DEV(dev);
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
|
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
|
|
|
case S_IFCHR:
|
|
|
|
case S_IFBLK:
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_MKNOD_DEV);
|
2016-07-15 09:23:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0 && dev == VNOVAL)
|
|
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case S_IFMT:
|
|
|
|
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_MKNOD_BAD);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case S_IFWHT:
|
|
|
|
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_MKNOD_WHT);
|
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2008-06-22 21:51:32 +00:00
|
|
|
case S_IFIFO:
|
|
|
|
if (dev == 0)
|
|
|
|
return (kern_mkfifoat(td, fd, path, pathseg, mode));
|
|
|
|
/* FALLTHROUGH */
|
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
restart:
|
2000-01-10 00:08:53 +00:00
|
|
|
bwillwrite();
|
2014-12-18 10:01:12 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&nd, CREATE, LOCKPARENT | SAVENAME | AUDITVNODE1 |
|
|
|
|
NOCACHE, pathseg, path, fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_MKNODAT),
|
|
|
|
td);
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
vp = nd.ni_vp;
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vp != NULL) {
|
2003-08-05 00:26:51 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
|
|
if (vp == nd.ni_dvp)
|
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
2006-02-01 00:25:26 +00:00
|
|
|
vrele(vp);
|
2003-08-05 00:26:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EEXIST);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
vattr.va_mode = (mode & ALLPERMS) &
|
|
|
|
~td->td_proc->p_fd->fd_cmask;
|
|
|
|
vattr.va_rdev = dev;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
whiteout = 0;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
case S_IFMT: /* used by badsect to flag bad sectors */
|
|
|
|
vattr.va_type = VBAD;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case S_IFCHR:
|
|
|
|
vattr.va_type = VCHR;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case S_IFBLK:
|
|
|
|
vattr.va_type = VBLK;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
case S_IFWHT:
|
|
|
|
whiteout = 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
panic("kern_mknod: invalid mode");
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vn_start_write(nd.ni_dvp, &mp, V_NOWAIT) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
if ((error = vn_start_write(NULL, &mp, V_XSLEEP | PCATCH)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
goto restart;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0 && !whiteout)
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_create(td->td_ucred, nd.ni_dvp,
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
&nd.ni_cnd, &vattr);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (whiteout)
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_WHITEOUT(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd, CREATE);
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
else {
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_MKNOD(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_vp,
|
|
|
|
&nd.ni_cnd, &vattr);
|
1999-11-13 14:35:50 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_vp);
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
* Create a named pipe.
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mkfifo_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_mkfifo(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct mkfifo_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_mkfifoat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->mode));
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct mkfifoat_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
mode_t mode;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_mkfifoat(struct thread *td, struct mkfifoat_args *uap)
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_mkfifoat(td, uap->fd, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->mode));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_mkfifoat(struct thread *td, int fd, char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg,
|
|
|
|
int mode)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vattr vattr;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_MODE(mode);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
restart:
|
2000-01-10 00:08:53 +00:00
|
|
|
bwillwrite();
|
2014-12-18 10:01:12 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&nd, CREATE, LOCKPARENT | SAVENAME | AUDITVNODE1 |
|
|
|
|
NOCACHE, pathseg, path, fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_MKFIFOAT),
|
|
|
|
td);
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
if (nd.ni_vp != NULL) {
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2003-08-05 00:26:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (nd.ni_vp == nd.ni_dvp)
|
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
2006-02-01 00:25:26 +00:00
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EEXIST);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vn_start_write(nd.ni_dvp, &mp, V_NOWAIT) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
if ((error = vn_start_write(NULL, &mp, V_XSLEEP | PCATCH)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
goto restart;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
|
|
|
|
vattr.va_type = VFIFO;
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
vattr.va_mode = (mode & ALLPERMS) & ~td->td_proc->p_fd->fd_cmask;
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_create(td->td_ucred, nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd,
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
&vattr);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-05-07 04:58:58 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_MKNOD(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_vp, &nd.ni_cnd, &vattr);
|
1999-11-13 14:35:50 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_vp);
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-05-07 04:58:58 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
2005-01-24 10:25:44 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
1998-05-07 04:58:58 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Make a hard file link.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct link_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
char *link;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_link(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct link_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
char *link;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_linkat(td, AT_FDCWD, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, uap->link,
|
|
|
|
UIO_USERSPACE, FOLLOW));
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct linkat_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd1;
|
|
|
|
char *path1;
|
|
|
|
int fd2;
|
|
|
|
char *path2;
|
|
|
|
int flag;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_linkat(struct thread *td, struct linkat_args *uap)
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int flag;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
flag = uap->flag;
|
|
|
|
if (flag & ~AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW)
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_linkat(td, uap->fd1, uap->fd2, uap->path1, uap->path2,
|
|
|
|
UIO_USERSPACE, (flag & AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW) ? FOLLOW : NOFOLLOW));
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-06-13 13:09:20 +00:00
|
|
|
int hardlink_check_uid = 0;
|
2004-03-08 20:37:25 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, hardlink_check_uid, CTLFLAG_RW,
|
|
|
|
&hardlink_check_uid, 0,
|
|
|
|
"Unprivileged processes cannot create hard links to files owned by other "
|
|
|
|
"users");
|
|
|
|
static int hardlink_check_gid = 0;
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, hardlink_check_gid, CTLFLAG_RW,
|
|
|
|
&hardlink_check_gid, 0,
|
|
|
|
"Unprivileged processes cannot create hard links to files owned by other "
|
|
|
|
"groups");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2008-08-28 15:23:18 +00:00
|
|
|
can_hardlink(struct vnode *vp, struct ucred *cred)
|
2004-03-08 20:37:25 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct vattr va;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!hardlink_check_uid && !hardlink_check_gid)
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
2008-08-28 15:23:18 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &va, cred);
|
2004-03-08 20:37:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (hardlink_check_uid && cred->cr_uid != va.va_uid) {
|
2007-06-12 00:12:01 +00:00
|
|
|
error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LINK, 0);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2004-03-08 20:37:25 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (hardlink_check_gid && !groupmember(va.va_gid, cred)) {
|
2007-06-12 00:12:01 +00:00
|
|
|
error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LINK, 0);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2004-03-08 20:37:25 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_linkat(struct thread *td, int fd1, int fd2, char *path1, char *path2,
|
|
|
|
enum uio_seg segflg, int follow)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-25 20:42:25 +00:00
|
|
|
again:
|
2000-01-10 00:08:53 +00:00
|
|
|
bwillwrite();
|
2015-08-27 15:16:41 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&nd, LOOKUP, follow | AUDITVNODE1, segflg, path1, fd1,
|
|
|
|
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LINKAT_SOURCE), td);
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
vp = nd.ni_vp;
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vp->v_type == VDIR) {
|
|
|
|
vrele(vp);
|
|
|
|
return (EPERM); /* POSIX */
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-08-27 15:16:41 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&nd, CREATE,
|
|
|
|
LOCKPARENT | SAVENAME | AUDITVNODE2 | NOCACHE, segflg, path2, fd2,
|
|
|
|
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LINKAT_TARGET), td);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (nd.ni_vp != NULL) {
|
2014-09-25 20:42:25 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2003-08-05 00:26:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (nd.ni_dvp == nd.ni_vp)
|
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
2006-02-01 00:25:26 +00:00
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
|
2014-09-25 20:42:25 +00:00
|
|
|
vrele(vp);
|
|
|
|
return (EEXIST);
|
|
|
|
} else if (nd.ni_dvp->v_mount != vp->v_mount) {
|
2014-07-16 14:04:46 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-09-25 20:42:25 +00:00
|
|
|
* Cross-device link. No need to recheck
|
|
|
|
* vp->v_type, since it cannot change, except
|
|
|
|
* to VBAD.
|
2014-07-16 14:04:46 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-09-25 20:42:25 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
vrele(vp);
|
|
|
|
return (EXDEV);
|
|
|
|
} else if ((error = vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE)) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
error = can_hardlink(vp, td->td_ucred);
|
2002-10-05 18:11:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2014-09-25 20:42:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_link(td->td_ucred,
|
2004-03-08 20:37:25 +00:00
|
|
|
nd.ni_dvp, vp, &nd.ni_cnd);
|
2002-10-05 18:11:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2014-09-25 20:42:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_NOWAIT);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
|
|
error = vn_start_write(NULL, &mp,
|
|
|
|
V_XSLEEP | PCATCH);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = VOP_LINK(nd.ni_dvp, vp, &nd.ni_cnd);
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
2003-08-05 00:26:51 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
2014-09-25 20:42:25 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2014-07-14 08:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
|
|
vrele(vp);
|
|
|
|
goto again;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vrele(vp);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Make a symbolic link.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct symlink_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
char *link;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_symlink(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct symlink_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
char *link;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_symlinkat(td, uap->path, AT_FDCWD, uap->link,
|
|
|
|
UIO_USERSPACE));
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct symlinkat_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
char *path2;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_symlinkat(struct thread *td, struct symlinkat_args *uap)
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_symlinkat(td, uap->path1, uap->fd, uap->path2,
|
|
|
|
UIO_USERSPACE));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_symlinkat(struct thread *td, char *path1, int fd, char *path2,
|
|
|
|
enum uio_seg segflg)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vattr vattr;
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
char *syspath;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (segflg == UIO_SYSSPACE) {
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
syspath = path1;
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2003-02-19 05:47:46 +00:00
|
|
|
syspath = uma_zalloc(namei_zone, M_WAITOK);
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = copyinstr(path1, syspath, MAXPATHLEN, NULL)) != 0)
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_TEXT(syspath);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
restart:
|
2000-01-10 00:08:53 +00:00
|
|
|
bwillwrite();
|
2014-12-18 10:01:12 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&nd, CREATE, LOCKPARENT | SAVENAME | AUDITVNODE1 |
|
|
|
|
NOCACHE, segflg, path2, fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_SYMLINKAT),
|
|
|
|
td);
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
if (nd.ni_vp) {
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2003-08-05 00:26:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (nd.ni_vp == nd.ni_dvp)
|
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
2006-02-01 00:25:26 +00:00
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
error = EEXIST;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vn_start_write(nd.ni_dvp, &mp, V_NOWAIT) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
if ((error = vn_start_write(NULL, &mp, V_XSLEEP | PCATCH)) != 0)
|
2004-05-11 10:42:02 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
goto restart;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
vattr.va_mode = ACCESSPERMS &~ td->td_proc->p_fd->fd_cmask;
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
|
|
vattr.va_type = VLNK;
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_create(td->td_ucred, nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd,
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
&vattr);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out2;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_SYMLINK(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_vp, &nd.ni_cnd, &vattr, syspath);
|
1999-11-13 20:58:17 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_vp);
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
|
|
out2:
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
1998-05-07 04:58:58 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (segflg != UIO_SYSSPACE)
|
|
|
|
uma_zfree(namei_zone, syspath);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Delete a whiteout from the filesystem.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_undelete(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct undelete_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
restart:
|
2000-01-10 00:08:53 +00:00
|
|
|
bwillwrite();
|
2012-10-22 17:50:54 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT(&nd, DELETE, LOCKPARENT | DOWHITEOUT | AUDITVNODE1,
|
Add pathname and/or vnode argument auditing for the following system calls:
quotactl, statfs, fstatfs, fchdir, chdir, chroot, open, mknod, mkfifo,
link, symlink, undelete, unlink, access, eaccess, stat, lstat, pathconf,
readlink, chflags, lchflags, fchflags, chmod, lchmod, fchmod, chown,
lchown, fchown, utimes, lutimes, futimes, truncate, ftruncate, fsync,
rename, mkdir, rmdir, getdirentries, revoke, lgetfh, getfh, extattrctl,
extattr_set_file, extattr_set_link, extattr_get_file, extattr_get_link,
extattr_delete_file, extattr_delete_link, extattr_list_file, extattr_list_link.
In many cases the pathname and vnode auditing is done within namei lookup
instead of directly in the system call.
Audit the remaining arguments to these system calls:
fstatfs, fchdir, open, mknod, chflags, lchflags, fchflags, chmod, lchmod,
fchmod, chown, lchown, fchown, futimes, ftruncate, fsync, mkdir,
getdirentries.
2006-02-22 16:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
error = namei(&nd);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (nd.ni_vp != NULLVP || !(nd.ni_cnd.cn_flags & ISWHITEOUT)) {
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2003-08-05 00:26:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (nd.ni_vp == nd.ni_dvp)
|
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
2006-02-01 00:25:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (nd.ni_vp)
|
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EEXIST);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vn_start_write(nd.ni_dvp, &mp, V_NOWAIT) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
if ((error = vn_start_write(NULL, &mp, V_XSLEEP | PCATCH)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
goto restart;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_WHITEOUT(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd, DELETE);
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Delete a name from the filesystem.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct unlink_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_unlink(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
struct unlink_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_unlinkat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE, 0));
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct unlinkat_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int flag;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_unlinkat(struct thread *td, struct unlinkat_args *uap)
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int flag = uap->flag;
|
|
|
|
int fd = uap->fd;
|
|
|
|
char *path = uap->path;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (flag & ~AT_REMOVEDIR)
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (flag & AT_REMOVEDIR)
|
|
|
|
return (kern_rmdirat(td, fd, path, UIO_USERSPACE));
|
|
|
|
else
|
2010-01-11 20:44:05 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_unlinkat(td, fd, path, UIO_USERSPACE, 0));
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2010-01-11 20:44:05 +00:00
|
|
|
kern_unlinkat(struct thread *td, int fd, char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg,
|
|
|
|
ino_t oldinum)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
2010-01-11 20:44:05 +00:00
|
|
|
struct stat sb;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
restart:
|
2000-01-10 00:08:53 +00:00
|
|
|
bwillwrite();
|
2013-01-31 22:20:05 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&nd, DELETE, LOCKPARENT | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNODE1,
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
pathseg, path, fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_UNLINKAT), td);
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
2006-01-22 19:37:02 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error == EINVAL ? EPERM : error);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
vp = nd.ni_vp;
|
2010-01-11 20:44:05 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vp->v_type == VDIR && oldinum == 0) {
|
1996-05-24 16:19:23 +00:00
|
|
|
error = EPERM; /* POSIX */
|
2010-01-11 20:44:05 +00:00
|
|
|
} else if (oldinum != 0 &&
|
|
|
|
((error = vn_stat(vp, &sb, td->td_ucred, NOCRED, td)) == 0) &&
|
|
|
|
sb.st_ino != oldinum) {
|
|
|
|
error = EIDRM; /* Identifier removed */
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The root of a mounted filesystem cannot be deleted.
|
1996-05-24 16:19:23 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* XXX: can this only be a VDIR case?
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-08-04 10:29:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vp->v_vflag & VV_ROOT)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
error = EBUSY;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-08-21 03:55:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (vn_start_write(nd.ni_dvp, &mp, V_NOWAIT) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2006-02-01 00:25:26 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
2002-08-21 03:55:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vp == nd.ni_dvp)
|
|
|
|
vrele(vp);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
|
|
|
if ((error = vn_start_write(NULL, &mp,
|
|
|
|
V_XSLEEP | PCATCH)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
goto restart;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_unlink(td->td_ucred, nd.ni_dvp, vp,
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
&nd.ni_cnd);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2013-05-11 11:17:44 +00:00
|
|
|
vfs_notify_upper(vp, VFS_NOTIFY_UPPER_UNLINK);
|
Make our v_usecount vnode reference count work identically to the
original BSD code. The association between the vnode and the vm_object
no longer includes reference counts. The major difference is that
vm_object's are no longer freed gratuitiously from the vnode, and so
once an object is created for the vnode, it will last as long as the
vnode does.
When a vnode object reference count is incremented, then the underlying
vnode reference count is incremented also. The two "objects" are now
more intimately related, and so the interactions are now much less
complex.
When vnodes are now normally placed onto the free queue with an object still
attached. The rundown of the object happens at vnode rundown time, and
happens with exactly the same filesystem semantics of the original VFS
code. There is absolutely no need for vnode_pager_uncache and other
travesties like that anymore.
A side-effect of these changes is that SMP locking should be much simpler,
the I/O copyin/copyout optimizations work, NFS should be more ponderable,
and further work on layered filesystems should be less frustrating, because
of the totally coherent management of the vnode objects and vnodes.
Please be careful with your system while running this code, but I would
greatly appreciate feedback as soon a reasonably possible.
1998-01-06 05:26:17 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_REMOVE(nd.ni_dvp, vp, &nd.ni_cnd);
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2002-08-21 03:55:35 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2006-02-01 00:25:26 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
2002-08-21 03:55:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vp == nd.ni_dvp)
|
|
|
|
vrele(vp);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Reposition read/write file offset.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct lseek_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
int pad;
|
|
|
|
off_t offset;
|
|
|
|
int whence;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_lseek(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct lseek_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
int pad;
|
|
|
|
off_t offset;
|
|
|
|
int whence;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2002-01-14 00:13:45 +00:00
|
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
2013-08-21 17:36:01 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-07-01 15:37:23 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_FD(uap->fd);
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
error = fget(td, uap->fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_SEEK), &fp);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2002-01-14 00:13:45 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2013-08-21 17:36:01 +00:00
|
|
|
error = (fp->f_ops->fo_flags & DFLAG_SEEKABLE) != 0 ?
|
|
|
|
fo_seek(fp, uap->offset, uap->whence, td) : ESPIPE;
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
2005-01-24 10:25:44 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-06-11 11:16:26 +00:00
|
|
|
#if defined(COMPAT_43)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Reposition read/write file offset.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct olseek_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
long offset;
|
|
|
|
int whence;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
olseek(td, uap)
|
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct olseek_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
long offset;
|
|
|
|
int whence;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
struct lseek_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
int pad;
|
|
|
|
off_t offset;
|
|
|
|
int whence;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ nuap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-12-14 01:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
nuap.fd = uap->fd;
|
|
|
|
nuap.offset = uap->offset;
|
|
|
|
nuap.whence = uap->whence;
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (sys_lseek(td, &nuap));
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* COMPAT_43 */
|
|
|
|
|
The lseek(2), mmap(2), truncate(2), ftruncate(2), pread(2), and
pwrite(2) syscalls are wrapped to provide compatibility with pre-7.x
kernels which required padding before the off_t parameter. The
fcntl(2) contains compatibility code to handle kernels before the
struct flock was changed during the 8.x CURRENT development. The
shims were reasonable to allow easier revert to the older kernel at
that time.
Now, two or three major releases later, shims do not serve any
purpose. Such old kernels cannot handle current libc, so revert the
compatibility code.
Make padded syscalls support conditional under the COMPAT6 config
option. For COMPAT32, the syscalls were under COMPAT6 already.
Remove WITHOUT_SYSCALL_COMPAT build option, which only purpose was to
(partially) disable the removed shims.
Reviewed by: jhb, imp (previous versions)
Discussed with: peter
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
2015-04-18 21:50:13 +00:00
|
|
|
#if defined(COMPAT_FREEBSD6)
|
2007-07-04 22:57:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Version with the 'pad' argument */
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
freebsd6_lseek(td, uap)
|
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
|
|
|
register struct freebsd6_lseek_args *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct lseek_args ouap;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ouap.fd = uap->fd;
|
|
|
|
ouap.offset = uap->offset;
|
|
|
|
ouap.whence = uap->whence;
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (sys_lseek(td, &ouap));
|
2007-07-04 22:57:21 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
The lseek(2), mmap(2), truncate(2), ftruncate(2), pread(2), and
pwrite(2) syscalls are wrapped to provide compatibility with pre-7.x
kernels which required padding before the off_t parameter. The
fcntl(2) contains compatibility code to handle kernels before the
struct flock was changed during the 8.x CURRENT development. The
shims were reasonable to allow easier revert to the older kernel at
that time.
Now, two or three major releases later, shims do not serve any
purpose. Such old kernels cannot handle current libc, so revert the
compatibility code.
Make padded syscalls support conditional under the COMPAT6 config
option. For COMPAT32, the syscalls were under COMPAT6 already.
Remove WITHOUT_SYSCALL_COMPAT build option, which only purpose was to
(partially) disable the removed shims.
Reviewed by: jhb, imp (previous versions)
Discussed with: peter
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
2015-04-18 21:50:13 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2007-07-04 22:57:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2001-09-21 21:33:22 +00:00
|
|
|
* Check access permissions using passed credentials.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2001-09-22 03:07:41 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_access(vp, user_flags, cred, td)
|
2001-09-21 21:33:22 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
|
|
|
int user_flags;
|
|
|
|
struct ucred *cred;
|
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2008-10-28 13:44:11 +00:00
|
|
|
accmode_t accmode;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
2001-09-21 21:33:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Flags == 0 means only check for existence. */
|
2014-10-22 01:53:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (user_flags == 0)
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
accmode = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (user_flags & R_OK)
|
|
|
|
accmode |= VREAD;
|
|
|
|
if (user_flags & W_OK)
|
|
|
|
accmode |= VWRITE;
|
|
|
|
if (user_flags & X_OK)
|
|
|
|
accmode |= VEXEC;
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the following
operations:
truncate on open() (write)
access() (access)
readlink() (readlink)
chflags(), lchflags(), fchflags() (setflag)
chmod(), fchmod(), lchmod() (setmode)
chown(), fchown(), lchown() (setowner)
utimes(), lutimes(), futimes() (setutimes)
truncate(), ftrunfcate() (write)
revoke() (revoke)
fhopen() (open)
truncate on fhopen() (write)
extattr_set_fd, extattr_set_file() (setextattr)
extattr_get_fd, extattr_get_file() (getextattr)
extattr_delete_fd(), extattr_delete_file() (setextattr)
These entry points permit MAC policies to enforce a variety of
protections on vnodes. More vnode checks to come, especially in
non-native ABIs.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-01 15:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2014-10-22 01:53:00 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_access(cred, vp, accmode);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the following
operations:
truncate on open() (write)
access() (access)
readlink() (readlink)
chflags(), lchflags(), fchflags() (setflag)
chmod(), fchmod(), lchmod() (setmode)
chown(), fchown(), lchown() (setowner)
utimes(), lutimes(), futimes() (setutimes)
truncate(), ftrunfcate() (write)
revoke() (revoke)
fhopen() (open)
truncate on fhopen() (write)
extattr_set_fd, extattr_set_file() (setextattr)
extattr_get_fd, extattr_get_file() (getextattr)
extattr_delete_fd(), extattr_delete_file() (setextattr)
These entry points permit MAC policies to enforce a variety of
protections on vnodes. More vnode checks to come, especially in
non-native ABIs.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-01 15:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2014-10-22 01:53:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((accmode & VWRITE) == 0 || (error = vn_writechk(vp)) == 0)
|
|
|
|
error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, accmode, cred, td);
|
2001-09-21 21:33:22 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check access permissions using "real" credentials.
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct access_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
2011-11-19 06:35:15 +00:00
|
|
|
int amode;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_access(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct access_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
2011-11-19 06:35:15 +00:00
|
|
|
int amode;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_accessat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
0, uap->amode));
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct faccessat_args {
|
|
|
|
int dirfd;
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
2011-11-19 06:35:15 +00:00
|
|
|
int amode;
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
int flag;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2008-10-23 21:50:16 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_faccessat(struct thread *td, struct faccessat_args *uap)
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_accessat(td, uap->fd, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->flag,
|
2011-11-19 06:35:15 +00:00
|
|
|
uap->amode));
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
kern_accessat(struct thread *td, int fd, char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg,
|
2011-11-19 06:35:15 +00:00
|
|
|
int flag, int amode)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-10-22 01:09:07 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ucred *cred, *usecred;
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
2005-01-24 10:25:44 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (flag & ~AT_EACCESS)
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
2014-09-16 00:56:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (amode != F_OK && (amode & ~(R_OK | W_OK | X_OK)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-02 12:31:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Create and modify a temporary credential instead of one that
|
2014-10-22 01:09:07 +00:00
|
|
|
* is potentially shared (if we need one).
|
2000-09-02 12:31:55 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-10-22 01:09:07 +00:00
|
|
|
cred = td->td_ucred;
|
|
|
|
if ((flag & AT_EACCESS) == 0 &&
|
|
|
|
((cred->cr_uid != cred->cr_ruid ||
|
|
|
|
cred->cr_rgid != cred->cr_groups[0]))) {
|
|
|
|
usecred = crdup(cred);
|
|
|
|
usecred->cr_uid = cred->cr_ruid;
|
|
|
|
usecred->cr_groups[0] = cred->cr_rgid;
|
|
|
|
td->td_ucred = usecred;
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
} else
|
2014-10-22 01:09:07 +00:00
|
|
|
usecred = cred;
|
2011-11-19 06:35:15 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_VALUE(amode);
|
2012-10-22 17:50:54 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKSHARED | LOCKLEAF |
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDITVNODE1, pathseg, path, fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_FSTAT),
|
|
|
|
td);
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
2014-10-22 01:09:07 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
vp = nd.ni_vp;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-22 01:09:07 +00:00
|
|
|
error = vn_access(vp, amode, usecred, td);
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
2014-10-22 01:09:07 +00:00
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
if (usecred != cred) {
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
td->td_ucred = cred;
|
2014-10-22 01:09:07 +00:00
|
|
|
crfree(usecred);
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-09-21 21:33:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check access permissions using "effective" credentials.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct eaccess_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
2011-11-19 06:35:15 +00:00
|
|
|
int amode;
|
2001-09-21 21:33:22 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_eaccess(td, uap)
|
2001-09-21 21:33:22 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
|
|
|
register struct eaccess_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
2011-11-19 06:35:15 +00:00
|
|
|
int amode;
|
2001-09-21 21:33:22 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
2006-02-06 22:00:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_accessat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
AT_EACCESS, uap->amode));
|
2001-09-21 21:33:22 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-06-11 11:16:26 +00:00
|
|
|
#if defined(COMPAT_43)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get file status; this version follows links.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ostat_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct ostat *ub;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
ostat(td, uap)
|
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct ostat_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct ostat *ub;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct stat sb;
|
|
|
|
struct ostat osb;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
error = kern_statat(td, 0, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
&sb, NULL);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
cvtstat(&sb, &osb);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
return (copyout(&osb, uap->ub, sizeof (osb)));
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get file status; this version does not follow links.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct olstat_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct ostat *ub;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
olstat(td, uap)
|
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct olstat_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct ostat *ub;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
1997-03-31 12:02:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct stat sb;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ostat osb;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
error = kern_statat(td, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, AT_FDCWD, uap->path,
|
|
|
|
UIO_USERSPACE, &sb, NULL);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1997-03-31 12:02:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
cvtstat(&sb, &osb);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
return (copyout(&osb, uap->ub, sizeof (osb)));
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Convert from an old to a new stat structure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
void
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
cvtstat(st, ost)
|
|
|
|
struct stat *st;
|
|
|
|
struct ostat *ost;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-31 16:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
bzero(ost, sizeof(*ost));
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
ost->st_dev = st->st_dev;
|
|
|
|
ost->st_ino = st->st_ino;
|
|
|
|
ost->st_mode = st->st_mode;
|
|
|
|
ost->st_nlink = st->st_nlink;
|
|
|
|
ost->st_uid = st->st_uid;
|
|
|
|
ost->st_gid = st->st_gid;
|
|
|
|
ost->st_rdev = st->st_rdev;
|
|
|
|
if (st->st_size < (quad_t)1 << 32)
|
|
|
|
ost->st_size = st->st_size;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ost->st_size = -2;
|
2010-03-28 13:13:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ost->st_atim = st->st_atim;
|
|
|
|
ost->st_mtim = st->st_mtim;
|
|
|
|
ost->st_ctim = st->st_ctim;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
ost->st_blksize = st->st_blksize;
|
|
|
|
ost->st_blocks = st->st_blocks;
|
|
|
|
ost->st_flags = st->st_flags;
|
|
|
|
ost->st_gen = st->st_gen;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-06-11 11:16:26 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* COMPAT_43 */
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get file status; this version follows links.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct stat_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct stat *ub;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_stat(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct stat_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct stat *ub;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct stat sb;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
error = kern_statat(td, 0, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
&sb, NULL);
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
error = copyout(&sb, uap->ub, sizeof (sb));
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct fstatat_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct stat *buf;
|
|
|
|
int flag;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_fstatat(struct thread *td, struct fstatat_args *uap)
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct stat sb;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = kern_statat(td, uap->flag, uap->fd, uap->path,
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
UIO_USERSPACE, &sb, NULL);
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
error = copyout(&sb, uap->buf, sizeof (sb));
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_statat(struct thread *td, int flag, int fd, char *path,
|
Don't make Linux stat() open character devices to resolve its name.
The existing code calls kern_open() to resolve the vnode of a pathname
right after a stat(). This is not correct, because it causes random
character devices to be opened in /dev. This means ls'ing a tape
streamer will cause it to rewind, for example. Changes I have made:
- Add kern_statat_vnhook() to allow binary emulators to `post-process'
struct stat, using the proper vnode.
- Remove unneeded printf's from stat() and statfs().
- Make the Linuxolator use kern_statat_vnhook(), replacing
translate_path_major_minor_at().
- Let translate_fd_major_minor() use vp->v_rdev instead of
vp->v_un.vu_cdev.
Result:
crw-rw-rw- 1 root root 0, 14 Feb 20 13:54 /dev/ptmx
crw--w---- 1 root adm 136, 0 Feb 20 14:03 /dev/pts/0
crw--w---- 1 root adm 136, 1 Feb 20 14:02 /dev/pts/1
crw--w---- 1 ed tty 136, 2 Feb 20 14:03 /dev/pts/2
Before this commit, ptmx also had a major number of 136, because it
silently allocated and deallocated a pseudo-terminal. Device nodes that
cannot be opened now have proper major/minor-numbers.
Reviewed by: kib, netchild, rdivacky (thanks!)
2009-02-20 13:05:29 +00:00
|
|
|
enum uio_seg pathseg, struct stat *sbp,
|
|
|
|
void (*hook)(struct vnode *vp, struct stat *sbp))
|
|
|
|
{
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
struct stat sb;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
2012-10-22 17:50:54 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
if (flag & ~AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
2011-08-13 09:21:16 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&nd, LOOKUP, ((flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) ? NOFOLLOW :
|
2013-01-31 22:20:05 +00:00
|
|
|
FOLLOW) | LOCKSHARED | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNODE1, pathseg, path, fd,
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_FSTAT), td);
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
Make similar changes to fo_stat() and fo_poll() as made earlier to
fo_read() and fo_write(): explicitly use the cred argument to fo_poll()
as "active_cred" using the passed file descriptor's f_cred reference
to provide access to the file credential. Add an active_cred
argument to fo_stat() so that implementers have access to the active
credential as well as the file credential. Generally modify callers
of fo_stat() to pass in td->td_ucred rather than fp->f_cred, which
was redundantly provided via the fp argument. This set of modifications
also permits threads to perform these operations on behalf of another
thread without modifying their credential.
Trickle this change down into fo_stat/poll() implementations:
- badfo_poll(), badfo_stat(): modify/add arguments.
- kqueue_poll(), kqueue_stat(): modify arguments.
- pipe_poll(), pipe_stat(): modify/add arguments, pass active_cred to
MAC checks rather than td->td_ucred.
- soo_poll(), soo_stat(): modify/add arguments, pass fp->f_cred rather
than cred to pru_sopoll() to maintain current semantics.
- sopoll(): moidfy arguments.
- vn_poll(), vn_statfile(): modify/add arguments, pass new arguments
to vn_stat(). Pass active_cred to MAC and fp->f_cred to VOP_POLL()
to maintian current semantics.
- vn_close(): rename cred to file_cred to reflect reality while I'm here.
- vn_stat(): Add active_cred and file_cred arguments to vn_stat()
and consumers so that this distinction is maintained at the VFS
as well as 'struct file' layer. Pass active_cred instead of
td->td_ucred to MAC and to VOP_GETATTR() to maintain current semantics.
- fifofs: modify the creation of a "filetemp" so that the file
credential is properly initialized and can be used in the socket
code if desired. Pass ap->a_td->td_ucred as the active
credential to soo_poll(). If we teach the vnop interface about
the distinction between file and active credentials, we would use
the active credential here.
Note that current inconsistent passing of active_cred vs. file_cred to
VOP's is maintained. It's not clear why GETATTR would be authorized
using active_cred while POLL would be authorized using file_cred at
the file system level.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-16 12:52:03 +00:00
|
|
|
error = vn_stat(nd.ni_vp, &sb, td->td_ucred, NOCRED, td);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
2015-09-28 12:14:16 +00:00
|
|
|
SDT_PROBE2(vfs, , stat, mode, path, sb.st_mode);
|
2008-11-05 19:40:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode))
|
2015-09-28 12:14:16 +00:00
|
|
|
SDT_PROBE2(vfs, , stat, reg, path, pathseg);
|
Don't make Linux stat() open character devices to resolve its name.
The existing code calls kern_open() to resolve the vnode of a pathname
right after a stat(). This is not correct, because it causes random
character devices to be opened in /dev. This means ls'ing a tape
streamer will cause it to rewind, for example. Changes I have made:
- Add kern_statat_vnhook() to allow binary emulators to `post-process'
struct stat, using the proper vnode.
- Remove unneeded printf's from stat() and statfs().
- Make the Linuxolator use kern_statat_vnhook(), replacing
translate_path_major_minor_at().
- Let translate_fd_major_minor() use vp->v_rdev instead of
vp->v_un.vu_cdev.
Result:
crw-rw-rw- 1 root root 0, 14 Feb 20 13:54 /dev/ptmx
crw--w---- 1 root adm 136, 0 Feb 20 14:03 /dev/pts/0
crw--w---- 1 root adm 136, 1 Feb 20 14:02 /dev/pts/1
crw--w---- 1 ed tty 136, 2 Feb 20 14:03 /dev/pts/2
Before this commit, ptmx also had a major number of 136, because it
silently allocated and deallocated a pseudo-terminal. Device nodes that
cannot be opened now have proper major/minor-numbers.
Reviewed by: kib, netchild, rdivacky (thanks!)
2009-02-20 13:05:29 +00:00
|
|
|
if (__predict_false(hook != NULL))
|
|
|
|
hook(nd.ni_vp, &sb);
|
2008-11-05 19:40:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_vp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
*sbp = sb;
|
2008-02-23 01:01:49 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef KTRACE
|
|
|
|
if (KTRPOINT(td, KTR_STRUCT))
|
|
|
|
ktrstat(&sb);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get file status; this version does not follow links.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct lstat_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct stat *ub;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_lstat(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct lstat_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct stat *ub;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
struct stat sb;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
error = kern_statat(td, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, AT_FDCWD, uap->path,
|
|
|
|
UIO_USERSPACE, &sb, NULL);
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
error = copyout(&sb, uap->ub, sizeof (sb));
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-14 19:13:59 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
* Implementation of the NetBSD [l]stat() functions.
|
2000-09-14 19:13:59 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
cvtnstat(sb, nsb)
|
|
|
|
struct stat *sb;
|
|
|
|
struct nstat *nsb;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-06-24 07:14:44 +00:00
|
|
|
bzero(nsb, sizeof *nsb);
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
nsb->st_dev = sb->st_dev;
|
|
|
|
nsb->st_ino = sb->st_ino;
|
|
|
|
nsb->st_mode = sb->st_mode;
|
|
|
|
nsb->st_nlink = sb->st_nlink;
|
|
|
|
nsb->st_uid = sb->st_uid;
|
|
|
|
nsb->st_gid = sb->st_gid;
|
|
|
|
nsb->st_rdev = sb->st_rdev;
|
2010-03-28 13:13:22 +00:00
|
|
|
nsb->st_atim = sb->st_atim;
|
|
|
|
nsb->st_mtim = sb->st_mtim;
|
|
|
|
nsb->st_ctim = sb->st_ctim;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
nsb->st_size = sb->st_size;
|
|
|
|
nsb->st_blocks = sb->st_blocks;
|
|
|
|
nsb->st_blksize = sb->st_blksize;
|
|
|
|
nsb->st_flags = sb->st_flags;
|
|
|
|
nsb->st_gen = sb->st_gen;
|
2010-03-28 13:13:22 +00:00
|
|
|
nsb->st_birthtim = sb->st_birthtim;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct nstat_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct nstat *ub;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_nstat(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct nstat_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct nstat *ub;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct stat sb;
|
|
|
|
struct nstat nsb;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
error = kern_statat(td, 0, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
&sb, NULL);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
cvtnstat(&sb, &nsb);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
return (copyout(&nsb, uap->ub, sizeof (nsb)));
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2000-09-14 19:13:59 +00:00
|
|
|
* NetBSD lstat. Get file status; this version does not follow links.
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct lstat_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct stat *ub;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_nlstat(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct nlstat_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct nstat *ub;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct stat sb;
|
|
|
|
struct nstat nsb;
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
error = kern_statat(td, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, AT_FDCWD, uap->path,
|
|
|
|
UIO_USERSPACE, &sb, NULL);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
cvtnstat(&sb, &nsb);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
return (copyout(&nsb, uap->ub, sizeof (nsb)));
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get configurable pathname variables.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct pathconf_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int name;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_pathconf(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct pathconf_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int name;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-02-07 21:46:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-07-08 15:23:18 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_pathconf(td, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->name, FOLLOW));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct lpathconf_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int name;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_lpathconf(td, uap)
|
2009-07-08 15:23:18 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
|
|
|
register struct lpathconf_args /* {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int name;
|
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-31 22:20:05 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_pathconf(td, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->name,
|
|
|
|
NOFOLLOW));
|
2005-02-07 21:46:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
2009-07-08 15:23:18 +00:00
|
|
|
kern_pathconf(struct thread *td, char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg, int name,
|
|
|
|
u_long flags)
|
2005-02-07 21:46:43 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
2012-10-22 17:50:54 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-10-22 17:50:54 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, LOCKSHARED | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNODE1 | flags,
|
|
|
|
pathseg, path, td);
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2002-10-27 18:07:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-09 19:05:11 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_PATHCONF(nd.ni_vp, name, td->td_retval);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_vp);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Return target name of a symbolic link.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct readlink_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
char *buf;
|
2008-02-12 20:09:04 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t count;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_readlink(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct readlink_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
char *buf;
|
2008-02-12 20:09:04 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t count;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_readlinkat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->buf, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->count));
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct readlinkat_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
char *buf;
|
|
|
|
size_t bufsize;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_readlinkat(struct thread *td, struct readlinkat_args *uap)
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_readlinkat(td, uap->fd, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->buf, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->bufsize));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_readlinkat(struct thread *td, int fd, char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg,
|
|
|
|
char *buf, enum uio_seg bufseg, size_t count)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct iovec aiov;
|
|
|
|
struct uio auio;
|
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-02-21 01:05:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (count > IOSIZE_MAX)
|
2009-05-11 19:58:03 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-31 22:20:05 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_AT(&nd, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW | LOCKSHARED | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNODE1,
|
|
|
|
pathseg, path, fd, td);
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
vp = nd.ni_vp;
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the following
operations:
truncate on open() (write)
access() (access)
readlink() (readlink)
chflags(), lchflags(), fchflags() (setflag)
chmod(), fchmod(), lchmod() (setmode)
chown(), fchown(), lchown() (setowner)
utimes(), lutimes(), futimes() (setutimes)
truncate(), ftrunfcate() (write)
revoke() (revoke)
fhopen() (open)
truncate on fhopen() (write)
extattr_set_fd, extattr_set_file() (setextattr)
extattr_get_fd, extattr_get_file() (getextattr)
extattr_delete_fd(), extattr_delete_file() (setextattr)
These entry points permit MAC policies to enforce a variety of
protections on vnodes. More vnode checks to come, especially in
non-native ABIs.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-01 15:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_readlink(td->td_ucred, vp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the following
operations:
truncate on open() (write)
access() (access)
readlink() (readlink)
chflags(), lchflags(), fchflags() (setflag)
chmod(), fchmod(), lchmod() (setmode)
chown(), fchown(), lchown() (setowner)
utimes(), lutimes(), futimes() (setutimes)
truncate(), ftrunfcate() (write)
revoke() (revoke)
fhopen() (open)
truncate on fhopen() (write)
extattr_set_fd, extattr_set_file() (setextattr)
extattr_get_fd, extattr_get_file() (getextattr)
extattr_delete_fd(), extattr_delete_file() (setextattr)
These entry points permit MAC policies to enforce a variety of
protections on vnodes. More vnode checks to come, especially in
non-native ABIs.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-01 15:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vp->v_type != VLNK)
|
|
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
else {
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
aiov.iov_base = buf;
|
|
|
|
aiov.iov_len = count;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
auio.uio_iov = &aiov;
|
|
|
|
auio.uio_iovcnt = 1;
|
|
|
|
auio.uio_offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
auio.uio_rw = UIO_READ;
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
auio.uio_segflg = bufseg;
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
auio.uio_td = td;
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
auio.uio_resid = count;
|
2002-02-27 18:32:23 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_READLINK(vp, &auio, td->td_ucred);
|
2014-03-12 10:23:51 +00:00
|
|
|
td->td_retval[0] = count - auio.uio_resid;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-14 19:13:59 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Common implementation code for chflags() and fchflags().
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
setfflags(td, vp, flags)
|
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
2013-03-21 22:44:33 +00:00
|
|
|
u_long flags;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vattr vattr;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-04-20 10:08:30 +00:00
|
|
|
/* We can't support the value matching VNOVAL. */
|
|
|
|
if (flags == VNOVAL)
|
|
|
|
return (EOPNOTSUPP);
|
|
|
|
|
1999-08-02 21:34:46 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
1999-08-04 04:52:18 +00:00
|
|
|
* Prevent non-root users from setting flags on devices. When
|
|
|
|
* a device is reused, users can retain ownership of the device
|
|
|
|
* if they are allowed to set flags and programs assume that
|
|
|
|
* chown can't fail when done as root.
|
1999-08-02 21:34:46 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2001-10-01 20:01:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vp->v_type == VCHR || vp->v_type == VBLK) {
|
2007-06-12 00:12:01 +00:00
|
|
|
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_CHFLAGS_DEV);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2001-10-01 20:01:07 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-08-03 17:07:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2003-03-05 23:15:23 +00:00
|
|
|
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
|
|
|
|
vattr.va_flags = flags;
|
2013-03-01 21:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the following
operations:
truncate on open() (write)
access() (access)
readlink() (readlink)
chflags(), lchflags(), fchflags() (setflag)
chmod(), fchmod(), lchmod() (setmode)
chown(), fchown(), lchown() (setowner)
utimes(), lutimes(), futimes() (setutimes)
truncate(), ftrunfcate() (write)
revoke() (revoke)
fhopen() (open)
truncate on fhopen() (write)
extattr_set_fd, extattr_set_file() (setextattr)
extattr_get_fd, extattr_get_file() (getextattr)
extattr_delete_fd(), extattr_delete_file() (setextattr)
These entry points permit MAC policies to enforce a variety of
protections on vnodes. More vnode checks to come, especially in
non-native ABIs.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-01 15:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_setflags(td->td_ucred, vp, vattr.va_flags);
|
2003-03-05 23:15:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the following
operations:
truncate on open() (write)
access() (access)
readlink() (readlink)
chflags(), lchflags(), fchflags() (setflag)
chmod(), fchmod(), lchmod() (setmode)
chown(), fchown(), lchown() (setowner)
utimes(), lutimes(), futimes() (setutimes)
truncate(), ftrunfcate() (write)
revoke() (revoke)
fhopen() (open)
truncate on fhopen() (write)
extattr_set_fd, extattr_set_file() (setextattr)
extattr_get_fd, extattr_get_file() (getextattr)
extattr_delete_fd(), extattr_delete_file() (setextattr)
These entry points permit MAC policies to enforce a variety of
protections on vnodes. More vnode checks to come, especially in
non-native ABIs.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-01 15:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2008-08-28 15:23:18 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, td->td_ucred);
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
1999-08-04 04:52:18 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Change flags of a file given a path name.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct chflags_args {
|
2013-03-21 22:44:33 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *path;
|
|
|
|
u_long flags;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_chflags(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct chflags_args /* {
|
2013-03-21 22:44:33 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *path;
|
|
|
|
u_long flags;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_chflagsat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->flags, 0));
|
2013-03-21 22:59:01 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct chflagsat_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
const char *path;
|
|
|
|
u_long flags;
|
|
|
|
int atflag;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
sys_chflagsat(struct thread *td, struct chflagsat_args *uap)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int fd = uap->fd;
|
2013-03-22 07:40:34 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *path = uap->path;
|
2013-03-21 22:59:01 +00:00
|
|
|
u_long flags = uap->flags;
|
|
|
|
int atflag = uap->atflag;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (atflag & ~AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_chflagsat(td, fd, path, UIO_USERSPACE, flags, atflag));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-05-05 23:47:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Same as chflags() but doesn't follow symlinks.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_lchflags(td, uap)
|
2002-05-05 23:47:41 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
|
|
|
register struct lchflags_args /* {
|
2013-03-21 22:44:33 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *path;
|
|
|
|
u_long flags;
|
2002-05-05 23:47:41 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-03-21 22:59:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_chflagsat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->flags, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
kern_chflagsat(struct thread *td, int fd, const char *path,
|
|
|
|
enum uio_seg pathseg, u_long flags, int atflag)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-05-05 23:47:41 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
2013-03-21 22:59:01 +00:00
|
|
|
int error, follow;
|
2002-05-05 23:47:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-03-21 22:59:01 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_FFLAGS(flags);
|
|
|
|
follow = (atflag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) ? NOFOLLOW : FOLLOW;
|
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&nd, LOOKUP, follow | AUDITVNODE1, pathseg, path, fd,
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_FCHFLAGS), td);
|
2002-05-05 23:47:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2013-03-21 22:59:01 +00:00
|
|
|
error = setfflags(td, nd.ni_vp, flags);
|
2002-05-05 23:47:41 +00:00
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
|
2004-01-11 19:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2002-05-05 23:47:41 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Change flags of a file given a file descriptor.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct fchflags_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
2013-03-21 22:44:33 +00:00
|
|
|
u_long flags;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_fchflags(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct fchflags_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int fd;
|
2013-03-21 22:44:33 +00:00
|
|
|
u_long flags;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_FD(uap->fd);
|
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_FFLAGS(uap->flags);
|
2015-06-16 13:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
error = getvnode(td, uap->fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_FCHFLAGS),
|
|
|
|
&fp);
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
Add pathname and/or vnode argument auditing for the following system calls:
quotactl, statfs, fstatfs, fchdir, chdir, chroot, open, mknod, mkfifo,
link, symlink, undelete, unlink, access, eaccess, stat, lstat, pathconf,
readlink, chflags, lchflags, fchflags, chmod, lchmod, fchmod, chown,
lchown, fchown, utimes, lutimes, futimes, truncate, ftruncate, fsync,
rename, mkdir, rmdir, getdirentries, revoke, lgetfh, getfh, extattrctl,
extattr_set_file, extattr_set_link, extattr_get_file, extattr_get_link,
extattr_delete_file, extattr_delete_link, extattr_list_file, extattr_list_link.
In many cases the pathname and vnode auditing is done within namei lookup
instead of directly in the system call.
Audit the remaining arguments to these system calls:
fstatfs, fchdir, open, mknod, chflags, lchflags, fchflags, chmod, lchmod,
fchmod, chown, lchown, fchown, futimes, ftruncate, fsync, mkdir,
getdirentries.
2006-02-22 16:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef AUDIT
|
2008-11-04 22:31:04 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_lock(fp->f_vnode, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
|
2009-07-28 21:52:24 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_VNODE1(fp->f_vnode);
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(fp->f_vnode, 0);
|
Add pathname and/or vnode argument auditing for the following system calls:
quotactl, statfs, fstatfs, fchdir, chdir, chroot, open, mknod, mkfifo,
link, symlink, undelete, unlink, access, eaccess, stat, lstat, pathconf,
readlink, chflags, lchflags, fchflags, chmod, lchmod, fchmod, chown,
lchown, fchown, utimes, lutimes, futimes, truncate, ftruncate, fsync,
rename, mkdir, rmdir, getdirentries, revoke, lgetfh, getfh, extattrctl,
extattr_set_file, extattr_set_link, extattr_get_file, extattr_get_link,
extattr_delete_file, extattr_delete_link, extattr_list_file, extattr_list_link.
In many cases the pathname and vnode auditing is done within namei lookup
instead of directly in the system call.
Audit the remaining arguments to these system calls:
fstatfs, fchdir, open, mknod, chflags, lchflags, fchflags, chmod, lchmod,
fchmod, chown, lchown, fchown, futimes, ftruncate, fsync, mkdir,
getdirentries.
2006-02-22 16:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2003-06-22 08:41:43 +00:00
|
|
|
error = setfflags(td, fp->f_vnode, uap->flags);
|
2005-12-20 00:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-14 19:13:59 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Common implementation code for chmod(), lchmod() and fchmod().
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
setfmode(td, cred, vp, mode)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ucred *cred;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vattr vattr;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2008-01-10 01:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
|
1995-10-22 09:32:48 +00:00
|
|
|
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
vattr.va_mode = mode & ALLPERMS;
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the following
operations:
truncate on open() (write)
access() (access)
readlink() (readlink)
chflags(), lchflags(), fchflags() (setflag)
chmod(), fchmod(), lchmod() (setmode)
chown(), fchown(), lchown() (setowner)
utimes(), lutimes(), futimes() (setutimes)
truncate(), ftrunfcate() (write)
revoke() (revoke)
fhopen() (open)
truncate on fhopen() (write)
extattr_set_fd, extattr_set_file() (setextattr)
extattr_get_fd, extattr_get_file() (getextattr)
extattr_delete_fd(), extattr_delete_file() (setextattr)
These entry points permit MAC policies to enforce a variety of
protections on vnodes. More vnode checks to come, especially in
non-native ABIs.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-01 15:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_setmode(cred, vp, vattr.va_mode);
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the following
operations:
truncate on open() (write)
access() (access)
readlink() (readlink)
chflags(), lchflags(), fchflags() (setflag)
chmod(), fchmod(), lchmod() (setmode)
chown(), fchown(), lchown() (setowner)
utimes(), lutimes(), futimes() (setutimes)
truncate(), ftrunfcate() (write)
revoke() (revoke)
fhopen() (open)
truncate on fhopen() (write)
extattr_set_fd, extattr_set_file() (setextattr)
extattr_get_fd, extattr_get_file() (getextattr)
extattr_delete_fd(), extattr_delete_file() (setextattr)
These entry points permit MAC policies to enforce a variety of
protections on vnodes. More vnode checks to come, especially in
non-native ABIs.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-01 15:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, cred);
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
2004-01-11 19:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Change mode of a file given path name.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct chmod_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_chmod(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct chmod_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_fchmodat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->mode, 0));
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct fchmodat_args {
|
|
|
|
int dirfd;
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
mode_t mode;
|
|
|
|
int flag;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_fchmodat(struct thread *td, struct fchmodat_args *uap)
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int flag = uap->flag;
|
|
|
|
int fd = uap->fd;
|
|
|
|
char *path = uap->path;
|
|
|
|
mode_t mode = uap->mode;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (flag & ~AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_fchmodat(td, fd, path, UIO_USERSPACE, mode, flag));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Change mode of a file given path name (don't follow links.)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct lchmod_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_lchmod(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct lchmod_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_fchmodat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->mode, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_fchmodat(struct thread *td, int fd, char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg,
|
|
|
|
mode_t mode, int flag)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int error, follow;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_MODE(mode);
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
follow = (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) ? NOFOLLOW : FOLLOW;
|
2013-03-16 22:36:24 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&nd, LOOKUP, follow | AUDITVNODE1, pathseg, path, fd,
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_FCHMOD), td);
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
error = setfmode(td, td->td_ucred, nd.ni_vp, mode);
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
|
2004-01-11 19:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Change mode of a file given a file descriptor.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct fchmod_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_fchmod(struct thread *td, struct fchmod_args *uap)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_FD(uap->fd);
|
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_MODE(uap->mode);
|
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
error = fget(td, uap->fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_FCHMOD), &fp);
|
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
error = fo_chmod(fp, uap->mode, td->td_ucred, td);
|
2005-12-20 00:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-14 19:13:59 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Common implementation for chown(), lchown(), and fchown()
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
setfown(td, cred, vp, uid, gid)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ucred *cred;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
|
|
|
uid_t uid;
|
|
|
|
gid_t gid;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vattr vattr;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2008-01-10 01:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
|
1995-10-22 09:32:48 +00:00
|
|
|
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
vattr.va_uid = uid;
|
|
|
|
vattr.va_gid = gid;
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the following
operations:
truncate on open() (write)
access() (access)
readlink() (readlink)
chflags(), lchflags(), fchflags() (setflag)
chmod(), fchmod(), lchmod() (setmode)
chown(), fchown(), lchown() (setowner)
utimes(), lutimes(), futimes() (setutimes)
truncate(), ftrunfcate() (write)
revoke() (revoke)
fhopen() (open)
truncate on fhopen() (write)
extattr_set_fd, extattr_set_file() (setextattr)
extattr_get_fd, extattr_get_file() (getextattr)
extattr_delete_fd(), extattr_delete_file() (setextattr)
These entry points permit MAC policies to enforce a variety of
protections on vnodes. More vnode checks to come, especially in
non-native ABIs.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-01 15:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_setowner(cred, vp, vattr.va_uid,
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the following
operations:
truncate on open() (write)
access() (access)
readlink() (readlink)
chflags(), lchflags(), fchflags() (setflag)
chmod(), fchmod(), lchmod() (setmode)
chown(), fchown(), lchown() (setowner)
utimes(), lutimes(), futimes() (setutimes)
truncate(), ftrunfcate() (write)
revoke() (revoke)
fhopen() (open)
truncate on fhopen() (write)
extattr_set_fd, extattr_set_file() (setextattr)
extattr_get_fd, extattr_get_file() (getextattr)
extattr_delete_fd(), extattr_delete_file() (setextattr)
These entry points permit MAC policies to enforce a variety of
protections on vnodes. More vnode checks to come, especially in
non-native ABIs.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-01 15:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
vattr.va_gid);
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, cred);
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
2004-01-11 19:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set ownership given a path name.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct chown_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int uid;
|
|
|
|
int gid;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_chown(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct chown_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int uid;
|
|
|
|
int gid;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 23:51:13 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_fchownat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->uid,
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
uap->gid, 0));
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct fchownat_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
const char * path;
|
|
|
|
uid_t uid;
|
|
|
|
gid_t gid;
|
|
|
|
int flag;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_fchownat(struct thread *td, struct fchownat_args *uap)
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int flag;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
flag = uap->flag;
|
|
|
|
if (flag & ~AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_fchownat(td, uap->fd, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->uid,
|
|
|
|
uap->gid, uap->flag));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_fchownat(struct thread *td, int fd, char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg,
|
|
|
|
int uid, int gid, int flag)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
2012-10-22 17:50:54 +00:00
|
|
|
int error, follow;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_OWNER(uid, gid);
|
2008-04-07 00:29:32 +00:00
|
|
|
follow = (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) ? NOFOLLOW : FOLLOW;
|
2013-01-31 22:20:05 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&nd, LOOKUP, follow | AUDITVNODE1, pathseg, path, fd,
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_FCHOWN), td);
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
error = setfown(td, td->td_ucred, nd.ni_vp, uid, gid);
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1997-03-31 12:21:37 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set ownership given a path name, do not cross symlinks.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct lchown_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int uid;
|
|
|
|
int gid;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_lchown(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-03-31 12:21:37 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct lchown_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int uid;
|
|
|
|
int gid;
|
1997-03-31 12:21:37 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_fchownat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->uid, uap->gid, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW));
|
1997-03-31 12:21:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set ownership given a file descriptor.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct fchown_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
int uid;
|
|
|
|
int gid;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_fchown(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct fchown_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
int uid;
|
|
|
|
int gid;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_FD(uap->fd);
|
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_OWNER(uap->uid, uap->gid);
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
error = fget(td, uap->fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_FCHOWN), &fp);
|
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2011-08-16 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
error = fo_chown(fp, uap->uid, uap->gid, td->td_ucred, td);
|
2005-12-20 00:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-14 19:13:59 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Common implementation code for utimes(), lutimes(), and futimes().
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
getutimes(usrtvp, tvpseg, tsp)
|
1999-08-22 01:46:57 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct timeval *usrtvp;
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
enum uio_seg tvpseg;
|
1999-08-22 01:46:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct timespec *tsp;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2006-01-04 00:47:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct timeval tv[2];
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct timeval *tvp;
|
1999-08-22 01:46:57 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (usrtvp == NULL) {
|
2009-08-26 14:32:37 +00:00
|
|
|
vfs_timestamp(&tsp[0]);
|
1999-08-22 01:46:57 +00:00
|
|
|
tsp[1] = tsp[0];
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tvpseg == UIO_SYSSPACE) {
|
|
|
|
tvp = usrtvp;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if ((error = copyin(usrtvp, tv, sizeof(tv))) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
tvp = tv;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-01-04 07:50:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tvp[0].tv_usec < 0 || tvp[0].tv_usec >= 1000000 ||
|
|
|
|
tvp[1].tv_usec < 0 || tvp[1].tv_usec >= 1000000)
|
2006-01-04 00:47:13 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tvp[0], &tsp[0]);
|
|
|
|
TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tvp[1], &tsp[1]);
|
1999-08-22 01:46:57 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-01-11 19:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
1999-08-22 01:46:57 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-14 19:13:59 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-01-23 21:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
* Common implementation code for futimens(), utimensat().
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define UTIMENS_NULL 0x1
|
|
|
|
#define UTIMENS_EXIT 0x2
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
getutimens(const struct timespec *usrtsp, enum uio_seg tspseg,
|
|
|
|
struct timespec *tsp, int *retflags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct timespec tsnow;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vfs_timestamp(&tsnow);
|
|
|
|
*retflags = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (usrtsp == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
tsp[0] = tsnow;
|
|
|
|
tsp[1] = tsnow;
|
|
|
|
*retflags |= UTIMENS_NULL;
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tspseg == UIO_SYSSPACE) {
|
|
|
|
tsp[0] = usrtsp[0];
|
|
|
|
tsp[1] = usrtsp[1];
|
|
|
|
} else if ((error = copyin(usrtsp, tsp, sizeof(*tsp) * 2)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
if (tsp[0].tv_nsec == UTIME_OMIT && tsp[1].tv_nsec == UTIME_OMIT)
|
|
|
|
*retflags |= UTIMENS_EXIT;
|
|
|
|
if (tsp[0].tv_nsec == UTIME_NOW && tsp[1].tv_nsec == UTIME_NOW)
|
|
|
|
*retflags |= UTIMENS_NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (tsp[0].tv_nsec == UTIME_OMIT)
|
|
|
|
tsp[0].tv_sec = VNOVAL;
|
|
|
|
else if (tsp[0].tv_nsec == UTIME_NOW)
|
|
|
|
tsp[0] = tsnow;
|
|
|
|
else if (tsp[0].tv_nsec < 0 || tsp[0].tv_nsec >= 1000000000L)
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
if (tsp[1].tv_nsec == UTIME_OMIT)
|
|
|
|
tsp[1].tv_sec = VNOVAL;
|
|
|
|
else if (tsp[1].tv_nsec == UTIME_NOW)
|
|
|
|
tsp[1] = tsnow;
|
|
|
|
else if (tsp[1].tv_nsec < 0 || tsp[1].tv_nsec >= 1000000000L)
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Common implementation code for utimes(), lutimes(), futimes(), futimens(),
|
|
|
|
* and utimensat().
|
2000-09-14 19:13:59 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
1999-08-22 01:46:57 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2002-07-17 02:03:19 +00:00
|
|
|
setutimes(td, vp, ts, numtimes, nullflag)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
1999-08-22 01:46:57 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct timespec *ts;
|
2002-07-17 02:03:19 +00:00
|
|
|
int numtimes;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int nullflag;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vattr vattr;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int error, setbirthtime;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2008-01-10 01:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
|
2002-07-17 02:03:19 +00:00
|
|
|
setbirthtime = 0;
|
2008-08-28 15:23:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (numtimes < 3 && !VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vattr, td->td_ucred) &&
|
2002-07-17 02:03:19 +00:00
|
|
|
timespeccmp(&ts[1], &vattr.va_birthtime, < ))
|
|
|
|
setbirthtime = 1;
|
1995-10-22 09:32:48 +00:00
|
|
|
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
|
1999-08-22 01:46:57 +00:00
|
|
|
vattr.va_atime = ts[0];
|
|
|
|
vattr.va_mtime = ts[1];
|
2002-07-17 02:03:19 +00:00
|
|
|
if (setbirthtime)
|
|
|
|
vattr.va_birthtime = ts[1];
|
|
|
|
if (numtimes > 2)
|
|
|
|
vattr.va_birthtime = ts[2];
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (nullflag)
|
|
|
|
vattr.va_vaflags |= VA_UTIMES_NULL;
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the following
operations:
truncate on open() (write)
access() (access)
readlink() (readlink)
chflags(), lchflags(), fchflags() (setflag)
chmod(), fchmod(), lchmod() (setmode)
chown(), fchown(), lchown() (setowner)
utimes(), lutimes(), futimes() (setutimes)
truncate(), ftrunfcate() (write)
revoke() (revoke)
fhopen() (open)
truncate on fhopen() (write)
extattr_set_fd, extattr_set_file() (setextattr)
extattr_get_fd, extattr_get_file() (getextattr)
extattr_delete_fd(), extattr_delete_file() (setextattr)
These entry points permit MAC policies to enforce a variety of
protections on vnodes. More vnode checks to come, especially in
non-native ABIs.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-01 15:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_setutimes(td->td_ucred, vp, vattr.va_atime,
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the following
operations:
truncate on open() (write)
access() (access)
readlink() (readlink)
chflags(), lchflags(), fchflags() (setflag)
chmod(), fchmod(), lchmod() (setmode)
chown(), fchown(), lchown() (setowner)
utimes(), lutimes(), futimes() (setutimes)
truncate(), ftrunfcate() (write)
revoke() (revoke)
fhopen() (open)
truncate on fhopen() (write)
extattr_set_fd, extattr_set_file() (setextattr)
extattr_get_fd, extattr_get_file() (getextattr)
extattr_delete_fd(), extattr_delete_file() (setextattr)
These entry points permit MAC policies to enforce a variety of
protections on vnodes. More vnode checks to come, especially in
non-native ABIs.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-01 15:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
vattr.va_mtime);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2002-10-02 09:09:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
2008-08-28 15:23:18 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, td->td_ucred);
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
2004-01-11 19:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set the access and modification times of a file.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct utimes_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct timeval *tptr;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_utimes(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct utimes_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct timeval *tptr;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_utimesat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->tptr, UIO_USERSPACE));
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct futimesat_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
const char * path;
|
|
|
|
const struct timeval * times;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_futimesat(struct thread *td, struct futimesat_args *uap)
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_utimesat(td, uap->fd, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->times, UIO_USERSPACE));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_utimesat(struct thread *td, int fd, char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg,
|
|
|
|
struct timeval *tptr, enum uio_seg tptrseg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
struct timespec ts[2];
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
2012-10-22 17:50:54 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = getutimes(tptr, tptrseg, ts)) != 0)
|
1999-08-22 01:46:57 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2013-01-31 22:20:05 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | AUDITVNODE1, pathseg, path, fd,
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_FUTIMES), td);
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
error = setutimes(td, nd.ni_vp, ts, 2, tptr == NULL);
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set the access and modification times of a file.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct lutimes_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct timeval *tptr;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_lutimes(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct lutimes_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
struct timeval *tptr;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_lutimes(td, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->tptr,
|
|
|
|
UIO_USERSPACE));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_lutimes(struct thread *td, char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg,
|
|
|
|
struct timeval *tptr, enum uio_seg tptrseg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-08-22 01:46:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct timespec ts[2];
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = getutimes(tptr, tptrseg, ts)) != 0)
|
1999-08-22 01:46:57 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2012-10-22 17:50:54 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW | AUDITVNODE1, pathseg, path, td);
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
error = setutimes(td, nd.ni_vp, ts, 2, tptr == NULL);
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set the access and modification times of a file.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct futimes_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
struct timeval *tptr;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_futimes(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct futimes_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
struct timeval *tptr;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_futimes(td, uap->fd, uap->tptr, UIO_USERSPACE));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_futimes(struct thread *td, int fd, struct timeval *tptr,
|
|
|
|
enum uio_seg tptrseg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-08-22 01:46:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct timespec ts[2];
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
error = getutimes(tptr, tptrseg, ts);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1999-08-22 01:46:57 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2015-06-16 13:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
error = getvnode(td, fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_FUTIMES), &fp);
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
Add pathname and/or vnode argument auditing for the following system calls:
quotactl, statfs, fstatfs, fchdir, chdir, chroot, open, mknod, mkfifo,
link, symlink, undelete, unlink, access, eaccess, stat, lstat, pathconf,
readlink, chflags, lchflags, fchflags, chmod, lchmod, fchmod, chown,
lchown, fchown, utimes, lutimes, futimes, truncate, ftruncate, fsync,
rename, mkdir, rmdir, getdirentries, revoke, lgetfh, getfh, extattrctl,
extattr_set_file, extattr_set_link, extattr_get_file, extattr_get_link,
extattr_delete_file, extattr_delete_link, extattr_list_file, extattr_list_link.
In many cases the pathname and vnode auditing is done within namei lookup
instead of directly in the system call.
Audit the remaining arguments to these system calls:
fstatfs, fchdir, open, mknod, chflags, lchflags, fchflags, chmod, lchmod,
fchmod, chown, lchown, fchown, futimes, ftruncate, fsync, mkdir,
getdirentries.
2006-02-22 16:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef AUDIT
|
2008-11-04 22:31:04 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_lock(fp->f_vnode, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
|
2009-07-28 21:52:24 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_VNODE1(fp->f_vnode);
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(fp->f_vnode, 0);
|
Add pathname and/or vnode argument auditing for the following system calls:
quotactl, statfs, fstatfs, fchdir, chdir, chroot, open, mknod, mkfifo,
link, symlink, undelete, unlink, access, eaccess, stat, lstat, pathconf,
readlink, chflags, lchflags, fchflags, chmod, lchmod, fchmod, chown,
lchown, fchown, utimes, lutimes, futimes, truncate, ftruncate, fsync,
rename, mkdir, rmdir, getdirentries, revoke, lgetfh, getfh, extattrctl,
extattr_set_file, extattr_set_link, extattr_get_file, extattr_get_link,
extattr_delete_file, extattr_delete_link, extattr_list_file, extattr_list_link.
In many cases the pathname and vnode auditing is done within namei lookup
instead of directly in the system call.
Audit the remaining arguments to these system calls:
fstatfs, fchdir, open, mknod, chflags, lchflags, fchflags, chmod, lchmod,
fchmod, chown, lchown, fchown, futimes, ftruncate, fsync, mkdir,
getdirentries.
2006-02-22 16:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2003-06-22 08:41:43 +00:00
|
|
|
error = setutimes(td, fp->f_vnode, ts, 2, tptr == NULL);
|
2005-12-20 00:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-23 21:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
sys_futimens(struct thread *td, struct futimens_args *uap)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_futimens(td, uap->fd, uap->times, UIO_USERSPACE));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_futimens(struct thread *td, int fd, struct timespec *tptr,
|
|
|
|
enum uio_seg tptrseg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct timespec ts[2];
|
|
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
|
|
|
int error, flags;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd);
|
|
|
|
error = getutimens(tptr, tptrseg, ts, &flags);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
if (flags & UTIMENS_EXIT)
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
2015-06-16 13:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
error = getvnode(td, fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_FUTIMES), &fp);
|
2015-01-23 21:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef AUDIT
|
|
|
|
vn_lock(fp->f_vnode, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
|
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_VNODE1(fp->f_vnode);
|
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(fp->f_vnode, 0);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
error = setutimes(td, fp->f_vnode, ts, 2, flags & UTIMENS_NULL);
|
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
sys_utimensat(struct thread *td, struct utimensat_args *uap)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_utimensat(td, uap->fd, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->times, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->flag));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_utimensat(struct thread *td, int fd, char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg,
|
|
|
|
struct timespec *tptr, enum uio_seg tptrseg, int flag)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
|
|
|
struct timespec ts[2];
|
2015-04-04 21:47:54 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
2015-01-23 21:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
int error, flags;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (flag & ~AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((error = getutimens(tptr, tptrseg, ts, &flags)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2015-04-04 21:47:54 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&nd, LOOKUP, ((flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) ? NOFOLLOW :
|
|
|
|
FOLLOW) | AUDITVNODE1, pathseg, path, fd,
|
|
|
|
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_FUTIMES), td);
|
2015-01-23 21:07:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We are allowed to call namei() regardless of 2xUTIME_OMIT.
|
|
|
|
* POSIX states:
|
|
|
|
* "If both tv_nsec fields are UTIME_OMIT... EACCESS may be detected."
|
|
|
|
* "Search permission is denied by a component of the path prefix."
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
|
|
if ((flags & UTIMENS_EXIT) == 0)
|
|
|
|
error = setutimes(td, nd.ni_vp, ts, 2, flags & UTIMENS_NULL);
|
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Truncate a file given its path name.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct truncate_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int pad;
|
|
|
|
off_t length;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_truncate(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct truncate_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int pad;
|
|
|
|
off_t length;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_truncate(td, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->length));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_truncate(struct thread *td, char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg, off_t length)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
2012-10-15 18:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
void *rl_cookie;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vattr vattr;
|
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
2012-10-22 17:50:54 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (length < 0)
|
1994-09-02 10:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
return(EINVAL);
|
2012-10-22 17:50:54 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | AUDITVNODE1, pathseg, path, td);
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
vp = nd.ni_vp;
|
2012-10-15 18:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
rl_cookie = vn_rangelock_wlock(vp, 0, OFF_MAX);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0) {
|
2012-10-15 18:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_rangelock_unlock(vp, rl_cookie);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
vrele(vp);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2008-01-10 01:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vp->v_type == VDIR)
|
|
|
|
error = EISDIR;
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the following
operations:
truncate on open() (write)
access() (access)
readlink() (readlink)
chflags(), lchflags(), fchflags() (setflag)
chmod(), fchmod(), lchmod() (setmode)
chown(), fchown(), lchown() (setowner)
utimes(), lutimes(), futimes() (setutimes)
truncate(), ftrunfcate() (write)
revoke() (revoke)
fhopen() (open)
truncate on fhopen() (write)
extattr_set_fd, extattr_set_file() (setextattr)
extattr_get_fd, extattr_get_file() (getextattr)
extattr_delete_fd(), extattr_delete_file() (setextattr)
These entry points permit MAC policies to enforce a variety of
protections on vnodes. More vnode checks to come, especially in
non-native ABIs.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-01 15:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
else if ((error = mac_vnode_check_write(td->td_ucred, NOCRED, vp))) {
|
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the following
operations:
truncate on open() (write)
access() (access)
readlink() (readlink)
chflags(), lchflags(), fchflags() (setflag)
chmod(), fchmod(), lchmod() (setmode)
chown(), fchown(), lchown() (setowner)
utimes(), lutimes(), futimes() (setutimes)
truncate(), ftrunfcate() (write)
revoke() (revoke)
fhopen() (open)
truncate on fhopen() (write)
extattr_set_fd, extattr_set_file() (setextattr)
extattr_get_fd, extattr_get_file() (getextattr)
extattr_delete_fd(), extattr_delete_file() (setextattr)
These entry points permit MAC policies to enforce a variety of
protections on vnodes. More vnode checks to come, especially in
non-native ABIs.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-01 15:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
else if ((error = vn_writechk(vp)) == 0 &&
|
2002-02-27 18:32:23 +00:00
|
|
|
(error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, VWRITE, td->td_ucred, td)) == 0) {
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
vattr.va_size = length;
|
2008-08-28 15:23:18 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, td->td_ucred);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-10-15 18:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
2012-10-15 18:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_rangelock_unlock(vp, rl_cookie);
|
|
|
|
vrele(vp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-06-11 11:16:26 +00:00
|
|
|
#if defined(COMPAT_43)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Truncate a file given its path name.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct otruncate_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
long length;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
otruncate(td, uap)
|
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct otruncate_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
long length;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
struct truncate_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int pad;
|
|
|
|
off_t length;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ nuap;
|
|
|
|
|
2002-12-14 01:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
nuap.path = uap->path;
|
|
|
|
nuap.length = uap->length;
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (sys_truncate(td, &nuap));
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-06-11 11:16:26 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* COMPAT_43 */
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
The lseek(2), mmap(2), truncate(2), ftruncate(2), pread(2), and
pwrite(2) syscalls are wrapped to provide compatibility with pre-7.x
kernels which required padding before the off_t parameter. The
fcntl(2) contains compatibility code to handle kernels before the
struct flock was changed during the 8.x CURRENT development. The
shims were reasonable to allow easier revert to the older kernel at
that time.
Now, two or three major releases later, shims do not serve any
purpose. Such old kernels cannot handle current libc, so revert the
compatibility code.
Make padded syscalls support conditional under the COMPAT6 config
option. For COMPAT32, the syscalls were under COMPAT6 already.
Remove WITHOUT_SYSCALL_COMPAT build option, which only purpose was to
(partially) disable the removed shims.
Reviewed by: jhb, imp (previous versions)
Discussed with: peter
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
2015-04-18 21:50:13 +00:00
|
|
|
#if defined(COMPAT_FREEBSD6)
|
2007-07-04 22:57:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Versions with the pad argument */
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
freebsd6_truncate(struct thread *td, struct freebsd6_truncate_args *uap)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct truncate_args ouap;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ouap.path = uap->path;
|
|
|
|
ouap.length = uap->length;
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (sys_truncate(td, &ouap));
|
2007-07-04 22:57:21 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
freebsd6_ftruncate(struct thread *td, struct freebsd6_ftruncate_args *uap)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ftruncate_args ouap;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ouap.fd = uap->fd;
|
|
|
|
ouap.length = uap->length;
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (sys_ftruncate(td, &ouap));
|
2007-07-04 22:57:21 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
The lseek(2), mmap(2), truncate(2), ftruncate(2), pread(2), and
pwrite(2) syscalls are wrapped to provide compatibility with pre-7.x
kernels which required padding before the off_t parameter. The
fcntl(2) contains compatibility code to handle kernels before the
struct flock was changed during the 8.x CURRENT development. The
shims were reasonable to allow easier revert to the older kernel at
that time.
Now, two or three major releases later, shims do not serve any
purpose. Such old kernels cannot handle current libc, so revert the
compatibility code.
Make padded syscalls support conditional under the COMPAT6 config
option. For COMPAT32, the syscalls were under COMPAT6 already.
Remove WITHOUT_SYSCALL_COMPAT build option, which only purpose was to
(partially) disable the removed shims.
Reviewed by: jhb, imp (previous versions)
Discussed with: peter
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
2015-04-18 21:50:13 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2007-07-04 22:57:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-08-15 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2016-08-15 19:08:51 +00:00
|
|
|
kern_fsync(struct thread *td, int fd, bool fullsync)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
2009-06-08 21:23:54 +00:00
|
|
|
int error, lock_flags;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-08-15 19:08:51 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd);
|
|
|
|
error = getvnode(td, fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_FSYNC), &fp);
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2003-06-22 08:41:43 +00:00
|
|
|
vp = fp->f_vnode;
|
2016-08-15 19:08:51 +00:00
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
|
|
if (!fullsync)
|
|
|
|
/* XXXKIB: compete outstanding aio writes */;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2005-01-24 10:25:44 +00:00
|
|
|
goto drop;
|
2009-06-08 21:23:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (MNT_SHARED_WRITES(mp) ||
|
|
|
|
((mp == NULL) && MNT_SHARED_WRITES(vp->v_mount))) {
|
|
|
|
lock_flags = LK_SHARED;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
lock_flags = LK_EXCLUSIVE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vn_lock(vp, lock_flags | LK_RETRY);
|
2009-07-28 21:52:24 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_VNODE1(vp);
|
2005-01-25 00:40:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vp->v_object != NULL) {
|
2013-02-20 12:03:20 +00:00
|
|
|
VM_OBJECT_WLOCK(vp->v_object);
|
2005-01-25 00:40:01 +00:00
|
|
|
vm_object_page_clean(vp->v_object, 0, 0, 0);
|
2013-02-20 12:03:20 +00:00
|
|
|
VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(vp->v_object);
|
2001-05-19 01:28:09 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-08-15 19:08:51 +00:00
|
|
|
error = fullsync ? VOP_FSYNC(vp, MNT_WAIT, td) : VOP_FDATASYNC(vp, td);
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
2005-01-24 10:25:44 +00:00
|
|
|
drop:
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-15 19:08:51 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Sync an open file.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct fsync_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
sys_fsync(struct thread *td, struct fsync_args *uap)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_fsync(td, uap->fd, true));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
sys_fdatasync(struct thread *td, struct fdatasync_args *uap)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_fsync(td, uap->fd, false));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2007-03-05 13:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
* Rename files. Source and destination must either both be directories, or
|
|
|
|
* both not be directories. If target is a directory, it must be empty.
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rename_args {
|
|
|
|
char *from;
|
|
|
|
char *to;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_rename(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct rename_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *from;
|
|
|
|
char *to;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_renameat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->from, AT_FDCWD,
|
|
|
|
uap->to, UIO_USERSPACE));
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct renameat_args {
|
|
|
|
int oldfd;
|
|
|
|
char *old;
|
|
|
|
int newfd;
|
|
|
|
char *new;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_renameat(struct thread *td, struct renameat_args *uap)
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_renameat(td, uap->oldfd, uap->old, uap->newfd, uap->new,
|
|
|
|
UIO_USERSPACE));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_renameat(struct thread *td, int oldfd, char *old, int newfd, char *new,
|
|
|
|
enum uio_seg pathseg)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2002-10-27 23:23:51 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp = NULL;
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vnode *tvp, *fvp, *tdvp;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata fromnd, tond;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-25 20:42:25 +00:00
|
|
|
again:
|
2000-01-10 00:08:53 +00:00
|
|
|
bwillwrite();
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2011-08-13 09:21:16 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&fromnd, DELETE, LOCKPARENT | LOCKLEAF | SAVESTART |
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDITVNODE1, pathseg, old, oldfd,
|
2015-08-27 15:16:41 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_RENAMEAT_SOURCE), td);
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2013-01-31 22:20:05 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&fromnd, DELETE, WANTPARENT | SAVESTART | AUDITVNODE1,
|
2015-08-27 15:16:41 +00:00
|
|
|
pathseg, old, oldfd,
|
|
|
|
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_RENAMEAT_SOURCE), td);
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&fromnd)) != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_rename_from(td->td_ucred, fromnd.ni_dvp,
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
fromnd.ni_vp, &fromnd.ni_cnd);
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(fromnd.ni_dvp, 0);
|
2006-10-26 13:20:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fromnd.ni_dvp != fromnd.ni_vp)
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(fromnd.ni_vp, 0);
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
fvp = fromnd.ni_vp;
|
2011-08-13 09:21:16 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&tond, RENAME, LOCKPARENT | LOCKLEAF | NOCACHE |
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
SAVESTART | AUDITVNODE2, pathseg, new, newfd,
|
2015-08-27 15:16:41 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_RENAMEAT_TARGET), td);
|
1995-07-31 00:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fromnd.ni_vp->v_type == VDIR)
|
|
|
|
tond.ni_cnd.cn_flags |= WILLBEDIR;
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&tond)) != 0) {
|
1995-11-18 11:35:05 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Translate error code for rename("dir1", "dir2/."). */
|
|
|
|
if (error == EISDIR && fvp->v_type == VDIR)
|
|
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&fromnd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
vrele(fromnd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
vrele(fvp);
|
|
|
|
goto out1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tdvp = tond.ni_dvp;
|
|
|
|
tvp = tond.ni_vp;
|
2014-09-25 20:42:25 +00:00
|
|
|
error = vn_start_write(fvp, &mp, V_NOWAIT);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&fromnd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&tond, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
|
|
if (tvp != NULL)
|
|
|
|
vput(tvp);
|
|
|
|
if (tdvp == tvp)
|
|
|
|
vrele(tdvp);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
vput(tdvp);
|
|
|
|
vrele(fromnd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
vrele(fvp);
|
|
|
|
vrele(tond.ni_startdir);
|
|
|
|
if (fromnd.ni_startdir != NULL)
|
|
|
|
vrele(fromnd.ni_startdir);
|
|
|
|
error = vn_start_write(NULL, &mp, V_XSLEEP | PCATCH);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tvp != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (fvp->v_type == VDIR && tvp->v_type != VDIR) {
|
|
|
|
error = ENOTDIR;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
} else if (fvp->v_type != VDIR && tvp->v_type == VDIR) {
|
|
|
|
error = EISDIR;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Merge Capsicum overhaul:
- Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor
has set of its own capability rights.
- The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and
should not be used in new code.
- The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of
cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor
without creating a new one.
- The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2).
- If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed
ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed
ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall.
- If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls
that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive
them with cap_fcntls_get(2).
- To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was
heavly modified.
- The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to
recognize new syscalls.
- Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide
backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes
that are described in detail below:
CAP_CREATE old behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
- Allow for linkat(2).
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
CAP_CREATE new behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
Added CAP_LINKAT:
- Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit.
- Allow to be target for renameat(2).
Added CAP_SYMLINKAT:
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object.
- Allow to be source for renameat(2).
Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory.
Added CAP_RENAMEAT:
- Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall.
Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR):
- Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object.
- Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this
call.
Removed CAP_MAPEXEC.
CAP_MMAP old behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and
PROT_WRITE.
CAP_MMAP new behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE.
Added CAP_MMAP_R:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ).
Added CAP_MMAP_W:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_X:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RW:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_RX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_WX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RWX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT.
Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT.
Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT.
CAP_READ old behaviour:
- Allow pread(2).
- Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_READ new behaviour:
- Allow read(2), readv(2).
- Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
CAP_WRITE old behaviour:
- Allow pwrite(2).
- Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_WRITE new behaviour:
- Allow write(2), writev(2).
- Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
Added convinient defines:
#define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL)
#define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W)
#define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_RECV CAP_READ
#define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE
#define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \
(CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \
CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
#define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \
(CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \
CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \
CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
Added defines for backward API compatibility:
#define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X
#define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT
#define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT
#define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT
#define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de>
Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan
ABI compatibility discussed with: kib
2013-03-02 00:53:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CAPABILITIES
|
2013-03-02 09:58:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (newfd != AT_FDCWD) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the target already exists we require CAP_UNLINKAT
|
|
|
|
* from 'newfd'.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
error = cap_check(&tond.ni_filecaps.fc_rights,
|
|
|
|
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_UNLINKAT));
|
2013-03-02 09:58:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Merge Capsicum overhaul:
- Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor
has set of its own capability rights.
- The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and
should not be used in new code.
- The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of
cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor
without creating a new one.
- The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2).
- If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed
ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed
ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall.
- If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls
that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive
them with cap_fcntls_get(2).
- To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was
heavly modified.
- The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to
recognize new syscalls.
- Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide
backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes
that are described in detail below:
CAP_CREATE old behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
- Allow for linkat(2).
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
CAP_CREATE new behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
Added CAP_LINKAT:
- Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit.
- Allow to be target for renameat(2).
Added CAP_SYMLINKAT:
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object.
- Allow to be source for renameat(2).
Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory.
Added CAP_RENAMEAT:
- Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall.
Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR):
- Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object.
- Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this
call.
Removed CAP_MAPEXEC.
CAP_MMAP old behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and
PROT_WRITE.
CAP_MMAP new behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE.
Added CAP_MMAP_R:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ).
Added CAP_MMAP_W:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_X:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RW:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_RX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_WX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RWX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT.
Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT.
Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT.
CAP_READ old behaviour:
- Allow pread(2).
- Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_READ new behaviour:
- Allow read(2), readv(2).
- Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
CAP_WRITE old behaviour:
- Allow pwrite(2).
- Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_WRITE new behaviour:
- Allow write(2), writev(2).
- Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
Added convinient defines:
#define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL)
#define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W)
#define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_RECV CAP_READ
#define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE
#define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \
(CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \
CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
#define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \
(CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \
CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \
CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
Added defines for backward API compatibility:
#define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X
#define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT
#define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT
#define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT
#define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de>
Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan
ABI compatibility discussed with: kib
2013-03-02 00:53:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-09-01 10:11:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fvp == tdvp) {
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
2008-09-01 10:11:39 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2002-09-10 11:09:13 +00:00
|
|
|
* If the source is the same as the destination (that is, if they
|
|
|
|
* are links to the same vnode), then there is nothing to do.
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-09-10 11:09:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fvp == tvp)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
error = -1;
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
|
|
else
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_rename_to(td->td_ucred, tdvp,
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
tond.ni_vp, fromnd.ni_dvp == tdvp, &tond.ni_cnd);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_RENAME(fromnd.ni_dvp, fromnd.ni_vp, &fromnd.ni_cnd,
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
tond.ni_dvp, tond.ni_vp, &tond.ni_cnd);
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&fromnd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&tond, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&fromnd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&tond, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tvp != NULL)
|
2005-04-11 09:19:08 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(tvp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tdvp == tvp)
|
|
|
|
vrele(tdvp);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
vput(tdvp);
|
|
|
|
vrele(fromnd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
vrele(fvp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vrele(tond.ni_startdir);
|
2002-10-27 23:23:51 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
2005-09-01 21:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
out1:
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fromnd.ni_startdir)
|
|
|
|
vrele(fromnd.ni_startdir);
|
|
|
|
if (error == -1)
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Make a directory file.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mkdir_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_mkdir(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct mkdir_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_mkdirat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->mode));
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct mkdirat_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
mode_t mode;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_mkdirat(struct thread *td, struct mkdirat_args *uap)
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (kern_mkdirat(td, uap->fd, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->mode));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_mkdirat(struct thread *td, int fd, char *path, enum uio_seg segflg,
|
|
|
|
int mode)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vattr vattr;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_MODE(mode);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
restart:
|
2000-01-10 00:08:53 +00:00
|
|
|
bwillwrite();
|
2014-12-18 10:01:12 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&nd, CREATE, LOCKPARENT | SAVENAME | AUDITVNODE1 |
|
|
|
|
NOCACHE, segflg, path, fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_MKDIRAT),
|
|
|
|
td);
|
1995-07-31 00:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
nd.ni_cnd.cn_flags |= WILLBEDIR;
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
vp = nd.ni_vp;
|
|
|
|
if (vp != NULL) {
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2002-06-28 20:06:47 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* XXX namei called with LOCKPARENT but not LOCKLEAF has
|
|
|
|
* the strange behaviour of leaving the vnode unlocked
|
|
|
|
* if the target is the same vnode as the parent.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (vp == nd.ni_dvp)
|
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
2006-02-01 00:25:26 +00:00
|
|
|
vrele(vp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EEXIST);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vn_start_write(nd.ni_dvp, &mp, V_NOWAIT) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
if ((error = vn_start_write(NULL, &mp, V_XSLEEP | PCATCH)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
goto restart;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
|
|
|
|
vattr.va_type = VDIR;
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
vattr.va_mode = (mode & ACCESSPERMS) &~ td->td_proc->p_fd->fd_cmask;
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_create(td->td_ucred, nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd,
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
&vattr);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_MKDIR(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_vp, &nd.ni_cnd, &vattr);
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
1998-05-07 04:58:58 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_vp);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Remove a directory file.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rmdir_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_rmdir(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rmdir_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
2002-09-01 20:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 18:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (kern_rmdirat(td, AT_FDCWD, uap->path, UIO_USERSPACE));
|
Implement the
openat(2), faccessat(2), fchmodat(2), fchownat(2), fstatat(2),
futimesat(2), linkat(2), mkdirat(2), mkfifoat(2), mknodat(2),
readlinkat(2), renameat(2), symlinkat(2)
syscalls.
Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho
2008-03-31 12:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_rmdirat(struct thread *td, int fd, char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
restart:
|
2000-01-10 00:08:53 +00:00
|
|
|
bwillwrite();
|
2013-01-31 22:20:05 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT_ATRIGHTS(&nd, DELETE, LOCKPARENT | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNODE1,
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
pathseg, path, fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_UNLINKAT), td);
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
vp = nd.ni_vp;
|
|
|
|
if (vp->v_type != VDIR) {
|
|
|
|
error = ENOTDIR;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* No rmdir "." please.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (nd.ni_dvp == vp) {
|
|
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The root of a mounted filesystem cannot be deleted.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-08-04 10:29:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vp->v_vflag & VV_ROOT) {
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
error = EBUSY;
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_unlink(td->td_ucred, nd.ni_dvp, vp,
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
&nd.ni_cnd);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2002-10-19 20:25:57 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vn_start_write(nd.ni_dvp, &mp, V_NOWAIT) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2006-02-01 00:25:26 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (nd.ni_dvp == vp)
|
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
if ((error = vn_start_write(NULL, &mp, V_XSLEEP | PCATCH)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
goto restart;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-05-11 11:17:44 +00:00
|
|
|
vfs_notify_upper(vp, VFS_NOTIFY_UPPER_UNLINK);
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_RMDIR(nd.ni_dvp, nd.ni_vp, &nd.ni_cnd);
|
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2006-02-01 00:25:26 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
1998-05-07 04:58:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (nd.ni_dvp == vp)
|
|
|
|
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef COMPAT_43
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2002-05-16 21:28:32 +00:00
|
|
|
* Read a block of directory entries in a filesystem independent format.
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ogetdirentries_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
char *buf;
|
|
|
|
u_int count;
|
|
|
|
long *basep;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-04-01 11:16:29 +00:00
|
|
|
ogetdirentries(struct thread *td, struct ogetdirentries_args *uap)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
long loff;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = kern_ogetdirentries(td, uap, &loff);
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
error = copyout(&loff, uap->basep, sizeof(long));
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_ogetdirentries(struct thread *td, struct ogetdirentries_args *uap,
|
|
|
|
long *ploff)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
1998-11-03 08:01:48 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
|
|
|
struct uio auio, kuio;
|
|
|
|
struct iovec aiov, kiov;
|
|
|
|
struct dirent *dp, *edp;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
caddr_t dirbuf;
|
2012-10-22 17:50:54 +00:00
|
|
|
int error, eofflag, readcnt;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
long loff;
|
2012-07-02 21:01:03 +00:00
|
|
|
off_t foffset;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-08-10 22:14:18 +00:00
|
|
|
/* XXX arbitrary sanity limit on `count'. */
|
2002-12-14 01:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (uap->count > 64 * 1024)
|
2001-08-10 22:14:18 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
2015-06-16 13:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
error = getvnode(td, uap->fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ), &fp);
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((fp->f_flag & FREAD) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EBADF);
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-06-22 08:41:43 +00:00
|
|
|
vp = fp->f_vnode;
|
2012-07-02 21:01:03 +00:00
|
|
|
foffset = foffset_lock(fp, 0);
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
unionread:
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vp->v_type != VDIR) {
|
2012-07-02 21:01:03 +00:00
|
|
|
foffset_unlock(fp, foffset, 0);
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-12-14 01:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
aiov.iov_base = uap->buf;
|
|
|
|
aiov.iov_len = uap->count;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
auio.uio_iov = &aiov;
|
|
|
|
auio.uio_iovcnt = 1;
|
|
|
|
auio.uio_rw = UIO_READ;
|
|
|
|
auio.uio_segflg = UIO_USERSPACE;
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
auio.uio_td = td;
|
2002-12-14 01:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
auio.uio_resid = uap->count;
|
2009-02-13 18:18:14 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_lock(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
|
2012-07-02 21:01:03 +00:00
|
|
|
loff = auio.uio_offset = foffset;
|
2002-08-01 20:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_readdir(td->td_ucred, vp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
2012-07-02 21:01:03 +00:00
|
|
|
foffset_unlock(fp, foffset, FOF_NOUPDATE);
|
2002-08-01 20:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
# if (BYTE_ORDER != LITTLE_ENDIAN)
|
|
|
|
if (vp->v_mount->mnt_maxsymlinklen <= 0) {
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_READDIR(vp, &auio, fp->f_cred, &eofflag,
|
|
|
|
NULL, NULL);
|
2012-07-02 21:01:03 +00:00
|
|
|
foffset = auio.uio_offset;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
kuio = auio;
|
|
|
|
kuio.uio_iov = &kiov;
|
|
|
|
kuio.uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
|
2002-12-14 01:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
kiov.iov_len = uap->count;
|
2008-10-23 15:53:51 +00:00
|
|
|
dirbuf = malloc(uap->count, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
kiov.iov_base = dirbuf;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_READDIR(vp, &kuio, fp->f_cred, &eofflag,
|
|
|
|
NULL, NULL);
|
2012-07-02 21:01:03 +00:00
|
|
|
foffset = kuio.uio_offset;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
2002-12-14 01:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
readcnt = uap->count - kuio.uio_resid;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
edp = (struct dirent *)&dirbuf[readcnt];
|
|
|
|
for (dp = (struct dirent *)dirbuf; dp < edp; ) {
|
|
|
|
# if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The expected low byte of
|
|
|
|
* dp->d_namlen is our dp->d_type.
|
|
|
|
* The high MBZ byte of dp->d_namlen
|
|
|
|
* is our dp->d_namlen.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
dp->d_type = dp->d_namlen;
|
|
|
|
dp->d_namlen = 0;
|
|
|
|
# else
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The dp->d_type is the high byte
|
|
|
|
* of the expected dp->d_namlen,
|
|
|
|
* so must be zero'ed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
dp->d_type = 0;
|
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
if (dp->d_reclen > 0) {
|
|
|
|
dp = (struct dirent *)
|
|
|
|
((char *)dp + dp->d_reclen);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
error = EIO;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (dp >= edp)
|
|
|
|
error = uiomove(dirbuf, readcnt, &auio);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-10-23 15:53:51 +00:00
|
|
|
free(dirbuf, M_TEMP);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
2012-07-02 21:01:03 +00:00
|
|
|
foffset_unlock(fp, foffset, 0);
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-02-19 10:56:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (uap->count == auio.uio_resid &&
|
|
|
|
(vp->v_vflag & VV_ROOT) &&
|
|
|
|
(vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_UNION)) {
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *tvp = vp;
|
|
|
|
vp = vp->v_mount->mnt_vnodecovered;
|
|
|
|
VREF(vp);
|
|
|
|
fp->f_vnode = vp;
|
|
|
|
fp->f_data = vp;
|
2012-07-02 21:01:03 +00:00
|
|
|
foffset = 0;
|
2007-02-19 10:56:09 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(tvp);
|
|
|
|
goto unionread;
|
1999-02-27 07:06:05 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
2012-07-02 21:01:03 +00:00
|
|
|
foffset_unlock(fp, foffset, 0);
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
2002-12-14 01:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
td->td_retval[0] = uap->count - auio.uio_resid;
|
2011-04-01 11:16:29 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
*ploff = loff;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* COMPAT_43 */
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2002-05-16 21:28:32 +00:00
|
|
|
* Read a block of directory entries in a filesystem independent format.
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct getdirentries_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
char *buf;
|
|
|
|
u_int count;
|
|
|
|
long *basep;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_getdirentries(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct getdirentries_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
char *buf;
|
|
|
|
u_int count;
|
|
|
|
long *basep;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
2008-10-22 21:55:48 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
long base;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-05-24 08:00:26 +00:00
|
|
|
error = kern_getdirentries(td, uap->fd, uap->buf, uap->count, &base,
|
|
|
|
NULL, UIO_USERSPACE);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2008-10-22 21:55:48 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
if (uap->basep != NULL)
|
|
|
|
error = copyout(&base, uap->basep, sizeof(long));
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_getdirentries(struct thread *td, int fd, char *buf, u_int count,
|
2012-05-24 08:00:26 +00:00
|
|
|
long *basep, ssize_t *residp, enum uio_seg bufseg)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
1998-11-03 08:01:48 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
|
|
|
struct uio auio;
|
|
|
|
struct iovec aiov;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
long loff;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
int error, eofflag;
|
2012-07-02 21:01:03 +00:00
|
|
|
off_t foffset;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd);
|
2012-03-09 21:31:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (count > IOSIZE_MAX)
|
2008-12-27 10:13:43 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
2012-03-09 21:31:12 +00:00
|
|
|
auio.uio_resid = count;
|
2015-06-16 13:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
error = getvnode(td, fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ), &fp);
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((fp->f_flag & FREAD) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EBADF);
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-06-22 08:41:43 +00:00
|
|
|
vp = fp->f_vnode;
|
2012-07-02 21:01:03 +00:00
|
|
|
foffset = foffset_lock(fp, 0);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
unionread:
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vp->v_type != VDIR) {
|
2005-01-24 10:25:44 +00:00
|
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-10-22 21:55:48 +00:00
|
|
|
aiov.iov_base = buf;
|
|
|
|
aiov.iov_len = count;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
auio.uio_iov = &aiov;
|
|
|
|
auio.uio_iovcnt = 1;
|
|
|
|
auio.uio_rw = UIO_READ;
|
2012-05-24 08:00:26 +00:00
|
|
|
auio.uio_segflg = bufseg;
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
auio.uio_td = td;
|
2009-02-13 18:18:14 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_lock(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
|
2009-07-28 21:52:24 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG_VNODE1(vp);
|
2012-07-02 21:01:03 +00:00
|
|
|
loff = auio.uio_offset = foffset;
|
2002-08-01 20:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_readdir(td->td_ucred, vp);
|
2002-08-01 20:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
error = VOP_READDIR(vp, &auio, fp->f_cred, &eofflag, NULL,
|
|
|
|
NULL);
|
2012-07-02 21:01:03 +00:00
|
|
|
foffset = auio.uio_offset;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
2007-02-19 10:56:09 +00:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-10-22 21:55:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if (count == auio.uio_resid &&
|
2007-02-19 10:56:09 +00:00
|
|
|
(vp->v_vflag & VV_ROOT) &&
|
|
|
|
(vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_UNION)) {
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *tvp = vp;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-02-19 10:56:09 +00:00
|
|
|
vp = vp->v_mount->mnt_vnodecovered;
|
|
|
|
VREF(vp);
|
|
|
|
fp->f_vnode = vp;
|
|
|
|
fp->f_data = vp;
|
2012-07-02 21:01:03 +00:00
|
|
|
foffset = 0;
|
2007-02-19 10:56:09 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(tvp);
|
|
|
|
goto unionread;
|
1999-02-27 07:06:05 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-13 14:44:15 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
2008-10-22 21:55:48 +00:00
|
|
|
*basep = loff;
|
2012-05-24 08:00:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (residp != NULL)
|
|
|
|
*residp = auio.uio_resid;
|
2008-10-22 21:55:48 +00:00
|
|
|
td->td_retval[0] = count - auio.uio_resid;
|
2005-01-24 10:25:44 +00:00
|
|
|
fail:
|
2012-07-02 21:01:03 +00:00
|
|
|
foffset_unlock(fp, foffset, 0);
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-03-05 13:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct getdents_args {
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
char *buf;
|
|
|
|
size_t count;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_getdents(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct getdents_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
char *buf;
|
|
|
|
u_int count;
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct getdirentries_args ap;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
ap.fd = uap->fd;
|
|
|
|
ap.buf = uap->buf;
|
|
|
|
ap.count = uap->count;
|
|
|
|
ap.basep = NULL;
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return (sys_getdirentries(td, &ap));
|
1998-05-11 03:55:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set the mode mask for creation of filesystem nodes.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct umask_args {
|
|
|
|
int newmask;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_umask(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
struct umask_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int newmask;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-05-18 13:43:33 +00:00
|
|
|
struct filedesc *fdp;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
fdp = td->td_proc->p_fd;
|
2015-05-18 13:43:33 +00:00
|
|
|
FILEDESC_XLOCK(fdp);
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
td->td_retval[0] = fdp->fd_cmask;
|
2002-12-14 01:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
fdp->fd_cmask = uap->newmask & ALLPERMS;
|
2015-05-18 13:43:33 +00:00
|
|
|
FILEDESC_XUNLOCK(fdp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2007-03-05 13:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
* Void all references to file by ripping underlying filesystem away from
|
|
|
|
* vnode.
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct revoke_args {
|
|
|
|
char *path;
|
|
|
|
};
|
1995-11-12 06:43:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_revoke(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct revoke_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
char *path;
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-07-11 22:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vattr vattr;
|
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-31 22:20:05 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNODE1, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->path, td);
|
1999-01-27 21:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
vp = nd.ni_vp;
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
2010-07-06 18:20:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vp->v_type != VCHR || vp->v_rdev == NULL) {
|
2005-01-24 10:25:44 +00:00
|
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
2005-03-13 11:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
1999-01-24 06:28:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the following
operations:
truncate on open() (write)
access() (access)
readlink() (readlink)
chflags(), lchflags(), fchflags() (setflag)
chmod(), fchmod(), lchmod() (setmode)
chown(), fchown(), lchown() (setowner)
utimes(), lutimes(), futimes() (setutimes)
truncate(), ftrunfcate() (write)
revoke() (revoke)
fhopen() (open)
truncate on fhopen() (write)
extattr_set_fd, extattr_set_file() (setextattr)
extattr_get_fd, extattr_get_file() (getextattr)
extattr_delete_fd(), extattr_delete_file() (setextattr)
These entry points permit MAC policies to enforce a variety of
protections on vnodes. More vnode checks to come, especially in
non-native ABIs.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-01 15:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_revoke(td->td_ucred, vp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2005-03-13 11:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the following
operations:
truncate on open() (write)
access() (access)
readlink() (readlink)
chflags(), lchflags(), fchflags() (setflag)
chmod(), fchmod(), lchmod() (setmode)
chown(), fchown(), lchown() (setowner)
utimes(), lutimes(), futimes() (setutimes)
truncate(), ftrunfcate() (write)
revoke() (revoke)
fhopen() (open)
truncate on fhopen() (write)
extattr_set_fd, extattr_set_file() (setextattr)
extattr_get_fd, extattr_get_file() (getextattr)
extattr_delete_fd(), extattr_delete_file() (setextattr)
These entry points permit MAC policies to enforce a variety of
protections on vnodes. More vnode checks to come, especially in
non-native ABIs.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-01 15:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2008-08-28 15:23:18 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vattr, td->td_ucred);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2005-03-13 11:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2002-02-27 18:32:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (td->td_ucred->cr_uid != vattr.va_uid) {
|
2007-06-12 00:12:01 +00:00
|
|
|
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2005-03-13 11:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2001-10-01 20:01:07 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-08-26 14:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vcount(vp) > 1)
|
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_REVOKE(vp, REVOKEALL);
|
2005-03-13 11:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2005-01-24 10:25:44 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2011-08-11 12:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
* Convert a user file descriptor to a kernel file entry and check that, if it
|
|
|
|
* is a capability, the correct rights are present. A reference on the file
|
|
|
|
* entry is held upon returning.
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2015-06-16 13:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
getvnode(struct thread *td, int fd, cap_rights_t *rightsp, struct file **fpp)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
2011-08-11 12:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 13:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
error = fget_unlocked(td->td_proc->p_fd, fd, rightsp, &fp, NULL);
|
Merge Capsicum overhaul:
- Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor
has set of its own capability rights.
- The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and
should not be used in new code.
- The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of
cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor
without creating a new one.
- The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2).
- If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed
ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed
ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall.
- If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls
that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive
them with cap_fcntls_get(2).
- To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was
heavly modified.
- The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to
recognize new syscalls.
- Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide
backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes
that are described in detail below:
CAP_CREATE old behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
- Allow for linkat(2).
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
CAP_CREATE new behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
Added CAP_LINKAT:
- Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit.
- Allow to be target for renameat(2).
Added CAP_SYMLINKAT:
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object.
- Allow to be source for renameat(2).
Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory.
Added CAP_RENAMEAT:
- Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall.
Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR):
- Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object.
- Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this
call.
Removed CAP_MAPEXEC.
CAP_MMAP old behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and
PROT_WRITE.
CAP_MMAP new behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE.
Added CAP_MMAP_R:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ).
Added CAP_MMAP_W:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_X:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RW:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_RX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_WX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RWX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT.
Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT.
Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT.
CAP_READ old behaviour:
- Allow pread(2).
- Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_READ new behaviour:
- Allow read(2), readv(2).
- Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
CAP_WRITE old behaviour:
- Allow pwrite(2).
- Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_WRITE new behaviour:
- Allow write(2), writev(2).
- Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
Added convinient defines:
#define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL)
#define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W)
#define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_RECV CAP_READ
#define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE
#define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \
(CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \
CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
#define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \
(CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \
CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \
CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
Added defines for backward API compatibility:
#define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X
#define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT
#define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT
#define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT
#define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de>
Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan
ABI compatibility discussed with: kib
2013-03-02 00:53:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2011-08-11 12:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2011-11-24 20:34:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The file could be not of the vnode type, or it may be not
|
|
|
|
* yet fully initialized, in which case the f_vnode pointer
|
|
|
|
* may be set, but f_ops is still badfileops. E.g.,
|
|
|
|
* devfs_open() transiently create such situation to
|
|
|
|
* facilitate csw d_fdopen().
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Dupfdopen() handling in kern_openat() installs the
|
|
|
|
* half-baked file into the process descriptor table, allowing
|
|
|
|
* other thread to dereference it. Guard against the race by
|
|
|
|
* checking f_ops.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (fp->f_vnode == NULL || fp->f_ops == &badfileops) {
|
2015-06-16 13:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
2011-08-11 12:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
2002-01-13 11:58:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
*fpp = fp;
|
2011-08-11 12:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-07-04 12:20:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-08-11 12:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2007-03-05 13:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
* Get an (NFS) file handle.
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2004-04-05 10:15:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct lgetfh_args {
|
|
|
|
char *fname;
|
|
|
|
fhandle_t *fhp;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_lgetfh(td, uap)
|
2004-04-05 10:15:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
|
|
|
register struct lgetfh_args *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
|
|
|
fhandle_t fh;
|
|
|
|
register struct vnode *vp;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_GETFH);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2004-04-05 10:15:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2013-01-31 22:20:05 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNODE1, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->fname, td);
|
2004-04-05 10:15:53 +00:00
|
|
|
error = namei(&nd);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2004-04-05 10:15:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
|
|
vp = nd.ni_vp;
|
|
|
|
bzero(&fh, sizeof(fh));
|
|
|
|
fh.fh_fsid = vp->v_mount->mnt_stat.f_fsid;
|
2007-02-15 22:08:35 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_VPTOFH(vp, &fh.fh_fid);
|
2004-04-05 10:15:53 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
error = copyout(&fh, uap->fhp, sizeof (fh));
|
2004-04-05 10:15:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct getfh_args {
|
|
|
|
char *fname;
|
|
|
|
fhandle_t *fhp;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_getfh(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct getfh_args *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
|
|
|
fhandle_t fh;
|
|
|
|
register struct vnode *vp;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_GETFH);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2013-01-31 22:20:05 +00:00
|
|
|
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNODE1, UIO_USERSPACE,
|
|
|
|
uap->fname, td);
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
error = namei(&nd);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1999-12-15 23:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
vp = nd.ni_vp;
|
|
|
|
bzero(&fh, sizeof(fh));
|
|
|
|
fh.fh_fsid = vp->v_mount->mnt_stat.f_fsid;
|
2007-02-15 22:08:35 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_VPTOFH(vp, &fh.fh_fid);
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
error = copyout(&fh, uap->fhp, sizeof (fh));
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
* syscall for the rpc.lockd to use to translate a NFS file handle into an
|
|
|
|
* open descriptor.
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
* warning: do not remove the priv_check() call or this becomes one giant
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
* security hole.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct fhopen_args {
|
|
|
|
const struct fhandle *u_fhp;
|
|
|
|
int flags;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_fhopen(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
struct fhopen_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct fhandle *u_fhp;
|
|
|
|
int flags;
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
|
|
|
struct fhandle fhp;
|
|
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
2012-07-31 18:25:00 +00:00
|
|
|
int fmode, error;
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
int indx;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_FHOPEN);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2012-06-08 18:32:09 +00:00
|
|
|
indx = -1;
|
2002-12-14 01:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
fmode = FFLAGS(uap->flags);
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/* why not allow a non-read/write open for our lockd? */
|
|
|
|
if (((fmode & (FREAD | FWRITE)) == 0) || (fmode & O_CREAT))
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
2002-12-14 01:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
error = copyin(uap->u_fhp, &fhp, sizeof(fhp));
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
return(error);
|
|
|
|
/* find the mount point */
|
2008-11-29 13:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
mp = vfs_busyfs(&fhp.fh_fsid);
|
2006-03-31 03:54:20 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mp == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return (ESTALE);
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/* now give me my vnode, it gets returned to me locked */
|
2011-05-22 01:07:54 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VFS_FHTOVP(mp, &fhp.fh_fid, LK_EXCLUSIVE, &vp);
|
2008-11-29 13:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
vfs_unbusy(mp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2012-06-08 18:32:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2005-01-24 23:53:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-06-13 21:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
error = falloc_noinstall(td, &fp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
2012-06-08 18:32:09 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2012-06-13 21:22:35 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* An extra reference on `fp' has been held for us by
|
|
|
|
* falloc_noinstall().
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-06-13 21:32:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-06-08 18:32:09 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INVARIANTS
|
|
|
|
td->td_dupfd = -1;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
error = vn_open_vnode(vp, fmode, td->td_ucred, td, fp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
2012-06-08 18:32:09 +00:00
|
|
|
KASSERT(fp->f_ops == &badfileops,
|
|
|
|
("VOP_OPEN in fhopen() set f_ops"));
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(td->td_dupfd < 0,
|
|
|
|
("fhopen() encountered fdopen()"));
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-06-08 18:32:09 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
goto bad;
|
2001-10-24 18:32:17 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-06-08 18:32:09 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INVARIANTS
|
|
|
|
td->td_dupfd = 0;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
fp->f_vnode = vp;
|
|
|
|
fp->f_seqcount = 1;
|
2012-07-31 18:25:00 +00:00
|
|
|
finit(fp, (fmode & FMASK) | (fp->f_flag & FHASLOCK), DTYPE_VNODE, vp,
|
|
|
|
&vnops);
|
2012-06-08 18:32:09 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((fmode & O_TRUNC) != 0) {
|
2012-06-08 18:32:09 +00:00
|
|
|
error = fo_truncate(fp, 0, td->td_ucred, td);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2012-06-08 18:32:09 +00:00
|
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Merge Capsicum overhaul:
- Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor
has set of its own capability rights.
- The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and
should not be used in new code.
- The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of
cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor
without creating a new one.
- The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2).
- If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed
ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed
ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall.
- If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls
that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive
them with cap_fcntls_get(2).
- To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was
heavly modified.
- The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to
recognize new syscalls.
- Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide
backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes
that are described in detail below:
CAP_CREATE old behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
- Allow for linkat(2).
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
CAP_CREATE new behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
Added CAP_LINKAT:
- Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit.
- Allow to be target for renameat(2).
Added CAP_SYMLINKAT:
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object.
- Allow to be source for renameat(2).
Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory.
Added CAP_RENAMEAT:
- Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall.
Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR):
- Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object.
- Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this
call.
Removed CAP_MAPEXEC.
CAP_MMAP old behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and
PROT_WRITE.
CAP_MMAP new behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE.
Added CAP_MMAP_R:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ).
Added CAP_MMAP_W:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_X:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RW:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_RX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_WX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RWX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT.
Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT.
Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT.
CAP_READ old behaviour:
- Allow pread(2).
- Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_READ new behaviour:
- Allow read(2), readv(2).
- Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
CAP_WRITE old behaviour:
- Allow pwrite(2).
- Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_WRITE new behaviour:
- Allow write(2), writev(2).
- Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
Added convinient defines:
#define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL)
#define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W)
#define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_RECV CAP_READ
#define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE
#define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \
(CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \
CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
#define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \
(CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \
CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \
CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
Added defines for backward API compatibility:
#define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X
#define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT
#define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT
#define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT
#define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de>
Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan
ABI compatibility discussed with: kib
2013-03-02 00:53:12 +00:00
|
|
|
error = finstall(td, fp, &indx, fmode, NULL);
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
bad:
|
2012-06-08 18:32:09 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
|
|
|
td->td_retval[0] = indx;
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-14 19:13:59 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Stat an (NFS) file handle.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct fhstat_args {
|
|
|
|
struct fhandle *u_fhp;
|
|
|
|
struct stat *sb;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_fhstat(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
register struct fhstat_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
struct fhandle *u_fhp;
|
|
|
|
struct stat *sb;
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct stat sb;
|
2012-05-24 08:00:26 +00:00
|
|
|
struct fhandle fh;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = copyin(uap->u_fhp, &fh, sizeof(fh));
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
error = kern_fhstat(td, fh, &sb);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
error = copyout(&sb, uap->sb, sizeof(sb));
|
2012-05-24 08:00:26 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_fhstat(struct thread *td, struct fhandle fh, struct stat *sb)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_FHSTAT);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2008-11-29 13:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((mp = vfs_busyfs(&fh.fh_fsid)) == NULL)
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
return (ESTALE);
|
2011-05-22 01:07:54 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VFS_FHTOVP(mp, &fh.fh_fid, LK_EXCLUSIVE, &vp);
|
2008-11-29 13:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
vfs_unbusy(mp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2012-05-24 08:00:26 +00:00
|
|
|
error = vn_stat(vp, sb, td->td_ucred, NOCRED, td);
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-14 19:13:59 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Implement fstatfs() for (NFS) file handles.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
|
|
|
|
struct fhstatfs_args {
|
|
|
|
struct fhandle *u_fhp;
|
|
|
|
struct statfs *buf;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_fhstatfs(td, uap)
|
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct thread *td;
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
struct fhstatfs_args /* {
|
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
struct fhandle *u_fhp;
|
|
|
|
struct statfs *buf;
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
} */ *uap;
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct statfs sf;
|
|
|
|
fhandle_t fh;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-05-27 19:15:46 +00:00
|
|
|
error = copyin(uap->u_fhp, &fh, sizeof(fhandle_t));
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
error = kern_fhstatfs(td, fh, &sf);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2005-05-27 19:15:46 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
return (copyout(&sf, uap->buf, sizeof(sf)));
|
2005-02-07 18:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
kern_fhstatfs(struct thread *td, fhandle_t fh, struct statfs *buf)
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2004-06-07 12:19:55 +00:00
|
|
|
struct statfs *sp;
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
|
|
|
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_FHSTATFS);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2008-11-29 13:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((mp = vfs_busyfs(&fh.fh_fsid)) == NULL)
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
return (ESTALE);
|
2011-05-22 01:07:54 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VFS_FHTOVP(mp, &fh.fh_fid, LK_EXCLUSIVE, &vp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
2008-11-29 13:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
vfs_unbusy(mp);
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
2005-05-28 12:58:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-02-22 09:52:25 +00:00
|
|
|
vput(vp);
|
2006-03-21 23:58:37 +00:00
|
|
|
error = prison_canseemount(td->td_ucred, mp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2006-03-21 23:58:37 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2002-07-31 01:27:33 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_mount_check_stat(td->td_ucred, mp);
|
2013-09-05 00:19:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2006-03-21 23:58:37 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2002-07-31 01:27:33 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set these in case the underlying filesystem fails to do so.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-02-23 05:18:07 +00:00
|
|
|
sp = &mp->mnt_stat;
|
2003-11-12 08:01:40 +00:00
|
|
|
sp->f_version = STATFS_VERSION;
|
|
|
|
sp->f_namemax = NAME_MAX;
|
|
|
|
sp->f_flags = mp->mnt_flag & MNT_VISFLAGMASK;
|
2009-05-11 15:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VFS_STATFS(mp, sp);
|
2006-09-20 00:32:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
|
|
|
*buf = *sp;
|
2006-03-21 23:58:37 +00:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2008-11-29 13:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
vfs_unbusy(mp);
|
2006-03-21 23:58:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1999-09-11 00:46:08 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-04-18 16:32:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-11-14 18:00:15 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2011-04-18 16:32:22 +00:00
|
|
|
kern_posix_fallocate(struct thread *td, int fd, off_t offset, off_t len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
|
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
2011-04-19 16:36:24 +00:00
|
|
|
off_t olen, ooffset;
|
2012-10-22 21:14:26 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
2011-04-18 16:32:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-12 17:31:38 +00:00
|
|
|
if (offset < 0 || len <= 0)
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
/* Check for wrap. */
|
|
|
|
if (offset > OFF_MAX - len)
|
|
|
|
return (EFBIG);
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
error = fget(td, fd, cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_WRITE), &fp);
|
2011-04-18 16:32:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2014-11-12 17:31:38 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
if ((fp->f_ops->fo_flags & DFLAG_SEEKABLE) == 0) {
|
2011-04-18 16:32:22 +00:00
|
|
|
error = ESPIPE;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-04-18 16:40:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((fp->f_flag & FWRITE) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
error = EBADF;
|
2011-04-18 16:32:22 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2011-04-18 16:40:47 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-11-12 17:31:38 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fp->f_type != DTYPE_VNODE) {
|
2011-04-18 16:32:22 +00:00
|
|
|
error = ENODEV;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-11-12 17:31:38 +00:00
|
|
|
vp = fp->f_vnode;
|
|
|
|
if (vp->v_type != VREG) {
|
|
|
|
error = ENODEV;
|
2011-04-18 16:32:22 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-04-19 16:36:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Allocating blocks may take a long time, so iterate. */
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
|
|
olen = len;
|
|
|
|
ooffset = offset;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bwillwrite();
|
|
|
|
mp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH);
|
2012-10-22 17:50:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2011-04-19 16:36:24 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
error = vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-04-18 16:32:22 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
2011-04-19 16:36:24 +00:00
|
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_write(td->td_ucred, fp->f_cred, vp);
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0)
|
2011-04-18 16:32:22 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2011-04-19 16:36:24 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_ALLOCATE(vp, &offset, &len);
|
2011-04-18 16:32:22 +00:00
|
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
2011-04-19 16:36:24 +00:00
|
|
|
vn_finished_write(mp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (olen + ooffset != offset + len) {
|
|
|
|
panic("offset + len changed from %jx/%jx to %jx/%jx",
|
|
|
|
ooffset, olen, offset, len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0 || len == 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(olen > len, ("Iteration did not make progress?"));
|
|
|
|
maybe_yield();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
2014-11-12 17:31:38 +00:00
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
2011-04-18 16:32:22 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-09-16 13:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
sys_posix_fallocate(struct thread *td, struct posix_fallocate_args *uap)
|
2011-04-18 16:32:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-02-25 19:58:23 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
2011-04-18 16:32:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-25 19:58:23 +00:00
|
|
|
error = kern_posix_fallocate(td, uap->fd, uap->offset, uap->len);
|
|
|
|
return (kern_posix_error(td, error));
|
2011-04-18 16:32:22 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Unlike madvise(2), we do not make a best effort to remember every
|
|
|
|
* possible caching hint. Instead, we remember the last setting with
|
|
|
|
* the exception that we will allow POSIX_FADV_NORMAL to adjust the
|
|
|
|
* region of any current setting.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
2011-11-14 18:00:15 +00:00
|
|
|
kern_posix_fadvise(struct thread *td, int fd, off_t offset, off_t len,
|
|
|
|
int advice)
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct fadvise_info *fa, *new;
|
|
|
|
struct file *fp;
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
cap_rights_t rights;
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
off_t end;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-11-14 18:00:15 +00:00
|
|
|
if (offset < 0 || len < 0 || offset > OFF_MAX - len)
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
2011-11-14 18:00:15 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (advice) {
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
case POSIX_FADV_SEQUENTIAL:
|
|
|
|
case POSIX_FADV_RANDOM:
|
|
|
|
case POSIX_FADV_NOREUSE:
|
|
|
|
new = malloc(sizeof(*fa), M_FADVISE, M_WAITOK);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case POSIX_FADV_NORMAL:
|
|
|
|
case POSIX_FADV_WILLNEED:
|
|
|
|
case POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED:
|
|
|
|
new = NULL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: CAP_POSIX_FADVISE? */
|
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
|
|
|
error = fget(td, fd, cap_rights_init(&rights), &fp);
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2014-11-12 17:31:38 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((fp->f_ops->fo_flags & DFLAG_SEEKABLE) == 0) {
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
error = ESPIPE;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2014-11-12 17:31:38 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (fp->f_type != DTYPE_VNODE) {
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
error = ENODEV;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vp = fp->f_vnode;
|
|
|
|
if (vp->v_type != VREG) {
|
|
|
|
error = ENODEV;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-11-14 18:00:15 +00:00
|
|
|
if (len == 0)
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
end = OFF_MAX;
|
|
|
|
else
|
2011-11-14 18:00:15 +00:00
|
|
|
end = offset + len - 1;
|
|
|
|
switch (advice) {
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
case POSIX_FADV_SEQUENTIAL:
|
|
|
|
case POSIX_FADV_RANDOM:
|
|
|
|
case POSIX_FADV_NOREUSE:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Try to merge any existing non-standard region with
|
|
|
|
* this new region if possible, otherwise create a new
|
|
|
|
* non-standard region for this request.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, fp);
|
|
|
|
fa = fp->f_advice;
|
2011-11-14 18:00:15 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fa != NULL && fa->fa_advice == advice &&
|
|
|
|
((fa->fa_start <= end && fa->fa_end >= offset) ||
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
(end != OFF_MAX && fa->fa_start == end + 1) ||
|
2011-11-14 18:00:15 +00:00
|
|
|
(fa->fa_end != OFF_MAX && fa->fa_end + 1 == offset))) {
|
|
|
|
if (offset < fa->fa_start)
|
|
|
|
fa->fa_start = offset;
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
if (end > fa->fa_end)
|
|
|
|
fa->fa_end = end;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2011-11-14 18:00:15 +00:00
|
|
|
new->fa_advice = advice;
|
|
|
|
new->fa_start = offset;
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
new->fa_end = end;
|
|
|
|
fp->f_advice = new;
|
|
|
|
new = fa;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, fp);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case POSIX_FADV_NORMAL:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If a the "normal" region overlaps with an existing
|
|
|
|
* non-standard region, trim or remove the
|
|
|
|
* non-standard region.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, fp);
|
|
|
|
fa = fp->f_advice;
|
|
|
|
if (fa != NULL) {
|
2011-11-14 18:00:15 +00:00
|
|
|
if (offset <= fa->fa_start && end >= fa->fa_end) {
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
new = fa;
|
|
|
|
fp->f_advice = NULL;
|
2011-11-14 18:00:15 +00:00
|
|
|
} else if (offset <= fa->fa_start &&
|
2013-03-16 22:37:30 +00:00
|
|
|
end >= fa->fa_start)
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
fa->fa_start = end + 1;
|
2011-11-14 18:00:15 +00:00
|
|
|
else if (offset <= fa->fa_end && end >= fa->fa_end)
|
|
|
|
fa->fa_end = offset - 1;
|
|
|
|
else if (offset >= fa->fa_start && end <= fa->fa_end) {
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the "normal" region is a middle
|
|
|
|
* portion of the existing
|
|
|
|
* non-standard region, just remove
|
|
|
|
* the whole thing rather than picking
|
|
|
|
* one side or the other to
|
|
|
|
* preserve.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
new = fa;
|
|
|
|
fp->f_advice = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, fp);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case POSIX_FADV_WILLNEED:
|
|
|
|
case POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED:
|
2011-11-14 18:00:15 +00:00
|
|
|
error = VOP_ADVISE(vp, offset, end, advice);
|
2011-11-04 04:02:50 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
if (fp != NULL)
|
|
|
|
fdrop(fp, td);
|
|
|
|
free(new, M_FADVISE);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-11-14 18:00:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
sys_posix_fadvise(struct thread *td, struct posix_fadvise_args *uap)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-02-25 19:58:23 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
2011-11-14 18:00:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-25 19:58:23 +00:00
|
|
|
error = kern_posix_fadvise(td, uap->fd, uap->offset, uap->len,
|
|
|
|
uap->advice);
|
|
|
|
return (kern_posix_error(td, error));
|
2011-11-14 18:00:15 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|