2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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/*-
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* Copyright (c) 2015 Allan Jude <allanjude@FreeBSD.org>
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* Copyright (c) 2005-2011 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pawel@dawidek.net>
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* $FreeBSD$
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*/
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Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
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#include "geliboot_internal.h"
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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#include "geliboot.h"
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SLIST_HEAD(geli_list, geli_entry) geli_head = SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(geli_head);
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struct geli_list *geli_headp;
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Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
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typedef u_char geli_ukey[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN];
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static geli_ukey saved_keys[GELI_MAX_KEYS];
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static unsigned int nsaved_keys = 0;
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/*
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* Copy keys from local storage to the keybuf struct.
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* Destroy the local storage when finished.
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*/
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void
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geli_fill_keybuf(struct keybuf *fkeybuf)
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{
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unsigned int i;
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for (i = 0; i < nsaved_keys; i++) {
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fkeybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_type = KEYBUF_TYPE_GELI;
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memcpy(fkeybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_data, saved_keys[i],
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G_ELI_USERKEYLEN);
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}
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fkeybuf->kb_nents = nsaved_keys;
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explicit_bzero(saved_keys, sizeof(saved_keys));
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}
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/*
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* Copy keys from a keybuf struct into local storage.
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* Zero out the keybuf.
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*/
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void
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geli_save_keybuf(struct keybuf *skeybuf)
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{
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unsigned int i;
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for (i = 0; i < skeybuf->kb_nents && i < GELI_MAX_KEYS; i++) {
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memcpy(saved_keys[i], skeybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_data,
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G_ELI_USERKEYLEN);
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explicit_bzero(skeybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_data,
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G_ELI_USERKEYLEN);
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skeybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_type = KEYBUF_TYPE_NONE;
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}
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nsaved_keys = skeybuf->kb_nents;
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skeybuf->kb_nents = 0;
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}
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static void
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save_key(geli_ukey key)
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{
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/*
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* If we run out of key space, the worst that will happen is
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* it will ask the user for the password again.
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*/
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if (nsaved_keys < GELI_MAX_KEYS) {
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memcpy(saved_keys[nsaved_keys], key, G_ELI_USERKEYLEN);
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nsaved_keys++;
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}
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}
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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static int
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geli_same_device(struct geli_entry *ge, struct dsk *dskp)
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{
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Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
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if (ge->dsk->drive == dskp->drive &&
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dskp->part == 255 && ge->dsk->part == dskp->slice) {
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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/*
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* Sometimes slice = slice, and sometimes part = slice
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* If the incoming struct dsk has part=255, it means look at
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* the slice instead of the part number
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*/
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return (0);
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}
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/* Is this the same device? */
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Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
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if (ge->dsk->drive != dskp->drive ||
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ge->dsk->slice != dskp->slice ||
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ge->dsk->part != dskp->part) {
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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return (1);
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}
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return (0);
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}
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Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
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static int
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geli_findkey(struct geli_entry *ge, struct dsk *dskp, u_char *mkey)
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{
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u_int keynum;
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int i;
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if (ge->keybuf_slot >= 0) {
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if (g_eli_mkey_decrypt(&ge->md, saved_keys[ge->keybuf_slot],
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mkey, &keynum) == 0) {
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return (0);
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}
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}
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for (i = 0; i < nsaved_keys; i++) {
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if (g_eli_mkey_decrypt(&ge->md, saved_keys[i], mkey,
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&keynum) == 0) {
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ge->keybuf_slot = i;
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return (0);
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}
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}
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return (1);
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}
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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void
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geli_init(void)
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{
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geli_count = 0;
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SLIST_INIT(&geli_head);
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}
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/*
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* Read the last sector of the drive or partition pointed to by dsk and see
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* if it is GELI encrypted
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*/
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int
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geli_taste(int read_func(void *vdev, void *priv, off_t off, void *buf,
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size_t bytes), struct dsk *dskp, daddr_t lastsector)
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{
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struct g_eli_metadata md;
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2016-04-06 23:21:44 +00:00
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u_char buf[DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE];
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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int error;
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2016-04-06 23:21:44 +00:00
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off_t alignsector;
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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2016-10-04 16:33:03 +00:00
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alignsector = rounddown2(lastsector * DEV_BSIZE, DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE);
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if (alignsector + DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE > ((lastsector + 1) * DEV_BSIZE)) {
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/* Don't read past the end of the disk */
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alignsector = (lastsector * DEV_BSIZE) + DEV_BSIZE
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- DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE;
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}
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2016-04-06 23:21:44 +00:00
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error = read_func(NULL, dskp, alignsector, &buf, DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE);
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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if (error != 0) {
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return (error);
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}
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2016-10-04 16:33:03 +00:00
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/* Extract the last 4k sector of the disk. */
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error = eli_metadata_decode(buf, &md);
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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if (error != 0) {
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2016-10-04 16:33:03 +00:00
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/* Try the last 512 byte sector instead. */
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error = eli_metadata_decode(buf +
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(DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE - DEV_BSIZE), &md);
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if (error != 0) {
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return (error);
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}
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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}
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2016-04-08 01:27:40 +00:00
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if (!(md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_GELIBOOT)) {
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/* The GELIBOOT feature is not activated */
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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return (1);
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}
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2016-04-08 01:27:40 +00:00
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if ((md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_ONETIME)) {
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/* Swap device, skip it. */
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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return (1);
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}
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2016-03-26 15:39:48 +00:00
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if (md.md_iterations < 0) {
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2016-04-06 23:21:44 +00:00
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/* XXX TODO: Support loading key files. */
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/* Disk does not have a passphrase, skip it. */
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2016-03-26 15:39:48 +00:00
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return (1);
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}
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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geli_e = malloc(sizeof(struct geli_entry));
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if (geli_e == NULL)
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return (2);
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geli_e->dsk = malloc(sizeof(struct dsk));
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if (geli_e->dsk == NULL)
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return (2);
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memcpy(geli_e->dsk, dskp, sizeof(struct dsk));
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geli_e->part_end = lastsector;
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if (dskp->part == 255) {
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geli_e->dsk->part = dskp->slice;
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}
|
Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
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geli_e->keybuf_slot = -1;
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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geli_e->md = md;
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eli_metadata_softc(&geli_e->sc, &md, DEV_BSIZE,
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(lastsector + DEV_BSIZE) * DEV_BSIZE);
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SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&geli_head, geli_e, entries);
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geli_count++;
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return (0);
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}
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/*
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* Attempt to decrypt the device
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*/
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2017-08-26 14:07:24 +00:00
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static int
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geli_attach(struct geli_entry *ge, struct dsk *dskp, const char *passphrase,
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const u_char *mkeyp)
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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{
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u_char key[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN], mkey[G_ELI_DATAIVKEYLEN], *mkp;
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u_int keynum;
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struct hmac_ctx ctx;
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int error;
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|
Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mkeyp != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&mkey, mkeyp, G_ELI_DATAIVKEYLEN);
|
|
|
|
explicit_bzero(mkeyp, G_ELI_DATAIVKEYLEN);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-26 14:07:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mkeyp != NULL || geli_findkey(ge, dskp, mkey) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto found_key;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-26 14:07:24 +00:00
|
|
|
g_eli_crypto_hmac_init(&ctx, NULL, 0);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Prepare Derived-Key from the user passphrase.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (geli_e->md.md_iterations < 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* XXX TODO: Support loading key files. */
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
} else if (geli_e->md.md_iterations == 0) {
|
|
|
|
g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(&ctx, geli_e->md.md_salt,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(geli_e->md.md_salt));
|
|
|
|
g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(&ctx, passphrase,
|
|
|
|
strlen(passphrase));
|
|
|
|
} else if (geli_e->md.md_iterations > 0) {
|
|
|
|
printf("Calculating GELI Decryption Key disk%dp%d @ %d"
|
|
|
|
" iterations...\n", dskp->unit,
|
|
|
|
(dskp->slice > 0 ? dskp->slice : dskp->part),
|
|
|
|
geli_e->md.md_iterations);
|
|
|
|
u_char dkey[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pkcs5v2_genkey(dkey, sizeof(dkey), geli_e->md.md_salt,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(geli_e->md.md_salt), passphrase,
|
|
|
|
geli_e->md.md_iterations);
|
|
|
|
g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(&ctx, dkey, sizeof(dkey));
|
|
|
|
explicit_bzero(dkey, sizeof(dkey));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-26 14:07:24 +00:00
|
|
|
g_eli_crypto_hmac_final(&ctx, key, 0);
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-26 14:07:24 +00:00
|
|
|
error = g_eli_mkey_decrypt(&geli_e->md, key, mkey, &keynum);
|
|
|
|
if (error == -1) {
|
|
|
|
explicit_bzero(mkey, sizeof(mkey));
|
|
|
|
explicit_bzero(key, sizeof(key));
|
|
|
|
printf("Bad GELI key: bad password?\n");
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
} else if (error != 0) {
|
2017-03-31 00:04:32 +00:00
|
|
|
explicit_bzero(mkey, sizeof(mkey));
|
2017-08-26 14:07:24 +00:00
|
|
|
explicit_bzero(key, sizeof(key));
|
|
|
|
printf("Failed to decrypt GELI master key: %d\n", error);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Add key to keychain */
|
|
|
|
save_key(key);
|
|
|
|
explicit_bzero(&key, sizeof(key));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-26 14:07:24 +00:00
|
|
|
found_key:
|
|
|
|
/* Store the keys */
|
|
|
|
bcopy(mkey, geli_e->sc.sc_mkey, sizeof(geli_e->sc.sc_mkey));
|
|
|
|
bcopy(mkey, geli_e->sc.sc_ivkey, sizeof(geli_e->sc.sc_ivkey));
|
|
|
|
mkp = mkey + sizeof(geli_e->sc.sc_ivkey);
|
|
|
|
if ((geli_e->sc.sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
bcopy(mkp, geli_e->sc.sc_ekey, G_ELI_DATAKEYLEN);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The encryption key is: ekey = HMAC_SHA512(Data-Key, 0x10)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
g_eli_crypto_hmac(mkp, G_ELI_MAXKEYLEN, "\x10", 1,
|
|
|
|
geli_e->sc.sc_ekey, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
explicit_bzero(mkey, sizeof(mkey));
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-26 14:07:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Initialize the per-sector IV. */
|
|
|
|
switch (geli_e->sc.sc_ealgo) {
|
|
|
|
case CRYPTO_AES_XTS:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
SHA256_Init(&geli_e->sc.sc_ivctx);
|
|
|
|
SHA256_Update(&geli_e->sc.sc_ivctx, geli_e->sc.sc_ivkey,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(geli_e->sc.sc_ivkey));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-26 14:07:24 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
is_geli(struct dsk *dskp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(geli_e, &geli_head, entries, geli_e_tmp) {
|
|
|
|
if (geli_same_device(geli_e, dskp) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
geli_read(struct dsk *dskp, off_t offset, u_char *buf, size_t bytes)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u_char iv[G_ELI_IVKEYLEN];
|
|
|
|
u_char *pbuf;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
2016-04-06 23:21:44 +00:00
|
|
|
off_t dstoff;
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
uint64_t keyno;
|
2016-04-06 23:21:44 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t n, nsec, secsize;
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
struct g_eli_key gkey;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-06 23:21:44 +00:00
|
|
|
pbuf = buf;
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(geli_e, &geli_head, entries, geli_e_tmp) {
|
|
|
|
if (geli_same_device(geli_e, dskp) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-06 23:21:44 +00:00
|
|
|
secsize = geli_e->sc.sc_sectorsize;
|
|
|
|
nsec = bytes / secsize;
|
|
|
|
if (nsec == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* A read of less than the GELI sector size has been
|
|
|
|
* requested. The caller provided destination buffer may
|
|
|
|
* not be big enough to boost the read to a full sector,
|
|
|
|
* so just attempt to decrypt the truncated sector.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
secsize = bytes;
|
|
|
|
nsec = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (n = 0, dstoff = offset; n < nsec; n++, dstoff += secsize) {
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-04-06 23:21:44 +00:00
|
|
|
g_eli_crypto_ivgen(&geli_e->sc, dstoff, iv,
|
|
|
|
G_ELI_IVKEYLEN);
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-04-06 23:21:44 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Get the key that corresponds to this offset. */
|
|
|
|
keyno = (dstoff >> G_ELI_KEY_SHIFT) / secsize;
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
g_eli_key_fill(&geli_e->sc, &gkey, keyno);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = geliboot_crypt(geli_e->sc.sc_ealgo, 0, pbuf,
|
2016-04-06 23:21:44 +00:00
|
|
|
secsize, gkey.gek_key,
|
|
|
|
geli_e->sc.sc_ekeylen, iv);
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
2017-03-31 00:04:32 +00:00
|
|
|
explicit_bzero(&gkey, sizeof(gkey));
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
printf("Failed to decrypt in geli_read()!");
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-04-06 23:21:44 +00:00
|
|
|
pbuf += secsize;
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-03-31 00:04:32 +00:00
|
|
|
explicit_bzero(&gkey, sizeof(gkey));
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
printf("GELI provider not found\n");
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
geli_havekey(struct dsk *dskp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u_char mkey[G_ELI_DATAIVKEYLEN];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(geli_e, &geli_head, entries, geli_e_tmp) {
|
|
|
|
if (geli_same_device(geli_e, dskp) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (geli_findkey(geli_e, dskp, mkey) == 0) {
|
2017-08-26 14:07:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (geli_attach(geli_e, dskp, NULL, mkey) == 0) {
|
Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
explicit_bzero(mkey, sizeof(mkey));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
geli_passphrase(char *pw, int disk, int parttype, int part, struct dsk *dskp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-26 14:07:24 +00:00
|
|
|
SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(geli_e, &geli_head, entries, geli_e_tmp) {
|
|
|
|
if (geli_same_device(geli_e, dskp) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: Implement GELI keyfile(s) support */
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
|
|
|
|
/* Try cached passphrase */
|
|
|
|
if (i == 0 && pw[0] != '\0') {
|
|
|
|
if (geli_attach(geli_e, dskp, pw, NULL) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
printf("GELI Passphrase for disk%d%c%d: ", disk,
|
|
|
|
parttype, part);
|
|
|
|
pwgets(pw, GELI_PW_MAXLEN,
|
|
|
|
(geli_e->md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_GELIDISPLAYPASS) == 0);
|
|
|
|
printf("\n");
|
|
|
|
if (geli_attach(geli_e, dskp, pw, NULL) == 0) {
|
2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
}
|