2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.\" $NetBSD: crypto.4,v 1.24 2014/01/27 21:23:59 pgoyette Exp $
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2002-10-04 20:43:30 +00:00
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.\"
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.\" Copyright (c) 2008 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
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.\" Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation
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2002-10-04 20:43:30 +00:00
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.\" All rights reserved.
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.\"
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.\" Portions of this documentation were written by John-Mark Gurney
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.\" under sponsorship of the FreeBSD Foundation and
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.\" Rubicon Communications, LLC (Netgate).
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.\"
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.\" This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
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.\" by Coyote Point Systems, Inc.
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.\"
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2002-10-04 20:43:30 +00:00
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.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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.\" are met:
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.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.\"
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.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
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.\" ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
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.\" TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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.\" PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
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.\" BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
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.\" CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
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.\" SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
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.\" INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
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.\" CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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.\" ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
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2002-10-04 20:43:30 +00:00
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.\" POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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.\"
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.\"
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.\"
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.\" Copyright (c) 2004
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.\" Jonathan Stone <jonathan@dsg.stanford.edu>. All rights reserved.
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.\"
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.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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.\" are met:
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.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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.\"
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.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Jonathan Stone AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL Jonathan Stone OR THE VOICES IN HIS HEAD
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.\" BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
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.\" CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
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.\" SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
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.\" INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
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.\" CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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.\" ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF
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.\" THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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.\"
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2002-12-10 14:21:55 +00:00
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.\" $FreeBSD$
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.\"
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2021-04-12 21:27:42 +00:00
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.Dd April 12, 2021
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2002-10-04 20:43:30 +00:00
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.Dt CRYPTO 4
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.Os
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.Sh NAME
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2004-01-16 17:21:02 +00:00
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.Nm crypto ,
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.Nm cryptodev
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.Nd user-mode access to hardware-accelerated cryptography
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2002-10-04 20:43:30 +00:00
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.Sh SYNOPSIS
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2002-12-10 14:21:55 +00:00
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.Cd device crypto
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2004-01-16 17:21:02 +00:00
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.Cd device cryptodev
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.Pp
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.In sys/ioctl.h
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.In sys/time.h
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.In crypto/cryptodev.h
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2002-10-04 20:43:30 +00:00
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.Sh DESCRIPTION
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The
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.Nm
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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driver gives user-mode applications access to hardware-accelerated
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2019-12-17 22:58:07 +00:00
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cryptographic transforms as implemented by the
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2015-12-15 06:01:02 +00:00
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.Xr crypto 9
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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in-kernel interface.
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.Pp
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2002-10-04 20:43:30 +00:00
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The
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.Pa /dev/crypto
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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special device provides an
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.Xr ioctl 2
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based interface.
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2019-12-17 22:58:07 +00:00
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User-mode applications open the special device and
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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then issue
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2002-10-04 20:43:30 +00:00
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.Xr ioctl 2
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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calls on the descriptor.
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User-mode access to
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.Pa /dev/crypto
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2021-04-12 21:27:42 +00:00
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is controlled by the
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.Ic kern.cryptodevallowsoft
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.Xr sysctl 8
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2021-04-12 21:27:42 +00:00
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variable.
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If this variable is zero,
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then user-mode sessions are only permitted to use cryptography coprocessors.
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.Sh THEORY OF OPERATION
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2021-04-12 21:27:42 +00:00
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Use of the device requires a basic series of steps:
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.Bl -enum
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.It
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2019-12-17 22:58:07 +00:00
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Open the
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.Pa /dev/crypto
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device.
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.It
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2021-04-12 21:27:42 +00:00
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Create a session with
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2020-11-25 00:10:54 +00:00
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.Dv CIOCGSESSION
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or
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.Dv CIOCGSESSION2 .
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2021-04-12 21:27:42 +00:00
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Applications will require at least one symmetric session.
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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Since cipher and MAC keys are tied to sessions, many
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applications will require more.
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.It
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Submit requests, synchronously with
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.Dv CIOCCRYPT
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or
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2021-04-12 21:27:42 +00:00
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.Dv CIOCCRYPTAEAD .
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.It
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2019-12-17 22:58:07 +00:00
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Optionally destroy a session with
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.Dv CIOCFSESSION .
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.It
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2020-11-25 00:10:54 +00:00
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Close the
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.Pa /dev/crypto
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device.
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2019-12-17 22:58:07 +00:00
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This will automatically close any remaining sessions associated with the
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file desriptor.
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.El
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.Sh SYMMETRIC-KEY OPERATION
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2021-04-12 21:27:42 +00:00
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.Nm cryptodev
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provides a context-based API
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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to traditional symmetric-key encryption (or privacy) algorithms,
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2021-04-12 21:27:42 +00:00
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keyed and unkeyed one-way hash (HMAC and MAC) algorithms,
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encrypt-then-authenticate (ETA) fused operations,
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and authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) operations.
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For ETA operations,
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drivers perform both a privacy algorithm and an integrity-check
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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algorithm in a single pass over the data: either a fused
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encrypt/HMAC-generate operation, or a fused HMAC-verify/decrypt operation.
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2021-04-12 21:27:42 +00:00
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Similarly, for AEAD operations,
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drivers perform either an encrypt/MAC-generate operation
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or a MAC-verify/decrypt operation.
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.Pp
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2021-04-12 21:27:42 +00:00
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The algorithm(s) and key(s) to use are specified when a session is
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created.
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Individual requests are able to specify per-request initialization vectors
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or nonces.
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.Ss Algorithms
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For a list of supported algorithms, see
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2021-04-12 21:27:42 +00:00
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.Xr crypto 7 .
|
2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.Ss IOCTL Request Descriptions
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.\"
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.Bl -tag -width CIOCGSESSION
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.\"
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.It Dv CIOCFINDDEV Fa struct crypt_find_op *fop
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.Bd -literal
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struct crypt_find_op {
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int crid; /* driver id + flags */
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char name[32]; /* device/driver name */
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};
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.Ed
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If
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.Fa crid
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is -1, then find the driver named
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.Fa name
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and return the id in
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.Fa crid .
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If
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.Fa crid
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is not -1, return the name of the driver with
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.Fa crid
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in
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.Fa name .
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In either case, if the driver is not found,
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.Dv ENOENT
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is returned.
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.It Dv CIOCGSESSION Fa struct session_op *sessp
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.Bd -literal
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struct session_op {
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2020-11-06 23:37:59 +00:00
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uint32_t cipher; /* e.g. CRYPTO_AES_CBC */
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uint32_t mac; /* e.g. CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC */
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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2020-11-06 23:37:59 +00:00
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uint32_t keylen; /* cipher key */
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2019-12-17 22:58:07 +00:00
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const void *key;
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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int mackeylen; /* mac key */
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2019-12-17 22:58:07 +00:00
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const void *mackey;
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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2020-11-06 23:37:59 +00:00
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uint32_t ses; /* returns: ses # */
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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};
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.Ed
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Create a new cryptographic session on a file descriptor for the device;
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that is, a persistent object specific to the chosen
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privacy algorithm, integrity algorithm, and keys specified in
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.Fa sessp .
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The special value 0 for either privacy or integrity
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is reserved to indicate that the indicated operation (privacy or integrity)
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is not desired for this session.
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2021-04-12 21:27:42 +00:00
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ETA sessions specify both privacy and integrity algorithms.
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AEAD sessions specify only a privacy algorithm.
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.Pp
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Multiple sessions may be bound to a single file descriptor.
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The session ID returned in
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]ses
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2021-04-12 21:27:42 +00:00
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is supplied as a required field in the operation structure
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.Fa crypt_op
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for future encryption or hashing requests.
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.\" .Pp
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.\" This implementation will never return a session ID of 0 for a successful
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.\" creation of a session, which is a
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.\" .Nx
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.\" extension.
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.Pp
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2021-04-12 21:27:42 +00:00
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For non-zero privacy algorithms, the privacy algorithm
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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must be specified in
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]cipher ,
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the key length in
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]keylen ,
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and the key value in the octets addressed by
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]key .
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2002-10-04 20:43:30 +00:00
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.Pp
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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For keyed one-way hash algorithms, the one-way hash must be specified
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in
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]mac ,
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the key length in
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]mackey ,
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and the key value in the octets addressed by
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]mackeylen .
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.\"
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.Pp
|
2019-12-17 22:58:07 +00:00
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Support for a specific combination of fused privacy and
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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integrity-check algorithms depends on whether the underlying
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hardware supports that combination.
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Not all combinations are supported
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by all hardware, even if the hardware supports each operation as a
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stand-alone non-fused operation.
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2019-12-17 22:58:07 +00:00
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.It Dv CIOCGSESSION2 Fa struct session2_op *sessp
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.Bd -literal
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struct session2_op {
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2020-11-06 23:37:59 +00:00
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uint32_t cipher; /* e.g. CRYPTO_AES_CBC */
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uint32_t mac; /* e.g. CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC */
|
2019-12-17 22:58:07 +00:00
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2020-11-06 23:37:59 +00:00
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uint32_t keylen; /* cipher key */
|
2019-12-17 22:58:07 +00:00
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const void *key;
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int mackeylen; /* mac key */
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const void *mackey;
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2020-11-06 23:37:59 +00:00
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uint32_t ses; /* returns: ses # */
|
2019-12-17 22:58:07 +00:00
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int crid; /* driver id + flags (rw) */
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int pad[4]; /* for future expansion */
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};
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.Ed
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This request is similar to CIOGSESSION except that
|
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]crid
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requests either a specific crypto device or a class of devices (software vs
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hardware).
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The
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]pad
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field must be initialized to zero.
|
2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.It Dv CIOCCRYPT Fa struct crypt_op *cr_op
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.Bd -literal
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struct crypt_op {
|
2020-11-06 23:37:59 +00:00
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uint32_t ses;
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uint16_t op; /* e.g. COP_ENCRYPT */
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uint16_t flags;
|
2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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u_int len;
|
2020-11-06 23:37:59 +00:00
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const void *src;
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void *dst;
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void *mac; /* must be large enough for result */
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const void *iv;
|
2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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};
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|
.Ed
|
2021-04-12 21:27:42 +00:00
|
|
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Request an encryption/decryption (or hash) operation.
|
2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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To encrypt, set
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.Fa cr_op-\*[Gt]op
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to
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.Dv COP_ENCRYPT .
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To decrypt, set
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.Fa cr_op-\*[Gt]op
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to
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.Dv COP_DECRYPT .
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The field
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.Fa cr_op-\*[Gt]len
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supplies the length of the input buffer; the fields
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.Fa cr_op-\*[Gt]src ,
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.Fa cr_op-\*[Gt]dst ,
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.Fa cr_op-\*[Gt]mac ,
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.Fa cr_op-\*[Gt]iv
|
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supply the addresses of the input buffer, output buffer,
|
|
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|
one-way hash, and initialization vector, respectively.
|
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto).
- The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session
initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct
crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define
how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes
include:
- COMPRESS (for compression/decompression)
- CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption)
- DIGEST (computing and verifying digests)
- AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM)
- ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate)
Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to
support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode
for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.)
The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as
before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and
switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs
encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth
keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression
algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.)
- Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This
doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might
support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined
for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been
added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This
method returns a negative value on success (similar to how
device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick
the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware
(e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software
(cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this
is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session,
you will no longer get a session using accelerated software.
Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software
crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software.
Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before.
- Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop'
structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed.
A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer
in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add
more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for
zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate
input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this).
Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane:
- CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv'
member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the
IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset.
- CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated
and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with
CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.
If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it
can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in
the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set
CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.
The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop.
crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD.
Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range,
but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext
(and they had to be adjacent).
crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of
the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation
(COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the
AAD region empty.
If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting
location is marked by crp_digest_start.
Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction
of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the
operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest
mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the
request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed
digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode
requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires
this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own
authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do
this, though there are no in-tree consumers.
To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session
cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer
set crp_sesssion directly.
- Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via
crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the
crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a
driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight.
- crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and
crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the
first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier
to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as
separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver
writers to use.
- bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer.
This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that
use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types.
- Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD
and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers.
- Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in
device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session
is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the
session.
- GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher
key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used.
- For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process'
callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This
function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it
simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in
'process'.
It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there
is some duplication.
- I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC
as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it.
- Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA
mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored.
This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but
the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST
flag.
- I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for
sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well
as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support
all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM.
- I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages
of which many are written from scratch.
- I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified
that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested
the following drivers:
- cryptosoft
- aesni (AES only)
- blake2
- ccr
and the following consumers:
- cryptodev
- IPsec
- ktls_ocf
- GELI (lightly)
I have not tested the following:
- ccp
- aesni with sha
- hifn
- kgssapi_krb5
- ubsec
- padlock
- safe
- armv8_crypto (aarch64)
- glxsb (i386)
- sec (ppc)
- cesa (armv7)
- cryptocteon (mips64)
- nlmsec (mips64)
Discussed with: cem
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
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.Pp
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If a session is using either fused encrypt-then-authenticate or
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an AEAD algorithm,
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decryption operations require the associated hash as an input.
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If the hash is incorrect, the
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operation will fail with
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.Dv EBADMSG
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and the output buffer will remain unchanged.
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.It Dv CIOCCRYPTAEAD Fa struct crypt_aead *cr_aead
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.Bd -literal
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struct crypt_aead {
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2020-11-06 23:37:59 +00:00
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uint32_t ses;
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uint16_t op; /* e.g. COP_ENCRYPT */
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uint16_t flags;
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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u_int len;
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u_int aadlen;
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u_int ivlen;
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2020-11-06 23:37:59 +00:00
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const void *src;
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void *dst;
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const void *aad; /* additional authenticated data */
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void *tag; /* must fit for chosen TAG length */
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const void *iv;
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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};
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.Ed
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The
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.Dv CIOCCRYPTAEAD
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is similar to the
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.Dv CIOCCRYPT
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but provides additional data in
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.Fa cr_aead-\*[Gt]aad
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to include in the authentication mode.
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.It Dv CIOCFSESSION Fa u_int32_t ses_id
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2019-12-17 22:58:07 +00:00
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Destroys the session identified by
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.Fa ses_id .
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2002-10-04 20:43:30 +00:00
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.El
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.Sh SEE ALSO
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2010-09-09 21:39:06 +00:00
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.Xr aesni 4 ,
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2002-10-04 20:43:30 +00:00
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.Xr hifn 4 ,
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2007-08-02 08:04:48 +00:00
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.Xr ipsec 4 ,
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2005-12-10 10:51:55 +00:00
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.Xr padlock 4 ,
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2003-12-27 15:00:07 +00:00
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.Xr safe 4 ,
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.Xr crypto 7 ,
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2005-12-10 10:51:55 +00:00
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.Xr geli 8 ,
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2002-10-04 20:43:30 +00:00
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.Xr crypto 9
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.Sh HISTORY
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The
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.Nm
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driver first appeared in
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2002-12-10 14:21:55 +00:00
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.Ox 3.0 .
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2002-10-04 20:43:30 +00:00
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The
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.Nm
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2002-12-10 14:21:55 +00:00
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driver was imported to
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.Fx 5.0 .
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2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00
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.Sh BUGS
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Error checking and reporting is weak.
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.Pp
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The values specified for symmetric-key key sizes to
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.Dv CIOCGSESSION
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must exactly match the values expected by
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.Xr opencrypto 9 .
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The output buffer and MAC buffers supplied to
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.Dv CIOCCRYPT
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must follow whether privacy or integrity algorithms were specified for
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session: if you request a
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.No non- Ns Dv NULL
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algorithm, you must supply a suitably-sized buffer.
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