Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
/*-
|
2004-02-22 00:33:12 +00:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 1999-2002 Robert N. M. Watson
|
2004-10-21 11:29:56 +00:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* All rights reserved.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
2002-11-04 01:53:12 +00:00
|
|
|
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
|
|
|
|
|
* Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
|
|
|
|
|
* Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
|
|
|
|
|
* as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
|
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
|
|
|
* are met:
|
|
|
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
|
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
|
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
|
|
|
|
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
|
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
|
|
|
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
|
|
|
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
|
|
|
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
|
|
|
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
|
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
|
|
|
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
|
|
|
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
|
|
|
|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* $FreeBSD$
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SYS_SECURITY_MAC_BSDEXTENDED_H
|
|
|
|
|
#define _SYS_SECURITY_MAC_BSDEXTENDED_H
|
|
|
|
|
|
Add some new options to mac_bsdestended. We can now match on:
subject: ranges of uid, ranges of gid, jail id
objects: ranges of uid, ranges of gid, filesystem,
object is suid, object is sgid, object matches subject uid/gid
object type
We can also negate individual conditions. The ruleset language is
a superset of the previous language, so old rules should continue
to work.
These changes require a change to the API between libugidfw and the
mac_bsdextended module. Add a version number, so we can tell if
we're running mismatched versions.
Update man pages to reflect changes, add extra test cases to
test_ugidfw.c and add a shell script that checks that the the
module seems to do what we expect.
Suggestions from: rwatson, trhodes
Reviewed by: trhodes
MFC after: 2 months
2006-04-23 17:06:18 +00:00
|
|
|
#define MB_VERSION 2 /* Used to check library and kernel are the same. */
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2004-10-21 11:19:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2007-07-05 13:16:04 +00:00
|
|
|
* Rights that can be represented in mbr_mode. These have the same values as
|
|
|
|
|
* the V* rights in vnode.h, but in order to avoid sharing user and kernel
|
|
|
|
|
* constants, we define them here. That will also improve ABI stability if
|
|
|
|
|
* the in-kernel values change.
|
2004-10-21 11:19:02 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBI_EXEC 000100
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBI_WRITE 000200
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBI_READ 000400
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBI_ADMIN 010000
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBI_STAT 020000
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBI_APPEND 040000
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBI_ALLPERM (MBI_EXEC | MBI_WRITE | MBI_READ | MBI_ADMIN | \
|
|
|
|
|
MBI_STAT | MBI_APPEND)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Add some new options to mac_bsdestended. We can now match on:
subject: ranges of uid, ranges of gid, jail id
objects: ranges of uid, ranges of gid, filesystem,
object is suid, object is sgid, object matches subject uid/gid
object type
We can also negate individual conditions. The ruleset language is
a superset of the previous language, so old rules should continue
to work.
These changes require a change to the API between libugidfw and the
mac_bsdextended module. Add a version number, so we can tell if
we're running mismatched versions.
Update man pages to reflect changes, add extra test cases to
test_ugidfw.c and add a shell script that checks that the the
module seems to do what we expect.
Suggestions from: rwatson, trhodes
Reviewed by: trhodes
MFC after: 2 months
2006-04-23 17:06:18 +00:00
|
|
|
#define MBS_UID_DEFINED 0x00000001 /* uid field should be matched */
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBS_GID_DEFINED 0x00000002 /* gid field should be matched */
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBS_PRISON_DEFINED 0x00000004 /* prison field should be matched */
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
#define MBS_ALL_FLAGS (MBS_UID_DEFINED | MBS_GID_DEFINED | MBS_PRISON_DEFINED)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_bsdextended_subject {
|
|
|
|
|
int mbs_flags;
|
|
|
|
|
int mbs_neg;
|
|
|
|
|
uid_t mbs_uid_min;
|
|
|
|
|
uid_t mbs_uid_max;
|
|
|
|
|
gid_t mbs_gid_min;
|
|
|
|
|
gid_t mbs_gid_max;
|
|
|
|
|
int mbs_prison;
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBO_UID_DEFINED 0x00000001 /* uid field should be matched */
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBO_GID_DEFINED 0x00000002 /* gid field should be matched */
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBO_FSID_DEFINED 0x00000004 /* fsid field should be matched */
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBO_SUID 0x00000008 /* object must be suid */
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBO_SGID 0x00000010 /* object must be sgid */
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBO_UID_SUBJECT 0x00000020 /* uid must match subject */
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBO_GID_SUBJECT 0x00000040 /* gid must match subject */
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBO_TYPE_DEFINED 0x00000080 /* object type should be matched */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBO_ALL_FLAGS (MBO_UID_DEFINED | MBO_GID_DEFINED | MBO_FSID_DEFINED | \
|
|
|
|
|
MBO_SUID | MBO_SGID | MBO_UID_SUBJECT | MBO_GID_SUBJECT | \
|
|
|
|
|
MBO_TYPE_DEFINED)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBO_TYPE_REG 0x00000001
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBO_TYPE_DIR 0x00000002
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBO_TYPE_BLK 0x00000004
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBO_TYPE_CHR 0x00000008
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBO_TYPE_LNK 0x00000010
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBO_TYPE_SOCK 0x00000020
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBO_TYPE_FIFO 0x00000040
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define MBO_ALL_TYPE (MBO_TYPE_REG | MBO_TYPE_DIR | MBO_TYPE_BLK | \
|
|
|
|
|
MBO_TYPE_CHR | MBO_TYPE_LNK | MBO_TYPE_SOCK | MBO_TYPE_FIFO)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_bsdextended_object {
|
|
|
|
|
int mbo_flags;
|
|
|
|
|
int mbo_neg;
|
|
|
|
|
uid_t mbo_uid_min;
|
|
|
|
|
uid_t mbo_uid_max;
|
|
|
|
|
gid_t mbo_gid_min;
|
|
|
|
|
gid_t mbo_gid_max;
|
|
|
|
|
struct fsid mbo_fsid;
|
|
|
|
|
int mbo_type;
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_bsdextended_rule {
|
Add some new options to mac_bsdestended. We can now match on:
subject: ranges of uid, ranges of gid, jail id
objects: ranges of uid, ranges of gid, filesystem,
object is suid, object is sgid, object matches subject uid/gid
object type
We can also negate individual conditions. The ruleset language is
a superset of the previous language, so old rules should continue
to work.
These changes require a change to the API between libugidfw and the
mac_bsdextended module. Add a version number, so we can tell if
we're running mismatched versions.
Update man pages to reflect changes, add extra test cases to
test_ugidfw.c and add a shell script that checks that the the
module seems to do what we expect.
Suggestions from: rwatson, trhodes
Reviewed by: trhodes
MFC after: 2 months
2006-04-23 17:06:18 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mac_bsdextended_subject mbr_subject;
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_bsdextended_object mbr_object;
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
mode_t mbr_mode; /* maximum access */
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* _SYS_SECURITY_MAC_BSDEXTENDED_H */
|
