Update the previous openssl fix. [12:01]

Fix a bug in crypt(3) ignoring characters of a passphrase. [12:02]

Security:	FreeBSD-SA-12:01.openssl (revised)
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-12:02.crypt
Approved by:	so (bz, simon)
This commit is contained in:
Bjoern A. Zeeb 2012-05-30 12:01:28 +00:00
parent a856ddc665
commit 071183ef48
3 changed files with 9 additions and 10 deletions

View File

@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, int len)
/* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */
if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION)
{
BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
n=(len+3)/3*4;

View File

@ -698,14 +698,6 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
int ok;
long n;
/* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
* negotiation. */
if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
return -1;
}
/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
* so permit appropriate message length */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
@ -718,6 +710,13 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
{
/* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
* negotiation. */
if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
return -1;
}
/* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
* which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH

View File

@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ crypt_des(const char *key, const char *setting)
q = (u_char *)keybuf;
while (q - (u_char *)keybuf - 8) {
*q++ = *key << 1;
if (*(q - 1))
if (*key != '\0')
key++;
}
if (des_setkey((char *)keybuf))