Allow root in the host environment to open ptys within jailed environments.
This logic change was introduced in revision 1.74: Correct an oversight in jail() that allowed processes in jail to access ptys in ways that might be unethical, especially towards processes not in jail, or in other jails. It should be fine to allow root in the host environment to do this. This allows for more effective monitoring of prisons from the host environment. Discussed with: rwatson MFC after: 1 week
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@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ ptsopen(struct cdev *dev, int flag, int devtype, struct thread *td)
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ttyinitmode(tp, 1, 0);
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} else if (tp->t_state & TS_XCLUDE && suser(td))
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return (EBUSY);
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else if (pt->pt_prison != td->td_ucred->cr_prison)
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else if (pt->pt_prison != td->td_ucred->cr_prison && suser(td))
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return (EBUSY);
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if (tp->t_oproc) /* Ctrlr still around. */
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(void)ttyld_modem(tp, 1);
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