Fix the length calculation for the final block of a sendfile(2)
transmission which could be tricked into rounding up to the nearest page size, leaking up to a page of kernel memory. [13:11] In IPv6 and NetATM, stop SIOCSIFADDR, SIOCSIFBRDADDR, SIOCSIFDSTADDR and SIOCSIFNETMASK at the socket layer rather than pass them on to the link layer without validation or credential checks. [SA-13:12] Prevent cross-mount hardlinks between different nullfs mounts of the same underlying filesystem. [SA-13:13] Security: CVE-2013-5666 Security: FreeBSD-SA-13:11.sendfile Security: CVE-2013-5691 Security: FreeBSD-SA-13:12.ifioctl Security: CVE-2013-5710 Security: FreeBSD-SA-13:13.nullfs Approved by: re
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96543c86c6
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@ -858,6 +858,15 @@ null_vptocnp(struct vop_vptocnp_args *ap)
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return (error);
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}
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static int
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null_link(struct vop_link_args *ap)
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{
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if (ap->a_tdvp->v_mount != ap->a_vp->v_mount)
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return (EXDEV);
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return (null_bypass((struct vop_generic_args *)ap));
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}
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/*
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* Global vfs data structures
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*/
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@ -871,6 +880,7 @@ struct vop_vector null_vnodeops = {
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.vop_getwritemount = null_getwritemount,
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.vop_inactive = null_inactive,
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.vop_islocked = vop_stdislocked,
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.vop_link = null_link,
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.vop_lock1 = null_lock,
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.vop_lookup = null_lookup,
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.vop_open = null_open,
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@ -2221,11 +2221,10 @@ retry_space:
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* or the passed in nbytes.
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*/
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pgoff = (vm_offset_t)(off & PAGE_MASK);
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if (nbytes)
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rem = (nbytes - fsbytes - loopbytes);
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else
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rem = va.va_size -
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offset - fsbytes - loopbytes;
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rem = va.va_size - offset;
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if (nbytes != 0)
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rem = omin(rem, nbytes);
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rem -= fsbytes + loopbytes;
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xfsize = omin(PAGE_SIZE - pgoff, rem);
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xfsize = omin(space - loopbytes, xfsize);
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if (xfsize <= 0) {
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18
sys/net/if.c
18
sys/net/if.c
@ -2553,11 +2553,23 @@ ifioctl(struct socket *so, u_long cmd, caddr_t data, struct thread *td)
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CURVNET_RESTORE();
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return (EOPNOTSUPP);
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}
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/*
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* Pass the request on to the socket control method, and if the
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* latter returns EOPNOTSUPP, directly to the interface.
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*
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* Make an exception for the legacy SIOCSIF* requests. Drivers
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* trust SIOCSIFADDR et al to come from an already privileged
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* layer, and do not perform any credentials checks or input
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* validation.
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*/
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#ifndef COMPAT_43
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error = ((*so->so_proto->pr_usrreqs->pru_control)(so, cmd,
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data,
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ifp, td));
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if (error == EOPNOTSUPP && ifp != NULL && ifp->if_ioctl != NULL)
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if (error == EOPNOTSUPP && ifp != NULL && ifp->if_ioctl != NULL &&
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cmd != SIOCSIFADDR && cmd != SIOCSIFBRDADDR &&
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cmd != SIOCSIFDSTADDR && cmd != SIOCSIFNETMASK)
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error = (*ifp->if_ioctl)(ifp, cmd, data);
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#else
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{
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@ -2601,7 +2613,9 @@ ifioctl(struct socket *so, u_long cmd, caddr_t data, struct thread *td)
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data,
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ifp, td));
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if (error == EOPNOTSUPP && ifp != NULL &&
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ifp->if_ioctl != NULL)
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ifp->if_ioctl != NULL &&
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cmd != SIOCSIFADDR && cmd != SIOCSIFBRDADDR &&
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cmd != SIOCSIFDSTADDR && cmd != SIOCSIFNETMASK)
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error = (*ifp->if_ioctl)(ifp, cmd, data);
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switch (ocmd) {
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@ -431,6 +431,18 @@ in6_control(struct socket *so, u_long cmd, caddr_t data,
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case SIOCGIFSTAT_ICMP6:
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sa6 = &ifr->ifr_addr;
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break;
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case SIOCSIFADDR:
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case SIOCSIFBRDADDR:
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case SIOCSIFDSTADDR:
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case SIOCSIFNETMASK:
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/*
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* Although we should pass any non-INET6 ioctl requests
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* down to driver, we filter some legacy INET requests.
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* Drivers trust SIOCSIFADDR et al to come from an already
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* privileged layer, and do not perform any credentials
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* checks or input validation.
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*/
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return (EINVAL);
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default:
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sa6 = NULL;
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break;
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@ -339,6 +339,21 @@ natm_usr_control(struct socket *so, u_long cmd, caddr_t arg,
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npcb = (struct natmpcb *)so->so_pcb;
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KASSERT(npcb != NULL, ("natm_usr_control: npcb == NULL"));
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switch (cmd) {
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case SIOCSIFADDR:
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case SIOCSIFBRDADDR:
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case SIOCSIFDSTADDR:
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case SIOCSIFNETMASK:
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/*
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* Although we should pass any non-ATM ioctl requests
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* down to driver, we filter some legacy INET requests.
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* Drivers trust SIOCSIFADDR et al to come from an already
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* privileged layer, and do not perform any credentials
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* checks or input validation.
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*/
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return (EINVAL);
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}
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if (ifp == NULL || ifp->if_ioctl == NULL)
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return (EOPNOTSUPP);
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return ((*ifp->if_ioctl)(ifp, cmd, arg));
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