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Import OpenSSL 1.0.1f.

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Approved by:	so (delphij), benl (silence)
This commit is contained in:
Jung-uk Kim 2014-01-22 19:27:13 +00:00
parent cbbee3a581
commit 2dc7f78169
98 changed files with 1453 additions and 813 deletions
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163
CHANGES
View File

@ -2,9 +2,31 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
*) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid
handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.
Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues.
(CVE-2013-4353)
*) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission
structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need
to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450)
[Steve Henson]
*) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug
is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
[Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]
*)
*) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI
supporting platforms or when small records were transferred.
[Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013]
@ -404,6 +426,63 @@
Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]
*) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
(CVE-2013-0169)
[Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
*) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
[Steve Henson]
*) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
so it returns the certificate actually sent.
See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
(This is a backport)
[Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
*) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]
[NB: OpenSSL 1.0.0i and later 1.0.0 patch levels were released after
OpenSSL 1.0.1.]
*) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
to fix DoS attack.
Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
[Steve Henson]
*) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]
*) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
(CVE-2012-2110)
[Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
*) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
@ -1394,6 +1473,86 @@
*) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
[NTT]
Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]
*) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
(CVE-2013-0169)
[Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
*) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
[Steve Henson]
*) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
so it returns the certificate actually sent.
See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
(This is a backport)
[Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
*) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]
*) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
to fix DoS attack.
Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
[Steve Henson]
*) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]
*) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the
'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by
rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
[Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
*) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
(CVE-2012-2110)
[Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]
*) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
an MMA defence is not necessary.
Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
[Steve Henson]
*) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
*) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
@ -1401,7 +1560,7 @@
Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
[Antonio Martin]
Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
*) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension

2
Configure
View File

@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ my %table=(
"debug-ben-no-opt", "gcc: -Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -Werror -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -Wall -g3::(unknown)::::::",
"debug-ben-strict", "gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DCONST_STRICT -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
"debug-rse","cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -pipe -O -g -ggdb3 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}",
"debug-bodo", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"debug-bodo", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"debug-ulf", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -march=i486 -Wall -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations:::CYGWIN32:::${no_asm}:win32:cygwin-shared:::.dll",
"debug-steve64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -Wno-overlength-strings -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-steve32", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m32 -DL_ENDIAN -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",

4
FREEBSD-Xlist
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@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
openssl-*/*.bak
openssl-*/*.com
openssl-*/*.doxy
openssl-*/*.mak
openssl-*/*.save
openssl-*/*.spec
openssl-*/*/*.bat
openssl-*/*/*.com
openssl-*/*/*.save
openssl-*/*/*/*.bat
openssl-*/*/*/*.com
openssl-*/*/*/*.save
openssl-*/INSTALL.DJGPP
openssl-*/INSTALL.MacOS
openssl-*/INSTALL.NW

4
FREEBSD-upgrade
View File

@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ First, read http://wiki.freebsd.org/SubversionPrimer/VendorImports
# Xlist
setenv XLIST /FreeBSD/work/openssl/svn-FREEBSD-files/FREEBSD-Xlist
setenv FSVN "svn+ssh://svn.freebsd.org/base"
setenv OSSLVER 1.0.1e
# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_1e
setenv OSSLVER 1.0.1f
# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_1f
###setenv OSSLTAG v`echo ${OSSLVER} | tr . _`

5
Makefile
View File

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
## Makefile for OpenSSL
##
VERSION=1.0.1e
VERSION=1.0.1f
MAJOR=1
MINOR=0.1
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT)
FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \
export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \
fi; \
$(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto build-shared; \
$(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto CC=$${CC:-$(CC)} build-shared; \
touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT); \
else \
echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
exit 1; \

3
Makefile.org
View File

@ -302,7 +302,8 @@ libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT)
FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \
export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \
fi; \
$(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto build-shared; \
$(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto CC=$${CC:-$(CC)} build-shared; \
touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT); \
else \
echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
exit 1; \

184
NEWS
View File

@ -5,11 +5,17 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1d and OpenSSL 1.0.1e:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1e and OpenSSL 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
o Fix for TLS record tampering bug CVE-2013-4353
o Fix for TLS version checking bug CVE-2013-6449
o Fix for DTLS retransmission bug CVE-2013-6450
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1d and OpenSSL 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]:
o Corrected fix for CVE-2013-0169
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1c and OpenSSL 1.0.1d:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1c and OpenSSL 1.0.1d [4 Feb 2013]:
o Fix renegotiation in TLS 1.1, 1.2 by using the correct TLS version.
o Include the fips configuration module.
@ -17,24 +23,24 @@
o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
o Fix for TLS AESNI record handling flaw CVE-2012-2686
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1b and OpenSSL 1.0.1c:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1b and OpenSSL 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]:
o Fix TLS/DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
o Don't attempt to use non-FIPS composite ciphers in FIPS mode.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1a and OpenSSL 1.0.1b:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1a and OpenSSL 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]:
o Fix compilation error on non-x86 platforms.
o Make FIPS capable OpenSSL ciphers work in non-FIPS mode.
o Fix SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 clash with SSL_OP_ALL in OpenSSL 1.0.0
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.1a:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]:
o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
o Workarounds for some servers that hang on long client hellos.
o Fix SEGV in AES code.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.1:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012]:
o TLS/DTLS heartbeat support.
o SCTP support.
@ -47,17 +53,30 @@
o Preliminary FIPS capability for unvalidated 2.0 FIPS module.
o SRP support.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0j and OpenSSL 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]:
o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0i and OpenSSL 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]:
o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]:
o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]:
o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
o Various DTLS fixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]:
o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]:
o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
@ -65,7 +84,7 @@
o Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE CVE-2012-0027
o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]:
o Fix for CRL vulnerability issue CVE-2011-3207
o Fix for ECDH crashes CVE-2011-3210
@ -73,11 +92,11 @@
o Support ECDH ciphersuites for certificates using SHA2 algorithms.
o Various DTLS fixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0c and OpenSSL 1.0.0d:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0c and OpenSSL 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0b and OpenSSL 1.0.0c:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0b and OpenSSL 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
@ -85,18 +104,18 @@
o Fix various platform compilation issues.
o Corrected fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0a and OpenSSL 1.0.0b:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0a and OpenSSL 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
o Fix for CVE-2010-2939
o Fix WIN32 build system for GOST ENGINE.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.0a:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.0a [1 Jun 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-1633.
o GOST MAC and CFB fixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 1.0.0:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010]:
o RFC3280 path validation: sufficient to process PKITS tests.
o Integrated support for PVK files and keyblobs.
@ -119,20 +138,55 @@
o Opaque PRF Input TLS extension support.
o Updated time routines to avoid OS limitations.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8x and OpenSSL 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]:
o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8w and OpenSSL 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]:
o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8v and OpenSSL 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]:
o Fix for CVE-2012-2131 (corrected fix for 0.9.8 and CVE-2012-2110)
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8u and OpenSSL 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]:
o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8t and OpenSSL 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]:
o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
o Various DTLS fixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8s and OpenSSL 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]:
o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8r and OpenSSL 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]:
o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
o Fix policy check double free error CVE-2011-4109
o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o [1 Jun 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-0742.
o Various DTLS fixes.
@ -140,12 +194,12 @@
o Fix for no-rc4 compilation.
o Chil ENGINE unload workaround.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]:
o CFB cipher definition fixes.
o Fix security issues CVE-2010-0740 and CVE-2010-0433.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]:
o Cipher definition fixes.
o Workaround for slow RAND_poll() on some WIN32 versions.
@ -157,33 +211,33 @@
o Ticket and SNI coexistence fixes.
o Many fixes to DTLS handling.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009]:
o Temporary work around for CVE-2009-3555: disable renegotiation.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009]:
o Fix various build issues.
o Fix security issues (CVE-2009-0590, CVE-2009-0591, CVE-2009-0789)
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j [7 Jan 2009]:
o Fix security issue (CVE-2008-5077)
o Merge FIPS 140-2 branch code.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]:
o CryptoAPI ENGINE support.
o Various precautionary measures.
o Fix for bugs affecting certificate request creation.
o Support for local machine keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007]:
o Backport of CMS functionality to 0.9.8.
o Fixes for bugs introduced with 0.9.8f.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007]:
o Add gcc 4.2 support.
o Add support for AES and SSE2 assembly lanugauge optimization
@ -194,23 +248,23 @@
o RFC4507bis support.
o TLS Extensions support.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007]:
o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
o RFC3779 support.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006]:
o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940)
o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
o Changes to ciphersuite selection algorithm
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c [5 Sep 2006]:
o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
o New cipher Camellia
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b [4 May 2006]:
o Cipher string fixes.
o Fixes for VC++ 2005.
@ -220,12 +274,12 @@
o Built in dynamic engine compilation support on Win32.
o Fixes auto dynamic engine loading in Win32.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]:
o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969
o Extended Windows CE support
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8 [5 Jul 2005]:
o Major work on the BIGNUM library for higher efficiency and to
make operations more streamlined and less contradictory. This
@ -299,36 +353,36 @@
o Added initial support for Win64.
o Added alternate pkg-config files.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]:
o FIPS 1.1.1 module linking.
o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006]:
o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940)
o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k [5 Sep 2006]:
o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j [4 May 2006]:
o Visual C++ 2005 fixes.
o Update Windows build system for FIPS.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]:
o Give EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE it's old value, except for a FIPS build.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]:
o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CVE-2005-2969
o Allow use of fixed-length exponent on DSA signing
o Default fixed-window RSA, DSA, DH private-key operations
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]:
o More compilation issues fixed.
o Adaptation to more modern Kerberos API.
@ -337,7 +391,7 @@
o More constification.
o Added processing of proxy certificates (RFC 3820).
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005]:
o Several compilation issues fixed.
o Many memory allocation failure checks added.
@ -345,12 +399,12 @@
o Mandatory basic checks on certificates.
o Performance improvements.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004]:
o Fix race condition in CRL checking code.
o Fixes to PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]:
o Security: Fix Kerberos ciphersuite SSL/TLS handshaking bug
o Security: Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec()
@ -358,14 +412,14 @@
o Multiple X509 verification fixes
o Speed up HMAC and other operations
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003]:
o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
o New -ignore_err option to OCSP utility.
o Various interop and bug fixes in S/MIME code.
o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003]:
o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
Bleichbacher's attack
@ -376,7 +430,7 @@
o ASN.1: treat domainComponent correctly.
o Documentation: fixes and additions.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003]:
o Security: Important security related bugfixes.
o Enhanced compatibility with MIT Kerberos.
@ -387,7 +441,7 @@
o SSL/TLS: now handles manual certificate chain building.
o SSL/TLS: certain session ID malfunctions corrected.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7 [30 Dec 2002]:
o New library section OCSP.
o Complete rewrite of ASN1 code.
@ -433,23 +487,23 @@
o SSL/TLS: add callback to retrieve SSL/TLS messages.
o SSL/TLS: support AES cipher suites (RFC3268).
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]:
o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003]:
o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
Bleichbacher's attack
o Security: make RSA blinding default.
o Build: shared library support fixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]:
o Important security related bugfixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]:
o New configuration targets for Tandem OSS and A/UX.
o New OIDs for Microsoft attributes.
@ -463,25 +517,25 @@
o Fixes for smaller building problems.
o Updates of manuals, FAQ and other instructive documents.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002]:
o Important building fixes on Unix.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002]:
o Various important bugfixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002]:
o Important security related bugfixes.
o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]:
o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
o Fix DH parameter generation for 'non-standard' generators.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c [21 Dec 2001]:
o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
o BIGNUM library fixes.
@ -494,7 +548,7 @@
Broadcom and Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver
[in 0.9.6c-engine release].
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001]:
o Security fix: PRNG improvements.
o Security fix: RSA OAEP check.
@ -511,7 +565,7 @@
o Increase default size for BIO buffering filter.
o Compatibility fixes in some scripts.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001]:
o Security fix: change behavior of OpenSSL to avoid using
environment variables when running as root.
@ -536,7 +590,7 @@
o New function BN_rand_range().
o Add "-rand" option to openssl s_client and s_server.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6 [10 Oct 2000]:
o Some documentation for BIO and SSL libraries.
o Enhanced chain verification using key identifiers.
@ -551,7 +605,7 @@
[1] The support for external crypto devices is currently a separate
distribution. See the file README.ENGINE.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000]:
o Bug fixes for Win32, SuSE Linux, NeXTSTEP and FreeBSD 2.2.8
o Shared library support for HPUX and Solaris-gcc
@ -560,7 +614,7 @@
o New 'rand' application
o New way to check for existence of algorithms from scripts
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5 [25 May 2000]:
o S/MIME support in new 'smime' command
o Documentation for the OpenSSL command line application
@ -596,7 +650,7 @@
o Enhanced support for Alpha Linux
o Experimental MacOS support
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4 [9 Aug 1999]:
o Transparent support for PKCS#8 format private keys: these are used
by several software packages and are more secure than the standard
@ -607,7 +661,7 @@
o New pipe-like BIO that allows using the SSL library when actual I/O
must be handled by the application (BIO pair)
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3 [24 May 1999]:
o Lots of enhancements and cleanups to the Configuration mechanism
o RSA OEAP related fixes
o Added `openssl ca -revoke' option for revoking a certificate
@ -621,7 +675,7 @@
o Sparc assembler bignum implementation, optimized hash functions
o Option to disable selected ciphers
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999]:
o Fixed a security hole related to session resumption
o Fixed RSA encryption routines for the p < q case
o "ALL" in cipher lists now means "everything except NULL ciphers"
@ -643,7 +697,7 @@
o Lots of memory leak fixes.
o Lots of bug fixes.
Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c:
Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c [23 Dec 1998]:
o Integration of the popular NO_RSA/NO_DSA patches
o Initial support for compression inside the SSL record layer
o Added BIO proxy and filtering functionality

2
README
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
OpenSSL 1.0.1e 11 Feb 2013
OpenSSL 1.0.1f 6 Jan 2014
Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson

17
apps/Makefile
View File

@ -577,14 +577,15 @@ openssl.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h openssl.c progs.h s_apps.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
openssl.o: openssl.c progs.h s_apps.h
passwd.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
passwd.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
passwd.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/des.h

2
apps/apps.h
View File

@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ extern BIO *bio_err;
do { CONF_modules_unload(1); destroy_ui_method(); \
OBJ_cleanup(); EVP_cleanup(); ENGINE_cleanup(); \
CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); \
RAND_cleanup(); \
ERR_free_strings(); zlib_cleanup();} while(0)
# else
# define apps_startup() \
@ -198,6 +199,7 @@ extern BIO *bio_err;
do { CONF_modules_unload(1); destroy_ui_method(); \
OBJ_cleanup(); EVP_cleanup(); \
CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); \
RAND_cleanup(); \
ERR_free_strings(); zlib_cleanup(); } while(0)
# endif
#endif

1
apps/openssl.c
View File

@ -117,6 +117,7 @@
#include "apps.h"
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>

9
apps/pkcs12.c
View File

@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
int maciter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
int twopass = 0;
int keytype = 0;
int cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
int cert_pbe;
int key_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
int ret = 1;
int macver = 1;
@ -130,6 +130,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
apps_startup();
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
else
#endif
cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
if (bio_err == NULL ) bio_err = BIO_new_fp (stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);

2
config
View File

@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ case "$GUESSOS" in
libc=/usr/lib/libc.so
else # OpenBSD
# ld searches for highest libc.so.* and so do we
libc=`(ls /usr/lib/libc.so.* | tail -1) 2>/dev/null`
libc=`(ls /usr/lib/libc.so.* /lib/libc.so.* | tail -1) 2>/dev/null`
fi
case "`(file -L $libc) 2>/dev/null`" in
*ELF*) OUT="BSD-x86-elf" ;;

4
crypto/Makefile
View File

@ -77,7 +77,9 @@ ia64cpuid.s: ia64cpuid.S; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -E ia64cpuid.S > $@
ppccpuid.s: ppccpuid.pl; $(PERL) ppccpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
pariscid.s: pariscid.pl; $(PERL) pariscid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
alphacpuid.s: alphacpuid.pl
$(PERL) $< | $(CC) -E - | tee $@ > /dev/null
(preproc=/tmp/$$$$.$@; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \
$(PERL) alphacpuid.pl > $$preproc && \
$(CC) -E $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc)
testapps:
[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || ( if echo $(SDIRS) | fgrep ' des '; \

3
crypto/aes/asm/aes-parisc.pl
View File

@ -1015,7 +1015,8 @@ foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
$SIZE_T==4 ? sprintf("extru%s,%d,8,",$1,31-$2)
: sprintf("extrd,u%s,%d,8,",$1,63-$2)/e;
s/,\*/,/ if ($SIZE_T==4);
s/,\*/,/ if ($SIZE_T==4);
s/\bbv\b(.*\(%r2\))/bve$1/ if ($SIZE_T==8);
print $_,"\n";
}
close STDOUT;

73
crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl
View File

@ -83,9 +83,9 @@
# Add decryption procedure. Performance in CPU cycles spent to decrypt
# one byte out of 4096-byte buffer with 128-bit key is:
#
# Core 2 11.0
# Nehalem 9.16
# Atom 20.9
# Core 2 9.83
# Nehalem 7.74
# Atom 19.0
#
# November 2011.
#
@ -456,6 +456,7 @@ sub MixColumns {
# modified to emit output in order suitable for feeding back to aesenc[last]
my @x=@_[0..7];
my @t=@_[8..15];
my $inv=@_[16]; # optional
$code.=<<___;
pshufd \$0x93, @x[0], @t[0] # x0 <<< 32
pshufd \$0x93, @x[1], @t[1]
@ -497,7 +498,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
pxor @t[4], @t[0]
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[2], @x[6]
pxor @t[5], @t[1]
___
$code.=<<___ if (!$inv);
pxor @t[3], @x[4]
pxor @t[7], @x[5]
pxor @t[6], @x[3]
@ -505,9 +507,20 @@ $code.=<<___;
pxor @t[2], @x[6]
movdqa @t[1], @x[7]
___
$code.=<<___ if ($inv);
pxor @x[4], @t[3]
pxor @t[7], @x[5]
pxor @x[3], @t[6]
movdqa @t[0], @x[3]
pxor @t[2], @x[6]
movdqa @t[6], @x[2]
movdqa @t[1], @x[7]
movdqa @x[6], @x[4]
movdqa @t[3], @x[6]
___
}
sub InvMixColumns {
sub InvMixColumns_orig {
my @x=@_[0..7];
my @t=@_[8..15];
@ -661,6 +674,54 @@ $code.=<<___;
___
}
sub InvMixColumns {
my @x=@_[0..7];
my @t=@_[8..15];
# Thanks to Jussi Kivilinna for providing pointer to
#
# | 0e 0b 0d 09 | | 02 03 01 01 | | 05 00 04 00 |
# | 09 0e 0b 0d | = | 01 02 03 01 | x | 00 05 00 04 |
# | 0d 09 0e 0b | | 01 01 02 03 | | 04 00 05 00 |
# | 0b 0d 09 0e | | 03 01 01 02 | | 00 04 00 05 |
$code.=<<___;
# multiplication by 0x05-0x00-0x04-0x00
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[0], @t[0]
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[6], @t[6]
pxor @x[0], @t[0]
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[7], @t[7]
pxor @x[6], @t[6]
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[1], @t[1]
pxor @x[7], @t[7]
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[2], @t[2]
pxor @x[1], @t[1]
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[3], @t[3]
pxor @x[2], @t[2]
pxor @t[6], @x[0]
pxor @t[6], @x[1]
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[4], @t[4]
pxor @x[3], @t[3]
pxor @t[0], @x[2]
pxor @t[1], @x[3]
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[5], @t[5]
pxor @x[4], @t[4]
pxor @t[7], @x[1]
pxor @t[2], @x[4]
pxor @x[5], @t[5]
pxor @t[7], @x[2]
pxor @t[6], @x[3]
pxor @t[6], @x[4]
pxor @t[3], @x[5]
pxor @t[4], @x[6]
pxor @t[7], @x[4]
pxor @t[7], @x[5]
pxor @t[5], @x[7]
___
&MixColumns (@x,@t,1); # flipped 2<->3 and 4<->6
}
sub aesenc { # not used
my @b=@_[0..7];
my @t=@_[8..15];
@ -2028,6 +2089,8 @@ ___
# const unsigned char iv[16]);
#
my ($twmask,$twres,$twtmp)=@XMM[13..15];
$arg6=~s/d$//;
$code.=<<___;
.globl bsaes_xts_encrypt
.type bsaes_xts_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent

2
crypto/armcap.c
View File

@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ unsigned int _armv7_tick(void);
unsigned int OPENSSL_rdtsc(void)
{
if (OPENSSL_armcap_P|ARMV7_TICK)
if (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_TICK)
return _armv7_tick();
else
return 0;

2
crypto/asn1/a_int.c
View File

@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
int pad=0,ret,i,neg;
unsigned char *p,*n,pb=0;
if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) return(0);
if (a == NULL) return(0);
neg=a->type & V_ASN1_NEG;
if (a->length == 0)
ret=1;

6
crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
View File

@ -906,8 +906,8 @@ BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag)
memset(authchunks, 0, sizeof(sockopt_len));
ret = getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_LOCAL_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, &sockopt_len);
OPENSSL_assert(ret >= 0);
for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks + sizeof(sctp_assoc_t);
for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks->gauth_chunks;
p < (unsigned char*) authchunks + sockopt_len;
p += sizeof(uint8_t))
{
@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
ii = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PEER_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, &optlen);
OPENSSL_assert(ii >= 0);
for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks + sizeof(sctp_assoc_t);
for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks->gauth_chunks;
p < (unsigned char*) authchunks + optlen;
p += sizeof(uint8_t))
{

4
crypto/bn/Makefile
View File

@ -125,7 +125,9 @@ ppc-mont.s: asm/ppc-mont.pl;$(PERL) asm/ppc-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
ppc64-mont.s: asm/ppc64-mont.pl;$(PERL) asm/ppc64-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
alpha-mont.s: asm/alpha-mont.pl
$(PERL) $< | $(CC) -E - | tee $@ > /dev/null
(preproc=/tmp/$$$$.$@; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \
$(PERL) asm/alpha-mont.pl > $$preproc && \
$(CC) -E $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc)
# GNU make "catch all"
%-mont.s: asm/%-mont.pl; $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@

2
crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl
View File

@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
bnez $at,1f
li $t0,0
slt $at,$num,17 # on in-order CPU
bnezl $at,bn_mul_mont_internal
bnez $at,bn_mul_mont_internal
nop
1: jr $ra
li $a0,0

44
crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl
View File

@ -140,10 +140,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
.set reorder
li $minus4,-4
and $ta0,$a2,$minus4
$LD $t0,0($a1)
beqz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail
.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop:
$LD $t0,0($a1)
$MULTU $t0,$a3
$LD $t1,0($a0)
$LD $t2,$BNSZ($a1)
@ -200,10 +200,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
$ADDU $v0,$ta2
sltu $at,$ta3,$at
$ST $ta3,-$BNSZ($a0)
$ADDU $v0,$at
.set noreorder
bgtzl $ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop
$LD $t0,0($a1)
bgtz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop
$ADDU $v0,$at
beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return
nop
@ -300,10 +299,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
.set reorder
li $minus4,-4
and $ta0,$a2,$minus4
$LD $t0,0($a1)
beqz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_tail
.L_bn_mul_words_loop:
$LD $t0,0($a1)
$MULTU $t0,$a3
$LD $t2,$BNSZ($a1)
$LD $ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1)
@ -341,10 +340,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
$ADDU $v0,$at
sltu $ta3,$v0,$at
$ST $v0,-$BNSZ($a0)
$ADDU $v0,$ta3,$ta2
.set noreorder
bgtzl $ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_loop
$LD $t0,0($a1)
bgtz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_loop
$ADDU $v0,$ta3,$ta2
beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return
nop
@ -429,10 +427,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
.set reorder
li $minus4,-4
and $ta0,$a2,$minus4
$LD $t0,0($a1)
beqz $ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_tail
.L_bn_sqr_words_loop:
$LD $t0,0($a1)
$MULTU $t0,$t0
$LD $t2,$BNSZ($a1)
$LD $ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1)
@ -463,11 +461,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
mflo $ta3
mfhi $ta2
$ST $ta3,-2*$BNSZ($a0)
$ST $ta2,-$BNSZ($a0)
.set noreorder
bgtzl $ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_loop
$LD $t0,0($a1)
bgtz $ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_loop
$ST $ta2,-$BNSZ($a0)
beqz $a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return
nop
@ -547,10 +544,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
.set reorder
li $minus4,-4
and $at,$a3,$minus4
$LD $t0,0($a1)
beqz $at,.L_bn_add_words_tail
.L_bn_add_words_loop:
$LD $t0,0($a1)
$LD $ta0,0($a2)
subu $a3,4
$LD $t1,$BNSZ($a1)
@ -589,11 +586,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
$ADDU $t3,$ta3,$v0
sltu $v0,$t3,$ta3
$ST $t3,-$BNSZ($a0)
$ADDU $v0,$t9
.set noreorder
bgtzl $at,.L_bn_add_words_loop
$LD $t0,0($a1)
bgtz $at,.L_bn_add_words_loop
$ADDU $v0,$t9
beqz $a3,.L_bn_add_words_return
nop
@ -679,10 +675,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
.set reorder
li $minus4,-4
and $at,$a3,$minus4
$LD $t0,0($a1)
beqz $at,.L_bn_sub_words_tail
.L_bn_sub_words_loop:
$LD $t0,0($a1)
$LD $ta0,0($a2)
subu $a3,4
$LD $t1,$BNSZ($a1)
@ -722,11 +718,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
$SUBU $t3,$ta3,$v0
sgtu $v0,$t3,$ta3
$ST $t3,-$BNSZ($a0)
$ADDU $v0,$t9
.set noreorder
bgtzl $at,.L_bn_sub_words_loop
$LD $t0,0($a1)
bgtz $at,.L_bn_sub_words_loop
$ADDU $v0,$t9
beqz $a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return
nop
@ -840,8 +835,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
sltu $ta0,$a1,$a2
or $t8,$ta0
.set noreorder
beqzl $at,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop
beqz $at,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop
$SUBU $v0,1
$ADDU $v0,1
.set reorder
.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop_done:
.set noreorder
@ -902,7 +898,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
and $t2,$a0
$SRL $at,$a1,$t1
.set noreorder
bnezl $t2,.+8
beqz $t2,.+12
nop
break 6 # signal overflow
.set reorder
$SLL $a0,$t9
@ -917,7 +914,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
$SRL $DH,$a2,4*$BNSZ # bits
sgeu $at,$a0,$a2
.set noreorder
bnezl $at,.+8
beqz $at,.+12
nop
$SUBU $a0,$a2
.set reorder

4
crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl
View File

@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
# of arithmetic operations, most notably multiplications. It requires
# more memory references, most notably to tp[num], but this doesn't
# seem to exhaust memory port capacity. And indeed, dedicated PA-RISC
# 2.0 code path, provides virtually same performance as pa-risc2[W].s:
# 2.0 code path provides virtually same performance as pa-risc2[W].s:
# it's ~10% better for shortest key length and ~10% worse for longest
# one.
#
@ -988,6 +988,8 @@ foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
# assemble 2.0 instructions in 32-bit mode...
s/^\s+([a-z]+)([\S]*)\s+([\S]*)/&assemble($1,$2,$3)/e if ($BN_SZ==4);
s/\bbv\b/bve/gm if ($SIZE_T==8);
print $_,"\n";
}
close STDOUT;

3
crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
View File

@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
*STDOUT=*OUT;
($lo,$hi)=("%rax","%rdx"); $a=$lo;
($i0,$i1)=("%rsi","%rdi");

4
crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
View File

@ -901,8 +901,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
jnz .Lgather
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
movaps (%rsp),%xmm6
movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
lea 0x28(%rsp),%rsp
___
$code.=<<___;

55
crypto/bn/bn_nist.c
View File

@ -286,26 +286,25 @@ const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_521(void)
}
static void nist_cp_bn_0(BN_ULONG *buf, BN_ULONG *a, int top, int max)
static void nist_cp_bn_0(BN_ULONG *dst, const BN_ULONG *src, int top, int max)
{
int i;
BN_ULONG *_tmp1 = (buf), *_tmp2 = (a);
#ifdef BN_DEBUG
OPENSSL_assert(top <= max);
#endif
for (i = (top); i != 0; i--)
*_tmp1++ = *_tmp2++;
for (i = (max) - (top); i != 0; i--)
*_tmp1++ = (BN_ULONG) 0;
for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
dst[i] = src[i];
for (; i < max; i++)
dst[i] = 0;
}
static void nist_cp_bn(BN_ULONG *buf, BN_ULONG *a, int top)
static void nist_cp_bn(BN_ULONG *dst, const BN_ULONG *src, int top)
{
int i;
BN_ULONG *_tmp1 = (buf), *_tmp2 = (a);
for (i = (top); i != 0; i--)
*_tmp1++ = *_tmp2++;
for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
dst[i] = src[i];
}
#if BN_BITS2 == 64
@ -451,8 +450,9 @@ int BN_nist_mod_192(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
*/
mask = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)bn_sub_words(c_d,r_d,_nist_p_192[0],BN_NIST_192_TOP);
mask &= 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)carry;
res = c_d;
res = (BN_ULONG *)
(((PTR_SIZE_INT)c_d&~mask) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
(((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_192_TOP);
r->top = BN_NIST_192_TOP;
bn_correct_top(r);
@ -479,8 +479,11 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
int top = a->top, i;
int carry;
BN_ULONG *r_d, *a_d = a->d;
BN_ULONG buf[BN_NIST_224_TOP],
c_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP],
union {
BN_ULONG bn[BN_NIST_224_TOP];
unsigned int ui[BN_NIST_224_TOP*sizeof(BN_ULONG)/sizeof(unsigned int)];
} buf;
BN_ULONG c_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP],
*res;
PTR_SIZE_INT mask;
union { bn_addsub_f f; PTR_SIZE_INT p; } u;
@ -519,18 +522,18 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
/* copy upper 256 bits of 448 bit number ... */
nist_cp_bn_0(c_d, a_d + (BN_NIST_224_TOP-1), top - (BN_NIST_224_TOP-1), BN_NIST_224_TOP);
/* ... and right shift by 32 to obtain upper 224 bits */
nist_set_224(buf, c_d, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8);
nist_set_224(buf.bn, c_d, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8);
/* truncate lower part to 224 bits too */
r_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP-1] &= BN_MASK2l;
#else
nist_cp_bn_0(buf, a_d + BN_NIST_224_TOP, top - BN_NIST_224_TOP, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
nist_cp_bn_0(buf.bn, a_d + BN_NIST_224_TOP, top - BN_NIST_224_TOP, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
#endif
#if defined(NIST_INT64) && BN_BITS2!=64
{
NIST_INT64 acc; /* accumulator */
unsigned int *rp=(unsigned int *)r_d;
const unsigned int *bp=(const unsigned int *)buf;
const unsigned int *bp=(const unsigned int *)buf.ui;
acc = rp[0]; acc -= bp[7-7];
acc -= bp[11-7]; rp[0] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32;
@ -565,13 +568,13 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
{
BN_ULONG t_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP];
nist_set_224(t_d, buf, 10, 9, 8, 7, 0, 0, 0);
nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 10, 9, 8, 7, 0, 0, 0);
carry = (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
nist_set_224(t_d, buf, 0, 13, 12, 11, 0, 0, 0);
nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 13, 12, 11, 0, 0, 0);
carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
nist_set_224(t_d, buf, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7);
nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7);
carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
nist_set_224(t_d, buf, 0, 0, 0, 0, 13, 12, 11);
nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 0, 0, 0, 13, 12, 11);
carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
#if BN_BITS2==64
@ -606,7 +609,8 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
/* otherwise it's effectively same as in BN_nist_mod_192... */
mask = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)(*u.f)(c_d,r_d,_nist_p_224[0],BN_NIST_224_TOP);
mask &= 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)carry;
res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)c_d&~mask) |
res = c_d;
res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) |
((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
r->top = BN_NIST_224_TOP;
@ -805,7 +809,8 @@ int BN_nist_mod_256(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
mask = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)(*u.f)(c_d,r_d,_nist_p_256[0],BN_NIST_256_TOP);
mask &= 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)carry;
res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)c_d&~mask) |
res = c_d;
res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) |
((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_256_TOP);
r->top = BN_NIST_256_TOP;
@ -1026,7 +1031,8 @@ int BN_nist_mod_384(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
mask = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)(*u.f)(c_d,r_d,_nist_p_384[0],BN_NIST_384_TOP);
mask &= 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)carry;
res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)c_d&~mask) |
res = c_d;
res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) |
((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_384_TOP);
r->top = BN_NIST_384_TOP;
@ -1092,7 +1098,8 @@ int BN_nist_mod_521(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
bn_add_words(r_d,r_d,t_d,BN_NIST_521_TOP);
mask = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)bn_sub_words(t_d,r_d,_nist_p_521,BN_NIST_521_TOP);
res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)t_d&~mask) |
res = t_d;
res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) |
((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
nist_cp_bn(r_d,res,BN_NIST_521_TOP);
r->top = BN_NIST_521_TOP;

4
crypto/buffer/buffer.c
View File

@ -179,14 +179,14 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len)
return(len);
}
void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in, size_t size)
void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t size)
{
size_t i;
if (in)
{
out += size - 1;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
*in++ = *out--;
*out-- = *in++;
}
else
{

2
crypto/buffer/buffer.h
View File

@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
char * BUF_strdup(const char *str);
char * BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz);
void * BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz);
void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in, size_t siz);
void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t siz);
/* safe string functions */
size_t BUF_strlcpy(char *dst,const char *src,size_t siz);

2
crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
View File

@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int eckey_param2type(int *pptype, void **ppval, EC_KEY *ec_key)
if (!pstr)
return 0;
pstr->length = i2d_ECParameters(ec_key, &pstr->data);
if (pstr->length < 0)
if (pstr->length <= 0)
{
ASN1_STRING_free(pstr);
ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM2TYPE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);

6
crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
View File

@ -89,7 +89,8 @@ int EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k)
if (group == NULL)
return 0;
if (EC_GROUP_method_of(group)->group_set_curve != ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve
if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
|| !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0) && (group->poly[2] == 0)))
{
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_TRINOMIAL_BASIS, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
@ -107,7 +108,8 @@ int EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k1,
if (group == NULL)
return 0;
if (EC_GROUP_method_of(group)->group_set_curve != ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve
if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
|| !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0) && (group->poly[2] != 0) && (group->poly[3] != 0) && (group->poly[4] == 0)))
{
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);

10
crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
View File

@ -480,10 +480,10 @@ int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(a)) !=
EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(b)))
return 1;
/* compare the curve name (if present) */
/* compare the curve name (if present in both) */
if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b) &&
EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) == EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b))
return 0;
EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) != EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b))
return 1;
if (!ctx)
ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new();
@ -993,12 +993,12 @@ int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN
if (group->meth->point_cmp == 0)
{
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
return -1;
}
if ((group->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth))
{
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
return -1;
}
return group->meth->point_cmp(group, a, b, ctx);
}

1
crypto/engine/eng_rdrand.c
View File

@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e)
{
if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_e_rdrand_id) ||
!ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_e_rdrand_name) ||
!ENGINE_set_flags(e, ENGINE_FLAGS_NO_REGISTER_ALL) ||
!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, rdrand_init) ||
!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &rdrand_meth) )
return 0;

2
crypto/evp/Makefile
View File

@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ files:
links:
@$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
@$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../test $(TEST)
[ ! -f $(TESTDATA) ] || cp $(TESTDATA) ../../test
@[ -f $(TESTDATA) ] && cp $(TESTDATA) ../../test && echo "$(TESTDATA) -> ../../test/$(TESTDATA)"
@$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../apps $(APPS)
install:

7
crypto/evp/digest.c
View File

@ -366,8 +366,11 @@ int EVP_Digest(const void *data, size_t count,
void EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
if (ctx)
{
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
}
/* This call frees resources associated with the context */

16
crypto/evp/e_aes.c
View File

@ -842,7 +842,10 @@ static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
gctx->ctr = NULL;
break;
}
else
#endif
(void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f)AES_encrypt);
#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
@ -1083,14 +1086,17 @@ static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)vpaes_decrypt;
}
vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len/2,
vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len/2,
ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks2);
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt;
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt;
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
break;
}
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
break;
}
else
#endif
(void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
if (enc)
{
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1);

5
crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
View File

@ -328,10 +328,11 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
if (res!=SHA_CBLOCK) continue;
mask = 0-((inp_len+8-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
/* j is not incremented yet */
mask = 0-((inp_len+7-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
data->u[SHA_LBLOCK-1] |= bitlen&mask;
sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
mask &= 0-((j-inp_len-73)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
mask &= 0-((j-inp_len-72)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;

6
crypto/evp/e_des3.c
View File

@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static int des_ede_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
static int des_ede_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
{
if (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
while (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
{
DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
&data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2, &data(ctx)->ks3,
@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int des_ede_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
printf("\n");
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
while (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
{
DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
&data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2, &data(ctx)->ks3,
@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static int des_ede_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
static int des_ede_cfb64_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
{
if (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
while (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
{
DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
&data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2, &data(ctx)->ks3,

40
crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
View File

@ -85,19 +85,24 @@ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4];
int cplen, j, k, tkeylen, mdlen;
unsigned long i = 1;
HMAC_CTX hctx;
HMAC_CTX hctx_tpl, hctx;
mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest);
if (mdlen < 0)
return 0;
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx_tpl);
p = out;
tkeylen = keylen;
if(!pass)
passlen = 0;
else if(passlen == -1)
passlen = strlen(pass);
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx_tpl, pass, passlen, digest, NULL))
{
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
return 0;
}
while(tkeylen)
{
if(tkeylen > mdlen)
@ -111,19 +116,36 @@ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen,
itmp[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 0xff);
itmp[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8) & 0xff);
itmp[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff);
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, pass, passlen, digest, NULL)
|| !HMAC_Update(&hctx, salt, saltlen)
|| !HMAC_Update(&hctx, itmp, 4)
|| !HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL))
if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(&hctx, &hctx_tpl))
{
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
return 0;
}
if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, salt, saltlen)
|| !HMAC_Update(&hctx, itmp, 4)
|| !HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL))
{
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
return 0;
}
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
memcpy(p, digtmp, cplen);
for(j = 1; j < iter; j++)
{
HMAC(digest, pass, passlen,
digtmp, mdlen, digtmp, NULL);
if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(&hctx, &hctx_tpl))
{
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
return 0;
}
if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, digtmp, mdlen)
|| !HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL))
{
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
return 0;
}
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
for(k = 0; k < cplen; k++)
p[k] ^= digtmp[k];
}
@ -131,7 +153,7 @@ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen,
i++;
p+= cplen;
}
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
#ifdef DEBUG_PKCS5V2
fprintf(stderr, "Password:\n");
h__dump (pass, passlen);

5
crypto/modes/Makefile
View File

@ -53,7 +53,10 @@ ghash-x86_64.s: asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
ghash-sparcv9.s: asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
$(PERL) asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl $@ $(CFLAGS)
ghash-alpha.s: asm/ghash-alpha.pl
$(PERL) $< | $(CC) -E - | tee $@ > /dev/null
(preproc=/tmp/$$$$.$@; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \
$(PERL) asm/ghash-alpha.pl > $$preproc && \
$(CC) -E $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc)
ghash-parisc.s: asm/ghash-parisc.pl
$(PERL) asm/ghash-parisc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@

1
crypto/modes/asm/ghash-parisc.pl
View File

@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
s/cmpb,\*/comb,/;
s/,\*/,/;
}
s/\bbv\b/bve/ if ($SIZE_T==8);
print $_,"\n";
}

25
crypto/modes/cbc128.c
View File

@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ void CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block)
{
size_t n;
union { size_t align; unsigned char c[16]; } tmp;
union { size_t t[16/sizeof(size_t)]; unsigned char c[16]; } tmp;
assert(in && out && key && ivec);
@ -137,11 +137,13 @@ void CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
out += 16;
}
}
else {
else if (16%sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true */
while (len>=16) {
size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out, *iv_t=(size_t *)iv;
(*block)(in, out, key);
for(n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t))
*(size_t *)(out+n) ^= *(size_t *)(iv+n);
for(n=0; n<16/sizeof(size_t); n++)
out_t[n] ^= iv_t[n];
iv = in;
len -= 16;
in += 16;
@ -165,15 +167,16 @@ void CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
out += 16;
}
}
else {
size_t c;
else if (16%sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true */
while (len>=16) {
size_t c, *out_t=(size_t *)out, *ivec_t=(size_t *)ivec;
const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
(*block)(in, tmp.c, key);
for(n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t)) {
c = *(size_t *)(in+n);
*(size_t *)(out+n) =
*(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) ^ *(size_t *)(ivec+n);
*(size_t *)(ivec+n) = c;
for(n=0; n<16/sizeof(size_t); n++) {
c = in_t[n];
out_t[n] = tmp.t[n] ^ ivec_t[n];
ivec_t[n] = c;
}
len -= 16;
in += 16;

2
crypto/modes/ccm128.c
View File

@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
ctx->nonce.c[11] = (u8)(mlen>>(32%(sizeof(mlen)*8)));
}
else
*(u32*)(&ctx->nonce.c[8]) = 0;
ctx->nonce.u[1] = 0;
ctx->nonce.c[12] = (u8)(mlen>>24);
ctx->nonce.c[13] = (u8)(mlen>>16);

28
crypto/modes/cts128.c
View File

@ -108,12 +108,8 @@ size_t CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
(*cbc)(in,out-16,residue,key,ivec,1);
memcpy(out,tmp.c,residue);
#else
{
size_t n;
for (n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t))
*(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = 0;
memset(tmp.c,0,sizeof(tmp));
memcpy(tmp.c,in,residue);
}
memcpy(out,out-16,residue);
(*cbc)(tmp.c,out-16,16,key,ivec,1);
#endif
@ -144,12 +140,8 @@ size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
#if defined(CBC_HANDLES_TRUNCATED_IO)
(*cbc)(in,out-16+residue,residue,key,ivec,1);
#else
{
size_t n;
for (n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t))
*(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = 0;
memset(tmp.c,0,sizeof(tmp));
memcpy(tmp.c,in,residue);
}
(*cbc)(tmp.c,out-16+residue,16,key,ivec,1);
#endif
return len+residue;
@ -177,8 +169,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
(*block)(in,tmp.c+16,key);
for (n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t))
*(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = *(size_t *)(tmp.c+16+n);
memcpy(tmp.c,tmp.c+16,16);
memcpy(tmp.c,in+16,residue);
(*block)(tmp.c,tmp.c,key);
@ -220,8 +211,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *o
(*block)(in+residue,tmp.c+16,key);
for (n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t))
*(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = *(size_t *)(tmp.c+16+n);
memcpy(tmp.c,tmp.c+16,16);
memcpy(tmp.c,in,residue);
(*block)(tmp.c,tmp.c,key);
@ -240,7 +230,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *o
size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
size_t len, const void *key,
unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc)
{ size_t residue, n;
{ size_t residue;
union { size_t align; unsigned char c[32]; } tmp;
assert (in && out && key && ivec);
@ -257,8 +247,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
out += len;
}
for (n=16; n<32; n+=sizeof(size_t))
*(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = 0;
memset(tmp.c,0,sizeof(tmp));
/* this places in[16] at &tmp.c[16] and decrypted block at &tmp.c[0] */
(*cbc)(in,tmp.c,16,key,tmp.c+16,0);
@ -275,7 +264,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
size_t len, const void *key,
unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc)
{ size_t residue, n;
{ size_t residue;
union { size_t align; unsigned char c[32]; } tmp;
assert (in && out && key && ivec);
@ -297,8 +286,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
out += len;
}
for (n=16; n<32; n+=sizeof(size_t))
*(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = 0;
memset(tmp.c,0,sizeof(tmp));
/* this places in[16] at &tmp.c[16] and decrypted block at &tmp.c[0] */
(*cbc)(in+residue,tmp.c,16,key,tmp.c+16,0);

104
crypto/modes/gcm128.c
View File

@ -941,15 +941,17 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
size_t j=GHASH_CHUNK;
while (j) {
size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t))
*(size_t *)(out+i) =
*(size_t *)(in+i)^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
out_t[i] = in_t[i] ^ ctx->EKi.t[i];
out += 16;
in += 16;
j -= 16;
@ -961,15 +963,17 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
size_t j=i;
while (len>=16) {
size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t))
*(size_t *)(out+i) =
*(size_t *)(in+i)^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
out_t[i] = in_t[i] ^ ctx->EKi.t[i];
out += 16;
in += 16;
len -= 16;
@ -978,16 +982,18 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
}
#else
while (len>=16) {
size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t))
*(size_t *)(ctx->Xi.c+i) ^=
*(size_t *)(out+i) =
*(size_t *)(in+i)^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
ctx->Xi.t[i] ^=
out_t[i] = in_t[i]^ctx->EKi.t[i];
GCM_MUL(ctx,Xi);
out += 16;
in += 16;
@ -1091,15 +1097,17 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
GHASH(ctx,in,GHASH_CHUNK);
while (j) {
size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t))
*(size_t *)(out+i) =
*(size_t *)(in+i)^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
out_t[i] = in_t[i]^ctx->EKi.t[i];
out += 16;
in += 16;
j -= 16;
@ -1109,15 +1117,17 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
if ((i = (len&(size_t)-16))) {
GHASH(ctx,in,i);
while (len>=16) {
size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t))
*(size_t *)(out+i) =
*(size_t *)(in+i)^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
out_t[i] = in_t[i]^ctx->EKi.t[i];
out += 16;
in += 16;
len -= 16;
@ -1125,16 +1135,19 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
}
#else
while (len>=16) {
size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t)) {
size_t c = *(size_t *)(in+i);
*(size_t *)(out+i) = c^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
*(size_t *)(ctx->Xi.c+i) ^= c;
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i) {
size_t c = in[i];
out[i] = c^ctx->EKi.t[i];
ctx->Xi.t[i] ^= c;
}
GCM_MUL(ctx,Xi);
out += 16;
@ -1669,6 +1682,46 @@ static const u8 IV18[]={0x93,0x13,0x22,0x5d,0xf8,0x84,0x06,0xe5,0x55,0x90,0x9c,0
0xa2,0x41,0x89,0x97,0x20,0x0e,0xf8,0x2e,0x44,0xae,0x7e,0x3f},
T18[]= {0xa4,0x4a,0x82,0x66,0xee,0x1c,0x8e,0xb0,0xc8,0xb5,0xd4,0xcf,0x5a,0xe9,0xf1,0x9a};
/* Test Case 19 */
#define K19 K1
#define P19 P1
#define IV19 IV1
#define C19 C1
static const u8 A19[]= {0xd9,0x31,0x32,0x25,0xf8,0x84,0x06,0xe5,0xa5,0x59,0x09,0xc5,0xaf,0xf5,0x26,0x9a,
0x86,0xa7,0xa9,0x53,0x15,0x34,0xf7,0xda,0x2e,0x4c,0x30,0x3d,0x8a,0x31,0x8a,0x72,
0x1c,0x3c,0x0c,0x95,0x95,0x68,0x09,0x53,0x2f,0xcf,0x0e,0x24,0x49,0xa6,0xb5,0x25,
0xb1,0x6a,0xed,0xf5,0xaa,0x0d,0xe6,0x57,0xba,0x63,0x7b,0x39,0x1a,0xaf,0xd2,0x55,
0x52,0x2d,0xc1,0xf0,0x99,0x56,0x7d,0x07,0xf4,0x7f,0x37,0xa3,0x2a,0x84,0x42,0x7d,
0x64,0x3a,0x8c,0xdc,0xbf,0xe5,0xc0,0xc9,0x75,0x98,0xa2,0xbd,0x25,0x55,0xd1,0xaa,
0x8c,0xb0,0x8e,0x48,0x59,0x0d,0xbb,0x3d,0xa7,0xb0,0x8b,0x10,0x56,0x82,0x88,0x38,
0xc5,0xf6,0x1e,0x63,0x93,0xba,0x7a,0x0a,0xbc,0xc9,0xf6,0x62,0x89,0x80,0x15,0xad},
T19[]= {0x5f,0xea,0x79,0x3a,0x2d,0x6f,0x97,0x4d,0x37,0xe6,0x8e,0x0c,0xb8,0xff,0x94,0x92};
/* Test Case 20 */
#define K20 K1
#define A20 A1
static const u8 IV20[64]={0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff}, /* this results in 0xff in counter LSB */
P20[288],
C20[]= {0x56,0xb3,0x37,0x3c,0xa9,0xef,0x6e,0x4a,0x2b,0x64,0xfe,0x1e,0x9a,0x17,0xb6,0x14,
0x25,0xf1,0x0d,0x47,0xa7,0x5a,0x5f,0xce,0x13,0xef,0xc6,0xbc,0x78,0x4a,0xf2,0x4f,
0x41,0x41,0xbd,0xd4,0x8c,0xf7,0xc7,0x70,0x88,0x7a,0xfd,0x57,0x3c,0xca,0x54,0x18,
0xa9,0xae,0xff,0xcd,0x7c,0x5c,0xed,0xdf,0xc6,0xa7,0x83,0x97,0xb9,0xa8,0x5b,0x49,
0x9d,0xa5,0x58,0x25,0x72,0x67,0xca,0xab,0x2a,0xd0,0xb2,0x3c,0xa4,0x76,0xa5,0x3c,
0xb1,0x7f,0xb4,0x1c,0x4b,0x8b,0x47,0x5c,0xb4,0xf3,0xf7,0x16,0x50,0x94,0xc2,0x29,
0xc9,0xe8,0xc4,0xdc,0x0a,0x2a,0x5f,0xf1,0x90,0x3e,0x50,0x15,0x11,0x22,0x13,0x76,
0xa1,0xcd,0xb8,0x36,0x4c,0x50,0x61,0xa2,0x0c,0xae,0x74,0xbc,0x4a,0xcd,0x76,0xce,
0xb0,0xab,0xc9,0xfd,0x32,0x17,0xef,0x9f,0x8c,0x90,0xbe,0x40,0x2d,0xdf,0x6d,0x86,
0x97,0xf4,0xf8,0x80,0xdf,0xf1,0x5b,0xfb,0x7a,0x6b,0x28,0x24,0x1e,0xc8,0xfe,0x18,
0x3c,0x2d,0x59,0xe3,0xf9,0xdf,0xff,0x65,0x3c,0x71,0x26,0xf0,0xac,0xb9,0xe6,0x42,
0x11,0xf4,0x2b,0xae,0x12,0xaf,0x46,0x2b,0x10,0x70,0xbe,0xf1,0xab,0x5e,0x36,0x06,
0x87,0x2c,0xa1,0x0d,0xee,0x15,0xb3,0x24,0x9b,0x1a,0x1b,0x95,0x8f,0x23,0x13,0x4c,
0x4b,0xcc,0xb7,0xd0,0x32,0x00,0xbc,0xe4,0x20,0xa2,0xf8,0xeb,0x66,0xdc,0xf3,0x64,
0x4d,0x14,0x23,0xc1,0xb5,0x69,0x90,0x03,0xc1,0x3e,0xce,0xf4,0xbf,0x38,0xa3,0xb6,
0x0e,0xed,0xc3,0x40,0x33,0xba,0xc1,0x90,0x27,0x83,0xdc,0x6d,0x89,0xe2,0xe7,0x74,
0x18,0x8a,0x43,0x9c,0x7e,0xbc,0xc0,0x67,0x2d,0xbd,0xa4,0xdd,0xcf,0xb2,0x79,0x46,
0x13,0xb0,0xbe,0x41,0x31,0x5e,0xf7,0x78,0x70,0x8a,0x70,0xee,0x7d,0x75,0x16,0x5c},
T20[]= {0x8b,0x30,0x7f,0x6b,0x33,0x28,0x6d,0x0a,0xb0,0x26,0xa9,0xed,0x3f,0xe1,0xe8,0x5f};
#define TEST_CASE(n) do { \
u8 out[sizeof(P##n)]; \
AES_set_encrypt_key(K##n,sizeof(K##n)*8,&key); \
@ -1713,6 +1766,8 @@ int main()
TEST_CASE(16);
TEST_CASE(17);
TEST_CASE(18);
TEST_CASE(19);
TEST_CASE(20);
#ifdef OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
{
@ -1743,11 +1798,16 @@ int main()
ctr_t/(double)sizeof(buf),
(gcm_t-ctr_t)/(double)sizeof(buf));
#ifdef GHASH
GHASH(&ctx,buf.c,sizeof(buf));
{
void (*gcm_ghash_p)(u64 Xi[2],const u128 Htable[16],
const u8 *inp,size_t len) = ctx.ghash;
GHASH((&ctx),buf.c,sizeof(buf));
start = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
for (i=0;i<100;++i) GHASH(&ctx,buf.c,sizeof(buf));
for (i=0;i<100;++i) GHASH((&ctx),buf.c,sizeof(buf));
gcm_t = OPENSSL_rdtsc() - start;
printf("%.2f\n",gcm_t/(double)sizeof(buf)/(double)i);
}
#endif
}
#endif

9
crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h
View File

@ -29,10 +29,7 @@ typedef unsigned char u8;
#if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || \
defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) || \
( (defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm)) && \
(defined(__ARM_ARCH_7__) || defined(__ARM_ARCH_7A__) || \
defined(__ARM_ARCH_7R__) || defined(__ARM_ARCH_7M__)) )
defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__)
# undef STRICT_ALIGNMENT
#endif
@ -101,8 +98,8 @@ typedef struct { u64 hi,lo; } u128;
struct gcm128_context {
/* Following 6 names follow names in GCM specification */
union { u64 u[2]; u32 d[4]; u8 c[16]; } Yi,EKi,EK0,len,
Xi,H;
union { u64 u[2]; u32 d[4]; u8 c[16]; size_t t[16/sizeof(size_t)]; }
Yi,EKi,EK0,len,Xi,H;
/* Relative position of Xi, H and pre-computed Htable is used
* in some assembler modules, i.e. don't change the order! */
#if TABLE_BITS==8

6
crypto/opensslv.h
View File

@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000105fL
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000106fL
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013"
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1f-fips 6 Jan 2014"
#else
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1e 11 Feb 2013"
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1f 6 Jan 2014"
#endif
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT

41
crypto/pariscid.pl
View File

@ -97,33 +97,33 @@ OPENSSL_cleanse
.PROC
.CALLINFO NO_CALLS
.ENTRY
cmpib,*= 0,$len,Ldone
cmpib,*= 0,$len,L\$done
nop
cmpib,*>>= 15,$len,Little
cmpib,*>>= 15,$len,L\$ittle
ldi $SIZE_T-1,%r1
Lalign
L\$align
and,*<> $inp,%r1,%r28
b,n Laligned
b,n L\$aligned
stb %r0,0($inp)
ldo -1($len),$len
b Lalign
b L\$align
ldo 1($inp),$inp
Laligned
L\$aligned
andcm $len,%r1,%r28
Lot
L\$ot
$ST %r0,0($inp)
addib,*<> -$SIZE_T,%r28,Lot
addib,*<> -$SIZE_T,%r28,L\$ot
ldo $SIZE_T($inp),$inp
and,*<> $len,%r1,$len
b,n Ldone
Little
b,n L\$done
L\$ittle
stb %r0,0($inp)
addib,*<> -1,$len,Little
addib,*<> -1,$len,L\$ittle
ldo 1($inp),$inp
Ldone
L\$done
bv ($rp)
.EXIT
nop
@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ OPENSSL_instrument_bus
ldw 0($out),$tick
add $diff,$tick,$tick
stw $tick,0($out)
Loop
L\$oop
mfctl %cr16,$tick
sub $tick,$lasttick,$diff
copy $tick,$lasttick
@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ Loop
add $diff,$tick,$tick
stw $tick,0($out)
addib,<> -1,$cnt,Loop
addib,<> -1,$cnt,L\$oop
addi 4,$out,$out
bv ($rp)
@ -190,14 +190,14 @@ OPENSSL_instrument_bus2
mfctl %cr16,$tick
sub $tick,$lasttick,$diff
copy $tick,$lasttick
Loop2
L\$oop2
copy $diff,$lastdiff
fdc 0($out)
ldw 0($out),$tick
add $diff,$tick,$tick
stw $tick,0($out)
addib,= -1,$max,Ldone2
addib,= -1,$max,L\$done2
nop
mfctl %cr16,$tick
@ -208,17 +208,18 @@ Loop2
ldi 1,%r1
xor %r1,$tick,$tick
addb,<> $tick,$cnt,Loop2
addb,<> $tick,$cnt,L\$oop2
shladd,l $tick,2,$out,$out
Ldone2
L\$done2
bv ($rp)
.EXIT
add $rv,$cnt,$rv
.PROCEND
___
}
$code =~ s/cmpib,\*/comib,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
$code =~ s/,\*/,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
$code =~ s/cmpib,\*/comib,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
$code =~ s/,\*/,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
$code =~ s/\bbv\b/bve/gm if ($SIZE_T==8);
print $code;
close STDOUT;

1
crypto/pem/pem_info.c
View File

@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk, pe
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (strcmp(name,PEM_STRING_RSA) == 0)
{
d2i=(D2I_OF(void))d2i_RSAPrivateKey;
if (xi->x_pkey != NULL)
{
if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret,xi)) goto err;

7
crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c
View File

@ -90,7 +90,14 @@ PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(char *pass, char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert,
/* Set defaults */
if (!nid_cert)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
else
#endif
nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
}
if (!nid_key)
nid_key = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
if (!iter)

22
crypto/rand/md_rand.c
View File

@ -380,8 +380,11 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
* are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
* global 'md'.
*/
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
/* NB: in FIPS mode we are already under a lock */
if (!FIPS_mode())
#endif
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
@ -460,7 +463,10 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
crypto_lock_rand = 0;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (!FIPS_mode())
#endif
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
while (num > 0)
{
@ -512,10 +518,16 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
MD_Init(&m);
MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (!FIPS_mode())
#endif
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
MD_Final(&m,md);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (!FIPS_mode())
#endif
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
if (ok)

1
crypto/rand/rand.h
View File

@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ void ERR_load_RAND_strings(void);
#define RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES 100
/* Reason codes. */
#define RAND_R_DUAL_EC_DRBG_DISABLED 104
#define RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG 102
#define RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG 103
#define RAND_R_NO_FIPS_RANDOM_METHOD_SET 101

1
crypto/rand/rand_err.c
View File

@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_functs[]=
static ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_reasons[]=
{
{ERR_REASON(RAND_R_DUAL_EC_DRBG_DISABLED),"dual ec drbg disabled"},
{ERR_REASON(RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG),"error initialising drbg"},
{ERR_REASON(RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG),"error instantiating drbg"},
{ERR_REASON(RAND_R_NO_FIPS_RANDOM_METHOD_SET),"no fips random method set"},

8
crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
View File

@ -269,6 +269,14 @@ int RAND_init_fips(void)
DRBG_CTX *dctx;
size_t plen;
unsigned char pers[32], *p;
#ifndef OPENSSL_ALLOW_DUAL_EC_DRBG
if (fips_drbg_type >> 16)
{
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_INIT_FIPS, RAND_R_DUAL_EC_DRBG_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
#endif
dctx = FIPS_get_default_drbg();
if (FIPS_drbg_init(dctx, fips_drbg_type, fips_drbg_flags) <= 0)
{

3
crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-parisc.pl
View File

@ -307,7 +307,8 @@ L\$opts
.STRINGZ "RC4 for PA-RISC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
___
$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
$code =~ s/cmpib,\*/comib,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
$code =~ s/cmpib,\*/comib,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
$code =~ s/\bbv\b/bve/gm if ($SIZE_T==8);
print $code;
close STDOUT;

8
crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
View File

@ -351,27 +351,27 @@ static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
goto err;
if (BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: ") <= 0)
if (BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: 0x") <= 0)
goto err;
if (pss->saltLength)
{
if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0)
goto err;
}
else if (BIO_puts(bp, "20 (default)") <= 0)
else if (BIO_puts(bp, "0x14 (default)") <= 0)
goto err;
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
goto err;
if (BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: ") <= 0)
if (BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: 0x") <= 0)
goto err;
if (pss->trailerField)
{
if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->trailerField) <= 0)
goto err;
}
else if (BIO_puts(bp, "0xbc (default)") <= 0)
else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0)
goto err;
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");

6
crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
View File

@ -59,6 +59,12 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
BN_CTX *ctx;
int r;
int ret=1;
if (!key->p || !key->q || !key->n || !key->e || !key->d)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
return 0;
}
i = BN_new();
j = BN_new();

2
crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
View File

@ -611,6 +611,8 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
else if (!strcmp(value, "oeap"))
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
else if (!strcmp(value, "oaep"))
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
else if (!strcmp(value, "x931"))
pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
else if (!strcmp(value, "pss"))

4
crypto/sha/Makefile
View File

@ -60,7 +60,9 @@ sha256-armv4.S: asm/sha256-armv4.pl
$(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
sha1-alpha.s: asm/sha1-alpha.pl
$(PERL) $< | $(CC) -E - | tee $@ > /dev/null
(preproc=/tmp/$$$$.$@; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \
$(PERL) asm/sha1-alpha.pl > $$preproc && \
$(CC) -E $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc)
# Solaris make has to be explicitly told
sha1-x86_64.s: asm/sha1-x86_64.pl; $(PERL) asm/sha1-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@

3
crypto/sha/asm/sha1-parisc.pl
View File

@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
___
$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
$code =~ s/,\*/,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
$code =~ s/,\*/,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
$code =~ s/\bbv\b/bve/gm if ($SIZE_T==8);
print $code;
close STDOUT;

4
crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
View File

@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov %rdi,$ctx # reassigned argument
mov %rsi,$inp # reassigned argument
mov %rdx,$num # reassigned argument
vzeroall
vzeroupper
shl \$6,$num
add $inp,$num
@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ ___
&Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
$code.=<<___;
vzeroall
vzeroupper
add 0($ctx),$A # update context
add 4($ctx),@T[0]

2
crypto/sha/asm/sha512-mips.pl
View File

@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
$ST $G,6*$SZ($ctx)
$ST $H,7*$SZ($ctx)
bnel $inp,@X[15],.Loop
bne $inp,@X[15],.Loop
$PTR_SUB $Ktbl,`($rounds-16)*$SZ` # rewind $Ktbl
$REG_L $ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp)

2
crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl
View File

@ -785,6 +785,8 @@ foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
s/cmpb,\*/comb,/ if ($SIZE_T==4);
s/\bbv\b/bve/ if ($SIZE_T==8);
print $_,"\n";
}

9
crypto/sha/sha512.c
View File

@ -232,7 +232,14 @@ int SHA384_Update (SHA512_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len)
{ return SHA512_Update (c,data,len); }
void SHA512_Transform (SHA512_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data)
{ sha512_block_data_order (c,data,1); }
{
#ifndef SHA512_BLOCK_CAN_MANAGE_UNALIGNED_DATA
if ((size_t)data%sizeof(c->u.d[0]) != 0)
memcpy(c->u.p,data,sizeof(c->u.p)),
data = c->u.p;
#endif
sha512_block_data_order (c,data,1);
}
unsigned char *SHA384(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md)
{

816
crypto/srp/srp_grps.h
View File

@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
/* start of generated data */
static BN_ULONG bn_group_1024_value[] = {
bn_pack4(9FC6,1D2F,C0EB,06E3),
bn_pack4(FD51,38FE,8376,435B),
bn_pack4(2FD4,CBF4,976E,AA9A),
bn_pack4(68ED,BC3C,0572,6CC0),
bn_pack4(C529,F566,660E,57EC),
bn_pack4(8255,9B29,7BCF,1885),
bn_pack4(CE8E,F4AD,69B1,5D49),
bn_pack4(5DC7,D7B4,6154,D6B6),
bn_pack4(8E49,5C1D,6089,DAD1),
bn_pack4(E0D5,D8E2,50B9,8BE4),
bn_pack4(383B,4813,D692,C6E0),
bn_pack4(D674,DF74,96EA,81D3),
bn_pack4(9EA2,314C,9C25,6576),
bn_pack4(6072,6187,75FF,3C0B),
bn_pack4(9C33,F80A,FA8F,C5E8),
bn_pack4(EEAF,0AB9,ADB3,8DD6)
bn_pack4(0x9FC6,0x1D2F,0xC0EB,0x06E3),
bn_pack4(0xFD51,0x38FE,0x8376,0x435B),
bn_pack4(0x2FD4,0xCBF4,0x976E,0xAA9A),
bn_pack4(0x68ED,0xBC3C,0x0572,0x6CC0),
bn_pack4(0xC529,0xF566,0x660E,0x57EC),
bn_pack4(0x8255,0x9B29,0x7BCF,0x1885),
bn_pack4(0xCE8E,0xF4AD,0x69B1,0x5D49),
bn_pack4(0x5DC7,0xD7B4,0x6154,0xD6B6),
bn_pack4(0x8E49,0x5C1D,0x6089,0xDAD1),
bn_pack4(0xE0D5,0xD8E2,0x50B9,0x8BE4),
bn_pack4(0x383B,0x4813,0xD692,0xC6E0),
bn_pack4(0xD674,0xDF74,0x96EA,0x81D3),
bn_pack4(0x9EA2,0x314C,0x9C25,0x6576),
bn_pack4(0x6072,0x6187,0x75FF,0x3C0B),
bn_pack4(0x9C33,0xF80A,0xFA8F,0xC5E8),
bn_pack4(0xEEAF,0x0AB9,0xADB3,0x8DD6)
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_1024 = {
bn_group_1024_value,
@ -27,30 +27,30 @@ static BIGNUM bn_group_1024 = {
};
static BN_ULONG bn_group_1536_value[] = {
bn_pack4(CF76,E3FE,D135,F9BB),
bn_pack4(1518,0F93,499A,234D),
bn_pack4(8CE7,A28C,2442,C6F3),
bn_pack4(5A02,1FFF,5E91,479E),
bn_pack4(7F8A,2FE9,B8B5,292E),
bn_pack4(837C,264A,E3A9,BEB8),
bn_pack4(E442,734A,F7CC,B7AE),
bn_pack4(6577,2E43,7D6C,7F8C),
bn_pack4(DB2F,D53D,24B7,C486),
bn_pack4(6EDF,0195,3934,9627),
bn_pack4(158B,FD3E,2B9C,8CF5),
bn_pack4(764E,3F4B,53DD,9DA1),
bn_pack4(4754,8381,DBC5,B1FC),
bn_pack4(9B60,9E0B,E3BA,B63D),
bn_pack4(8134,B1C8,B979,8914),
bn_pack4(DF02,8A7C,EC67,F0D0),
bn_pack4(80B6,55BB,9A22,E8DC),
bn_pack4(1558,903B,A0D0,F843),
bn_pack4(51C6,A94B,E460,7A29),
bn_pack4(5F4F,5F55,6E27,CBDE),
bn_pack4(BEEE,A961,4B19,CC4D),
bn_pack4(DBA5,1DF4,99AC,4C80),
bn_pack4(B1F1,2A86,17A4,7BBB),
bn_pack4(9DEF,3CAF,B939,277A)
bn_pack4(0xCF76,0xE3FE,0xD135,0xF9BB),
bn_pack4(0x1518,0x0F93,0x499A,0x234D),
bn_pack4(0x8CE7,0xA28C,0x2442,0xC6F3),
bn_pack4(0x5A02,0x1FFF,0x5E91,0x479E),
bn_pack4(0x7F8A,0x2FE9,0xB8B5,0x292E),
bn_pack4(0x837C,0x264A,0xE3A9,0xBEB8),
bn_pack4(0xE442,0x734A,0xF7CC,0xB7AE),
bn_pack4(0x6577,0x2E43,0x7D6C,0x7F8C),
bn_pack4(0xDB2F,0xD53D,0x24B7,0xC486),
bn_pack4(0x6EDF,0x0195,0x3934,0x9627),
bn_pack4(0x158B,0xFD3E,0x2B9C,0x8CF5),
bn_pack4(0x764E,0x3F4B,0x53DD,0x9DA1),
bn_pack4(0x4754,0x8381,0xDBC5,0xB1FC),
bn_pack4(0x9B60,0x9E0B,0xE3BA,0xB63D),
bn_pack4(0x8134,0xB1C8,0xB979,0x8914),
bn_pack4(0xDF02,0x8A7C,0xEC67,0xF0D0),
bn_pack4(0x80B6,0x55BB,0x9A22,0xE8DC),
bn_pack4(0x1558,0x903B,0xA0D0,0xF843),
bn_pack4(0x51C6,0xA94B,0xE460,0x7A29),
bn_pack4(0x5F4F,0x5F55,0x6E27,0xCBDE),
bn_pack4(0xBEEE,0xA961,0x4B19,0xCC4D),
bn_pack4(0xDBA5,0x1DF4,0x99AC,0x4C80),
bn_pack4(0xB1F1,0x2A86,0x17A4,0x7BBB),
bn_pack4(0x9DEF,0x3CAF,0xB939,0x277A)
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_1536 = {
bn_group_1536_value,
@ -61,38 +61,38 @@ static BIGNUM bn_group_1536 = {
};
static BN_ULONG bn_group_2048_value[] = {
bn_pack4(0FA7,111F,9E4A,FF73),
bn_pack4(9B65,E372,FCD6,8EF2),
bn_pack4(35DE,236D,525F,5475),
bn_pack4(94B5,C803,D89F,7AE4),
bn_pack4(71AE,35F8,E9DB,FBB6),
bn_pack4(2A56,98F3,A8D0,C382),
bn_pack4(9CCC,041C,7BC3,08D8),
bn_pack4(AF87,4E73,03CE,5329),
bn_pack4(6160,2790,04E5,7AE6),
bn_pack4(032C,FBDB,F52F,B378),
bn_pack4(5EA7,7A27,75D2,ECFA),
bn_pack4(5445,23B5,24B0,D57D),
bn_pack4(5B9D,32E6,88F8,7748),
bn_pack4(F1D2,B907,8717,461A),
bn_pack4(76BD,207A,436C,6481),
bn_pack4(CA97,B43A,23FB,8016),
bn_pack4(1D28,1E44,6B14,773B),
bn_pack4(7359,D041,D5C3,3EA7),
bn_pack4(A80D,740A,DBF4,FF74),
bn_pack4(55F9,7993,EC97,5EEA),
bn_pack4(2918,A996,2F0B,93B8),
bn_pack4(661A,05FB,D5FA,AAE8),
bn_pack4(CF60,9517,9A16,3AB3),
bn_pack4(E808,3969,EDB7,67B0),
bn_pack4(CD7F,48A9,DA04,FD50),
bn_pack4(D523,12AB,4B03,310D),
bn_pack4(8193,E075,7767,A13D),
bn_pack4(A373,29CB,B4A0,99ED),
bn_pack4(FC31,9294,3DB5,6050),
bn_pack4(AF72,B665,1987,EE07),
bn_pack4(F166,DE5E,1389,582F),
bn_pack4(AC6B,DB41,324A,9A9B)
bn_pack4(0x0FA7,0x111F,0x9E4A,0xFF73),
bn_pack4(0x9B65,0xE372,0xFCD6,0x8EF2),
bn_pack4(0x35DE,0x236D,0x525F,0x5475),
bn_pack4(0x94B5,0xC803,0xD89F,0x7AE4),
bn_pack4(0x71AE,0x35F8,0xE9DB,0xFBB6),
bn_pack4(0x2A56,0x98F3,0xA8D0,0xC382),
bn_pack4(0x9CCC,0x041C,0x7BC3,0x08D8),
bn_pack4(0xAF87,0x4E73,0x03CE,0x5329),
bn_pack4(0x6160,0x2790,0x04E5,0x7AE6),
bn_pack4(0x032C,0xFBDB,0xF52F,0xB378),
bn_pack4(0x5EA7,0x7A27,0x75D2,0xECFA),
bn_pack4(0x5445,0x23B5,0x24B0,0xD57D),
bn_pack4(0x5B9D,0x32E6,0x88F8,0x7748),
bn_pack4(0xF1D2,0xB907,0x8717,0x461A),
bn_pack4(0x76BD,0x207A,0x436C,0x6481),
bn_pack4(0xCA97,0xB43A,0x23FB,0x8016),
bn_pack4(0x1D28,0x1E44,0x6B14,0x773B),
bn_pack4(0x7359,0xD041,0xD5C3,0x3EA7),
bn_pack4(0xA80D,0x740A,0xDBF4,0xFF74),
bn_pack4(0x55F9,0x7993,0xEC97,0x5EEA),
bn_pack4(0x2918,0xA996,0x2F0B,0x93B8),
bn_pack4(0x661A,0x05FB,0xD5FA,0xAAE8),
bn_pack4(0xCF60,0x9517,0x9A16,0x3AB3),
bn_pack4(0xE808,0x3969,0xEDB7,0x67B0),
bn_pack4(0xCD7F,0x48A9,0xDA04,0xFD50),
bn_pack4(0xD523,0x12AB,0x4B03,0x310D),
bn_pack4(0x8193,0xE075,0x7767,0xA13D),
bn_pack4(0xA373,0x29CB,0xB4A0,0x99ED),
bn_pack4(0xFC31,0x9294,0x3DB5,0x6050),
bn_pack4(0xAF72,0xB665,0x1987,0xEE07),
bn_pack4(0xF166,0xDE5E,0x1389,0x582F),
bn_pack4(0xAC6B,0xDB41,0x324A,0x9A9B)
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_2048 = {
bn_group_2048_value,
@ -103,54 +103,54 @@ static BIGNUM bn_group_2048 = {
};
static BN_ULONG bn_group_3072_value[] = {
bn_pack4(FFFF,FFFF,FFFF,FFFF),
bn_pack4(4B82,D120,A93A,D2CA),
bn_pack4(43DB,5BFC,E0FD,108E),
bn_pack4(08E2,4FA0,74E5,AB31),
bn_pack4(7709,88C0,BAD9,46E2),
bn_pack4(BBE1,1757,7A61,5D6C),
bn_pack4(521F,2B18,177B,200C),
bn_pack4(D876,0273,3EC8,6A64),
bn_pack4(F12F,FA06,D98A,0864),
bn_pack4(CEE3,D226,1AD2,EE6B),
bn_pack4(1E8C,94E0,4A25,619D),
bn_pack4(ABF5,AE8C,DB09,33D7),
bn_pack4(B397,0F85,A6E1,E4C7),
bn_pack4(8AEA,7157,5D06,0C7D),
bn_pack4(ECFB,8504,58DB,EF0A),
bn_pack4(A855,21AB,DF1C,BA64),
bn_pack4(AD33,170D,0450,7A33),
bn_pack4(1572,8E5A,8AAA,C42D),
bn_pack4(15D2,2618,98FA,0510),
bn_pack4(3995,497C,EA95,6AE5),
bn_pack4(DE2B,CBF6,9558,1718),
bn_pack4(B5C5,5DF0,6F4C,52C9),
bn_pack4(9B27,83A2,EC07,A28F),
bn_pack4(E39E,772C,180E,8603),
bn_pack4(3290,5E46,2E36,CE3B),
bn_pack4(F174,6C08,CA18,217C),
bn_pack4(670C,354E,4ABC,9804),
bn_pack4(9ED5,2907,7096,966D),
bn_pack4(1C62,F356,2085,52BB),
bn_pack4(8365,5D23,DCA3,AD96),
bn_pack4(6916,3FA8,FD24,CF5F),
bn_pack4(98DA,4836,1C55,D39A),
bn_pack4(C200,7CB8,A163,BF05),
bn_pack4(4928,6651,ECE4,5B3D),
bn_pack4(AE9F,2411,7C4B,1FE6),
bn_pack4(EE38,6BFB,5A89,9FA5),
bn_pack4(0BFF,5CB6,F406,B7ED),
bn_pack4(F44C,42E9,A637,ED6B),
bn_pack4(E485,B576,625E,7EC6),
bn_pack4(4FE1,356D,6D51,C245),
bn_pack4(302B,0A6D,F25F,1437),
bn_pack4(EF95,19B3,CD3A,431B),
bn_pack4(514A,0879,8E34,04DD),
bn_pack4(020B,BEA6,3B13,9B22),
bn_pack4(2902,4E08,8A67,CC74),
bn_pack4(C4C6,628B,80DC,1CD1),
bn_pack4(C90F,DAA2,2168,C234),
bn_pack4(FFFF,FFFF,FFFF,FFFF)
bn_pack4(0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF),
bn_pack4(0x4B82,0xD120,0xA93A,0xD2CA),
bn_pack4(0x43DB,0x5BFC,0xE0FD,0x108E),
bn_pack4(0x08E2,0x4FA0,0x74E5,0xAB31),
bn_pack4(0x7709,0x88C0,0xBAD9,0x46E2),
bn_pack4(0xBBE1,0x1757,0x7A61,0x5D6C),
bn_pack4(0x521F,0x2B18,0x177B,0x200C),
bn_pack4(0xD876,0x0273,0x3EC8,0x6A64),
bn_pack4(0xF12F,0xFA06,0xD98A,0x0864),
bn_pack4(0xCEE3,0xD226,0x1AD2,0xEE6B),
bn_pack4(0x1E8C,0x94E0,0x4A25,0x619D),
bn_pack4(0xABF5,0xAE8C,0xDB09,0x33D7),
bn_pack4(0xB397,0x0F85,0xA6E1,0xE4C7),
bn_pack4(0x8AEA,0x7157,0x5D06,0x0C7D),
bn_pack4(0xECFB,0x8504,0x58DB,0xEF0A),
bn_pack4(0xA855,0x21AB,0xDF1C,0xBA64),
bn_pack4(0xAD33,0x170D,0x0450,0x7A33),
bn_pack4(0x1572,0x8E5A,0x8AAA,0xC42D),
bn_pack4(0x15D2,0x2618,0x98FA,0x0510),
bn_pack4(0x3995,0x497C,0xEA95,0x6AE5),
bn_pack4(0xDE2B,0xCBF6,0x9558,0x1718),
bn_pack4(0xB5C5,0x5DF0,0x6F4C,0x52C9),
bn_pack4(0x9B27,0x83A2,0xEC07,0xA28F),
bn_pack4(0xE39E,0x772C,0x180E,0x8603),
bn_pack4(0x3290,0x5E46,0x2E36,0xCE3B),
bn_pack4(0xF174,0x6C08,0xCA18,0x217C),
bn_pack4(0x670C,0x354E,0x4ABC,0x9804),
bn_pack4(0x9ED5,0x2907,0x7096,0x966D),
bn_pack4(0x1C62,0xF356,0x2085,0x52BB),
bn_pack4(0x8365,0x5D23,0xDCA3,0xAD96),
bn_pack4(0x6916,0x3FA8,0xFD24,0xCF5F),
bn_pack4(0x98DA,0x4836,0x1C55,0xD39A),
bn_pack4(0xC200,0x7CB8,0xA163,0xBF05),
bn_pack4(0x4928,0x6651,0xECE4,0x5B3D),
bn_pack4(0xAE9F,0x2411,0x7C4B,0x1FE6),
bn_pack4(0xEE38,0x6BFB,0x5A89,0x9FA5),
bn_pack4(0x0BFF,0x5CB6,0xF406,0xB7ED),
bn_pack4(0xF44C,0x42E9,0xA637,0xED6B),
bn_pack4(0xE485,0xB576,0x625E,0x7EC6),
bn_pack4(0x4FE1,0x356D,0x6D51,0xC245),
bn_pack4(0x302B,0x0A6D,0xF25F,0x1437),
bn_pack4(0xEF95,0x19B3,0xCD3A,0x431B),
bn_pack4(0x514A,0x0879,0x8E34,0x04DD),
bn_pack4(0x020B,0xBEA6,0x3B13,0x9B22),
bn_pack4(0x2902,0x4E08,0x8A67,0xCC74),
bn_pack4(0xC4C6,0x628B,0x80DC,0x1CD1),
bn_pack4(0xC90F,0xDAA2,0x2168,0xC234),
bn_pack4(0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF)
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_3072 = {
bn_group_3072_value,
@ -161,70 +161,70 @@ static BIGNUM bn_group_3072 = {
};
static BN_ULONG bn_group_4096_value[] = {
bn_pack4(FFFF,FFFF,FFFF,FFFF),
bn_pack4(4DF4,35C9,3406,3199),
bn_pack4(86FF,B7DC,90A6,C08F),
bn_pack4(93B4,EA98,8D8F,DDC1),
bn_pack4(D006,9127,D5B0,5AA9),
bn_pack4(B81B,DD76,2170,481C),
bn_pack4(1F61,2970,CEE2,D7AF),
bn_pack4(233B,A186,515B,E7ED),
bn_pack4(99B2,964F,A090,C3A2),
bn_pack4(287C,5947,4E6B,C05D),
bn_pack4(2E8E,FC14,1FBE,CAA6),
bn_pack4(DBBB,C2DB,04DE,8EF9),
bn_pack4(2583,E9CA,2AD4,4CE8),
bn_pack4(1A94,6834,B615,0BDA),
bn_pack4(99C3,2718,6AF4,E23C),
bn_pack4(8871,9A10,BDBA,5B26),
bn_pack4(1A72,3C12,A787,E6D7),
bn_pack4(4B82,D120,A921,0801),
bn_pack4(43DB,5BFC,E0FD,108E),
bn_pack4(08E2,4FA0,74E5,AB31),
bn_pack4(7709,88C0,BAD9,46E2),
bn_pack4(BBE1,1757,7A61,5D6C),
bn_pack4(521F,2B18,177B,200C),
bn_pack4(D876,0273,3EC8,6A64),
bn_pack4(F12F,FA06,D98A,0864),
bn_pack4(CEE3,D226,1AD2,EE6B),
bn_pack4(1E8C,94E0,4A25,619D),
bn_pack4(ABF5,AE8C,DB09,33D7),
bn_pack4(B397,0F85,A6E1,E4C7),
bn_pack4(8AEA,7157,5D06,0C7D),
bn_pack4(ECFB,8504,58DB,EF0A),
bn_pack4(A855,21AB,DF1C,BA64),
bn_pack4(AD33,170D,0450,7A33),
bn_pack4(1572,8E5A,8AAA,C42D),
bn_pack4(15D2,2618,98FA,0510),
bn_pack4(3995,497C,EA95,6AE5),
bn_pack4(DE2B,CBF6,9558,1718),
bn_pack4(B5C5,5DF0,6F4C,52C9),
bn_pack4(9B27,83A2,EC07,A28F),
bn_pack4(E39E,772C,180E,8603),
bn_pack4(3290,5E46,2E36,CE3B),
bn_pack4(F174,6C08,CA18,217C),
bn_pack4(670C,354E,4ABC,9804),
bn_pack4(9ED5,2907,7096,966D),
bn_pack4(1C62,F356,2085,52BB),
bn_pack4(8365,5D23,DCA3,AD96),
bn_pack4(6916,3FA8,FD24,CF5F),
bn_pack4(98DA,4836,1C55,D39A),
bn_pack4(C200,7CB8,A163,BF05),
bn_pack4(4928,6651,ECE4,5B3D),
bn_pack4(AE9F,2411,7C4B,1FE6),
bn_pack4(EE38,6BFB,5A89,9FA5),
bn_pack4(0BFF,5CB6,F406,B7ED),
bn_pack4(F44C,42E9,A637,ED6B),
bn_pack4(E485,B576,625E,7EC6),
bn_pack4(4FE1,356D,6D51,C245),
bn_pack4(302B,0A6D,F25F,1437),
bn_pack4(EF95,19B3,CD3A,431B),
bn_pack4(514A,0879,8E34,04DD),
bn_pack4(020B,BEA6,3B13,9B22),
bn_pack4(2902,4E08,8A67,CC74),
bn_pack4(C4C6,628B,80DC,1CD1),
bn_pack4(C90F,DAA2,2168,C234),
bn_pack4(FFFF,FFFF,FFFF,FFFF)
bn_pack4(0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF),
bn_pack4(0x4DF4,0x35C9,0x3406,0x3199),
bn_pack4(0x86FF,0xB7DC,0x90A6,0xC08F),
bn_pack4(0x93B4,0xEA98,0x8D8F,0xDDC1),
bn_pack4(0xD006,0x9127,0xD5B0,0x5AA9),
bn_pack4(0xB81B,0xDD76,0x2170,0x481C),
bn_pack4(0x1F61,0x2970,0xCEE2,0xD7AF),
bn_pack4(0x233B,0xA186,0x515B,0xE7ED),
bn_pack4(0x99B2,0x964F,0xA090,0xC3A2),
bn_pack4(0x287C,0x5947,0x4E6B,0xC05D),
bn_pack4(0x2E8E,0xFC14,0x1FBE,0xCAA6),
bn_pack4(0xDBBB,0xC2DB,0x04DE,0x8EF9),
bn_pack4(0x2583,0xE9CA,0x2AD4,0x4CE8),
bn_pack4(0x1A94,0x6834,0xB615,0x0BDA),
bn_pack4(0x99C3,0x2718,0x6AF4,0xE23C),
bn_pack4(0x8871,0x9A10,0xBDBA,0x5B26),
bn_pack4(0x1A72,0x3C12,0xA787,0xE6D7),
bn_pack4(0x4B82,0xD120,0xA921,0x0801),
bn_pack4(0x43DB,0x5BFC,0xE0FD,0x108E),
bn_pack4(0x08E2,0x4FA0,0x74E5,0xAB31),
bn_pack4(0x7709,0x88C0,0xBAD9,0x46E2),
bn_pack4(0xBBE1,0x1757,0x7A61,0x5D6C),
bn_pack4(0x521F,0x2B18,0x177B,0x200C),
bn_pack4(0xD876,0x0273,0x3EC8,0x6A64),
bn_pack4(0xF12F,0xFA06,0xD98A,0x0864),
bn_pack4(0xCEE3,0xD226,0x1AD2,0xEE6B),
bn_pack4(0x1E8C,0x94E0,0x4A25,0x619D),
bn_pack4(0xABF5,0xAE8C,0xDB09,0x33D7),
bn_pack4(0xB397,0x0F85,0xA6E1,0xE4C7),
bn_pack4(0x8AEA,0x7157,0x5D06,0x0C7D),
bn_pack4(0xECFB,0x8504,0x58DB,0xEF0A),
bn_pack4(0xA855,0x21AB,0xDF1C,0xBA64),
bn_pack4(0xAD33,0x170D,0x0450,0x7A33),
bn_pack4(0x1572,0x8E5A,0x8AAA,0xC42D),
bn_pack4(0x15D2,0x2618,0x98FA,0x0510),
bn_pack4(0x3995,0x497C,0xEA95,0x6AE5),
bn_pack4(0xDE2B,0xCBF6,0x9558,0x1718),
bn_pack4(0xB5C5,0x5DF0,0x6F4C,0x52C9),
bn_pack4(0x9B27,0x83A2,0xEC07,0xA28F),
bn_pack4(0xE39E,0x772C,0x180E,0x8603),
bn_pack4(0x3290,0x5E46,0x2E36,0xCE3B),
bn_pack4(0xF174,0x6C08,0xCA18,0x217C),
bn_pack4(0x670C,0x354E,0x4ABC,0x9804),
bn_pack4(0x9ED5,0x2907,0x7096,0x966D),
bn_pack4(0x1C62,0xF356,0x2085,0x52BB),
bn_pack4(0x8365,0x5D23,0xDCA3,0xAD96),
bn_pack4(0x6916,0x3FA8,0xFD24,0xCF5F),
bn_pack4(0x98DA,0x4836,0x1C55,0xD39A),
bn_pack4(0xC200,0x7CB8,0xA163,0xBF05),
bn_pack4(0x4928,0x6651,0xECE4,0x5B3D),
bn_pack4(0xAE9F,0x2411,0x7C4B,0x1FE6),
bn_pack4(0xEE38,0x6BFB,0x5A89,0x9FA5),
bn_pack4(0x0BFF,0x5CB6,0xF406,0xB7ED),
bn_pack4(0xF44C,0x42E9,0xA637,0xED6B),
bn_pack4(0xE485,0xB576,0x625E,0x7EC6),
bn_pack4(0x4FE1,0x356D,0x6D51,0xC245),
bn_pack4(0x302B,0x0A6D,0xF25F,0x1437),
bn_pack4(0xEF95,0x19B3,0xCD3A,0x431B),
bn_pack4(0x514A,0x0879,0x8E34,0x04DD),
bn_pack4(0x020B,0xBEA6,0x3B13,0x9B22),
bn_pack4(0x2902,0x4E08,0x8A67,0xCC74),
bn_pack4(0xC4C6,0x628B,0x80DC,0x1CD1),
bn_pack4(0xC90F,0xDAA2,0x2168,0xC234),
bn_pack4(0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF)
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_4096 = {
bn_group_4096_value,
@ -235,102 +235,102 @@ static BIGNUM bn_group_4096 = {
};
static BN_ULONG bn_group_6144_value[] = {
bn_pack4(FFFF,FFFF,FFFF,FFFF),
bn_pack4(E694,F91E,6DCC,4024),
bn_pack4(12BF,2D5B,0B74,74D6),
bn_pack4(043E,8F66,3F48,60EE),
bn_pack4(387F,E8D7,6E3C,0468),
bn_pack4(DA56,C9EC,2EF2,9632),
bn_pack4(EB19,CCB1,A313,D55C),
bn_pack4(F550,AA3D,8A1F,BFF0),
bn_pack4(06A1,D58B,B7C5,DA76),
bn_pack4(A797,15EE,F29B,E328),
bn_pack4(14CC,5ED2,0F80,37E0),
bn_pack4(CC8F,6D7E,BF48,E1D8),
bn_pack4(4BD4,07B2,2B41,54AA),
bn_pack4(0F1D,45B7,FF58,5AC5),
bn_pack4(23A9,7A7E,36CC,88BE),
bn_pack4(59E7,C97F,BEC7,E8F3),
bn_pack4(B5A8,4031,900B,1C9E),
bn_pack4(D55E,702F,4698,0C82),
bn_pack4(F482,D7CE,6E74,FEF6),
bn_pack4(F032,EA15,D172,1D03),
bn_pack4(5983,CA01,C64B,92EC),
bn_pack4(6FB8,F401,378C,D2BF),
bn_pack4(3320,5151,2BD7,AF42),
bn_pack4(DB7F,1447,E6CC,254B),
bn_pack4(44CE,6CBA,CED4,BB1B),
bn_pack4(DA3E,DBEB,CF9B,14ED),
bn_pack4(1797,27B0,865A,8918),
bn_pack4(B06A,53ED,9027,D831),
bn_pack4(E5DB,382F,4130,01AE),
bn_pack4(F8FF,9406,AD9E,530E),
bn_pack4(C975,1E76,3DBA,37BD),
bn_pack4(C1D4,DCB2,6026,46DE),
bn_pack4(36C3,FAB4,D27C,7026),
bn_pack4(4DF4,35C9,3402,8492),
bn_pack4(86FF,B7DC,90A6,C08F),
bn_pack4(93B4,EA98,8D8F,DDC1),
bn_pack4(D006,9127,D5B0,5AA9),
bn_pack4(B81B,DD76,2170,481C),
bn_pack4(1F61,2970,CEE2,D7AF),
bn_pack4(233B,A186,515B,E7ED),
bn_pack4(99B2,964F,A090,C3A2),
bn_pack4(287C,5947,4E6B,C05D),
bn_pack4(2E8E,FC14,1FBE,CAA6),
bn_pack4(DBBB,C2DB,04DE,8EF9),
bn_pack4(2583,E9CA,2AD4,4CE8),
bn_pack4(1A94,6834,B615,0BDA),
bn_pack4(99C3,2718,6AF4,E23C),
bn_pack4(8871,9A10,BDBA,5B26),
bn_pack4(1A72,3C12,A787,E6D7),
bn_pack4(4B82,D120,A921,0801),
bn_pack4(43DB,5BFC,E0FD,108E),
bn_pack4(08E2,4FA0,74E5,AB31),
bn_pack4(7709,88C0,BAD9,46E2),
bn_pack4(BBE1,1757,7A61,5D6C),
bn_pack4(521F,2B18,177B,200C),
bn_pack4(D876,0273,3EC8,6A64),
bn_pack4(F12F,FA06,D98A,0864),
bn_pack4(CEE3,D226,1AD2,EE6B),
bn_pack4(1E8C,94E0,4A25,619D),
bn_pack4(ABF5,AE8C,DB09,33D7),
bn_pack4(B397,0F85,A6E1,E4C7),
bn_pack4(8AEA,7157,5D06,0C7D),
bn_pack4(ECFB,8504,58DB,EF0A),
bn_pack4(A855,21AB,DF1C,BA64),
bn_pack4(AD33,170D,0450,7A33),
bn_pack4(1572,8E5A,8AAA,C42D),
bn_pack4(15D2,2618,98FA,0510),
bn_pack4(3995,497C,EA95,6AE5),
bn_pack4(DE2B,CBF6,9558,1718),
bn_pack4(B5C5,5DF0,6F4C,52C9),
bn_pack4(9B27,83A2,EC07,A28F),
bn_pack4(E39E,772C,180E,8603),
bn_pack4(3290,5E46,2E36,CE3B),
bn_pack4(F174,6C08,CA18,217C),
bn_pack4(670C,354E,4ABC,9804),
bn_pack4(9ED5,2907,7096,966D),
bn_pack4(1C62,F356,2085,52BB),
bn_pack4(8365,5D23,DCA3,AD96),
bn_pack4(6916,3FA8,FD24,CF5F),
bn_pack4(98DA,4836,1C55,D39A),
bn_pack4(C200,7CB8,A163,BF05),
bn_pack4(4928,6651,ECE4,5B3D),
bn_pack4(AE9F,2411,7C4B,1FE6),
bn_pack4(EE38,6BFB,5A89,9FA5),
bn_pack4(0BFF,5CB6,F406,B7ED),
bn_pack4(F44C,42E9,A637,ED6B),
bn_pack4(E485,B576,625E,7EC6),
bn_pack4(4FE1,356D,6D51,C245),
bn_pack4(302B,0A6D,F25F,1437),
bn_pack4(EF95,19B3,CD3A,431B),
bn_pack4(514A,0879,8E34,04DD),
bn_pack4(020B,BEA6,3B13,9B22),
bn_pack4(2902,4E08,8A67,CC74),
bn_pack4(C4C6,628B,80DC,1CD1),
bn_pack4(C90F,DAA2,2168,C234),
bn_pack4(FFFF,FFFF,FFFF,FFFF)
bn_pack4(0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF),
bn_pack4(0xE694,0xF91E,0x6DCC,0x4024),
bn_pack4(0x12BF,0x2D5B,0x0B74,0x74D6),
bn_pack4(0x043E,0x8F66,0x3F48,0x60EE),
bn_pack4(0x387F,0xE8D7,0x6E3C,0x0468),
bn_pack4(0xDA56,0xC9EC,0x2EF2,0x9632),
bn_pack4(0xEB19,0xCCB1,0xA313,0xD55C),
bn_pack4(0xF550,0xAA3D,0x8A1F,0xBFF0),
bn_pack4(0x06A1,0xD58B,0xB7C5,0xDA76),
bn_pack4(0xA797,0x15EE,0xF29B,0xE328),
bn_pack4(0x14CC,0x5ED2,0x0F80,0x37E0),
bn_pack4(0xCC8F,0x6D7E,0xBF48,0xE1D8),
bn_pack4(0x4BD4,0x07B2,0x2B41,0x54AA),
bn_pack4(0x0F1D,0x45B7,0xFF58,0x5AC5),
bn_pack4(0x23A9,0x7A7E,0x36CC,0x88BE),
bn_pack4(0x59E7,0xC97F,0xBEC7,0xE8F3),
bn_pack4(0xB5A8,0x4031,0x900B,0x1C9E),
bn_pack4(0xD55E,0x702F,0x4698,0x0C82),
bn_pack4(0xF482,0xD7CE,0x6E74,0xFEF6),
bn_pack4(0xF032,0xEA15,0xD172,0x1D03),
bn_pack4(0x5983,0xCA01,0xC64B,0x92EC),
bn_pack4(0x6FB8,0xF401,0x378C,0xD2BF),
bn_pack4(0x3320,0x5151,0x2BD7,0xAF42),
bn_pack4(0xDB7F,0x1447,0xE6CC,0x254B),
bn_pack4(0x44CE,0x6CBA,0xCED4,0xBB1B),
bn_pack4(0xDA3E,0xDBEB,0xCF9B,0x14ED),
bn_pack4(0x1797,0x27B0,0x865A,0x8918),
bn_pack4(0xB06A,0x53ED,0x9027,0xD831),
bn_pack4(0xE5DB,0x382F,0x4130,0x01AE),
bn_pack4(0xF8FF,0x9406,0xAD9E,0x530E),
bn_pack4(0xC975,0x1E76,0x3DBA,0x37BD),
bn_pack4(0xC1D4,0xDCB2,0x6026,0x46DE),
bn_pack4(0x36C3,0xFAB4,0xD27C,0x7026),
bn_pack4(0x4DF4,0x35C9,0x3402,0x8492),
bn_pack4(0x86FF,0xB7DC,0x90A6,0xC08F),
bn_pack4(0x93B4,0xEA98,0x8D8F,0xDDC1),
bn_pack4(0xD006,0x9127,0xD5B0,0x5AA9),
bn_pack4(0xB81B,0xDD76,0x2170,0x481C),
bn_pack4(0x1F61,0x2970,0xCEE2,0xD7AF),
bn_pack4(0x233B,0xA186,0x515B,0xE7ED),
bn_pack4(0x99B2,0x964F,0xA090,0xC3A2),
bn_pack4(0x287C,0x5947,0x4E6B,0xC05D),
bn_pack4(0x2E8E,0xFC14,0x1FBE,0xCAA6),
bn_pack4(0xDBBB,0xC2DB,0x04DE,0x8EF9),
bn_pack4(0x2583,0xE9CA,0x2AD4,0x4CE8),
bn_pack4(0x1A94,0x6834,0xB615,0x0BDA),
bn_pack4(0x99C3,0x2718,0x6AF4,0xE23C),
bn_pack4(0x8871,0x9A10,0xBDBA,0x5B26),
bn_pack4(0x1A72,0x3C12,0xA787,0xE6D7),
bn_pack4(0x4B82,0xD120,0xA921,0x0801),
bn_pack4(0x43DB,0x5BFC,0xE0FD,0x108E),
bn_pack4(0x08E2,0x4FA0,0x74E5,0xAB31),
bn_pack4(0x7709,0x88C0,0xBAD9,0x46E2),
bn_pack4(0xBBE1,0x1757,0x7A61,0x5D6C),
bn_pack4(0x521F,0x2B18,0x177B,0x200C),
bn_pack4(0xD876,0x0273,0x3EC8,0x6A64),
bn_pack4(0xF12F,0xFA06,0xD98A,0x0864),
bn_pack4(0xCEE3,0xD226,0x1AD2,0xEE6B),
bn_pack4(0x1E8C,0x94E0,0x4A25,0x619D),
bn_pack4(0xABF5,0xAE8C,0xDB09,0x33D7),
bn_pack4(0xB397,0x0F85,0xA6E1,0xE4C7),
bn_pack4(0x8AEA,0x7157,0x5D06,0x0C7D),
bn_pack4(0xECFB,0x8504,0x58DB,0xEF0A),
bn_pack4(0xA855,0x21AB,0xDF1C,0xBA64),
bn_pack4(0xAD33,0x170D,0x0450,0x7A33),
bn_pack4(0x1572,0x8E5A,0x8AAA,0xC42D),
bn_pack4(0x15D2,0x2618,0x98FA,0x0510),
bn_pack4(0x3995,0x497C,0xEA95,0x6AE5),
bn_pack4(0xDE2B,0xCBF6,0x9558,0x1718),
bn_pack4(0xB5C5,0x5DF0,0x6F4C,0x52C9),
bn_pack4(0x9B27,0x83A2,0xEC07,0xA28F),
bn_pack4(0xE39E,0x772C,0x180E,0x8603),
bn_pack4(0x3290,0x5E46,0x2E36,0xCE3B),
bn_pack4(0xF174,0x6C08,0xCA18,0x217C),
bn_pack4(0x670C,0x354E,0x4ABC,0x9804),
bn_pack4(0x9ED5,0x2907,0x7096,0x966D),
bn_pack4(0x1C62,0xF356,0x2085,0x52BB),
bn_pack4(0x8365,0x5D23,0xDCA3,0xAD96),
bn_pack4(0x6916,0x3FA8,0xFD24,0xCF5F),
bn_pack4(0x98DA,0x4836,0x1C55,0xD39A),
bn_pack4(0xC200,0x7CB8,0xA163,0xBF05),
bn_pack4(0x4928,0x6651,0xECE4,0x5B3D),
bn_pack4(0xAE9F,0x2411,0x7C4B,0x1FE6),
bn_pack4(0xEE38,0x6BFB,0x5A89,0x9FA5),
bn_pack4(0x0BFF,0x5CB6,0xF406,0xB7ED),
bn_pack4(0xF44C,0x42E9,0xA637,0xED6B),
bn_pack4(0xE485,0xB576,0x625E,0x7EC6),
bn_pack4(0x4FE1,0x356D,0x6D51,0xC245),
bn_pack4(0x302B,0x0A6D,0xF25F,0x1437),
bn_pack4(0xEF95,0x19B3,0xCD3A,0x431B),
bn_pack4(0x514A,0x0879,0x8E34,0x04DD),
bn_pack4(0x020B,0xBEA6,0x3B13,0x9B22),
bn_pack4(0x2902,0x4E08,0x8A67,0xCC74),
bn_pack4(0xC4C6,0x628B,0x80DC,0x1CD1),
bn_pack4(0xC90F,0xDAA2,0x2168,0xC234),
bn_pack4(0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF)
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_6144 = {
bn_group_6144_value,
@ -341,134 +341,134 @@ static BIGNUM bn_group_6144 = {
};
static BN_ULONG bn_group_8192_value[] = {
bn_pack4(FFFF,FFFF,FFFF,FFFF),
bn_pack4(60C9,80DD,98ED,D3DF),
bn_pack4(C81F,56E8,80B9,6E71),
bn_pack4(9E30,50E2,7656,94DF),
bn_pack4(9558,E447,5677,E9AA),
bn_pack4(C919,0DA6,FC02,6E47),
bn_pack4(889A,002E,D5EE,382B),
bn_pack4(4009,438B,481C,6CD7),
bn_pack4(3590,46F4,EB87,9F92),
bn_pack4(FAF3,6BC3,1ECF,A268),
bn_pack4(B1D5,10BD,7EE7,4D73),
bn_pack4(F9AB,4819,5DED,7EA1),
bn_pack4(64F3,1CC5,0846,851D),
bn_pack4(4597,E899,A025,5DC1),
bn_pack4(DF31,0EE0,74AB,6A36),
bn_pack4(6D2A,13F8,3F44,F82D),
bn_pack4(062B,3CF5,B3A2,78A6),
bn_pack4(7968,3303,ED5B,DD3A),
bn_pack4(FA9D,4B7F,A2C0,87E8),
bn_pack4(4BCB,C886,2F83,85DD),
bn_pack4(3473,FC64,6CEA,306B),
bn_pack4(13EB,57A8,1A23,F0C7),
bn_pack4(2222,2E04,A403,7C07),
bn_pack4(E3FD,B8BE,FC84,8AD9),
bn_pack4(238F,16CB,E39D,652D),
bn_pack4(3423,B474,2BF1,C978),
bn_pack4(3AAB,639C,5AE4,F568),
bn_pack4(2576,F693,6BA4,2466),
bn_pack4(741F,A7BF,8AFC,47ED),
bn_pack4(3BC8,32B6,8D9D,D300),
bn_pack4(D8BE,C4D0,73B9,31BA),
bn_pack4(3877,7CB6,A932,DF8C),
bn_pack4(74A3,926F,12FE,E5E4),
bn_pack4(E694,F91E,6DBE,1159),
bn_pack4(12BF,2D5B,0B74,74D6),
bn_pack4(043E,8F66,3F48,60EE),
bn_pack4(387F,E8D7,6E3C,0468),
bn_pack4(DA56,C9EC,2EF2,9632),
bn_pack4(EB19,CCB1,A313,D55C),
bn_pack4(F550,AA3D,8A1F,BFF0),
bn_pack4(06A1,D58B,B7C5,DA76),
bn_pack4(A797,15EE,F29B,E328),
bn_pack4(14CC,5ED2,0F80,37E0),
bn_pack4(CC8F,6D7E,BF48,E1D8),
bn_pack4(4BD4,07B2,2B41,54AA),
bn_pack4(0F1D,45B7,FF58,5AC5),
bn_pack4(23A9,7A7E,36CC,88BE),
bn_pack4(59E7,C97F,BEC7,E8F3),
bn_pack4(B5A8,4031,900B,1C9E),
bn_pack4(D55E,702F,4698,0C82),
bn_pack4(F482,D7CE,6E74,FEF6),
bn_pack4(F032,EA15,D172,1D03),
bn_pack4(5983,CA01,C64B,92EC),
bn_pack4(6FB8,F401,378C,D2BF),
bn_pack4(3320,5151,2BD7,AF42),
bn_pack4(DB7F,1447,E6CC,254B),
bn_pack4(44CE,6CBA,CED4,BB1B),
bn_pack4(DA3E,DBEB,CF9B,14ED),
bn_pack4(1797,27B0,865A,8918),
bn_pack4(B06A,53ED,9027,D831),
bn_pack4(E5DB,382F,4130,01AE),
bn_pack4(F8FF,9406,AD9E,530E),
bn_pack4(C975,1E76,3DBA,37BD),
bn_pack4(C1D4,DCB2,6026,46DE),
bn_pack4(36C3,FAB4,D27C,7026),
bn_pack4(4DF4,35C9,3402,8492),
bn_pack4(86FF,B7DC,90A6,C08F),
bn_pack4(93B4,EA98,8D8F,DDC1),
bn_pack4(D006,9127,D5B0,5AA9),
bn_pack4(B81B,DD76,2170,481C),
bn_pack4(1F61,2970,CEE2,D7AF),
bn_pack4(233B,A186,515B,E7ED),
bn_pack4(99B2,964F,A090,C3A2),
bn_pack4(287C,5947,4E6B,C05D),
bn_pack4(2E8E,FC14,1FBE,CAA6),
bn_pack4(DBBB,C2DB,04DE,8EF9),
bn_pack4(2583,E9CA,2AD4,4CE8),
bn_pack4(1A94,6834,B615,0BDA),
bn_pack4(99C3,2718,6AF4,E23C),
bn_pack4(8871,9A10,BDBA,5B26),
bn_pack4(1A72,3C12,A787,E6D7),
bn_pack4(4B82,D120,A921,0801),
bn_pack4(43DB,5BFC,E0FD,108E),
bn_pack4(08E2,4FA0,74E5,AB31),
bn_pack4(7709,88C0,BAD9,46E2),
bn_pack4(BBE1,1757,7A61,5D6C),
bn_pack4(521F,2B18,177B,200C),
bn_pack4(D876,0273,3EC8,6A64),
bn_pack4(F12F,FA06,D98A,0864),
bn_pack4(CEE3,D226,1AD2,EE6B),
bn_pack4(1E8C,94E0,4A25,619D),
bn_pack4(ABF5,AE8C,DB09,33D7),
bn_pack4(B397,0F85,A6E1,E4C7),
bn_pack4(8AEA,7157,5D06,0C7D),
bn_pack4(ECFB,8504,58DB,EF0A),
bn_pack4(A855,21AB,DF1C,BA64),
bn_pack4(AD33,170D,0450,7A33),
bn_pack4(1572,8E5A,8AAA,C42D),
bn_pack4(15D2,2618,98FA,0510),
bn_pack4(3995,497C,EA95,6AE5),
bn_pack4(DE2B,CBF6,9558,1718),
bn_pack4(B5C5,5DF0,6F4C,52C9),
bn_pack4(9B27,83A2,EC07,A28F),
bn_pack4(E39E,772C,180E,8603),
bn_pack4(3290,5E46,2E36,CE3B),
bn_pack4(F174,6C08,CA18,217C),
bn_pack4(670C,354E,4ABC,9804),
bn_pack4(9ED5,2907,7096,966D),
bn_pack4(1C62,F356,2085,52BB),
bn_pack4(8365,5D23,DCA3,AD96),
bn_pack4(6916,3FA8,FD24,CF5F),
bn_pack4(98DA,4836,1C55,D39A),
bn_pack4(C200,7CB8,A163,BF05),
bn_pack4(4928,6651,ECE4,5B3D),
bn_pack4(AE9F,2411,7C4B,1FE6),
bn_pack4(EE38,6BFB,5A89,9FA5),
bn_pack4(0BFF,5CB6,F406,B7ED),
bn_pack4(F44C,42E9,A637,ED6B),
bn_pack4(E485,B576,625E,7EC6),
bn_pack4(4FE1,356D,6D51,C245),
bn_pack4(302B,0A6D,F25F,1437),
bn_pack4(EF95,19B3,CD3A,431B),
bn_pack4(514A,0879,8E34,04DD),
bn_pack4(020B,BEA6,3B13,9B22),
bn_pack4(2902,4E08,8A67,CC74),
bn_pack4(C4C6,628B,80DC,1CD1),
bn_pack4(C90F,DAA2,2168,C234),
bn_pack4(FFFF,FFFF,FFFF,FFFF)
bn_pack4(0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF),
bn_pack4(0x60C9,0x80DD,0x98ED,0xD3DF),
bn_pack4(0xC81F,0x56E8,0x80B9,0x6E71),
bn_pack4(0x9E30,0x50E2,0x7656,0x94DF),
bn_pack4(0x9558,0xE447,0x5677,0xE9AA),
bn_pack4(0xC919,0x0DA6,0xFC02,0x6E47),
bn_pack4(0x889A,0x002E,0xD5EE,0x382B),
bn_pack4(0x4009,0x438B,0x481C,0x6CD7),
bn_pack4(0x3590,0x46F4,0xEB87,0x9F92),
bn_pack4(0xFAF3,0x6BC3,0x1ECF,0xA268),
bn_pack4(0xB1D5,0x10BD,0x7EE7,0x4D73),
bn_pack4(0xF9AB,0x4819,0x5DED,0x7EA1),
bn_pack4(0x64F3,0x1CC5,0x0846,0x851D),
bn_pack4(0x4597,0xE899,0xA025,0x5DC1),
bn_pack4(0xDF31,0x0EE0,0x74AB,0x6A36),
bn_pack4(0x6D2A,0x13F8,0x3F44,0xF82D),
bn_pack4(0x062B,0x3CF5,0xB3A2,0x78A6),
bn_pack4(0x7968,0x3303,0xED5B,0xDD3A),
bn_pack4(0xFA9D,0x4B7F,0xA2C0,0x87E8),
bn_pack4(0x4BCB,0xC886,0x2F83,0x85DD),
bn_pack4(0x3473,0xFC64,0x6CEA,0x306B),
bn_pack4(0x13EB,0x57A8,0x1A23,0xF0C7),
bn_pack4(0x2222,0x2E04,0xA403,0x7C07),
bn_pack4(0xE3FD,0xB8BE,0xFC84,0x8AD9),
bn_pack4(0x238F,0x16CB,0xE39D,0x652D),
bn_pack4(0x3423,0xB474,0x2BF1,0xC978),
bn_pack4(0x3AAB,0x639C,0x5AE4,0xF568),
bn_pack4(0x2576,0xF693,0x6BA4,0x2466),
bn_pack4(0x741F,0xA7BF,0x8AFC,0x47ED),
bn_pack4(0x3BC8,0x32B6,0x8D9D,0xD300),
bn_pack4(0xD8BE,0xC4D0,0x73B9,0x31BA),
bn_pack4(0x3877,0x7CB6,0xA932,0xDF8C),
bn_pack4(0x74A3,0x926F,0x12FE,0xE5E4),
bn_pack4(0xE694,0xF91E,0x6DBE,0x1159),
bn_pack4(0x12BF,0x2D5B,0x0B74,0x74D6),
bn_pack4(0x043E,0x8F66,0x3F48,0x60EE),
bn_pack4(0x387F,0xE8D7,0x6E3C,0x0468),
bn_pack4(0xDA56,0xC9EC,0x2EF2,0x9632),
bn_pack4(0xEB19,0xCCB1,0xA313,0xD55C),
bn_pack4(0xF550,0xAA3D,0x8A1F,0xBFF0),
bn_pack4(0x06A1,0xD58B,0xB7C5,0xDA76),
bn_pack4(0xA797,0x15EE,0xF29B,0xE328),
bn_pack4(0x14CC,0x5ED2,0x0F80,0x37E0),
bn_pack4(0xCC8F,0x6D7E,0xBF48,0xE1D8),
bn_pack4(0x4BD4,0x07B2,0x2B41,0x54AA),
bn_pack4(0x0F1D,0x45B7,0xFF58,0x5AC5),
bn_pack4(0x23A9,0x7A7E,0x36CC,0x88BE),
bn_pack4(0x59E7,0xC97F,0xBEC7,0xE8F3),
bn_pack4(0xB5A8,0x4031,0x900B,0x1C9E),
bn_pack4(0xD55E,0x702F,0x4698,0x0C82),
bn_pack4(0xF482,0xD7CE,0x6E74,0xFEF6),
bn_pack4(0xF032,0xEA15,0xD172,0x1D03),
bn_pack4(0x5983,0xCA01,0xC64B,0x92EC),
bn_pack4(0x6FB8,0xF401,0x378C,0xD2BF),
bn_pack4(0x3320,0x5151,0x2BD7,0xAF42),
bn_pack4(0xDB7F,0x1447,0xE6CC,0x254B),
bn_pack4(0x44CE,0x6CBA,0xCED4,0xBB1B),
bn_pack4(0xDA3E,0xDBEB,0xCF9B,0x14ED),
bn_pack4(0x1797,0x27B0,0x865A,0x8918),
bn_pack4(0xB06A,0x53ED,0x9027,0xD831),
bn_pack4(0xE5DB,0x382F,0x4130,0x01AE),
bn_pack4(0xF8FF,0x9406,0xAD9E,0x530E),
bn_pack4(0xC975,0x1E76,0x3DBA,0x37BD),
bn_pack4(0xC1D4,0xDCB2,0x6026,0x46DE),
bn_pack4(0x36C3,0xFAB4,0xD27C,0x7026),
bn_pack4(0x4DF4,0x35C9,0x3402,0x8492),
bn_pack4(0x86FF,0xB7DC,0x90A6,0xC08F),
bn_pack4(0x93B4,0xEA98,0x8D8F,0xDDC1),
bn_pack4(0xD006,0x9127,0xD5B0,0x5AA9),
bn_pack4(0xB81B,0xDD76,0x2170,0x481C),
bn_pack4(0x1F61,0x2970,0xCEE2,0xD7AF),
bn_pack4(0x233B,0xA186,0x515B,0xE7ED),
bn_pack4(0x99B2,0x964F,0xA090,0xC3A2),
bn_pack4(0x287C,0x5947,0x4E6B,0xC05D),
bn_pack4(0x2E8E,0xFC14,0x1FBE,0xCAA6),
bn_pack4(0xDBBB,0xC2DB,0x04DE,0x8EF9),
bn_pack4(0x2583,0xE9CA,0x2AD4,0x4CE8),
bn_pack4(0x1A94,0x6834,0xB615,0x0BDA),
bn_pack4(0x99C3,0x2718,0x6AF4,0xE23C),
bn_pack4(0x8871,0x9A10,0xBDBA,0x5B26),
bn_pack4(0x1A72,0x3C12,0xA787,0xE6D7),
bn_pack4(0x4B82,0xD120,0xA921,0x0801),
bn_pack4(0x43DB,0x5BFC,0xE0FD,0x108E),
bn_pack4(0x08E2,0x4FA0,0x74E5,0xAB31),
bn_pack4(0x7709,0x88C0,0xBAD9,0x46E2),
bn_pack4(0xBBE1,0x1757,0x7A61,0x5D6C),
bn_pack4(0x521F,0x2B18,0x177B,0x200C),
bn_pack4(0xD876,0x0273,0x3EC8,0x6A64),
bn_pack4(0xF12F,0xFA06,0xD98A,0x0864),
bn_pack4(0xCEE3,0xD226,0x1AD2,0xEE6B),
bn_pack4(0x1E8C,0x94E0,0x4A25,0x619D),
bn_pack4(0xABF5,0xAE8C,0xDB09,0x33D7),
bn_pack4(0xB397,0x0F85,0xA6E1,0xE4C7),
bn_pack4(0x8AEA,0x7157,0x5D06,0x0C7D),
bn_pack4(0xECFB,0x8504,0x58DB,0xEF0A),
bn_pack4(0xA855,0x21AB,0xDF1C,0xBA64),
bn_pack4(0xAD33,0x170D,0x0450,0x7A33),
bn_pack4(0x1572,0x8E5A,0x8AAA,0xC42D),
bn_pack4(0x15D2,0x2618,0x98FA,0x0510),
bn_pack4(0x3995,0x497C,0xEA95,0x6AE5),
bn_pack4(0xDE2B,0xCBF6,0x9558,0x1718),
bn_pack4(0xB5C5,0x5DF0,0x6F4C,0x52C9),
bn_pack4(0x9B27,0x83A2,0xEC07,0xA28F),
bn_pack4(0xE39E,0x772C,0x180E,0x8603),
bn_pack4(0x3290,0x5E46,0x2E36,0xCE3B),
bn_pack4(0xF174,0x6C08,0xCA18,0x217C),
bn_pack4(0x670C,0x354E,0x4ABC,0x9804),
bn_pack4(0x9ED5,0x2907,0x7096,0x966D),
bn_pack4(0x1C62,0xF356,0x2085,0x52BB),
bn_pack4(0x8365,0x5D23,0xDCA3,0xAD96),
bn_pack4(0x6916,0x3FA8,0xFD24,0xCF5F),
bn_pack4(0x98DA,0x4836,0x1C55,0xD39A),
bn_pack4(0xC200,0x7CB8,0xA163,0xBF05),
bn_pack4(0x4928,0x6651,0xECE4,0x5B3D),
bn_pack4(0xAE9F,0x2411,0x7C4B,0x1FE6),
bn_pack4(0xEE38,0x6BFB,0x5A89,0x9FA5),
bn_pack4(0x0BFF,0x5CB6,0xF406,0xB7ED),
bn_pack4(0xF44C,0x42E9,0xA637,0xED6B),
bn_pack4(0xE485,0xB576,0x625E,0x7EC6),
bn_pack4(0x4FE1,0x356D,0x6D51,0xC245),
bn_pack4(0x302B,0x0A6D,0xF25F,0x1437),
bn_pack4(0xEF95,0x19B3,0xCD3A,0x431B),
bn_pack4(0x514A,0x0879,0x8E34,0x04DD),
bn_pack4(0x020B,0xBEA6,0x3B13,0x9B22),
bn_pack4(0x2902,0x4E08,0x8A67,0xCC74),
bn_pack4(0xC4C6,0x628B,0x80DC,0x1CD1),
bn_pack4(0xC90F,0xDAA2,0x2168,0xC234),
bn_pack4(0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF,0xFFFF)
};
static BIGNUM bn_group_8192 = {
bn_group_8192_value,

18
crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
View File

@ -63,13 +63,17 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#if (BN_BYTES == 8)
#define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) 0x##a1##a2##a3##a4##ul
#endif
#if (BN_BYTES == 4)
#define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) 0x##a3##a4##ul, 0x##a1##a2##ul
#endif
#if (BN_BYTES == 2)
#define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) 0x##a4##u,0x##a3##u,0x##a2##u,0x##a1##u
# if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN64)) && !defined(__MINGW32__)
# define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) ((a1##UI64<<48)|(a2##UI64<<32)|(a3##UI64<<16)|a4##UI64)
# elif defined(__arch64__)
# define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) ((a1##UL<<48)|(a2##UL<<32)|(a3##UL<<16)|a4##UL)
# else
# define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) ((a1##ULL<<48)|(a2##ULL<<32)|(a3##ULL<<16)|a4##ULL)
# endif
#elif (BN_BYTES == 4)
# define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) ((a3##UL<<16)|a4##UL), ((a1##UL<<16)|a2##UL)
#else
# error "unsupported BN_BYTES"
#endif

11
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
View File

@ -694,6 +694,7 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
X509 *x;
int ok, cnum;
unsigned int last_reasons;
cnum = ctx->error_depth;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
ctx->current_cert = x;
@ -702,6 +703,7 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->current_reasons = 0;
while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
{
last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
if (ctx->get_crl)
ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
@ -745,6 +747,15 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
crl = NULL;
dcrl = NULL;
/* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
* another iteration, so exit loop.
*/
if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
goto err;
}
}
err:
X509_CRL_free(crl);

2
crypto/x509/x_all.c
View File

@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ int X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md)
int X509_sign_ctx(X509 *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
x->cert_info->enc.modified = 1;
return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF),
x->cert_info->signature,
x->sig_alg, x->signature, x->cert_info, ctx);
@ -123,6 +124,7 @@ int X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md)
int X509_CRL_sign_ctx(X509_CRL *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
x->crl->enc.modified = 1;
return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO),
x->crl->sig_alg, x->sig_alg, x->signature, x->crl, ctx);
}

2
crypto/x86cpuid.pl
View File

@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
&inc ("esi"); # number of cores
&mov ("eax",1);
&xor ("ecx","ecx");
&cpuid ();
&bt ("edx",28);
&jnc (&label("generic"));
@ -91,6 +92,7 @@ for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
&set_label("nocacheinfo");
&mov ("eax",1);
&xor ("ecx","ecx");
&cpuid ();
&and ("edx",0xbfefffff); # force reserved bits #20, #30 to 0
&cmp ("ebp",0);

15
doc/apps/rsa.pod
View File

@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ B<openssl> B<rsa>
[B<-check>]
[B<-pubin>]
[B<-pubout>]
[B<-RSAPublicKey_in>]
[B<-RSAPublicKey_out>]
[B<-engine id>]
=head1 DESCRIPTION
@ -118,6 +120,10 @@ by default a private key is output: with this option a public
key will be output instead. This option is automatically set if
the input is a public key.
=item B<-RSAPublicKey_in>, B<-RSAPublicKey_out>
like B<-pubin> and B<-pubout> except B<RSAPublicKey> format is used instead.
=item B<-engine id>
specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<rsa>
@ -139,6 +145,11 @@ The PEM public key format uses the header and footer lines:
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
The PEM B<RSAPublicKey> format uses the header and footer lines:
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
The B<NET> form is a format compatible with older Netscape servers
and Microsoft IIS .key files, this uses unsalted RC4 for its encryption.
It is not very secure and so should only be used when necessary.
@ -173,6 +184,10 @@ To just output the public part of a private key:
openssl rsa -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem
Output the public part of a private key in B<RSAPublicKey> format:
openssl rsa -in key.pem -RSAPublicKey_out -out pubkey.pem
=head1 BUGS
The command line password arguments don't currently work with

2
doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod
View File

@ -278,6 +278,8 @@ happen if extended CRL checking is enabled.
an application specific error. This will never be returned unless explicitly
set by an application.
=back
=head1 NOTES
The above functions should be used instead of directly referencing the fields

10
doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod
View File

@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ is ignored.
ECDSA_verify() verifies that the signature in B<sig> of size
B<siglen> is a valid ECDSA signature of the hash value
value B<dgst> of size B<dgstlen> using the public key B<eckey>.
B<dgst> of size B<dgstlen> using the public key B<eckey>.
The parameter B<type> is ignored.
ECDSA_do_sign() is wrapper function for ECDSA_do_sign_ex with B<kinv>
@ -131,16 +131,12 @@ specific)
int ret;
ECDSA_SIG *sig;
EC_KEY *eckey = EC_KEY_new();
EC_KEY *eckey;
eckey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp192k1);
if (eckey == NULL)
{
/* error */
}
key->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_nid(NID_secp192k1);
if (key->group == NULL)
{
/* error */
}
if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey))
{
/* error */

8
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod
View File

@ -66,16 +66,16 @@ values:
=over 4
=item 1
The operation succeeded.
=item 0
A failure while manipulating the STACK_OF(X509_NAME) object occurred or
the X509_NAME could not be extracted from B<cacert>. Check the error stack
to find out the reason.
=item 1
The operation succeeded.
=back
=head1 EXAMPLES

5
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
View File

@ -88,9 +88,10 @@ As of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c, this option has no effect.
...
=item SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
=item SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
As of OpenSSL 0.9.7h and 0.9.8a, this option has no effect.
Don't prefer ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X.
OS X 10.8..10.8.3 has broken support for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers.
=item SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG

4
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod
View File

@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint() and SSL_use_psk_identity_hint() return
Return values from the server callback are interpreted as follows:
=over 4
=item > 0
PSK identity was found and the server callback has provided the PSK
@ -99,4 +101,6 @@ completely.
PSK identity was not found. An "unknown_psk_identity" alert message
will be sent and the connection setup fails.
=back
=cut

10
doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod
View File

@ -44,17 +44,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
=over 4
=item 1
The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
established.
=item 0
The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
=item 1
The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
established.
=item E<lt>0
The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either

10
doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod
View File

@ -41,17 +41,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
=over 4
=item 1
The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
established.
=item 0
The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
=item 1
The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
established.
=item E<lt>0
The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred either

10
doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod
View File

@ -45,17 +45,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
=over 4
=item 1
The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
established.
=item 0
The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
=item 1
The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
established.
=item E<lt>0
The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either

10
doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod
View File

@ -92,11 +92,6 @@ The following return values can occur:
=over 4
=item 1
The shutdown was successfully completed. The "close notify" alert was sent
and the peer's "close notify" alert was received.
=item 0
The shutdown is not yet finished. Call SSL_shutdown() for a second time,
@ -104,6 +99,11 @@ if a bidirectional shutdown shall be performed.
The output of L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)> may be misleading, as an
erroneous SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL may be flagged even though no error occurred.
=item 1
The shutdown was successfully completed. The "close notify" alert was sent
and the peer's "close notify" alert was received.
=item -1
The shutdown was not successful because a fatal error occurred either

4
engines/ccgost/gost89.h
View File

@ -87,10 +87,6 @@ extern gost_subst_block Gost28147_CryptoProParamSetB;
extern gost_subst_block Gost28147_CryptoProParamSetC;
extern gost_subst_block Gost28147_CryptoProParamSetD;
extern const byte CryptoProKeyMeshingKey[];
#if __LONG_MAX__ > 2147483647L
typedef unsigned int word32;
#else
typedef unsigned long word32;
#endif
#endif

7
ssl/d1_both.c
View File

@ -319,9 +319,10 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
/* write atleast DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes */
if ( len <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
len = curr_mtu;
else
len = s->init_num;
}
dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,

36
ssl/d1_clnt.c
View File

@ -538,13 +538,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
* will be ignored if no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
#endif
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
@ -571,6 +564,16 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
goto end;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (s->hit)
{
/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
* will be ignored if no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
}
#endif
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
break;
@ -613,6 +616,13 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
}
else
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
* will be ignored if no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
@ -773,7 +783,7 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
unsigned int i,j;
unsigned long Time,l;
unsigned long l;
SSL_COMP *comp;
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
@ -798,13 +808,11 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
/* if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
* required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify */
for (i=0;p[i]=='\0' && i<sizeof(s->s3->client_random);i++) ;
for (i=0;p[i]=='\0' && i<sizeof(s->s3->client_random);i++)
;
if (i==sizeof(s->s3->client_random))
{
Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
l2n(Time,p);
RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,sizeof(s->s3->client_random)-4);
}
ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);

1
ssl/d1_lib.c
View File

@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
OPENSSL_free(s->d1);
s->d1 = NULL;
}
void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)

7
ssl/d1_pkt.c
View File

@ -847,6 +847,12 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
}
}
if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
{
rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
@ -1051,6 +1057,7 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
!s->s3->renegotiate)
{
s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
s->new_session = 1;
ssl3_renegotiate(s);
if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))

29
ssl/d1_srvr.c
View File

@ -276,10 +276,11 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
s->shutdown=0;
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
@ -721,10 +722,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
* will be ignored if no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
if (!s->hit)
{
/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
* will be ignored if no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
}
#endif
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
@ -749,7 +753,16 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit)
{
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
* will be ignored if no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
#endif
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
@ -912,15 +925,13 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i;
unsigned int sl;
unsigned long l,Time;
unsigned long l;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
{
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p=s->s3->server_random;
Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
l2n(Time,p);
RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4);
ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);

29
ssl/s23_clnt.c
View File

@ -269,12 +269,35 @@ static int ssl23_no_ssl2_ciphers(SSL *s)
return 1;
}
/* Fill a ClientRandom or ServerRandom field of length len. Returns <= 0
* on failure, 1 on success. */
int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, int len)
{
int send_time = 0;
if (len < 4)
return 0;
if (server)
send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME) != 0;
else
send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME) != 0;
if (send_time)
{
unsigned long Time = time(NULL);
unsigned char *p = result;
l2n(Time, p);
return RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, len-4);
}
else
return RAND_pseudo_bytes(result, len);
}
static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,ch_len;
unsigned long Time,l;
unsigned long l;
int ssl2_compat;
int version = 0, version_major, version_minor;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
@ -355,9 +378,7 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
#endif
p=s->s3->client_random;
Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
l2n(Time,p);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
return -1;
if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION)

2
ssl/s3_both.c
View File

@ -161,6 +161,8 @@ int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
if (i == 0)
return 0;
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
p+=i;

7
ssl/s3_clnt.c
View File

@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i;
unsigned long Time,l;
unsigned long l;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int j;
SSL_COMP *comp;
@ -680,9 +680,8 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
p=s->s3->client_random;
Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
l2n(Time,p);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
goto err;
/* Do the message type and length last */

18
ssl/s3_lib.c
View File

@ -1683,7 +1683,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_3DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
168,
168,
@ -1699,7 +1699,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_AES128,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
128,
128,
@ -1715,7 +1715,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_AES256,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
256,
256,
@ -3037,6 +3037,11 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
s->s3->is_probably_safari = 0;
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
rp = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
wp = s->s3->wbuf.buf;
@ -4016,6 +4021,13 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
ii=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,c);
if (ii >= 0)
{
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
if ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) && (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && s->s3->is_probably_safari)
{
if (!ret) ret=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow,ii);
continue;
}
#endif
ret=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow,ii);
break;
}

10
ssl/s3_pkt.c
View File

@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
if (version != s->version)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
/* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
s->version = (unsigned short)version;
al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
@ -1459,8 +1459,14 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
}
s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
if (i == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
return(1);
}

16
ssl/s3_srvr.c
View File

@ -958,7 +958,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
(s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
{
/* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
s->version = s->client_version;
@ -1193,12 +1194,9 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
* server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
* SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
{
unsigned long Time;
unsigned char *pos;
Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
pos=s->s3->server_random;
l2n(Time,pos);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
@ -1435,19 +1433,13 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,sl;
unsigned long l;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
unsigned long Time;
#endif
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
{
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
p=s->s3->server_random;
/* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
l2n(Time,p);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
return -1;
#endif
/* Do the message type and length last */

11
ssl/ssl.h
View File

@ -555,11 +555,14 @@ struct ssl_session_st
#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x00000008L
#define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG 0x00000010L
#define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 0x00000020L
#define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING 0x00000040L /* no effect since 0.9.7h and 0.9.8b */
#define SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG 0x00000040L
#define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG 0x00000080L
#define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG 0x00000100L
#define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0x00000200L
/* Hasn't done anything since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, retained for compatibility */
#define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING 0x0
/* Disable SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability workaround that was added
* in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. Usually (depending on the application protocol)
* the workaround is not needed. Unfortunately some broken SSL/TLS
@ -641,6 +644,12 @@ struct ssl_session_st
* TLS only.) "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context
* or just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len). */
#define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010L
/* Send the current time in the Random fields of the ClientHello and
* ServerHello records for compatibility with hypothetical implementations
* that require it.
*/
#define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L
#define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L
/* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
* they cannot be used to clear bits. */

9
ssl/ssl3.h
View File

@ -539,6 +539,15 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
/* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer. */
int next_proto_neg_seen;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/* This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari
* running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari
* on 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support. */
char is_probably_safari;
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
} SSL3_STATE;
#endif

8
ssl/ssl_lib.c
View File

@ -1797,7 +1797,9 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
ret->extra_certs=NULL;
ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
/* No compression for DTLS */
if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
@ -2792,9 +2794,7 @@ void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->server)
return(ssl_get_server_send_cert(s));
else if (s->cert != NULL)
if (s->cert != NULL)
return(s->cert->key->x509);
else
return(NULL);

1
ssl/ssl_locl.h
View File

@ -849,6 +849,7 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s);
int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type);
void ssl_load_ciphers(void);
int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field, int len);
int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client);
int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s);

8
ssl/ssltest.c
View File

@ -881,7 +881,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
meth=SSLv23_method();
#else
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
meth=SSLv3_method();
if (tls1)
meth=TLSv1_method();
else
if (ssl3)
meth=SSLv3_method();
else
meth=SSLv23_method();
#else
meth=SSLv2_method();
#endif

11
ssl/t1_enc.c
View File

@ -920,18 +920,19 @@ int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
{
int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
{
/* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
err = 1;
}
else
{
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i);
if (i != (unsigned int)hashsize) /* can't really happen */
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i) ||
(i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
err = 1;
q+=i;
q+=hashsize;
}
}
}

104
ssl/t1_lib.c
View File

@ -342,19 +342,11 @@ static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
#endif
};
int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
{
size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
/* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
if (FIPS_mode())
slen -= 2;
#endif
if (p)
memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
return (int)slen;
@ -866,6 +858,89 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
return ret;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
* SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
* Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
* SNI,
* elliptic_curves
* ec_point_formats
*
* We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
* but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
* Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
* 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
*/
static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
unsigned short type, size;
static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
0x01, /* 1 point format */
0x00, /* uncompressed */
};
/* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
};
if (data >= (d+n-2))
return;
data += 2;
if (data > (d+n-4))
return;
n2s(data,type);
n2s(data,size);
if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
return;
if (data+size > d+n)
return;
data += size;
if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
{
const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
return;
if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
return;
if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
return;
}
else
{
const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
if (data + len != d+n)
return;
if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
return;
}
s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
{
unsigned short type;
@ -886,6 +961,11 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (data >= (d+n-2))
goto ri_check;
n2s(data,len);
@ -2364,14 +2444,6 @@ const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
{
switch(hash_alg)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
return NULL;
#endif
return EVP_md5();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
return EVP_sha1();

6
util/shlib_wrap.sh
View File

@ -90,4 +90,8 @@ fi
cmd="$1${EXE_EXT}"
shift
exec "$cmd" "$@"
if [ $# -eq 0 ]; then
exec "$cmd" # old sh, such as Tru64 4.x, fails to expand empty "$@"
else
exec "$cmd" "$@"
fi