From 330f749452432f4e102815236f1495ee811ea529 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: mw Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 06:39:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Extend libsecureboot(old libve) to obtain trusted certificates from UEFI and implement revocation UEFI related headers were copied from edk2. A new build option "MK_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT" was added to allow loading of trusted anchors from UEFI. Certificate revocation support is also introduced. The forbidden certificates are loaded from dbx variable. Verification fails in two cases: There is a direct match between cert in dbx and the one in the chain. The CA used to sign the chain is found in dbx. One can also insert a hash of TBS section of a certificate into dbx. In this case verifications fails only if a direct match with a certificate in chain is found. Submitted by: Kornel Duleba Reviewed by: sjg Obtained from: Semihalf Sponsored by: Stormshield Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19093 --- lib/libsecureboot/Makefile.inc | 13 +- lib/libsecureboot/Makefile.libsa.inc | 13 + lib/libsecureboot/efi/efi_init.c | 74 ++++ lib/libsecureboot/efi/efi_variables.c | 278 ++++++++++++++ .../efi/include/Guid/GlobalVariable.h | 194 ++++++++++ .../efi/include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h | 352 ++++++++++++++++++ lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Protocol/Hash.h | 171 +++++++++ lib/libsecureboot/h/verify_file.h | 1 + lib/libsecureboot/libsecureboot-priv.h | 14 +- lib/libsecureboot/local.trust.mk | 19 +- lib/libsecureboot/verify_file.c | 2 +- lib/libsecureboot/vets.c | 246 ++++++++++-- share/mk/src.opts.mk | 1 + stand/efi/loader/Makefile | 4 + stand/efi/loader/main.c | 11 + .../build/options/WITH_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT | 5 + 16 files changed, 1362 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) create mode 100644 lib/libsecureboot/efi/efi_init.c create mode 100644 lib/libsecureboot/efi/efi_variables.c create mode 100644 lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Guid/GlobalVariable.h create mode 100644 lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h create mode 100644 lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Protocol/Hash.h create mode 100644 tools/build/options/WITH_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT diff --git a/lib/libsecureboot/Makefile.inc b/lib/libsecureboot/Makefile.inc index e7564b7bb7cb..93eaee04989e 100644 --- a/lib/libsecureboot/Makefile.inc +++ b/lib/libsecureboot/Makefile.inc @@ -31,6 +31,17 @@ BRSSL_SRCS+= \ ${BEARSSL}/tools/xmem.c \ ${BEARSSL}/tools/vector.c +BRSSL_DEPS= \ + brf.c \ + vets.c \ + veta.c + +.if ${MK_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT} != "no" +BRSSL_DEPS+= \ + efi_init.c \ + efi_variables.c +.endif + # we do not need/want nested objdirs OBJS_SRCS_FILTER = T R @@ -134,7 +145,7 @@ vse.h: echo 'NULL };' ) > ${.TARGET} -.for s in ${BRSSL_SRCS} brf.c vets.c veta.c +.for s in ${BRSSL_SRCS} ${BRSSL_DEPS} .ifdef BRSSL_SED $s: brssl.h .endif diff --git a/lib/libsecureboot/Makefile.libsa.inc b/lib/libsecureboot/Makefile.libsa.inc index 2456484a89c7..388d2edd90a2 100644 --- a/lib/libsecureboot/Makefile.libsa.inc +++ b/lib/libsecureboot/Makefile.libsa.inc @@ -16,6 +16,19 @@ SRCS+= \ vepcr.c \ verify_file.c \ +# Build library with support for the UEFI based authentication +.if ${MK_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT} == "yes" +SRCS+= \ + efi/efi_variables.c \ + efi/efi_init.c + +# Add includes required by efi part +CFLAGS+= \ + -I${SRCTOP}/stand/efi/include \ + -I${SRCTOP}/lib/libsecureboot/efi/include \ + -I${SRCTOP}/stand/efi/include/${MACHINE} +.endif + # this is the list of paths (relative to a file # that we need to verify) used to find a signed manifest. # the signature extensions in VE_SIGNATURE_EXT_LIST diff --git a/lib/libsecureboot/efi/efi_init.c b/lib/libsecureboot/efi/efi_init.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..241e99dab17a --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/libsecureboot/efi/efi_init.c @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2019 Stormshield. + * Copyright (c) 2019 Semihalf. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE + * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, + * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES + * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR + * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN + * ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#include +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#define NEED_BRSSL_H +#include "../libsecureboot-priv.h" +#include + +void +ve_efi_init(void) +{ + br_x509_certificate *xcs; + hash_data *digests; + size_t num; + int result; + static int once = 0; + + if (once > 0) + return; + + once = 1; + + result = efi_secure_boot_enabled(); + if (result <= 0) + return; + + xcs = efi_get_trusted_certs(&num); + if (num > 0 && xcs != NULL) { + num = ve_trust_anchors_add(xcs, num); + free_certificates(xcs, num); + } + xcs = efi_get_forbidden_certs(&num); + if (num > 0 && xcs != NULL) { + num = ve_forbidden_anchors_add(xcs, num); + free_certificates(xcs, num); + } + digests = efi_get_forbidden_digests(&num); + if (num > 0 && digests != NULL) { + ve_forbidden_digest_add(digests, num); + /* + * Don't free the buffors for digests, + * since they are shallow copied. + */ + xfree(digests); + } + + return; +} diff --git a/lib/libsecureboot/efi/efi_variables.c b/lib/libsecureboot/efi/efi_variables.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..12b553679bae --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/libsecureboot/efi/efi_variables.c @@ -0,0 +1,278 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2019 Stormshield. + * Copyright (c) 2019 Semihalf. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE + * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, + * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES + * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR + * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN + * ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * $FreeBSD$ + */ + +#include +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#define NEED_BRSSL_H +#include "../libsecureboot-priv.h" +#include + +static EFI_GUID ImageSecurityDatabaseGUID = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID; + +static EFI_GUID efiCertX509GUID = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID; +static EFI_GUID efiCertX509Sha256GUID = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID; +static EFI_GUID efiCertX509Sha384GUID = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID; +static EFI_GUID efiCertX509Sha5122UID = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID; + +/* + * Check if Secure Boot is enabled in firmware. + * We evaluate two variables - Secure Boot and Setup Mode. + * Secure Boot is enforced only if the first one equals 1 and the other 0. + */ +int +efi_secure_boot_enabled(void) +{ + UINT8 SecureBoot; + UINT8 SetupMode; + size_t length; + EFI_STATUS status; + + length = sizeof(SecureBoot); + status = efi_global_getenv("SecureBoot", &SecureBoot, &length); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) + return (0); + + printf("Failed to read \"SecureBoot\" variable\n"); + return (-efi_status_to_errno(status)); + } + + length = sizeof(SetupMode); + status = efi_global_getenv("SetupMode", &SetupMode, &length); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + SetupMode = 0; + + printf(" SecureBoot: %d, SetupMode: %d\n", SecureBoot, SetupMode); + + return (SecureBoot == 1 && SetupMode == 0); +} + +/* + * Iterate through UEFI variable and extract X509 certificates from it. + * The EFI_* structures and related guids are defined in UEFI standard. + */ +static br_x509_certificate* +efi_get_certs(const char *name, size_t *count) +{ + br_x509_certificate *certs; + UINT8 *database; + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *list; + EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *entry; + size_t db_size; + ssize_t cert_count; + EFI_STATUS status; + + database = NULL; + certs = NULL; + db_size = 0; + cert_count = 0; + + /* + * Read variable length and allocate memory for it + */ + status = efi_getenv(&ImageSecurityDatabaseGUID, name, database, &db_size); + if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) + return (NULL); + + database = malloc(db_size); + if (database == NULL) + return (NULL); + + status = efi_getenv(&ImageSecurityDatabaseGUID, name, database, &db_size); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + goto fail; + + for (list = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) database; + db_size >= list->SignatureListSize && db_size > 0; + db_size -= list->SignatureListSize, + list = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) + ((UINT8*)list + list->SignatureListSize)) { + + /* We are only interested in entries containing X509 certs. */ + if (memcmp(&efiCertX509GUID, + &list->SignatureType, + sizeof(EFI_GUID)) != 0) { + continue; + } + + entry = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) + ((UINT8*)list + + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + + list->SignatureHeaderSize); + + certs = realloc(certs, + (cert_count + 1) * sizeof(br_x509_certificate)); + if (certs == NULL) { + cert_count = 0; + goto fail; + } + + certs[cert_count].data_len = list->SignatureSize - sizeof(EFI_GUID); + certs[cert_count].data = malloc(certs[cert_count].data_len); + if (certs[cert_count].data == NULL) + goto fail; + + memcpy(certs[cert_count].data, + entry->SignatureData, + certs[cert_count].data_len); + + cert_count++; + } + + *count = cert_count; + + xfree(database); + return (certs); + +fail: + free_certificates(certs, cert_count); + xfree(database); + return (NULL); + +} + +/* + * Extract digests from UEFI "dbx" variable. + * UEFI standard specifies three types of digest - sha256, sha386, sha512. + */ +hash_data* +efi_get_forbidden_digests(size_t *count) +{ + UINT8 *database; + hash_data *digests; + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *list; + EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *entry; + size_t db_size, header_size, hash_size; + int digest_count, entry_count; + EFI_STATUS status; + + db_size = 0; + digest_count = 0; + database = NULL; + digests = NULL; + + status = efi_getenv(&ImageSecurityDatabaseGUID, "dbx", database, &db_size); + if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) + return (NULL); + + database = malloc(db_size); + if (database == NULL) + return (NULL); + + status = efi_getenv(&ImageSecurityDatabaseGUID, "dbx", database, &db_size); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + goto fail; + + + for (list = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) database; + db_size >= list->SignatureListSize && db_size > 0; + db_size -= list->SignatureListSize, + list = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) + ((UINT8*)list + list->SignatureListSize)) { + + /* We are only interested in entries that contain digests. */ + if (memcmp(&efiCertX509Sha256GUID, &list->SignatureType, + sizeof(EFI_GUID)) == 0) { + hash_size = br_sha256_SIZE; + } else if (memcmp(&efiCertX509Sha384GUID, &list->SignatureType, + sizeof(EFI_GUID)) == 0) { + hash_size = br_sha384_SIZE; + } else if (memcmp(&efiCertX509Sha5122UID, &list->SignatureType, + sizeof(EFI_GUID)) == 0) { + hash_size = br_sha512_SIZE; + } else { + continue; + } + + /* + * A single entry can have multiple digests + * of the same type for some reason. + */ + header_size = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + list->SignatureHeaderSize; + + /* Calculate the number of entries basing on structure size */ + entry_count = list->SignatureListSize - header_size; + entry_count /= list->SignatureSize; + entry = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)((UINT8*)list + header_size); + while (entry_count-- > 0) { + digests = realloc(digests, + (digest_count + 1) * sizeof(hash_data)); + if (digests == NULL) { + digest_count = 0; + goto fail; + } + + digests[digest_count].data = malloc(hash_size); + if (digests[digest_count].data == NULL) + goto fail; + + memcpy(digests[digest_count].data, + entry->SignatureData, + hash_size); + digests[digest_count].hash_size = hash_size; + + entry = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)(entry + list->SignatureSize); + digest_count++; + } + } + xfree(database); + if (count != NULL) + *count = digest_count; + + return (digests); + +fail: + while (digest_count--) + xfree(digests[digest_count].data); + + xfree(database); + xfree(digests); + return (NULL); +} + +/* Copy x509 certificates from db */ +br_x509_certificate* +efi_get_trusted_certs(size_t *count) +{ + return (efi_get_certs("db", count)); +} + +/* Copy forbidden certificates from dbx */ +br_x509_certificate* +efi_get_forbidden_certs(size_t *count) +{ + return (efi_get_certs("dbx", count)); +} diff --git a/lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Guid/GlobalVariable.h b/lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Guid/GlobalVariable.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cef7995e7497 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Guid/GlobalVariable.h @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +/** @file + GUID for EFI (NVRAM) Variables. + Copyright (c) 2006 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ This program and the accompanying materials + are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License + which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at + http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php + THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. + @par Revision Reference: + GUID defined in UEFI 2.1 +**/ + +#ifndef __GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID_H__ +#define __GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID_H__ + +#include +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#ifndef EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE +#define EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE \ + { \ + 0x8BE4DF61, 0x93CA, 0x11d2, {0xAA, 0x0D, 0x00, 0xE0, 0x98, 0x03, 0x2B, 0x8C } \ + } +#endif /* EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE */ + +extern EFI_GUID gEfiGlobalVariableGuid; + +// +// Follow UEFI 2.4 spec: +// To prevent name collisions with possible future globally defined variables, +// other internal firmware data variables that are not defined here must be +// saved with a unique VendorGuid other than EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE or +// any other GUID defined by the UEFI Specification. Implementations must +// only permit the creation of variables with a UEFI Specification-defined +// VendorGuid when these variables are documented in the UEFI Specification. +// +// Note: except the globally defined variables defined below, the spec also defines +// L"Boot####" - A boot load option. +// L"Driver####" - A driver load option. +// L"SysPrep####" - A System Prep application load option. +// L"Key####" - Describes hot key relationship with a Boot#### load option. +// The attribute for them is NV+BS+RT, #### is a printed hex value, and no 0x or h +// is included in the hex value. They can not be expressed as a #define like other globally +// defined variables, it is because we can not list the Boot0000, Boot0001, etc one by one. +// + +/// +/// The language codes that the firmware supports. This value is deprecated. +/// Its attribute is BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_LANG_CODES_VARIABLE_NAME L"LangCodes" +/// +/// The language code that the system is configured for. This value is deprecated. +/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_LANG_VARIABLE_NAME L"Lang" +/// +/// The firmware's boot managers timeout, in seconds, before initiating the default boot selection. +/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_TIME_OUT_VARIABLE_NAME L"Timeout" +/// +/// The language codes that the firmware supports. +/// Its attribute is BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_PLATFORM_LANG_CODES_VARIABLE_NAME L"PlatformLangCodes" +/// +/// The language code that the system is configured for. +/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_PLATFORM_LANG_VARIABLE_NAME L"PlatformLang" +/// +/// The device path of the default input/output/error output console. +/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_CON_IN_VARIABLE_NAME L"ConIn" +#define EFI_CON_OUT_VARIABLE_NAME L"ConOut" +#define EFI_ERR_OUT_VARIABLE_NAME L"ErrOut" +/// +/// The device path of all possible input/output/error output devices. +/// Its attribute is BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_CON_IN_DEV_VARIABLE_NAME L"ConInDev" +#define EFI_CON_OUT_DEV_VARIABLE_NAME L"ConOutDev" +#define EFI_ERR_OUT_DEV_VARIABLE_NAME L"ErrOutDev" +/// +/// The ordered boot option load list. +/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_BOOT_ORDER_VARIABLE_NAME L"BootOrder" +/// +/// The boot option for the next boot only. +/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_BOOT_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME L"BootNext" +/// +/// The boot option that was selected for the current boot. +/// Its attribute is BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_BOOT_CURRENT_VARIABLE_NAME L"BootCurrent" +/// +/// The types of boot options supported by the boot manager. Should be treated as read-only. +/// Its attribute is BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_BOOT_OPTION_SUPPORT_VARIABLE_NAME L"BootOptionSupport" +/// +/// The ordered driver load option list. +/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_DRIVER_ORDER_VARIABLE_NAME L"DriverOrder" +/// +/// The ordered System Prep Application load option list. +/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_SYS_PREP_ORDER_VARIABLE_NAME L"SysPrepOrder" +/// +/// Identifies the level of hardware error record persistence +/// support implemented by the platform. This variable is +/// only modified by firmware and is read-only to the OS. +/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_HW_ERR_REC_SUPPORT_VARIABLE_NAME L"HwErrRecSupport" +/// +/// Whether the system is operating in setup mode (1) or not (0). +/// All other values are reserved. Should be treated as read-only. +/// Its attribute is BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME L"SetupMode" +/// +/// The Key Exchange Key Signature Database. +/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT+AT. +/// +#define EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME L"KEK" +/// +/// The public Platform Key. +/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT+AT. +/// +#define EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME L"PK" +/// +/// Array of GUIDs representing the type of signatures supported +/// by the platform firmware. Should be treated as read-only. +/// Its attribute is BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME L"SignatureSupport" +/// +/// Whether the platform firmware is operating in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0). +/// All other values are reserved. Should be treated as read-only. +/// Its attribute is BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME L"SecureBoot" +/// +/// The OEM's default Key Exchange Key Signature Database. Should be treated as read-only. +/// Its attribute is BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_KEK_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME L"KEKDefault" +/// +/// The OEM's default public Platform Key. Should be treated as read-only. +/// Its attribute is BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_PK_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME L"PKDefault" +/// +/// The OEM's default secure boot signature store. Should be treated as read-only. +/// Its attribute is BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_DB_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME L"dbDefault" +/// +/// The OEM's default secure boot blacklist signature store. Should be treated as read-only. +/// Its attribute is BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_DBX_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME L"dbxDefault" +/// +/// The OEM's default secure boot timestamp signature store. Should be treated as read-only. +/// Its attribute is BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_DBT_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME L"dbtDefault" +/// +/// Allows the firmware to indicate supported features and actions to the OS. +/// Its attribute is BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_OS_INDICATIONS_SUPPORT_VARIABLE_NAME L"OsIndicationsSupported" +/// +/// Allows the OS to request the firmware to enable certain features and to take certain actions. +/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_OS_INDICATIONS_VARIABLE_NAME L"OsIndications" +/// +/// Whether the system is configured to use only vendor provided +/// keys or not. Should be treated as read-only. +/// Its attribute is BS+RT. +/// +#define EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME L"VendorKeys" + +#endif diff --git a/lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h b/lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c68e5fce205a --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h @@ -0,0 +1,352 @@ +/** @file + Image signature database are defined for the signed image validation. + Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ This program and the accompanying materials + are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License + which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at + http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php + THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. + @par Revision Reference: + GUIDs defined in UEFI 2.5 spec. +**/ + +#ifndef __IMAGE_AUTHTICATION_H__ +#define __IMAGE_AUTHTICATION_H__ + +#include +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#include +#include + +#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID \ + { \ + 0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, { 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0xe, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f } \ + } + +/// +/// Varialbe name with guid EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID +/// for the authorized signature database. +/// +#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE L"db" +/// +/// Varialbe name with guid EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID +/// for the forbidden signature database. +/// +#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1 L"dbx" +/// +/// Variable name with guid EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID +/// for the timestamp signature database. +/// +#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2 L"dbt" + +#define SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE 1 +#define SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE 0 + +#define SETUP_MODE 1 +#define USER_MODE 0 + +//*********************************************************************** +// Signature Database +//*********************************************************************** +/// +/// The format of a signature database. +/// +#pragma pack(1) + +typedef struct { + /// + /// An identifier which identifies the agent which added the signature to the list. + /// + EFI_GUID SignatureOwner; + /// + /// The format of the signature is defined by the SignatureType. + /// + UINT8 SignatureData[1]; +} EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA; + +typedef struct { + /// + /// Type of the signature. GUID signature types are defined in below. + /// + EFI_GUID SignatureType; + /// + /// Total size of the signature list, including this header. + /// + UINT32 SignatureListSize; + /// + /// Size of the signature header which precedes the array of signatures. + /// + UINT32 SignatureHeaderSize; + /// + /// Size of each signature. + /// + UINT32 SignatureSize; + /// + /// Header before the array of signatures. The format of this header is specified + /// by the SignatureType. + /// UINT8 SignatureHeader[SignatureHeaderSize]; + /// + /// An array of signatures. Each signature is SignatureSize bytes in length. + /// EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA Signatures[][SignatureSize]; + /// +} EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST; + +typedef struct { + /// + /// The SHA256 hash of an X.509 certificate's To-Be-Signed contents. + /// + EFI_SHA256_HASH ToBeSignedHash; + /// + /// The time that the certificate shall be considered to be revoked. + /// + EFI_TIME TimeOfRevocation; +} EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256; + +typedef struct { + /// + /// The SHA384 hash of an X.509 certificate's To-Be-Signed contents. + /// + EFI_SHA384_HASH ToBeSignedHash; + /// + /// The time that the certificate shall be considered to be revoked. + /// + EFI_TIME TimeOfRevocation; +} EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384; + +typedef struct { + /// + /// The SHA512 hash of an X.509 certificate's To-Be-Signed contents. + /// + EFI_SHA512_HASH ToBeSignedHash; + /// + /// The time that the certificate shall be considered to be revoked. + /// + EFI_TIME TimeOfRevocation; +} EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512; + +#pragma pack() + +/// +/// This identifies a signature containing a SHA-256 hash. The SignatureHeader size shall +/// always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner component) + +/// 32 bytes. +/// +#define EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID \ + { \ + 0xc1c41626, 0x504c, 0x4092, {0xac, 0xa9, 0x41, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x93, 0x43, 0x28} \ + } + +/// +/// This identifies a signature containing an RSA-2048 key. The key (only the modulus +/// since the public key exponent is known to be 0x10001) shall be stored in big-endian +/// order. +/// The SignatureHeader size shall always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size +/// of SignatureOwner component) + 256 bytes. +/// +#define EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID \ + { \ + 0x3c5766e8, 0x269c, 0x4e34, {0xaa, 0x14, 0xed, 0x77, 0x6e, 0x85, 0xb3, 0xb6} \ + } + +/// +/// This identifies a signature containing a RSA-2048 signature of a SHA-256 hash. The +/// SignatureHeader size shall always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of +/// SignatureOwner component) + 256 bytes. +/// +#define EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID \ + { \ + 0xe2b36190, 0x879b, 0x4a3d, {0xad, 0x8d, 0xf2, 0xe7, 0xbb, 0xa3, 0x27, 0x84} \ + } + +/// +/// This identifies a signature containing a SHA-1 hash. The SignatureSize shall always +/// be 16 (size of SignatureOwner component) + 20 bytes. +/// +#define EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID \ + { \ + 0x826ca512, 0xcf10, 0x4ac9, {0xb1, 0x87, 0xbe, 0x1, 0x49, 0x66, 0x31, 0xbd} \ + } + +/// +/// TThis identifies a signature containing a RSA-2048 signature of a SHA-1 hash. The +/// SignatureHeader size shall always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of +/// SignatureOwner component) + 256 bytes. +/// +#define EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID \ + { \ + 0x67f8444f, 0x8743, 0x48f1, {0xa3, 0x28, 0x1e, 0xaa, 0xb8, 0x73, 0x60, 0x80} \ + } + +/// +/// This identifies a signature based on an X.509 certificate. If the signature is an X.509 +/// certificate then verification of the signature of an image should validate the public +/// key certificate in the image using certificate path verification, up to this X.509 +/// certificate as a trusted root. The SignatureHeader size shall always be 0. The +/// SignatureSize may vary but shall always be 16 (size of the SignatureOwner component) + +/// the size of the certificate itself. +/// Note: This means that each certificate will normally be in a separate EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. +/// +#define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \ + { \ + 0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, {0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72} \ + } + +/// +/// This identifies a signature containing a SHA-224 hash. The SignatureHeader size shall +/// always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner component) + +/// 28 bytes. +/// +#define EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID \ + { \ + 0xb6e5233, 0xa65c, 0x44c9, {0x94, 0x7, 0xd9, 0xab, 0x83, 0xbf, 0xc8, 0xbd} \ + } + +/// +/// This identifies a signature containing a SHA-384 hash. The SignatureHeader size shall +/// always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner component) + +/// 48 bytes. +/// +#define EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID \ + { \ + 0xff3e5307, 0x9fd0, 0x48c9, {0x85, 0xf1, 0x8a, 0xd5, 0x6c, 0x70, 0x1e, 0x1} \ + } + +/// +/// This identifies a signature containing a SHA-512 hash. The SignatureHeader size shall +/// always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner component) + +/// 64 bytes. +/// +#define EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID \ + { \ + 0x93e0fae, 0xa6c4, 0x4f50, {0x9f, 0x1b, 0xd4, 0x1e, 0x2b, 0x89, 0xc1, 0x9a} \ + } + +/// +/// This identifies a signature containing the SHA256 hash of an X.509 certificate's +/// To-Be-Signed contents, and a time of revocation. The SignatureHeader size shall +/// always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of the SignatureOwner component) +/// + 48 bytes for an EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256 structure. If the TimeOfRevocation is non-zero, +/// the certificate should be considered to be revoked from that time and onwards, and +/// otherwise the certificate shall be considered to always be revoked. +/// +#define EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID \ + { \ + 0x3bd2a492, 0x96c0, 0x4079, {0xb4, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xf9, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x03, 0xed } \ + } + +/// +/// This identifies a signature containing the SHA384 hash of an X.509 certificate's +/// To-Be-Signed contents, and a time of revocation. The SignatureHeader size shall +/// always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of the SignatureOwner component) +/// + 64 bytes for an EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384 structure. If the TimeOfRevocation is non-zero, +/// the certificate should be considered to be revoked from that time and onwards, and +/// otherwise the certificate shall be considered to always be revoked. +/// +#define EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID \ + { \ + 0x7076876e, 0x80c2, 0x4ee6, {0xaa, 0xd2, 0x28, 0xb3, 0x49, 0xa6, 0x86, 0x5b } \ + } + +/// +/// This identifies a signature containing the SHA512 hash of an X.509 certificate's +/// To-Be-Signed contents, and a time of revocation. The SignatureHeader size shall +/// always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of the SignatureOwner component) +/// + 80 bytes for an EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512 structure. If the TimeOfRevocation is non-zero, +/// the certificate should be considered to be revoked from that time and onwards, and +/// otherwise the certificate shall be considered to always be revoked. +/// +#define EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID \ + { \ + 0x446dbf63, 0x2502, 0x4cda, {0xbc, 0xfa, 0x24, 0x65, 0xd2, 0xb0, 0xfe, 0x9d } \ + } + +/// +/// This identifies a signature containing a DER-encoded PKCS #7 version 1.5 [RFC2315] +/// SignedData value. +/// +#define EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID \ + { \ + 0x4aafd29d, 0x68df, 0x49ee, {0x8a, 0xa9, 0x34, 0x7d, 0x37, 0x56, 0x65, 0xa7} \ + } + +//*********************************************************************** +// Image Execution Information Table Definition +//*********************************************************************** +typedef UINT32 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION; + +#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000007 +#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED 0x00000000 +#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED 0x00000001 +#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED 0x00000002 +#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_NOT_FOUND 0x00000003 +#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND 0x00000004 +#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_POLICY_FAILED 0x00000005 +#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 + +// +// EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO is added to EFI System Configuration Table +// and assigned the GUID EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID. +// +typedef struct { + /// + /// Describes the action taken by the firmware regarding this image. + /// + EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action; + /// + /// Size of all of the entire structure. + /// + UINT32 InfoSize; + /// + /// If this image was a UEFI device driver (for option ROM, for example) this is the + /// null-terminated, user-friendly name for the device. If the image was for an application, + /// then this is the name of the application. If this cannot be determined, then a simple + /// NULL character should be put in this position. + /// CHAR16 Name[]; + /// + + /// + /// For device drivers, this is the device path of the device for which this device driver + /// was intended. In some cases, the driver itself may be stored as part of the system + /// firmware, but this field should record the device's path, not the firmware path. For + /// applications, this is the device path of the application. If this cannot be determined, + /// a simple end-of-path device node should be put in this position. + /// EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL DevicePath; + /// + + /// + /// Zero or more image signatures. If the image contained no signatures, + /// then this field is empty. + /// EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST Signature; + /// +} EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO; + + +typedef struct { + /// + /// Number of EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO structures. + /// + UINTN NumberOfImages; + /// + /// Number of image instances of EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO structures. + /// + // EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO InformationInfo[] +} EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE; + +extern EFI_GUID gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertSha256Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertRsa2048Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertRsa2048Sha256Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertSha1Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertRsa2048Sha1Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertX509Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertSha224Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertSha384Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertSha512Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertPkcs7Guid; + +#endif diff --git a/lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Protocol/Hash.h b/lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Protocol/Hash.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f25267952391 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Protocol/Hash.h @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +/** @file + EFI_HASH_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL as defined in UEFI 2.0. + EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL as defined in UEFI 2.0. + The EFI Hash Service Binding Protocol is used to locate hashing services support + provided by a driver and to create and destroy instances of the EFI Hash Protocol + so that a multiple drivers can use the underlying hashing services. +Copyright (c) 2006 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available under +the terms and conditions of the BSD License that accompanies this distribution. +The full text of the license may be found at +http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php. +THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. +**/ + +#ifndef __EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL_H__ +#define __EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL_H__ + +#include +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#define CONST const + +#define EFI_HASH_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL_GUID \ + { \ + 0x42881c98, 0xa4f3, 0x44b0, {0xa3, 0x9d, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0x86, 0x67, 0xd8, 0xcd } \ + } + +#define EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL_GUID \ + { \ + 0xc5184932, 0xdba5, 0x46db, {0xa5, 0xba, 0xcc, 0x0b, 0xda, 0x9c, 0x14, 0x35 } \ + } + +#define EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA1_GUID \ + { \ + 0x2ae9d80f, 0x3fb2, 0x4095, {0xb7, 0xb1, 0xe9, 0x31, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x46, 0xb6 } \ + } + +#define EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA224_GUID \ + { \ + 0x8df01a06, 0x9bd5, 0x4bf7, {0xb0, 0x21, 0xdb, 0x4f, 0xd9, 0xcc, 0xf4, 0x5b } \ + } + +#define EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA256_GUID \ + { \ + 0x51aa59de, 0xfdf2, 0x4ea3, {0xbc, 0x63, 0x87, 0x5f, 0xb7, 0x84, 0x2e, 0xe9 } \ + } + +#define EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA384_GUID \ + { \ + 0xefa96432, 0xde33, 0x4dd2, {0xae, 0xe6, 0x32, 0x8c, 0x33, 0xdf, 0x77, 0x7a } \ + } + +#define EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA512_GUID \ + { \ + 0xcaa4381e, 0x750c, 0x4770, {0xb8, 0x70, 0x7a, 0x23, 0xb4, 0xe4, 0x21, 0x30 } \ + } + +#define EFI_HASH_ALGORTIHM_MD5_GUID \ + { \ + 0xaf7c79c, 0x65b5, 0x4319, {0xb0, 0xae, 0x44, 0xec, 0x48, 0x4e, 0x4a, 0xd7 } \ + } + +#define EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA1_NOPAD_GUID \ + { \ + 0x24c5dc2f, 0x53e2, 0x40ca, {0x9e, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xd9, 0xa4, 0x9f, 0x46, 0x3b } \ + } + +#define EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA256_NOPAD_GUID \ + { \ + 0x8628752a, 0x6cb7, 0x4814, {0x96, 0xfc, 0x24, 0xa8, 0x15, 0xac, 0x22, 0x26 } \ + } + +// +// Note: Use of the following algorithms with EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL is deprecated. +// EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA1_GUID +// EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA224_GUID +// EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA256_GUID +// EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA384_GUID +// EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA512_GUID +// EFI_HASH_ALGORTIHM_MD5_GUID +// + +typedef struct _EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL; + +typedef UINT8 EFI_MD5_HASH[16]; +typedef UINT8 EFI_SHA1_HASH[20]; +typedef UINT8 EFI_SHA224_HASH[28]; +typedef UINT8 EFI_SHA256_HASH[32]; +typedef UINT8 EFI_SHA384_HASH[48]; +typedef UINT8 EFI_SHA512_HASH[64]; + +typedef union { + EFI_MD5_HASH *Md5Hash; + EFI_SHA1_HASH *Sha1Hash; + EFI_SHA224_HASH *Sha224Hash; + EFI_SHA256_HASH *Sha256Hash; + EFI_SHA384_HASH *Sha384Hash; + EFI_SHA512_HASH *Sha512Hash; +} EFI_HASH_OUTPUT; + +/** + Returns the size of the hash which results from a specific algorithm. + @param[in] This Points to this instance of EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL. + @param[in] HashAlgorithm Points to the EFI_GUID which identifies the algorithm to use. + @param[out] HashSize Holds the returned size of the algorithm's hash. + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash size returned successfully. + @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER HashSize is NULL or HashAlgorithm is NULL. + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The algorithm specified by HashAlgorithm is not supported + by this driver. +**/ +typedef +EFI_STATUS +(EFIAPI *EFI_HASH_GET_HASH_SIZE)( + IN CONST EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL *This, + IN CONST EFI_GUID *HashAlgorithm, + OUT UINTN *HashSize + ); + +/** + Creates a hash for the specified message text. + @param[in] This Points to this instance of EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL. + @param[in] HashAlgorithm Points to the EFI_GUID which identifies the algorithm to use. + @param[in] Extend Specifies whether to create a new hash (FALSE) or extend the specified + existing hash (TRUE). + @param[in] Message Points to the start of the message. + @param[in] MessageSize The size of Message, in bytes. + @param[in,out] Hash On input, if Extend is TRUE, then this parameter holds a pointer + to a pointer to an array containing the hash to extend. If Extend + is FALSE, then this parameter holds a pointer to a pointer to a + caller-allocated array that will receive the result of the hash + computation. On output (regardless of the value of Extend), the + array will contain the result of the hash computation. + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash returned successfully. + @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Message or Hash, HashAlgorithm is NULL or MessageSize is 0. + MessageSize is not an integer multiple of block size. + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The algorithm specified by HashAlgorithm is not supported by this + driver. Or, Extend is TRUE, and the algorithm doesn't support extending the hash. +**/ +typedef +EFI_STATUS +(EFIAPI *EFI_HASH_HASH)( + IN CONST EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL *This, + IN CONST EFI_GUID *HashAlgorithm, + IN BOOLEAN Extend, + IN CONST UINT8 *Message, + IN UINT64 MessageSize, + IN OUT EFI_HASH_OUTPUT *Hash + ); + +/// +/// This protocol allows creating a hash of an arbitrary message digest +/// using one or more hash algorithms. +/// +struct _EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL { + EFI_HASH_GET_HASH_SIZE GetHashSize; + EFI_HASH_HASH Hash; +}; + +extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashServiceBindingProtocolGuid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashProtocolGuid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashAlgorithmSha1Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashAlgorithmSha224Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashAlgorithmSha256Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashAlgorithmSha384Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashAlgorithmSha512Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashAlgorithmMD5Guid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashAlgorithmSha1NoPadGuid; +extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashAlgorithmSha256NoPadGuid; + +#endif diff --git a/lib/libsecureboot/h/verify_file.h b/lib/libsecureboot/h/verify_file.h index 3f8e6138cbc8..4556f8268714 100644 --- a/lib/libsecureboot/h/verify_file.h +++ b/lib/libsecureboot/h/verify_file.h @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ struct stat; void ve_debug_set(int); int ve_status_get(int); +void ve_efi_init(void); int load_manifest(const char *, const char *, const char *, struct stat *); int verify_file(int, const char *, off_t, int); void verify_pcr_export(void); diff --git a/lib/libsecureboot/libsecureboot-priv.h b/lib/libsecureboot/libsecureboot-priv.h index 0618f05f15b1..5cfc9800c829 100644 --- a/lib/libsecureboot/libsecureboot-priv.h +++ b/lib/libsecureboot/libsecureboot-priv.h @@ -31,8 +31,15 @@ /* public api */ #include "libsecureboot.h" +typedef struct { + unsigned char *data; + size_t hash_size; +} hash_data; + size_t ve_trust_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *, size_t); -char *fingerprint_info_lookup(int, const char *); +size_t ve_forbidden_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *, size_t); +void ve_forbidden_digest_add(hash_data *digest, size_t); +char *fingerprint_info_lookup(int, const char *); br_x509_certificate * parse_certificates(unsigned char *, size_t, size_t *); int certificate_to_trust_anchor_inner(br_x509_trust_anchor *, @@ -45,4 +52,9 @@ int verify_rsa_digest(br_rsa_public_key *pkey, int openpgp_self_tests(void); +int efi_secure_boot_enabled(void); +br_x509_certificate* efi_get_trusted_certs(size_t *count); +br_x509_certificate* efi_get_forbidden_certs(size_t *count); +hash_data* efi_get_forbidden_digests(size_t *count); + #endif /* _LIBSECUREBOOT_PRIV_H_ */ diff --git a/lib/libsecureboot/local.trust.mk b/lib/libsecureboot/local.trust.mk index f26a4ec0a9be..cdc3a796b7ec 100644 --- a/lib/libsecureboot/local.trust.mk +++ b/lib/libsecureboot/local.trust.mk @@ -7,27 +7,26 @@ # for each key will provide the appropriate certificate chain on request # force these for Junos -MANIFEST_SKIP_ALWAYS= boot +#MANIFEST_SKIP_ALWAYS= boot VE_HASH_LIST= \ SHA1 \ SHA256 \ - SHA384 + SHA384 \ + SHA512 VE_SIGNATURE_LIST= \ - ECDSA + ECDSA \ + RSA VE_SIGNATURE_EXT_LIST= \ - esig + esig \ + rsig VE_SELF_TESTS= yes .if ${MACHINE} == "host" && ${.CURDIR:T} == "tests" -# for testing -VE_HASH_LIST+= \ - SHA512 VE_SIGNATURE_LIST+= \ - RSA \ DEPRECATED_RSA_SHA1 VE_SIGNATURE_EXT_LIST+= \ @@ -88,7 +87,7 @@ vc_rsa.pem: rcerts.pem _2ndLAST_PEM_USE .endif # we take the mtime of this as our baseline time -BUILD_UTC_FILE= ecerts.pem +#BUILD_UTC_FILE= ecerts.pem #VE_DEBUG_LEVEL=3 #VE_VERBOSE_DEFAULT=1 @@ -97,7 +96,7 @@ BUILD_UTC_FILE= ecerts.pem .if empty(TRUST_ANCHORS) TRUST_ANCHORS!= cd ${.CURDIR} && 'ls' -1 *.pem t*.asc 2> /dev/null .endif -.if empty(TRUST_ANCHORS) +.if empty(TRUST_ANCHORS) && ${MK_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT} != "yes" .error Need TRUST_ANCHORS see ${.CURDIR}/README.rst .endif .if ${TRUST_ANCHORS:T:Mt*.pem} != "" diff --git a/lib/libsecureboot/verify_file.c b/lib/libsecureboot/verify_file.c index 8bde42090755..dcf9a9a6be12 100644 --- a/lib/libsecureboot/verify_file.c +++ b/lib/libsecureboot/verify_file.c @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ verify_file(int fd, const char *filename, off_t off, int severity) if (verbose || severity > VE_WANT) { #if defined(VE_DEBUG_LEVEL) && VE_DEBUG_LEVEL > 0 printf("Verified %s %llu,%llu\n", filename, - st.st_dev, st.st_ino); + (long long)st.st_dev, (long long)st.st_ino); #else printf("Verified %s\n", filename); #endif diff --git a/lib/libsecureboot/vets.c b/lib/libsecureboot/vets.c index db96fe965a5c..06bfd0e3fc0c 100644 --- a/lib/libsecureboot/vets.c +++ b/lib/libsecureboot/vets.c @@ -49,8 +49,11 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); int DebugVe = 0; typedef VECTOR(br_x509_certificate) cert_list; +typedef VECTOR(hash_data) digest_list; static anchor_list trust_anchors = VEC_INIT; +static anchor_list forbidden_anchors = VEC_INIT; +static digest_list forbidden_digests = VEC_INIT; void ve_debug_set(int n) @@ -113,12 +116,75 @@ free_cert_contents(br_x509_certificate *xc) xfree(xc->data); } -/** - * @brief - * add certs to our trust store +/* ASN parsing related defines */ +#define ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG 0x1F +#define ASN1_INF_LENGTH 0x80 +#define ASN1_LENGTH_MASK 0x7F + +/* + * Get TBS part of certificate. + * Since BearSSL doesn't provide any API to do this, + * it has to be implemented here. */ -size_t -ve_trust_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *xcs, size_t num) +static void* +X509_to_tbs(unsigned char* cert, size_t* output_size) +{ + unsigned char *result; + size_t tbs_size; + int size, i; + + if (cert == NULL) + return (NULL); + + /* Strip two sequences to get to the TBS section */ + for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { + /* + * XXX: We don't need to support extended tags since + * they should not be present in certificates. + */ + if ((*cert & ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG) == ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG) + return (NULL); + + cert++; + + if (*cert == ASN1_INF_LENGTH) + return (NULL); + + size = *cert & ASN1_LENGTH_MASK; + tbs_size = 0; + + /* Size can either be stored on a single or multiple bytes */ + if (*cert & (ASN1_LENGTH_MASK + 1)) { + cert++; + while (*cert == 0 && size > 0) { + cert++; + size--; + } + while (size-- > 0) { + tbs_size <<= 8; + tbs_size |= *(cert++); + } + } + if (i == 0) + result = cert; + } + tbs_size += (cert - result); + + if (output_size != NULL) + *output_size = tbs_size; + + return (result); +} + +void +ve_forbidden_digest_add(hash_data *digest, size_t num) +{ + while (num--) + VEC_ADD(forbidden_digests, digest[num]); +} + +static size_t +ve_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *xcs, size_t num, anchor_list *anchors) { br_x509_trust_anchor ta; size_t u; @@ -127,11 +193,27 @@ ve_trust_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *xcs, size_t num) if (certificate_to_trust_anchor_inner(&ta, &xcs[u]) < 0) { break; } - VEC_ADD(trust_anchors, ta); + VEC_ADD(*anchors, ta); } return (u); } +/** + * @brief + * add certs to our trust store + */ +size_t +ve_trust_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *xcs, size_t num) +{ + return (ve_anchors_add(xcs, num, &trust_anchors)); +} + +size_t +ve_forbidden_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *xcs, size_t num) +{ + return (ve_anchors_add(xcs, num, &forbidden_anchors)); +} + /** * @brief * initialize our trust_anchors from ta_PEM @@ -139,13 +221,14 @@ ve_trust_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *xcs, size_t num) int ve_trust_init(void) { +#ifdef TRUST_ANCHOR_STR br_x509_certificate *xcs; +#endif static int once = -1; size_t num; if (once >= 0) return (once); - once = 0; ve_utc_set(time(NULL)); #ifdef BUILD_UTC @@ -159,14 +242,12 @@ ve_trust_init(void) #ifdef TRUST_ANCHOR_STR xcs = parse_certificates(__DECONST(unsigned char *, TRUST_ANCHOR_STR), sizeof(TRUST_ANCHOR_STR), &num); - if (xcs == NULL) - return (0); - num = ve_trust_anchors_add(xcs, num); - once = (int) num; -#else - num = 0; + if (xcs != NULL) + num = ve_trust_anchors_add(xcs, num); #endif - return (num); + once = (int) VEC_LEN(trust_anchors); + + return (once); } /** @@ -177,7 +258,8 @@ ve_trust_init(void) static br_x509_pkey * verify_signer_xcs(br_x509_certificate *xcs, size_t num, - br_name_element *elts, size_t num_elts) + br_name_element *elts, size_t num_elts, + anchor_list *anchors) { br_x509_minimal_context mc; br_x509_certificate *xc; @@ -196,11 +278,11 @@ verify_signer_xcs(br_x509_certificate *xcs, } DEBUG_PRINTF(5, ("verify_signer: %zu trust anchors\n", - VEC_LEN(trust_anchors))); + VEC_LEN(*anchors))); br_x509_minimal_init(&mc, &br_sha256_vtable, - &VEC_ELT(trust_anchors, 0), - VEC_LEN(trust_anchors)); + &VEC_ELT(*anchors, 0), + VEC_LEN(*anchors)); #ifdef VE_ECDSA_SUPPORT br_x509_minimal_set_ecdsa(&mc, &br_ec_prime_i31, &br_ecdsa_i31_vrfy_asn1); @@ -255,10 +337,96 @@ verify_signer_xcs(br_x509_certificate *xcs, pk = xpkeydup(tpk); } } - VEC_CLEAREXT(chain, &free_cert_contents); + VEC_CLEAR(chain); return (pk); } +/* + * Check if digest of one of the certificates from verified chain + * is present in the forbidden database. + * Since UEFI allows to store three types of digests + * all of them have to be checked separately. + */ +static int +check_forbidden_digests(br_x509_certificate *xcs, size_t num) +{ + unsigned char sha256_digest[br_sha256_SIZE]; + unsigned char sha384_digest[br_sha384_SIZE]; + unsigned char sha512_digest[br_sha512_SIZE]; + void *tbs; + hash_data *digest; + br_hash_compat_context ctx; + const br_hash_class *md; + size_t tbs_len, i; + int have_sha256, have_sha384, have_sha512; + + if (VEC_LEN(forbidden_digests) == 0) + return (0); + + /* + * Iterate through certificates, extract their To-Be-Signed section, + * and compare its digest against the ones in the forbidden database. + */ + while (num--) { + tbs = X509_to_tbs(xcs[num].data, &tbs_len); + if (tbs == NULL) { + printf("Failed to obtain TBS part of certificate\n"); + return (1); + } + have_sha256 = have_sha384 = have_sha512 = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < VEC_LEN(forbidden_digests); i++) { + digest = &VEC_ELT(forbidden_digests, i); + switch (digest->hash_size) { + case br_sha256_SIZE: + if (!have_sha256) { + have_sha256 = 1; + md = &br_sha256_vtable; + md->init(&ctx.vtable); + md->update(&ctx.vtable, tbs, tbs_len); + md->out(&ctx.vtable, sha256_digest); + } + if (!memcmp(sha256_digest, + digest->data, + br_sha256_SIZE)) + return (1); + + break; + case br_sha384_SIZE: + if (!have_sha384) { + have_sha384 = 1; + md = &br_sha384_vtable; + md->init(&ctx.vtable); + md->update(&ctx.vtable, tbs, tbs_len); + md->out(&ctx.vtable, sha384_digest); + } + if (!memcmp(sha384_digest, + digest->data, + br_sha384_SIZE)) + return (1); + + break; + case br_sha512_SIZE: + if (!have_sha512) { + have_sha512 = 1; + md = &br_sha512_vtable; + md->init(&ctx.vtable); + md->update(&ctx.vtable, tbs, tbs_len); + md->out(&ctx.vtable, sha512_digest); + } + if (!memcmp(sha512_digest, + digest->data, + br_sha512_SIZE)) + return (1); + + break; + } + } + } + + return (0); +} + static br_x509_pkey * verify_signer(const char *certs, br_name_element *elts, size_t num_elts) @@ -266,15 +434,46 @@ verify_signer(const char *certs, br_x509_certificate *xcs; br_x509_pkey *pk; size_t num; - + + pk = NULL; + ve_trust_init(); xcs = read_certificates(certs, &num); if (xcs == NULL) { ve_error_set("cannot read certificates\n"); return (NULL); } - pk = verify_signer_xcs(xcs, num, elts, num_elts); - xfree(xcs); + + /* + * Check if either + * 1. There is a direct match between cert from forbidden_anchors + * and a cert from chain. + * 2. CA that signed the chain is found in forbidden_anchors. + */ + if (VEC_LEN(forbidden_anchors) > 0) + pk = verify_signer_xcs(xcs, num, elts, num_elts, &forbidden_anchors); + if (pk != NULL) { + ve_error_set("Certificate is on forbidden list\n"); + xfreepkey(pk); + pk = NULL; + goto out; + } + + pk = verify_signer_xcs(xcs, num, elts, num_elts, &trust_anchors); + if (pk == NULL) + goto out; + + /* + * Check if hash of tbs part of any certificate in chain + * is on the forbidden list. + */ + if (check_forbidden_digests(xcs, num)) { + ve_error_set("Certificate hash is on forbidden list\n"); + xfreepkey(pk); + pk = NULL; + } +out: + free_certificates(xcs, num); return (pk); } @@ -679,7 +878,8 @@ ve_self_tests(void) for (u = 0; u < num; u ++) { cn.len = sizeof(cn_buf); - if ((pk = verify_signer_xcs(&xcs[u], 1, &cn, 1)) != NULL) { + if ((pk = verify_signer_xcs(&xcs[u], 1, &cn, 1, &trust_anchors)) != NULL) { + free_cert_contents(&xcs[u]); once++; printf("Testing verify certificate: %s\tPassed\n", cn.status ? cn_buf : ""); diff --git a/share/mk/src.opts.mk b/share/mk/src.opts.mk index 3c3f34b6fb43..9cb83f2ef78f 100644 --- a/share/mk/src.opts.mk +++ b/share/mk/src.opts.mk @@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ __DEFAULT_DEPENDENT_OPTIONS= \ CLANG_FULL/CLANG \ LLVM_TARGET_ALL/CLANG \ LOADER_VERIEXEC/BEARSSL \ + LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT/LOADER_VERIEXEC \ VERIEXEC/BEARSSL \ # MK_*_SUPPORT options which default to "yes" unless their corresponding diff --git a/stand/efi/loader/Makefile b/stand/efi/loader/Makefile index 58c58533ab2e..814bf069796c 100644 --- a/stand/efi/loader/Makefile +++ b/stand/efi/loader/Makefile @@ -81,6 +81,10 @@ HAVE_BCACHE= yes CFLAGS+= -DEFI_STAGING_SIZE=${EFI_STAGING_SIZE} .endif +.if ${MK_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT} != "no" +CFLAGS+= -DEFI_SECUREBOOT +.endif + NEWVERSWHAT= "EFI loader" ${MACHINE} VERSION_FILE= ${.CURDIR}/../loader/version diff --git a/stand/efi/loader/main.c b/stand/efi/loader/main.c index fb6c97ab73de..62a155599ea2 100644 --- a/stand/efi/loader/main.c +++ b/stand/efi/loader/main.c @@ -963,6 +963,17 @@ main(int argc, CHAR16 *argv[]) */ BS->SetWatchdogTimer(0, 0, 0, NULL); + /* + * Initialize the trusted/forbidden certificates from UEFI. + * They will be later used to verify the manifest(s), + * which should contain hashes of verified files. + * This needs to be initialized before any configuration files + * are loaded. + */ +#ifdef EFI_SECUREBOOT + ve_efi_init(); +#endif + /* * Try and find a good currdev based on the image that was booted. * It might be desirable here to have a short pause to allow falling diff --git a/tools/build/options/WITH_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT b/tools/build/options/WITH_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6ba0e310448b --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/build/options/WITH_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +.\" $FreeBSD$ +Enable building +.Xr loader 8 +with support for verification based on certificates obtained from UEFI. +.Pp