Vendor import of OpenSSH 7.5p1.

2017-08-03 10:10:20 +00:00 · 2017-08-03 10:10:20 +00:00 · 343d577115
commit 343d577115
parent 19ca85510b
72 changed files with 2471 additions and 2616 deletions
--- a/3214
+++ b/3214
--- a/3
+++ b/3
@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+1. Prerequisites
 ----------------

 A C compiler.  Any C89 or better compiler should work.  Where supported,
@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ manually using the following commands:

    ssh-keygen -t [type] -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ""

-for each of the types you wish to generate (rsa, dsa or ecdsaa) or
+for each of the types you wish to generate (rsa, dsa or ecdsa) or

    ssh-keygen -A

--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@ -236,6 +236,8 @@ clean:	regressclean
 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
 	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
 	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap
+	rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion
 	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
 	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys
 	rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
@ -262,6 +264,8 @@ distclean:	regressclean
 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
 	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
 	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap
+	rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion
 	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
 	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys
 	rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
@ -426,6 +430,8 @@ regress-prep:
 		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
 	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap ] || \
 		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/conversion ] || \
+		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/conversion
 	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys ] || \
 		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys
 	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex ] || \
@ -503,6 +509,16 @@ regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS} \
 	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
 	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)

+UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/conversion/tests.o
+
+regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT): \
+    ${UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
 UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS=\
 	regress/unittests/kex/tests.o \
 	regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.o
@ -558,13 +574,14 @@ regress-binaries: regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)

-tests interop-tests t-exec: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS)
+tests interop-tests t-exec unit: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS)
 	BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
 	TEST_SSH_SCP="$${BUILDDIR}/scp"; \
 	TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh"; \
--- a/2
+++ b/2
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#7.4p1 for the release notes.
+See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#7.5p1 for the release notes.

 Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html for bug reporting
 instructions and note that we do not use Github for bug reporting or
--- a/auth-pam.c
+++ b/auth-pam.c
@ -830,6 +830,8 @@ fake_password(const char *wire_password)
 		fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);

 	ret = malloc(l + 1);
+	if (ret == NULL)
+		return NULL;
 	for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
 		ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
 	ret[i] = '\0';
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.60 2016/11/30 02:57:40 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.62 2017/01/30 01:03:00 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 *
@ -564,9 +564,12 @@ process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
 {
 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
 	u_long linenum = 0;
-	u_int i;
+	u_int i, found_principal = 0;

 	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
+		/* Always consume entire input */
+		if (found_principal)
+			continue;
 		/* Skip leading whitespace. */
 		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
 			;
@ -599,11 +602,12 @@ process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
 				if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
 				    file, linenum) != 1)
 					continue;
-				return 1;
+				found_principal = 1;
+				continue;
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	return 0;
+	return found_principal;
 }

 static int
@ -727,6 +731,9 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key)

 	ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, cert);

+	fclose(f);
+	f = NULL;
+
 	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command) != 0)
 		goto out;

@ -768,6 +775,9 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
 		char *cp, *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
 		const char *reason = NULL;

+		/* Always consume entrire file */
+		if (found_key)
+			continue;
 		if (found != NULL)
 			key_free(found);
 		found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
@ -854,7 +864,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
 			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
 			free(fp);
 			found_key = 1;
-			break;
+			continue;
 		}
 	}
 	if (found != NULL)
@ -1050,6 +1060,9 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)

 	ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);

+	fclose(f);
+	f = NULL;
+
 	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0)
 		goto out;

--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.136 2016/05/02 08:49:03 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.137 2017/02/03 23:05:57 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 *
@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 static int
 input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
+	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;	/* XXX */
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
 	char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
@ -235,9 +236,10 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
 		if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
 			authctxt->valid = 1;
-			debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user);
+			debug2("%s: setting up authctxt for %s",
+			    __func__, user);
 		} else {
-			logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
+			/* Invalid user, fake password information */
 			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
@ -247,6 +249,8 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		if (options.use_pam)
 			PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
 #endif
+		ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
+		    authctxt->valid ? "authenticating " : "invalid ", user);
 		setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
@ -292,6 +296,7 @@ void
 userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method,
    const char *submethod)
 {
+	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;	/* XXX */
 	char *methods;
 	int partial = 0;

@ -353,6 +358,7 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method,
 		packet_write_wait();
 		/* now we can break out */
 		authctxt->success = 1;
+		ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
 	} else {

 		/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
--- a/channels.c
+++ b/channels.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.356 2016/10/18 17:32:54 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.357 2017/02/01 02:59:09 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -3065,7 +3065,7 @@ channel_input_port_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	}
 	packet_check_eom();
 	c = channel_connect_to_port(host, host_port,
-	    "connected socket", originator_string);
+	    "connected socket", originator_string, NULL, NULL);
 	free(originator_string);
 	free(host);
 	if (c == NULL) {
@ -4026,9 +4026,13 @@ channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx)
 	memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx));
 }

-/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */
+/*
+ * Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path,
+ * passing back the failure reason if appropriate.
+ */
 static Channel *
-connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname)
+connect_to_reason(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname,
+     int *reason, const char **errmsg)
 {
 	struct addrinfo hints;
 	int gaierr;
@ -4069,7 +4073,12 @@ connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname)
 		hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
 		hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
 		snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
-		if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx.aitop)) != 0) {
+		if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx.aitop))
+		    != 0) {
+			if (errmsg != NULL)
+				*errmsg = ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr);
+			if (reason != NULL)
+				*reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED;
 			error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", name,
 			    ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
 			return NULL;
@ -4092,6 +4101,13 @@ connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname)
 	return c;
 }

+/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */
+static Channel *
+connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname)
+{
+	return connect_to_reason(name, port, ctype, rname, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
 /*
 * returns either the newly connected channel or the downstream channel
 * that needs to deal with this connection.
@ -4136,7 +4152,8 @@ channel_connect_by_listen_path(const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname)

 /* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */
 Channel *
-channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname)
+channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype,
+    char *rname, int *reason, const char **errmsg)
 {
 	int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;

@ -4161,9 +4178,11 @@ channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname
 	if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
 		logit("Received request to connect to host %.100s port %d, "
 		    "but the request was denied.", host, port);
+		if (reason != NULL)
+			*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
 		return NULL;
 	}
-	return connect_to(host, port, ctype, rname);
+	return connect_to_reason(host, port, ctype, rname, reason, errmsg);
 }

 /* Check if connecting to that path is permitted and connect. */
@ -4354,6 +4373,33 @@ connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
 	return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
 }

+#ifdef __APPLE__
+static int
+is_path_to_xsocket(const char *display, char *path, size_t pathlen)
+{
+	struct stat sbuf;
+
+	if (strlcpy(path, display, pathlen) >= pathlen) {
+		error("%s: display path too long", __func__);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (display[0] != '/')
+		return 0;
+	if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) {
+		return 1;
+	} else {
+		char *dot = strrchr(path, '.');
+		if (dot != NULL) {
+			*dot = '\0';
+			if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) {
+				return 1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 int
 x11_connect_display(void)
 {
@ -4375,16 +4421,23 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
 	 * connection to the real X server.
 	 */

-	/* Check if the display is from launchd. */
 #ifdef __APPLE__
-	if (strncmp(display, "/tmp/launch", 11) == 0) {
-		sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(display);
+	/* Check if display is a path to a socket (as set by launchd). */
+	{
+		char path[PATH_MAX];
+
+		if (is_path_to_xsocket(display, path, sizeof(path))) {
+			debug("x11_connect_display: $DISPLAY is launchd");
+
+			/* Create a socket. */
+			sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(path);
 			if (sock < 0)
 				return -1;

 			/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
 			return sock;
 		}
+	}
 #endif
 	/*
 	 * Check if it is a unix domain socket.  Unix domain displays are in
--- a/channels.h
+++ b/channels.h
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.120 2016/10/18 17:32:54 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.121 2017/02/01 02:59:09 dtucker Exp $ */

 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -275,7 +275,8 @@ void	 channel_update_permitted_opens(int, int);
 void	 channel_clear_permitted_opens(void);
 void	 channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void);
 void 	 channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void);
-Channel	*channel_connect_to_port(const char *, u_short, char *, char *);
+Channel	*channel_connect_to_port(const char *, u_short, char *, char *, int *,
+	     const char **);
 Channel *channel_connect_to_path(const char *, char *, char *);
 Channel	*channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char*, u_short, int, int);
 Channel	*channel_connect_by_listen_address(const char *, u_short,
--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.289 2016/09/30 09:19:13 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.291 2017/03/10 05:01:13 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ process_cmdline(void)
 			    CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC,
 			    &options.fwd_opts) > 0;
 		if (!ok) {
-			logit("Unkown port forwarding.");
+			logit("Unknown port forwarding.");
 			goto out;
 		}
 		logit("Canceled forwarding.");
@ -2390,6 +2390,26 @@ client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx)
 	hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
 }

+/*
+ * Returns non-zero if the key is accepted by HostkeyAlgorithms.
+ * Made slightly less trivial by the multiple RSA signature algorithm names.
+ */
+static int
+key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	const char *ktype = sshkey_ssh_name(key);
+	const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL ?
+	    options.hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG;
+
+	if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
+		return 0;
+	if (key->type == KEY_RSA &&
+	    (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1 ||
+	    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1))
+		return 1;
+	return match_pattern_list(ktype, hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1;
+}
+
 /*
 * Handle hostkeys-00@openssh.com global request to inform the client of all
 * the server's hostkeys. The keys are checked against the user's
@ -2436,10 +2456,7 @@ client_input_hostkeys(void)
 		    sshkey_type(key), fp);
 		free(fp);

-		/* Check that the key is accepted in HostkeyAlgorithms */
-		if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
-		    options.hostkeyalgorithms ? options.hostkeyalgorithms :
-		    KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, 0) != 1) {
+		if (!key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(key)) {
 			debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms",
 			    __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
 			continue;
--- a/compat.c
+++ b/compat.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.99 2016/05/24 02:31:57 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.100 2017/02/03 23:01:19 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 *
@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "match.h"
+#include "kex.h"

 int compat13 = 0;
 int compat20 = 0;
@ -250,42 +251,14 @@ proto_spec(const char *spec)
 	return ret;
 }

-/*
- * Filters a proposal string, excluding any algorithm matching the 'filter'
- * pattern list.
- */
-static char *
-filter_proposal(char *proposal, const char *filter)
-{
-	Buffer b;
-	char *orig_prop, *fix_prop;
-	char *cp, *tmp;
-
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	tmp = orig_prop = xstrdup(proposal);
-	while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) {
-		if (match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0) != 1) {
-			if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
-				buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
-			buffer_append(&b, cp, strlen(cp));
-		} else
-			debug2("Compat: skipping algorithm \"%s\"", cp);
-	}
-	buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
-	fix_prop = xstrdup((char *)buffer_ptr(&b));
-	buffer_free(&b);
-	free(orig_prop);
-
-	return fix_prop;
-}
-
 char *
 compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop)
 {
 	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES))
 		return cipher_prop;
 	debug2("%s: original cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
-	cipher_prop = filter_proposal(cipher_prop, "aes*");
+	if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_list(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL)
+		fatal("match_filter_list failed");
 	debug2("%s: compat cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
 	if (*cipher_prop == '\0')
 		fatal("No supported ciphers found");
@ -298,7 +271,8 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop)
 	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5))
 		return pkalg_prop;
 	debug2("%s: original public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
-	pkalg_prop = filter_proposal(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa");
+	if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_list(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL)
+		fatal("match_filter_list failed");
 	debug2("%s: compat public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
 	if (*pkalg_prop == '\0')
 		fatal("No supported PK algorithms found");
@ -312,10 +286,14 @@ compat_kex_proposal(char *p)
 		return p;
 	debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p);
 	if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
-		p = filter_proposal(p, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org");
+		if ((p = match_filter_list(p,
+		    "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
+			fatal("match_filter_list failed");
 	if ((datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
-		p = filter_proposal(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256");
-		p = filter_proposal(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1");
+		if ((p = match_filter_list(p,
+		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
+		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
+			fatal("match_filter_list failed");
 	}
 	debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p);
 	if (*p == '\0')
--- a/config.h.in
+++ b/config.h.in
@ -736,6 +736,9 @@
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/seccomp.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_LINUX_SECCOMP_H

+/* Define to 1 if you have the `llabs' function. */
+#undef HAVE_LLABS
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <locale.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_LOCALE_H

--- a/133
+++ b/133
@ -647,6 +647,7 @@ COMMENT_OUT_ECC
 TEST_SSH_ECC
 LIBEDIT
 PKGCONFIG
+LDNSCONFIG
 COMMENT_OUT_RSA1
 LD
 PATH_PASSWD_PROG
@ -7593,6 +7594,7 @@ $as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
 	use_pie=auto
 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
 	check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE"

 $as_echo "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h

@ -9958,19 +9960,128 @@ LDNS_MSG="no"
 # Check whether --with-ldns was given.
 if test "${with_ldns+set}" = set; then :
  withval=$with_ldns;
-        if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+	ldns=""
+	if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+		if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
+  # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}ldns-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}ldns-config; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG+:} false; then :
+  $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+  case $LDNSCONFIG in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG="$LDNSCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS

-			if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
-				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
-				LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+LDNSCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG
+if test -n "$LDNSCONFIG"; then
+  { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $LDNSCONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$LDNSCONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+  { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
 fi


+fi
+if test -z "$ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG"; then
+  ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG=$LDNSCONFIG
+  # Extract the first word of "ldns-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ldns-config; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG+:} false; then :
+  $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+  case $ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG="$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG
+if test -n "$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG"; then
+  { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+  { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+  if test "x$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" = x; then
+    LDNSCONFIG="no"
+  else
+    case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
+yes:)
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
+$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
+ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
+esac
+    LDNSCONFIG=$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG
+  fi
+else
+  LDNSCONFIG="$ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG"
+fi
+
+		if test "x$PKGCONFIG" = "xno"; then
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+			LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
+			LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
+			ldns=yes
+		else
+			LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`"
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`"
+		fi
+	elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+			LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
+			LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
+			ldns=yes
+	fi
+
+	# Verify that it works.
+	if test "x$ldns" = "xyes" ; then
+
 $as_echo "#define HAVE_LDNS 1" >>confdefs.h

-            LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
 		LDNS_MSG="yes"
-
 		{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ldns support" >&5
 $as_echo_n "checking for ldns support... " >&6; }
 		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
@ -9998,7 +10109,6 @@ rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
 	fi

-
 fi


@ -10558,6 +10668,7 @@ for ac_func in  \
 	inet_ntoa \
 	inet_ntop \
 	innetgr \
+	llabs \
 	login_getcapbool \
 	md5_crypt \
 	memmove \
@ -10637,8 +10748,6 @@ fi
 done


-saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
-CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE"
 for ac_func in mblen mbtowc nl_langinfo wcwidth
 do :
  as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
@ -10651,7 +10760,6 @@ _ACEOF
 fi
 done

-CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"

 TEST_SSH_UTF8=${TEST_SSH_UTF8:=yes}
 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for utf8 locale support" >&5
@ -12373,8 +12481,8 @@ if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
 			ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver`
 			# Check version is supported.
 			case "$ssl_library_ver" in
-				0090[0-7]*|009080[0-5]*)
-					as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f required (have \"$ssl_library_ver\")" "$LINENO" 5
+				10000*|0*)
+					as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have \"$ssl_library_ver\")" "$LINENO" 5
 			                ;;
 			        *) ;;
 			esac
@ -20282,6 +20390,7 @@ echo "                 Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
 echo "                     S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
 echo "              MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
 echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+echo "                   libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
 echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
 echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
 echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@ -740,6 +740,9 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
 	use_pie=auto
 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
 	check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
+	dnl Target SUSv3/POSIX.1-2001 plus BSD specifics.
+	dnl _DEFAULT_SOURCE is the new name for _BSD_SOURCE
+	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE"
 	AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1],
 		[Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY])
 	AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"],
@ -1472,17 +1475,29 @@ LDNS_MSG="no"
 AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
 	[  --with-ldns[[=PATH]]      Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)],
 	[
-        if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-
-			if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
+	ldns=""
+	if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+		AC_PATH_TOOL([LDNSCONFIG], [ldns-config], [no])
+		if test "x$PKGCONFIG" = "xno"; then
 			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
 			LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
+			LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
+			ldns=yes
+		else
+			LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`"
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`"
+		fi
+	elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+			LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
+			LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
+			ldns=yes
 	fi

+	# Verify that it works.
+	if test "x$ldns" = "xyes" ; then
 		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support])
-            LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
 		LDNS_MSG="yes"
-
 		AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support])
 		AC_LINK_IFELSE(
 			[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
@ -1499,8 +1514,7 @@ int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); s
 					AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries.])
 				])
 	fi
-    ]
-)
+])

 # Check whether user wants libedit support
 LIBEDIT_MSG="no"
@ -1703,6 +1717,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
 	inet_ntoa \
 	inet_ntop \
 	innetgr \
+	llabs \
 	login_getcapbool \
 	md5_crypt \
 	memmove \
@ -1771,11 +1786,8 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
 	warn \
 ])

-dnl Wide character support.  Linux man page says it needs _XOPEN_SOURCE.
-saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
-CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE"
+dnl Wide character support.
 AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mblen mbtowc nl_langinfo wcwidth])
-CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"

 TEST_SSH_UTF8=${TEST_SSH_UTF8:=yes}
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([for utf8 locale support])
@ -2520,8 +2532,8 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
 			ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver`
 			# Check version is supported.
 			case "$ssl_library_ver" in
-				0090[[0-7]]*|009080[[0-5]]*)
-					AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f required (have "$ssl_library_ver")])
+				10000*|0*)
+					AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have "$ssl_library_ver")])
 			                ;;
 			        *) ;;
 			esac
@ -5083,6 +5095,7 @@ echo "                 Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
 echo "                     S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
 echo "              MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
 echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+echo "                   libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
 echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
 echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
 echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
--- a/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config
+++ b/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config
@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ sshd_config_configured=no
 port_number=22
 service_name=sshd
 strictmodes=yes
-privsep_used=yes
 cygwin_value=""
 user_account=
 password_value=
@ -140,33 +139,21 @@ sshd_strictmodes() {

 # ======================================================================
 # Routine: sshd_privsep
-#  MODIFIES: privsep_used
+# Try to create ssshd user account
 # ======================================================================
 sshd_privsep() {
  local ret=0

  if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
  then
-    echo
-    csih_inform "Privilege separation is set to 'sandbox' by default since"
-    csih_inform "OpenSSH 6.1.  This is unsupported by Cygwin and has to be set"
-    csih_inform "to 'yes' or 'no'."
-    csih_inform "However, using privilege separation requires a non-privileged account"
-    csih_inform "called 'sshd'."
-    csih_inform "For more info on privilege separation read /usr/share/doc/openssh/README.privsep."
-    if csih_request "Should privilege separation be used?"
-    then
-      privsep_used=yes
    if ! csih_create_unprivileged_user sshd
    then
-	csih_error_recoverable "Couldn't create user 'sshd'!"
-	csih_error_recoverable "Privilege separation set to 'no' again!"
-	csih_error_recoverable "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
+      csih_error_recoverable "Could not create user 'sshd'!"
+      csih_error_recoverable "You will not be able to run an sshd service"
+      csih_error_recoverable "under a privileged account successfully."
+      csih_error_recoverable "Make sure to create a non-privileged user 'sshd'"
+      csih_error_recoverable "manually before trying to run the service!"
      let ++ret
-	privsep_used=no
-      fi
-    else
-      privsep_used=no
    fi
  fi
  return $ret
@ -202,18 +189,6 @@ sshd_config_tweak() {
      let ++ret
    fi
  fi
-  if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
-  then
-    /usr/bin/sed -i -e "
-      s/^#\?UsePrivilegeSeparation .*/UsePrivilegeSeparation ${privsep_used}/" \
-      ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
-    if [ $? -ne 0 ]
-    then
-      csih_warning "Setting privilege separation failed!"
-      csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
-      let ++ret
-    fi
-  fi
  return $ret
 } # --- End of sshd_config_tweak --- #

@ -693,7 +668,7 @@ then
  fi
 fi

-# handle sshd_config (and privsep)
+# handle sshd_config
 csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt
 if ! /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" >/dev/null 2>&1
 then
--- a/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
+++ b/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-%define ver 7.4p1
+%define ver 7.5p1
 %define rel 1

 # OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
--- a/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
+++ b/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@

 Summary:	OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
 Name:		openssh
-Version:	7.4p1
+Version:	7.5p1
 URL:		https://www.openssh.com/
 Release:	1
 Source0:	openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
--- a/digest-openssl.c
+++ b/digest-openssl.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.5 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.6 2017/03/10 02:59:51 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
 *
@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
 	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
 	u_int l = dlen;

-	if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
+	if (digest == NULL || dlen > UINT_MAX)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--- a/hostfile.c
+++ b/hostfile.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.67 2016/09/17 18:00:27 tedu Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.68 2017/03/10 04:26:06 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -419,19 +419,24 @@ write_host_entry(FILE *f, const char *host, const char *ip,
    const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
 {
 	int r, success = 0;
-	char *hashed_host = NULL;
+	char *hashed_host = NULL, *lhost;
+
+	lhost = xstrdup(host);
+	lowercase(lhost);

 	if (store_hash) {
-		if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
+		if ((hashed_host = host_hash(lhost, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
 			error("%s: host_hash failed", __func__);
+			free(lhost);
 			return 0;
 		}
 		fprintf(f, "%s ", hashed_host);
 	} else if (ip != NULL)
-		fprintf(f, "%s,%s ", host, ip);
-	else
-		fprintf(f, "%s ", host);
-
+		fprintf(f, "%s,%s ", lhost, ip);
+	else {
+		fprintf(f, "%s ", lhost);
+	}
+	free(lhost);
 	if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) == 0)
 		success = 1;
 	else
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.127 2016/10/10 19:28:48 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.131 2017/03/15 07:07:39 markus Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 *
@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
 char *
 kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
 {
-	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
+	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
 	size_t len;

 	if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
@ -195,8 +195,10 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
 	}
 	strlcpy(ret, a, len);
 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
-		if (match_list(ret, p, NULL) != NULL)
+		if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
+			free(m);
 			continue; /* Algorithm already present */
+		}
 		if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
 		    strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
 			free(tmp);
@ -211,7 +213,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
 /*
 * Assemble a list of algorithms from a default list and a string from a
 * configuration file. The user-provided string may begin with '+' to
- * indicate that it should be appended to the default.
+ * indicate that it should be appended to the default or '-' that the
+ * specified names should be removed.
 */
 int
 kex_assemble_names(const char *def, char **list)
@ -222,14 +225,18 @@ kex_assemble_names(const char *def, char **list)
 		*list = strdup(def);
 		return 0;
 	}
-	if (**list != '+') {
-		return 0;
-	}
-
+	if (**list == '+') {
 		if ((ret = kex_names_cat(def, *list + 1)) == NULL)
 			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		free(*list);
 		*list = ret;
+	} else if (**list == '-') {
+		if ((ret = match_filter_list(def, *list + 1)) == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		free(*list);
+		*list = ret;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }

@ -334,7 +341,6 @@ kex_reset_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
 	ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN,
 	    SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error);
-	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
 }

 static int
@ -343,7 +349,7 @@ kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh)
 	int r;
 	char *algs;

-	if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, ',')) == NULL)
+	if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||
@ -424,6 +430,7 @@ kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)

 	debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
 		return r;
 	if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0)
@ -538,6 +545,7 @@ kex_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX], struct kex **kexp)
 		goto out;
 	kex->done = 0;
 	kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
 	r = 0;
 	*kexp = kex;
 out:
@ -646,8 +654,10 @@ choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server)

 	if (name == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH;
-	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
+	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) {
+		free(name);
 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
 	enc->name = name;
 	enc->enabled = 0;
 	enc->iv = NULL;
@ -665,8 +675,10 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server)

 	if (name == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH;
-	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
+	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) {
+		free(name);
 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
 	/* truncate the key */
 	if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HMAC)
 		mac->key_len = 16;
@ -690,6 +702,7 @@ choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
 	} else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
 		comp->type = COMP_NONE;
 	} else {
+		free(name);
 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	}
 	comp->name = name;
--- a/krl.c
+++ b/krl.c
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 */

-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.38 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.39 2017/03/10 07:18:32 dtucker Exp $ */

 #include "includes.h"

@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
 			break;
 		case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
 			/* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */
-			sshbuf_reset(sect);
+			sshbuf_free(sect);
 			sect = NULL;
 			if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0)
 				goto out;
@ -1288,6 +1288,7 @@ ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key)
 	debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path);
 	r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key);
 out:
+	if (fd != -1)
 		close(fd);
 	sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
 	ssh_krl_free(krl);
--- a/log.c
+++ b/log.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.48 2016/07/15 05:01:58 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.49 2017/03/10 03:15:58 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -453,7 +453,8 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args)
 		tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx);
 		log_handler = tmp_handler;
 	} else if (log_on_stderr) {
-		snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%s\r\n", fmtbuf);
+		snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%.*s\r\n",
+		    (int)sizeof msgbuf - 3, fmtbuf);
 		(void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf));
 	} else {
 #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
--- a/match.c
+++ b/match.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.33 2016/11/06 05:46:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.37 2017/03/10 04:24:55 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -42,9 +42,11 @@
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>

 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "match.h"
+#include "misc.h"

 /*
 * Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
@ -145,7 +147,7 @@ match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, int dolower)
 		if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1)
 			return 0;

-		/* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, skip the comma. */
+		/* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, then skip it. */
 		if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',')
 			i++;

@ -177,7 +179,13 @@ match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, int dolower)
 int
 match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern)
 {
-	return match_pattern_list(host, pattern, 1);
+	char *hostcopy = xstrdup(host);
+	int r;
+
+	lowercase(hostcopy);
+	r = match_pattern_list(hostcopy, pattern, 1);
+	free(hostcopy);
+	return r;
 }

 /*
@ -284,3 +292,35 @@ match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next)
 	free(s);
 	return NULL;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Filters a comma-separated list of strings, excluding any entry matching
+ * the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+char *
+match_filter_list(const char *proposal, const char *filter)
+{
+	size_t len = strlen(proposal) + 1;
+	char *fix_prop = malloc(len);
+	char *orig_prop = strdup(proposal);
+	char *cp, *tmp;
+
+	if (fix_prop == NULL || orig_prop == NULL) {
+		free(orig_prop);
+		free(fix_prop);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	tmp = orig_prop;
+	*fix_prop = '\0';
+	while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) {
+		if (match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0) != 1) {
+			if (*fix_prop != '\0')
+				strlcat(fix_prop, ",", len);
+			strlcat(fix_prop, cp, len);
+		}
+	}
+	free(orig_prop);
+	return fix_prop;
+}
+
--- a/match.h
+++ b/match.h
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.16 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.17 2017/02/03 23:01:19 djm Exp $ */

 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ int	 match_hostname(const char *, const char *);
 int	 match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *);
 int	 match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
 char	*match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *);
+char	*match_filter_list(const char *, const char *);

 /* addrmatch.c */
 int	 addr_match_list(const char *, const char *);
--- a/misc.c
+++ b/misc.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.107 2016/11/30 00:28:31 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.109 2017/03/14 00:55:37 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ a2tun(const char *s, int *remote)
 long
 convtime(const char *s)
 {
-	long total, secs;
+	long total, secs, multiplier = 1;
 	const char *p;
 	char *endp;

@ -333,23 +333,28 @@ convtime(const char *s)
 			break;
 		case 'm':
 		case 'M':
-			secs *= MINUTES;
+			multiplier = MINUTES;
 			break;
 		case 'h':
 		case 'H':
-			secs *= HOURS;
+			multiplier = HOURS;
 			break;
 		case 'd':
 		case 'D':
-			secs *= DAYS;
+			multiplier = DAYS;
 			break;
 		case 'w':
 		case 'W':
-			secs *= WEEKS;
+			multiplier = WEEKS;
 			break;
 		default:
 			return -1;
 		}
+		if (secs >= LONG_MAX / multiplier)
+			return -1;
+		secs *= multiplier;
+		if  (total >= LONG_MAX - secs)
+			return -1;
 		total += secs;
 		if (total < 0)
 			return -1;
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.166 2016/09/28 16:33:06 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.167 2017/02/03 23:05:57 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
 * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@ -283,6 +283,7 @@ monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
 void
 monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 {
+	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;	/* XXX */
 	struct mon_table *ent;
 	int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;

@ -356,6 +357,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)

 	debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
 	    __func__, authctxt->user);
+	ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);

 	mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);

@ -695,6 +697,7 @@ mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
 int
 mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
 {
+	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;	/* XXX */
 	char *username;
 	struct passwd *pwent;
 	int allowed = 0;
@ -739,6 +742,8 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);

 out:
+	ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
+	    authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user);
 	buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));

 #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
--- a/mux.c
+++ b/mux.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.63 2016/10/19 23:21:56 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.64 2017/01/21 11:32:04 guenther Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
 *
@ -2161,7 +2161,6 @@ int
 muxclient(const char *path)
 {
 	struct sockaddr_un addr;
-	socklen_t sun_len;
 	int sock;
 	u_int pid;

@ -2185,8 +2184,6 @@ muxclient(const char *path)

 	memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
 	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
-	sun_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
-	    strlen(path) + 1;

 	if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path,
 	    sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
@ -2196,7 +2193,7 @@ muxclient(const char *path)
 	if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
 		fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));

-	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sun_len) == -1) {
+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1) {
 		switch (muxclient_command) {
 		case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
 		case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD:
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
@ -301,3 +301,11 @@ mbtowc(wchar_t *pwc, const char *s, size_t n)
 	return 1;
 }
 #endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_LLABS
+long long
+llabs(long long j)
+{
+	return (j < 0 ? -j : j);
+}
+#endif
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
@ -135,4 +135,8 @@ void errx(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
 void warn(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
 #endif

+#ifndef HAVE_LLABS
+long long llabs(long long);
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */
--- a/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: fmt_scaled.c,v 1.9 2007/03/20 03:42:52 tedu Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: fmt_scaled.c,v 1.13 2017/03/11 23:37:23 djm Exp $	*/

 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003 Ian F. Darwin.  All rights reserved.
@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static long long scale_factors[] = {

 #define MAX_DIGITS (SCALE_LENGTH * 3)	/* XXX strlen(sprintf("%lld", -1)? */

-/** Convert the given input string "scaled" into numeric in "result".
+/* Convert the given input string "scaled" into numeric in "result".
 * Return 0 on success, -1 and errno set on error.
 */
 int
@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
 	long long scale_fact = 1, whole = 0, fpart = 0;

 	/* Skip leading whitespace */
-	while (isascii(*p) && isspace(*p))
+	while (isascii((unsigned char)*p) && isspace((unsigned char)*p))
 		++p;

 	/* Then at most one leading + or - */
@ -108,7 +108,8 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
 	 * (but note that E for Exa might look like e to some!).
 	 * Advance 'p' to end, to get scale factor.
 	 */
-	for (; isascii(*p) && (isdigit(*p) || *p=='.'); ++p) {
+	for (; isascii((unsigned char)*p) &&
+	    (isdigit((unsigned char)*p) || *p=='.'); ++p) {
 		if (*p == '.') {
 			if (fract_digits > 0) {	/* oops, more than one '.' */
 				errno = EINVAL;
@ -124,6 +125,10 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
 				/* ignore extra fractional digits */
 				continue;
 			fract_digits++;		/* for later scaling */
+			if (fpart >= LLONG_MAX / 10) {
+				errno = ERANGE;
+				return -1;
+			}
 			fpart *= 10;
 			fpart += i;
 		} else {				/* normal digit */
@ -131,6 +136,10 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
 				errno = ERANGE;
 				return -1;
 			}
+			if (whole >= LLONG_MAX / 10) {
+				errno = ERANGE;
+				return -1;
+			}
 			whole *= 10;
 			whole += i;
 		}
@ -150,17 +159,22 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
 	/* Validate scale factor, and scale whole and fraction by it. */
 	for (i = 0; i < SCALE_LENGTH; i++) {

-		/** Are we there yet? */
+		/* Are we there yet? */
 		if (*p == scale_chars[i] ||
-			*p == tolower(scale_chars[i])) {
+			*p == tolower((unsigned char)scale_chars[i])) {

 			/* If it ends with alphanumerics after the scale char, bad. */
-			if (isalnum(*(p+1))) {
+			if (isalnum((unsigned char)*(p+1))) {
 				errno = EINVAL;
 				return -1;
 			}
 			scale_fact = scale_factors[i];

+			if (whole >= LLONG_MAX / scale_fact) {
+				errno = ERANGE;
+				return -1;
+			}
+
 			/* scale whole part */
 			whole *= scale_fact;

@ -181,7 +195,9 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
 			return 0;
 		}
 	}
-	errno = ERANGE;
+
+	/* Invalid unit or character */
+	errno = EINVAL;
 	return -1;
 }

@ -196,7 +212,7 @@ fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result)
 	unsigned int i;
 	unit_type unit = NONE;

-	abval = (number < 0LL) ? -number : number;	/* no long long_abs yet */
+	abval = llabs(number);

 	/* Not every negative long long has a positive representation.
 	 * Also check for numbers that are just too darned big to format
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.243 2016/10/11 21:47:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.247 2017/03/11 13:07:35 markus Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -352,6 +352,25 @@ ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
 	return ssh->state->mux;
 }

+int
+ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+	int r;
+
+	free(ssh->log_preamble);
+	if (fmt == NULL)
+		ssh->log_preamble = NULL;
+	else {
+		va_start(args, fmt);
+		r = vasprintf(&ssh->log_preamble, fmt, args);
+		va_end(args);
+		if (r < 0 || ssh->log_preamble == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int
 ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
@ -1049,7 +1068,7 @@ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)

 	/* Time-based rekeying */
 	if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
-	    state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
+	    (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
 		return 1;

 	/* Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction */
@ -1447,8 +1466,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 				break;
 			}
 		}
-		if (r == 0)
-			return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
+		if (r == 0) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		/* Read data from the socket. */
 		len = read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
 		if (len == 0) {
@ -1829,11 +1850,11 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 			if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
 				goto out;
 			logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
-			if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
+			if (need + block_size > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
 				return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 			return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
 			    sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
-			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need);
+			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need - block_size);
 		}
 		/* Remove MAC from input buffer */
 		DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr));
@ -2074,27 +2095,36 @@ ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
 		fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 }

+static void
+fmt_connection_id(struct ssh *ssh, char *s, size_t l)
+{
+	snprintf(s, l, "%.200s%s%s port %d",
+	    ssh->log_preamble ? ssh->log_preamble : "",
+	    ssh->log_preamble ? " " : "",
+	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+}
+
 /*
 * Pretty-print connection-terminating errors and exit.
 */
 void
 sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r)
 {
+	char remote_id[512];
+
+	fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
+
 	switch (r) {
 	case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
-		logdie("Connection closed by %.200s port %d",
-		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+		logdie("Connection closed by %s", remote_id);
 	case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
-		logdie("Connection %s %.200s port %d timed out",
-		    ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to",
-		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+		logdie("Connection %s %s timed out",
+		    ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id);
 	case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
-		logdie("Disconnected from %.200s port %d",
-		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+		logdie("Disconnected from %s", remote_id);
 	case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
 		if (errno == ECONNRESET)
-			logdie("Connection reset by %.200s port %d",
-			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+			logdie("Connection reset by %s", remote_id);
 		/* FALLTHROUGH */
 	case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH:
 	case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH:
@ -2102,17 +2132,16 @@ sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r)
 	case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH:
 	case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH:
 		if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) {
-			logdie("Unable to negotiate with %.200s port %d: %s. "
-			    "Their offer: %s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
-			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_err(r),
+			logdie("Unable to negotiate with %s: %s. "
+			    "Their offer: %s", remote_id, ssh_err(r),
 			    ssh->kex->failed_choice);
 		}
 		/* FALLTHROUGH */
 	default:
-		logdie("%s%sConnection %s %.200s port %d: %s",
+		logdie("%s%sConnection %s %s: %s",
 		    tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "",
 		    ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to",
-		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_err(r));
+		    remote_id, ssh_err(r));
 	}
 }

@ -2125,7 +2154,7 @@ sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r)
 void
 ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
 {
-	char buf[1024];
+	char buf[1024], remote_id[512];
 	va_list args;
 	static int disconnecting = 0;
 	int r;
@ -2138,12 +2167,13 @@ ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
 	 * Format the message.  Note that the caller must make sure the
 	 * message is of limited size.
 	 */
+	fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
 	va_start(args, fmt);
 	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
 	va_end(args);

 	/* Display the error locally */
-	logit("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf);
+	logit("Disconnecting %s: %.100s", remote_id, buf);

 	/*
 	 * Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait
@ -2396,10 +2426,10 @@ ssh_packet_send_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, int nbytes)
 }

 void
-ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, time_t seconds)
+ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, u_int32_t seconds)
 {
-	debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %d seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes,
-	    (int)seconds);
+	debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %u seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes,
+	    (unsigned int)seconds);
 	ssh->state->rekey_limit = bytes;
 	ssh->state->rekey_interval = seconds;
 }
--- a/packet.h
+++ b/packet.h
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.74 2016/10/11 21:47:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.76 2017/02/03 23:03:33 djm Exp $ */

 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ struct ssh {
 	char *local_ipaddr;
 	int local_port;

+	/* Optional preamble for log messages (e.g. username) */
+	char *log_preamble;
+
 	/* Dispatcher table */
 	dispatch_fn *dispatch[DISPATCH_MAX];
 	/* number of packets to ignore in the dispatcher */
@ -104,6 +107,8 @@ void     ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *);
 void     ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *);
 void     ssh_packet_set_mux(struct ssh *);
 int	 ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *);
+int	 ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *, const char *, ...)
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));

 int	 ssh_packet_log_type(u_char);

@ -154,7 +159,7 @@ int	 ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *);
 const char *ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *);
 int	 ssh_local_port(struct ssh *);

-void	 ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *, u_int64_t, time_t);
+void	 ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *, u_int64_t, u_int32_t);
 time_t	 ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *);

 void	*ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *);
--- a/pathnames.h
+++ b/pathnames.h
@ -166,15 +166,6 @@
 #define _PATH_LS			"ls"
 #endif

-/* path to login program */
-#ifndef LOGIN_PROGRAM
-# ifdef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
-#  define LOGIN_PROGRAM         LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
-# else
-#  define LOGIN_PROGRAM         "/usr/bin/login"
-# endif
-#endif /* LOGIN_PROGRAM */
-
 /* Askpass program define */
 #ifndef ASKPASS_PROGRAM
 #define ASKPASS_PROGRAM         "/usr/lib/ssh/ssh-askpass"
--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.262 2016/10/25 04:08:13 jsg Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.270 2017/03/10 04:27:32 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -93,7 +93,7 @@

   Host books.com
     RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999
-     Cipher 3des
+     Ciphers 3des-cbc

   Host fascist.blob.com
     Port 23123
@ -108,7 +108,7 @@
     PublicKeyAuthentication no

   Host *.su
-     Cipher none
+     Ciphers aes128-ctr
     PasswordAuthentication no

   Host vpn.fake.com
@ -180,6 +180,44 @@ static struct {
 	const char *name;
 	OpCodes opcode;
 } keywords[] = {
+	/* Deprecated options */
+	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+	{ "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
+	{ "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
+	{ "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
+	{ "useroaming", oDeprecated },
+	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
+
+	/* Unsupported options */
+	{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
+	{ "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported },
+	{ "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported },
+
+	/* Sometimes-unsupported options */
+#if defined(GSSAPI)
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
+# else
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
+#endif
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	{ "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
+	{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
+# else
+	{ "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported },
+	{ "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported },
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+	{ "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication },
+	{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", oRhostsRSAAuthentication },
+	{ "compressionlevel", oCompressionLevel },
+# else
+	{ "rsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
+	{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
+	{ "compressionlevel", oUnsupported },
+#endif
+
 	{ "forwardagent", oForwardAgent },
 	{ "forwardx11", oForwardX11 },
 	{ "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted },
@ -188,30 +226,15 @@ static struct {
 	{ "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation },
 	{ "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts },
 	{ "useprivilegedport", oUsePrivilegedPort },
-	{ "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
 	{ "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication },
 	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
 	{ "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices },
-	{ "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication },
 	{ "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },
 	{ "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },		    /* alias */
-	{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", oRhostsRSAAuthentication },
 	{ "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication },
 	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },
 	{ "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
 	{ "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },  /* alias */
-	{ "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported },
-	{ "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported },
-	{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
-#if defined(GSSAPI)
-	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
-	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
-#else
-	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
-	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
-#endif
-	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
-	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
 	{ "identityfile", oIdentityFile },
 	{ "identityfile2", oIdentityFile },			/* obsolete */
 	{ "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly },
@ -233,15 +256,12 @@ static struct {
 	{ "match", oMatch },
 	{ "escapechar", oEscapeChar },
 	{ "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile },
-	{ "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
 	{ "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile },
-	{ "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
 	{ "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts },
 	{ "batchmode", oBatchMode },
 	{ "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP },
 	{ "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking },
 	{ "compression", oCompression },
-	{ "compressionlevel", oCompressionLevel },
 	{ "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive },
 	{ "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive },				/* obsolete */
 	{ "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts },
@ -250,13 +270,6 @@ static struct {
 	{ "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications },
 	{ "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms },
 	{ "bindaddress", oBindAddress },
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-	{ "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
-	{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
-#else
-	{ "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported },
-	{ "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported },
-#endif
 	{ "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings },
 	{ "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign },
 	{ "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS },
@ -277,7 +290,6 @@ static struct {
 	{ "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
 	{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
 	{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
-	{ "useroaming", oDeprecated },
 	{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
 	{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
 	{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
@ -830,11 +842,11 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 		activep = &cmdline;
 	}

-	/* Strip trailing whitespace */
+	/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
 	if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
 		return 0;
 	for (len--; len > 0; len--) {
-		if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL)
+		if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL)
 			break;
 		line[len] = '\0';
 	}
@ -1182,7 +1194,7 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 		arg = strdelim(&s);
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
-		if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+		if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
 			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
 		if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL)
@ -1193,7 +1205,7 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 		arg = strdelim(&s);
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
-		if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+		if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 Mac spec '%s'.",
 			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
 		if (*activep && options->macs == NULL)
@ -1205,7 +1217,8 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
 			    filename, linenum);
-		if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+		if (*arg != '-' &&
+		    !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
 			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
 		if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
@ -1219,7 +1232,8 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
 			    filename, linenum);
-		if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
+		if (*arg != '-' &&
+		    !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
 				filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
@ -1486,6 +1500,7 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 			if (r == GLOB_NOMATCH) {
 				debug("%.200s line %d: include %s matched no "
 				    "files",filename, linenum, arg2);
+				free(arg2);
 				continue;
 			} else if (r != 0 || gl.gl_pathc < 0)
 				fatal("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
@ -1502,6 +1517,11 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 				    flags | SSHCONF_CHECKPERM |
 				    (oactive ? 0 : SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH),
 				    activep, depth + 1);
+				if (r != 1 && errno != ENOENT) {
+					fatal("Can't open user config file "
+					    "%.100s: %.100s", gl.gl_pathv[i],
+					    strerror(errno));
+				}
 				/*
 				 * don't let Match in includes clobber the
 				 * containing file's Match state.
@ -1700,7 +1720,7 @@ read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
    int flags, int *activep, int depth)
 {
 	FILE *f;
-	char line[1024];
+	char line[4096];
 	int linenum;
 	int bad_options = 0;

@ -1730,6 +1750,8 @@ read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
 	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
 		/* Update line number counter. */
 		linenum++;
+		if (strlen(line) == sizeof(line) - 1)
+			fatal("%s line %d too long", filename, linenum);
 		if (process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host,
 		    line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, depth) != 0)
 			bad_options++;
@ -2446,10 +2468,10 @@ dump_cfg_forwards(OpCodes code, u_int count, const struct Forward *fwds)
 	/* oDynamicForward */
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 		fwd = &fwds[i];
-		if (code == oDynamicForward &&
+		if (code == oDynamicForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
 		    strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") != 0)
 			continue;
-		if (code == oLocalForward &&
+		if (code == oLocalForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
 		    strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") == 0)
 			continue;
 		printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
@ -2522,8 +2544,10 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oProxyUseFdpass, o->proxy_use_fdpass);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oRequestTTY, o->request_tty);
+#ifdef WITH_RSA1
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oRhostsRSAAuthentication, o->rhosts_rsa_authentication);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oRSAAuthentication, o->rsa_authentication);
+#endif
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oStrictHostKeyChecking, o->strict_host_key_checking);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive);
@ -2535,7 +2559,9 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)

 	/* Integer options */
 	dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots);
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
 	dump_cfg_int(oCompressionLevel, o->compression_level);
+#endif
 	dump_cfg_int(oConnectionAttempts, o->connection_attempts);
 	dump_cfg_int(oForwardX11Timeout, o->forward_x11_timeout);
 	dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts);
@ -2555,7 +2581,9 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
 	dump_cfg_string(oLocalCommand, o->local_command);
 	dump_cfg_string(oLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
 	dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_CLIENT_MAC);
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
 	dump_cfg_string(oPKCS11Provider, o->pkcs11_provider);
+#endif
 	dump_cfg_string(oPreferredAuthentications, o->preferred_authentications);
 	dump_cfg_string(oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types);
 	dump_cfg_string(oRevokedHostKeys, o->revoked_host_keys);
--- a/regress/Makefile
+++ b/regress/Makefile
@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ unit:
 		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \
 			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \
 		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap ; \
+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/conversion/test_conversion ; \
 		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/kex/test_kex ; \
 		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys \
 			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/testdata ; \
--- a/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
+++ b/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.7 2016/09/26 21:34:38 bluhm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.8 2017/01/06 02:51:16 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.

 tid="disallow agent attach from other uid"
@ -32,17 +32,17 @@ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
 else
 	chmod 644 ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}

-	ssh-add -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+	${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
 	r=$?
 	if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then
 		fail "ssh-add failed with $r != 1"
 	fi
 	if test -z "$sudo" ; then
 		# doas
-		${SUDO} -n -u ${UNPRIV} ssh-add -l 2>/dev/null
+		${SUDO} -n -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null
 	else
 		# sudo
-		< /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ssh-add -l 2>/dev/null
+		< /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null
 	fi
 	r=$?
 	if [ $r -lt 2 ]; then
--- a/regress/allow-deny-users.sh
+++ b/regress/allow-deny-users.sh
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 tid="AllowUsers/DenyUsers"

 me="$LOGNAME"
-if [ "x$me" == "x" ]; then
+if [ "x$me" = "x" ]; then
 	me=`whoami`
 fi
 other="nobody"
--- a/regress/cert-file.sh
+++ b/regress/cert-file.sh
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: cert-file.sh,v 1.4 2016/12/16 02:48:55 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: cert-file.sh,v 1.5 2017/03/11 23:44:16 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.

 tid="ssh with certificates"
@ -17,24 +17,59 @@ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
 	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
 ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
 	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key3 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key4 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key5 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+
 # Move the certificate to a different address to better control
 # when it is offered.
 ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
 	-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 ||
-		fail "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key1"
+		fatal "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key1"
 mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub
 ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key2 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
 	-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 ||
-		fail "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key2"
+		fatal "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key2"
 mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+	-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key3 ||
+		fatal "couldn't sign user_key3 with user_ca_key1"
+rm $OBJ/user_key3.pub # to test use of private key w/o public half.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+	-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key4 ||
+		fatal "couldn't sign user_key4 with user_ca_key1"
+rm $OBJ/user_key4 $OBJ/user_key4.pub # to test no matching pub/private key case.

 trace 'try with identity files'
 opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes"
 opts2="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2"
 echo "cert-authority $(cat $OBJ/user_ca_key1.pub)" > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER

+# Make a clean config that doesn't have any pre-added identities.
+cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy | grep -v IdentityFile > $OBJ/no_identity_config
+
+# XXX: verify that certificate used was what we expect. Needs exposure of
+# keys via enviornment variable or similar.
+
 for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	# Key with no .pub should work - finding the equivalent *-cert.pub.
+	verbose "protocol $p: identity cert with no plain public file"
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \
+	    -i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 5$p
+	[ $? -ne 5$p ] && fail "ssh failed"
+
+	# CertificateFile matching private key with no .pub file should work.
+	verbose "protocol $p: CertificateFile with no plain public file"
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \
+	    -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub \
+	    -i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 5$p
+	[ $? -ne 5$p ] && fail "ssh failed"
+
 	# Just keys should fail
+	verbose "protocol $p: plain keys"
 	${SSH} $opts2 somehost exit 5$p
 	r=$?
 	if [ $r -eq 5$p ]; then
@ -42,6 +77,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	fi

 	# Keys with untrusted cert should fail.
+	verbose "protocol $p: untrusted cert"
 	opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
 	${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
 	r=$?
@ -50,6 +86,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	fi

 	# Good cert with bad key should fail.
+	verbose "protocol $p: good cert, bad key"
 	opts3="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key2"
 	opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
 	${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
@ -59,6 +96,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	fi

 	# Keys with one trusted cert, should succeed.
+	verbose "protocol $p: single trusted"
 	opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
 	${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
 	r=$?
@ -67,6 +105,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	fi

 	# Multiple certs and keys, with one trusted cert, should succeed.
+	verbose "protocol $p: multiple trusted"
 	opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
 	opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
 	${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
@ -74,14 +113,6 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then
 		fail "ssh failed with multiple certs in protocol $p"
 	fi
-
-	#Keys with trusted certificate specified in config options, should succeed.
-	opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
-	${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
-	r=$?
-	if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then
-		fail "ssh failed with trusted cert in config in protocol $p"
-	fi
 done

 #next, using an agent in combination with the keys
--- a/regress/forwarding.sh
+++ b/regress/forwarding.sh
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.16 2016/04/14 23:57:17 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.19 2017/01/30 05:22:14 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.

 tid="local and remote forwarding"
@ -10,8 +10,7 @@ start_sshd
 base=33
 last=$PORT
 fwd=""
-CTL=$OBJ/ctl-sock
-rm -f $CTL
+CTL=/tmp/openssh.regress.ctl-sock.$$

 for j in 0 1 2; do
 	for i in 0 1 2; do
@ -29,7 +28,8 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 		q=$p
 	fi
 	trace "start forwarding, fork to background"
-	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10
+	rm -f $CTL
+	${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10

 	trace "transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
 	${SSH} -$q -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$last -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	test -s ${COPY}		|| fail "failed copy of ${DATA}"
 	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"

-	sleep 10
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
 done

 for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ for d in L R; do
 	    -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
 	    -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true
 	if [ $? != 0 ]; then
-		fail "connection failed, should not"
+		fatal "connection failed, should not"
 	else
 		# this one should fail
 		${SSH} -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
@ -75,30 +75,32 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost true

 	trace "clear local forward proto $p"
-	${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	rm -f $CTL
+	${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
 	    -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10
 	if [ $? != 0 ]; then
 		fail "connection failed with cleared local forwarding"
 	else
 		# this one should fail
-		${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 true \
+		${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \
 		     >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
 			fail "local forwarding not cleared"
 	fi
-	sleep 10
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
 	
 	trace "clear remote forward proto $p"
-	${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	rm -f $CTL
+	${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
 	    -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10
 	if [ $? != 0 ]; then
 		fail "connection failed with cleared remote forwarding"
 	else
 		# this one should fail
-		${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 true \
+		${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \
 		     >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
 			fail "remote forwarding not cleared"
 	fi
-	sleep 10
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
 done

 for p in 2; do
@ -115,6 +117,7 @@ echo "LocalForward ${base}01 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
 echo "RemoteForward ${base}02 127.0.0.1:${base}01" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
 for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	trace "config file: start forwarding, fork to background"
+	rm -f $CTL
 	${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost sleep 10

 	trace "config file: transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
@ -123,21 +126,24 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	test -s ${COPY}		|| fail "failed copy of ${DATA}"
 	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"

-	${SSH} -S $CTL -O exit somehost
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
 done

 for p in 2; do
 	trace "transfer over chained unix domain socket forwards and check result"
 	rm -f $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
-	${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost sleep 10
-	${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost sleep 10
-	${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost sleep 10
-	${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost sleep 10
+	rm -f $CTL $CTL.[123]
+	${SSH} -S $CTL -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost sleep 10
+	${SSH} -S $CTL.1 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost sleep 10
+	${SSH} -S $CTL.2 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost sleep 10
+	${SSH} -S $CTL.3 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost sleep 10
 	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}01 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
 		somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
 	test -s ${COPY}			|| fail "failed copy ${DATA}"
 	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"

-	#wait
-	sleep 10
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.1 -O exit somehost
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.2 -O exit somehost
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.3 -O exit somehost
 done
--- a/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.19 2016/11/25 02:56:49 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.20 2017/01/06 02:26:10 dtucker Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.

 tid="integrity"
 cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak

 # start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
-# XXX the test hangs if we modify the low bytes of the packet length
-# XXX and ssh tries to read...
 tries=10
 startoffset=2900
 macs=`${SSH} -Q mac`
@ -27,6 +25,7 @@ for m in $macs; do
 	elen=0
 	epad=0
 	emac=0
+	etmo=0
 	ecnt=0
 	skip=0
 	for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do
--- a/regress/test-exec.sh
+++ b/regress/test-exec.sh
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.58 2016/12/16 01:06:27 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.59 2017/02/07 23:03:11 dtucker Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.

 #SUDO=sudo
@ -444,12 +444,10 @@ Host *
 	User			$USER
 	GlobalKnownHostsFile	$OBJ/known_hosts
 	UserKnownHostsFile	$OBJ/known_hosts
-	RSAAuthentication	yes
 	PubkeyAuthentication	yes
 	ChallengeResponseAuthentication	no
 	HostbasedAuthentication	no
 	PasswordAuthentication	no
-	RhostsRSAAuthentication	no
 	BatchMode		yes
 	StrictHostKeyChecking	yes
 	LogLevel		DEBUG3
--- a/regress/unittests/Makefile
+++ b/regress/unittests/Makefile
@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.7 2016/08/19 06:44:13 djm Exp $
-REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY= yes
-SUBDIR=	test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys utf8 match
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.9 2017/03/14 01:20:29 dtucker Exp $
+
+REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?=	yes
+SUBDIR=	test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys utf8 match conversion

 .include <bsd.subdir.mk>
--- a/regress/unittests/conversion/Makefile
+++ b/regress/unittests/conversion/Makefile
@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2017/03/14 01:20:29 dtucker Exp $
+
+PROG=test_conversion
+SRCS=tests.c
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+	env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG}
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
--- a/regress/unittests/conversion/tests.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/conversion/tests.c
@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2017/03/14 01:20:29 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for conversions
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "misc.h"
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+
+	TEST_START("conversion_convtime");
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("0"), 0);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1"), 1);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1S"), 1);
+	/* from the examples in the comment above the function */
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("90m"), 5400);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1h30m"), 5400);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("2d"), 172800);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1w"), 604800);
+
+	/* negative time is not allowed */
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("-7"), -1);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("-9d"), -1);
+	
+	/* overflow */
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%llu", (unsigned long long)LONG_MAX + 1);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime(buf), -1);
+
+	/* overflow with multiplier */
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%lluM", (unsigned long long)LONG_MAX/60 + 1);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime(buf), -1);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1000000000000000000000w"), -1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
--- a/regress/unittests/match/tests.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/match/tests.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.3 2016/09/21 17:03:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.4 2017/02/03 23:01:42 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Regress test for matching functions
 *
@ -103,6 +103,25 @@ tests(void)
 	/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.2,10.0.0.1"), 1); */
 	TEST_DONE();

+#define CHECK_FILTER(string,filter,expected) \
+	do { \
+		char *result = match_filter_list((string), (filter)); \
+		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(result, expected); \
+		free(result); \
+	} while (0)
+
+	TEST_START("match_filter_list");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "", "a,b,c");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a", "b,c");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b", "a,c");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "c", "a,b");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b", "c");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,c", "b");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b,c", "");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a");
+	CHECK_FILTER("", "a,b,c", "");
+	TEST_DONE();
 /*
 * XXX TODO
 * int      match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *);
--- a/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: test_helper.c,v 1.6 2015/03/03 20:42:49 djm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: test_helper.c,v 1.7 2017/03/14 01:10:07 dtucker Exp $	*/
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
 *
@ -441,6 +441,17 @@ assert_u_int(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
 	test_die();
 }

+void
+assert_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    long aa1, long aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "LONG", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %ld / 0x%lx\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %ld / 0x%lx\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
 void
 assert_long_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
    long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
--- a/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h
+++ b/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: test_helper.h,v 1.6 2015/01/18 19:52:44 djm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: test_helper.h,v 1.7 2017/03/14 01:10:07 dtucker Exp $	*/
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
 *
@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ void assert_size_t(const char *file, int line,
 void assert_u_int(const char *file, int line,
    const char *a1, const char *a2,
    u_int aa1, u_int aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_long(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    long aa1, long aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
 void assert_long_long(const char *file, int line,
    const char *a1, const char *a2,
    long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
@ -110,6 +113,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
 	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
 #define ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(a1, a2) \
 	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
 #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_EQ(a1, a2) \
 	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
 #define ASSERT_CHAR_EQ(a1, a2) \
@ -139,6 +144,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
 	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
 #define ASSERT_U_INT_NE(a1, a2) \
 	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
 #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_NE(a1, a2) \
 	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
 #define ASSERT_CHAR_NE(a1, a2) \
@ -166,6 +173,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
 	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
 #define ASSERT_U_INT_LT(a1, a2) \
 	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
 #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LT(a1, a2) \
 	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
 #define ASSERT_CHAR_LT(a1, a2) \
@ -193,6 +202,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
 	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
 #define ASSERT_U_INT_LE(a1, a2) \
 	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
 #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LE(a1, a2) \
 	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
 #define ASSERT_CHAR_LE(a1, a2) \
@ -220,6 +231,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
 	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
 #define ASSERT_U_INT_GT(a1, a2) \
 	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
 #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GT(a1, a2) \
 	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
 #define ASSERT_CHAR_GT(a1, a2) \
@ -247,6 +260,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
 	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
 #define ASSERT_U_INT_GE(a1, a2) \
 	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
 #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GE(a1, a2) \
 	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
 #define ASSERT_CHAR_GE(a1, a2) \
--- a/regress/unittests/utf8/tests.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/utf8/tests.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.3 2016/12/19 04:55:18 djm Exp $ */
+/*	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.4 2017/02/19 00:11:29 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Regress test for the utf8.h *mprintf() API
 *
@ -15,10 +15,7 @@

 #include "utf8.h"

-void	 badarg(void);
-void	 one(const char *, const char *, int, int, int, const char *);
-
-void
+static void
 badarg(void)
 {
 	char	 buf[16];
@ -33,8 +30,8 @@ badarg(void)
 	TEST_DONE();
 }

-void
-one(const char *name, const char *mbs, int width,
+static void
+one(int utf8, const char *name, const char *mbs, int width,
    int wantwidth, int wantlen, const char *wants)
 {
 	char	 buf[16];
@ -43,7 +40,7 @@ one(const char *name, const char *mbs, int width,

 	if (wantlen == -2)
 		wantlen = strlen(wants);
-	(void)strlcpy(buf, "utf8_", sizeof(buf));
+	(void)strlcpy(buf, utf8 ? "utf8_" : "c_", sizeof(buf));
 	(void)strlcat(buf, name, sizeof(buf));
 	TEST_START(buf);
 	wp = wantwidth == -2 ? NULL : &width;
@ -65,19 +62,41 @@ tests(void)
 	TEST_DONE();

 	badarg();
-	one("empty", "", 2, 0, 0, "");
-	one("ascii", "x", -2, -2, -2, "x");
-	one("newline", "a\nb", -2, -2, -2, "a\nb");
-	one("cr", "a\rb", -2, -2, -2, "a\rb");
-	one("tab", "a\tb", -2, -2, -2, "a\tb");
-	one("esc", "\033x", -2, -2, -2, "\\033x");
-	one("inv_badbyte", "\377x", -2, -2, -2, "\\377x");
-	one("inv_nocont", "\341x", -2, -2, -2, "\\341x");
-	one("inv_nolead", "a\200b", -2, -2, -2, "a\\200b");
-	one("sz_ascii", "1234567890123456", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012345");
-	one("sz_esc", "123456789012\033", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012");
-	one("width_ascii", "123", 2, 2, -1, "12");
-	one("width_double", "a\343\201\201", 2, 1, -1, "a");
-	one("double_fit", "a\343\201\201", 3, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201");
-	one("double_spc", "a\343\201\201", 4, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201");
+	one(1, "empty", "", 2, 0, 0, "");
+	one(1, "ascii", "x", -2, -2, -2, "x");
+	one(1, "newline", "a\nb", -2, -2, -2, "a\nb");
+	one(1, "cr", "a\rb", -2, -2, -2, "a\rb");
+	one(1, "tab", "a\tb", -2, -2, -2, "a\tb");
+	one(1, "esc", "\033x", -2, -2, -2, "\\033x");
+	one(1, "inv_badbyte", "\377x", -2, -2, -2, "\\377x");
+	one(1, "inv_nocont", "\341x", -2, -2, -2, "\\341x");
+	one(1, "inv_nolead", "a\200b", -2, -2, -2, "a\\200b");
+	one(1, "sz_ascii", "1234567890123456", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012345");
+	one(1, "sz_esc", "123456789012\033", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012");
+	one(1, "width_ascii", "123", 2, 2, -1, "12");
+	one(1, "width_double", "a\343\201\201", 2, 1, -1, "a");
+	one(1, "double_fit", "a\343\201\201", 3, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201");
+	one(1, "double_spc", "a\343\201\201", 4, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201");
+
+	TEST_START("C_setlocale");
+	loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(loc, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	badarg();
+	one(0, "empty", "", 2, 0, 0, "");
+	one(0, "ascii", "x", -2, -2, -2, "x");
+	one(0, "newline", "a\nb", -2, -2, -2, "a\nb");
+	one(0, "cr", "a\rb", -2, -2, -2, "a\rb");
+	one(0, "tab", "a\tb", -2, -2, -2, "a\tb");
+	one(0, "esc", "\033x", -2, -2, -2, "\\033x");
+	one(0, "inv_badbyte", "\377x", -2, -2, -2, "\\377x");
+	one(0, "inv_nocont", "\341x", -2, -2, -2, "\\341x");
+	one(0, "inv_nolead", "a\200b", -2, -2, -2, "a\\200b");
+	one(0, "sz_ascii", "1234567890123456", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012345");
+	one(0, "sz_esc", "123456789012\033", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012");
+	one(0, "width_ascii", "123", 2, 2, -1, "12");
+	one(0, "width_double", "a\343\201\201", 2, 1, -1, "a");
+	one(0, "double_fit", "a\343\201\201", 7, 5, -1, "a\\343");
+	one(0, "double_spc", "a\343\201\201", 13, 13, 13, "a\\343\\201\\201");
 }
--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@ -73,19 +73,35 @@
 # define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
 #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */

+#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+# define ARG_LO_OFFSET  0
+# define ARG_HI_OFFSET  sizeof(uint32_t)
+#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
+# define ARG_LO_OFFSET  sizeof(uint32_t)
+# define ARG_HI_OFFSET  0
+#else
+#error "Unknown endianness"
+#endif
+
 /* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */
 #define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno))
 #define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
 #define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 4), \
-	/* load first syscall argument */ \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 6), \
+	/* load and test first syscall argument, low word */ \
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
-	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)])), \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_arg_val), 0, 1), \
+	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
+	    ((_arg_val) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 3), \
+	/* load and test first syscall argument, high word */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
+	    (((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_val) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 1), \
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
 	/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
@ -104,108 +120,122 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {

 	/* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */
 #ifdef __NR_lstat
-	SC_DENY(lstat, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_lstat, EACCES),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_lstat64
-	SC_DENY(lstat64, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_lstat64, EACCES),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_fstat
-	SC_DENY(fstat, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_fstat, EACCES),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_fstat64
-	SC_DENY(fstat64, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_fstat64, EACCES),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_open
-	SC_DENY(open, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_openat
-	SC_DENY(openat, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_newfstatat
-	SC_DENY(newfstatat, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_newfstatat, EACCES),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_stat
-	SC_DENY(stat, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_stat, EACCES),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_stat64
-	SC_DENY(stat64, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_stat64, EACCES),
 #endif

 	/* Syscalls to permit */
 #ifdef __NR_brk
-	SC_ALLOW(brk),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_brk),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
-	SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_close
-	SC_ALLOW(close),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_close),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_exit
-	SC_ALLOW(exit),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_exit_group
-	SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_getpgid
-	SC_ALLOW(getpgid),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_getpid
-	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_getrandom
-	SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
-	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_madvise
-	SC_ALLOW(madvise),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_mmap
-	SC_ALLOW(mmap),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_mmap2
-	SC_ALLOW(mmap2),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap2),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_mremap
-	SC_ALLOW(mremap),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_mremap),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_munmap
-	SC_ALLOW(munmap),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_munmap),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR__newselect
-	SC_ALLOW(_newselect),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR__newselect),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_poll
-	SC_ALLOW(poll),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_poll),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_pselect6
-	SC_ALLOW(pselect6),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_read
-	SC_ALLOW(read),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_read),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask
-	SC_ALLOW(rt_sigprocmask),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_rt_sigprocmask),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_select
-	SC_ALLOW(select),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_select),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_shutdown
-	SC_ALLOW(shutdown),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_shutdown),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
-	SC_ALLOW(sigprocmask),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_time
-	SC_ALLOW(time),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_time),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_write
-	SC_ALLOW(write),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_write),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_socketcall
-	SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
+#endif
+#if defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__)
+	/* Allow ioctls for ICA crypto card on s390 */
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
+#endif
+#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
+	/*
+	 * On Linux x32, the clock_gettime VDSO falls back to the
+	 * x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g.
+	 * https://bugs.debian.org/849923
+	 */
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT);
 #endif

 	/* Default deny */
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.301 2016/11/30 03:00:05 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.306 2017/03/14 07:19:07 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
 *                    All rights reserved
@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
 		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
 	if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
-		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0;
+		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
 		options->password_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "authorizedkeysfile2", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
-	{ "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
+	{ "useprivilegeseparation", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
 	{ "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "permittty", sPermitTTY, SSHCFG_ALL },
@ -966,6 +966,15 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 	long long val64;
 	const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;

+	/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
+	if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	for (len--; len > 0; len--) {
+		if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL)
+			break;
+		line[len] = '\0';
+	}
+
 	cp = line;
 	if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
 		return 0;
@ -1168,7 +1177,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
 			    filename, linenum);
-		if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
+		if (*arg != '-' &&
+		    !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
 			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
@ -1364,11 +1374,6 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		intptr = &options->disable_forwarding;
 		goto parse_flag;

-	case sUsePrivilegeSeparation:
-		intptr = &use_privsep;
-		multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
-		goto parse_multistate;
-
 	case sAllowUsers:
 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
 			if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
@ -1427,7 +1432,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
-		if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+		if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
 			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
 		if (options->ciphers == NULL)
@ -1438,7 +1443,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
-		if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+		if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.",
 			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
 		if (options->macs == NULL)
@ -1450,7 +1455,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
 			    filename, linenum);
-		if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+		if (*arg != '-' &&
+		    !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
 			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
 		if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
@ -2096,8 +2102,6 @@ fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
 		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports);
 	case sCompression:
 		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression);
-	case sUsePrivilegeSeparation:
-		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_privsep);
 	case sAllowTcpForwarding:
 		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
 	case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding:
@ -2148,8 +2152,6 @@ dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
 static void
 dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val)
 {
-	if (val == NULL)
-		return;
 	printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code),
 	    val == NULL ? "none" : val);
 }
@ -2275,7 +2277,6 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sDisableForwarding, o->disable_forwarding);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
-	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);

 	/* string arguments */
--- a/serverloop.c
+++ b/serverloop.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.189 2016/12/14 00:36:34 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.191 2017/02/01 02:59:09 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 }

 static Channel *
-server_request_direct_tcpip(void)
+server_request_direct_tcpip(int *reason, const char **errmsg)
 {
 	Channel *c = NULL;
 	char *target, *originator;
@ -449,11 +449,13 @@ server_request_direct_tcpip(void)
 	if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
 	    !no_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding) {
 		c = channel_connect_to_port(target, target_port,
-		    "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip");
+		    "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip", reason, errmsg);
 	} else {
 		logit("refused local port forward: "
 		    "originator %s port %d, target %s port %d",
 		    originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
+		if (reason != NULL)
+			*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
 	}

 	free(originator);
@ -468,6 +470,10 @@ server_request_direct_streamlocal(void)
 	Channel *c = NULL;
 	char *target, *originator;
 	u_short originator_port;
+	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+
+	if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
+		fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user");

 	target = packet_get_string(NULL);
 	originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
@ -480,7 +486,7 @@ server_request_direct_streamlocal(void)
 	/* XXX fine grained permissions */
 	if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
 	    !no_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding &&
-	    use_privsep) {
+	    (pw->pw_uid == 0 || use_privsep)) {
 		c = channel_connect_to_path(target,
 		    "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal");
 	} else {
@ -577,7 +583,8 @@ server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Channel *c = NULL;
 	char *ctype;
-	int rchan;
+	const char *errmsg = NULL;
+	int rchan, reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED;
 	u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len;

 	ctype = packet_get_string(&len);
@ -591,7 +598,7 @@ server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) {
 		c = server_request_session();
 	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) {
-		c = server_request_direct_tcpip();
+		c = server_request_direct_tcpip(&reason, &errmsg);
 	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
 		c = server_request_direct_streamlocal();
 	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "tun@openssh.com") == 0) {
@ -614,9 +621,9 @@ server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		debug("server_input_channel_open: failure %s", ctype);
 		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
 		packet_put_int(rchan);
-		packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED);
+		packet_put_int(reason);
 		if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
-			packet_put_cstring("open failed");
+			packet_put_cstring(errmsg ? errmsg : "open failed");
 			packet_put_cstring("");
 		}
 		packet_send();
@ -702,6 +709,10 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	int want_reply;
 	int r, success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0;
 	struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
+	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+
+	if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
+		fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user");

 	rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
 	want_reply = packet_get_char();
@ -709,12 +720,8 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)

 	/* -R style forwarding */
 	if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) {
-		struct passwd *pw;
 		struct Forward fwd;

-		pw = the_authctxt->pw;
-		if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
-			fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user");
 		memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
 		fwd.listen_host = packet_get_string(NULL);
 		fwd.listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int();
@ -762,9 +769,10 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		/* check permissions */
 		if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0
 		    || no_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding ||
-		    !use_privsep) {
+		    (pw->pw_uid != 0 && !use_privsep)) {
 			success = 0;
-			packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding.");
+			packet_send_debug("Server has disabled "
+			    "streamlocal forwarding.");
 		} else {
 			/* Start listening on the socket */
 			success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(
--- a/sftp-client.c
+++ b/sftp-client.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.125 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.126 2017/01/03 05:46:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
 *
@ -67,6 +67,13 @@ extern int showprogress;
 /* Maximum depth to descend in directory trees */
 #define MAX_DIR_DEPTH 64

+/* Directory separator characters */
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+# define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS      "/\\"
+#else /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+# define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS      "/"
+#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+
 struct sftp_conn {
 	int fd_in;
 	int fd_out;
@ -587,6 +594,8 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag,

 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0)
 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		if (count > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
+			fatal("%s: nonsensical number of entries", __func__);
 		if (count == 0)
 			break;
 		debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count);
@ -617,7 +626,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag,
 			 * These can be used to attack recursive ops
 			 * (e.g. send '../../../../etc/passwd')
 			 */
-			if (strchr(filename, '/') != NULL) {
+			if (strpbrk(filename, SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS) != NULL) {
 				error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" "
 				    "during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path);
 			} else if (dir) {
--- a/sftp.c
+++ b/sftp.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.177 2016/10/18 12:41:22 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.178 2017/02/15 01:46:47 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
 *
@ -969,23 +969,34 @@ static int
 do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
 {
 	struct sftp_statvfs st;
-	char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
-	char s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
-	char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
-	char s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
-	unsigned long long ffree;
+	char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+	char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+	char s_icapacity[16], s_dcapacity[16];

 	if (do_statvfs(conn, path, &st, 1) == -1)
 		return -1;
+	if (st.f_files == 0)
+		strlcpy(s_icapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_icapacity));
+	else {
+		snprintf(s_icapacity, sizeof(s_icapacity), "%3llu%%",
+		    (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) /
+		    st.f_files));
+	}
+	if (st.f_blocks == 0)
+		strlcpy(s_dcapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_dcapacity));
+	else {
+		snprintf(s_dcapacity, sizeof(s_dcapacity), "%3llu%%",
+		    (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
+		    st.f_blocks));
+	}
 	if (iflag) {
-		ffree = st.f_files ? (100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) / st.f_files) : 0;
 		printf("     Inodes        Used       Avail      "
 		    "(root)    %%Capacity\n");
-		printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu         %3llu%%\n",
+		printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu         %s\n",
 		    (unsigned long long)st.f_files,
 		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_files - st.f_ffree),
 		    (unsigned long long)st.f_favail,
-		    (unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, ffree);
+		    (unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, s_icapacity);
 	} else if (hflag) {
 		strlcpy(s_used, "error", sizeof(s_used));
 		strlcpy(s_avail, "error", sizeof(s_avail));
@ -996,21 +1007,18 @@ do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
 		fmt_scaled(st.f_bfree * st.f_frsize, s_root);
 		fmt_scaled(st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize, s_total);
 		printf("    Size     Used    Avail   (root)    %%Capacity\n");
-		printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB         %3llu%%\n",
-		    s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root,
-		    (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
-		    st.f_blocks));
+		printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB         %s\n",
+		    s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root, s_dcapacity);
 	} else {
 		printf("        Size         Used        Avail       "
 		    "(root)    %%Capacity\n");
-		printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu         %3llu%%\n",
+		printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu         %s\n",
 		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_blocks / 1024),
 		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize *
 		    (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / 1024),
 		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bavail / 1024),
 		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bfree / 1024),
-		    (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
-		    st.f_blocks));
+		    s_dcapacity);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
--- a/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/ssh-agent.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.215 2016/11/30 03:07:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.218 2017/03/15 03:52:30 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@
 #endif

 #ifndef DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST
-# define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/*"
+# define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*"
 #endif

 typedef enum {
@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
 static void
 process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
 {
-	char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL;
+	char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
 	int r, version, success = 0;
 	Identity *id, *nxt;
 	Idtab *tab;
@ -831,6 +831,13 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 	free(pin);

+	if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
+		verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
+		    provider, strerror(errno));
+		goto send;
+	}
+
+	debug("%s: remove %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
 	for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) {
 		tab = idtab_lookup(version);
 		for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
@ -838,18 +845,19 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
 			/* Skip file--based keys */
 			if (id->provider == NULL)
 				continue;
-			if (!strcmp(provider, id->provider)) {
+			if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) {
 				TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
 				free_identity(id);
 				tab->nentries--;
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	if (pkcs11_del_provider(provider) == 0)
+	if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0)
 		success = 1;
 	else
 		error("process_remove_smartcard_key:"
 		    " pkcs11_del_provider failed");
+send:
 	free(provider);
 	send_status(e, success);
 }
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.292 2016/09/12 03:29:16 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.299 2017/03/10 04:26:06 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <limits.h>
+#include <locale.h>

 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "sshkey.h"
@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "krl.h"
 #include "digest.h"
+#include "utf8.h"

 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 # define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
@ -843,7 +845,7 @@ fingerprint_one_key(const struct sshkey *public, const char *comment)
 	ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
 	if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
-	printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp,
+	mprintf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp,
 	    comment ? comment : "no comment", sshkey_type(public));
 	if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
 		printf("%s\n", ra);
@ -1082,6 +1084,7 @@ known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 	struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx;
 	char *hashed, *cp, *hosts, *ohosts;
 	int has_wild = l->hosts && strcspn(l->hosts, "*?!") != strlen(l->hosts);
+	int was_hashed = l->hosts && l->hosts[0] == HASH_DELIM;

 	switch (l->status) {
 	case HKF_STATUS_OK:
@ -1090,11 +1093,10 @@ known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 		 * Don't hash hosts already already hashed, with wildcard
 		 * characters or a CA/revocation marker.
 		 */
-		if ((l->match & HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED) != 0 ||
-		    has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
+		if (was_hashed || has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
 			fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
 			if (has_wild && !find_host) {
-				logit("%s:%ld: ignoring host name "
+				logit("%s:%lu: ignoring host name "
 				    "with wildcard: %.64s", l->path,
 				    l->linenum, l->hosts);
 			}
@ -1106,6 +1108,7 @@ known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 		 */
 		ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(l->hosts);
 		while ((cp = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
+			lowercase(cp);
 			if ((hashed = host_hash(cp, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
 				fatal("hash_host failed");
 			fprintf(ctx->out, "%s %s\n", hashed, l->rawkey);
@ -1116,7 +1119,7 @@ known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 	case HKF_STATUS_INVALID:
 		/* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */
 		ctx->invalid = 1;
-		logit("%s:%ld: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
+		logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
 		/* FALLTHROUGH */
 	default:
 		fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
@ -1150,14 +1153,14 @@ known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 				 */
 				ctx->found_key = 1;
 				if (!quiet)
-					printf("# Host %s found: line %ld\n",
+					printf("# Host %s found: line %lu\n",
 					    ctx->host, l->linenum);
 			}
 			return 0;
 		} else if (find_host) {
 			ctx->found_key = 1;
 			if (!quiet) {
-				printf("# Host %s found: line %ld %s\n",
+				printf("# Host %s found: line %lu %s\n",
 				    ctx->host,
 				    l->linenum, l->marker == MRK_CA ? "CA" :
 				    (l->marker == MRK_REVOKE ? "REVOKED" : ""));
@ -1166,7 +1169,7 @@ known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 				known_hosts_hash(l, ctx);
 			else if (print_fingerprint) {
 				fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep);
-				printf("%s %s %s %s\n", ctx->host,
+				mprintf("%s %s %s %s\n", ctx->host,
 				    sshkey_type(l->key), fp, l->comment);
 				free(fp);
 			} else
@ -1177,7 +1180,7 @@ known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 		/* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */
 		if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
 			ctx->invalid = 1;
-			logit("%s:%ld: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
+			logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
 		}
 		fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
 	}
@ -1317,7 +1320,7 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
 		fatal("Failed to load key %s: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r));
 	}
 	if (comment)
-		printf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment);
+		mprintf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment);

 	/* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */
 	if (identity_new_passphrase) {
@ -1441,7 +1444,10 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw)
 		sshkey_free(private);
 		exit(1);
 	}
+	if (comment)
 		printf("Key now has comment '%s'\n", comment);
+	else
+		printf("Key now has no comment\n");

 	if (identity_comment) {
 		strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment));
@ -2203,11 +2209,17 @@ do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
 	exit(ret);
 }

+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+# define RSA1_USAGE " | rsa1"
+#else
+# define RSA1_USAGE ""
+#endif
+
 static void
 usage(void)
 {
 	fprintf(stderr,
-	    "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1]\n"
+	    "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa%s]\n"
 	    "                  [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]\n"
 	    "       ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]\n"
 	    "       ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
@ -2215,7 +2227,7 @@ usage(void)
 	    "       ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n"
 	    "       ssh-keygen -c [-P passphrase] [-C comment] [-f keyfile]\n"
 	    "       ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
-	    "       ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n");
+	    "       ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n", RSA1_USAGE);
 #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
 	fprintf(stderr,
 	    "       ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n");
@ -2280,6 +2292,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)

 	seed_rng();

+	msetlocale();
+
 	/* we need this for the home * directory.  */
 	pw = getpwuid(getuid());
 	if (!pw)
--- a/ssh-keyscan.c
+++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.106 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.109 2017/03/10 04:26:06 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
 *
@ -321,16 +321,18 @@ keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
 }

 static void
-keyprint_one(char *host, struct sshkey *key)
+keyprint_one(const char *host, struct sshkey *key)
 {
 	char *hostport;
-
-	if (hash_hosts && (host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
-		fatal("host_hash failed");
+	const char *known_host, *hashed;

 	hostport = put_host_port(host, ssh_port);
+	lowercase(hostport);
+	if (hash_hosts && (hashed = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
+		fatal("host_hash failed");
+	known_host = hash_hosts ? hashed : hostport;
 	if (!get_cert)
-		fprintf(stdout, "%s ", hostport);
+		fprintf(stdout, "%s ", known_host);
 	sshkey_write(key, stdout);
 	fputs("\n", stdout);
 	free(hostport);
@ -752,10 +754,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 			tname = strtok(optarg, ",");
 			while (tname) {
 				int type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname);
+
 				switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
 				case KEY_RSA1:
 					get_keytypes |= KT_RSA1;
 					break;
+#endif
 				case KEY_DSA:
 					get_keytypes |= KT_DSA;
 					break;
@ -769,7 +774,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 					get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519;
 					break;
 				case KEY_UNSPEC:
-					fatal("unknown key type %s", tname);
+				default:
+					fatal("Unknown key type \"%s\"", tname);
 				}
 				tname = strtok(NULL, ",");
 			}
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.448 2016/12/06 07:48:01 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.451 2017/03/10 04:07:20 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -684,11 +684,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0)
 				cp = kex_alg_list('\n');
 			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0)
-				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, '\n');
+				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n');
 			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0)
-				cp = sshkey_alg_list(1, 0, '\n');
+				cp = sshkey_alg_list(1, 0, 0, '\n');
 			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0)
-				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, '\n');
+				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 0, '\n');
 			else if (strcmp(optarg, "protocol-version") == 0) {
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
 				cp = xstrdup("1\n2");
@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		options.proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
 		snprintf(port_s, sizeof(port_s), "%d", options.jump_port);
 		xasprintf(&options.proxy_command,
-		    "ssh%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%.*s -W %%h:%%p %s",
+		    "ssh%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%.*s -W '[%%h]:%%p' %s",
 		    /* Optional "-l user" argument if jump_user set */
 		    options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : " -l ",
 		    options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : options.jump_user,
--- a/ssh_config.0
+++ b/ssh_config.0
@ -201,7 +201,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
             preference.  Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.  If the
             specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
             ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing
-             them.
+             them.  If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then
+             the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from
+             the default set instead of replacing them.

             The supported ciphers are:

@ -448,7 +450,10 @@ DESCRIPTION
             authentication as a comma-separated pattern list.  Alternately if
             the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
             specified key types will be appended to the default set instead
-             of replacing them.  The default for this option is:
+             of replacing them.  If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y
+             character, then the specified key types (including wildcards)
+             will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+             The default for this option is:

                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
                ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -464,8 +469,10 @@ DESCRIPTION
             Specifies the host key algorithms that the client wants to use in
             order of preference.  Alternately if the specified value begins
             with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be
-             appended to the default set instead of replacing them.  The
-             default for this option is:
+             appended to the default set instead of replacing them.  If the
+             specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
+             key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default
+             set instead of replacing them.  The default for this option is:

                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
                ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -591,7 +598,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
             algorithms must be comma-separated.  Alternately if the specified
             value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods
             will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them.
-             The default is:
+             If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
+             specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed from the
+             default set instead of replacing them.  The default is:

                   curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
                   ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
@ -644,7 +653,10 @@ DESCRIPTION
             integrity protection.  Multiple algorithms must be comma-
             separated.  If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
             then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-             instead of replacing them.
+             instead of replacing them.  If the specified value begins with a
+             M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms (including
+             wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of
+             replacing them.

             The algorithms that contain "-etm" calculate the MAC after
             encryption (encrypt-then-mac).  These are considered safer and
@ -667,7 +679,7 @@ DESCRIPTION
             machine on each of the machines and the user will get many
             warnings about changed host keys.  However, this option disables
             host authentication for localhost.  The argument to this keyword
-             must be yes or no.  (the default).
+             must be yes or no (the default).

     NumberOfPasswordPrompts
             Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up.  The
@ -753,7 +765,10 @@ DESCRIPTION
             authentication as a comma-separated pattern list.  Alternately if
             the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the key
             types after it will be appended to the default instead of
-             replacing it.  The default for this option is:
+             replacing it.  If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y
+             character, then the specified key types (including wildcards)
+             will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+             The default for this option is:

                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
                ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -1074,4 +1089,4 @@ AUTHORS
     created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
     versions 1.5 and 2.0.

-OpenBSD 6.0                    October 15, 2016                    OpenBSD 6.0
+OpenBSD 6.0                    February 27, 2017                   OpenBSD 6.0
--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.240 2016/10/15 19:56:25 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: October 15 2016 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.242 2017/02/27 14:30:33 jmc Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: February 27 2017 $
 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@ -415,6 +415,10 @@ If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 .Pp
 The supported ciphers are:
 .Bd -literal -offset indent
@ -784,6 +788,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 The default for this option is:
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -807,6 +815,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 The default for this option is:
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -1027,6 +1039,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 The default is:
 .Bd -literal -offset indent
 curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
@ -1102,6 +1118,10 @@ If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 .Pp
 The algorithms that contain
 .Qq -etm
@ -1127,7 +1147,7 @@ However, this option disables host authentication for localhost.
 The argument to this keyword must be
 .Cm yes
 or
-.Cm no .
+.Cm no
 (the default).
 .It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts
 Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up.
@ -1264,6 +1284,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
 instead of replacing it.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 The default for this option is:
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.272 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.273 2017/03/10 03:22:40 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -1532,6 +1532,7 @@ maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, Key *private, char *comment,
 	if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 2 &&
 	    !ask_permission("Add key %s (%s) to agent?", authfile, comment)) {
 		debug3("user denied adding this key");
+		close(auth_sock);
 		return;
 	}

@ -1540,4 +1541,5 @@ maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, Key *private, char *comment,
 		debug("identity added to agent: %s", authfile);
 	else
 		debug("could not add identity to agent: %s (%d)", authfile, r);
+	close(auth_sock);
 }
--- a/sshconnect1.c
+++ b/sshconnect1.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.79 2016/09/19 07:52:42 natano Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.80 2017/03/10 03:53:11 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -520,7 +520,8 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 		cookie[i] = packet_get_char();

 	/* Get the public key. */
-	server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+	if ((server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
 	bits = packet_get_int();
 	packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->e);
 	packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->n);
@ -532,7 +533,8 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 		logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
 	}
 	/* Get the host key. */
-	host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+	if ((host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
 	bits = packet_get_int();
 	packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
 	packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.251 2016/12/04 23:54:02 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.255 2017/03/11 23:40:26 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@ -193,8 +193,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
 	}

 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
-		packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
-		    (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
+		packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit,
+		    options.rekey_interval);

 	/* start key exchange */
 	if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
@ -934,14 +934,14 @@ input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
 	char *info, *lang, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL;
 	char prompt[150];
-	const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias :
-	    authctxt->host;
+	const char *host;

 	debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq");

 	if (authctxt == NULL)
 		fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: "
 		    "no authentication context");
+	host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host;

 	info = packet_get_string(NULL);
 	lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
@ -996,11 +996,11 @@ input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
 }

 static const char *
-identity_sign_encode(struct identity *id)
+key_sign_encode(const struct sshkey *key)
 {
 	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;

-	if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+	if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
 		switch (ssh->kex->rsa_sha2) {
 		case 256:
 			return "rsa-sha2-256";
@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ identity_sign_encode(struct identity *id)
 			return "rsa-sha2-512";
 		}
 	}
-	return key_ssh_name(id->key);
+	return key_ssh_name(key);
 }

 static int
@ -1017,30 +1017,49 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 {
 	Key *prv;
 	int ret;
-	const char *alg;
-
-	alg = identity_sign_encode(id);

 	/* the agent supports this key */
-	if (id->agent_fd != -1)
+	if (id->key != NULL && id->agent_fd != -1)
 		return ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp,
-		    data, datalen, alg, compat);
+		    data, datalen, key_sign_encode(id->key), compat);

 	/*
 	 * we have already loaded the private key or
 	 * the private key is stored in external hardware
 	 */
-	if (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT))
-		return (sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg,
-		    compat));
+	if (id->key != NULL &&
+	    (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT)))
+		return (sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
+		    key_sign_encode(id->key), compat));
+
 	/* load the private key from the file */
 	if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
-	ret = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat);
+	ret = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
+	    key_sign_encode(prv), compat);
 	sshkey_free(prv);
 	return (ret);
 }

+static int
+id_filename_matches(Identity *id, Identity *private_id)
+{
+	const char *suffixes[] = { ".pub", "-cert.pub", NULL };
+	size_t len = strlen(id->filename), plen = strlen(private_id->filename);
+	size_t i, slen;
+
+	if (strcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename) == 0)
+		return 1;
+	for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) {
+		slen = strlen(suffixes[i]);
+		if (len > slen && plen == len - slen &&
+		    strcmp(id->filename + (len - slen), suffixes[i]) == 0 &&
+		    memcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename, plen) == 0)
+			return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int
 sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
 {
@ -1083,7 +1102,7 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
 	} else {
 		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
 		buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
-		buffer_put_cstring(&b, identity_sign_encode(id));
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_sign_encode(id->key));
 	}
 	buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen);

@ -1103,6 +1122,24 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
 				break;
 			}
 		}
+		/*
+		 * Exact key matches are preferred, but also allow
+		 * filename matches for non-PKCS#11/agent keys that
+		 * didn't load public keys. This supports the case
+		 * of keeping just a private key file and public
+		 * certificate on disk.
+		 */
+		if (!matched && !id->isprivate && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
+		    (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) {
+			TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) {
+				if (private_id->key == NULL &&
+				    id_filename_matches(id, private_id)) {
+					id = private_id;
+					matched = 1;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
 		if (matched) {
 			debug2("%s: using private key \"%s\"%s for "
 			    "certificate", __func__, id->filename,
@ -1181,7 +1218,7 @@ send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
 	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
 	packet_put_char(have_sig);
 	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH))
-		packet_put_cstring(identity_sign_encode(id));
+		packet_put_cstring(key_sign_encode(id->key));
 	packet_put_string(blob, bloblen);
 	free(blob);
 	packet_send();
@ -1632,7 +1669,7 @@ ssh_keysign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 	/* send # of sock, data to be signed */
-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock) != 0) ||
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, data, datalen)) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 	if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, b) == -1)
--- a/sshd.0
+++ b/sshd.0
@ -398,8 +398,8 @@ SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
     The /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host
     public keys for all known hosts.  The global file should be prepared by
     the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained
-     automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host, its key
-     is added to the per-user file.
+     automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host, its key is
+     added to the per-user file.

     Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers
     (optional), hostnames, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.  The fields
@ -623,4 +623,4 @@ AUTHORS
     versions 1.5 and 2.0.  Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
     for privilege separation.

-OpenBSD 6.0                    November 30, 2016                   OpenBSD 6.0
+OpenBSD 6.0                    January 30, 2017                    OpenBSD 6.0
--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.287 2016/11/30 02:57:40 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2016 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.288 2017/01/30 23:27:39 dtucker Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: January 30 2017 $
 .Dt SSHD 8
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ and
 files contain host public keys for all known hosts.
 The global file should
 be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is
-maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host,
+maintained automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host,
 its key is added to the per-user file.
 .Pp
 Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional),
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.480 2016/12/09 03:04:29 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.485 2017/03/15 03:52:30 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -362,14 +362,14 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
 {
 	u_int i;
 	int remote_major, remote_minor;
-	char *s, *newline = "\n";
+	char *s;
 	char buf[256];			/* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
 	char remote_version[256];	/* Must be at least as big as buf. */

-	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
+	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
 	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
 	    *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
-	    options.version_addendum, newline);
+	    options.version_addendum);

 	/* Send our protocol version identification. */
 	if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
@ -1046,6 +1046,11 @@ server_listen(void)
 			close(listen_sock);
 			continue;
 		}
+		if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) {
+			verbose("socket: CLOEXEC: %s", strerror(errno));
+			close(listen_sock);
+			continue;
+		}
 		/*
 		 * Set socket options.
 		 * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
@ -1670,6 +1675,15 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			continue;
 		key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
 		pubkey = key_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], NULL);
+
+		if ((pubkey != NULL && pubkey->type == KEY_RSA1) ||
+		    (key != NULL && key->type == KEY_RSA1)) {
+			verbose("Ignoring RSA1 key %s",
+			    options.host_key_files[i]);
+			key_free(key);
+			key_free(pubkey);
+			continue;
+		}
 		if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL)
 			pubkey = key_demote(key);
 		sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
@ -2154,7 +2168,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)

 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
 		packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit,
-		    (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
+		    options.rekey_interval);

 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
 	    list_hostkey_types());
--- a/3
+++ b/3
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.100 2016/08/15 12:32:04 naddy Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.101 2017/03/14 07:19:07 djm Exp $

 # This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file.  See
 # sshd_config(5) for more information.
@ -93,7 +93,6 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
 #PrintLastLog yes
 #TCPKeepAlive yes
 #UseLogin no
-#UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox
 #PermitUserEnvironment no
 #Compression delayed
 #ClientAliveInterval 0
--- a/sshd_config.0
+++ b/sshd_config.0
@ -238,7 +238,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
             Specifies the ciphers allowed.  Multiple ciphers must be comma-
             separated.  If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
             then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
-             instead of replacing them.
+             instead of replacing them.  If the specified value begins with a
+             M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards)
+             will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.

             The supported ciphers are:

@ -378,7 +380,10 @@ DESCRIPTION
             authentication as a comma-separated pattern list.  Alternately if
             the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
             specified key types will be appended to the default set instead
-             of replacing them.  The default for this option is:
+             of replacing them.  If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y
+             character, then the specified key types (including wildcards)
+             will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+             The default for this option is:

                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
                ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -503,7 +508,10 @@ DESCRIPTION
             algorithms must be comma-separated.  Alternately if the specified
             value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods
             will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them.
-             The supported algorithms are:
+             If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
+             specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed from the
+             default set instead of replacing them.  The supported algorithms
+             are:

                   curve25519-sha256
                   curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
@ -555,7 +563,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
             protection.  Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.  If the
             specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
             algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of
-             replacing them.
+             replacing them.  If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y
+             character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards)
+             will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.

             The algorithms that contain "-etm" calculate the MAC after
             encryption (encrypt-then-mac).  These are considered safer and
@ -751,7 +761,10 @@ DESCRIPTION
             authentication as a comma-separated pattern list.  Alternately if
             the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
             specified key types will be appended to the default set instead
-             of replacing them.  The default for this option is:
+             of replacing them.  If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y
+             character, then the specified key types (including wildcards)
+             will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+             The default for this option is:

                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
                ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -891,18 +904,6 @@ DESCRIPTION
             If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
             non-root user.  The default is no.

-     UsePrivilegeSeparation
-             Specifies whether sshd(8) separates privileges by creating an
-             unprivileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic.
-             After successful authentication, another process will be created
-             that has the privilege of the authenticated user.  The goal of
-             privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by
-             containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes.  The
-             argument must be yes, no, or sandbox.  If UsePrivilegeSeparation
-             is set to sandbox then the pre-authentication unprivileged
-             process is subject to additional restrictions.  The default is
-             sandbox.
-
     VersionAddendum
             Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH
             protocol banner sent by the server upon connection.  The default
@ -988,12 +989,12 @@ TOKENS
           %t    The key or certificate type.
           %u    The username.

-     AuthorizedKeysCommand accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %t, and %u.
+     AuthorizedKeysCommand accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, and %u.

     AuthorizedKeysFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, and %u.

-     AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %K, %k, %h,
-     %i, %s, %T, %t, and %u.
+     AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K,
+     %k, %s, %T, %t, and %u.

     AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, and %u.

@ -1016,4 +1017,4 @@ AUTHORS
     versions 1.5 and 2.0.  Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
     for privilege separation.

-OpenBSD 6.0                    November 30, 2016                   OpenBSD 6.0
+OpenBSD 6.0                     March 14, 2017                     OpenBSD 6.0
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.239 2016/11/30 03:00:05 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2016 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.243 2017/03/14 07:19:07 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: March 14 2017 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@ -437,6 +437,10 @@ If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 .Pp
 The supported ciphers are:
 .Pp
@ -649,6 +653,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 The default for this option is:
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -843,6 +851,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 The supported algorithms are:
 .Pp
 .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
@ -933,6 +945,10 @@ If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 .Pp
 The algorithms that contain
 .Qq -etm
@ -1280,6 +1296,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 The default for this option is:
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -1474,28 +1494,6 @@ is enabled, you will not be able to run
 as a non-root user.
 The default is
 .Cm no .
-.It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
-Specifies whether
-.Xr sshd 8
-separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process
-to deal with incoming network traffic.
-After successful authentication, another process will be created that has
-the privilege of the authenticated user.
-The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege
-escalation by containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes.
-The argument must be
-.Cm yes ,
-.Cm no ,
-or
-.Cm sandbox .
-If
-.Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
-is set to
-.Cm sandbox
-then the pre-authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional
-restrictions.
-The default is
-.Cm sandbox .
 .It Cm VersionAddendum
 Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
 sent by the server upon connection.
@ -1644,13 +1642,13 @@ The username.
 .El
 .Pp
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
-accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %t, and %u.
+accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, and %u.
 .Pp
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
 accepts the tokens %%, %h, and %u.
 .Pp
 .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
-accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %K, %k, %h, %i, %s, %T, %t, and %u.
+accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, %k, %s, %T, %t, and %u.
 .Pp
 .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
 accepts the tokens %%, %h, and %u.
--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.41 2016/10/24 01:09:17 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.45 2017/03/10 04:07:20 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler.  All rights reserved.
@ -89,7 +89,9 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
 	{ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT",
 	    KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# ifdef WITH_SSH1
 	{ NULL, "RSA1", KEY_RSA1, 0, 0, 0 },
+# endif
 	{ "ssh-rsa", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 0 },
 	{ "rsa-sha2-256", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 },
 	{ "rsa-sha2-512", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 },
@ -195,14 +197,16 @@ sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name)
 }

 char *
-sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, char sep)
+sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
 {
 	char *tmp, *ret = NULL;
 	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
 	const struct keytype *kt;

 	for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
-		if (kt->name == NULL || kt->sigonly)
+		if (kt->name == NULL)
+			continue;
+		if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
 			continue;
 		if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
 			continue;
@ -1237,6 +1241,9 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
 	u_long bits;
 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */

+	if (ret == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
 	cp = *cpp;

 	switch (ret->type) {
@ -3786,8 +3793,47 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,

 	if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL,
 	    (char *)passphrase)) == NULL) {
+		unsigned long pem_err = ERR_peek_last_error();
+		int pem_reason = ERR_GET_REASON(pem_err);
+
+		/*
+		 * Translate OpenSSL error codes to determine whether
+		 * passphrase is required/incorrect.
+		 */
+		switch (ERR_GET_LIB(pem_err)) {
+		case ERR_LIB_PEM:
+			switch (pem_reason) {
+			case PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ:
+			case PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD:
+			case PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
 				r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
 				goto out;
+			default:
+				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		case ERR_LIB_EVP:
+			switch (pem_reason) {
+			case EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
+				r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+				goto out;
+			case EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR:
+			case EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR:
+#ifdef EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR
+			case EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR:
+#endif
+				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+				goto out;
+			default:
+				r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		case ERR_LIB_ASN1:
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
 	}
 	if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA &&
 	    (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_RSA)) {
@ -3860,6 +3906,8 @@ int
 sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
    const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
 {
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
 	if (keyp != NULL)
 		*keyp = NULL;
 	if (commentp != NULL)
@ -3882,9 +3930,11 @@ sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
 		return sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase,
 		    keyp, commentp);
 	case KEY_UNSPEC:
-		if (sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp,
-		    commentp) == 0)
-			return 0;
+		r = sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp,
+		    commentp);
+		/* Do not fallback to PEM parser if only passphrase is wrong. */
+		if (r == 0 || r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
+			return r;
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 		return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type,
 		    passphrase, keyp);
--- a/sshkey.h
+++ b/sshkey.h
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.14 2016/09/12 23:31:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.15 2017/03/10 04:07:20 djm Exp $ */

 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int		 sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *);
 const char	*sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
 const char	*sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
 int		 sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
-char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, char);
+char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);

 int	 sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
 int	 sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
--- a/utf8.c
+++ b/utf8.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: utf8.c,v 1.3 2016/05/30 12:57:21 schwarze Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: utf8.c,v 1.5 2017/02/19 00:10:57 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2016 Ingo Schwarze <schwarze@openbsd.org>
 *
@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ dangerous_locale(void) {
 	char	*loc;

 	loc = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
-	return strcmp(loc, "US-ASCII") && strcmp(loc, "UTF-8");
+	return strcmp(loc, "US-ASCII") != 0 && strcmp(loc, "UTF-8") != 0 &&
+	    strcmp(loc, "ANSI_X3.4-1968") != 0 && strcmp(loc, "646") != 0;
 }

 static int
@ -116,6 +117,7 @@ vasnmprintf(char **str, size_t maxsz, int *wp, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
 	sz = strlen(src) + 1;
 	if ((dst = malloc(sz)) == NULL) {
 		free(src);
+		ret = -1;
 		goto fail;
 	}

--- a/version.h
+++ b/version.h
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.78 2016/12/19 04:55:51 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.79 2017/03/20 01:18:59 djm Exp $ */

-#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_7.4"
+#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_7.5"

 #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
 #define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE