o Tighten up rules for which processes can't debug which other processes
in the p_candebug() function. Synchronize with sef's CHECKIO() macro from the old procfs, which seems to be a good source of security checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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@ -1082,8 +1082,10 @@ p_candebug(const struct proc *p1, const struct proc *p2, int *privused)
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/* not owned by you, has done setuid (unless you're root) */
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/* add a CAP_SYS_PTRACE here? */
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if ((p1->p_cred->p_ruid != p2->p_cred->p_ruid) ||
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(p2->p_flag & P_SUGID)) {
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if (p1->p_cred->pc_ucred->cr_uid != p2->p_cred->p_ruid ||
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p1->p_cred->p_ruid != p2->p_cred->p_ruid ||
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p1->p_cred->p_svuid == p2->p_cred->p_ruid ||
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p2->p_flag & P_SUGID) {
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if ((error = suser_xxx(0, p1, PRISON_ROOT)))
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return (error);
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if (privused != NULL)
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