Provide unconditionally compiled stub implementations of audit system

calls that simply return ENOSYS.  This will allow basic forward
compatibility with userland audit pieces to be committed in the future,
avoiding the "login killed by SIGSYS" problem users of CVS HEAD
experienced when booting older kernels with newer user spaces (an
unsupported but not uncommon situation when debugging problems).

Approved by:	re (scottl)
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
This commit is contained in:
rwatson 2006-03-17 01:47:06 +00:00
parent 32f6962a6f
commit 3d5d8935a4
3 changed files with 10 additions and 565 deletions

View File

@ -1786,6 +1786,7 @@ posix4/ksched.c optional _kposix_priority_scheduling
posix4/p1003_1b.c standard
posix4/posix4_mib.c standard
rpc/rpcclnt.c optional nfsclient
security/audit/audit_syscalls.c standard
security/mac/mac_inet.c optional mac inet
security/mac/mac_label.c optional mac
security/mac/mac_net.c optional mac

View File

@ -774,21 +774,21 @@
const struct timespec *timeout); }
443 AUE_NULL MSTD { int thr_wake(long id); }
444 AUE_NULL MSTD { int kldunloadf(int fileid, int flags); }
445 AUE_NULL MNOSTD { int audit(const void *record, \
445 AUE_NULL MSTD { int audit(const void *record, \
u_int length); }
446 AUE_NULL MNOSTD { int auditon(int cmd, void *data, \
446 AUE_NULL MSTD { int auditon(int cmd, void *data, \
u_int length); }
447 AUE_NULL MNOSTD { int getauid(uid_t *auid); }
448 AUE_NULL MNOSTD { int setauid(uid_t *auid); }
449 AUE_NULL MNOSTD { int getaudit(struct auditinfo *auditinfo); }
450 AUE_NULL MNOSTD { int setaudit(struct auditinfo *auditinfo); }
451 AUE_NULL MNOSTD { int getaudit_addr( \
447 AUE_NULL MSTD { int getauid(uid_t *auid); }
448 AUE_NULL MSTD { int setauid(uid_t *auid); }
449 AUE_NULL MSTD { int getaudit(struct auditinfo *auditinfo); }
450 AUE_NULL MSTD { int setaudit(struct auditinfo *auditinfo); }
451 AUE_NULL MSTD { int getaudit_addr( \
struct auditinfo_addr *auditinfo_addr, \
u_int length); }
452 AUE_NULL MNOSTD { int setaudit_addr( \
452 AUE_NULL MSTD { int setaudit_addr( \
struct auditinfo_addr *auditinfo_addr, \
u_int length); }
453 AUE_NULL MNOSTD { int auditctl(int cmd, char *path); }
453 AUE_NULL MSTD { int auditctl(int cmd, char *path); }
454 AUE_NULL MSTD { int _umtx_op(struct umtx *umtx, int op, \
long id, void *uaddr, void *uaddr2); }
455 AUE_NULL MSTD { int thr_new(struct thr_param *param, \

View File

@ -30,543 +30,7 @@
*/
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/namei.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <bsm/audit.h>
#include <bsm/audit_kevents.h>
#include <security/audit/audit.h>
#include <security/audit/audit_private.h>
#ifdef AUDIT
/*
* MPSAFE
*
* System call to allow a user space application to submit a BSM audit
* record to the kernel for inclusion in the audit log. This function
* does little verification on the audit record that is submitted.
*
* XXXAUDIT: Audit preselection for user records does not currently
* work, since we pre-select only based on the AUE_audit event type,
* not the event type submitted as part of the user audit data.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
audit(struct thread *td, struct audit_args *uap)
{
int error;
void * rec;
struct kaudit_record *ar;
error = suser(td);
if (error)
return (error);
if ((uap->length <= 0) || (uap->length > audit_qctrl.aq_bufsz))
return (EINVAL);
ar = currecord();
/* If there's no current audit record (audit() itself not audited)
* commit the user audit record.
*/
if (ar == NULL) {
/* This is not very efficient; we're required to allocate
* a complete kernel audit record just so the user record
* can tag along.
*
* XXXAUDIT: Maybe AUE_AUDIT in the system call context and
* special pre-select handling?
*/
td->td_ar = audit_new(AUE_NULL, td);
if (td->td_ar == NULL)
return (ENOTSUP);
ar = td->td_ar;
}
if (uap->length > MAX_AUDIT_RECORD_SIZE)
return (EINVAL);
rec = malloc(uap->length, M_AUDITDATA, M_WAITOK);
error = copyin(uap->record, rec, uap->length);
if (error)
goto free_out;
/* Verify the record */
if (bsm_rec_verify(rec) == 0) {
error = EINVAL;
goto free_out;
}
/* Attach the user audit record to the kernel audit record. Because
* this system call is an auditable event, we will write the user
* record along with the record for this audit event.
*
* XXXAUDIT: KASSERT appropriate starting values of k_udata, k_ulen,
* k_ar_commit & AR_COMMIT_USER?
*/
ar->k_udata = rec;
ar->k_ulen = uap->length;
ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_COMMIT_USER;
return (0);
free_out:
/* audit_syscall_exit() will free the audit record on the thread
* even if we allocated it above.
*/
free(rec, M_AUDITDATA);
return (error);
}
/*
* MPSAFE
*
* System call to manipulate auditing.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
auditon(struct thread *td, struct auditon_args *uap)
{
int error;
union auditon_udata udata;
struct proc *tp;
AUDIT_ARG(cmd, uap->cmd);
error = suser(td);
if (error)
return (error);
if ((uap->length <= 0) || (uap->length > sizeof(union auditon_udata)))
return (EINVAL);
memset((void *)&udata, 0, sizeof(udata));
switch (uap->cmd) {
/* Some of the GET commands use the arguments too */
case A_SETPOLICY:
case A_SETKMASK:
case A_SETQCTRL:
case A_SETSTAT:
case A_SETUMASK:
case A_SETSMASK:
case A_SETCOND:
case A_SETCLASS:
case A_SETPMASK:
case A_SETFSIZE:
case A_SETKAUDIT:
case A_GETCLASS:
case A_GETPINFO:
case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
case A_SENDTRIGGER:
error = copyin(uap->data, (void *)&udata, uap->length);
if (error)
return (error);
AUDIT_ARG(auditon, &udata);
break;
}
/* XXX Need to implement these commands by accessing the global
* values associated with the commands.
*
* XXXAUDIT: Locking?
*/
switch (uap->cmd) {
case A_GETPOLICY:
if (!audit_fail_stop)
udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_CNT;
if (audit_panic_on_write_fail)
udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_AHLT;
break;
case A_SETPOLICY:
if (udata.au_policy & ~(AUDIT_CNT|AUDIT_AHLT))
return (EINVAL);
/*
* XXX - Need to wake up waiters if the policy relaxes?
*/
audit_fail_stop = ((udata.au_policy & AUDIT_CNT) == 0);
audit_panic_on_write_fail = (udata.au_policy & AUDIT_AHLT);
break;
case A_GETKMASK:
udata.au_mask = audit_nae_mask;
break;
case A_SETKMASK:
audit_nae_mask = udata.au_mask;
break;
case A_GETQCTRL:
udata.au_qctrl = audit_qctrl;
break;
case A_SETQCTRL:
if ((udata.au_qctrl.aq_hiwater > AQ_MAXHIGH) ||
(udata.au_qctrl.aq_lowater >= udata.au_qctrl.aq_hiwater) ||
(udata.au_qctrl.aq_bufsz > AQ_MAXBUFSZ) ||
(udata.au_qctrl.aq_minfree < 0) ||
(udata.au_qctrl.aq_minfree > 100))
return (EINVAL);
audit_qctrl = udata.au_qctrl;
/* XXX The queue delay value isn't used with the kernel. */
audit_qctrl.aq_delay = -1;
break;
case A_GETCWD:
return (ENOSYS);
break;
case A_GETCAR:
return (ENOSYS);
break;
case A_GETSTAT:
return (ENOSYS);
break;
case A_SETSTAT:
return (ENOSYS);
break;
case A_SETUMASK:
return (ENOSYS);
break;
case A_SETSMASK:
return (ENOSYS);
break;
case A_GETCOND:
if (audit_enabled && !audit_suspended)
udata.au_cond = AUC_AUDITING;
else
udata.au_cond = AUC_NOAUDIT;
break;
case A_SETCOND:
if (udata.au_cond == AUC_NOAUDIT)
audit_suspended = 1;
if (udata.au_cond == AUC_AUDITING)
audit_suspended = 0;
if (udata.au_cond == AUC_DISABLED) {
audit_suspended = 1;
audit_shutdown(NULL, 0);
}
break;
case A_GETCLASS:
udata.au_evclass.ec_class =
au_event_class(udata.au_evclass.ec_number);
break;
case A_SETCLASS:
au_evclassmap_insert(udata.au_evclass.ec_number,
udata.au_evclass.ec_class);
break;
case A_GETPINFO:
if (udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid < 1)
return (EINVAL);
/* XXXAUDIT: p_cansee()? */
if ((tp = pfind(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) == NULL)
return (EINVAL);
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_auid = tp->p_au->ai_auid;
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_success =
tp->p_au->ai_mask.am_success;
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_failure =
tp->p_au->ai_mask.am_failure;
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_termid.machine =
tp->p_au->ai_termid.machine;
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_termid.port =
tp->p_au->ai_termid.port;
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_asid = tp->p_au->ai_asid;
PROC_UNLOCK(tp);
break;
case A_SETPMASK:
if (udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid < 1)
return (EINVAL);
/* XXXAUDIT: p_cansee()? */
if ((tp = pfind(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) == NULL)
return (EINVAL);
tp->p_au->ai_mask.am_success =
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_success;
tp->p_au->ai_mask.am_failure =
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_failure;
PROC_UNLOCK(tp);
break;
case A_SETFSIZE:
if ((udata.au_fstat.af_filesz != 0) &&
(udata.au_fstat.af_filesz < MIN_AUDIT_FILE_SIZE))
return (EINVAL);
audit_fstat.af_filesz = udata.au_fstat.af_filesz;
break;
case A_GETFSIZE:
udata.au_fstat.af_filesz = audit_fstat.af_filesz;
udata.au_fstat.af_currsz = audit_fstat.af_currsz;
break;
case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
return (ENOSYS);
break;
case A_GETKAUDIT:
return (ENOSYS);
break;
case A_SETKAUDIT:
return (ENOSYS);
break;
case A_SENDTRIGGER:
if ((udata.au_trigger < AUDIT_TRIGGER_MIN) ||
(udata.au_trigger > AUDIT_TRIGGER_MAX))
return (EINVAL);
send_trigger(udata.au_trigger);
break;
}
/* Copy data back to userspace for the GET comands */
switch (uap->cmd) {
case A_GETPOLICY:
case A_GETKMASK:
case A_GETQCTRL:
case A_GETCWD:
case A_GETCAR:
case A_GETSTAT:
case A_GETCOND:
case A_GETCLASS:
case A_GETPINFO:
case A_GETFSIZE:
case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
case A_GETKAUDIT:
error = copyout((void *)&udata, uap->data, uap->length);
if (error)
return (error);
break;
}
return (0);
}
/*
* MPSAFE
*
* System calls to manage the user audit information.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
getauid(struct thread *td, struct getauid_args *uap)
{
int error;
au_id_t id;
error = suser(td);
if (error)
return (error);
/*
* XXX:
* Integer read on static pointer dereference: doesn't need locking?
*/
PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc);
id = td->td_proc->p_au->ai_auid;
PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
return copyout(&id, uap->auid, sizeof(id));
}
/* MPSAFE */
/* ARGSUSED */
int
setauid(struct thread *td, struct setauid_args *uap)
{
int error;
au_id_t id;
error = suser(td);
if (error)
return (error);
error = copyin(uap->auid, &id, sizeof(id));
if (error)
return (error);
audit_arg_auid(id);
/*
* XXX:
* Integer write on static pointer dereference: doesn't need locking?
*
* XXXAUDIT: Might need locking to serialize audit events in the same
* order as change events? Or maybe that's an under-solveable
* problem.
*
* XXXRW: Test privilege while holding the proc lock?
*/
PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc);
td->td_proc->p_au->ai_auid = id;
PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
return (0);
}
/*
* MPSAFE
* System calls to get and set process audit information.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
getaudit(struct thread *td, struct getaudit_args *uap)
{
struct auditinfo ai;
int error;
error = suser(td);
if (error)
return (error);
PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc);
ai = *td->td_proc->p_au;
PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
return (copyout(&ai, uap->auditinfo, sizeof(ai)));
}
/* MPSAFE */
/* ARGSUSED */
int
setaudit(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_args *uap)
{
struct auditinfo ai;
int error;
error = suser(td);
if (error)
return (error);
error = copyin(uap->auditinfo, &ai, sizeof(ai));
if (error)
return (error);
audit_arg_auditinfo(&ai);
/*
* XXXRW: Test privilege while holding the proc lock?
*/
PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc);
*td->td_proc->p_au = ai;
PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
return (0);
}
/* MPSAFE */
/* ARGSUSED */
int
getaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct getaudit_addr_args *uap)
{
int error;
error = suser(td);
if (error)
return (error);
return (ENOSYS);
}
/* MPSAFE */
/* ARGSUSED */
int
setaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_addr_args *uap)
{
int error;
error = suser(td);
if (error)
return (error);
return (ENOSYS);
}
/*
* MPSAFE
* Syscall to manage audit files.
*
* XXX: Should generate an audit event.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
auditctl(struct thread *td, struct auditctl_args *uap)
{
struct nameidata nd;
struct ucred *cred;
struct vnode *vp;
int error = 0;
int flags;
error = suser(td);
if (error)
return (error);
vp = NULL;
cred = NULL;
/*
* If a path is specified, open the replacement vnode, perform
* validity checks, and grab another reference to the current
* credential.
*
* XXXAUDIT: On Darwin, a NULL path is used to disable audit.
*/
if (uap->path == NULL)
return (EINVAL);
/*
* XXXAUDIT: Giant may no longer be required here.
*/
mtx_lock(&Giant);
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
flags = AUDIT_OPEN_FLAGS;
error = vn_open(&nd, &flags, 0, -1);
if (error) {
mtx_unlock(&Giant);
goto err_out;
}
VOP_UNLOCK(nd.ni_vp, 0, td);
vp = nd.ni_vp;
if (vp->v_type != VREG) {
vn_close(vp, AUDIT_CLOSE_FLAGS, td->td_ucred, td);
mtx_unlock(&Giant);
error = EINVAL;
goto err_out;
}
cred = td->td_ucred;
crhold(cred);
/*
* XXXAUDIT: Should audit_suspended actually be cleared by
* audit_worker?
*/
audit_suspended = 0;
mtx_unlock(&Giant);
audit_rotate_vnode(cred, vp);
err_out:
return (error);
}
#else /* !AUDIT */
int
audit(struct thread *td, struct audit_args *uap)
@ -630,23 +94,3 @@ auditctl(struct thread *td, struct auditctl_args *uap)
return (ENOSYS);
}
void
audit_proc_init(struct proc *p)
{
}
void
audit_proc_fork(struct proc *parent, struct proc *child)
{
}
void
audit_proc_free(struct proc *p)
{
}
#endif /* AUDIT */