Avoid an overflow when computing the staleness.
This issue was found by running libfuzz on the userland stack. MFC after: 1 week
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@ -2553,15 +2553,12 @@ sctp_handle_cookie_echo(struct mbuf *m, int iphlen, int offset,
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/* Expire time is in Ticks, so we convert to seconds */
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time_expires.tv_sec = cookie->time_entered.tv_sec + TICKS_TO_SEC(cookie->cookie_life);
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time_expires.tv_usec = cookie->time_entered.tv_usec;
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/*
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* TODO sctp_constants.h needs alternative time macros when _KERNEL
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* is undefined.
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*/
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if (timevalcmp(&now, &time_expires, >)) {
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/* cookie is stale! */
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struct mbuf *op_err;
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struct sctp_error_stale_cookie *cause;
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uint32_t tim;
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struct timeval diff;
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uint32_t staleness;
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op_err = sctp_get_mbuf_for_msg(sizeof(struct sctp_error_stale_cookie),
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0, M_NOWAIT, 1, MT_DATA);
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@ -2575,12 +2572,19 @@ sctp_handle_cookie_echo(struct mbuf *m, int iphlen, int offset,
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cause->cause.code = htons(SCTP_CAUSE_STALE_COOKIE);
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cause->cause.length = htons((sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) +
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(sizeof(uint32_t))));
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/* seconds to usec */
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tim = (now.tv_sec - time_expires.tv_sec) * 1000000;
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/* add in usec */
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if (tim == 0)
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tim = now.tv_usec - cookie->time_entered.tv_usec;
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cause->stale_time = htonl(tim);
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diff = now;
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timevalsub(&diff, &time_expires);
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if (diff.tv_sec > UINT32_MAX / 1000000) {
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staleness = UINT32_MAX;
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} else {
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staleness = diff.tv_sec * 1000000;
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}
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if (UINT32_MAX - staleness >= diff.tv_usec) {
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staleness += diff.tv_usec;
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} else {
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staleness = UINT32_MAX;
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}
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cause->stale_time = htonl(staleness);
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sctp_send_operr_to(src, dst, sh, cookie->peers_vtag, op_err,
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mflowtype, mflowid, l_inp->fibnum,
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vrf_id, port);
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