Switch to check for effective user id in r349320, and disable dumping

into existing files for sugid processes.

Despite using real user id pronounces the intent, it actually breaks
suid coredumps, while not making any difference for non-sugid
processes.  The reason for the breakage is that non-existent core file
is created with the effective uid (unless weird hacks like SUIDDIR are
configured).

Then, if user enabled kern.sugid_coredump, core dumping should not
overwrite core files owned by effective uid, but we cannot pretend to
use real uid for dumping.

PR:	68905
admbugs:	358
Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after:	1 week
This commit is contained in:
kib 2019-06-23 21:15:31 +00:00
parent 7cd42a206e
commit 60709b2892

View File

@ -3398,10 +3398,16 @@ corefile_open_last(struct thread *td, char *name, int indexpos,
}
if (oldvp != NULL) {
if (nextvp == NULL)
nextvp = oldvp;
else
if (nextvp == NULL) {
if ((td->td_proc->p_flag & P_SUGID) != 0) {
error = EFAULT;
vnode_close_locked(td, oldvp);
} else {
nextvp = oldvp;
}
} else {
vnode_close_locked(td, oldvp);
}
}
if (error != 0) {
if (nextvp != NULL)
@ -3521,6 +3527,8 @@ corefile_open(const char *comm, uid_t uid, pid_t pid, struct thread *td,
oflags = VN_OPEN_NOAUDIT | VN_OPEN_NAMECACHE |
(capmode_coredump ? VN_OPEN_NOCAPCHECK : 0);
flags = O_CREAT | FWRITE | O_NOFOLLOW;
if ((td->td_proc->p_flag & P_SUGID) != 0)
flags |= O_EXCL;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW, UIO_SYSSPACE, name, td);
error = vn_open_cred(&nd, &flags, cmode, oflags, td->td_ucred,
@ -3597,11 +3605,11 @@ coredump(struct thread *td)
/*
* Don't dump to non-regular files or files with links.
* Do not dump into system files. Real user must own the corefile.
* Do not dump into system files. Effective user must own the corefile.
*/
if (vp->v_type != VREG || VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vattr, cred) != 0 ||
vattr.va_nlink != 1 || (vp->v_vflag & VV_SYSTEM) != 0 ||
vattr.va_uid != cred->cr_ruid) {
vattr.va_uid != cred->cr_uid) {
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
error = EFAULT;
goto out;