MFC r308887,309090: fix unsafe modification of zfs_vnodeops when

DIAGNOSTIC is enabled
This commit is contained in:
Andriy Gapon 2016-12-14 16:08:28 +00:00
parent 363a2a677a
commit 69a4df5ad0
2 changed files with 7 additions and 23 deletions

View File

@ -5976,26 +5976,17 @@ zfs_lock(ap)
int line;
} */ *ap;
{
zfsvfs_t *zfsvfs;
znode_t *zp;
vnode_t *vp;
int flags;
znode_t *zp;
int err;
vp = ap->a_vp;
flags = ap->a_flags;
if ((flags & LK_INTERLOCK) == 0 && (flags & LK_NOWAIT) == 0 &&
(vp->v_iflag & VI_DOOMED) == 0 && (zp = vp->v_data) != NULL &&
(zp->z_pflags & ZFS_XATTR) == 0) {
zfsvfs = zp->z_zfsvfs;
VERIFY(!RRM_LOCK_HELD(&zfsvfs->z_teardown_lock));
}
err = vop_stdlock(ap);
if ((flags & LK_INTERLOCK) != 0 && (flags & LK_NOWAIT) == 0 &&
(vp->v_iflag & VI_DOOMED) == 0 && (zp = vp->v_data) != NULL &&
(zp->z_pflags & ZFS_XATTR) == 0) {
zfsvfs = zp->z_zfsvfs;
VERIFY(!RRM_LOCK_HELD(&zfsvfs->z_teardown_lock));
if (err == 0 && (ap->a_flags & LK_NOWAIT) == 0) {
vp = ap->a_vp;
zp = vp->v_data;
if (vp->v_mount != NULL && (vp->v_iflag & VI_DOOMED) == 0 &&
zp != NULL && (zp->z_pflags & ZFS_XATTR) == 0)
VERIFY(!RRM_LOCK_HELD(&zp->z_zfsvfs->z_teardown_lock));
}
return (err);
}

View File

@ -727,14 +727,7 @@ zfs_znode_alloc(zfsvfs_t *zfsvfs, dmu_buf_t *db, int blksz,
/*
* Acquire vnode lock before making it available to the world.
*/
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
vop_lock1_t *orig_lock = vp->v_op->vop_lock1;
vp->v_op->vop_lock1 = vop_stdlock;
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
vp->v_op->vop_lock1 = orig_lock;
#else
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
#endif
VN_LOCK_AREC(vp);
if (vp->v_type != VFIFO)
VN_LOCK_ASHARE(vp);