diff --git a/sbin/geom/class/eli/geli.8 b/sbin/geom/class/eli/geli.8
index d465099295d5..ef9da572cc70 100644
--- a/sbin/geom/class/eli/geli.8
+++ b/sbin/geom/class/eli/geli.8
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
 .\"
 .\" $FreeBSD$
 .\"
-.Dd February 11, 2006
+.Dd August 9, 2006
 .Dt GELI 8
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ utility:
 .Nm
 .Cm init
 .Op Fl bPv
-.Op Fl a Ar algo
+.Op Fl a Ar aalgo
+.Op Fl e Ar ealgo
 .Op Fl i Ar iterations
 .Op Fl K Ar newkeyfile
 .Op Fl l Ar keylen
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ utility:
 .Cm init
 .Nm
 .Cm attach
-.Op Fl dpv
+.Op Fl dprv
 .Op Fl k Ar keyfile
 .Ar prov
 .Nm
@@ -76,7 +77,8 @@ utility:
 .Nm
 .Cm onetime
 .Op Fl d
-.Op Fl a Ar algo
+.Op Fl a Ar aalgo
+.Op Fl e Ar ealgo
 .Op Fl l Ar keylen
 .Op Fl s Ar sectorsize
 .Ar prov ...
@@ -144,6 +146,16 @@ Supports many cryptographic algorithms (currently
 and
 .Nm 3DES ) .
 .It
+Can optionally perform data authentication (integrity verification) utilizing
+one of the following algorithms:
+.Nm HMAC/MD5 ,
+.Nm HMAC/SHA1 ,
+.Nm HMAC/RIPEMD160 ,
+.Nm HMAC/SHA256 ,
+.Nm HMAC/SHA384
+or
+.Nm HMAC/SHA512 .
+.It
 Can create a key from a couple of components (user entered passphrase, random
 bits from a file, etc.).
 .It
@@ -151,7 +163,7 @@ Allows to encrypt the root partition - the user will be asked for the
 passphrase before the root file system is mounted.
 .It
 The passphrase of the user is strengthened with:
-.Rs 
+.Rs
 .%A B. Kaliski
 .%T "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification, Version 2.0."
 .%R RFC
@@ -163,7 +175,7 @@ Allows to use two independent keys (e.g.
 and
 .Qq "company key" ) .
 .It
-It is fast - 
+It is fast -
 .Nm
 performs simple sector-to-sector encryption.
 .It
@@ -177,6 +189,8 @@ the file systems).
 .It
 Allows to attach a provider with a random, one-time key - useful for swap
 partitions and temporary file systems.
+.It
+Allows to verify data integrity (data authentication).
 .El
 .Pp
 The first argument to
@@ -189,8 +203,23 @@ Here you can set up the cryptographic algorithm to use, key length, etc.
 The last provider's sector is used to store metadata.
 .Pp
 Additional options include:
-.Bl -tag -width ".Fl a Ar algo"
-.It Fl a Ar algo
+.Bl -tag -width ".Fl a Ar aalgo"
+.It Fl a Ar aalgo
+Enable data integrity verification (authentication) using the given algorithm.
+This will reduce size of available storage and also reduce speed.
+For example, when using 4096 bytes sector and
+.Nm HMAC/SHA256
+algorithm, 89% of the original provider storage will be available for use.
+Currently supported algorithms are:
+.Nm HMAC/MD5 ,
+.Nm HMAC/SHA1 ,
+.Nm HMAC/RIPEMD160 ,
+.Nm HMAC/SHA256 ,
+.Nm HMAC/SHA384
+and
+.Nm HMAC/SHA512 .
+If the option is not given, there will be no authentication, only encryption.
+.It Fl e Ar ealgo
 Encryption algorithm to use.
 Currently supported algorithms are:
 .Nm AES ,
@@ -259,6 +288,9 @@ Probably a better choice is the
 option for the
 .Cm detach
 subcommand.
+.It Fl r
+Attach read-only provider.
+It will not be opened for writing.
 .It Fl k Ar keyfile
 Specifies a file which contains part of the key.
 For more information see the description of the
@@ -289,8 +321,13 @@ Attach the given providers with random, one-time keys.
 The command can be used to encrypt swap partitions or temporary file systems.
 .Pp
 Additional options include:
-.Bl -tag -width ".Fl a Ar algo"
-.It Fl a Ar algo
+.Bl -tag -width ".Fl a Ar aalgo"
+.It Fl a Ar aalgo
+Enable data integrity verification (authentication).
+For more information, see the description of the
+.Cm init
+subcommand.
+.It Fl e Ar ealgo
 Encryption algorithm to use.
 For more information, see the description of the
 .Cm init
@@ -415,6 +452,8 @@ variables can be used to control the behavior of the
 .Nm ELI
 GEOM class.
 The default value is shown next to each variable.
+All variables can also be set in
+.Pa /boot/loader.conf .
 .Bl -tag -width indent
 .It Va kern.geom.eli.debug : No 0
 Debug level of the
@@ -424,8 +463,6 @@ This can be set to a number between 0 and 3 inclusive.
 If set to 0, minimal debug information is printed.
 If set to 3, the
 maximum amount of debug information is printed.
-This variable could be set in
-.Pa /boot/loader.conf .
 .It Va kern.geom.eli.tries : No 3
 Number of times a user is asked for the passphrase.
 This is only used for providers which should be attached on boot
@@ -451,8 +488,11 @@ cryptography.
 Its purpose is to increase performance on SMP systems.
 If hardware acceleration is available, only one thread will be started.
 If set to 0, CPU-bound thread will be started for every active CPU.
-This variable could be set in
-.Pa /boot/loader.conf .
+.It Va kern.geom.eli.batch : No 0
+When set to 1, can speed-up crypto operations by using batching.
+Batching allows to reduce number of interrupts by responding on a group of
+crypto requests with one interrupt.
+The crypto card and the driver has to support this feature.
 .El
 .Sh EXIT STATUS
 Exit status is 0 on success, and 1 if the command fails.
@@ -508,7 +548,7 @@ Reenter new passphrase:
 Encrypted swap partition setup:
 .Bd -literal -offset indent
 # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/ad0s1b bs=1m
-# geli onetime -d -a 3des ad0s1b
+# geli onetime -d -e 3des ad0s1b
 # swapon /dev/ad0s1b.eli
 .Ed
 .Pp
@@ -546,6 +586,38 @@ geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_load="YES"
 geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_type="da1s3a:geli_keyfile0"
 geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_name="/boot/keys/da1s3a.key"
 .Ed
+.Pp
+Not only configure encryption, but also data integrity verification using
+.Nm HMAC/SHA256 .
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+# geli init -a hmac/sha256 -s 4096 /dev/da0
+Enter new passphrase:
+Reenter new passphrase:
+# geli attach /dev/da0
+Enter passphrase:
+# dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da0.eli bs=1m
+# newfs /dev/da0.eli
+# mount /dev/da0.eli /mnt/secret
+.Ed
+.Sh DATA AUTHENTICATION
+.Nm
+can verify data integrity when an authentication algorithm is specified.
+When data corruption/modification is detected,
+.Nm
+will not return any data, but instead will return an error
+.Pq Er EINVAL .
+The offset and size of the corrupted data will be printed on the console.
+It is important to know against which attacks
+.Nm
+provides protection for your data.
+If data is modified or copied from one place on the disk
+to another,
+.Nm
+should be able to detect such a modification.
+If an attacker can remember the encrypted data, modify them and write them
+back to the same place, the modification will not be detected.
+.Nm
+will not protect your data against replay attacks.
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr crypto 4 ,
 .Xr gbde 4 ,
diff --git a/sbin/geom/class/eli/geom_eli.c b/sbin/geom/class/eli/geom_eli.c
index e71adc9e4d02..d9543aea8a5f 100644
--- a/sbin/geom/class/eli/geom_eli.c
+++ b/sbin/geom/class/eli/geom_eli.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*-
- * Copyright (c) 2004 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org>
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
 uint32_t lib_version = G_LIB_VERSION;
 uint32_t version = G_ELI_VERSION;
 
-static char algo[] = "aes";
+static char aalgo[] = "none";
+static char ealgo[] = "aes";
 static intmax_t keylen = 0;
 static intmax_t keyno = -1;
 static intmax_t iterations = -1;
@@ -75,12 +76,12 @@ static void eli_dump(struct gctl_req *req);
 /*
  * Available commands:
  *
- * init [-bhPv] [-a algo] [-i iterations] [-l keylen] [-K newkeyfile] prov
+ * init [-bhPv] [-a aalgo] [-e ealgo] [-i iterations] [-l keylen] [-K newkeyfile] prov
  * label - alias for 'init'
- * attach [-dpv] [-k keyfile] prov
+ * attach [-dprv] [-k keyfile] prov
  * detach [-fl] prov ...
  * stop - alias for 'detach'
- * onetime [-d] [-a algo] [-l keylen] prov ...
+ * onetime [-d] [-a aalgo] [-e ealgo] [-l keylen] prov ...
  * setkey [-pPv] [-n keyno] [-k keyfile] [-K newkeyfile] prov
  * delkey [-afv] [-n keyno] prov
  * kill [-av] [prov ...]
@@ -92,8 +93,9 @@ static void eli_dump(struct gctl_req *req);
 struct g_command class_commands[] = {
 	{ "init", G_FLAG_VERBOSE, eli_main,
 	    {
-		{ 'a', "algo", algo, G_TYPE_STRING },
+		{ 'a', "aalgo", aalgo, G_TYPE_STRING },
 		{ 'b', "boot", NULL, G_TYPE_NONE },
+		{ 'e', "ealgo", ealgo, G_TYPE_STRING },
 		{ 'i', "iterations", &iterations, G_TYPE_NUMBER },
 		{ 'K', "newkeyfile", newkeyfile, G_TYPE_STRING },
 		{ 'l', "keylen", &keylen, G_TYPE_NUMBER },
@@ -101,12 +103,13 @@ struct g_command class_commands[] = {
 		{ 's', "sectorsize", &sectorsize, G_TYPE_NUMBER },
 		G_OPT_SENTINEL
 	    },
-	    "[-bPv] [-a algo] [-i iterations] [-l keylen] [-K newkeyfile] [-s sectorsize] prov"
+	    "[-bPv] [-a aalgo] [-e ealgo] [-i iterations] [-l keylen] [-K newkeyfile] [-s sectorsize] prov"
 	},
 	{ "label", G_FLAG_VERBOSE, eli_main,
 	    {
-		{ 'a', "algo", algo, G_TYPE_STRING },
+		{ 'a', "aalgo", aalgo, G_TYPE_STRING },
 		{ 'b', "boot", NULL, G_TYPE_NONE },
+		{ 'e', "ealgo", ealgo, G_TYPE_STRING },
 		{ 'i', "iterations", &iterations, G_TYPE_NUMBER },
 		{ 'K', "newkeyfile", newkeyfile, G_TYPE_STRING },
 		{ 'l', "keylen", &keylen, G_TYPE_NUMBER },
@@ -121,9 +124,10 @@ struct g_command class_commands[] = {
 		{ 'd', "detach", NULL, G_TYPE_NONE },
 		{ 'k', "keyfile", keyfile, G_TYPE_STRING },
 		{ 'p', "nopassphrase", NULL, G_TYPE_NONE },
+		{ 'r', "readonly", NULL, G_TYPE_NONE },
 		G_OPT_SENTINEL
 	    },
-	    "[-dpv] [-k keyfile] prov"
+	    "[-dprv] [-k keyfile] prov"
 	},
 	{ "detach", 0, NULL,
 	    {
@@ -143,13 +147,14 @@ struct g_command class_commands[] = {
 	},
 	{ "onetime", G_FLAG_VERBOSE | G_FLAG_LOADKLD, NULL,
 	    {
-		{ 'a', "algo", algo, G_TYPE_STRING },
+		{ 'a', "aalgo", aalgo, G_TYPE_STRING },
 		{ 'd', "detach", NULL, G_TYPE_NONE },
+		{ 'e', "ealgo", ealgo, G_TYPE_STRING },
 		{ 'l', "keylen", &keylen, G_TYPE_NUMBER },
 		{ 's', "sectorsize", &sectorsize, G_TYPE_NUMBER },
 		G_OPT_SENTINEL
 	    },
-	    "[-d] [-a algo] [-l keylen] [-s sectorsize] prov ..."
+	    "[-d] [-a aalgo] [-e ealgo] [-l keylen] [-s sectorsize] prov ..."
 	},
 	{ "setkey", G_FLAG_VERBOSE, eli_main,
 	    {
@@ -389,7 +394,7 @@ eli_genkey(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_eli_metadata *md, unsigned char *key,
 			}
 		}
 		/*
-		 * If md_iterations is equal to 0, user don't want PKCS5v2.
+		 * If md_iterations is equal to 0, user don't want PKCS#5v2.
 		 */
 		if (md->md_iterations == 0) {
 			g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(&ctx, md->md_salt,
@@ -523,16 +528,44 @@ eli_init(struct gctl_req *req)
 	md.md_flags = 0;
 	if (gctl_get_int(req, "boot"))
 		md.md_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_BOOT;
-	str = gctl_get_ascii(req, "algo");
-	md.md_algo = g_eli_str2algo(str);
-	if (md.md_algo < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN ||
-	    md.md_algo > CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX) {
-		gctl_error(req, "Invalid encryption algorithm.");
-		return;
+	md.md_ealgo = CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN - 1;
+	str = gctl_get_ascii(req, "aalgo");
+	if (strcmp(str, "none") != 0) {
+		md.md_aalgo = g_eli_str2aalgo(str);
+		if (md.md_aalgo >= CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN &&
+		    md.md_aalgo <= CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX) {
+			md.md_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH;
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * For backward compatibility, check if the -a option
+			 * was used to provide encryption algorithm.
+			 */
+			md.md_ealgo = g_eli_str2ealgo(str);
+			if (md.md_ealgo < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN ||
+			    md.md_ealgo > CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX) {
+				gctl_error(req,
+				    "Invalid authentication algorithm.");
+				return;
+			} else {
+				fprintf(stderr, "warning: The -e option, not "
+				    "the -a option is now used to specify "
+				    "encryption algorithm to use.\n");
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (md.md_ealgo < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN ||
+	    md.md_ealgo > CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX) {
+		str = gctl_get_ascii(req, "ealgo");
+		md.md_ealgo = g_eli_str2ealgo(str);
+		if (md.md_ealgo < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN ||
+		    md.md_ealgo > CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX) {
+			gctl_error(req, "Invalid encryption algorithm.");
+			return;
+		}
 	}
 	val = gctl_get_intmax(req, "keylen");
 	md.md_keylen = val;
-	md.md_keylen = g_eli_keylen(md.md_algo, md.md_keylen);
+	md.md_keylen = g_eli_keylen(md.md_ealgo, md.md_keylen);
 	if (md.md_keylen == 0) {
 		gctl_error(req, "Invalid key length.");
 		return;
@@ -579,7 +612,7 @@ eli_init(struct gctl_req *req)
 	}
 
 	/* Encrypt the first and the only Master Key. */
-	error = g_eli_mkey_encrypt(md.md_algo, key, md.md_keylen, md.md_mkeys);
+	error = g_eli_mkey_encrypt(md.md_ealgo, key, md.md_keylen, md.md_mkeys);
 	bzero(key, sizeof(key));
 	if (error != 0) {
 		bzero(&md, sizeof(md));
@@ -733,7 +766,7 @@ eli_setkey_detached(struct gctl_req *req, const char *prov,
 	}
 
 	/* Encrypt the Master-Key with the new key. */
-	error = g_eli_mkey_encrypt(md->md_algo, key, md->md_keylen, mkeydst);
+	error = g_eli_mkey_encrypt(md->md_ealgo, key, md->md_keylen, mkeydst);
 	bzero(key, sizeof(key));
 	if (error != 0) {
 		bzero(md, sizeof(*md));
diff --git a/sys/geom/eli/g_eli.c b/sys/geom/eli/g_eli.c
index e57e405253c6..51846fc762da 100644
--- a/sys/geom/eli/g_eli.c
+++ b/sys/geom/eli/g_eli.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*-
- * Copyright (c) 2005 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2006 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org>
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -69,16 +69,20 @@ SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_geom_eli, OID_AUTO, visible_passphrase, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &g_eli_visible_passphrase, 0,
     "Turn on echo when entering the passphrase (for debug purposes only!!)");
 u_int g_eli_overwrites = 5;
+TUNABLE_INT("kern.geom.eli.overwrites", &g_eli_overwrites);
 SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_geom_eli, OID_AUTO, overwrites, CTLFLAG_RW, &g_eli_overwrites,
     0, "Number of times on-disk keys should be overwritten when destroying them");
 static u_int g_eli_threads = 0;
 TUNABLE_INT("kern.geom.eli.threads", &g_eli_threads);
 SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_geom_eli, OID_AUTO, threads, CTLFLAG_RW, &g_eli_threads, 0,
     "Number of threads doing crypto work");
+u_int g_eli_batch = 0;
+TUNABLE_INT("kern.geom.eli.batch", &g_eli_batch);
+SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_geom_eli, OID_AUTO, batch, CTLFLAG_RW, &g_eli_batch, 0,
+    "Use crypto operations batching");
 
 static int g_eli_destroy_geom(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp,
     struct g_geom *gp);
-static void g_eli_crypto_run(struct g_eli_worker *wr, struct bio *bp);
 
 static g_taste_t g_eli_taste;
 static g_dumpconf_t g_eli_dumpconf;
@@ -106,7 +110,7 @@ struct g_class g_eli_class = {
  * accelerator or something like this.
  * The function updates the SID and rerun the operation.
  */
-static int
+int
 g_eli_crypto_rerun(struct cryptop *crp)
 {
 	struct g_eli_softc *sc;
@@ -139,7 +143,7 @@ g_eli_crypto_rerun(struct cryptop *crp)
  *
  * g_eli_start -> g_io_request -> G_ELI_READ_DONE -> g_eli_crypto_run -> g_eli_crypto_read_done -> g_io_deliver
  */
-static void
+void
 g_eli_read_done(struct bio *bp)
 {
 	struct g_eli_softc *sc;
@@ -149,10 +153,20 @@ g_eli_read_done(struct bio *bp)
 	pbp = bp->bio_parent;
 	if (pbp->bio_error == 0)
 		pbp->bio_error = bp->bio_error;
+	/*
+	 * Do we have all sectors already?
+	 */
+	pbp->bio_inbed++;
+	if (pbp->bio_inbed < pbp->bio_children)
+		return;
 	g_destroy_bio(bp);
 	if (pbp->bio_error != 0) {
 		G_ELI_LOGREQ(0, pbp, "%s() failed", __func__);
 		pbp->bio_completed = 0;
+		if (pbp->bio_driver2 != NULL) {
+			free(pbp->bio_driver2, M_ELI);
+			pbp->bio_driver2 = NULL;
+		}
 		g_io_deliver(pbp, pbp->bio_error);
 		return;
 	}
@@ -163,70 +177,31 @@ g_eli_read_done(struct bio *bp)
 	wakeup(sc);
 }
 
-/*
- * The function is called after we read and decrypt data.
- *
- * g_eli_start -> g_io_request -> g_eli_read_done -> g_eli_crypto_run -> G_ELI_CRYPTO_READ_DONE -> g_io_deliver
- */
-static int
-g_eli_crypto_read_done(struct cryptop *crp)
-{
-	struct bio *bp;
-
-	if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
-		if (g_eli_crypto_rerun(crp) == 0)
-			return (0);
-	}
-	bp = (struct bio *)crp->crp_opaque;
-	bp->bio_inbed++;
-	if (crp->crp_etype == 0) {
-		G_ELI_DEBUG(3, "Crypto READ request done (%d/%d).",
-		    bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children);
-		bp->bio_completed += crp->crp_olen;
-	} else {
-		G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Crypto READ request failed (%d/%d) error=%d.",
-		    bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children, crp->crp_etype);
-		if (bp->bio_error == 0)
-			bp->bio_error = crp->crp_etype;
-	}
-	/*
-	 * Do we have all sectors already?
-	 */
-	if (bp->bio_inbed < bp->bio_children)
-		return (0);
-	free(bp->bio_driver2, M_ELI);
-	bp->bio_driver2 = NULL;
-	if (bp->bio_error != 0) {
-		G_ELI_LOGREQ(0, bp, "Crypto READ request failed (error=%d).",
-		    bp->bio_error);
-		bp->bio_completed = 0;
-	}
-	/*
-	 * Read is finished, send it up.
-	 */
-	g_io_deliver(bp, bp->bio_error);
-	return (0);
-}
-
 /*
  * The function is called after we encrypt and write data.
  *
  * g_eli_start -> g_eli_crypto_run -> g_eli_crypto_write_done -> g_io_request -> G_ELI_WRITE_DONE -> g_io_deliver
  */
-static void
+void
 g_eli_write_done(struct bio *bp)
 {
 	struct bio *pbp;
 
 	G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, bp, "Request done.");
 	pbp = bp->bio_parent;
-	if (pbp->bio_error == 0)
-		pbp->bio_error = bp->bio_error;
+	if (pbp->bio_error == 0) {
+		if (bp->bio_error != 0)
+			pbp->bio_error = bp->bio_error;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Do we have all sectors already?
+	 */
+	pbp->bio_inbed++;
+	if (pbp->bio_inbed < pbp->bio_children)
+		return;
 	free(pbp->bio_driver2, M_ELI);
 	pbp->bio_driver2 = NULL;
-	if (pbp->bio_error == 0)
-		pbp->bio_completed = pbp->bio_length;
-	else {
+	if (pbp->bio_error != 0) {
 		G_ELI_LOGREQ(0, pbp, "Crypto WRITE request failed (error=%d).",
 		    pbp->bio_error);
 		pbp->bio_completed = 0;
@@ -235,67 +210,10 @@ g_eli_write_done(struct bio *bp)
 	/*
 	 * Write is finished, send it up.
 	 */
+	pbp->bio_completed = pbp->bio_length;
 	g_io_deliver(pbp, pbp->bio_error);
 }
 
-/*
- * The function is called after data encryption.
- *
- * g_eli_start -> g_eli_crypto_run -> G_ELI_CRYPTO_WRITE_DONE -> g_io_request -> g_eli_write_done -> g_io_deliver
- */
-static int
-g_eli_crypto_write_done(struct cryptop *crp)
-{
-	struct g_geom *gp;
-	struct g_consumer *cp;
-	struct bio *bp, *cbp;
-
-	if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
-		if (g_eli_crypto_rerun(crp) == 0)
-			return (0);
-	}
-	bp = (struct bio *)crp->crp_opaque;
-	bp->bio_inbed++;
-	if (crp->crp_etype == 0) {
-		G_ELI_DEBUG(3, "Crypto WRITE request done (%d/%d).",
-		    bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children);
-	} else {
-		G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Crypto WRITE request failed (%d/%d) error=%d.",
-		    bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children, crp->crp_etype);
-		if (bp->bio_error == 0)
-			bp->bio_error = crp->crp_etype;
-	}
-	/*
-	 * All sectors are already encrypted?
-	 */
-	if (bp->bio_inbed < bp->bio_children)
-		return (0);
-	bp->bio_inbed = 0;
-	bp->bio_children = 1;
-	cbp = bp->bio_driver1;
-	bp->bio_driver1 = NULL;
-	if (bp->bio_error != 0) {
-		G_ELI_LOGREQ(0, bp, "Crypto WRITE request failed (error=%d).",
-		    bp->bio_error);
-		free(bp->bio_driver2, M_ELI);
-		bp->bio_driver2 = NULL;
-		g_destroy_bio(cbp);
-		g_io_deliver(bp, bp->bio_error);
-		return (0);
-	}
-	cbp->bio_data = bp->bio_driver2;
-	cbp->bio_done = g_eli_write_done;
-	gp = bp->bio_to->geom;
-	cp = LIST_FIRST(&gp->consumer);
-	cbp->bio_to = cp->provider;
-	G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, cbp, "Sending request.");
-	/*
-	 * Send encrypted data to the provider.
-	 */
-	g_io_request(cbp, cp);
-	return (0);
-}
-
 /*
  * This function should never be called, but GEOM made as it set ->orphan()
  * method for every geom.
@@ -358,15 +276,20 @@ g_eli_start(struct bio *bp)
 	}
 	switch (bp->bio_cmd) {
 	case BIO_READ:
-		cbp->bio_done = g_eli_read_done;
-		cp = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer);
-		cbp->bio_to = cp->provider;
-		G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, cbp, "Sending request.");
-		/*
-		 * Read encrypted data from provider.
-		 */
-		g_io_request(cbp, cp);
-		break;
+		if (!(sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH)) {
+			bp->bio_driver2 = NULL;
+			cbp->bio_done = g_eli_read_done;
+			cp = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer);
+			cbp->bio_to = cp->provider;
+			G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, cbp, "Sending request.");
+			/*
+			 * Read encrypted data from provider.
+			 */
+			g_io_request(cbp, cp);
+			break;
+		}
+		bp->bio_pflags = 255;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
 	case BIO_WRITE:
 		bp->bio_driver1 = cbp;
 		mtx_lock(&sc->sc_queue_mtx);
@@ -411,7 +334,7 @@ g_eli_worker(void *arg)
 		mtx_lock(&sc->sc_queue_mtx);
 		bp = bioq_takefirst(&sc->sc_queue);
 		if (bp == NULL) {
-			if ((sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_DESTROY) != 0) {
+			if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_DESTROY) {
 				LIST_REMOVE(wr, w_next);
 				crypto_freesession(wr->w_sid);
 				free(wr, M_ELI);
@@ -426,20 +349,27 @@ g_eli_worker(void *arg)
 			continue;
 		}
 		mtx_unlock(&sc->sc_queue_mtx);
-		g_eli_crypto_run(wr, bp);
+		if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_READ && bp->bio_pflags == 255)
+			g_eli_auth_read(sc, bp);
+		else if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH)
+			g_eli_auth_run(wr, bp);
+		else
+			g_eli_crypto_run(wr, bp);
 	}
 }
 
 /*
  * Here we generate IV. It is unique for every sector.
  */
-static void
+void
 g_eli_crypto_ivgen(struct g_eli_softc *sc, off_t offset, u_char *iv,
     size_t size)
 {
-	u_char hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	u_char off[8], hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 	SHA256_CTX ctx;
 
+	if (!(sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_NATIVE_BYTE_ORDER))
+		le64enc(off, (uint64_t)offset);
 	/* Copy precalculated SHA256 context for IV-Key. */
 	bcopy(&sc->sc_ivctx, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
 	SHA256_Update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)&offset, sizeof(offset));
@@ -447,110 +377,6 @@ g_eli_crypto_ivgen(struct g_eli_softc *sc, off_t offset, u_char *iv,
 	bcopy(hash, iv, size);
 }
 
-/*
- * This is the main function responsible for cryptography (ie. communication
- * with crypto(9) subsystem).
- */
-static void
-g_eli_crypto_run(struct g_eli_worker *wr, struct bio *bp)
-{
-	struct g_eli_softc *sc;
-	struct cryptop *crp;
-	struct cryptodesc *crd;
-	struct uio *uio;
-	struct iovec *iov;
-	u_int i, nsec, add, secsize;
-	int err, error;
-	size_t size;
-	u_char *p, *data;
-
-	G_ELI_LOGREQ(3, bp, "%s", __func__);
-
-	bp->bio_pflags = wr->w_number;
-	sc = wr->w_softc;
-	secsize = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->provider)->sectorsize;
-	nsec = bp->bio_length / secsize;
-
-	/*
-	 * Calculate how much memory do we need.
-	 * We need separate crypto operation for every single sector.
-	 * It is much faster to calculate total amount of needed memory here and
-	 * do the allocation once instead of allocating memory in pieces (many,
-	 * many pieces).
-	 */
-	size = sizeof(*crp) * nsec;
-	size += sizeof(*crd) * nsec;
-	size += sizeof(*uio) * nsec;
-	size += sizeof(*iov) * nsec;
-	/*
-	 * If we write the data we cannot destroy current bio_data content,
-	 * so we need to allocate more memory for encrypted data.
-	 */
-	if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_WRITE)
-		size += bp->bio_length;
-	p = malloc(size, M_ELI, M_WAITOK);
-
-	bp->bio_inbed = 0;
-	bp->bio_children = nsec;
-	bp->bio_driver2 = p;
-
-	if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_READ)
-		data = bp->bio_data;
-	else {
-		data = p;
-		p += bp->bio_length;
-		bcopy(bp->bio_data, data, bp->bio_length);
-	}
-
-	error = 0;
-	for (i = 0, add = 0; i < nsec; i++, add += secsize) {
-		crp = (struct cryptop *)p;	p += sizeof(*crp);
-		crd = (struct cryptodesc *)p;	p += sizeof(*crd);
-		uio = (struct uio *)p;		p += sizeof(*uio);
-		iov = (struct iovec *)p;	p += sizeof(*iov);
-
-		iov->iov_len = secsize;
-		iov->iov_base = data;
-		data += secsize;
-
-		uio->uio_iov = iov;
-		uio->uio_iovcnt = 1;
-		uio->uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
-		uio->uio_resid = secsize;
-
-		crp->crp_sid = wr->w_sid;
-		crp->crp_ilen = secsize;
-		crp->crp_olen = secsize;
-		crp->crp_opaque = (void *)bp;
-		crp->crp_buf = (void *)uio;
-		if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_WRITE)
-			crp->crp_callback = g_eli_crypto_write_done;
-		else /* if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_READ) */
-			crp->crp_callback = g_eli_crypto_read_done;
-		crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IOV | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC | CRYPTO_F_REL;
-		crp->crp_desc = crd;
-
-		crd->crd_skip = 0;
-		crd->crd_len = secsize;
-		crd->crd_flags = CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT | CRD_F_IV_PRESENT;
-		if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_WRITE)
-			crd->crd_flags |= CRD_F_ENCRYPT;
-		crd->crd_alg = sc->sc_algo;
-		crd->crd_key = sc->sc_datakey;
-		crd->crd_klen = sc->sc_keylen;
-		g_eli_crypto_ivgen(sc, bp->bio_offset + add, crd->crd_iv,
-		    sizeof(crd->crd_iv));
-		crd->crd_next = NULL;
-
-		crp->crp_etype = 0;
-		err = crypto_dispatch(crp);
-		if (error == 0)
-			error = err;
-	}
-	if (bp->bio_error == 0)
-		bp->bio_error = error;
-}
-
 int
 g_eli_read_metadata(struct g_class *mp, struct g_provider *pp,
     struct g_eli_metadata *md)
@@ -631,6 +457,10 @@ g_eli_access(struct g_provider *pp, int dr, int dw, int de)
 	sc = gp->softc;
 
 	if (dw > 0) {
+		if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_RO) {
+			/* Deny write attempts. */
+			return (EROFS);
+		}
 		/* Someone is opening us for write, we need to remember that. */
 		sc->sc_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_WOPEN;
 		return (0);
@@ -658,7 +488,7 @@ g_eli_create(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp, struct g_provider *bpp,
 	struct g_geom *gp;
 	struct g_provider *pp;
 	struct g_consumer *cp;
-	struct cryptoini cri;
+	struct cryptoini crie, cria;
 	u_int i, threads;
 	int error;
 
@@ -671,31 +501,60 @@ g_eli_create(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp, struct g_provider *bpp,
 	gp->start = g_eli_start;
 	/*
 	 * Spoiling cannot happen actually, because we keep provider open for
-	 * writing all the time.
+	 * writing all the time or provider is read-only.
 	 */
 	gp->spoiled = g_eli_orphan_spoil_assert;
 	gp->orphan = g_eli_orphan;
+	gp->dumpconf = g_eli_dumpconf;
 	/*
-	 * If detach-on-last-close feature is not enabled, we can simply use
-	 * g_std_access().
+	 * If detach-on-last-close feature is not enabled and we don't operate
+	 * on read-only provider, we can simply use g_std_access().
 	 */
-	if (md->md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_WO_DETACH)
+	if (md->md_flags & (G_ELI_FLAG_WO_DETACH | G_ELI_FLAG_RO))
 		gp->access = g_eli_access;
 	else
 		gp->access = g_std_access;
-	gp->dumpconf = g_eli_dumpconf;
 
 	sc->sc_crypto = G_ELI_CRYPTO_SW;
 	sc->sc_flags = md->md_flags;
-	sc->sc_algo = md->md_algo;
+	/* Backward compatibility. */
+	if (md->md_version < 2)
+		sc->sc_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_NATIVE_BYTE_ORDER;
+	sc->sc_ealgo = md->md_ealgo;
 	sc->sc_nkey = nkey;
 	/*
 	 * Remember the keys in our softc structure.
 	 */
-	bcopy(mkey, sc->sc_ivkey, sizeof(sc->sc_ivkey));
-	mkey += sizeof(sc->sc_ivkey);
-	bcopy(mkey, sc->sc_datakey, sizeof(sc->sc_datakey));
-	sc->sc_keylen = md->md_keylen;
+	g_eli_mkey_propagate(sc, mkey);
+	sc->sc_ekeylen = md->md_keylen;
+
+	if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH) {
+		sc->sc_akeylen = sizeof(sc->sc_akey) * 8;
+		sc->sc_aalgo = md->md_aalgo;
+		sc->sc_alen = g_eli_hashlen(sc->sc_aalgo);
+
+		sc->sc_data_per_sector = bpp->sectorsize - sc->sc_alen;
+		/*
+		 * Some hash functions (like SHA1 and RIPEMD160) generates hash
+		 * which length is not multiple of 128 bits, but we want data
+		 * length to be multiple of 128, so we can encrypt without
+		 * padding. The line below rounds down data length to multiple
+		 * of 128 bits.
+		 */
+		sc->sc_data_per_sector -= sc->sc_data_per_sector % 16;
+
+		sc->sc_bytes_per_sector =
+		    (md->md_sectorsize - 1) / sc->sc_data_per_sector + 1;
+		sc->sc_bytes_per_sector *= bpp->sectorsize;
+		/*
+		 * Precalculate SHA256 for HMAC key generation.
+		 * This is expensive operation and we can do it only once now or
+		 * for every access to sector, so now will be much better.
+		 */
+		SHA256_Init(&sc->sc_akeyctx);
+		SHA256_Update(&sc->sc_akeyctx, sc->sc_akey,
+		    sizeof(sc->sc_akey));
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Precalculate SHA256 for IV generation.
@@ -728,8 +587,13 @@ g_eli_create(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp, struct g_provider *bpp,
 	 * Keep provider open all the time, so we can run critical tasks,
 	 * like Master Keys deletion, without wondering if we can open
 	 * provider or not.
+	 * We don't open provider for writing only when user requested read-only
+	 * access.
 	 */
-	error = g_access(cp, 1, 1, 1);
+	if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_RO)
+		error = g_access(cp, 1, 0, 1);
+	else
+		error = g_access(cp, 1, 1, 1);
 	if (error != 0) {
 		if (req != NULL) {
 			gctl_error(req, "Cannot access %s (error=%d).",
@@ -743,10 +607,17 @@ g_eli_create(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp, struct g_provider *bpp,
 
 	LIST_INIT(&sc->sc_workers);
 
-	bzero(&cri, sizeof(cri));
-	cri.cri_alg = sc->sc_algo;
-	cri.cri_klen = sc->sc_keylen;
-	cri.cri_key = sc->sc_datakey;
+	bzero(&crie, sizeof(crie));
+	crie.cri_alg = sc->sc_ealgo;
+	crie.cri_klen = sc->sc_ekeylen;
+	crie.cri_key = sc->sc_ekey;
+	if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH) {
+		bzero(&cria, sizeof(cria));
+		cria.cri_alg = sc->sc_aalgo;
+		cria.cri_klen = sc->sc_akeylen;
+		cria.cri_key = sc->sc_akey;
+		crie.cri_next = &cria;
+	}
 
 	threads = g_eli_threads;
 	if (threads == 0)
@@ -766,12 +637,12 @@ g_eli_create(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp, struct g_provider *bpp,
 		 * Use software cryptography, if we cannot get it.
 		 */
 		if (i == 0) {
-			error = crypto_newsession(&wr->w_sid, &cri, 1);
+			error = crypto_newsession(&wr->w_sid, &crie, 1);
 			if (error == 0)
 				sc->sc_crypto = G_ELI_CRYPTO_HW;
 		}
 		if (sc->sc_crypto == G_ELI_CRYPTO_SW)
-			error = crypto_newsession(&wr->w_sid, &cri, 0);
+			error = crypto_newsession(&wr->w_sid, &crie, 0);
 		if (error != 0) {
 			free(wr, M_ELI);
 			if (req != NULL) {
@@ -810,14 +681,22 @@ g_eli_create(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp, struct g_provider *bpp,
 	pp = g_new_providerf(gp, "%s%s", bpp->name, G_ELI_SUFFIX);
 	pp->sectorsize = md->md_sectorsize;
 	pp->mediasize = bpp->mediasize;
-	if ((sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_ONETIME) == 0)
+	if (!(sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_ONETIME))
 		pp->mediasize -= bpp->sectorsize;
-	pp->mediasize -= (pp->mediasize % pp->sectorsize);
+	if (!(sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH))
+		pp->mediasize -= (pp->mediasize % pp->sectorsize);
+	else {
+		pp->mediasize /= sc->sc_bytes_per_sector;
+		pp->mediasize *= pp->sectorsize;
+	}
+
 	g_error_provider(pp, 0);
 
 	G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Device %s created.", pp->name);
-	G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "    Cipher: %s", g_eli_algo2str(sc->sc_algo));
-	G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Key length: %u", sc->sc_keylen);
+	G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Encryption: %s %u", g_eli_algo2str(sc->sc_ealgo),
+	    sc->sc_ekeylen);
+	if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH)
+		G_ELI_DEBUG(0, " Integrity: %s", g_eli_algo2str(sc->sc_aalgo));
 	G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "    Crypto: %s",
 	    sc->sc_crypto == G_ELI_CRYPTO_SW ? "software" : "hardware");
 	return (gp);
@@ -995,7 +874,7 @@ g_eli_taste(struct g_class *mp, struct g_provider *pp, int flags __unused)
 	if (md.md_provsize != pp->mediasize)
 		return (NULL);
 	/* Should we attach it on boot? */
-	if ((md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_BOOT) == 0)
+	if (!(md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_BOOT))
 		return (NULL);
 	if (md.md_keys == 0x00) {
 		G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "No valid keys on %s.", pp->name);
@@ -1117,7 +996,7 @@ g_eli_dumpconf(struct sbuf *sb, const char *indent, struct g_geom *gp,
 		int first = 1;
 
 #define ADD_FLAG(flag, name)	do {					\
-	if ((sc->sc_flags & (flag)) != 0) {				\
+	if (sc->sc_flags & (flag)) {					\
 		if (!first)						\
 			sbuf_printf(sb, ", ");				\
 		else							\
@@ -1125,17 +1004,20 @@ g_eli_dumpconf(struct sbuf *sb, const char *indent, struct g_geom *gp,
 		sbuf_printf(sb, name);					\
 	}								\
 } while (0)
+		ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_NATIVE_BYTE_ORDER, "NATIVE-BYTE-ORDER");
 		ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_ONETIME, "ONETIME");
 		ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_BOOT, "BOOT");
 		ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_WO_DETACH, "W-DETACH");
 		ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_RW_DETACH, "RW-DETACH");
+		ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH, "AUTH");
 		ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_WOPEN, "W-OPEN");
 		ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_DESTROY, "DESTROY");
+		ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_RO, "READ-ONLY");
 #undef  ADD_FLAG
 	}
 	sbuf_printf(sb, "</Flags>\n");
 
-	if ((sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_ONETIME) == 0) {
+	if (!(sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_ONETIME)) {
 		sbuf_printf(sb, "%s<UsedKey>%u</UsedKey>\n", indent,
 		    sc->sc_nkey);
 	}
@@ -1152,9 +1034,15 @@ g_eli_dumpconf(struct sbuf *sb, const char *indent, struct g_geom *gp,
 		break;
 	}
 	sbuf_printf(sb, "</Crypto>\n");
-	sbuf_printf(sb, "%s<KeyLength>%u</KeyLength>\n", indent, sc->sc_keylen);
-	sbuf_printf(sb, "%s<Cipher>%s</Cipher>\n", indent,
-	    g_eli_algo2str(sc->sc_algo));
+	if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH) {
+		sbuf_printf(sb,
+		    "%s<AuthenticationAlgorithm>%s</AuthenticationAlgorithm>\n",
+		    indent, g_eli_algo2str(sc->sc_aalgo));
+	}
+	sbuf_printf(sb, "%s<KeyLength>%u</KeyLength>\n", indent,
+	    sc->sc_ekeylen);
+	sbuf_printf(sb, "%s<EncryptionAlgorithm>%s</EncryptionAlgorithm>\n", indent,
+	    g_eli_algo2str(sc->sc_ealgo));
 }
 
 DECLARE_GEOM_CLASS(g_eli_class, g_eli);
diff --git a/sys/geom/eli/g_eli.h b/sys/geom/eli/g_eli.h
index 363b38b4502c..e24f31491119 100644
--- a/sys/geom/eli/g_eli.h
+++ b/sys/geom/eli/g_eli.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*-
- * Copyright (c) 2005 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2006 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org>
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -54,28 +54,43 @@
 /*
  * Version history:
  * 0 - Initial version number.
+ * 1 - Added data authentication support (md_aalgo field and
+ *     G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH flag).
+ * 2 - Added G_ELI_FLAG_READONLY.
+ *   - IV is generated from offset converted to little-endian
+ *     (flag G_ELI_FLAG_NATIVE_BYTE_ORDER will be set for older versions).
  */
-#define	G_ELI_VERSION		0
+#define	G_ELI_VERSION		2
 
+/* ON DISK FLAGS. */
 /* Use random, onetime keys. */
-#define	G_ELI_FLAG_ONETIME	0x00000001
+#define	G_ELI_FLAG_ONETIME		0x00000001
 /* Ask for the passphrase from the kernel, before mounting root. */
-#define	G_ELI_FLAG_BOOT		0x00000002
+#define	G_ELI_FLAG_BOOT			0x00000002
 /* Detach on last close, if we were open for writing. */
-#define	G_ELI_FLAG_WO_DETACH	0x00000004
+#define	G_ELI_FLAG_WO_DETACH		0x00000004
 /* Detach on last close. */
-#define	G_ELI_FLAG_RW_DETACH	0x00000008
+#define	G_ELI_FLAG_RW_DETACH		0x00000008
+/* Provide data authentication. */
+#define	G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH			0x00000010
+/* Provider is read-only, we should deny all write attempts. */
+#define	G_ELI_FLAG_RO			0x00000020
+/* RUNTIME FLAGS. */
 /* Provider was open for writing. */
-#define	G_ELI_FLAG_WOPEN	0x00010000
+#define	G_ELI_FLAG_WOPEN		0x00010000
 /* Destroy device. */
-#define	G_ELI_FLAG_DESTROY	0x00020000
+#define	G_ELI_FLAG_DESTROY		0x00020000
+/* Provider uses native byte-order for IV generation. */
+#define	G_ELI_FLAG_NATIVE_BYTE_ORDER	0x00040000
 
 #define	SHA512_MDLEN		64
+#define	G_ELI_AUTH_SECKEYLEN	SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
 
 #define	G_ELI_MAXMKEYS		2
 #define	G_ELI_MAXKEYLEN		64
 #define	G_ELI_USERKEYLEN	G_ELI_MAXKEYLEN
 #define	G_ELI_DATAKEYLEN	G_ELI_MAXKEYLEN
+#define	G_ELI_AUTHKEYLEN	G_ELI_MAXKEYLEN
 #define	G_ELI_IVKEYLEN		G_ELI_MAXKEYLEN
 #define	G_ELI_SALTLEN		64
 #define	G_ELI_DATAIVKEYLEN	(G_ELI_DATAKEYLEN + G_ELI_IVKEYLEN)
@@ -85,6 +100,7 @@
 #ifdef _KERNEL
 extern u_int g_eli_debug;
 extern u_int g_eli_overwrites;
+extern u_int g_eli_batch;
 
 #define	G_ELI_CRYPTO_HW		1
 #define	G_ELI_CRYPTO_SW		2
@@ -123,13 +139,21 @@ struct g_eli_worker {
 struct g_eli_softc {
 	struct g_geom	*sc_geom;
 	u_int		 sc_crypto;
-	uint8_t		 sc_datakey[G_ELI_DATAKEYLEN];
+	uint8_t		 sc_mkey[G_ELI_DATAIVKEYLEN];
+	uint8_t		 sc_ekey[G_ELI_DATAKEYLEN];
+	u_int		 sc_ealgo;
+	u_int		 sc_ekeylen;
+	uint8_t		 sc_akey[G_ELI_AUTHKEYLEN];
+	u_int		 sc_aalgo;
+	u_int		 sc_akeylen;
+	u_int		 sc_alen;
+	SHA256_CTX	 sc_akeyctx;
 	uint8_t		 sc_ivkey[G_ELI_IVKEYLEN];
 	SHA256_CTX	 sc_ivctx;
-	u_int		 sc_algo;
-	u_int		 sc_keylen;
 	int		 sc_nkey;
 	uint32_t	 sc_flags;
+	u_int		 sc_bytes_per_sector;
+	u_int		 sc_data_per_sector;
 
 	/* Only for software cryptography. */
 	struct bio_queue_head sc_queue;
@@ -143,8 +167,9 @@ struct g_eli_metadata {
 	char		md_magic[16];	/* Magic value. */
 	uint32_t	md_version;	/* Version number. */
 	uint32_t	md_flags;	/* Additional flags. */
-	uint16_t	md_algo;	/* Encryption algorithm. */
+	uint16_t	md_ealgo;	/* Encryption algorithm. */
 	uint16_t	md_keylen;	/* Key length. */
+	uint16_t	md_aalgo;	/* Authentication algorithm. */
 	uint64_t	md_provsize;	/* Provider's size. */
 	uint32_t	md_sectorsize;	/* Sector size. */
 	uint8_t		md_keys;	/* Available keys. */
@@ -165,8 +190,9 @@ eli_metadata_encode(struct g_eli_metadata *md, u_char *data)
 	bcopy(md->md_magic, p, sizeof(md->md_magic)); p += sizeof(md->md_magic);
 	le32enc(p, md->md_version);	p += sizeof(md->md_version);
 	le32enc(p, md->md_flags);	p += sizeof(md->md_flags);
-	le16enc(p, md->md_algo);	p += sizeof(md->md_algo);
+	le16enc(p, md->md_ealgo);	p += sizeof(md->md_ealgo);
 	le16enc(p, md->md_keylen);	p += sizeof(md->md_keylen);
+	le16enc(p, md->md_aalgo);	p += sizeof(md->md_aalgo);
 	le64enc(p, md->md_provsize);	p += sizeof(md->md_provsize);
 	le32enc(p, md->md_sectorsize);	p += sizeof(md->md_sectorsize);
 	*p = md->md_keys;		p += sizeof(md->md_keys);
@@ -186,7 +212,7 @@ eli_metadata_decode_v0(const u_char *data, struct g_eli_metadata *md)
 
 	p = data + sizeof(md->md_magic) + sizeof(md->md_version);
 	md->md_flags = le32dec(p);	p += sizeof(md->md_flags);
-	md->md_algo = le16dec(p);	p += sizeof(md->md_algo);
+	md->md_ealgo = le16dec(p);	p += sizeof(md->md_ealgo);
 	md->md_keylen = le16dec(p);	p += sizeof(md->md_keylen);
 	md->md_provsize = le64dec(p);	p += sizeof(md->md_provsize);
 	md->md_sectorsize = le32dec(p);	p += sizeof(md->md_sectorsize);
@@ -202,6 +228,30 @@ eli_metadata_decode_v0(const u_char *data, struct g_eli_metadata *md)
 	return (0);
 }
 static __inline int
+eli_metadata_decode_v1v2(const u_char *data, struct g_eli_metadata *md)
+{
+	MD5_CTX ctx;
+	const u_char *p;
+
+	p = data + sizeof(md->md_magic) + sizeof(md->md_version);
+	md->md_flags = le32dec(p);	p += sizeof(md->md_flags);
+	md->md_ealgo = le16dec(p);	p += sizeof(md->md_ealgo);
+	md->md_keylen = le16dec(p);	p += sizeof(md->md_keylen);
+	md->md_aalgo = le16dec(p);	p += sizeof(md->md_aalgo);
+	md->md_provsize = le64dec(p);	p += sizeof(md->md_provsize);
+	md->md_sectorsize = le32dec(p);	p += sizeof(md->md_sectorsize);
+	md->md_keys = *p;		p += sizeof(md->md_keys);
+	md->md_iterations = le32dec(p);	p += sizeof(md->md_iterations);
+	bcopy(p, md->md_salt, sizeof(md->md_salt)); p += sizeof(md->md_salt);
+	bcopy(p, md->md_mkeys, sizeof(md->md_mkeys)); p += sizeof(md->md_mkeys);
+	MD5Init(&ctx);
+	MD5Update(&ctx, data, p - data);
+	MD5Final(md->md_hash, &ctx);
+	if (bcmp(md->md_hash, p, 16) != 0)
+		return (EINVAL);
+	return (0);
+}
+static __inline int
 eli_metadata_decode(const u_char *data, struct g_eli_metadata *md)
 {
 	int error;
@@ -212,6 +262,10 @@ eli_metadata_decode(const u_char *data, struct g_eli_metadata *md)
 	case 0:
 		error = eli_metadata_decode_v0(data, md);
 		break;
+	case 1:
+	case 2:
+		error = eli_metadata_decode_v1v2(data, md);
+		break;
 	default:
 		error = EINVAL;
 		break;
@@ -221,7 +275,7 @@ eli_metadata_decode(const u_char *data, struct g_eli_metadata *md)
 #endif	/* !_OpenSSL */
 
 static __inline u_int
-g_eli_str2algo(const char *name)
+g_eli_str2ealgo(const char *name)
 {
 
 	if (strcasecmp("null", name) == 0)
@@ -235,6 +289,25 @@ g_eli_str2algo(const char *name)
 	return (CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN - 1);
 }
 
+static __inline u_int
+g_eli_str2aalgo(const char *name)
+{
+
+	if (strcasecmp("hmac/md5", name) == 0)
+		return (CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC);
+	else if (strcasecmp("hmac/sha1", name) == 0)
+		return (CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC);
+	else if (strcasecmp("hmac/ripemd160", name) == 0)
+		return (CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC);
+	else if (strcasecmp("hmac/sha256", name) == 0)
+		return (CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC);
+	else if (strcasecmp("hmac/sha384", name) == 0)
+		return (CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC);
+	else if (strcasecmp("hmac/sha512", name) == 0)
+		return (CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC);
+	return (CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN - 1);
+}
+
 static __inline const char *
 g_eli_algo2str(u_int algo)
 {
@@ -243,11 +316,23 @@ g_eli_algo2str(u_int algo)
 	case CRYPTO_NULL_CBC:
 		return ("NULL");
 	case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
-		return ("AES");
+		return ("AES-CBC");
 	case CRYPTO_BLF_CBC:
-		return ("Blowfish");
+		return ("Blowfish-CBC");
 	case CRYPTO_3DES_CBC:
-		return ("3DES");
+		return ("3DES-CBC");
+	case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
+		return ("HMAC/MD5");
+	case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
+		return ("HMAC/SHA1");
+	case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
+		return ("HMAC/RIPEMD160");
+	case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
+		return ("HMAC/SHA256");
+	case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
+		return ("HMAC/SHA384");
+	case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
+		return ("HMAC/SHA512");
 	}
 	return ("unknown");
 }
@@ -262,8 +347,10 @@ eli_metadata_dump(const struct g_eli_metadata *md)
 	printf("     magic: %s\n", md->md_magic);
 	printf("   version: %u\n", (u_int)md->md_version);
 	printf("     flags: 0x%x\n", (u_int)md->md_flags);
-	printf("      algo: %s\n", g_eli_algo2str(md->md_algo));
+	printf("     ealgo: %s\n", g_eli_algo2str(md->md_ealgo));
 	printf("    keylen: %u\n", (u_int)md->md_keylen);
+	if (md->md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH)
+		printf("     aalgo: %s\n", g_eli_algo2str(md->md_aalgo));
 	printf("  provsize: %ju\n", (uintmax_t)md->md_provsize);
 	printf("sectorsize: %u\n", (u_int)md->md_sectorsize);
 	printf("      keys: 0x%02x\n", (u_int)md->md_keys);
@@ -329,6 +416,27 @@ g_eli_keylen(u_int algo, u_int keylen)
 	}
 }
 
+static __inline u_int
+g_eli_hashlen(u_int algo)
+{
+
+	switch (algo) {
+	case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
+		return (16);
+	case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
+		return (20);
+	case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
+		return (20);
+	case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
+		return (32);
+	case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
+		return (48);
+	case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
+		return (64);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
 #ifdef _KERNEL
 int g_eli_read_metadata(struct g_class *mp, struct g_provider *pp,
     struct g_eli_metadata *md);
@@ -339,6 +447,17 @@ int g_eli_destroy(struct g_eli_softc *sc, boolean_t force);
 
 int g_eli_access(struct g_provider *pp, int dr, int dw, int de);
 void g_eli_config(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp, const char *verb);
+
+void g_eli_read_done(struct bio *bp);
+void g_eli_write_done(struct bio *bp);
+int g_eli_crypto_rerun(struct cryptop *crp);
+void g_eli_crypto_ivgen(struct g_eli_softc *sc, off_t offset, u_char *iv,
+    size_t size);
+
+void g_eli_crypto_run(struct g_eli_worker *wr, struct bio *bp);
+
+void g_eli_auth_read(struct g_eli_softc *sc, struct bio *bp);
+void g_eli_auth_run(struct g_eli_worker *wr, struct bio *bp);
 #endif
 
 void g_eli_mkey_hmac(unsigned char *mkey, const unsigned char *key);
@@ -346,6 +465,9 @@ int g_eli_mkey_decrypt(const struct g_eli_metadata *md,
     const unsigned char *key, unsigned char *mkey, unsigned *nkeyp);
 int g_eli_mkey_encrypt(unsigned algo, const unsigned char *key, unsigned keylen,
     unsigned char *mkey);
+#ifdef _KERNEL
+void g_eli_mkey_propagate(struct g_eli_softc *sc, const unsigned char *mkey);
+#endif
 
 int g_eli_crypto_encrypt(u_int algo, u_char *data, size_t datasize,
     const u_char *key, size_t keysize);
diff --git a/sys/geom/eli/g_eli_ctl.c b/sys/geom/eli/g_eli_ctl.c
index e8297d318a08..702f8542429e 100644
--- a/sys/geom/eli/g_eli_ctl.c
+++ b/sys/geom/eli/g_eli_ctl.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ g_eli_ctl_attach(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp)
 	struct g_provider *pp;
 	const char *name;
 	u_char *key, mkey[G_ELI_DATAIVKEYLEN];
-	int *nargs, *detach;
+	int *nargs, *detach, *readonly;
 	int keysize, error;
 	u_int nkey;
 
@@ -79,6 +79,12 @@ g_eli_ctl_attach(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	readonly = gctl_get_paraml(req, "readonly", sizeof(*readonly));
+	if (readonly == NULL) {
+		gctl_error(req, "No '%s' argument.", "readonly");
+		return;
+	}
+
 	name = gctl_get_asciiparam(req, "arg0");
 	if (name == NULL) {
 		gctl_error(req, "No 'arg%u' argument.", 0);
@@ -124,8 +130,16 @@ g_eli_ctl_attach(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp)
 	}
 	G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Using Master Key %u for %s.", nkey, pp->name);
 
+	if (*detach && *readonly) {
+		bzero(&md, sizeof(md));
+		gctl_error(req, "Options -d and -r are mutually exclusive.",
+		    pp->name, error);
+		return;
+	}
 	if (*detach)
 		md.md_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_WO_DETACH;
+	if (*readonly)
+		md.md_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_RO;
 	g_eli_create(req, mp, pp, &md, mkey, nkey);
 	bzero(mkey, sizeof(mkey));
 	bzero(&md, sizeof(md));
@@ -250,16 +264,49 @@ g_eli_ctl_onetime(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp)
 	if (*detach)
 		md.md_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_WO_DETACH;
 
-	name = gctl_get_asciiparam(req, "algo");
+	md.md_ealgo = CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN - 1;
+	name = gctl_get_asciiparam(req, "aalgo");
 	if (name == NULL) {
-		gctl_error(req, "No '%s' argument.", "algo");
+		gctl_error(req, "No '%s' argument.", "aalgo");
 		return;
 	}
-	md.md_algo = g_eli_str2algo(name);
-	if (md.md_algo < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN ||
-	    md.md_algo > CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX) {
-		gctl_error(req, "Invalid '%s' argument.", "algo");
-		return;
+	if (strcmp(name, "none") != 0) {
+		md.md_aalgo = g_eli_str2aalgo(name);
+		if (md.md_aalgo >= CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN &&
+		    md.md_aalgo <= CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX) {
+			md.md_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH;
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * For backward compatibility, check if the -a option
+			 * was used to provide encryption algorithm.
+			 */
+			md.md_ealgo = g_eli_str2ealgo(name);
+			if (md.md_ealgo < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN ||
+			    md.md_ealgo > CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX) {
+				gctl_error(req,
+				    "Invalid authentication algorithm.");
+				return;
+			} else {
+				gctl_error(req, "warning: The -e option, not "
+				    "the -a option is now used to specify "
+				    "encryption algorithm to use.");
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (md.md_ealgo < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN ||
+	    md.md_ealgo > CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX) {
+		name = gctl_get_asciiparam(req, "ealgo");
+		if (name == NULL) {
+			gctl_error(req, "No '%s' argument.", "ealgo");
+			return;
+		}
+		md.md_ealgo = g_eli_str2ealgo(name);
+		if (md.md_ealgo < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN ||
+		    md.md_ealgo > CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX) {
+			gctl_error(req, "Invalid encryption algorithm.");
+			return;
+		}
 	}
 
 	keylen = gctl_get_paraml(req, "keylen", sizeof(*keylen));
@@ -267,7 +314,7 @@ g_eli_ctl_onetime(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp)
 		gctl_error(req, "No '%s' argument.", "keylen");
 		return;
 	}
-	md.md_keylen = g_eli_keylen(md.md_algo, *keylen);
+	md.md_keylen = g_eli_keylen(md.md_ealgo, *keylen);
 	if (md.md_keylen == 0) {
 		gctl_error(req, "Invalid '%s' argument.", "keylen");
 		return;
@@ -341,6 +388,10 @@ g_eli_ctl_setkey(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp)
 		gctl_error(req, "Provider %s is invalid.", name);
 		return;
 	}
+	if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_RO) {
+		gctl_error(req, "Cannot change keys for read-only provider.");
+		return;
+	}
 	cp = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer);
 	pp = cp->provider;
 
@@ -395,12 +446,10 @@ g_eli_ctl_setkey(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp)
 	mkeydst = md.md_mkeys + nkey * G_ELI_MKEYLEN;
 	md.md_keys |= (1 << nkey);
 
-	bcopy(sc->sc_ivkey, mkeydst, sizeof(sc->sc_ivkey));
-	bcopy(sc->sc_datakey, mkeydst + sizeof(sc->sc_ivkey),
-	    sizeof(sc->sc_datakey));
+	bcopy(sc->sc_mkey, mkeydst, sizeof(sc->sc_mkey));
 
 	/* Encrypt Master Key with the new key. */
-	error = g_eli_mkey_encrypt(md.md_algo, key, md.md_keylen, mkeydst);
+	error = g_eli_mkey_encrypt(md.md_ealgo, key, md.md_keylen, mkeydst);
 	bzero(key, sizeof(key));
 	if (error != 0) {
 		bzero(&md, sizeof(md));
@@ -452,6 +501,10 @@ g_eli_ctl_delkey(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp)
 		gctl_error(req, "Provider %s is invalid.", name);
 		return;
 	}
+	if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_RO) {
+		gctl_error(req, "Cannot delete keys for read-only provider.");
+		return;
+	}
 	cp = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer);
 	pp = cp->provider;
 
@@ -534,9 +587,7 @@ g_eli_kill_one(struct g_eli_softc *sc)
 {
 	struct g_provider *pp;
 	struct g_consumer *cp;
-	u_char *sector;
-	int err, error = 0;
-	u_int i;
+	int error = 0;
 
 	g_topology_assert();
 
@@ -549,22 +600,31 @@ g_eli_kill_one(struct g_eli_softc *sc)
 	cp = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer);
 	pp = cp->provider;
 
-	sector = malloc(pp->sectorsize, M_ELI, M_WAITOK);
-	for (i = 0; i <= g_eli_overwrites; i++) {
-		if (i == g_eli_overwrites)
-			bzero(sector, pp->sectorsize);
-		else
-			arc4rand(sector, pp->sectorsize, 0);
-		err = g_write_data(cp, pp->mediasize - pp->sectorsize, sector,
-		    pp->sectorsize);
-		if (err != 0) {
-			G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Cannot erase metadata on %s "
-			    "(error=%d).", pp->name, err);
-			if (error == 0)
-				error = err;
+	if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_RO) {
+		G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "WARNING: Metadata won't be erased on read-only "
+		    "provider: %s.", pp->name);
+	} else {
+		u_char *sector;
+		u_int i;
+		int err;
+
+		sector = malloc(pp->sectorsize, M_ELI, M_WAITOK);
+		for (i = 0; i <= g_eli_overwrites; i++) {
+			if (i == g_eli_overwrites)
+				bzero(sector, pp->sectorsize);
+			else
+				arc4rand(sector, pp->sectorsize, 0);
+			err = g_write_data(cp, pp->mediasize - pp->sectorsize,
+			    sector, pp->sectorsize);
+			if (err != 0) {
+				G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Cannot erase metadata on %s "
+				    "(error=%d).", pp->name, err);
+				if (error == 0)
+					error = err;
+			}
 		}
+		free(sector, M_ELI);
 	}
-	free(sector, M_ELI);
 	if (error == 0)
 		G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "%s has been killed.", pp->name);
 	g_eli_destroy(sc, 1);
diff --git a/sys/geom/eli/g_eli_key.c b/sys/geom/eli/g_eli_key.c
index aef66976578a..3f7be95752c2 100644
--- a/sys/geom/eli/g_eli_key.c
+++ b/sys/geom/eli/g_eli_key.c
@@ -123,10 +123,10 @@ g_eli_mkey_decrypt(const struct g_eli_metadata *md, const unsigned char *key,
 	nkey = 0;
 	for (nkey = 0; nkey < G_ELI_MAXMKEYS; nkey++, mmkey += G_ELI_MKEYLEN) {
 		bit = (1 << nkey);
-		if ((md->md_keys & bit) == 0)
+		if (!(md->md_keys & bit))
 			continue;
 		bcopy(mmkey, tmpmkey, G_ELI_MKEYLEN);
-		error = g_eli_crypto_decrypt(md->md_algo, tmpmkey,
+		error = g_eli_crypto_decrypt(md->md_ealgo, tmpmkey,
 		    G_ELI_MKEYLEN, enckey, md->md_keylen);
 		if (error != 0) {
 			bzero(tmpmkey, sizeof(tmpmkey));
@@ -177,3 +177,33 @@ g_eli_mkey_encrypt(unsigned algo, const unsigned char *key, unsigned keylen,
 
 	return (error);
 }
+
+#ifdef _KERNEL
+/*
+ * When doing encryption only, copy IV key and encryption key.
+ * When doing encryption and authentication, copy IV key, generate encryption
+ * key and generate authentication key.
+ */
+void
+g_eli_mkey_propagate(struct g_eli_softc *sc, const unsigned char *mkey)
+{
+
+	/* Remember the Master Key. */
+	bcopy(mkey, sc->sc_mkey, sizeof(sc->sc_mkey));
+
+	bcopy(mkey, sc->sc_ivkey, sizeof(sc->sc_ivkey));
+	mkey += sizeof(sc->sc_ivkey);
+
+	if (!(sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH)) {
+		bcopy(mkey, sc->sc_ekey, sizeof(sc->sc_ekey));
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * The encryption key is: ekey = HMAC_SHA512(Master-Key, 0x10)
+		 * The authentication key is: akey = HMAC_SHA512(Master-Key, 0x11)
+		 */
+		g_eli_crypto_hmac(mkey, G_ELI_MAXKEYLEN, "\x10", 1, sc->sc_ekey, 0);
+		g_eli_crypto_hmac(mkey, G_ELI_MAXKEYLEN, "\x11", 1, sc->sc_akey, 0);
+	}
+
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/sys/modules/geom/geom_eli/Makefile b/sys/modules/geom/geom_eli/Makefile
index e94fb88307b7..7b4c506de62f 100644
--- a/sys/modules/geom/geom_eli/Makefile
+++ b/sys/modules/geom/geom_eli/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,14 @@
 .PATH: ${.CURDIR}/../../../geom/eli
 
 KMOD=	geom_eli
-SRCS=	g_eli.c g_eli_crypto.c g_eli_ctl.c g_eli_key.c pkcs5v2.c vnode_if.h
+SRCS=	g_eli.c
+SRCS+=	g_eli_crypto.c
+SRCS+=	g_eli_ctl.c
+SRCS+=	g_eli_integrity.c
+SRCS+=	g_eli_key.c
+SRCS+=	g_eli_privacy.c
+SRCS+=	pkcs5v2.c
+SRCS+=	vnode_if.h
 WARNS?=	2
 
 .include <bsd.kmod.mk>
diff --git a/tools/regression/geom_eli/init.t b/tools/regression/geom_eli/init.t
index 5e4775c846bb..10fd7f741513 100644
--- a/tools/regression/geom_eli/init.t
+++ b/tools/regression/geom_eli/init.t
@@ -4,11 +4,9 @@
 base=`basename $0`
 no=45
 sectors=100
-rnd=`mktemp /tmp/$base.XXXXXX` || exit 1
 keyfile=`mktemp /tmp/$base.XXXXXX` || exit 1
-mdconfig -a -t malloc -s `expr $sectors + 1` -u $no || exit 1
 
-echo "1..36"
+echo "1..180"
 
 i=1
 for cipher in aes:0 aes:128 aes:192 aes:256 \
@@ -16,36 +14,43 @@ for cipher in aes:0 aes:128 aes:192 aes:256 \
     blowfish:0 blowfish:128 blowfish:160 blowfish:192 blowfish:224 \
     blowfish:256 blowfish:288 blowfish:320 blowfish:352 blowfish:384 \
     blowfish:416 blowfish:448; do
-	algo=${cipher%%:*}
+	ealgo=${cipher%%:*}
 	keylen=${cipher##*:}
+	for secsize in 512 1024 2048 4096 8192; do
+		rnd=`mktemp /tmp/$base.XXXXXX` || exit 1
+		mdconfig -a -t malloc -s `expr $secsize \* $sectors + 512`b -u $no || exit 1
 
-	dd if=/dev/random of=${rnd} bs=512 count=${sectors} >/dev/null 2>&1
-	dd if=/dev/random of=${keyfile} bs=512 count=16 >/dev/null 2>&1
+		dd if=/dev/random of=${keyfile} bs=512 count=16 >/dev/null 2>&1
 
-	geli init -a $algo -l $keylen -P -K $keyfile md${no}
-	geli attach -p -k $keyfile md${no}
+		geli init -e $ealgo -l $keylen -P -K $keyfile -s $secsize md${no}
+		geli attach -p -k $keyfile md${no}
 
-	dd if=${rnd} of=/dev/md${no}.eli bs=512 count=${sectors} 2>/dev/null
+		secs=`diskinfo /dev/md${no}.eli | awk '{print $4}'`
 
-	md_rnd=`dd if=${rnd} bs=512 count=${sectors} 2>/dev/null | md5`
-	md_ddev=`dd if=/dev/md${no}.eli bs=512 count=${sectors} 2>/dev/null | md5`
-	md_edev=`dd if=/dev/md${no} bs=512 count=${sectors} 2>/dev/null | md5`
+		dd if=/dev/random of=${rnd} bs=${secsize} count=${secs} >/dev/null 2>&1
+		dd if=${rnd} of=/dev/md${no}.eli bs=${secsize} count=${secs} 2>/dev/null
 
-	if [ ${md_rnd} = ${md_ddev} ]; then
-		echo "ok $i - ${cipher}"
-	else
-		echo "not ok $i - ${cipher}"
-	fi
-	i=$((i+1))
-	if [ ${md_rnd} != ${md_edev} ]; then
-		echo "ok $i - ${cipher}"
-	else
-		echo "not ok $i - ${cipher}"
-	fi
-	i=$((i+1))
+		md_rnd=`dd if=${rnd} bs=${secsize} count=${secs} 2>/dev/null | md5`
+		md_ddev=`dd if=/dev/md${no}.eli bs=${secsize} count=${secs} 2>/dev/null | md5`
+		md_edev=`dd if=/dev/md${no} bs=${secsize} count=${secs} 2>/dev/null | md5`
 
-	geli detach md${no}
+		if [ ${md_rnd} = ${md_ddev} ]; then
+			echo "ok $i - ealgo=${ealgo} keylen=${keylen} sec=${secsize}"
+		else
+			echo "not ok $i - ealgo=${ealgo} keylen=${keylen} sec=${secsize}"
+		fi
+		i=$((i+1))
+		if [ ${md_rnd} != ${md_edev} ]; then
+			echo "ok $i - ealgo=${ealgo} keylen=${keylen} sec=${secsize}"
+		else
+			echo "not ok $i - ealgo=${ealgo} keylen=${keylen} sec=${secsize}"
+		fi
+		i=$((i+1))
+
+		geli detach md${no}
+		rm -f $rnd
+		mdconfig -d -u $no
+	done
 done
 
-mdconfig -d -u $no
-rm -f $rnd $keyfile
+rm -f $keyfile
diff --git a/tools/regression/geom_eli/onetime.t b/tools/regression/geom_eli/onetime.t
index d52ef5640360..70b547966912 100644
--- a/tools/regression/geom_eli/onetime.t
+++ b/tools/regression/geom_eli/onetime.t
@@ -4,10 +4,8 @@
 base=`basename $0`
 no=45
 sectors=100
-rnd=`mktemp /tmp/$base.XXXXXX` || exit 1
-mdconfig -a -t malloc -s $sectors -u $no || exit 1
 
-echo "1..36"
+echo "1..180"
 
 i=1
 for cipher in aes:0 aes:128 aes:192 aes:256 \
@@ -15,34 +13,38 @@ for cipher in aes:0 aes:128 aes:192 aes:256 \
     blowfish:0 blowfish:128 blowfish:160 blowfish:192 blowfish:224 \
     blowfish:256 blowfish:288 blowfish:320 blowfish:352 blowfish:384 \
     blowfish:416 blowfish:448; do
-	algo=${cipher%%:*}
+	ealgo=${cipher%%:*}
 	keylen=${cipher##*:}
+	for secsize in 512 1024 2048 4096 8192; do
+		rnd=`mktemp /tmp/$base.XXXXXX` || exit 1
+		mdconfig -a -t malloc -s `expr $secsize \* $sectors`b -u $no || exit 1
 
-	dd if=/dev/random of=${rnd} bs=512 count=${sectors} >/dev/null 2>&1
+		geli onetime -e $ealgo -l $keylen -s $secsize md${no}
 
-	geli onetime -a $algo -l $keylen md${no}
+		secs=`diskinfo /dev/md${no}.eli | awk '{print $4}'`
 
-	dd if=${rnd} of=/dev/md${no}.eli bs=512 count=${sectors} 2>/dev/null
+		dd if=/dev/random of=${rnd} bs=${secsize} count=${secs} >/dev/null 2>&1
+		dd if=${rnd} of=/dev/md${no}.eli bs=${secsize} count=${secs} 2>/dev/null
 
-	md_rnd=`dd if=${rnd} bs=512 count=${sectors} 2>/dev/null | md5`
-	md_ddev=`dd if=/dev/md${no}.eli bs=512 count=${sectors} 2>/dev/null | md5`
-	md_edev=`dd if=/dev/md${no} bs=512 count=${sectors} 2>/dev/null | md5`
+		md_rnd=`dd if=${rnd} bs=${secsize} count=${secs} 2>/dev/null | md5`
+		md_ddev=`dd if=/dev/md${no}.eli bs=${secsize} count=${secs} 2>/dev/null | md5`
+		md_edev=`dd if=/dev/md${no} bs=${secsize} count=${secs} 2>/dev/null | md5`
 
-	if [ ${md_rnd} = ${md_ddev} ]; then
-		echo "ok $i - ${cipher}"
-	else
-		echo "not ok $i - ${cipher}"
-	fi
-	i=$((i+1))
-	if [ ${md_rnd} != ${md_edev} ]; then
-		echo "ok $i - ${cipher}"
-	else
-		echo "not ok $i - ${cipher}"
-	fi
-	i=$((i+1))
+		if [ ${md_rnd} = ${md_ddev} ]; then
+			echo "ok $i - ealgo=${ealgo} keylen=${keylen} sec=${secsize}"
+		else
+			echo "not ok $i - ealgo=${ealgo} keylen=${keylen} sec=${secsize}"
+		fi
+		i=$((i+1))
+		if [ ${md_rnd} != ${md_edev} ]; then
+			echo "ok $i - ealgo=${ealgo} keylen=${keylen} sec=${secsize}"
+		else
+			echo "not ok $i - ealgo=${ealgo} keylen=${keylen} sec=${secsize}"
+		fi
+		i=$((i+1))
 
-	geli detach md${no}
+		geli detach md${no}
+		rm -f $rnd
+		mdconfig -d -u $no
+	done
 done
-
-mdconfig -d -u $no
-rm -f $rnd