Merge OpenSSL 1.0.1k.

crypto/openssl/CHANGES

@@ -2,6 +2,136 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015]
+
+  *) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS
+     message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer
+     dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to
+     Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3571)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the
+     dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this
+     could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same
+     sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited
+     by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion.
+     Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2015-0206)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is
+     built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl
+     method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer
+     dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3569)
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+  *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral
+     ECDH ciphersuites.
+
+     Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for
+     reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3572)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code
+     violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in
+     non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively
+     downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server
+     certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at
+     INRIA or reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2015-0204)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification.
+     An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication
+     without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to
+     authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers
+     which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates
+     containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered.
+     Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting
+     this issue.
+     (CVE-2015-0205)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its
+     SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX.
+
+     The session ID context is typically set from the parent SSL_CTX,
+     and can vary with the CTX.
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
+
+     By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
+     certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
+     Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
+     this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
+     certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
+
+     1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
+
+     If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
+     the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
+
+     2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
+
+     Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
+     certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
+     errors for some broken certificates.
+
+     Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue.
+
+     3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
+
+     Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
+     signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
+
+     This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
+     (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
+     program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
+     (negative or with leading zeroes).
+
+     Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson
+     of the OpenSSL core team.
+
+     (CVE-2014-8275)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+   *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
+      results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
+      with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
+      way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
+      Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
+      fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
+      Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
+      the OpenSSL core team.
+      (CVE-2014-3570)
+      [Andy Polyakov]
+
+   *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
+      version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
+      version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
+      sanity and breaks all known clients.
+      [David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper]
+
+   *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
+      early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
+      renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
+      [Emilia Käsper]
+
+   *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
+      ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
+      the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
+      reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
+      announced in the initial ServerHello.
+
+      Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
+      was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
+      ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
+      [Emilia Käsper]
+
  Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
 
   *) SRTP Memory Leak.

crypto/openssl/Configure

@@ -804,6 +804,11 @@ PROCESS_ARGS:
 					{
 					$disabled{"tls1"} = "option(tls)"
 					}
+				elsif ($1 eq "ssl3-method")
+					{
+					$disabled{"ssl3-method"} = "option(ssl)";
+					$disabled{"ssl3"} = "option(ssl)";
+					}
 				else
 					{
 					$disabled{$1} = "option";

crypto/openssl/Makefile

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 ## Makefile for OpenSSL
 ##
 
-VERSION=1.0.1j
+VERSION=1.0.1k
 MAJOR=1
 MINOR=0.1
 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0

crypto/openssl/NEWS

@@ -5,6 +5,17 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1j and OpenSSL 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015]
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3571
+      o Fix for CVE-2015-0206
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3569
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3572
+      o Fix for CVE-2015-0204
+      o Fix for CVE-2015-0205
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-8275
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3570
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1i and OpenSSL 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
 
       o Fix for CVE-2014-3513

crypto/openssl/README

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.1j 15 Oct 2014
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1k 8 Jan 2015
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson

crypto/openssl/apps/ca.c

@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ EF_ALIGNMENT=0;
 		ERR_clear_error();
 #ifdef RL_DEBUG
 	if (!p)
-		BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: unique_subject undefined\n", p);
+		BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: unique_subject undefined\n");
 #endif
 #ifdef RL_DEBUG
 	BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: configured unique_subject is %d\n",

crypto/openssl/apps/dgst.c

@@ -273,6 +273,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"-d              to output debug info\n");
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"-hex            output as hex dump\n");
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"-binary         output in binary form\n");
+		BIO_printf(bio_err,"-hmac arg       set the HMAC key to arg\n");
+		BIO_printf(bio_err,"-non-fips-allow allow use of non FIPS digest\n");
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"-sign   file    sign digest using private key in file\n");
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"-verify file    verify a signature using public key in file\n");
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"-prverify file  verify a signature using private key in file\n");

crypto/openssl/apps/ocsp.c

@@ -583,51 +583,52 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "OCSP utility\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "Usage ocsp [options]\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "where options are\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-out file          output filename\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-out file            output filename\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-issuer file       issuer certificate\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-issuer file         issuer certificate\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-cert file         certificate to check\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-cert file           certificate to check\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-serial n          serial number to check\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-serial n            serial number to check\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signer file       certificate to sign OCSP request with\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signer file         certificate to sign OCSP request with\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signkey file      private key to sign OCSP request with\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signkey file        private key to sign OCSP request with\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-sign_other file   additional certificates to include in signed request\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-sign_other file     additional certificates to include in signed request\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_certs          don't include any certificates in signed request\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_certs            don't include any certificates in signed request\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-req_text          print text form of request\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-req_text            print text form of request\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-resp_text         print text form of response\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-resp_text           print text form of response\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-text              print text form of request and response\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-text                print text form of request and response\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-reqout file       write DER encoded OCSP request to \"file\"\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-reqout file         write DER encoded OCSP request to \"file\"\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-respout file      write DER encoded OCSP reponse to \"file\"\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-respout file        write DER encoded OCSP reponse to \"file\"\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-reqin file        read DER encoded OCSP request from \"file\"\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-reqin file          read DER encoded OCSP request from \"file\"\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-respin file       read DER encoded OCSP reponse from \"file\"\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-respin file         read DER encoded OCSP reponse from \"file\"\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-nonce             add OCSP nonce to request\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-nonce               add OCSP nonce to request\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_nonce          don't add OCSP nonce to request\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_nonce            don't add OCSP nonce to request\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-url URL           OCSP responder URL\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-url URL             OCSP responder URL\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-host host:n       send OCSP request to host on port n\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-host host:n         send OCSP request to host on port n\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-path              path to use in OCSP request\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-path                path to use in OCSP request\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir        trusted certificates directory\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir          trusted certificates directory\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file       trusted certificates file\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file         trusted certificates file\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-VAfile file       validator certificates file\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-VAfile file         validator certificates file\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-validity_period n maximum validity discrepancy in seconds\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-validity_period n   maximum validity discrepancy in seconds\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-status_age n      maximum status age in seconds\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-status_age n        maximum status age in seconds\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-noverify          don't verify response at all\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-noverify            don't verify response at all\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-verify_other file additional certificates to search for signer\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-verify_other file   additional certificates to search for signer\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trust_other       don't verify additional certificates\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trust_other         don't verify additional certificates\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_intern         don't search certificates contained in response for signer\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_intern           don't search certificates contained in response for signer\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_signature_verify don't check signature on response\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_cert_verify    don't check signing certificate\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_cert_verify      don't check signing certificate\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_chain          don't chain verify response\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_chain            don't chain verify response\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_cert_checks    don't do additional checks on signing certificate\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_cert_checks      don't do additional checks on signing certificate\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-port num		 port to run responder on\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-port num            port to run responder on\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-index file	 certificate status index file\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-index file          certificate status index file\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CA file		 CA certificate\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CA file             CA certificate\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-rsigner file	 responder certificate to sign responses with\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-rsigner file        responder certificate to sign responses with\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-rkey file	 responder key to sign responses with\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-rkey file           responder key to sign responses with\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-rother file	 other certificates to include in response\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-rother file         other certificates to include in response\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-resp_no_certs     don't include any certificates in response\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-resp_no_certs       don't include any certificates in response\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-nmin n	 	 number of minutes before next update\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-nmin n              number of minutes before next update\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-ndays n	 	 number of days before next update\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-ndays n             number of days before next update\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-resp_key_id       identify reponse by signing certificate key ID\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-resp_key_id         identify reponse by signing certificate key ID\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-nrequest n        number of requests to accept (default unlimited)\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-nrequest n          number of requests to accept (default unlimited)\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-<dgst alg>     use specified digest in the request\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-<dgst alg>          use specified digest in the request\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-timeout n           timeout connection to OCSP responder after n seconds\n");
 		goto end;
 		}
 
@@ -1398,16 +1399,7 @@ OCSP_RESPONSE *process_responder(BIO *err, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
 	if (use_ssl == 1)
 		{
 		BIO *sbio;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 		ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-		ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method());
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-		ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv2_client_method());
-#else
-		BIO_printf(err, "SSL is disabled\n");
-			goto end;
-#endif
 		if (ctx == NULL)
 			{
 			BIO_printf(err, "Error creating SSL context.\n");

crypto/openssl/apps/openssl.c

@@ -435,9 +435,7 @@ int main(int Argc, char *ARGV[])
 	if (prog != NULL) lh_FUNCTION_free(prog);
 	if (arg.data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(arg.data);
 
-	apps_shutdown();
 
-	CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err);
 	if (bio_err != NULL)
 		{
 		BIO_free(bio_err);
@@ -450,6 +448,9 @@ int main(int Argc, char *ARGV[])
 		OPENSSL_free(Argv);
 		}
 #endif
+	apps_shutdown();
+	CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err);
+
 	OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
 	}
 

crypto/openssl/apps/s_client.c

@@ -329,10 +329,12 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -srppass arg      - password for 'user'\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -srp_lateuser     - SRP username into second ClientHello message\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -srp_moregroups   - Tolerate other than the known g N values.\n");
-	BIO_printf(bio_err," -srp_strength int - minimal mength in bits for N (default %d).\n",SRP_MINIMAL_N);
+	BIO_printf(bio_err," -srp_strength int - minimal length in bits for N (default %d).\n",SRP_MINIMAL_N);
 #endif
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -ssl2         - just use SSLv2\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -ssl3         - just use SSLv3\n");
+#endif
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1_2       - just use TLSv1.2\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1_1       - just use TLSv1.1\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1         - just use TLSv1\n");
@@ -807,7 +809,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-ssl2") == 0)
 			meth=SSLv2_client_method();
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-ssl3") == 0)
 			meth=SSLv3_client_method();
 #endif
@@ -1319,10 +1321,22 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
 			}
 
-		if (socket_mtu > 28)
+		if (socket_mtu)
 			{
+			if(socket_mtu < DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con))
+				{
+				BIO_printf(bio_err,"MTU too small. Must be at least %ld\n",
+					DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con));
+				BIO_free(sbio);
+				goto shut;
+				}
 			SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU);
-			SSL_set_mtu(con, socket_mtu - 28);
+			if(!DTLS_set_link_mtu(con, socket_mtu))
+				{
+				BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set MTU\n");
+				BIO_free(sbio);
+				goto shut;
+				}
 			}
 		else
 			/* want to do MTU discovery */

crypto/openssl/apps/s_server.c

@@ -515,7 +515,9 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -srpuserseed string - A seed string for a default user salt.\n");
 #endif
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -ssl2         - Just talk SSLv2\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -ssl3         - Just talk SSLv3\n");
+#endif
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1_2       - Just talk TLSv1.2\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1_1       - Just talk TLSv1.1\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1         - Just talk TLSv1\n");
@@ -1251,7 +1253,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-ssl2") == 0)
 			{ meth=SSLv2_server_method(); }
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-ssl3") == 0)
 			{ meth=SSLv3_server_method(); }
 #endif
@@ -2049,10 +2051,24 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
 			BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
 			}
 
-		if (socket_mtu > 28)
+		if (socket_mtu)
 			{
+			if(socket_mtu < DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con))
+				{
+				BIO_printf(bio_err,"MTU too small. Must be at least %ld\n",
+					DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con));
+				ret = -1;
+				BIO_free(sbio);
+				goto err;
+				}
 			SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU);
-			SSL_set_mtu(con, socket_mtu - 28);
+			if(!DTLS_set_link_mtu(con, socket_mtu))
+				{
+				BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set MTU\n");
+				ret = -1;
+				BIO_free(sbio);
+				goto err;
+				}
 			}
 		else
 			/* want to do MTU discovery */

crypto/openssl/apps/s_time.c

@@ -349,13 +349,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	if (bio_err == NULL)
 		bio_err=BIO_new_fp(stderr,BIO_NOCLOSE);
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 	s_time_meth=SSLv23_client_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-	s_time_meth=SSLv3_client_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-	s_time_meth=SSLv2_client_method();
-#endif
 
 	/* parse the command line arguments */
 	if( parseArgs( argc, argv ) < 0 )

crypto/openssl/apps/speed.c

@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@
 
 #undef BUFSIZE
 #define BUFSIZE	((long)1024*8+1)
-int run=0;
+static volatile int run=0;
 
 static int mr=0;
 static int usertime=1;
@@ -2727,27 +2727,6 @@ static int do_multi(int multi)
 				k=atoi(sstrsep(&p,sep));
 				sstrsep(&p,sep);
 
-				d=atof(sstrsep(&p,sep));
-				if(n)
-					rsa_results[k][0]=1/(1/rsa_results[k][0]+1/d);
-				else
-					rsa_results[k][0]=d;
-
-				d=atof(sstrsep(&p,sep));
-				if(n)
-					rsa_results[k][1]=1/(1/rsa_results[k][1]+1/d);
-				else
-					rsa_results[k][1]=d;
-				}
-			else if(!strncmp(buf,"+F2:",4))
-				{
-				int k;
-				double d;
-				
-				p=buf+4;
-				k=atoi(sstrsep(&p,sep));
-				sstrsep(&p,sep);
-
 				d=atof(sstrsep(&p,sep));
 				if(n)
 					rsa_results[k][0]=1/(1/rsa_results[k][0]+1/d);

crypto/openssl/crypto/Makefile

@@ -56,12 +56,7 @@ top:
 all: shared
 
 buildinf.h: ../Makefile
-	( echo "#ifndef MK1MF_BUILD"; \
+	$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkbuildinf.pl "$(CFLAGS)" "$(PLATFORM)" >buildinf.h
-	echo '  /* auto-generated by crypto/Makefile for crypto/cversion.c */'; \
-	echo '  #define CFLAGS "$(CC) $(CFLAG)"'; \
-	echo '  #define PLATFORM "$(PLATFORM)"'; \
-	echo "  #define DATE \"`LC_ALL=C LC_TIME=C date`\""; \
-	echo '#endif' ) >buildinf.h
 
 x86cpuid.s:	x86cpuid.pl perlasm/x86asm.pl
 	$(PERL) x86cpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) > $@

crypto/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-mips.pl

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ $pf = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? $t0 : $t2;
 #
 ######################################################################
 
-$big_endian=(`echo MIPSEL | $ENV{CC} -E -P -`=~/MIPSEL/)?1:0;
+$big_endian=(`echo MIPSEL | $ENV{CC} -E -`=~/MIPSEL/)?1:0 if ($ENV{CC});
 
 for (@ARGV) {	$output=$_ if (/^\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/);	}
 open STDOUT,">$output";

crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c

@@ -136,11 +136,16 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a,
 
 	p= *pp;
 	i= *(p++);
+	if (i > 7)
+		{
+		i=ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT;
+		goto err;
+		}
 	/* We do this to preserve the settings.  If we modify
 	 * the settings, via the _set_bit function, we will recalculate
 	 * on output */
 	ret->flags&= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|0x07); /* clear */
-	ret->flags|=(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|(i&0x07)); /* set */
+	ret->flags|=(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|i); /* set */
 
 	if (len-- > 1) /* using one because of the bits left byte */
 		{

crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE)
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_TYPE)
 
 /* Returns 0 if they are equal, != 0 otherwise. */
-int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(ASN1_TYPE *a, ASN1_TYPE *b)
+int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
 	{
 	int result = -1;
 

crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c

@@ -90,6 +90,12 @@ int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
 		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
 		goto err;
 		}
+
+	if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
+		goto err;
+		}
 	
 	inl=i2d(data,NULL);
 	buf_in=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl);
@@ -146,6 +152,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
 		return -1;
 		}
 
+	if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 
 	/* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */

crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h

@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(ASN1_TYPE, ASN1_ANY, ASN1_TYPE)
 int ASN1_TYPE_get(ASN1_TYPE *a);
 void ASN1_TYPE_set(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, void *value);
 int ASN1_TYPE_set1(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, const void *value);
-int            ASN1_TYPE_cmp(ASN1_TYPE *a, ASN1_TYPE *b);
+int            ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b);
 
 ASN1_OBJECT *	ASN1_OBJECT_new(void );
 void		ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a);
@@ -1329,6 +1329,7 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE			 184
 #define ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT			 185
 #define ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG		 128
+#define ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT		 220
 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH			 129
 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT				 130
 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE			 205
@@ -1378,6 +1379,7 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
 #define ASN1_R_TIME_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT			 193
 #define ASN1_R_TOO_LONG					 155
 #define ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED			 156
+#define ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE			 218
 #define ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_KEY			 157
 #define ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_PRIVATE_KEY		 158
 #define ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC				 159

crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2014 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE)   ,"illegal time value"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT),"integer not ascii format"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG),"integer too large for long"},
+{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT),"invalid bit string bits left"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH),"invalid bmpstring length"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT)        ,"invalid digit"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE)    ,"invalid mime type"},
@@ -295,6 +296,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TIME_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT),"time not ascii format"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TOO_LONG)             ,"too long"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED) ,"type not constructed"},
+{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE)   ,"type not primitive"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_KEY),"unable to decode rsa key"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_PRIVATE_KEY),"unable to decode rsa private key"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC)       ,"unexpected eoc"},

crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c

@@ -870,6 +870,14 @@ static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
 		}
 	else if (cst)
 		{
+		if (utype == V_ASN1_NULL || utype == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN
+			|| utype == V_ASN1_OBJECT || utype == V_ASN1_INTEGER
+			|| utype == V_ASN1_ENUMERATED)
+			{
+			ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE,
+				ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE);
+			return 0;
+			}
 		buf.length = 0;
 		buf.max = 0;
 		buf.data = NULL;

crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c

@@ -142,3 +142,14 @@ void X509_ALGOR_set_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, const EVP_MD *md)
 	X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_type(md)), param_type, NULL);
 
 	}
+
+int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b)
+	{
+	int rv;
+	rv = OBJ_cmp(a->algorithm, b->algorithm);
+	if (rv)
+		return rv;
+	if (!a->parameter && !b->parameter)
+		return 0;
+	return ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->parameter, b->parameter);
+	}

crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c

@@ -350,6 +350,8 @@ static int x509_name_canon(X509_NAME *a)
 			set = entry->set;
 			}
 		tmpentry = X509_NAME_ENTRY_new();
+		if (!tmpentry)
+			goto err;
 		tmpentry->object = OBJ_dup(entry->object);
 		if (!asn1_string_canon(tmpentry->value, entry->value))
 			goto err;

crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h

@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ extern "C" {
 #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT   45 /* Next DTLS handshake timeout to
                                               * adjust socket timeouts */
 
+#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD   49
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
 /* SCTP stuff */
 #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE	50
@@ -607,6 +609,8 @@ int BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request(BIO *b);
          (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_PEER, 0, (char *)peer)
 #define BIO_dgram_set_peer(b,peer) \
          (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER, 0, (char *)peer)
+#define BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(b) \
+         (unsigned int)BIO_ctrl((b), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD, 0, NULL)
 
 /* These two aren't currently implemented */
 /* int BIO_get_ex_num(BIO *bio); */

crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c

@@ -454,6 +454,36 @@ static int dgram_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
 	return(ret);
 	}
 
+static long dgram_get_mtu_overhead(bio_dgram_data *data)
+	{
+	long ret;
+
+	switch (data->peer.sa.sa_family)
+		{
+		case AF_INET:
+			/* Assume this is UDP - 20 bytes for IP, 8 bytes for UDP */
+			ret = 28;
+			break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+		case AF_INET6:
+#ifdef IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED
+			if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&data->peer.sa_in6.sin6_addr))
+				/* Assume this is UDP - 20 bytes for IP, 8 bytes for UDP */
+				ret = 28;
+			else
+#endif
+				/* Assume this is UDP - 40 bytes for IP, 8 bytes for UDP */
+				ret = 48;
+			break;
+#endif
+		default:
+			/* We don't know. Go with the historical default */
+			ret = 28;
+			break;
+		}
+	return ret;
+	}
+
 static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 	{
 	long ret=1;
@@ -630,23 +660,24 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 #endif
 		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU:
+		ret = -dgram_get_mtu_overhead(data);
 		switch (data->peer.sa.sa_family)
 			{
 			case AF_INET:
-				ret = 576 - 20 - 8;
+				ret += 576;
 				break;
 #if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
 			case AF_INET6:
 #ifdef IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED
 				if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&data->peer.sa_in6.sin6_addr))
-					ret = 576 - 20 - 8;
+					ret += 576;
 				else
 #endif
-					ret = 1280 - 40 - 8;
+					ret += 1280;
 				break;
 #endif
 			default:
-				ret = 576 - 20 - 8;
+				ret += 576;
 				break;
 			}
 		break;
@@ -847,6 +878,9 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 			ret = 0;
 		break;
 #endif
+	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD:
+		ret = dgram_get_mtu_overhead(data);
+		break;
 	default:
 		ret=0;
 		break;
@@ -893,10 +927,18 @@ BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag)
 	/* Activate SCTP-AUTH for DATA and FORWARD-TSN chunks */
 	auth.sauth_chunk = OPENSSL_SCTP_DATA_CHUNK_TYPE;
 	ret = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_CHUNK, &auth, sizeof(struct sctp_authchunk));
-	OPENSSL_assert(ret >= 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		{
+		BIO_vfree(bio);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
 	auth.sauth_chunk = OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE;
 	ret = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_CHUNK, &auth, sizeof(struct sctp_authchunk));
-	OPENSSL_assert(ret >= 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		{
+		BIO_vfree(bio);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
 
 	/* Test if activation was successful. When using accept(),
 	 * SCTP-AUTH has to be activated for the listening socket
@@ -905,7 +947,13 @@ BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag)
 	authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(sockopt_len);
 	memset(authchunks, 0, sizeof(sockopt_len));
 	ret = getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_LOCAL_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, &sockopt_len);
-	OPENSSL_assert(ret >= 0);
+
+	if (ret < 0)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(authchunks);
+		BIO_vfree(bio);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
 
 	for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks->gauth_chunks;
 	     p < (unsigned char*) authchunks + sockopt_len;
@@ -927,16 +975,28 @@ BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag)
 	event.se_type = SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT;
 	event.se_on = 1;
 	ret = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENT, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event));
-	OPENSSL_assert(ret >= 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		{
+		BIO_vfree(bio);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
 #else
 	sockopt_len = (socklen_t) sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe);
 	ret = getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, &sockopt_len);
-	OPENSSL_assert(ret >= 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		{
+		BIO_vfree(bio);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
 
 	event.sctp_authentication_event = 1;
 
 	ret = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe));
-	OPENSSL_assert(ret >= 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		{
+		BIO_vfree(bio);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
 #endif
 #endif
 
@@ -944,7 +1004,11 @@ BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag)
 	 * larger than the max record size of 2^14 + 2048 + 13
 	 */
 	ret = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PARTIAL_DELIVERY_POINT, &optval, sizeof(optval));
-	OPENSSL_assert(ret >= 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		{
+		BIO_vfree(bio);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
 
 	return(bio);
 	}
@@ -982,7 +1046,12 @@ static int dgram_sctp_free(BIO *a)
 		return 0;
 
 	data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *)a->ptr;
-	if(data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(data);
+	if(data != NULL)
+		{
+		if(data->saved_message.data != NULL)
+			OPENSSL_free(data->saved_message.data);
+		OPENSSL_free(data);
+		}
 
 	return(1);
 	}
@@ -1034,6 +1103,13 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 			msg.msg_flags = 0;
 			n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, 0);
 
+			if (n <= 0)
+				{
+				if (n < 0)
+					ret = n;
+				break;
+				}
+
 			if (msg.msg_controllen > 0)
 				{
 				for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); cmsg; cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, cmsg))
@@ -1073,13 +1149,6 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 					}
 				}
 
-			if (n <= 0)
-				{
-				if (n < 0)
-					ret = n;
-				break;
-				}
-
 			if (msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION)
 				{
 				snp = (union sctp_notification*) out;
@@ -1099,6 +1168,7 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 						dgram_sctp_write(data->saved_message.bio, data->saved_message.data,
 						                 data->saved_message.length);
 						OPENSSL_free(data->saved_message.data);
+						data->saved_message.data = NULL;
 						data->saved_message.length = 0;
 						}
 
@@ -1109,16 +1179,28 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 					event.se_type = SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT;
 					event.se_on = 0;
 					i = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENT, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event));
-					OPENSSL_assert(i >= 0);
+					if (i < 0)
+						{
+						ret = i;
+						break;
+						}
 #else
 					eventsize = sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe);
 					i = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, &eventsize);
-					OPENSSL_assert(i >= 0);
+					if (i < 0)
+						{
+						ret = i;
+						break;
+						}
 
 					event.sctp_sender_dry_event = 0;
 
 					i = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe));
-					OPENSSL_assert(i >= 0);
+					if (i < 0)
+						{
+						ret = i;
+						break;
+						}
 #endif
 					}
 
@@ -1151,8 +1233,8 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 			 */
 			optlen = (socklen_t) sizeof(int);
 			ret = getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &optval, &optlen);
-			OPENSSL_assert(ret >= 0);
+			if (ret >= 0)
-			OPENSSL_assert(optval >= 18445);
+				OPENSSL_assert(optval >= 18445);
 
 			/* Test if SCTP doesn't partially deliver below
 			 * max record size (2^14 + 2048 + 13)
@@ -1160,8 +1242,8 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 			optlen = (socklen_t) sizeof(int);
 			ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PARTIAL_DELIVERY_POINT,
 			                 &optval, &optlen);
-			OPENSSL_assert(ret >= 0);
+			if (ret >= 0)
-			OPENSSL_assert(optval >= 18445);
+				OPENSSL_assert(optval >= 18445);
 
 			/* Partially delivered notification??? Probably a bug.... */
 			OPENSSL_assert(!(msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION));
@@ -1195,15 +1277,15 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 			authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(optlen);
 			memset(authchunks, 0, sizeof(optlen));
 			ii = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PEER_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, &optlen);
-			OPENSSL_assert(ii >= 0);
 
-			for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks->gauth_chunks;
+			if (ii >= 0)
-				 p < (unsigned char*) authchunks + optlen;
+				for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks->gauth_chunks;
-				 p += sizeof(uint8_t))
+				     p < (unsigned char*) authchunks + optlen;
-				{
+				     p += sizeof(uint8_t))
-				if (*p == OPENSSL_SCTP_DATA_CHUNK_TYPE) auth_data = 1;
+					{
-				if (*p == OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE) auth_forward = 1;
+					if (*p == OPENSSL_SCTP_DATA_CHUNK_TYPE) auth_data = 1;
-				}
+					if (*p == OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE) auth_forward = 1;
+					}
 
 			OPENSSL_free(authchunks);
 
@@ -1258,9 +1340,11 @@ static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
 	if (data->save_shutdown && !BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(b))
 	{
 		data->saved_message.bio = b;
-		data->saved_message.length = inl;
+		if (data->saved_message.data)
+			OPENSSL_free(data->saved_message.data);
 		data->saved_message.data = OPENSSL_malloc(inl);
 		memcpy(data->saved_message.data, in, inl);
+		data->saved_message.length = inl;
 		return inl;
 	}
 
@@ -1367,6 +1451,10 @@ static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		 * Returns always 1.
 		 */
 		break;
+	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD:
+		/* We allow transport protocol fragmentation so this is irrelevant */
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE:
 		if (num > 0)
 			data->in_handshake = 1;

crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl

@@ -1872,6 +1872,41 @@ ___
 
 ($a_4,$a_5,$a_6,$a_7)=($b_0,$b_1,$b_2,$b_3);
 
+sub add_c2 () {
+my ($hi,$lo,$c0,$c1,$c2,
+    $warm,      # !$warm denotes first call with specific sequence of
+                # $c_[XYZ] when there is no Z-carry to accumulate yet;
+    $an,$bn     # these two are arguments for multiplication which
+                # result is used in *next* step [which is why it's
+                # commented as "forward multiplication" below];
+    )=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+	mflo	$lo
+	mfhi	$hi
+	$ADDU	$c0,$lo
+	sltu	$at,$c0,$lo
+	 $MULTU	$an,$bn			# forward multiplication
+	$ADDU	$c0,$lo
+	$ADDU	$at,$hi
+	sltu	$lo,$c0,$lo
+	$ADDU	$c1,$at
+	$ADDU	$hi,$lo
+___
+$code.=<<___	if (!$warm);
+	sltu	$c2,$c1,$at
+	$ADDU	$c1,$hi
+	sltu	$hi,$c1,$hi
+	$ADDU	$c2,$hi
+___
+$code.=<<___	if ($warm);
+	sltu	$at,$c1,$at
+	$ADDU	$c1,$hi
+	$ADDU	$c2,$at
+	sltu	$hi,$c1,$hi
+	$ADDU	$c2,$hi
+___
+}
+
 $code.=<<___;
 
 .align	5
@@ -1920,21 +1955,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
 	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2,$at
 	$ST	$c_2,$BNSZ($a0)
-
+___
-	mflo	$t_1
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
-	mfhi	$t_2
+		$a_1,$a_1);		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
-	slt	$c_2,$t_2,$zero
+$code.=<<___;
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	$MULTU	$a_1,$a_1		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
 	mflo	$t_1
 	mfhi	$t_2
 	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
@@ -1945,67 +1969,19 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
 	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
 	$ST	$c_3,2*$BNSZ($a0)
-
+___
-	mflo	$t_1
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0,
-	mfhi	$t_2
+		$a_1,$a_2);		# mul_add_c2(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
-	slt	$c_3,$t_2,$zero
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+		$a_4,$a_0);		# mul_add_c2(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
-	$MULTU	$a_1,$a_2		# mul_add_c2(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+$code.=<<___;
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
-	mflo	$t_1
-	mfhi	$t_2
-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
-	 $MULTU	$a_4,$a_0		# mul_add_c2(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
 	$ST	$c_1,3*$BNSZ($a0)
-
+___
-	mflo	$t_1
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0,
-	mfhi	$t_2
+		$a_3,$a_1);		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
-	slt	$c_1,$t_2,$zero
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1,
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+		$a_2,$a_2);		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
-	$MULTU	$a_3,$a_1		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+$code.=<<___;
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
-	mflo	$t_1
-	mfhi	$t_2
-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
-	$MULTU	$a_2,$a_2		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
 	mflo	$t_1
 	mfhi	$t_2
 	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
@@ -2016,97 +1992,23 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
 	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
 	$ST	$c_2,4*$BNSZ($a0)
-
+___
-	mflo	$t_1
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
-	mfhi	$t_2
+		$a_1,$a_4);		# mul_add_c2(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
-	slt	$c_2,$t_2,$zero
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1,
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+		$a_2,$a_3);		# mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
-	$MULTU	$a_1,$a_4		# mul_add_c2(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1,
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+		$a_6,$a_0);		# mul_add_c2(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+$code.=<<___;
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
-	mflo	$t_1
-	mfhi	$t_2
-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
-	$MULTU	$a_2,$a_3		# mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
-	mflo	$t_1
-	mfhi	$t_2
-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
-	 $MULTU	$a_6,$a_0		# mul_add_c2(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
 	$ST	$c_3,5*$BNSZ($a0)
-
+___
-	mflo	$t_1
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0,
-	mfhi	$t_2
+		$a_5,$a_1);		# mul_add_c2(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
-	slt	$c_3,$t_2,$zero
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+		$a_4,$a_2);		# mul_add_c2(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
-	$MULTU	$a_5,$a_1		# mul_add_c2(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+		$a_3,$a_3);		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+$code.=<<___;
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
-	mflo	$t_1
-	mfhi	$t_2
-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
-	$MULTU	$a_4,$a_2		# mul_add_c2(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
-	mflo	$t_1
-	mfhi	$t_2
-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
-	$MULTU	$a_3,$a_3		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
 	mflo	$t_1
 	mfhi	$t_2
 	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
@@ -2117,112 +2019,25 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
 	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
 	$ST	$c_1,6*$BNSZ($a0)
-
+___
-	mflo	$t_1
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0,
-	mfhi	$t_2
+		$a_1,$a_6);		# mul_add_c2(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
-	slt	$c_1,$t_2,$zero
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1,
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+		$a_2,$a_5);		# mul_add_c2(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
-	$MULTU	$a_1,$a_6		# mul_add_c2(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1,
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+		$a_3,$a_4);		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1,
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+		$a_7,$a_1);		# mul_add_c2(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+$code.=<<___;
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
-	mflo	$t_1
-	mfhi	$t_2
-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
-	$MULTU	$a_2,$a_5		# mul_add_c2(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
-	mflo	$t_1
-	mfhi	$t_2
-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
-	$MULTU	$a_3,$a_4		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
-	mflo	$t_1
-	mfhi	$t_2
-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
-	 $MULTU	$a_7,$a_1		# mul_add_c2(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
 	$ST	$c_2,7*$BNSZ($a0)
-
+___
-	mflo	$t_1
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
-	mfhi	$t_2
+		$a_6,$a_2);		# mul_add_c2(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
-	slt	$c_2,$t_2,$zero
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1,
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+		$a_5,$a_3);		# mul_add_c2(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
-	$MULTU	$a_6,$a_2		# mul_add_c2(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1,
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+		$a_4,$a_4);		# mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+$code.=<<___;
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
-	mflo	$t_1
-	mfhi	$t_2
-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
-	$MULTU	$a_5,$a_3		# mul_add_c2(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
-	mflo	$t_1
-	mfhi	$t_2
-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
-	$MULTU	$a_4,$a_4		# mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
 	mflo	$t_1
 	mfhi	$t_2
 	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
@@ -2233,82 +2048,21 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
 	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
 	$ST	$c_3,8*$BNSZ($a0)
-
+___
-	mflo	$t_1
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0,
-	mfhi	$t_2
+		$a_3,$a_6);		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
-	slt	$c_3,$t_2,$zero
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+		$a_4,$a_5);		# mul_add_c2(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
-	$MULTU	$a_3,$a_6		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+		$a_7,$a_3);		# mul_add_c2(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+$code.=<<___;
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
-	mflo	$t_1
-	mfhi	$t_2
-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
-	$MULTU	$a_4,$a_5		# mul_add_c2(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
-	mflo	$t_1
-	mfhi	$t_2
-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
-	 $MULTU	$a_7,$a_3		# mul_add_c2(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
 	$ST	$c_1,9*$BNSZ($a0)
-
+___
-	mflo	$t_1
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0,
-	mfhi	$t_2
+		$a_6,$a_4);		# mul_add_c2(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
-	slt	$c_1,$t_2,$zero
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1,
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+		$a_5,$a_5);		# mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
-	$MULTU	$a_6,$a_4		# mul_add_c2(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+$code.=<<___;
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
-	mflo	$t_1
-	mfhi	$t_2
-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
-	$MULTU	$a_5,$a_5		# mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
 	mflo	$t_1
 	mfhi	$t_2
 	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
@@ -2319,52 +2073,17 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
 	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
 	$ST	$c_2,10*$BNSZ($a0)
-
+___
-	mflo	$t_1
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
-	mfhi	$t_2
+		$a_5,$a_6);		# mul_add_c2(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2);
-	slt	$c_2,$t_2,$zero
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1,
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+		$a_7,$a_5);		# mul_add_c2(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
-	$MULTU	$a_5,$a_6		# mul_add_c2(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2);
+$code.=<<___;
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
-	mflo	$t_1
-	mfhi	$t_2
-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
-	 $MULTU	$a_7,$a_5		# mul_add_c2(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
 	$ST	$c_3,11*$BNSZ($a0)
-
+___
-	mflo	$t_1
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0,
-	mfhi	$t_2
+		$a_6,$a_6);		# mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
-	slt	$c_3,$t_2,$zero
+$code.=<<___;
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	$MULTU	$a_6,$a_6		# mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
 	mflo	$t_1
 	mfhi	$t_2
 	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
@@ -2375,21 +2094,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
 	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
 	$ST	$c_1,12*$BNSZ($a0)
-
+___
-	mflo	$t_1
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0,
-	mfhi	$t_2
+		$a_7,$a_7);		# mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
-	slt	$c_1,$t_2,$zero
+$code.=<<___;
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	 $MULTU	$a_7,$a_7		# mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
 	$ST	$c_2,13*$BNSZ($a0)
 
 	mflo	$t_1
@@ -2457,21 +2165,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
 	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2,$at
 	$ST	$c_2,$BNSZ($a0)
-
+___
-	mflo	$t_1
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
-	mfhi	$t_2
+		$a_1,$a_1);		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
-	slt	$c_2,$t_2,$zero
+$code.=<<___;
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	$MULTU	$a_1,$a_1		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
 	mflo	$t_1
 	mfhi	$t_2
 	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
@@ -2482,52 +2179,17 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
 	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
 	$ST	$c_3,2*$BNSZ($a0)
-
+___
-	mflo	$t_1
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0,
-	mfhi	$t_2
+		$a_1,$a_2);		# mul_add_c2(a2[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
-	slt	$c_3,$t_2,$zero
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+		$a_3,$a_1);		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
-	$MULTU	$a_1,$a_2		# mul_add_c(a2[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+$code.=<<___;
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
-	mflo	$t_1
-	mfhi	$t_2
-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
-	 $MULTU	$a_3,$a_1		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
 	$ST	$c_1,3*$BNSZ($a0)
-
+___
-	mflo	$t_1
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0,
-	mfhi	$t_2
+		$a_2,$a_2);		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
-	slt	$c_1,$t_2,$zero
+$code.=<<___;
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	$MULTU	$a_2,$a_2		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
 	mflo	$t_1
 	mfhi	$t_2
 	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
@@ -2538,21 +2200,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
 	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
 	$ST	$c_2,4*$BNSZ($a0)
-
+___
-	mflo	$t_1
+	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
-	mfhi	$t_2
+		$a_3,$a_3);		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
-	slt	$c_2,$t_2,$zero
+$code.=<<___;
-	$SLL	$t_2,1
-	 $MULTU	$a_3,$a_3		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
-	$SLL	$t_1,1
-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
 	$ST	$c_3,5*$BNSZ($a0)
 
 	mflo	$t_1

crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c

@@ -273,6 +273,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
 /* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)  -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
 /* sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
 
+/*
+ * Keep in mind that carrying into high part of multiplication result
+ * can not overflow, because it cannot be all-ones.
+ */
 #if 0
 /* original macros are kept for reference purposes */
 #define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) {	\
@@ -287,10 +291,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
 	BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b),t0;	\
 	t1 = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb);	\
 	t0 = ta * tb;			\
-	t2 = t1+t1; c2 += (t2<t1)?1:0;	\
+	c0 += t0; t2 = t1+((c0<t0)?1:0);\
-	t1 = t0+t0; t2 += (t1<t0)?1:0;	\
-	c0 += t1; t2 += (c0<t1)?1:0;	\
 	c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0;	\
+	c0 += t0; t1 += (c0<t0)?1:0;	\
+	c1 += t1; c2 += (c1<t1)?1:0;	\
 	}
 #else
 #define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2)	do {	\
@@ -328,22 +332,14 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
 		: "=a"(t1),"=d"(t2)	\
 		: "a"(a),"m"(b)		\
 		: "cc");		\
-	asm ("addq %0,%0; adcq %2,%1"	\
+	asm ("addq %3,%0; adcq %4,%1; adcq %5,%2"	\
-		: "+d"(t2),"+r"(c2)	\
+		: "+r"(c0),"+r"(c1),"+r"(c2)		\
-		: "g"(0)		\
+		: "r"(t1),"r"(t2),"g"(0)		\
-		: "cc");		\
+		: "cc");				\
-	asm ("addq %0,%0; adcq %2,%1"	\
+	asm ("addq %3,%0; adcq %4,%1; adcq %5,%2"	\
-		: "+a"(t1),"+d"(t2)	\
+		: "+r"(c0),"+r"(c1),"+r"(c2)		\
-		: "g"(0)		\
+		: "r"(t1),"r"(t2),"g"(0)		\
-		: "cc");		\
+		: "cc");				\
-	asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"	\
-		: "+r"(c0),"+d"(t2)	\
-		: "a"(t1),"g"(0)	\
-		: "cc");		\
-	asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"	\
-		: "+r"(c1),"+r"(c2)	\
-		: "d"(t2),"g"(0)	\
-		: "cc");		\
 	} while (0)
 #endif
 

crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h

@@ -780,7 +780,9 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf,int num);
 #define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \
 	do { \
 		const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \
-		assert(words <= (_bnum2)->dmax && words >= (_bnum2)->top); \
+		assert((words) <= (_bnum2)->dmax && (words) >= (_bnum2)->top); \
+		/* avoid unused variable warning with NDEBUG */ \
+		(void)(_bnum2); \
 	} while(0)
 
 #else /* !BN_DEBUG */

crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_asm.c

@@ -438,6 +438,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n)
 /* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)  -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
 /* sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
 
+/*
+ * Keep in mind that carrying into high part of multiplication result
+ * can not overflow, because it cannot be all-ones.
+ */
 #ifdef BN_LLONG
 #define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) \
 	t=(BN_ULLONG)a*b; \
@@ -478,10 +482,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n)
 #define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) {	\
 	BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b),t0;	\
 	BN_UMULT_LOHI(t0,t1,ta,tb);	\
-	t2 = t1+t1; c2 += (t2<t1)?1:0;	\
+	c0 += t0; t2 = t1+((c0<t0)?1:0);\
-	t1 = t0+t0; t2 += (t1<t0)?1:0;	\
-	c0 += t1; t2 += (c0<t1)?1:0;	\
 	c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0;	\
+	c0 += t0; t1 += (c0<t0)?1:0;	\
+	c1 += t1; c2 += (c1<t1)?1:0;	\
 	}
 
 #define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)	{	\
@@ -508,10 +512,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n)
 	BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b),t0;	\
 	t1 = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb);	\
 	t0 = ta * tb;			\
-	t2 = t1+t1; c2 += (t2<t1)?1:0;	\
+	c0 += t0; t2 = t1+((c0<t0)?1:0);\
-	t1 = t0+t0; t2 += (t1<t0)?1:0;	\
-	c0 += t1; t2 += (c0<t1)?1:0;	\
 	c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0;	\
+	c0 += t0; t1 += (c0<t0)?1:0;	\
+	c1 += t1; c2 += (c1<t1)?1:0;	\
 	}
 
 #define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)	{	\

crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_ctx.c

@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static void ctxdbg(BN_CTX *ctx)
 	unsigned int bnidx = 0, fpidx = 0;
 	BN_POOL_ITEM *item = ctx->pool.head;
 	BN_STACK *stack = &ctx->stack;
-	fprintf(stderr,"(%08x): ", (unsigned int)ctx);
+	fprintf(stderr,"(%16p): ", ctx);
 	while(bnidx < ctx->used)
 		{
 		fprintf(stderr,"%03x ", item->vals[bnidx++ % BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE].dmax);

crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_div.c

@@ -189,15 +189,17 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
 	int no_branch=0;
 
 	/* Invalid zero-padding would have particularly bad consequences
-	 * in the case of 'num', so don't just rely on bn_check_top() for this one
+	 * so don't just rely on bn_check_top() here
 	 * (bn_check_top() works only for BN_DEBUG builds) */
-	if (num->top > 0 && num->d[num->top - 1] == 0)
+	if ((num->top > 0 && num->d[num->top - 1] == 0) ||
+		(divisor->top > 0 && divisor->d[divisor->top - 1] == 0))
 		{
 		BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
 		return 0;
 		}
 
 	bn_check_top(num);
+	bn_check_top(divisor);
 
 	if ((BN_get_flags(num, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) || (BN_get_flags(divisor, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0))
 		{
@@ -207,7 +209,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
 	bn_check_top(dv);
 	bn_check_top(rm);
 	/* bn_check_top(num); */ /* 'num' has been checked already */
-	bn_check_top(divisor);
+	/* bn_check_top(divisor); */ /* 'divisor' has been checked already */
 
 	if (BN_is_zero(divisor))
 		{

crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bntest.c

@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ int test_mod(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx);
 int test_mod_mul(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx);
 int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx);
 int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_mod_exp_mont5(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
 int test_exp(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx);
 int test_gf2m_add(BIO *bp);
 int test_gf2m_mod(BIO *bp);
@@ -249,6 +250,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 
 	message(out,"BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime");
 	if (!test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(out,ctx)) goto err;
+	if (!test_mod_exp_mont5(out,ctx)) goto err;
 	(void)BIO_flush(out);
 
 	message(out,"BN_exp");
@@ -676,44 +678,98 @@ int test_mul(BIO *bp)
 
 int test_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	{
-	BIGNUM a,c,d,e;
+	BIGNUM *a,*c,*d,*e;
-	int i;
+	int i, ret = 0;
 
-	BN_init(&a);
+	a = BN_new();
-	BN_init(&c);
+	c = BN_new();
-	BN_init(&d);
+	d = BN_new();
-	BN_init(&e);
+	e = BN_new();
+	if (a == NULL || c == NULL || d == NULL || e == NULL)
+		{
+		goto err;
+		}
 
 	for (i=0; i<num0; i++)
 		{
-		BN_bntest_rand(&a,40+i*10,0,0);
+		BN_bntest_rand(a,40+i*10,0,0);
-		a.neg=rand_neg();
+		a->neg=rand_neg();
-		BN_sqr(&c,&a,ctx);
+		BN_sqr(c,a,ctx);
 		if (bp != NULL)
 			{
 			if (!results)
 				{
-				BN_print(bp,&a);
+				BN_print(bp,a);
 				BIO_puts(bp," * ");
-				BN_print(bp,&a);
+				BN_print(bp,a);
 				BIO_puts(bp," - ");
 				}
-			BN_print(bp,&c);
+			BN_print(bp,c);
 			BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
 			}
-		BN_div(&d,&e,&c,&a,ctx);
+		BN_div(d,e,c,a,ctx);
-		BN_sub(&d,&d,&a);
+		BN_sub(d,d,a);
-		if(!BN_is_zero(&d) || !BN_is_zero(&e))
+		if(!BN_is_zero(d) || !BN_is_zero(e))
-		    {
+			{
-		    fprintf(stderr,"Square test failed!\n");
+			fprintf(stderr,"Square test failed!\n");
-		    return 0;
+			goto err;
-		    }
+			}
 		}
-	BN_free(&a);
+
-	BN_free(&c);
+	/* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */
-	BN_free(&d);
+	BN_hex2bn(&a,
-	BN_free(&e);
+		"80000000000000008000000000000001FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE0000000000000000");
-	return(1);
+	BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
+	if (bp != NULL)
+		{
+		if (!results)
+			{
+			BN_print(bp,a);
+			BIO_puts(bp," * ");
+			BN_print(bp,a);
+			BIO_puts(bp," - ");
+			}
+		BN_print(bp,c);
+		BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
+		}
+	BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx);
+	if (BN_cmp(c, d))
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce "
+			"different results!\n");
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */
+	BN_hex2bn(&a,
+		"80000000000000000000000080000001FFFFFFFE000000000000000000000000");
+	BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
+	if (bp != NULL)
+		{
+		if (!results)
+			{
+			BN_print(bp,a);
+			BIO_puts(bp," * ");
+			BN_print(bp,a);
+			BIO_puts(bp," - ");
+			}
+		BN_print(bp,c);
+		BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
+		}
+	BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx);
+	if (BN_cmp(c, d))
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce "
+			"different results!\n");
+		goto err;
+		}
+	ret = 1;
+err:
+	if (a != NULL) BN_free(a);
+	if (c != NULL) BN_free(c);
+	if (d != NULL) BN_free(d);
+	if (e != NULL) BN_free(e);
+	return ret;
 	}
 
 int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
@@ -1012,6 +1068,80 @@ int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	return(1);
 	}
 
+/* Test constant-time modular exponentiation with 1024-bit inputs,
+ * which on x86_64 cause a different code branch to be taken.
+ */
+int test_mod_exp_mont5(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	BIGNUM *a,*p,*m,*d,*e;
+
+	BN_MONT_CTX *mont;
+
+	a=BN_new();
+	p=BN_new();
+	m=BN_new();
+	d=BN_new();
+	e=BN_new();
+
+	mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+
+	BN_bntest_rand(m,1024,0,1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
+	/* Zero exponent */
+	BN_bntest_rand(a,1024,0,0);
+	BN_zero(p);
+	if(!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d,a,p,m,ctx,NULL))
+		return 0;
+	if(!BN_is_one(d))
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
+		return 0;
+		}
+	/* Zero input */
+	BN_bntest_rand(p,1024,0,0);
+	BN_zero(a);
+	if(!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d,a,p,m,ctx,NULL))
+		return 0;
+	if(!BN_is_zero(d))
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
+		return 0;
+		}
+	/* Craft an input whose Montgomery representation is 1,
+	 * i.e., shorter than the modulus m, in order to test
+	 * the const time precomputation scattering/gathering.
+	 */
+	BN_one(a);
+	BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont,m,ctx);
+	if(!BN_from_montgomery(e,a,mont,ctx))
+		return 0;
+	if(!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d,e,p,m,ctx,NULL))
+		return 0;
+	if(!BN_mod_exp_simple(a,e,p,m,ctx))
+		return 0;
+	if(BN_cmp(a,d) != 0)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr,"Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
+		return 0;
+		}
+	/* Finally, some regular test vectors. */
+	BN_bntest_rand(e,1024,0,0);
+	if(!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d,e,p,m,ctx,NULL))
+		return 0;
+	if(!BN_mod_exp_simple(a,e,p,m,ctx))
+		return 0;
+	if(BN_cmp(a,d) != 0)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr,"Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
+		return 0;
+		}
+	BN_free(a);
+	BN_free(p);
+	BN_free(m);
+	BN_free(d);
+	BN_free(e);
+	return(1);
+	}
+
 int test_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	{
 	BIGNUM *a,*b,*d,*e,*one;

crypto/openssl/crypto/constant_time_locl.h

@@ -129,17 +129,12 @@ static inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b);
 
 static inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a)
 	{
-	return (unsigned int)((int)(a) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1));
+	return 0-(a >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1));
 	}
 
 static inline unsigned int constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
 	{
-	unsigned int lt;
+	return constant_time_msb(a^((a^b)|((a-b)^b)));
-	/* Case 1: msb(a) == msb(b). a < b iff the MSB of a - b is set.*/
-	lt = ~(a ^ b) & (a - b);
-	/* Case 2: msb(a) != msb(b). a < b iff the MSB of b is set. */
-	lt |= ~a & b;
-	return constant_time_msb(lt);
 	}
 
 static inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
@@ -149,12 +144,7 @@ static inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
 
 static inline unsigned int constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
 	{
-	unsigned int ge;
+	return ~constant_time_lt(a, b);
-	/* Case 1: msb(a) == msb(b). a >= b iff the MSB of a - b is not set.*/
-	ge = ~((a ^ b) | (a - b));
-	/* Case 2: msb(a) != msb(b). a >= b iff the MSB of a is set. */
-	ge |= a & ~b;
-	return constant_time_msb(ge);
 	}
 
 static inline unsigned char constant_time_ge_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
@@ -204,7 +194,7 @@ static inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask,
 	return (unsigned char)(constant_time_select(mask, a, b));
 	}
 
-inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b)
+static inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b)
 	{
 	return (int)(constant_time_select(mask, (unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b)));
 	}

crypto/openssl/crypto/cversion.c

@@ -69,10 +69,7 @@ const char *SSLeay_version(int t)
 	if (t == SSLEAY_BUILT_ON)
 		{
 #ifdef DATE
-		static char buf[sizeof(DATE)+11];
+		return(DATE);
-
-		BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"built on: %s",DATE);
-		return(buf);
 #else
 		return("built on: date not available");
 #endif
@@ -80,10 +77,7 @@ const char *SSLeay_version(int t)
 	if (t == SSLEAY_CFLAGS)
 		{
 #ifdef CFLAGS
-		static char buf[sizeof(CFLAGS)+11];
+		return(cflags);
-
-		BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"compiler: %s",CFLAGS);
-		return(buf);
 #else
 		return("compiler: information not available");
 #endif
@@ -91,10 +85,7 @@ const char *SSLeay_version(int t)
 	if (t == SSLEAY_PLATFORM)
 		{
 #ifdef PLATFORM
-		static char buf[sizeof(PLATFORM)+11];
+		return(PLATFORM);
-
-		BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"platform: %s", PLATFORM);
-		return(buf);
 #else
 		return("platform: information not available");
 #endif

crypto/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c

@@ -176,13 +176,25 @@ int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
 	     const unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa)
 	{
 	DSA_SIG *s;
+	const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
+	unsigned char *der = NULL;
+	int derlen = -1;
 	int ret=-1;
 
 	s = DSA_SIG_new();
 	if (s == NULL) return(ret);
-	if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&sigbuf,siglen) == NULL) goto err;
+	if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&p,siglen) == NULL) goto err;
+	/* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
+	derlen = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &der);
+	if (derlen != siglen || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
+		goto err;
 	ret=DSA_do_verify(dgst,dgst_len,s,dsa);
 err:
+	if (derlen > 0)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
+		OPENSSL_free(der);
+		}
 	DSA_SIG_free(s);
 	return(ret);
 	}

crypto/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c

@@ -60,10 +60,8 @@
    that handle _GNU_SOURCE and other similar macros.  Defining it later
    is simply too late, because those headers are protected from re-
    inclusion.  */
-#ifdef __linux
+#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
-# ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
+# define _GNU_SOURCE	/* make sure dladdr is declared */
-#  define _GNU_SOURCE	/* make sure dladdr is declared */
-# endif
 #endif
 
 #include <stdio.h>

crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@
 
 #include "ec_lcl.h"
 
-static const char EC_version[] = "EC" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+const char EC_version[] = "EC" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 
 
 /* functions for EC_GROUP objects */

crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c

@@ -445,15 +445,16 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
 	wNAF_len = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof wNAF_len[0]);
 	wNAF     = OPENSSL_malloc((totalnum + 1) * sizeof wNAF[0]); /* includes space for pivot */
 	val_sub  = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof val_sub[0]);
-		 
+
+	/* Ensure wNAF is initialised in case we end up going to err */
+	if (wNAF) wNAF[0] = NULL;	/* preliminary pivot */
+
 	if (!wsize || !wNAF_len || !wNAF || !val_sub)
 		{
 		ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 		goto err;
 		}
 
-	wNAF[0] = NULL;	/* preliminary pivot */
-
 	/* num_val will be the total number of temporarily precomputed points */
 	num_val = 0;
 

crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c

@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ static int pkey_ec_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
 	return ret;
 	}
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
 static int pkey_ec_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen)
 	{
 	int ret;
@@ -200,6 +201,7 @@ static int pkey_ec_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen)
 	*keylen = ret;
 	return 1;
 	}
+#endif
 
 static int pkey_ec_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
 	{
@@ -333,7 +335,11 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ec_pkey_meth =
 	0,0,
 
 	0,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
 	pkey_ec_derive,
+#else
+	0,
+#endif
 
 	pkey_ec_ctrl,
 	pkey_ec_ctrl_str

crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c

@@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ typedef u64 smallfelem[NLIMBS];
 
 /* This is the value of the prime as four 64-bit words, little-endian. */
 static const u64 kPrime[4] = { 0xfffffffffffffffful, 0xffffffff, 0, 0xffffffff00000001ul };
-static const limb bottom32bits = 0xffffffff;
 static const u64 bottom63bits = 0x7ffffffffffffffful;
 
 /* bin32_to_felem takes a little-endian byte array and converts it into felem

crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ectest.c

@@ -1366,7 +1366,7 @@ static const struct nistp_test_params nistp_tests_params[] =
 		},
 	};
 
-void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
+static void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
 	{
 	BN_CTX *ctx;
 	BIGNUM *p, *a, *b, *x, *y, *n, *m, *order;
@@ -1469,7 +1469,7 @@ void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
 	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
 	}
 
-void nistp_tests()
+static void nistp_tests()
 	{
 	unsigned i;
 

crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile

@@ -126,15 +126,16 @@ ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
 ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
 ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
 ecs_sign.o: ecs_locl.h ecs_sign.c
-ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
+ecs_vrf.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
+ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h
+ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
 ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
 ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
 ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
 ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
 ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
 ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ecs_locl.h ecs_vrf.c
+ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h ecs_locl.h ecs_vrf.c

crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "ecs_locl.h"
+#include "cryptlib.h"
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 #include <openssl/engine.h>
 #endif
@@ -84,13 +85,25 @@ int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
 		const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey)
  	{
 	ECDSA_SIG *s;
+	const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
+	unsigned char *der = NULL;
+	int derlen = -1;
 	int ret=-1;
 
 	s = ECDSA_SIG_new();
 	if (s == NULL) return(ret);
-	if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &sigbuf, sig_len) == NULL) goto err;
+	if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &p, sig_len) == NULL) goto err;
+	/* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
+	derlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &der);
+	if (derlen != sig_len || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
+		goto err;
 	ret=ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, s, eckey);
 err:
+	if (derlen > 0)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
+		OPENSSL_free(der);
+		}
 	ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
 	return(ret);
 	}

crypto/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c

@@ -114,9 +114,6 @@ static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN dynamic_cmd_defns[] = {
 		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT},
 	{0, NULL, NULL, 0}
 	};
-static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN dynamic_cmd_defns_empty[] = {
-	{0, NULL, NULL, 0}
-	};
 
 /* Loading code stores state inside the ENGINE structure via the "ex_data"
  * element. We load all our state into a single structure and use that as a

crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile

@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
 evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
 evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
 evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-evp_enc.o: ../constant_time_locl.h ../cryptlib.h evp_enc.c evp_locl.h
+evp_enc.o: ../cryptlib.h evp_enc.c evp_locl.h
 evp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
 evp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
 evp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h

crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/e_des3.c

@@ -124,12 +124,11 @@ static int des_ede_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	{
         int i;
-        char *cp;
+	fprintf(stderr,"des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx=%p, buflen=%d)\n", ctx, ctx->buf_len);
-	printf("des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx=%lx, buflen=%d)\n", ctx, ctx->buf_len);
+	fprintf(stderr,"\t iv= ");
-	printf("\t iv= ");
         for(i=0;i<8;i++)
-                printf("%02X",ctx->iv[i]);
+                fprintf(stderr,"%02X",ctx->iv[i]);
-	printf("\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 	}
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 	while (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
@@ -260,11 +259,14 @@ static int des_ede3_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	{
         int i;
-        printf("des_ede3_init_key(ctx=%lx)\n", ctx);
+        fprintf(stderr,"des_ede3_init_key(ctx=%p)\n", ctx);
-	printf("\tKEY= ");
+	fprintf(stderr,"\tKEY= ");
-        for(i=0;i<24;i++) printf("%02X",key[i]); printf("\n");
+        for(i=0;i<24;i++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X",key[i]); fprintf(stderr,"\n");
-	printf("\t IV= ");
+	if (iv) 
-        for(i=0;i<8;i++) printf("%02X",iv[i]); printf("\n");
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr,"\t IV= ");
+		for(i=0;i<8;i++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X",iv[i]); fprintf(stderr,"\n");
+		}
 	}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 

crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c

@@ -67,7 +67,6 @@
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 #include <openssl/fips.h>
 #endif
-#include "constant_time_locl.h"
 #include "evp_locl.h"
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
@@ -501,21 +500,21 @@ int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 
 int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 	{
-	unsigned int i, b;
+	int i,n;
-        unsigned char pad, padding_good;
+	unsigned int b;
 	*outl=0;
 
 	if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
 		{
-		int ret = M_do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0);
+		i = M_do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0);
-		if (ret < 0)
+		if (i < 0)
 			return 0;
 		else
-			*outl = ret;
+			*outl = i;
 		return 1;
 		}
 
-	b=(unsigned int)(ctx->cipher->block_size);
+	b=ctx->cipher->block_size;
 	if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING)
 		{
 		if(ctx->buf_len)
@@ -534,34 +533,33 @@ int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 			return(0);
 			}
 		OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->final);
-		pad=ctx->final[b-1];
-
-		padding_good = (unsigned char)(~constant_time_is_zero_8(pad));
-		padding_good &= constant_time_ge_8(b, pad);
-
-                for (i = 1; i < b; ++i)
-			{
-			unsigned char is_pad_index = constant_time_lt_8(i, pad);
-			unsigned char pad_byte_good = constant_time_eq_8(ctx->final[b-i-1], pad);
-			padding_good &= constant_time_select_8(is_pad_index, pad_byte_good, 0xff);
-			}
 
 		/*
-		 * At least 1 byte is always padding, so we always write b - 1
+		 * The following assumes that the ciphertext has been authenticated.
-		 * bytes to avoid a timing leak. The caller is required to have |b|
+		 * Otherwise it provides a padding oracle.
-		 * bytes space in |out| by the API contract.
 		 */
-		for (i = 0; i < b - 1; ++i)
+		n=ctx->final[b-1];
-			out[i] = ctx->final[i] & padding_good;
+		if (n == 0 || n > (int)b)
-		/* Safe cast: for a good padding, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH >= b >= pad */
+			{
-		*outl = padding_good & ((unsigned char)(b - pad));
+			EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX,EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
-		return padding_good & 1;
+			return(0);
+			}
+		for (i=0; i<n; i++)
+			{
+			if (ctx->final[--b] != n)
+				{
+				EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX,EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+				return(0);
+				}
+			}
+		n=ctx->cipher->block_size-n;
+		for (i=0; i<n; i++)
+			out[i]=ctx->final[i];
+		*outl=n;
 		}
 	else
-		{
+		*outl=0;
-		*outl = 0;
+	return(1);
-		return 1;
-		}
 	}
 
 void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)

crypto/openssl/crypto/md32_common.h

@@ -225,8 +225,7 @@
 #define HOST_c2l(c,l)	(l =(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24),		\
 			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16),		\
 			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8),		\
-			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))    ),		\
+			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))    )		)
-			 l)
 #endif
 #ifndef HOST_l2c
 #define HOST_l2c(l,c)	(*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff),	\
@@ -262,8 +261,7 @@
 #define HOST_c2l(c,l)	(l =(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))    ),		\
 			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8),		\
 			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16),		\
-			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24),		\
+			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24)		)
-			 l)
 #endif
 #ifndef HOST_l2c
 #define HOST_l2c(l,c)	(*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff),	\

crypto/openssl/crypto/mem.c

@@ -255,10 +255,12 @@ void *CRYPTO_malloc_locked(int num, const char *file, int line)
 
 	if (num <= 0) return NULL;
 
-	allow_customize = 0;
+	if(allow_customize)
+		allow_customize = 0;
 	if (malloc_debug_func != NULL)
 		{
-		allow_customize_debug = 0;
+		if(allow_customize_debug)
+			allow_customize_debug = 0;
 		malloc_debug_func(NULL, num, file, line, 0);
 		}
 	ret = malloc_locked_ex_func(num,file,line);
@@ -299,10 +301,12 @@ void *CRYPTO_malloc(int num, const char *file, int line)
 
 	if (num <= 0) return NULL;
 
-	allow_customize = 0;
+	if(allow_customize)
+		allow_customize = 0;
 	if (malloc_debug_func != NULL)
 		{
-		allow_customize_debug = 0;
+		if(allow_customize_debug)
+			allow_customize_debug = 0;
 		malloc_debug_func(NULL, num, file, line, 0);
 		}
 	ret = malloc_ex_func(num,file,line);

crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h

@@ -43,9 +43,6 @@ static const nid_triple sigoid_srt[] =
 
 static const nid_triple * const sigoid_srt_xref[] =
 	{
-	&sigoid_srt[29],
-	&sigoid_srt[17],
-	&sigoid_srt[18],
 	&sigoid_srt[0],
 	&sigoid_srt[1],
 	&sigoid_srt[7],

crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/objxref.pl

@@ -90,7 +90,10 @@ EOF
 
 foreach (@srt2)
 	{
-	my $x = $xref_tbl{$_}[2];
+	my ($p1, $p2, $x) = @{$xref_tbl{$_}};
+	# If digest or signature algorithm is "undef" then the algorithm
+	# needs special handling and is excluded from the cross reference table.
+	next if $p1 eq "undef" || $p2 eq "undef";
 	print "\t\&sigoid_srt\[$x\],\n";
 	}
 

crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h

@@ -29,11 +29,11 @@ extern "C" {
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x100010afL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x100010bfL
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1j-fips 15 Oct 2014"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1k-fips 8 Jan 2015"
 #else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1j-freebsd 15 Oct 2014"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1k-freebsd 8 Jan 2015"
 #endif
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT	" part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 

crypto/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mips.pl

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ if ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i) {
 #
 ######################################################################
 
-$big_endian=(`echo MIPSEL | $ENV{CC} -E -P -`=~/MIPSEL/)?1:0;
+$big_endian=(`echo MIPSEL | $ENV{CC} -E -`=~/MIPSEL/)?1:0 if ($ENV{CC});
 
 for (@ARGV) {	$output=$_ if (/^\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/);   }
 open STDOUT,">$output";

crypto/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-mips.pl

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ $pf = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? $t0 : $t2;
 #
 ######################################################################
 
-$big_endian=(`echo MIPSEL | $ENV{CC} -E -P -`=~/MIPSEL/)?1:0;
+$big_endian=(`echo MIPSEL | $ENV{CC} -E -`=~/MIPSEL/)?1:0 if ($ENV{CC});
 
 for (@ARGV) {	$output=$_ if (/^\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/);	}
 open STDOUT,">$output";

crypto/openssl/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c

@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ TS_RESP_set_genTime_with_precision(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *asn1_time,
 	if (precision > 0)
 	{
 		/* Add fraction of seconds (leave space for dot and null). */
-		BIO_snprintf(p, 2 + precision, ".%ld", usec);
+		BIO_snprintf(p, 2 + precision, ".%06ld", usec);
 		/* We cannot use the snprintf return value, 
 		   because it might have been truncated. */
 		p += strlen(p);

crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509.h

@@ -768,6 +768,7 @@ int X509_ALGOR_set0(X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj, int ptype, void *pval);
 void X509_ALGOR_get0(ASN1_OBJECT **paobj, int *pptype, void **ppval,
 						X509_ALGOR *algor);
 void X509_ALGOR_set_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, const EVP_MD *md);
+int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b);
 
 X509_NAME *X509_NAME_dup(X509_NAME *xn);
 X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne);

crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c

@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(void)
 	{
 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
 	param = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_VERIFY_PARAM));
+	if (!param)
+		return NULL;
 	memset(param, 0, sizeof(X509_VERIFY_PARAM));
 	x509_verify_param_zero(param);
 	return param;

crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x_all.c

@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
 
 int X509_verify(X509 *a, EVP_PKEY *r)
 	{
+	if (X509_ALGOR_cmp(a->sig_alg, a->cert_info->signature))
+		return 0;
 	return(ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF),a->sig_alg,
 		a->signature,a->cert_info,r));
 	}

crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt

@@ -3,22 +3,22 @@
 
 1. Introduction
 
-How you handle certificates depend a great deal on what your role is.
+How you handle certificates depends a great deal on what your role is.
 Your role can be one or several of:
 
-  - User of some client software
+  - User of some client application
-  - User of some server software
+  - User of some server application
   - Certificate authority
 
 This file is for users who wish to get a certificate of their own.
-Certificate authorities should read ca.txt.
+Certificate authorities should read https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ca.html.
 
 In all the cases shown below, the standard configuration file, as
 compiled into openssl, will be used.  You may find it in /etc/,
-/usr/local/ssl/ or somewhere else.  The name is openssl.cnf, and
+/usr/local/ssl/ or somewhere else.  By default the file is named
-is better described in another HOWTO <config.txt?>.  If you want to
+openssl.cnf and is described at https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/config.html.
-use a different configuration file, use the argument '-config {file}'
+You can specify a different configuration file using the
-with the command shown below.
+'-config {file}' argument with the commands shown below.
 
 
 2. Relationship with keys
@@ -29,24 +29,26 @@ somewhere.  With OpenSSL, public keys are easily derived from private
 keys, so before you create a certificate or a certificate request, you
 need to create a private key.
 
-Private keys are generated with 'openssl genrsa' if you want a RSA
+Private keys are generated with 'openssl genrsa -out privkey.pem' if
-private key, or 'openssl gendsa' if you want a DSA private key.
+you want a RSA private key, or if you want a DSA private key:
-Further information on how to create private keys can be found in
+'openssl dsaparam -out dsaparam.pem 2048; openssl gendsa -out privkey.pem dsaparam.pem'.
-another HOWTO <keys.txt?>.  The rest of this text assumes you have
+
-a private key in the file privkey.pem.
+The private keys created by these commands are not passphrase protected;
+it might or might not be the desirable thing.  Further information on how to
+create private keys can be found at https://www.openssl.org/docs/HOWTO/keys.txt.
+The rest of this text assumes you have a private key in the file privkey.pem.
 
 
 3. Creating a certificate request
 
-To create a certificate, you need to start with a certificate
+To create a certificate, you need to start with a certificate request
-request (or, as some certificate authorities like to put
+(or, as some certificate authorities like to put it, "certificate
-it, "certificate signing request", since that's exactly what they do,
+signing request", since that's exactly what they do, they sign it and
-they sign it and give you the result back, thus making it authentic
+give you the result back, thus making it authentic according to their
-according to their policies).  A certificate request can then be sent
+policies).  A certificate request is sent to a certificate authority
-to a certificate authority to get it signed into a certificate, or if
+to get it signed into a certificate. You can also sign the certificate
-you have your own certificate authority, you may sign it yourself, or
+yourself if you have your own certificate authority or create a
-if you need a self-signed certificate (because you just want a test
+self-signed certificate (typically for testing purpose).
-certificate or because you are setting up your own CA).
 
 The certificate request is created like this:
 
@@ -55,12 +57,14 @@ The certificate request is created like this:
 Now, cert.csr can be sent to the certificate authority, if they can
 handle files in PEM format.  If not, use the extra argument '-outform'
 followed by the keyword for the format to use (see another HOWTO
-<formats.txt?>).  In some cases, that isn't sufficient and you will
+<formats.txt?>).  In some cases, -outform does not let you output the
-have to be more creative.
+certificate request in the right format and you will have to use one
+of the various other commands that are exposed by openssl (or get
+creative and use a combination of tools).
 
-When the certificate authority has then done the checks the need to
+The certificate authority performs various checks (according to their
-do (and probably gotten payment from you), they will hand over your
+policies) and usually waits for payment from you. Once that is
-new certificate to you.
+complete, they send you your new certificate.
 
 Section 5 will tell you more on how to handle the certificate you
 received.
@@ -68,11 +72,12 @@ received.
 
 4. Creating a self-signed test certificate
 
-If you don't want to deal with another certificate authority, or just
+You can create a self-signed certificate if you don't want to deal
-want to create a test certificate for yourself.  This is similar to
+with a certificate authority, or if you just want to create a test
-creating a certificate request, but creates a certificate instead of
+certificate for yourself.  This is similar to creating a certificate
-a certificate request.  This is NOT the recommended way to create a
+request, but creates a certificate instead of a certificate request.
-CA certificate, see ca.txt.
+This is NOT the recommended way to create a CA certificate, see
+https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ca.html.
 
   openssl req -new -x509 -key privkey.pem -out cacert.pem -days 1095
 
@@ -93,13 +98,13 @@ certificate and your key to various formats, most often also putting
 them together into one file.  The ways to do this is described in
 another HOWTO <formats.txt?>, I will just mention the simplest case.
 In the case of a raw DER thing in PEM format, and assuming that's all
-right for yor applications, simply concatenating the certificate and
+right for your applications, simply concatenating the certificate and
 the key into a new file and using that one should be enough.  With
 some applications, you don't even have to do that.
 
 
-By now, you have your cetificate and your private key and can start
+By now, you have your certificate and your private key and can start
-using the software that depend on it.
+using applications that depend on it.
 
 -- 
 Richard Levitte

crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt

@@ -1,74 +1,69 @@
-<DRAFT!>
 			HOWTO proxy certificates
 
 0. WARNING
 
-NONE OF THE CODE PRESENTED HERE HAVE BEEN CHECKED!  They are just an
+NONE OF THE CODE PRESENTED HERE HAS BEEN CHECKED!  The code is just examples to
-example to show you how things can be done.  There may be typos or
+show you how things could be done.  There might be typos or type conflicts, and
-type conflicts, and you will have to resolve them.
+you will have to resolve them.
 
 1. Introduction
 
-Proxy certificates are defined in RFC 3820.  They are really usual
+Proxy certificates are defined in RFC 3820.  They are really usual certificates
-certificates with the mandatory extension proxyCertInfo.
+with the mandatory extension proxyCertInfo.
 
-Proxy certificates are issued by an End Entity (typically a user),
+Proxy certificates are issued by an End Entity (typically a user), either
-either directly with the EE certificate as issuing certificate, or by
+directly with the EE certificate as issuing certificate, or by extension through
-extension through an already issued proxy certificate..  They are used
+an already issued proxy certificate.  Proxy certificates are used to extend
-to extend rights to some other entity (a computer process, typically,
+rights to some other entity (a computer process, typically, or sometimes to the
-or sometimes to the user itself), so it can perform operations in the
+user itself).  This allows the entity to perform operations on behalf of the
-name of the owner of the EE certificate.
+owner of the EE certificate.
 
 See http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3820.txt for more information.
 
 
 2. A warning about proxy certificates
 
-Noone seems to have tested proxy certificates with security in mind.
+No one seems to have tested proxy certificates with security in mind.  To this
-Basically, to this date, it seems that proxy certificates have only
+date, it seems that proxy certificates have only been used in a context highly
-been used in a world that's highly aware of them.  What would happen
+aware of them.
-if an unsuspecting application is to validate a chain of certificates
-that contains proxy certificates?  It would usually consider the leaf
-to be the certificate to check for authorisation data, and since proxy
-certificates are controlled by the EE certificate owner alone, it's
-would be normal to consider what the EE certificate owner could do
-with them.
 
-subjectAltName and issuerAltName are forbidden in proxy certificates,
+Existing applications might misbehave when trying to validate a chain of
-and this is enforced in OpenSSL.  The subject must be the same as the
+certificates which use a proxy certificate.  They might incorrectly consider the
-issuer, with one commonName added on.
+leaf to be the certificate to check for authorisation data, which is controlled
+by the EE certificate owner.
 
-Possible threats are, as far as has been imagined so far:
+subjectAltName and issuerAltName are forbidden in proxy certificates, and this
+is enforced in OpenSSL.  The subject must be the same as the issuer, with one
+commonName added on.
+
+Possible threats we can think of at this time include:
 
  - impersonation through commonName (think server certificates).
- - use of additional extensions, possibly non-standard ones used in
+ - use of additional extensions, possibly non-standard ones used in certain
-   certain environments, that would grant extra or different
+   environments, that would grant extra or different authorisation rights.
-   authorisation rights.
 
-For this reason, OpenSSL requires that the use of proxy certificates
+For these reasons, OpenSSL requires that the use of proxy certificates be
-be explicitely allowed.  Currently, this can be done using the
+explicitly allowed.  Currently, this can be done using the following methods:
-following methods:
 
- - if the application calls X509_verify_cert() itself, it can do the
+ - if the application directly calls X509_verify_cert(), it can first call:
-   following prior to that call (ctx is the pointer passed in the call
-   to X509_verify_cert()):
 
-	X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
+   X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
 
- - in all other cases, proxy certificate validation can be enabled
+   Where ctx is the pointer which then gets passed to X509_verify_cert().
-   before starting the application by setting the envirnoment variable
-   OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS with some non-empty value.
 
-There are thoughts to allow proxy certificates with a line in the
+ - proxy certificate validation can be enabled before starting the application
-default openssl.cnf, but that's still in the future.
+   by setting the environment variable OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS.
+
+In the future, it might be possible to enable proxy certificates by editing
+openssl.cnf.
 
 
-3. How to create proxy cerificates
+3. How to create proxy certificates
 
-It's quite easy to create proxy certificates, by taking advantage of
+Creating proxy certificates is quite easy, by taking advantage of a lack of
-the lack of checks of the 'openssl x509' application (*ahem*).  But
+checks in the 'openssl x509' application (*ahem*).  You must first create a
-first, you need to create a configuration section that contains a
+configuration section that contains a definition of the proxyCertInfo extension,
-definition of the proxyCertInfo extension, a little like this:
+for example:
 
   [ v3_proxy ]
   # A proxy certificate MUST NEVER be a CA certificate.
@@ -77,10 +72,10 @@ definition of the proxyCertInfo extension, a little like this:
   # Usual authority key ID
   authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always
 
-  # Now, for the extension that marks this certificate as a proxy one
+  # The extension which marks this certificate as a proxy
   proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:1,policy:text:AB
 
-It's also possible to give the proxy extension in a separate section:
+It's also possible to specify the proxy extension in a separate section:
 
   proxyCertInfo=critical,@proxy_ext
 
@@ -89,96 +84,85 @@ It's also possible to give the proxy extension in a separate section:
   pathlen=0
   policy=text:BC
 
-The policy value has a specific syntax, {syntag}:{string}, where the
+The policy value has a specific syntax, {syntag}:{string}, where the syntag
-syntag determines what will be done with the string.  The recognised
+determines what will be done with the string.  The following syntags are
-syntags are as follows:
+recognised:
 
-  text	indicates that the string is simply the bytes, not
+  text  indicates that the string is simply bytes, without any encoding:
-	encoded in any kind of way:
 
-		policy=text:räksmörgås
+          policy=text:räksmörgås
 
-	Previous versions of this design had a specific tag
+        Previous versions of this design had a specific tag for UTF-8 text.
-	for UTF-8 text.  However, since the bytes are copied
+        However, since the bytes are copied as-is anyway, there is no need for
-	as-is anyway, there's no need for it.  Instead, use
+        such a specific tag.
-	the text: tag, like this:
 
-		policy=text:räksmörgås
+  hex   indicates the string is encoded in hex, with colons between each byte
+        (every second hex digit):
 
-  hex	indicates the string is encoded in hex, with colons
+          policy=hex:72:E4:6B:73:6D:F6:72:67:E5:73
-	between each byte (every second hex digit):
 
-		policy=hex:72:E4:6B:73:6D:F6:72:67:E5:73
+        Previous versions of this design had a tag to insert a complete DER
+        blob.  However, the only legal use for this would be to surround the
+        bytes that would go with the hex: tag with whatever is needed to
+        construct a correct OCTET STRING.  The DER tag therefore felt
+        superfluous, and was removed.
 
-	Previous versions of this design had a tag to insert a
+  file  indicates that the text of the policy should really be taken from a
-	complete DER blob.  However, the only legal use for
+        file.  The string is then really a file name.  This is useful for
-	this would be to surround the bytes that would go with
+        policies that are large (more than a few lines, e.g. XML documents).
-	the hex: tag with what's needed to construct a correct
-	OCTET STRING.  Since hex: does that, the DER tag felt
-	superfluous, and was therefore removed.
-
-  file	indicates that the text of the policy should really be
-	taken from a file.  The string is then really a file
-	name.  This is useful for policies that are large
-	(more than a few of lines) XML documents, for example.
 
 The 'policy' setting can be split up in multiple lines like this:
 
   0.policy=This is
-  1.polisy= a multi-
+  1.policy= a multi-
   2.policy=line policy.
 
-NOTE: the proxy policy value is the part that determines the rights
+NOTE: the proxy policy value is the part which determines the rights granted to
-granted to the process using the proxy certificate.  The value is
+the process using the proxy certificate.  The value is completely dependent on
-completely dependent on the application reading and interpretting it!
+the application reading and interpreting it!
 
-Now that you have created an extension section for your proxy
+Now that you have created an extension section for your proxy certificate, you
-certificate, you can now easily create a proxy certificate like this:
+can easily create a proxy certificate by doing:
 
-  openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf \
+  openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf -out proxy.req -keyout proxy.key
-	  -out proxy.req -keyout proxy.key
+  openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy.req -days 7 -out proxy.crt \
-  openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy.req -days 7 \
+    -CA user.crt -CAkey user.key -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy
-	  -out proxy.crt -CA user.crt -CAkey user.key \
-	  -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy
 
-It's just as easy to create a proxy certificate using another proxy
+You can also create a proxy certificate using another proxy certificate as
-certificate as issuer (note that I'm using a different configuration
+issuer (note: I'm using a different configuration section for it):
-section for it):
 
-  openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf \
+  openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf -out proxy2.req -keyout proxy2.key
-	  -out proxy2.req -keyout proxy2.key
+  openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy2.req -days 7 -out proxy2.crt \
-  openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy2.req -days 7 \
+    -CA proxy.crt -CAkey proxy.key -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy2
-	  -out proxy2.crt -CA proxy.crt -CAkey proxy.key \
-	  -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy2
 
 
 4. How to have your application interpret the policy?
 
-The basic way to interpret proxy policies is to prepare some default
+The basic way to interpret proxy policies is to start with some default rights,
-rights, then do a check of the proxy certificate against the a chain
+then compute the resulting rights by checking the proxy certificate against
-of proxy certificates, user certificate and CA certificates, and see
+the chain of proxy certificates, user certificate and CA certificates. You then
-what rights came out by the end.  Sounds easy, huh?  It almost is.
+use the final computed rights.  Sounds easy, huh?  It almost is.
 
-The slightly complicated part is how to pass data between your
+The slightly complicated part is figuring out how to pass data between your
 application and the certificate validation procedure.
 
 You need the following ingredients:
 
- - a callback routing that will be called for every certificate that's
+ - a callback function that will be called for every certificate being
-   validated.  It will be called several times for each certificates,
+   validated.  The callback be called several times for each certificate,
-   so you must be attentive to when it's a good time to do the proxy
+   so you must be careful to do the proxy policy interpretation at the right
-   policy interpretation and check, as well as to fill in the defaults
+   time.  You also need to fill in the defaults when the EE certificate is
-   when the EE certificate is checked.
+   checked.
 
- - a structure of data that's shared between your application code and
+ - a data structure that is shared between your application code and the
-   the callback.
+   callback.
 
  - a wrapper function that sets it all up.
 
- - an ex_data index function that creates an index into the generic
+ - an ex_data index function that creates an index into the generic ex_data
-   ex_data store that's attached to an X509 validation context.
+   store that is attached to an X509 validation context.
 
-This is some cookbook code for you to fill in:
+Here is some skeleton code you can fill in:
 
   /* In this example, I will use a view of granted rights as a bit
      array, one bit for each possible right.  */
@@ -210,7 +194,7 @@ This is some cookbook code for you to fill in:
   static int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
   {
     if (ok == 1) /* It's REALLY important you keep the proxy policy
-                    check within this secion.  It's important to know
+                    check within this section.  It's important to know
                     that when ok is 1, the certificates are checked
                     from top to bottom.  You get the CA root first,
                     followed by the possible chain of intermediate
@@ -221,7 +205,7 @@ This is some cookbook code for you to fill in:
 
         if (xs->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
           {
-	    YOUR_RIGHTS *rights =
+            YOUR_RIGHTS *rights =
               (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
                 get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx());
             PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci =
@@ -250,12 +234,12 @@ This is some cookbook code for you to fill in:
                    bit array and fill it with the rights granted by
                    the current proxy certificate, then use it as a
                    mask on the accumulated rights bit array, and
-                   voilà, you now have a new accumulated rights bit
+                   voilà, you now have a new accumulated rights bit
                    array.  */
                 {
                   int i;
                   YOUR_RIGHTS tmp_rights;
-		  memset(tmp_rights.rights, 0, sizeof(tmp_rights.rights));
+                  memset(tmp_rights.rights, 0, sizeof(tmp_rights.rights));
 
                   /* process_rights() is supposed to be a procedure
                      that takes a string and it's length, interprets
@@ -276,7 +260,7 @@ This is some cookbook code for you to fill in:
           {
             /* We have a EE certificate, let's use it to set default!
             */
-	    YOUR_RIGHTS *rights =
+            YOUR_RIGHTS *rights =
               (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
                 get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx());
 

crypto/openssl/doc/apps/dgst.pod

@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ B<openssl> B<dgst>
 [B<-hex>]
 [B<-binary>]
 [B<-r>]
+[B<-hmac arg>]
+[B<-non-fips-allow>]
 [B<-out filename>]
 [B<-sign filename>]
 [B<-keyform arg>]
@@ -62,6 +64,15 @@ output the digest or signature in binary form.
 
 output the digest in the "coreutils" format used by programs like B<sha1sum>.
 
+=item B<-hmac arg>
+
+set the HMAC key to "arg".
+
+=item B<-non-fips-allow>
+
+Allow use of non FIPS digest when in FIPS mode.  This has no effect when not in
+FIPS mode.
+
 =item B<-out filename>
 
 filename to output to, or standard output by default.

crypto/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod

@@ -133,6 +133,10 @@ if the B<host> option is present then the OCSP request is sent to the host
 B<hostname> on port B<port>. B<path> specifies the HTTP path name to use
 or "/" by default.
 
+=item B<-timeout seconds>
+
+connection timeout to the OCSP responder in seconds
+
 =item B<-CAfile file>, B<-CApath pathname>
 
 file or pathname containing trusted CA certificates. These are used to verify

crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ writes the encrypted version to B<out>. This function can be called
 multiple times to encrypt successive blocks of data. The amount
 of data written depends on the block alignment of the encrypted data:
 as a result the amount of data written may be anything from zero bytes
-to (inl + cipher_block_size - 1) so B<outl> should contain sufficient
+to (inl + cipher_block_size - 1) so B<out> should contain sufficient
 room. The actual number of bytes written is placed in B<outl>.
 
 If padding is enabled (the default) then EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() encrypts

crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod

@@ -43,19 +43,23 @@ indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
 
 =head1 EXAMPLE
 
-Encrypt data using OAEP (for RSA keys):
+Encrypt data using OAEP (for RSA keys). See also L<PEM_read_PUBKEY(3)|pem(3)> or
+L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> for means to load a public key. You may also simply
+set 'eng = NULL;' to start with the default OpenSSL RSA implementation:
 
  #include <openssl/evp.h>
  #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/engine.h>
 
  EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
+ ENGINE *eng;
  unsigned char *out, *in;
  size_t outlen, inlen; 
  EVP_PKEY *key;
- /* NB: assumes key in, inlen are already set up
+ /* NB: assumes eng, key, in, inlen are already set up,
   * and that key is an RSA public key
   */
- ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key);
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key,eng);
  if (!ctx)
 	/* Error occurred */
  if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) <= 0)
@@ -79,6 +83,8 @@ Encrypt data using OAEP (for RSA keys):
 
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
+L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)>,
+L<engine(3)|engine(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,

crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.pod

@@ -81,14 +81,14 @@ Create an B<X509_NAME> structure:
  nm = X509_NAME_new();
  if (nm == NULL)
 	/* Some error */
- if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, MBSTRING_ASC,
+ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "C", MBSTRING_ASC, 
-			"C", "UK", -1, -1, 0))
+			"UK", -1, -1, 0))
 	/* Error */
- if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, MBSTRING_ASC,
+ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "O", MBSTRING_ASC,
-			"O", "Disorganized Organization", -1, -1, 0))
+			"Disorganized Organization", -1, -1, 0))
 	/* Error */
- if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, MBSTRING_ASC,
+ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC,
-			"CN", "Joe Bloggs", -1, -1, 0))
+			"Joe Bloggs", -1, -1, 0))
 	/* Error */
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES

crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod

@@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() should be used followed by
 X509_NAME_get_entry() on any matching indices and then the
 various B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> utility functions on the result.
 
+The list of all relevant B<NID_*> and B<OBJ_* codes> can be found in
+the source code header files E<lt>openssl/obj_mac.hE<gt> and/or
+E<lt>openssl/objects.hE<gt>.
+
 =head1 EXAMPLES
 
 Process all entries:

crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod

@@ -71,6 +71,16 @@ SSL_CTX->freelist_max_len, which defaults to 32.  Using this flag can
 save around 34k per idle SSL connection.
 This flag has no effect on SSL v2 connections, or on DTLS connections.
 
+=item SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
+
+Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
+To be set only by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
+version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details.
+
+DO NOT ENABLE THIS if your application attempts a normal handshake.
+Only use this in explicit fallback retries, following the guidance
+in draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00.
+
 =back
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES

crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod

@@ -158,15 +158,7 @@ temporary/ephemeral DH parameters are used.
 
 =item SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
 
-Always use ephemeral (temporary) RSA key when doing RSA operations
+This option is no longer implemented and is treated as no op.
-(see L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)>).
-According to the specifications this is only done, when a RSA key
-can only be used for signature operations (namely under export ciphers
-with restricted RSA keylength). By setting this option, ephemeral
-RSA keys are always used. This option breaks compatibility with the
-SSL/TLS specifications and may lead to interoperability problems with
-clients and should therefore never be used. Ciphers with EDH (ephemeral
-Diffie-Hellman) key exchange should be used instead.
 
 =item SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
 

crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod

@@ -74,21 +74,14 @@ exchange and use EDH (Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman) key exchange instead
 in order to achieve forward secrecy (see
 L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>).
 
-On OpenSSL servers ephemeral RSA key exchange is therefore disabled by default
+An application may either directly specify the key or can supply the key via a
-and must be explicitly enabled  using the SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA option of
+callback function. The callback approach has the advantage, that the callback
-L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)|SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, violating the TLS/SSL
+may generate the key only in case it is actually needed. As the generation of a
-standard. When ephemeral RSA key exchange is required for export ciphers,
+RSA key is however costly, it will lead to a significant delay in the handshake
-it will automatically be used without this option!
+procedure.  Another advantage of the callback function is that it can supply
-
+keys of different size while the explicit setting of the key is only useful for
-An application may either directly specify the key or can supply the key via
+key size of 512 bits to satisfy the export restricted ciphers and does give
-a callback function. The callback approach has the advantage, that the
+away key length if a longer key would be allowed.
-callback may generate the key only in case it is actually needed. As the
-generation of a RSA key is however costly, it will lead to a significant
-delay in the handshake procedure.  Another advantage of the callback function
-is that it can supply keys of different size (e.g. for SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
-usage) while the explicit setting of the key is only useful for key size of
-512 bits to satisfy the export restricted ciphers and does give away key length
-if a longer key would be allowed.
 
 The B<tmp_rsa_callback> is called with the B<keylength> needed and
 the B<is_export> information. The B<is_export> flag is set, when the

crypto/openssl/e_os.h

@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #    ifdef _WIN64
 #      define strlen(s) _strlen31(s)
 /* cut strings to 2GB */
-static unsigned int _strlen31(const char *str)
+static __inline unsigned int _strlen31(const char *str)
 	{
 	unsigned int len=0;
 	while (*str && len<0x80000000U) str++, len++;
@@ -375,15 +375,6 @@ static unsigned int _strlen31(const char *str)
 #  define check_winnt() (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
 #endif
 
-/*
- * Visual Studio: inline is available in C++ only, however
- * __inline is available for C, see
- * http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/z8y1yy88.aspx
- */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__cplusplus) && !defined(inline)
-#  define inline __inline
-#endif
-
 #else /* The non-microsoft world */
 
 #  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
@@ -741,6 +732,22 @@ struct servent *getservbyname(const char *name, const char *proto);
 #include <OS.h>
 #endif
 
+#if !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
+# if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__>=199901L
+   /* do nothing, inline works */
+# elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+#  define inline __inline__
+# elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+  /*
+   * Visual Studio: inline is available in C++ only, however
+   * __inline is available for C, see
+   * http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/z8y1yy88.aspx
+   */
+#  define inline __inline
+# else
+#  define inline
+# endif
+#endif
 
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 }

crypto/openssl/engines/e_padlock.c

@@ -384,6 +384,7 @@ padlock_available(void)
 }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
+#ifndef AES_ASM
 /* Our own htonl()/ntohl() */
 static inline void
 padlock_bswapl(AES_KEY *ks)
@@ -397,6 +398,7 @@ padlock_bswapl(AES_KEY *ks)
 	}
 }
 #endif
+#endif
 
 /* Force key reload from memory to the CPU microcode.
    Loading EFLAGS from the stack clears EFLAGS[30] 

crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c

@@ -156,9 +156,8 @@ static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = {0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe
 static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[]   = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f};
 
 /* XDTLS:  figure out the right values */
-static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28};
+static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500, 512, 256};
 
-static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu);
 static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, 
 	unsigned long frag_len);
 static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s,
@@ -211,8 +210,7 @@ dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly)
 	return frag;
 	}
 
-static void
+void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
-dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
 	{
 
 	if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
@@ -225,53 +223,50 @@ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
 	OPENSSL_free(frag);
 	}
 
+static int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
+{
+	if(s->d1->link_mtu)
+		{
+		s->d1->mtu = s->d1->link_mtu-BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+		s->d1->link_mtu = 0;
+		}
+
+	/* AHA!  Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
+	if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s))
+		{
+		if(!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
+			{
+			s->d1->mtu =
+				BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+
+			/* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
+			 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
+			if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s))
+				{
+				/* Set to min mtu */
+				s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
+				BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
+					s->d1->mtu, NULL);
+				}
+			}
+		else
+			return 0;
+		}
+	return 1;
+}
+
 /* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
 int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 	{
 	int ret;
-	int curr_mtu;
+	unsigned int curr_mtu;
-	unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
+	int retry = 1;
+	unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize, used_len;
 
-	/* AHA!  Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
+	if(!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
-	if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
+		return -1;
-		{
-		s->d1->mtu = 
-			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
 
-		/* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
+	OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu(s));  /* should have something reasonable now */
-		 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
-		if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
-			{
-			s->d1->mtu = 0;
-			s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
-			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, 
-				s->d1->mtu, NULL);
-			}
-		}
-#if 0 
-	mtu = s->d1->mtu;
-
-	fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu);
-
-	mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
-
-	curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s));
-
-	if ( curr_mtu > 0)
-		mtu = curr_mtu;
-	else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0)
-		return ret;
-
-	if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu)
-		{
-		ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
-		if ( ret <= 0)
-			return ret;
-		mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
-		}
-#endif
-
-	OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu());  /* should have something reasonable now */
 
 	if ( s->init_off == 0  && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
 		OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 
@@ -289,10 +284,15 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 		blocksize = 0;
 
 	frag_off = 0;
-	while( s->init_num)
+	/* s->init_num shouldn't ever be < 0...but just in case */
+	while(s->init_num > 0)
 		{
-		curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) - 
+		used_len = BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) +  DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
-			DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize;
+			+ mac_size + blocksize;
+		if(s->d1->mtu > used_len)
+			curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
+		else
+			curr_mtu = 0;
 
 		if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
 			{
@@ -300,15 +300,27 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 			ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
 			if ( ret <= 0)
 				return ret;
-			curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH -
+			used_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize;
-				mac_size - blocksize;
+			if(s->d1->mtu > used_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+				{
+				curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				/* Shouldn't happen */
+				return -1;
+				}
 			}
 
-		if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
+		/* We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should be safe */
+		if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
 			len = curr_mtu;
 		else
 			len = s->init_num;
 
+		/* Shouldn't ever happen */
+		if(len > INT_MAX)
+			len = INT_MAX;
 
 		/* XDTLS: this function is too long.  split out the CCS part */
 		if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
@@ -319,18 +331,29 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 				s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
 				s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
 
-				if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
+				/* We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should be safe */
+				if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
 					len = curr_mtu;
 				else
 					len = s->init_num;
 				}
 
+			/* Shouldn't ever happen */
+			if(len > INT_MAX)
+				len = INT_MAX;
+
+			if ( len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH )
+				{
+				/*
+				 * len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible
+				 * so fail
+				 */
+				return -1;
+				}
 			dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 
 				len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
 
 			dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]);
-
-			OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
 			}
 
 		ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
@@ -343,12 +366,23 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 			 * is fine and wait for an alert to handle the
 			 * retransmit 
 			 */
-			if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+			if ( retry && BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
 				BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 )
-				s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+				{
-					BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+				if(!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
+					{
+					if(!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
+						return -1;
+					/* Have one more go */
+					retry = 0;
+					}
+				else
+					return -1;
+				}
 			else
+				{
 				return(-1);
+				}
 			}
 		else
 			{
@@ -1412,28 +1446,20 @@ dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
 	return p;
 	}
 
-unsigned int 
+unsigned int
-dtls1_min_mtu(void)
+dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
 	{
 	return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / 
 		sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
 	}
 
-static unsigned int 
+unsigned int
-dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu)
+dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
 	{
-	unsigned int i;
+	return dtls1_link_min_mtu()-BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
-
-	if ( curr_mtu == 0 )
-		return g_probable_mtu[0] ;
-
-	for ( i = 0; i < sizeof(g_probable_mtu)/sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0]); i++)
-		if ( curr_mtu > g_probable_mtu[i])
-			return g_probable_mtu[i];
-
-	return curr_mtu;
 	}
 
+
 void
 dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
 	{

crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c

@@ -249,6 +249,9 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 			memset(s->s3->client_random,0,sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
 			s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
 			s->hit = 0;
+			s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
+			/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
+			s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
 			break;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
@@ -370,20 +373,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-			ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			if (ret == 2)
-				{
-				s->hit = 1;
-				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-				s->init_num=0;
-				break;
-				}
-#endif
 			/* Check if it is anon DH or PSK */
 			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
 			    !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
@@ -506,7 +495,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 				else
 #endif
 					s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-				s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
 				}
 
 			s->init_num=0;
@@ -527,7 +515,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 #endif
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
-			s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
 			break;
 
 		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
@@ -1730,6 +1717,12 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
 		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
 		l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,
 			(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
+		if (!l)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return 0;
+			}
 		s->init_num=(int)l;
 		s->init_off=0;
 

crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c

@@ -241,7 +241,8 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 				return 0;
 			}
 		
-		EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+		if(EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l) < 1)
+			return -1;
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 		{

crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c

@@ -113,6 +113,9 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
 		d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
 		}
 
+	d1->link_mtu = 0;
+	d1->mtu = 0;
+
 	if( ! d1->unprocessed_rcds.q || ! d1->processed_rcds.q 
         || ! d1->buffered_messages || ! d1->sent_messages || ! d1->buffered_app_data.q)
 		{
@@ -161,16 +164,14 @@ static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
     while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL)
         {
         frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-        OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+        dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-        OPENSSL_free(frag);
         pitem_free(item);
         }
 
     while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL)
         {
         frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-        OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+        dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-        OPENSSL_free(frag);
         pitem_free(item);
         }
 
@@ -210,6 +211,7 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
 	pqueue sent_messages;
 	pqueue buffered_app_data;
 	unsigned int mtu;
+	unsigned int link_mtu;
 
 	if (s->d1)
 		{
@@ -219,6 +221,7 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
 		sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages;
 		buffered_app_data = s->d1->buffered_app_data.q;
 		mtu = s->d1->mtu;
+		link_mtu = s->d1->link_mtu;
 
 		dtls1_clear_queues(s);
 
@@ -232,6 +235,7 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
 		if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)
 			{
 			s->d1->mtu = mtu;
+			s->d1->link_mtu = link_mtu;
 			}
 
 		s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds;
@@ -276,7 +280,22 @@ long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 		/* Just one protocol version is supported so far;
 		 * fail closed if the version is not as expected. */
 		return s->version == DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
-
+	case DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU:
+		if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu())
+			return 0;
+		s->d1->link_mtu = larg;
+		return 1;
+	case DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU:
+		return (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu();
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
+		/*
+		 *  We may not have a BIO set yet so can't call dtls1_min_mtu()
+		 *  We'll have to make do with dtls1_link_min_mtu() and max overhead
+		 */
+		if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu() - DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD)
+			return 0;
+		s->d1->mtu = larg;
+		return larg;
 	default:
 		ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
 		break;
@@ -415,12 +434,17 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
 
 int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
 	{
+	unsigned int mtu;
+
 	s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
 
 	/* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
-	if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2)
+	if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2
+			&& !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
 		{
-		s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL);		
+		mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL);
+		if(mtu < s->d1->mtu)
+			s->d1->mtu = mtu;
 		}
 
 	if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT)

crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c

@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
 	/* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
 	if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
 		return 0;
-		
+
 	rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
 	item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
 	if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
@@ -247,18 +247,22 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
 	if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
+			OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
 		OPENSSL_free(rdata);
 		pitem_free(item);
-		return(0);
+		return(-1);
 		}
 
 	/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
 	if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
+			OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
 		OPENSSL_free(rdata);
 		pitem_free(item);
-		return(0);
+		return(-1);
 		}
 
 	return(1);
@@ -314,8 +318,9 @@ dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
             dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
             if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
                 return(0);
-            dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds), 
+            if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
-                s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
+                s->s3->rrec.seq_num)<0)
+                return -1;
             }
         }
 
@@ -530,7 +535,6 @@ printf("\n");
 
 	/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
 	s->packet_length=0;
-	dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
 	return(1);
 
 f_err:
@@ -563,7 +567,8 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
 
 	/* The epoch may have changed.  If so, process all the
 	 * pending records.  This is a non-blocking operation. */
-	dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
+	if(dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)<0)
+		return -1;
 
 	/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
 	if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
@@ -642,8 +647,6 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
 		/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
 		i=rr->length;
 		n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
-		if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
-
 		/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
 		if ( n != i)
 			{
@@ -678,7 +681,8 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
 		 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
 		 */
 		if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
-		    *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+		    s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
+		    s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
 		    !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
 			{
 			rr->length = 0;
@@ -701,7 +705,9 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
 		{
 		if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
 			{
-			dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
+			if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num)<0)
+				return -1;
+			dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);/* Mark receipt of record. */
 			}
 		rr->length = 0;
 		s->packet_length = 0;
@@ -714,6 +720,7 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
 		s->packet_length = 0;  /* dump this record */
 		goto again;   /* get another record */
 		}
+	dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);/* Mark receipt of record. */
 
 	return(1);
 
@@ -865,7 +872,11 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
 		 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
 		 * than dropping the connection.
 		 */
-		dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num);
+		if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num)<0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return -1;
+			}
 		rr->length = 0;
 		goto start;
 		}
@@ -1619,7 +1630,7 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 		wr->length += bs;
 		}
 
-	s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
+	if(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1) < 1) goto err;
 
 	/* record length after mac and block padding */
 /*	if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||

crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c

@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 					}
 				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
 					{
+					BUF_MEM_free(buf);
 					ret= -1;
 					goto end;
 					}
@@ -246,6 +247,9 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 				}
 
 			s->init_num=0;
+			s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
+			/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
+			s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
 
 			if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
 				{
@@ -450,24 +454,15 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
 			alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 
-			/* clear this, it may get reset by
+			/*
-			 * send_server_key_exchange */
+			 * clear this, it may get reset by
-			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
+			 * send_server_key_exchange
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+			 */
-				&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+			s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-				)
-				/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
-				 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
-				 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
-				 * be able to handle this) */
-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
-			else
-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
 
 			/* only send if a DH key exchange or
 			 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
-			if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+			if (0
 			/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
 			 * hint if provided */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
@@ -658,8 +653,14 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
-
+			/*
-			s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
+			 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
+			 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
+			 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
+			 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
+			 */
+			if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+				s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
 			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
 			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -675,7 +676,18 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
-			s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
+			/*
+			 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes.
+			 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
+			 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, so change_cipher_spec_ok was
+			 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+			 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+			 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
+			 * processed in d1_pkt.c, and remains set until
+			 * the client's Finished message is read.
+			 */
+			if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+				s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
 				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -1604,6 +1616,11 @@ int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
 			}
 
 		l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,x);
+		if (!l)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return(0);
+			}
 		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
 		s->init_num=(int)l;
 		s->init_off=0;

crypto/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h

@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ extern "C" {
 #define DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL	"EXPORTER_DTLS_OVER_SCTP"
 #endif
 
+/* Max MTU overhead we know about so far is 40 for IPv6 + 8 for UDP */
+#define DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD                   48
+
 typedef struct dtls1_bitmap_st
 	{
 	unsigned long map;		/* track 32 packets on 32-bit systems
@@ -231,6 +234,7 @@ typedef struct dtls1_state_st
 	/* Is set when listening for new connections with dtls1_listen() */
 	unsigned int listen;
 
+	unsigned int link_mtu; /* max on-the-wire DTLS packet size */
 	unsigned int mtu; /* max DTLS packet size */
 
 	struct hm_header_st w_msg_hdr;
@@ -252,6 +256,10 @@ typedef struct dtls1_state_st
 	unsigned int handshake_fragment_len;
 
 	unsigned int retransmitting;
+	/*
+	 * Set when the handshake is ready to process peer's ChangeCipherSpec message.
+	 * Cleared after the message has been processed.
+	 */
 	unsigned int change_cipher_spec_ok;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP

crypto/openssl/ssl/kssl.c

@@ -954,15 +954,15 @@ print_krb5_data(char *label, krb5_data *kdata)
         {
 	int i;
 
-	printf("%s[%d] ", label, kdata->length);
+	fprintf(stderr,"%s[%d] ", label, kdata->length);
 	for (i=0; i < (int)kdata->length; i++)
                 {
 		if (0 &&  isprint((int) kdata->data[i]))
-                        printf(	"%c ",  kdata->data[i]);
+                        fprintf(stderr,	"%c ",  kdata->data[i]);
 		else
-                        printf(	"%02x ", (unsigned char) kdata->data[i]);
+                        fprintf(stderr,	"%02x ", (unsigned char) kdata->data[i]);
 		}
-	printf("\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"\n");
         }
 
 
@@ -973,20 +973,20 @@ print_krb5_authdata(char *label, krb5_authdata **adata)
         {
 	if (adata == NULL)
                 {
-		printf("%s, authdata==0\n", label);
+		fprintf(stderr,"%s, authdata==0\n", label);
 		return;
 		}
-	printf("%s [%p]\n", label, (void *)adata);
+	fprintf(stderr,"%s [%p]\n", label, (void *)adata);
 #if 0
 	{
         int 	i;
-	printf("%s[at%d:%d] ", label, adata->ad_type, adata->length);
+	fprintf(stderr,"%s[at%d:%d] ", label, adata->ad_type, adata->length);
 	for (i=0; i < adata->length; i++)
                 {
-                printf((isprint(adata->contents[i]))? "%c ": "%02x",
+                fprintf(stderr,(isprint(adata->contents[i]))? "%c ": "%02x",
                         adata->contents[i]);
 		}
-	printf("\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 	}
 #endif
 	}
@@ -1001,24 +1001,24 @@ print_krb5_keyblock(char *label, krb5_keyblock *keyblk)
 
 	if (keyblk == NULL)
                 {
-		printf("%s, keyblk==0\n", label);
+		fprintf(stderr,"%s, keyblk==0\n", label);
 		return;
 		}
 #ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
-	printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->keytype,
+	fprintf(stderr,"%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->keytype,
 					   keyblk->keyvalue->length);
 	for (i=0; i < (int)keyblk->keyvalue->length; i++)
                 {
-		printf("%02x",(unsigned char *)(keyblk->keyvalue->contents)[i]);
+		fprintf(stderr,"%02x",(unsigned char *)(keyblk->keyvalue->contents)[i]);
 		}
-	printf("\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 #else
-	printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->enctype, keyblk->length);
+	fprintf(stderr,"%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->enctype, keyblk->length);
 	for (i=0; i < (int)keyblk->length; i++)
                 {
-		printf("%02x",keyblk->contents[i]);
+		fprintf(stderr,"%02x",keyblk->contents[i]);
 		}
-	printf("\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 #endif
         }
 
@@ -1031,17 +1031,17 @@ print_krb5_princ(char *label, krb5_principal_data *princ)
         {
 	int i, ui, uj;
 
-	printf("%s principal Realm: ", label);
+	fprintf(stderr,"%s principal Realm: ", label);
 	if (princ == NULL)  return;
 	for (ui=0; ui < (int)princ->realm.length; ui++)  putchar(princ->realm.data[ui]);
-	printf(" (nametype %d) has %d strings:\n", princ->type,princ->length);
+	fprintf(stderr," (nametype %d) has %d strings:\n", princ->type,princ->length);
 	for (i=0; i < (int)princ->length; i++)
                 {
-		printf("\t%d [%d]: ", i, princ->data[i].length);
+		fprintf(stderr,"\t%d [%d]: ", i, princ->data[i].length);
 		for (uj=0; uj < (int)princ->data[i].length; uj++)  {
 			putchar(princ->data[i].data[uj]);
 			}
-		printf("\n");
+		fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 		}
 	return;
         }
@@ -1332,7 +1332,7 @@ kssl_sget_tkt(	/* UPDATE */	KSSL_CTX		*kssl_ctx,
 		}
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("in kssl_sget_tkt(%s)\n", kstring(kssl_ctx->service_name));
+	fprintf(stderr,"in kssl_sget_tkt(%s)\n", kstring(kssl_ctx->service_name));
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
 	if (!krb5context  &&  (krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)))
@@ -1481,18 +1481,18 @@ kssl_sget_tkt(	/* UPDATE */	KSSL_CTX		*kssl_ctx,
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 		{
 		int i; krb5_address **paddr = krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs;
-		printf("Decrypted ticket fields:\n");
+		fprintf(stderr,"Decrypted ticket fields:\n");
-		printf("\tflags: %X, transit-type: %X",
+		fprintf(stderr,"\tflags: %X, transit-type: %X",
 			krb5ticket->enc_part2->flags,
 			krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_type);
 		print_krb5_data("\ttransit-data: ",
 			&(krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_contents));
-		printf("\tcaddrs: %p, authdata: %p\n",
+		fprintf(stderr,"\tcaddrs: %p, authdata: %p\n",
 			krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs,
 			krb5ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data);
 		if (paddr)
 			{
-			printf("\tcaddrs:\n");
+			fprintf(stderr,"\tcaddrs:\n");
 			for (i=0; paddr[i] != NULL; i++)
 				{
 				krb5_data d;
@@ -1501,7 +1501,7 @@ kssl_sget_tkt(	/* UPDATE */	KSSL_CTX		*kssl_ctx,
 				print_krb5_data("\t\tIP: ", &d);
 				}
 			}
-		printf("\tstart/auth/end times: %d / %d / %d\n",
+		fprintf(stderr,"\tstart/auth/end times: %d / %d / %d\n",
 			krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime,
 			krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime,
 			krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime);
@@ -1976,7 +1976,7 @@ krb5_error_code  kssl_validate_times(	krb5_timestamp atime,
 	if ((now - ttimes->endtime) > skew)  return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED;
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("kssl_validate_times: %d |<-  | %d - %d | < %d  ->| %d\n",
+	fprintf(stderr,"kssl_validate_times: %d |<-  | %d - %d | < %d  ->| %d\n",
 		start, atime, now, skew, ttimes->endtime);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -2027,10 +2027,10 @@ krb5_error_code  kssl_check_authent(
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
         {
         unsigned int ui;
-	printf("kssl_check_authent: authenticator[%d]:\n",authentp->length);
+	fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent: authenticator[%d]:\n",authentp->length);
 	p = authentp->data; 
-	for (ui=0; ui < authentp->length; ui++)  printf("%02x ",p[ui]);
+	for (ui=0; ui < authentp->length; ui++)  fprintf(stderr,"%02x ",p[ui]);
-	printf("\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"\n");
         }
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -2095,9 +2095,9 @@ krb5_error_code  kssl_check_authent(
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	{
 	int padl;
-	printf("kssl_check_authent: decrypted authenticator[%d] =\n", outl);
+	fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent: decrypted authenticator[%d] =\n", outl);
-	for (padl=0; padl < outl; padl++) printf("%02x ",unenc_authent[padl]);
+	for (padl=0; padl < outl; padl++) fprintf(stderr,"%02x ",unenc_authent[padl]);
-	printf("\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 	}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -2132,10 +2132,10 @@ krb5_error_code  kssl_check_authent(
  		}
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("kssl_check_authent: returns %d for client time ", *atimep);
+	fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent: returns %d for client time ", *atimep);
 	if (auth && auth->ctime && auth->ctime->length && auth->ctime->data)
-		printf("%.*s\n", auth->ctime->length, auth->ctime->data);
+		fprintf(stderr,"%.*s\n", auth->ctime->length, auth->ctime->data);
-	else	printf("NULL\n");
+	else	fprintf(stderr,"NULL\n");
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
  err:

crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c

@@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ int ssl23_accept(SSL *s)
 					}
 				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
 					{
+					BUF_MEM_free(buf);
 					ret= -1;
 					goto end;
 					}
@@ -602,12 +603,14 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
 		{
 		/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
-                s->method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
+		const SSL_METHOD *new_method;
-		if (s->method == NULL)
+		new_method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
+		if (new_method == NULL)
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
 			goto err;
 			}
+		s->method = new_method;
 
 		if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
 

crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c

@@ -117,8 +117,9 @@ int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client)
 
 /* read/writes from s->s2->mac_data using length for encrypt and 
  * decrypt.  It sets s->s2->padding and s->[rw]length
- * if we are encrypting */
+ * if we are encrypting
-void ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send)
+ * Returns 0 on error and 1 on success */
+int ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	{
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
 	unsigned long l;
@@ -136,7 +137,7 @@ void ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		}
 
 	/* check for NULL cipher */
-	if (ds == NULL) return;
+	if (ds == NULL) return 1;
 
 
 	bs=ds->cipher->block_size;
@@ -145,7 +146,10 @@ void ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	if (bs == 8)
 		l=(l+7)/8*8;
 
-	EVP_Cipher(ds,s->s2->mac_data,s->s2->mac_data,l);
+	if(EVP_Cipher(ds,s->s2->mac_data,s->s2->mac_data,l) < 1)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
 	}
 
 void ssl2_mac(SSL *s, unsigned char *md, int send)

crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c

@@ -265,7 +265,11 @@ static int ssl2_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
 		if ((!s->s2->clear_text) &&
 			(s->s2->rlength >= (unsigned int)mac_size))
 			{
-			ssl2_enc(s,0);
+			if(!ssl2_enc(s,0))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+				return(-1);
+				}
 			s->s2->ract_data_length-=mac_size;
 			ssl2_mac(s,mac,0);
 			s->s2->ract_data_length-=s->s2->padding;
@@ -616,7 +620,8 @@ static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
 		s->s2->wact_data_length=len+p;
 		ssl2_mac(s,s->s2->mac_data,1);
 		s->s2->wlength+=p+mac_size;
-		ssl2_enc(s,1);
+		if(ssl2_enc(s,1) < 1)
+			return -1;
 		}
 
 	/* package up the header */

crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c

@@ -188,13 +188,21 @@ int ssl2_accept(SSL *s)
 			s->version=SSL2_VERSION;
 			s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
 
-			buf=s->init_buf;
+			if(s->init_buf == NULL)
-			if ((buf == NULL) && ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL))
+				{
-				{ ret= -1; goto end; }
+				if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
-			if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,(int)
+					{
-				SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
+					ret= -1;
-				{ ret= -1; goto end; }
+					goto end;
-			s->init_buf=buf;
+					}
+				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,(int) SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
+					{
+					BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+					ret= -1;
+					goto end;
+					}
+				s->init_buf=buf;
+				}
 			s->init_num=0;
 			s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
 			s->handshake_func=ssl2_accept;

crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c

@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
 			goto f_err;
 			}
 		*ok=1;
+		s->state = stn;
 		s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
 		s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
 		return s->init_num;

crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c

@@ -167,9 +167,9 @@
 #include <openssl/engine.h>
 #endif
 
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
 	{
 	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
 			ssl_undefined_function,
 			ssl3_connect,
 			ssl3_get_client_method)
+#endif
 
 int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 	{
@@ -272,6 +273,9 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
 			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
 			s->init_num=0;
+			s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+			/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
+			s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
 			break;
 
 		case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
@@ -312,20 +316,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-			ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			if (ret == 2)
-				{
-				s->hit = 1;
-				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-				s->init_num=0;
-				break;
-				}
-#endif
 			/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
 			/* or PSK */
 			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) &&
@@ -433,12 +423,10 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 			else
 				{
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-				s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
 				}
 			if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
 				{
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-				s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
 				}
 
 			s->init_num=0;
@@ -450,7 +438,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
-			s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
 			break;
 
 		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
@@ -510,7 +497,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
 				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
 
 			/* clear flags */
@@ -559,7 +545,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
-
 			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
 				SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
@@ -669,11 +654,7 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
 		SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
 		if ((sess == NULL) ||
 			(sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 			!sess->session_id_length ||
-#else
-			(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
-#endif
 			(sess->not_resumable))
 			{
 			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
@@ -879,6 +860,8 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 	memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 	p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
 
+	s->hit = 0;
+
 	/* get the session-id */
 	j= *(p++);
 
@@ -902,12 +885,12 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 			{
 			s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
 				pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
-	    		s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+			s->hit = 1;
 			}
 		}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
 
-	if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
+	if (!s->hit && j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
 	    && memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0)
 	    {
 	    if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
@@ -918,14 +901,13 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
-	    s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 	    s->hit=1;
 	    }
-	else	/* a miss or crap from the other end */
+	/* a miss or crap from the other end */
+	if (!s->hit)
 		{
 		/* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
 		 * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
-		s->hit=0;
 		if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
 			{
 			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
@@ -1203,9 +1185,9 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
 	            ? 0 : 1;
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
+	fprintf(stderr,"pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
-	printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
+	fprintf(stderr,"ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
-	printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
+	fprintf(stderr,"cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
 		s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -1295,6 +1277,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 	int encoded_pt_len = 0;
 #endif
 
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
 	/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
 	 * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
 	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
@@ -1305,14 +1289,26 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		&ok);
 	if (!ok) return((int)n);
 
+	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
 	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
 		{
+		/*
+		 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
+		 * ciphersuite.
+		 */
+		if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kEECDH))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+			al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			goto f_err;
+			}
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
 		/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
 		   omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
 		   session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
 		   later.*/
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
+		if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
 			{
 			s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
 			if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
@@ -1357,9 +1353,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 	/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
 	param_len=0;
 
-	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
 
 	al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 
@@ -1543,6 +1537,13 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 	if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
 		{
+		/* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
+		if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
 		if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -2174,24 +2175,13 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
 	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
 		SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
 		SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
-		-1,
+		SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET,
 		16384,
 		&ok);
 
 	if (!ok)
 		return((int)n);
 
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
-		{
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		return(1);
-		}
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
 	if (n < 6)
 		{
 		/* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
@@ -2223,7 +2213,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
 		}
 	memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
 	s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
-	/* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
+	/* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session.
 	 * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
 	 * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
 	 * client session ID matching to work and we know much 
@@ -2462,7 +2452,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-			printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
+			fprintf(stderr,"ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
 				alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -2478,9 +2468,9 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			    goto err;
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 			{
-			printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
+			fprintf(stderr,"kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
 			if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
-			  printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
+			  fprintf(stderr,"kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
 			}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -3309,6 +3299,12 @@ int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
 		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
 		l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
 			(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
+		if (!l)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return 0;
+			}
 		s->init_num=(int)l;
 		s->init_off=0;
 		}
@@ -3478,40 +3474,9 @@ int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
 		}
 
 	return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
-}
+        }
 #endif  /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
 
-/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
- * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
- * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
- */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ok;
-	long n;
-	/* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */
-	if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
-		return 1;
-	/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate
-	 * message, so permit appropriate message length */
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-		-1,
-		s->max_cert_list,
-		&ok);
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-	s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-	if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
-		|| (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
-		return 2;
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-#endif
-
 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
 	{
 	int i = 0;

crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c

@@ -535,7 +535,8 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 			/* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
 			}
 		
-		EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+		if(EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l) < 1)
+			return -1;
 
 		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
 			mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);

crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c

@@ -3810,17 +3810,17 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-	printf("Server has %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr), (void *)srvr);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Server has %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr), (void *)srvr);
 	for(i=0 ; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr) ; ++i)
 		{
 		c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(srvr,i);
-		printf("%p:%s\n",(void *)c,c->name);
+		fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n",(void *)c,c->name);
 		}
-	printf("Client sent %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt), (void *)clnt);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Client sent %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt), (void *)clnt);
 	for(i=0 ; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt) ; ++i)
 	    {
 	    c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clnt,i);
-	    printf("%p:%s\n",(void *)c,c->name);
+	    fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n",(void *)c,c->name);
 	    }
 #endif
 
@@ -3860,7 +3860,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 #endif
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-/*		printf("ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/
+/*		fprintf(stderr,"ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
 		alg_k=c->algorithm_mkey;
@@ -3883,7 +3883,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 			{
 			ok = (alg_k & emask_k) && (alg_a & emask_a);
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-			printf("%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s (export)\n",ok,alg_k,alg_a,emask_k,emask_a,
+			fprintf(stderr, "%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s (export)\n",ok,alg_k,alg_a,emask_k,emask_a,
 			       (void *)c,c->name);
 #endif
 			}
@@ -3891,7 +3891,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 			{
 			ok = (alg_k & mask_k) && (alg_a & mask_a);
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-			printf("%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s\n",ok,alg_k,alg_a,mask_k,mask_a,(void *)c,
+			fprintf(stderr, "%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s\n",ok,alg_k,alg_a,mask_k,mask_a,(void *)c,
 			       c->name);
 #endif
 			}
@@ -4000,6 +4000,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 				}
 			ok = ok && ec_ok;
 			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
 		if (
 			/* if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses an ephemeral EC key */
 			(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
@@ -4047,6 +4048,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 				}
 			ok = ok && ec_ok;
 			}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
 

crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_meth.c

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_method(int ver);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_method(int ver)
 	{
 	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
@@ -73,5 +73,4 @@ IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_method,
 			 ssl3_accept,
 			 ssl3_connect,
 			 ssl3_get_method)
-
+#endif
-

crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c

@@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
 	 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
 	if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 		{
+		if (left == 0 && extend)
+			return 0;
 		if (left > 0 && n > left)
 			n = left;
 		}
@@ -856,8 +858,7 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 		wr->length += eivlen;
 		}
 
-	/* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
+	if(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1)<1) goto err;
-	s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
 
 	/* record length after mac and block padding */
 	s2n(wr->length,plen);

crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c

@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@
 #endif
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
 
 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
@@ -180,6 +181,12 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
 		return(NULL);
 	}
 
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
+			ssl3_accept,
+			ssl_undefined_function,
+			ssl3_get_server_method)
+#endif
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
 	{
@@ -206,11 +213,6 @@ static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
 	}
 #endif
 
-IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
-			ssl3_accept,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			ssl3_get_server_method)
-
 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 	{
 	BUF_MEM *buf;
@@ -284,6 +286,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 					}
 				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
 					{
+					BUF_MEM_free(buf);
 					ret= -1;
 					goto end;
 					}
@@ -298,6 +301,9 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 
 			s->init_num=0;
 			s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
+			s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+			/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
+			s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
 
 			if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
 				{
@@ -441,20 +447,11 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
 			alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 
-			/* clear this, it may get reset by
+			/*
-			 * send_server_key_exchange */
+			 * clear this, it may get reset by
-			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
+			 * send_server_key_exchange
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+			 */
-				&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+			s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-				)
-				/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
-				 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
-				 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
-				 * be able to handle this) */
-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
-			else
-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
 
 
 			/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
@@ -468,7 +465,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 			 * server certificate contains the server's
 			 * public key for key exchange.
 			 */
-			if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+			if (0
 			/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
 			 * hint if provided */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
@@ -674,8 +671,14 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
-
+			/*
-			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+			 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
+			 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
+			 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
+			 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
+			 */
+			if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+				s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
 			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -694,6 +697,19 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
+			/*
+			 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
+			 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
+			 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
+			 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+			 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+			 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
+			 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
+			 * the client's Finished message is read.
+			 */
+			if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+				s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
 			ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 			s->init_num = 0;
@@ -703,7 +719,18 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
-			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+			/*
+			 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
+			 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
+			 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
+			 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+			 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+			 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
+			 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
+			 * the client's Finished message is read.
+			 */
+			if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+				s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
 				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -775,7 +802,6 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 #else
 				if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
 					{
-					s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
 					}
 				else
@@ -1017,7 +1043,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	else
 		{
 		i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
-		if (i == 1)
+		/*
+		 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
+		 * version.
+		 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
+		 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
+		 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
+		 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
+		 * will abort the handshake with an error.
+		 */
+		if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
 			{ /* previous session */
 			s->hit=1;
 			}
@@ -1112,14 +1147,15 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 		id=s->session->cipher->id;
 
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-		printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
+		fprintf(stderr,"client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
 #endif
 		for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
 			{
 			c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-			printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
+			fprintf(stderr,"client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
-				i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+				i,sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers),
+				SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
 #endif
 			if (c->id == id)
 				{
@@ -2171,6 +2207,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
 		int decrypt_len;
 		unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
+		size_t j;
 
 		/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
 		if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
@@ -2209,8 +2246,9 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				{
 				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
 					{
+					al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
-					goto err;
+					goto f_err;
 					}
 				else
 					p-=2;
@@ -2219,6 +2257,20 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				n=i;
 			}
 
+		/*
+		 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
+		 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
+		 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
+		 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
+		 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
+		 */
+		if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+			{
+			al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
 		/* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
 		 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
 		 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
@@ -2266,19 +2318,23 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
 		decrypt_good &= version_good;
 
-		/* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
+		/*
-		 * decrypt_good_mask. */
+		 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
-		for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
+		 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
+		 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
+		 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
+		 */
+		for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++)
 			{
-			p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
+			p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
-						      rand_premaster_secret[i]);
+						      rand_premaster_secret[j]);
 			}
 
 		s->session->master_key_length=
 			s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
 				s->session->master_key,
-				p,i);
+				p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
 		}
 	else
 #endif
@@ -2420,10 +2476,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 					&kssl_err)) != 0)
 			{
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-			printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
+			fprintf(stderr,"kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
 				krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
 			if (kssl_err.text)
-				printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+				fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
 				kssl_err.reason);
@@ -2437,10 +2493,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 					&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
 			{
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-			printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
+			fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
 				krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
 			if (kssl_err.text)
-				printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+				fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
 				kssl_err.reason);
@@ -2958,7 +3014,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
 	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
 		{
 		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+		if (peer != NULL)
 			{
 			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
@@ -3362,6 +3418,11 @@ int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
 			}
 
 		l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
+		if (!l)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return(0);
+			}
 		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
 		s->init_num=(int)l;
 		s->init_off=0;

crypto/openssl/ssl/srtp.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* ssl/tls1.h */
+/* ssl/srtp.h */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@
 #ifndef HEADER_D1_SRTP_H
 #define HEADER_D1_SRTP_H
 
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 extern "C" {
 #endif

crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h

@@ -596,9 +596,8 @@ struct ssl_session_st
 #define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE				0x00080000L
 /* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */
 #define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE				0x00100000L
-/* Set to always use the tmp_rsa key when doing RSA operations,
+/* Does nothing: retained for compatibiity */
- * even when this violates protocol specs */
+#define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA				0x0
-#define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA				0x00200000L
 /* Set on servers to choose the cipher according to the server's
  * preferences */
 #define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE			0x00400000L
@@ -654,8 +653,13 @@ struct ssl_session_st
 #define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L
 #define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L
 /* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
- * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
+ * To be set only by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
- * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */
+ * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details.
+ *
+ * DO NOT ENABLE THIS if your application attempts a normal handshake.
+ * Only use this in explicit fallback retries, following the guidance
+ * in draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00.
+ */
 #define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L
 
 /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
@@ -688,6 +692,10 @@ struct ssl_session_st
         SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL)
 #define SSL_set_mtu(ssl, mtu) \
         SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU,(mtu),NULL)
+#define DTLS_set_link_mtu(ssl, mtu) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU,(mtu),NULL)
+#define DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(ssl) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU,0,NULL)
 
 #define SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) \
 	SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT, 0, NULL)
@@ -1627,6 +1635,8 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
 #define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS	83
 
 #define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION		119
+#define DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU			120
+#define DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU		121
 
 #define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
 	SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
@@ -1878,13 +1888,15 @@ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_server_method(void);	/* SSLv2 */
 const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void);	/* SSLv2 */
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
 const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void);		/* SSLv3 */
 const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void);	/* SSLv3 */
 const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void);	/* SSLv3 */
+#endif
 
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void);	/* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void);	/* Negotiate highest available SSL/TLS version */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void);	/* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void);	/* Negotiate highest available SSL/TLS version */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void);	/* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void);	/* Negotiate highest available SSL/TLS version */
 
 const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void);		/* TLSv1.0 */
 const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void);	/* TLSv1.0 */

crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h

@@ -393,8 +393,12 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG		0x0008
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY		0x0010
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE		0x0020
+/*
+ * Set when the handshake is ready to process peer's ChangeCipherSpec message.
+ * Cleared after the message has been processed.
+ */
 #define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK			0x0080
- 
+
 /* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
  * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
  * from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's reset on a
@@ -456,8 +460,11 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 	 * and freed and MD_CTX-es for all required digests are stored in
 	 * this array */
 	EVP_MD_CTX **handshake_dgst;
-	/* this is set whenerver we see a change_cipher_spec message
+	/*
-	 * come in when we are not looking for one */
+	 * Set whenever an expected ChangeCipherSpec message is processed.
+	 * Unset when the peer's Finished message is received.
+	 * Unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages trigger a fatal alert.
+	 */
 	int change_cipher_spec;
 
 	int warn_alert;

crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c

@@ -286,35 +286,6 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
 			ret->pkeys[i].privatekey = cert->pkeys[i].privatekey;
 			CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].privatekey->references, 1,
 				CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
-
-			switch(i) 
-				{
-				/* If there was anything special to do for
-				 * certain types of keys, we'd do it here.
-				 * (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */
-
-			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
-			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
-				/* We have an RSA key. */
-				break;
-				
-			case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
-				/* We have a DSA key. */
-				break;
-				
-			case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
-			case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
-				/* We have a DH key. */
-				break;
-
-			case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
-				/* We have an ECC key */
-				break;
-
-			default:
-				/* Can't happen. */
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
-				}
 			}
 		}
 	

crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c

@@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
 			co_list[co_list_num].active = 0;
 			co_list_num++;
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-			printf("\t%d: %s %lx %lx %lx\n",i,c->name,c->id,c->algorithm_mkey,c->algorithm_auth);
+			fprintf(stderr,"\t%d: %s %lx %lx %lx\n",i,c->name,c->id,c->algorithm_mkey,c->algorithm_auth);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 			/*
 			if (!sk_push(ca_list,(char *)c)) goto err;
@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
 	int reverse = 0;
 
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-	printf("Applying rule %d with %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx %08lx (%d)\n",
+	fprintf(stderr, "Applying rule %d with %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx %08lx (%d)\n",
 		rule, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, algo_strength, strength_bits);
 #endif
 
@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
 		else
 			{
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-			printf("\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx Algo_strength = %08lx\n", cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth, cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->algorithm_ssl, cp->algo_strength);
+			fprintf(stderr, "\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx Algo_strength = %08lx\n", cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth, cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->algorithm_ssl, cp->algo_strength);
 #endif
 
 			if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey))
@@ -997,7 +997,7 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
 			}
 
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-		printf("Action = %d\n", rule);
+		fprintf(stderr, "Action = %d\n", rule);
 #endif
 
 		/* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */
@@ -1386,7 +1386,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
 	 */
 	num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers();
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("ssl_create_cipher_list() for %d ciphers\n", num_of_ciphers);
+	fprintf(stderr,"ssl_create_cipher_list() for %d ciphers\n", num_of_ciphers);
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 	co_list = (CIPHER_ORDER *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CIPHER_ORDER) * num_of_ciphers);
 	if (co_list == NULL)
@@ -1513,7 +1513,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
 			{
 			sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher);
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-			printf("<%s>\n",curr->cipher->name);
+			fprintf(stderr, "<%s>\n",curr->cipher->name);
 #endif
 			}
 		}

crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c

@@ -383,13 +383,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
 	return(s);
 err:
 	if (s != NULL)
-		{
+		SSL_free(s);
-		if (s->cert != NULL)
-			ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
-		if (s->ctx != NULL)
-			SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
-		OPENSSL_free(s);
-		}
 	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 	return(NULL);
 	}
@@ -1080,19 +1074,6 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
 		l=s->max_cert_list;
 		s->max_cert_list=larg;
 		return(l);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
-		if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
-			return 0;
-#endif
-
-		if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
-		    SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-			{
-			s->d1->mtu = larg;
-			return larg;
-			}
-		return 0;
 	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
 		if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
 			return 0;
@@ -1507,6 +1488,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
 					ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
 				goto err;
 				}
+			p += n;
 			continue;
 			}
 
@@ -2112,7 +2094,7 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
 	
 
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-	printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
+	fprintf(stderr,"rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
 	        rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp,
 		rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa);
 #endif
@@ -2996,10 +2978,32 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx)
 			}
 		ssl_cert_free(ocert);
 		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH),
+	 * so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system.
+	 */
+	OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
+
+	/*
+	 * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX,
+	 * inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does
+	 * not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context),
+	 * leave it unchanged.
+	 */
+	if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) &&
+		(ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) &&
+		(memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0))
+		{
+		ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
+		memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
+		}
+
 	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
 	if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
 		SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
 	ssl->ctx = ctx;
+
 	return(ssl->ctx);
 	}
 

crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h

@@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field, int len);
 
 int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client);
 int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s);
-void ssl2_enc(SSL *s,int send_data);
+int ssl2_enc(SSL *s,int send_data);
 void ssl2_mac(SSL *s,unsigned char *mac,int send_data);
 const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
 int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c,unsigned char *p);
@@ -997,7 +997,9 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s);
 void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
-unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void);
+unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s);
+unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void);
+void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag);
 
 /* some client-only functions */
 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s);
@@ -1014,7 +1016,6 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s);
 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s);
 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s);
 # endif

crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c

@@ -335,7 +335,21 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
 			return(0);
 			}
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-		/* If RFC4507 ticket use empty session ID */
+		/*
+		 * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server).
+		 * Note that:
+		 * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the
+		 *     ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket.
+		 *     When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls
+		 *     ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello().
+		 *     At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions,
+		 *     however, because of the lookahead, it already knows
+		 *     whether a ticket is expected or not.
+		 *
+		 * (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing
+		 *     ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session
+		 *     ID received from the server, so this block is a noop.
+		 */
 		if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
 			{
 			ss->session_id_length = 0;

crypto/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c

@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
 	fprintf(stderr," -ssl2         - use SSLv2\n");
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
 	fprintf(stderr," -ssl3         - use SSLv3\n");
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
@@ -368,7 +368,9 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
 	               "                 Use \"openssl ecparam -list_curves\" for all names\n"  \
 	               "                 (default is sect163r2).\n");
 #endif
-	fprintf(stderr," -test_cipherlist - verifies the order of the ssl cipher lists\n");
+	fprintf(stderr," -test_cipherlist - Verifies the order of the ssl cipher lists.\n"
+		       "                    When this option is requested, the cipherlist\n"
+		       "                    tests are run instead of handshake tests.\n");
 	}
 
 static void print_details(SSL *c_ssl, const char *prefix)
@@ -549,6 +551,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 	int fips_mode=0;
 #endif
+        int no_protocol = 0;
 
 	verbose = 0;
 	debug = 0;
@@ -658,11 +661,26 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 			}
 #endif
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-ssl2") == 0)
-			ssl2=1;
+			{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+			no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+			ssl2 = 1;
+			}
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-tls1") == 0)
-			tls1=1;
+			{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+			no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+			tls1 = 1;
+			}
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-ssl3") == 0)
-			ssl3=1;
+			{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+			no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+			ssl3 = 1;
+			}
 		else if	(strncmp(*argv,"-num",4) == 0)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
@@ -781,15 +799,41 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		goto end;
 		}
 
+	/*
+	 * test_cipherlist prevails over protocol switch: we test the cipherlist
+	 * for all enabled protocols.
+	 */
 	if (test_cipherlist == 1)
 		{
 		/* ensure that the cipher list are correctly sorted and exit */
+		fprintf(stdout, "Testing cipherlist order only. Ignoring all "
+			"other options.\n");
 		if (do_test_cipherlist() == 0)
 			EXIT(1);
 		ret = 0;
 		goto end;
 		}
 
+	if (ssl2 + ssl3 + tls1 > 1)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "At most one of -ssl2, -ssl3, or -tls1 should "
+			"be requested.\n");
+		EXIT(1);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Testing was requested for a compiled-out protocol (e.g. SSLv2).
+         * Ideally, we would error out, but the generic test wrapper can't know
+	 * when to expect failure. So we do nothing and return success.
+	 */
+	if (no_protocol)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Testing was requested for a disabled protocol. "
+			"Skipping tests.\n");
+		ret = 0;
+		goto end;
+		}
+
 	if (!ssl2 && !ssl3 && !tls1 && number > 1 && !reuse && !force)
 		{
 		fprintf(stderr, "This case cannot work.  Use -f to perform "
@@ -868,30 +912,25 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	}
 #endif
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
+/* At this point, ssl2/ssl3/tls1 is only set if the protocol is available.
+ * (Otherwise we exit early.)
+ * However the compiler doesn't know this, so we ifdef. */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
 	if (ssl2)
 		meth=SSLv2_method();
-	else 
-	if (tls1)
-		meth=TLSv1_method();
 	else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
 	if (ssl3)
 		meth=SSLv3_method();
 	else
-		meth=SSLv23_method();
+#endif
-#else
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
 	if (tls1)
 		meth=TLSv1_method();
 	else
-	if (ssl3)
-		meth=SSLv3_method();
-	else
-		meth=SSLv23_method();
-#else
-	meth=SSLv2_method();
-#endif
 #endif
+	meth=SSLv23_method();
 
 	c_ctx=SSL_CTX_new(meth);
 	s_ctx=SSL_CTX_new(meth);