MFhead@r322057

This commit is contained in:
Enji Cooper 2017-08-04 17:41:49 +00:00
commit 7921075587
133 changed files with 3359 additions and 3317 deletions

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

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@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
1. Prerequisites
----------------
A C compiler. Any C89 or better compiler should work. Where supported,
@ -243,7 +244,7 @@ manually using the following commands:
ssh-keygen -t [type] -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ""
for each of the types you wish to generate (rsa, dsa or ecdsaa) or
for each of the types you wish to generate (rsa, dsa or ecdsa) or
ssh-keygen -A

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@ -236,6 +236,8 @@ clean: regressclean
rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap
rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion
rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys
rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
@ -262,6 +264,8 @@ distclean: regressclean
rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap
rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion
rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys
rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
@ -426,6 +430,8 @@ regress-prep:
mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap ] || \
mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap
[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/conversion ] || \
mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/conversion
[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys ] || \
mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys
[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex ] || \
@ -503,6 +509,16 @@ regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/conversion/tests.o
regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT): \
${UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/kex/tests.o \
regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.o
@ -558,13 +574,14 @@ regress-binaries: regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \
regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)
tests interop-tests t-exec: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS)
tests interop-tests t-exec unit: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS)
BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
TEST_SSH_SCP="$${BUILDDIR}/scp"; \
TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh"; \

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#7.4p1 for the release notes.
See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#7.5p1 for the release notes.
Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html for bug reporting
instructions and note that we do not use Github for bug reporting or

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@ -833,6 +833,8 @@ fake_password(const char *wire_password)
fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);
ret = malloc(l + 1);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
ret[i] = '\0';

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@ -1,448 +0,0 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.82 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "blacklist_client.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern Buffer loginmsg;
static int auth1_process_password(Authctxt *);
static int auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *);
static int auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *);
static int auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *);
static int auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *);
static char *client_user = NULL; /* Used to fill in remote user for PAM */
struct AuthMethod1 {
int type;
char *name;
int *enabled;
int (*method)(Authctxt *);
};
const struct AuthMethod1 auth1_methods[] = {
{
SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD, "password",
&options.password_authentication, auth1_process_password
},
{
SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA, "rsa",
&options.rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rsa
},
{
SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA, "rhosts-rsa",
&options.rhosts_rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rhosts_rsa
},
{
SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, "challenge-response",
&options.challenge_response_authentication,
auth1_process_tis_challenge
},
{
SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE, "challenge-response",
&options.challenge_response_authentication,
auth1_process_tis_response
},
{ -1, NULL, NULL, NULL}
};
static const struct AuthMethod1
*lookup_authmethod1(int type)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; auth1_methods[i].name != NULL; i++)
if (auth1_methods[i].type == type)
return (&(auth1_methods[i]));
return (NULL);
}
static char *
get_authname(int type)
{
const struct AuthMethod1 *a;
static char buf[64];
if ((a = lookup_authmethod1(type)) != NULL)
return (a->name);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
return (buf);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static int
auth1_process_password(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
int authenticated = 0;
char *password;
u_int dlen;
/*
* Read user password. It is in plain text, but was
* transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is
* not visible to an outside observer.
*/
password = packet_get_string(&dlen);
packet_check_eom();
/* Try authentication with the password. */
authenticated = PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password));
explicit_bzero(password, dlen);
free(password);
return (authenticated);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static int
auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
int authenticated = 0;
BIGNUM *n;
/* RSA authentication requested. */
if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("do_authloop: BN_new failed");
packet_get_bignum(n);
packet_check_eom();
authenticated = auth_rsa(authctxt, n);
BN_clear_free(n);
return (authenticated);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static int
auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
int keybits, authenticated = 0;
u_int bits;
Key *client_host_key;
u_int ulen;
/*
* Get client user name. Note that we just have to
* trust the client; root on the client machine can
* claim to be any user.
*/
client_user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
/* Get the client host key. */
client_host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
bits = packet_get_int();
packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->e);
packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->n);
keybits = BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n);
if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) {
verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: "
"actual %d, announced %d",
BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n), bits);
}
packet_check_eom();
authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(authctxt, client_user,
client_host_key);
key_free(client_host_key);
auth_info(authctxt, "ruser %.100s", client_user);
return (authenticated);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static int
auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
char *challenge;
if ((challenge = get_challenge(authctxt)) == NULL)
return (0);
debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge);
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
packet_put_cstring(challenge);
free(challenge);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
return (-1);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static int
auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
int authenticated = 0;
char *response;
u_int dlen;
response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
packet_check_eom();
authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response);
explicit_bzero(response, dlen);
free(response);
return (authenticated);
}
/*
* read packets, try to authenticate the user and
* return only if authentication is successful
*/
static void
do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
int authenticated = 0;
int prev = 0, type = 0;
const struct AuthMethod1 *meth;
debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.",
authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user);
/* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication &&
#ifdef KRB5
(!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) &&
#endif
PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, ""))) {
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam && (PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())))
#endif
{
auth_log(authctxt, 1, 0, "without authentication",
NULL);
return;
}
}
/* Indicate that authentication is needed. */
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
for (;;) {
/* default to fail */
authenticated = 0;
/* Get a packet from the client. */
prev = type;
type = packet_read();
/*
* If we started challenge-response authentication but the
* next packet is not a response to our challenge, release
* the resources allocated by get_challenge() (which would
* normally have been released by verify_response() had we
* received such a response)
*/
if (prev == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS &&
type != SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE)
abandon_challenge_response(authctxt);
if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries)
goto skip;
if ((meth = lookup_authmethod1(type)) == NULL) {
logit("Unknown message during authentication: "
"type %d", type);
goto skip;
}
if (!*(meth->enabled)) {
verbose("%s authentication disabled.", meth->name);
goto skip;
}
authenticated = meth->method(authctxt);
if (authenticated == -1)
continue; /* "postponed" */
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
if (authctxt->as) {
auth_close(authctxt->as);
authctxt->as = NULL;
}
#endif
if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
authctxt->user);
#ifdef _UNICOS
if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
authenticated = 0;
fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user);
}
#endif /* _UNICOS */
#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
/* Special handling for root */
if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
!auth_root_allowed(meth->name)) {
authenticated = 0;
# ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
# endif
}
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam && authenticated &&
!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
char *msg;
size_t len;
BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "ssh");
error("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
"configuration", authctxt->user);
len = buffer_len(&loginmsg);
buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
msg = buffer_ptr(&loginmsg);
/* strip trailing newlines */
if (len > 0)
while (len > 0 && msg[--len] == '\n')
msg[len] = '\0';
else
msg = "Access denied.";
packet_disconnect("%s", msg);
}
#endif
skip:
/* Log before sending the reply */
auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, 0, get_authname(type), NULL);
free(client_user);
client_user = NULL;
if (authenticated)
return;
BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "ssh");
if (++authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
#endif
auth_maxtries_exceeded(authctxt);
}
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
}
}
/*
* Performs authentication of an incoming connection. Session key has already
* been exchanged and encryption is enabled.
*/
void
do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
u_int ulen;
char *user, *style = NULL;
/* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
/* Get the user name. */
user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
packet_check_eom();
if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
*style++ = '\0';
authctxt->user = user;
authctxt->style = style;
/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
authctxt->valid = 1;
else {
debug("do_authentication: invalid user %s", user);
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_BAD_USER, user);
}
/* Configuration may have changed as a result of Match */
if (options.num_auth_methods != 0)
fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with SSH "
"protocol 1");
setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
#endif
/*
* If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as
* the server.
*/
#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (!use_privsep && getuid() != 0 && authctxt->pw &&
authctxt->pw->pw_uid != getuid())
packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root.");
#endif
/*
* Loop until the user has been authenticated or the connection is
* closed, do_authloop() returns only if authentication is successful
*/
do_authloop(authctxt);
/* The user has been authenticated and accepted. */
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
}
#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.60 2016/11/30 02:57:40 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.62 2017/01/30 01:03:00 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -564,9 +564,12 @@ process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
{
char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
u_long linenum = 0;
u_int i;
u_int i, found_principal = 0;
while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
/* Always consume entire input */
if (found_principal)
continue;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
@ -599,11 +602,12 @@ process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
file, linenum) != 1)
continue;
return 1;
found_principal = 1;
continue;
}
}
}
return 0;
return found_principal;
}
static int
@ -727,6 +731,9 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key)
ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, cert);
fclose(f);
f = NULL;
if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command) != 0)
goto out;
@ -768,6 +775,9 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
char *cp, *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
const char *reason = NULL;
/* Always consume entrire file */
if (found_key)
continue;
if (found != NULL)
key_free(found);
found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
@ -854,7 +864,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
free(fp);
found_key = 1;
break;
continue;
}
}
if (found != NULL)
@ -1050,6 +1060,9 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
fclose(f);
f = NULL;
if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0)
goto out;

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.136 2016/05/02 08:49:03 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.137 2017/02/03 23:05:57 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -214,15 +214,16 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
static int
input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
Authmethod *m = NULL;
char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
int authenticated = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
login_cap_t *lc;
const char *from_host, *from_ip;
#endif
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_request: no authctxt");
@ -241,9 +242,10 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
authctxt->valid = 1;
debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user);
debug2("%s: setting up authctxt for %s",
__func__, user);
} else {
logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
/* Invalid user, fake password information */
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
@ -253,6 +255,8 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
if (options.use_pam)
PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
#endif
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
authctxt->valid ? "authenticating " : "invalid ", user);
setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
@ -320,6 +324,7 @@ void
userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method,
const char *submethod)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
char *methods;
int partial = 0;
@ -381,6 +386,7 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method,
packet_write_wait();
/* now we can break out */
authctxt->success = 1;
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
} else {
/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.356 2016/10/18 17:32:54 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.357 2017/02/01 02:59:09 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -3065,7 +3065,7 @@ channel_input_port_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
}
packet_check_eom();
c = channel_connect_to_port(host, host_port,
"connected socket", originator_string);
"connected socket", originator_string, NULL, NULL);
free(originator_string);
free(host);
if (c == NULL) {
@ -4026,9 +4026,13 @@ channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx)
memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx));
}
/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */
/*
* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path,
* passing back the failure reason if appropriate.
*/
static Channel *
connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname)
connect_to_reason(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname,
int *reason, const char **errmsg)
{
struct addrinfo hints;
int gaierr;
@ -4069,7 +4073,12 @@ connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname)
hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx.aitop)) != 0) {
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx.aitop))
!= 0) {
if (errmsg != NULL)
*errmsg = ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr);
if (reason != NULL)
*reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED;
error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", name,
ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return NULL;
@ -4092,6 +4101,13 @@ connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname)
return c;
}
/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */
static Channel *
connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname)
{
return connect_to_reason(name, port, ctype, rname, NULL, NULL);
}
/*
* returns either the newly connected channel or the downstream channel
* that needs to deal with this connection.
@ -4136,7 +4152,8 @@ channel_connect_by_listen_path(const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname)
/* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */
Channel *
channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname)
channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype,
char *rname, int *reason, const char **errmsg)
{
int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
@ -4161,9 +4178,11 @@ channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname
if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
logit("Received request to connect to host %.100s port %d, "
"but the request was denied.", host, port);
if (reason != NULL)
*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
return NULL;
}
return connect_to(host, port, ctype, rname);
return connect_to_reason(host, port, ctype, rname, reason, errmsg);
}
/* Check if connecting to that path is permitted and connect. */
@ -4354,6 +4373,33 @@ connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
}
#ifdef __APPLE__
static int
is_path_to_xsocket(const char *display, char *path, size_t pathlen)
{
struct stat sbuf;
if (strlcpy(path, display, pathlen) >= pathlen) {
error("%s: display path too long", __func__);
return 0;
}
if (display[0] != '/')
return 0;
if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) {
return 1;
} else {
char *dot = strrchr(path, '.');
if (dot != NULL) {
*dot = '\0';
if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) {
return 1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
#endif
int
x11_connect_display(void)
{
@ -4375,15 +4421,22 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
* connection to the real X server.
*/
/* Check if the display is from launchd. */
#ifdef __APPLE__
if (strncmp(display, "/tmp/launch", 11) == 0) {
sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(display);
if (sock < 0)
return -1;
/* Check if display is a path to a socket (as set by launchd). */
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
return sock;
if (is_path_to_xsocket(display, path, sizeof(path))) {
debug("x11_connect_display: $DISPLAY is launchd");
/* Create a socket. */
sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(path);
if (sock < 0)
return -1;
/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
return sock;
}
}
#endif
/*

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.120 2016/10/18 17:32:54 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.121 2017/02/01 02:59:09 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -275,7 +275,8 @@ void channel_update_permitted_opens(int, int);
void channel_clear_permitted_opens(void);
void channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void);
void channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void);
Channel *channel_connect_to_port(const char *, u_short, char *, char *);
Channel *channel_connect_to_port(const char *, u_short, char *, char *, int *,
const char **);
Channel *channel_connect_to_path(const char *, char *, char *);
Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char*, u_short, int, int);
Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(const char *, u_short,

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.289 2016/09/30 09:19:13 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.291 2017/03/10 05:01:13 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ process_cmdline(void)
CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC,
&options.fwd_opts) > 0;
if (!ok) {
logit("Unkown port forwarding.");
logit("Unknown port forwarding.");
goto out;
}
logit("Canceled forwarding.");
@ -2390,6 +2390,26 @@ client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx)
hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
}
/*
* Returns non-zero if the key is accepted by HostkeyAlgorithms.
* Made slightly less trivial by the multiple RSA signature algorithm names.
*/
static int
key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct sshkey *key)
{
const char *ktype = sshkey_ssh_name(key);
const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL ?
options.hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG;
if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
return 0;
if (key->type == KEY_RSA &&
(match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1 ||
match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1))
return 1;
return match_pattern_list(ktype, hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1;
}
/*
* Handle hostkeys-00@openssh.com global request to inform the client of all
* the server's hostkeys. The keys are checked against the user's
@ -2436,10 +2456,7 @@ client_input_hostkeys(void)
sshkey_type(key), fp);
free(fp);
/* Check that the key is accepted in HostkeyAlgorithms */
if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
options.hostkeyalgorithms ? options.hostkeyalgorithms :
KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, 0) != 1) {
if (!key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(key)) {
debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms",
__func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
continue;

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.99 2016/05/24 02:31:57 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.100 2017/02/03 23:01:19 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "kex.h"
int compat13 = 0;
int compat20 = 0;
@ -250,42 +251,14 @@ proto_spec(const char *spec)
return ret;
}
/*
* Filters a proposal string, excluding any algorithm matching the 'filter'
* pattern list.
*/
static char *
filter_proposal(char *proposal, const char *filter)
{
Buffer b;
char *orig_prop, *fix_prop;
char *cp, *tmp;
buffer_init(&b);
tmp = orig_prop = xstrdup(proposal);
while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) {
if (match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0) != 1) {
if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
buffer_append(&b, cp, strlen(cp));
} else
debug2("Compat: skipping algorithm \"%s\"", cp);
}
buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
fix_prop = xstrdup((char *)buffer_ptr(&b));
buffer_free(&b);
free(orig_prop);
return fix_prop;
}
char *
compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop)
{
if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES))
return cipher_prop;
debug2("%s: original cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
cipher_prop = filter_proposal(cipher_prop, "aes*");
if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_list(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL)
fatal("match_filter_list failed");
debug2("%s: compat cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
if (*cipher_prop == '\0')
fatal("No supported ciphers found");
@ -298,7 +271,8 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop)
if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5))
return pkalg_prop;
debug2("%s: original public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
pkalg_prop = filter_proposal(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa");
if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_list(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL)
fatal("match_filter_list failed");
debug2("%s: compat public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
if (*pkalg_prop == '\0')
fatal("No supported PK algorithms found");
@ -312,10 +286,14 @@ compat_kex_proposal(char *p)
return p;
debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p);
if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
p = filter_proposal(p, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org");
if ((p = match_filter_list(p,
"curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
fatal("match_filter_list failed");
if ((datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
p = filter_proposal(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256");
p = filter_proposal(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1");
if ((p = match_filter_list(p,
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
fatal("match_filter_list failed");
}
debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p);
if (*p == '\0')

View File

@ -737,6 +737,9 @@
/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/seccomp.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_LINUX_SECCOMP_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `llabs' function. */
#define HAVE_LLABS 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <locale.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_LOCALE_H 1
@ -786,7 +789,7 @@
#define HAVE_MEMORY_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `memset_s' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_MEMSET_S */
#define HAVE_MEMSET_S 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */
#define HAVE_MKDTEMP 1

View File

@ -747,6 +747,9 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
use_pie=auto
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
dnl Target SUSv3/POSIX.1-2001 plus BSD specifics.
dnl _DEFAULT_SOURCE is the new name for _BSD_SOURCE
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE"
AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1],
[Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"],
@ -1523,7 +1526,6 @@ int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
TCPW_MSG="yes"
], [
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
])
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
fi
@ -1534,36 +1536,47 @@ int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
LDNS_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
[ --with-ldns[[=PATH]] Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
[
ldns=""
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
AC_PATH_TOOL([LDNSCONFIG], [ldns-config], [no])
if test "x$PKGCONFIG" = "xno"; then
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
ldns=yes
else
LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`"
fi
elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
ldns=yes
fi
if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
fi
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support])
LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
LDNS_MSG="yes"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
# Verify that it works.
if test "x$ldns" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support])
LDNS_MSG="yes"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <ldns/ldns.h>
int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); }
]])
],
[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
]])
],
[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries.])
])
fi
]
)
fi
])
# Check whether user wants libedit support
LIBEDIT_MSG="no"
@ -1766,6 +1779,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
inet_ntoa \
inet_ntop \
innetgr \
llabs \
login_getcapbool \
md5_crypt \
memmove \
@ -1834,11 +1848,8 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
warn \
])
dnl Wide character support. Linux man page says it needs _XOPEN_SOURCE.
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE"
dnl Wide character support.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mblen mbtowc nl_langinfo wcwidth])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
TEST_SSH_UTF8=${TEST_SSH_UTF8:=yes}
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for utf8 locale support])
@ -2583,8 +2594,8 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver`
# Check version is supported.
case "$ssl_library_ver" in
0090[[0-7]]*|009080[[0-5]]*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f required (have "$ssl_library_ver")])
10000*|0*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have "$ssl_library_ver")])
;;
*) ;;
esac
@ -5147,6 +5158,7 @@ echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
echo " libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"

View File

@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ sshd_config_configured=no
port_number=22
service_name=sshd
strictmodes=yes
privsep_used=yes
cygwin_value=""
user_account=
password_value=
@ -140,33 +139,21 @@ sshd_strictmodes() {
# ======================================================================
# Routine: sshd_privsep
# MODIFIES: privsep_used
# Try to create ssshd user account
# ======================================================================
sshd_privsep() {
local ret=0
if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
then
echo
csih_inform "Privilege separation is set to 'sandbox' by default since"
csih_inform "OpenSSH 6.1. This is unsupported by Cygwin and has to be set"
csih_inform "to 'yes' or 'no'."
csih_inform "However, using privilege separation requires a non-privileged account"
csih_inform "called 'sshd'."
csih_inform "For more info on privilege separation read /usr/share/doc/openssh/README.privsep."
if csih_request "Should privilege separation be used?"
if ! csih_create_unprivileged_user sshd
then
privsep_used=yes
if ! csih_create_unprivileged_user sshd
then
csih_error_recoverable "Couldn't create user 'sshd'!"
csih_error_recoverable "Privilege separation set to 'no' again!"
csih_error_recoverable "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
let ++ret
privsep_used=no
fi
else
privsep_used=no
csih_error_recoverable "Could not create user 'sshd'!"
csih_error_recoverable "You will not be able to run an sshd service"
csih_error_recoverable "under a privileged account successfully."
csih_error_recoverable "Make sure to create a non-privileged user 'sshd'"
csih_error_recoverable "manually before trying to run the service!"
let ++ret
fi
fi
return $ret
@ -202,18 +189,6 @@ sshd_config_tweak() {
let ++ret
fi
fi
if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
then
/usr/bin/sed -i -e "
s/^#\?UsePrivilegeSeparation .*/UsePrivilegeSeparation ${privsep_used}/" \
${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
if [ $? -ne 0 ]
then
csih_warning "Setting privilege separation failed!"
csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
let ++ret
fi
fi
return $ret
} # --- End of sshd_config_tweak --- #
@ -693,7 +668,7 @@ then
fi
fi
# handle sshd_config (and privsep)
# handle sshd_config
csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt
if ! /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" >/dev/null 2>&1
then

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
%define ver 7.4p1
%define ver 7.5p1
%define rel 1
# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID

View File

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
Name: openssh
Version: 7.4p1
Version: 7.5p1
URL: https://www.openssh.com/
Release: 1
Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.5 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.6 2017/03/10 02:59:51 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
u_int l = dlen;
if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
if (digest == NULL || dlen > UINT_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;

View File

@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ configure_args="
--with-libedit
--with-ssl-engine
--without-xauth
"
"
set -e

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.67 2016/09/17 18:00:27 tedu Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.68 2017/03/10 04:26:06 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -419,19 +419,24 @@ write_host_entry(FILE *f, const char *host, const char *ip,
const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
{
int r, success = 0;
char *hashed_host = NULL;
char *hashed_host = NULL, *lhost;
lhost = xstrdup(host);
lowercase(lhost);
if (store_hash) {
if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
if ((hashed_host = host_hash(lhost, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
error("%s: host_hash failed", __func__);
free(lhost);
return 0;
}
fprintf(f, "%s ", hashed_host);
} else if (ip != NULL)
fprintf(f, "%s,%s ", host, ip);
else
fprintf(f, "%s ", host);
fprintf(f, "%s,%s ", lhost, ip);
else {
fprintf(f, "%s ", lhost);
}
free(lhost);
if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) == 0)
success = 1;
else

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.127 2016/10/10 19:28:48 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.131 2017/03/15 07:07:39 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
char *
kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
{
char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
size_t len;
if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
@ -195,8 +195,10 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
}
strlcpy(ret, a, len);
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
if (match_list(ret, p, NULL) != NULL)
if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
free(m);
continue; /* Algorithm already present */
}
if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
free(tmp);
@ -211,7 +213,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
/*
* Assemble a list of algorithms from a default list and a string from a
* configuration file. The user-provided string may begin with '+' to
* indicate that it should be appended to the default.
* indicate that it should be appended to the default or '-' that the
* specified names should be removed.
*/
int
kex_assemble_names(const char *def, char **list)
@ -222,14 +225,18 @@ kex_assemble_names(const char *def, char **list)
*list = strdup(def);
return 0;
}
if (**list != '+') {
return 0;
if (**list == '+') {
if ((ret = kex_names_cat(def, *list + 1)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
free(*list);
*list = ret;
} else if (**list == '-') {
if ((ret = match_filter_list(def, *list + 1)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
free(*list);
*list = ret;
}
if ((ret = kex_names_cat(def, *list + 1)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
free(*list);
*list = ret;
return 0;
}
@ -334,7 +341,6 @@ kex_reset_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN,
SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
}
static int
@ -343,7 +349,7 @@ kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh)
int r;
char *algs;
if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, ',')) == NULL)
if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||
@ -424,6 +430,7 @@ kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0)
@ -538,6 +545,7 @@ kex_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX], struct kex **kexp)
goto out;
kex->done = 0;
kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
r = 0;
*kexp = kex;
out:
@ -646,8 +654,10 @@ choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server)
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH;
if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) {
free(name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
enc->name = name;
enc->enabled = 0;
enc->iv = NULL;
@ -665,8 +675,10 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server)
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH;
if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) {
free(name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* truncate the key */
if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HMAC)
mac->key_len = 16;
@ -690,6 +702,7 @@ choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
} else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_NONE;
} else {
free(name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
comp->name = name;

View File

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.38 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.39 2017/03/10 07:18:32 dtucker Exp $ */
#include "includes.h"
@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
break;
case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
/* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */
sshbuf_reset(sect);
sshbuf_free(sect);
sect = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0)
goto out;
@ -1288,7 +1288,8 @@ ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key)
debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path);
r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key);
out:
close(fd);
if (fd != -1)
close(fd);
sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
ssh_krl_free(krl);
if (r != 0)

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.48 2016/07/15 05:01:58 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.49 2017/03/10 03:15:58 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -453,7 +453,8 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args)
tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx);
log_handler = tmp_handler;
} else if (log_on_stderr) {
snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%s\r\n", fmtbuf);
snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%.*s\r\n",
(int)sizeof msgbuf - 3, fmtbuf);
(void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf));
} else {
#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.33 2016/11/06 05:46:37 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.37 2017/03/10 04:24:55 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -42,9 +42,11 @@
#include <ctype.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "misc.h"
/*
* Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
@ -145,7 +147,7 @@ match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, int dolower)
if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1)
return 0;
/* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, skip the comma. */
/* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, then skip it. */
if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',')
i++;
@ -177,7 +179,13 @@ match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, int dolower)
int
match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern)
{
return match_pattern_list(host, pattern, 1);
char *hostcopy = xstrdup(host);
int r;
lowercase(hostcopy);
r = match_pattern_list(hostcopy, pattern, 1);
free(hostcopy);
return r;
}
/*
@ -284,3 +292,35 @@ match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next)
free(s);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Filters a comma-separated list of strings, excluding any entry matching
* the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
match_filter_list(const char *proposal, const char *filter)
{
size_t len = strlen(proposal) + 1;
char *fix_prop = malloc(len);
char *orig_prop = strdup(proposal);
char *cp, *tmp;
if (fix_prop == NULL || orig_prop == NULL) {
free(orig_prop);
free(fix_prop);
return NULL;
}
tmp = orig_prop;
*fix_prop = '\0';
while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) {
if (match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0) != 1) {
if (*fix_prop != '\0')
strlcat(fix_prop, ",", len);
strlcat(fix_prop, cp, len);
}
}
free(orig_prop);
return fix_prop;
}

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.16 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.17 2017/02/03 23:01:19 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ int match_hostname(const char *, const char *);
int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *);
int match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
char *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *);
char *match_filter_list(const char *, const char *);
/* addrmatch.c */
int addr_match_list(const char *, const char *);

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.107 2016/11/30 00:28:31 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.109 2017/03/14 00:55:37 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ a2tun(const char *s, int *remote)
long
convtime(const char *s)
{
long total, secs;
long total, secs, multiplier = 1;
const char *p;
char *endp;
@ -334,23 +334,28 @@ convtime(const char *s)
break;
case 'm':
case 'M':
secs *= MINUTES;
multiplier = MINUTES;
break;
case 'h':
case 'H':
secs *= HOURS;
multiplier = HOURS;
break;
case 'd':
case 'D':
secs *= DAYS;
multiplier = DAYS;
break;
case 'w':
case 'W':
secs *= WEEKS;
multiplier = WEEKS;
break;
default:
return -1;
}
if (secs >= LONG_MAX / multiplier)
return -1;
secs *= multiplier;
if (total >= LONG_MAX - secs)
return -1;
total += secs;
if (total < 0)
return -1;

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.166 2016/09/28 16:33:06 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.167 2017/02/03 23:05:57 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@ -283,6 +283,7 @@ monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
void
monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct mon_table *ent;
int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
@ -356,6 +357,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
__func__, authctxt->user);
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
@ -695,6 +697,7 @@ mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
int
mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
char *username;
struct passwd *pwent;
int allowed = 0;
@ -739,6 +742,8 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
out:
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user);
buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.63 2016/10/19 23:21:56 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.64 2017/01/21 11:32:04 guenther Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
@ -2162,7 +2162,6 @@ int
muxclient(const char *path)
{
struct sockaddr_un addr;
socklen_t sun_len;
int sock;
u_int pid;
@ -2186,8 +2185,6 @@ muxclient(const char *path)
memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
sun_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
strlen(path) + 1;
if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path,
sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
@ -2197,7 +2194,7 @@ muxclient(const char *path)
if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sun_len) == -1) {
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1) {
switch (muxclient_command) {
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD:

View File

@ -301,3 +301,11 @@ mbtowc(wchar_t *pwc, const char *s, size_t n)
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_LLABS
long long
llabs(long long j)
{
return (j < 0 ? -j : j);
}
#endif

View File

@ -135,4 +135,8 @@ void errx(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
void warn(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_LLABS
long long llabs(long long);
#endif
#endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: fmt_scaled.c,v 1.9 2007/03/20 03:42:52 tedu Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: fmt_scaled.c,v 1.13 2017/03/11 23:37:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003 Ian F. Darwin. All rights reserved.
@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static long long scale_factors[] = {
#define MAX_DIGITS (SCALE_LENGTH * 3) /* XXX strlen(sprintf("%lld", -1)? */
/** Convert the given input string "scaled" into numeric in "result".
/* Convert the given input string "scaled" into numeric in "result".
* Return 0 on success, -1 and errno set on error.
*/
int
@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
long long scale_fact = 1, whole = 0, fpart = 0;
/* Skip leading whitespace */
while (isascii(*p) && isspace(*p))
while (isascii((unsigned char)*p) && isspace((unsigned char)*p))
++p;
/* Then at most one leading + or - */
@ -108,7 +108,8 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
* (but note that E for Exa might look like e to some!).
* Advance 'p' to end, to get scale factor.
*/
for (; isascii(*p) && (isdigit(*p) || *p=='.'); ++p) {
for (; isascii((unsigned char)*p) &&
(isdigit((unsigned char)*p) || *p=='.'); ++p) {
if (*p == '.') {
if (fract_digits > 0) { /* oops, more than one '.' */
errno = EINVAL;
@ -124,6 +125,10 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
/* ignore extra fractional digits */
continue;
fract_digits++; /* for later scaling */
if (fpart >= LLONG_MAX / 10) {
errno = ERANGE;
return -1;
}
fpart *= 10;
fpart += i;
} else { /* normal digit */
@ -131,6 +136,10 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
errno = ERANGE;
return -1;
}
if (whole >= LLONG_MAX / 10) {
errno = ERANGE;
return -1;
}
whole *= 10;
whole += i;
}
@ -150,17 +159,22 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
/* Validate scale factor, and scale whole and fraction by it. */
for (i = 0; i < SCALE_LENGTH; i++) {
/** Are we there yet? */
/* Are we there yet? */
if (*p == scale_chars[i] ||
*p == tolower(scale_chars[i])) {
*p == tolower((unsigned char)scale_chars[i])) {
/* If it ends with alphanumerics after the scale char, bad. */
if (isalnum(*(p+1))) {
if (isalnum((unsigned char)*(p+1))) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
scale_fact = scale_factors[i];
if (whole >= LLONG_MAX / scale_fact) {
errno = ERANGE;
return -1;
}
/* scale whole part */
whole *= scale_fact;
@ -181,7 +195,9 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
return 0;
}
}
errno = ERANGE;
/* Invalid unit or character */
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
@ -196,7 +212,7 @@ fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result)
unsigned int i;
unit_type unit = NONE;
abval = (number < 0LL) ? -number : number; /* no long long_abs yet */
abval = llabs(number);
/* Not every negative long long has a positive representation.
* Also check for numbers that are just too darned big to format

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.243 2016/10/11 21:47:45 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.247 2017/03/11 13:07:35 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -354,6 +354,25 @@ ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
return ssh->state->mux;
}
int
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
int r;
free(ssh->log_preamble);
if (fmt == NULL)
ssh->log_preamble = NULL;
else {
va_start(args, fmt);
r = vasprintf(&ssh->log_preamble, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if (r < 0 || ssh->log_preamble == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
return 0;
}
int
ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *ssh)
{
@ -1051,7 +1070,7 @@ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
/* Time-based rekeying */
if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
(int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
return 1;
/* Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction */
@ -1449,8 +1468,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
break;
}
}
if (r == 0)
return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
if (r == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
goto out;
}
/* Read data from the socket. */
len = read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len == 0) {
@ -1831,11 +1852,11 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
goto out;
logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
if (need + block_size > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need);
PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need - block_size);
}
/* Remove MAC from input buffer */
DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr));
@ -2076,27 +2097,36 @@ ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
static void
fmt_connection_id(struct ssh *ssh, char *s, size_t l)
{
snprintf(s, l, "%.200s%s%s port %d",
ssh->log_preamble ? ssh->log_preamble : "",
ssh->log_preamble ? " " : "",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
}
/*
* Pretty-print connection-terminating errors and exit.
*/
void
sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r)
{
char remote_id[512];
fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
switch (r) {
case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
logdie("Connection closed by %.200s port %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
logdie("Connection closed by %s", remote_id);
case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
logdie("Connection %s %.200s port %d timed out",
ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
logdie("Connection %s %s timed out",
ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id);
case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
logdie("Disconnected from %.200s port %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
logdie("Disconnected from %s", remote_id);
case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
if (errno == ECONNRESET)
logdie("Connection reset by %.200s port %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
logdie("Connection reset by %s", remote_id);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH:
@ -2105,17 +2135,16 @@ sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r)
case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH:
if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) {
BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "ssh");
logdie("Unable to negotiate with %.200s port %d: %s. "
"Their offer: %s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_err(r),
logdie("Unable to negotiate with %s: %s. "
"Their offer: %s", remote_id, ssh_err(r),
ssh->kex->failed_choice);
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
logdie("%s%sConnection %s %.200s port %d: %s",
logdie("%s%sConnection %s %s: %s",
tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "",
ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_err(r));
remote_id, ssh_err(r));
}
}
@ -2128,7 +2157,7 @@ sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r)
void
ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
{
char buf[1024];
char buf[1024], remote_id[512];
va_list args;
static int disconnecting = 0;
int r;
@ -2141,12 +2170,13 @@ ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
* Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the
* message is of limited size.
*/
fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
/* Display the error locally */
logit("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf);
logit("Disconnecting %s: %.100s", remote_id, buf);
/*
* Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait
@ -2399,10 +2429,10 @@ ssh_packet_send_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, int nbytes)
}
void
ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, time_t seconds)
ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, u_int32_t seconds)
{
debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %d seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes,
(int)seconds);
debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %u seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes,
(unsigned int)seconds);
ssh->state->rekey_limit = bytes;
ssh->state->rekey_interval = seconds;
}

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.74 2016/10/11 21:47:45 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.76 2017/02/03 23:03:33 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ struct ssh {
char *local_ipaddr;
int local_port;
/* Optional preamble for log messages (e.g. username) */
char *log_preamble;
/* Dispatcher table */
dispatch_fn *dispatch[DISPATCH_MAX];
/* number of packets to ignore in the dispatcher */
@ -104,6 +107,8 @@ void ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *);
void ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *);
void ssh_packet_set_mux(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *, const char *, ...)
__attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
int ssh_packet_log_type(u_char);
@ -154,7 +159,7 @@ int ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *);
const char *ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *);
int ssh_local_port(struct ssh *);
void ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *, u_int64_t, time_t);
void ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *, u_int64_t, u_int32_t);
time_t ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *);
void *ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *);

View File

@ -167,15 +167,6 @@
#define _PATH_LS "ls"
#endif
/* path to login program */
#ifndef LOGIN_PROGRAM
# ifdef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
# define LOGIN_PROGRAM LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
# else
# define LOGIN_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/login"
# endif
#endif /* LOGIN_PROGRAM */
/* Askpass program define */
#ifndef ASKPASS_PROGRAM
#define ASKPASS_PROGRAM "/usr/lib/ssh/ssh-askpass"

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.262 2016/10/25 04:08:13 jsg Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.270 2017/03/10 04:27:32 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
Host books.com
RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999
Cipher 3des
Ciphers 3des-cbc
Host fascist.blob.com
Port 23123
@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
PublicKeyAuthentication no
Host *.su
Cipher none
Ciphers aes128-ctr
PasswordAuthentication no
Host vpn.fake.com
@ -183,6 +183,44 @@ static struct {
const char *name;
OpCodes opcode;
} keywords[] = {
/* Deprecated options */
{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
{ "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
{ "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
{ "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
{ "useroaming", oDeprecated },
{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
/* Unsupported options */
{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
{ "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported },
/* Sometimes-unsupported options */
#if defined(GSSAPI)
{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
# else
{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
{ "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
# else
{ "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported },
{ "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported },
#endif
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
{ "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication },
{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", oRhostsRSAAuthentication },
{ "compressionlevel", oCompressionLevel },
# else
{ "rsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "compressionlevel", oUnsupported },
#endif
{ "forwardagent", oForwardAgent },
{ "forwardx11", oForwardX11 },
{ "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted },
@ -191,30 +229,15 @@ static struct {
{ "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation },
{ "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts },
{ "useprivilegedport", oUsePrivilegedPort },
{ "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
{ "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication },
{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
{ "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices },
{ "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication },
{ "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },
{ "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */
{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", oRhostsRSAAuthentication },
{ "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication },
{ "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },
{ "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
{ "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
{ "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported },
{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
#if defined(GSSAPI)
{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
#else
{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
#endif
{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
{ "identityfile", oIdentityFile },
{ "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* obsolete */
{ "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly },
@ -236,15 +259,12 @@ static struct {
{ "match", oMatch },
{ "escapechar", oEscapeChar },
{ "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile },
{ "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
{ "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile },
{ "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
{ "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts },
{ "batchmode", oBatchMode },
{ "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP },
{ "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking },
{ "compression", oCompression },
{ "compressionlevel", oCompressionLevel },
{ "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive },
{ "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, /* obsolete */
{ "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts },
@ -253,13 +273,6 @@ static struct {
{ "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications },
{ "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms },
{ "bindaddress", oBindAddress },
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
{ "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
#else
{ "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported },
{ "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported },
#endif
{ "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings },
{ "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign },
{ "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS },
@ -280,7 +293,6 @@ static struct {
{ "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
{ "useroaming", oDeprecated },
{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
@ -841,11 +853,11 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
activep = &cmdline;
}
/* Strip trailing whitespace */
/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
return 0;
for (len--; len > 0; len--) {
if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL)
if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL)
break;
line[len] = '\0';
}
@ -1193,7 +1205,7 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL)
@ -1204,7 +1216,7 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 Mac spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && options->macs == NULL)
@ -1216,7 +1228,8 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
if (*arg != '-' &&
!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
@ -1230,7 +1243,8 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
if (*arg != '-' &&
!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
@ -1497,6 +1511,7 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
if (r == GLOB_NOMATCH) {
debug("%.200s line %d: include %s matched no "
"files",filename, linenum, arg2);
free(arg2);
continue;
} else if (r != 0 || gl.gl_pathc < 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
@ -1513,6 +1528,11 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
flags | SSHCONF_CHECKPERM |
(oactive ? 0 : SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH),
activep, depth + 1);
if (r != 1 && errno != ENOENT) {
fatal("Can't open user config file "
"%.100s: %.100s", gl.gl_pathv[i],
strerror(errno));
}
/*
* don't let Match in includes clobber the
* containing file's Match state.
@ -1727,7 +1747,7 @@ read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
int flags, int *activep, int depth)
{
FILE *f;
char line[1024];
char line[4096];
int linenum;
int bad_options = 0;
@ -1757,6 +1777,8 @@ read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
/* Update line number counter. */
linenum++;
if (strlen(line) == sizeof(line) - 1)
fatal("%s line %d too long", filename, linenum);
if (process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host,
line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, depth) != 0)
bad_options++;
@ -2482,10 +2504,10 @@ dump_cfg_forwards(OpCodes code, u_int count, const struct Forward *fwds)
/* oDynamicForward */
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
fwd = &fwds[i];
if (code == oDynamicForward &&
if (code == oDynamicForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") != 0)
continue;
if (code == oLocalForward &&
if (code == oLocalForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") == 0)
continue;
printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
@ -2558,8 +2580,10 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
dump_cfg_fmtint(oProxyUseFdpass, o->proxy_use_fdpass);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oRequestTTY, o->request_tty);
#ifdef WITH_RSA1
dump_cfg_fmtint(oRhostsRSAAuthentication, o->rhosts_rsa_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oRSAAuthentication, o->rsa_authentication);
#endif
dump_cfg_fmtint(oStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oStrictHostKeyChecking, o->strict_host_key_checking);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive);
@ -2571,7 +2595,9 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
/* Integer options */
dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots);
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
dump_cfg_int(oCompressionLevel, o->compression_level);
#endif
dump_cfg_int(oConnectionAttempts, o->connection_attempts);
dump_cfg_int(oForwardX11Timeout, o->forward_x11_timeout);
dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts);
@ -2591,7 +2617,9 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
dump_cfg_string(oLocalCommand, o->local_command);
dump_cfg_string(oLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_CLIENT_MAC);
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
dump_cfg_string(oPKCS11Provider, o->pkcs11_provider);
#endif
dump_cfg_string(oPreferredAuthentications, o->preferred_authentications);
dump_cfg_string(oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types);
dump_cfg_string(oRevokedHostKeys, o->revoked_host_keys);

View File

@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ unit:
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \
-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/conversion/test_conversion ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/kex/test_kex ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys \
-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/testdata ; \

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# $OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.7 2016/09/26 21:34:38 bluhm Exp $
# $OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.8 2017/01/06 02:51:16 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="disallow agent attach from other uid"
@ -32,17 +32,17 @@ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
else
chmod 644 ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}
ssh-add -l > /dev/null 2>&1
${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then
fail "ssh-add failed with $r != 1"
fi
if test -z "$sudo" ; then
# doas
${SUDO} -n -u ${UNPRIV} ssh-add -l 2>/dev/null
${SUDO} -n -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null
else
# sudo
< /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ssh-add -l 2>/dev/null
< /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null
fi
r=$?
if [ $r -lt 2 ]; then

View File

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
tid="AllowUsers/DenyUsers"
me="$LOGNAME"
if [ "x$me" == "x" ]; then
if [ "x$me" = "x" ]; then
me=`whoami`
fi
other="nobody"

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# $OpenBSD: cert-file.sh,v 1.4 2016/12/16 02:48:55 djm Exp $
# $OpenBSD: cert-file.sh,v 1.5 2017/03/11 23:44:16 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="ssh with certificates"
@ -17,24 +17,59 @@ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key3 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key4 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key5 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
# Move the certificate to a different address to better control
# when it is offered.
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 ||
fail "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key1"
fatal "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key1"
mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key2 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 ||
fail "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key2"
fatal "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key2"
mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key3 ||
fatal "couldn't sign user_key3 with user_ca_key1"
rm $OBJ/user_key3.pub # to test use of private key w/o public half.
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key4 ||
fatal "couldn't sign user_key4 with user_ca_key1"
rm $OBJ/user_key4 $OBJ/user_key4.pub # to test no matching pub/private key case.
trace 'try with identity files'
opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes"
opts2="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2"
echo "cert-authority $(cat $OBJ/user_ca_key1.pub)" > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
# Make a clean config that doesn't have any pre-added identities.
cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy | grep -v IdentityFile > $OBJ/no_identity_config
# XXX: verify that certificate used was what we expect. Needs exposure of
# keys via enviornment variable or similar.
for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
# Key with no .pub should work - finding the equivalent *-cert.pub.
verbose "protocol $p: identity cert with no plain public file"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \
-i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 5$p
[ $? -ne 5$p ] && fail "ssh failed"
# CertificateFile matching private key with no .pub file should work.
verbose "protocol $p: CertificateFile with no plain public file"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \
-oCertificateFile=$OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub \
-i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 5$p
[ $? -ne 5$p ] && fail "ssh failed"
# Just keys should fail
verbose "protocol $p: plain keys"
${SSH} $opts2 somehost exit 5$p
r=$?
if [ $r -eq 5$p ]; then
@ -42,6 +77,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
fi
# Keys with untrusted cert should fail.
verbose "protocol $p: untrusted cert"
opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
r=$?
@ -50,6 +86,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
fi
# Good cert with bad key should fail.
verbose "protocol $p: good cert, bad key"
opts3="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key2"
opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
@ -59,6 +96,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
fi
# Keys with one trusted cert, should succeed.
verbose "protocol $p: single trusted"
opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
r=$?
@ -67,6 +105,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
fi
# Multiple certs and keys, with one trusted cert, should succeed.
verbose "protocol $p: multiple trusted"
opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
@ -74,14 +113,6 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then
fail "ssh failed with multiple certs in protocol $p"
fi
#Keys with trusted certificate specified in config options, should succeed.
opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then
fail "ssh failed with trusted cert in config in protocol $p"
fi
done
#next, using an agent in combination with the keys

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# $OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.16 2016/04/14 23:57:17 djm Exp $
# $OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.19 2017/01/30 05:22:14 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="local and remote forwarding"
@ -10,8 +10,7 @@ start_sshd
base=33
last=$PORT
fwd=""
CTL=$OBJ/ctl-sock
rm -f $CTL
CTL=/tmp/openssh.regress.ctl-sock.$$
for j in 0 1 2; do
for i in 0 1 2; do
@ -29,7 +28,8 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
q=$p
fi
trace "start forwarding, fork to background"
${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10
rm -f $CTL
${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10
trace "transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
${SSH} -$q -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$last -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
sleep 10
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
done
for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ for d in L R; do
-$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
-oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true
if [ $? != 0 ]; then
fail "connection failed, should not"
fatal "connection failed, should not"
else
# this one should fail
${SSH} -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
@ -75,30 +75,32 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost true
trace "clear local forward proto $p"
${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
rm -f $CTL
${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
-oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10
if [ $? != 0 ]; then
fail "connection failed with cleared local forwarding"
else
# this one should fail
${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 true \
${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \
>>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
fail "local forwarding not cleared"
fi
sleep 10
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
trace "clear remote forward proto $p"
${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
rm -f $CTL
${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
-oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10
if [ $? != 0 ]; then
fail "connection failed with cleared remote forwarding"
else
# this one should fail
${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 true \
${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \
>>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
fail "remote forwarding not cleared"
fi
sleep 10
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
done
for p in 2; do
@ -115,6 +117,7 @@ echo "LocalForward ${base}01 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
echo "RemoteForward ${base}02 127.0.0.1:${base}01" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
trace "config file: start forwarding, fork to background"
rm -f $CTL
${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost sleep 10
trace "config file: transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
@ -123,21 +126,24 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
${SSH} -S $CTL -O exit somehost
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
done
for p in 2; do
trace "transfer over chained unix domain socket forwards and check result"
rm -f $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost sleep 10
${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost sleep 10
${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost sleep 10
${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost sleep 10
rm -f $CTL $CTL.[123]
${SSH} -S $CTL -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost sleep 10
${SSH} -S $CTL.1 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost sleep 10
${SSH} -S $CTL.2 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost sleep 10
${SSH} -S $CTL.3 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost sleep 10
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}01 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
#wait
sleep 10
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.1 -O exit somehost
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.2 -O exit somehost
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.3 -O exit somehost
done

View File

@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.19 2016/11/25 02:56:49 dtucker Exp $
# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.20 2017/01/06 02:26:10 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="integrity"
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
# start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
# XXX the test hangs if we modify the low bytes of the packet length
# XXX and ssh tries to read...
tries=10
startoffset=2900
macs=`${SSH} -Q mac`
@ -27,6 +25,7 @@ for m in $macs; do
elen=0
epad=0
emac=0
etmo=0
ecnt=0
skip=0
for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.58 2016/12/16 01:06:27 dtucker Exp $
# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.59 2017/02/07 23:03:11 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
#SUDO=sudo
@ -444,12 +444,10 @@ Host *
User $USER
GlobalKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts
UserKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts
RSAAuthentication yes
PubkeyAuthentication yes
ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
HostbasedAuthentication no
PasswordAuthentication no
RhostsRSAAuthentication no
BatchMode yes
StrictHostKeyChecking yes
LogLevel DEBUG3

View File

@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.7 2016/08/19 06:44:13 djm Exp $
REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY= yes
SUBDIR= test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys utf8 match
# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.9 2017/03/14 01:20:29 dtucker Exp $
REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?= yes
SUBDIR= test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys utf8 match conversion
.include <bsd.subdir.mk>

View File

@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2017/03/14 01:20:29 dtucker Exp $
PROG=test_conversion
SRCS=tests.c
REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG}
.include <bsd.regress.mk>

View File

@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2017/03/14 01:20:29 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for conversions
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "misc.h"
void
tests(void)
{
char buf[1024];
TEST_START("conversion_convtime");
ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("0"), 0);
ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1"), 1);
ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1S"), 1);
/* from the examples in the comment above the function */
ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("90m"), 5400);
ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1h30m"), 5400);
ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("2d"), 172800);
ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1w"), 604800);
/* negative time is not allowed */
ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("-7"), -1);
ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("-9d"), -1);
/* overflow */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%llu", (unsigned long long)LONG_MAX + 1);
ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime(buf), -1);
/* overflow with multiplier */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%lluM", (unsigned long long)LONG_MAX/60 + 1);
ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime(buf), -1);
ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1000000000000000000000w"), -1);
TEST_DONE();
}

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.3 2016/09/21 17:03:54 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.4 2017/02/03 23:01:42 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for matching functions
*
@ -103,6 +103,25 @@ tests(void)
/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.2,10.0.0.1"), 1); */
TEST_DONE();
#define CHECK_FILTER(string,filter,expected) \
do { \
char *result = match_filter_list((string), (filter)); \
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(result, expected); \
free(result); \
} while (0)
TEST_START("match_filter_list");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "", "a,b,c");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a", "b,c");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b", "a,c");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "c", "a,b");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b", "c");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,c", "b");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b,c", "");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a");
CHECK_FILTER("", "a,b,c", "");
TEST_DONE();
/*
* XXX TODO
* int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *);

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: test_helper.c,v 1.6 2015/03/03 20:42:49 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: test_helper.c,v 1.7 2017/03/14 01:10:07 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
@ -441,6 +441,17 @@ assert_u_int(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
test_die();
}
void
assert_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
long aa1, long aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
{
TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "LONG", pred);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %ld / 0x%lx\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %ld / 0x%lx\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
test_die();
}
void
assert_long_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred)

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: test_helper.h,v 1.6 2015/01/18 19:52:44 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: test_helper.h,v 1.7 2017/03/14 01:10:07 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ void assert_size_t(const char *file, int line,
void assert_u_int(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1, const char *a2,
u_int aa1, u_int aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
void assert_long(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1, const char *a2,
long aa1, long aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
void assert_long_long(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1, const char *a2,
long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
@ -110,6 +113,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(a1, a2) \
assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_LONG_EQ(a1, a2) \
assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_EQ(a1, a2) \
assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_CHAR_EQ(a1, a2) \
@ -139,6 +144,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_U_INT_NE(a1, a2) \
assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_LONG_NE(a1, a2) \
assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_NE(a1, a2) \
assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_CHAR_NE(a1, a2) \
@ -166,6 +173,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_U_INT_LT(a1, a2) \
assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_LONG_LT(a1, a2) \
assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LT(a1, a2) \
assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_CHAR_LT(a1, a2) \
@ -193,6 +202,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_U_INT_LE(a1, a2) \
assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_LONG_LE(a1, a2) \
assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LE(a1, a2) \
assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_CHAR_LE(a1, a2) \
@ -220,6 +231,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_U_INT_GT(a1, a2) \
assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_LONG_GT(a1, a2) \
assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GT(a1, a2) \
assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_CHAR_GT(a1, a2) \
@ -247,6 +260,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
#define ASSERT_U_INT_GE(a1, a2) \
assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
#define ASSERT_LONG_GE(a1, a2) \
assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GE(a1, a2) \
assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
#define ASSERT_CHAR_GE(a1, a2) \

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.3 2016/12/19 04:55:18 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.4 2017/02/19 00:11:29 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for the utf8.h *mprintf() API
*
@ -15,10 +15,7 @@
#include "utf8.h"
void badarg(void);
void one(const char *, const char *, int, int, int, const char *);
void
static void
badarg(void)
{
char buf[16];
@ -33,8 +30,8 @@ badarg(void)
TEST_DONE();
}
void
one(const char *name, const char *mbs, int width,
static void
one(int utf8, const char *name, const char *mbs, int width,
int wantwidth, int wantlen, const char *wants)
{
char buf[16];
@ -43,7 +40,7 @@ one(const char *name, const char *mbs, int width,
if (wantlen == -2)
wantlen = strlen(wants);
(void)strlcpy(buf, "utf8_", sizeof(buf));
(void)strlcpy(buf, utf8 ? "utf8_" : "c_", sizeof(buf));
(void)strlcat(buf, name, sizeof(buf));
TEST_START(buf);
wp = wantwidth == -2 ? NULL : &width;
@ -65,19 +62,41 @@ tests(void)
TEST_DONE();
badarg();
one("empty", "", 2, 0, 0, "");
one("ascii", "x", -2, -2, -2, "x");
one("newline", "a\nb", -2, -2, -2, "a\nb");
one("cr", "a\rb", -2, -2, -2, "a\rb");
one("tab", "a\tb", -2, -2, -2, "a\tb");
one("esc", "\033x", -2, -2, -2, "\\033x");
one("inv_badbyte", "\377x", -2, -2, -2, "\\377x");
one("inv_nocont", "\341x", -2, -2, -2, "\\341x");
one("inv_nolead", "a\200b", -2, -2, -2, "a\\200b");
one("sz_ascii", "1234567890123456", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012345");
one("sz_esc", "123456789012\033", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012");
one("width_ascii", "123", 2, 2, -1, "12");
one("width_double", "a\343\201\201", 2, 1, -1, "a");
one("double_fit", "a\343\201\201", 3, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201");
one("double_spc", "a\343\201\201", 4, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201");
one(1, "empty", "", 2, 0, 0, "");
one(1, "ascii", "x", -2, -2, -2, "x");
one(1, "newline", "a\nb", -2, -2, -2, "a\nb");
one(1, "cr", "a\rb", -2, -2, -2, "a\rb");
one(1, "tab", "a\tb", -2, -2, -2, "a\tb");
one(1, "esc", "\033x", -2, -2, -2, "\\033x");
one(1, "inv_badbyte", "\377x", -2, -2, -2, "\\377x");
one(1, "inv_nocont", "\341x", -2, -2, -2, "\\341x");
one(1, "inv_nolead", "a\200b", -2, -2, -2, "a\\200b");
one(1, "sz_ascii", "1234567890123456", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012345");
one(1, "sz_esc", "123456789012\033", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012");
one(1, "width_ascii", "123", 2, 2, -1, "12");
one(1, "width_double", "a\343\201\201", 2, 1, -1, "a");
one(1, "double_fit", "a\343\201\201", 3, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201");
one(1, "double_spc", "a\343\201\201", 4, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201");
TEST_START("C_setlocale");
loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(loc, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
badarg();
one(0, "empty", "", 2, 0, 0, "");
one(0, "ascii", "x", -2, -2, -2, "x");
one(0, "newline", "a\nb", -2, -2, -2, "a\nb");
one(0, "cr", "a\rb", -2, -2, -2, "a\rb");
one(0, "tab", "a\tb", -2, -2, -2, "a\tb");
one(0, "esc", "\033x", -2, -2, -2, "\\033x");
one(0, "inv_badbyte", "\377x", -2, -2, -2, "\\377x");
one(0, "inv_nocont", "\341x", -2, -2, -2, "\\341x");
one(0, "inv_nolead", "a\200b", -2, -2, -2, "a\\200b");
one(0, "sz_ascii", "1234567890123456", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012345");
one(0, "sz_esc", "123456789012\033", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012");
one(0, "width_ascii", "123", 2, 2, -1, "12");
one(0, "width_double", "a\343\201\201", 2, 1, -1, "a");
one(0, "double_fit", "a\343\201\201", 7, 5, -1, "a\\343");
one(0, "double_spc", "a\343\201\201", 13, 13, 13, "a\\343\\201\\201");
}

View File

@ -73,19 +73,35 @@
# define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
# define ARG_LO_OFFSET 0
# define ARG_HI_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t)
#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
# define ARG_LO_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t)
# define ARG_HI_OFFSET 0
#else
#error "Unknown endianness"
#endif
/* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */
#define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno))
#define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
#define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 4), \
/* load first syscall argument */ \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 6), \
/* load and test first syscall argument, low word */ \
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)])), \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_arg_val), 0, 1), \
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
((_arg_val) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 3), \
/* load and test first syscall argument, high word */ \
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_val) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 1), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
@ -104,108 +120,122 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
/* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */
#ifdef __NR_lstat
SC_DENY(lstat, EACCES),
SC_DENY(__NR_lstat, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_lstat64
SC_DENY(lstat64, EACCES),
SC_DENY(__NR_lstat64, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_fstat
SC_DENY(fstat, EACCES),
SC_DENY(__NR_fstat, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_fstat64
SC_DENY(fstat64, EACCES),
SC_DENY(__NR_fstat64, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_open
SC_DENY(open, EACCES),
SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_openat
SC_DENY(openat, EACCES),
SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_newfstatat
SC_DENY(newfstatat, EACCES),
SC_DENY(__NR_newfstatat, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_stat
SC_DENY(stat, EACCES),
SC_DENY(__NR_stat, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_stat64
SC_DENY(stat64, EACCES),
SC_DENY(__NR_stat64, EACCES),
#endif
/* Syscalls to permit */
#ifdef __NR_brk
SC_ALLOW(brk),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_brk),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_close
SC_ALLOW(close),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_close),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_exit
SC_ALLOW(exit),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_exit_group
SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getpgid
SC_ALLOW(getpgid),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getpid
SC_ALLOW(getpid),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getrandom
SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_madvise
SC_ALLOW(madvise),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_mmap
SC_ALLOW(mmap),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_mmap2
SC_ALLOW(mmap2),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap2),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_mremap
SC_ALLOW(mremap),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_mremap),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_munmap
SC_ALLOW(munmap),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_munmap),
#endif
#ifdef __NR__newselect
SC_ALLOW(_newselect),
SC_ALLOW(__NR__newselect),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_poll
SC_ALLOW(poll),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_poll),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_pselect6
SC_ALLOW(pselect6),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_read
SC_ALLOW(read),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_read),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask
SC_ALLOW(rt_sigprocmask),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_rt_sigprocmask),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_select
SC_ALLOW(select),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_select),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_shutdown
SC_ALLOW(shutdown),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_shutdown),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
SC_ALLOW(sigprocmask),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_time
SC_ALLOW(time),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_time),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_write
SC_ALLOW(write),
SC_ALLOW(__NR_write),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_socketcall
SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
#endif
#if defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__)
/* Allow ioctls for ICA crypto card on s390 */
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
#endif
#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
/*
* On Linux x32, the clock_gettime VDSO falls back to the
* x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g.
* https://bugs.debian.org/849923
*/
SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT);
#endif
/* Default deny */

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.301 2016/11/30 03:00:05 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.306 2017/03/14 07:19:07 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0;
options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 0;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ static struct {
{ "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeysfile2", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
{ "useprivilegeseparation", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
{ "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permittty", sPermitTTY, SSHCFG_ALL },
@ -983,6 +983,15 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
long long val64;
const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
return 0;
for (len--; len > 0; len--) {
if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL)
break;
line[len] = '\0';
}
cp = line;
if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
return 0;
@ -1185,7 +1194,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
if (*arg != '-' &&
!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
@ -1381,11 +1391,6 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
intptr = &options->disable_forwarding;
goto parse_flag;
case sUsePrivilegeSeparation:
intptr = &use_privsep;
multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
goto parse_multistate;
case sAllowUsers:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
@ -1444,7 +1449,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (options->ciphers == NULL)
@ -1455,7 +1460,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (options->macs == NULL)
@ -1467,7 +1472,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
if (*arg != '-' &&
!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
@ -2117,8 +2123,6 @@ fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports);
case sCompression:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression);
case sUsePrivilegeSeparation:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_privsep);
case sAllowTcpForwarding:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding:
@ -2169,8 +2173,6 @@ dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
static void
dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val)
{
if (val == NULL)
return;
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code),
val == NULL ? "none" : val);
}
@ -2296,7 +2298,6 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
dump_cfg_fmtint(sDisableForwarding, o->disable_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseBlacklist, o->use_blacklist);

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.189 2016/12/14 00:36:34 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.191 2017/02/01 02:59:09 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
}
static Channel *
server_request_direct_tcpip(void)
server_request_direct_tcpip(int *reason, const char **errmsg)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *target, *originator;
@ -449,11 +449,13 @@ server_request_direct_tcpip(void)
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
!no_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding) {
c = channel_connect_to_port(target, target_port,
"direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip");
"direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip", reason, errmsg);
} else {
logit("refused local port forward: "
"originator %s port %d, target %s port %d",
originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
if (reason != NULL)
*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
}
free(originator);
@ -468,6 +470,10 @@ server_request_direct_streamlocal(void)
Channel *c = NULL;
char *target, *originator;
u_short originator_port;
struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user");
target = packet_get_string(NULL);
originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
@ -480,7 +486,7 @@ server_request_direct_streamlocal(void)
/* XXX fine grained permissions */
if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
!no_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding &&
use_privsep) {
(pw->pw_uid == 0 || use_privsep)) {
c = channel_connect_to_path(target,
"direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal");
} else {
@ -577,7 +583,8 @@ server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *ctype;
int rchan;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
int rchan, reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED;
u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len;
ctype = packet_get_string(&len);
@ -591,7 +598,7 @@ server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) {
c = server_request_session();
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) {
c = server_request_direct_tcpip();
c = server_request_direct_tcpip(&reason, &errmsg);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
c = server_request_direct_streamlocal();
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "tun@openssh.com") == 0) {
@ -614,9 +621,9 @@ server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
debug("server_input_channel_open: failure %s", ctype);
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
packet_put_int(rchan);
packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED);
packet_put_int(reason);
if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
packet_put_cstring("open failed");
packet_put_cstring(errmsg ? errmsg : "open failed");
packet_put_cstring("");
}
packet_send();
@ -702,6 +709,10 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
int want_reply;
int r, success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0;
struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user");
rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
want_reply = packet_get_char();
@ -709,12 +720,8 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
/* -R style forwarding */
if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) {
struct passwd *pw;
struct Forward fwd;
pw = the_authctxt->pw;
if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user");
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_host = packet_get_string(NULL);
fwd.listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int();
@ -762,9 +769,10 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
/* check permissions */
if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0
|| no_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding ||
!use_privsep) {
(pw->pw_uid != 0 && !use_privsep)) {
success = 0;
packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding.");
packet_send_debug("Server has disabled "
"streamlocal forwarding.");
} else {
/* Start listening on the socket */
success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(

View File

@ -1261,7 +1261,8 @@ static void
do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
char buf[1024], *nl, *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN;
const char *nl;
char buf[1024], *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN;
struct stat sb;
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
@ -1273,11 +1274,8 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
return;
nl = def_nl;
#endif
if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1) {
if (nl != def_nl)
free(nl);
if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1)
return;
}
/* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents if we can and exit. */
logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl);

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.125 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.126 2017/01/03 05:46:51 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
@ -67,6 +67,13 @@ extern int showprogress;
/* Maximum depth to descend in directory trees */
#define MAX_DIR_DEPTH 64
/* Directory separator characters */
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
# define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS "/\\"
#else /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
# define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS "/"
#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
struct sftp_conn {
int fd_in;
int fd_out;
@ -587,6 +594,8 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag,
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (count > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
fatal("%s: nonsensical number of entries", __func__);
if (count == 0)
break;
debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count);
@ -617,7 +626,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag,
* These can be used to attack recursive ops
* (e.g. send '../../../../etc/passwd')
*/
if (strchr(filename, '/') != NULL) {
if (strpbrk(filename, SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS) != NULL) {
error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" "
"during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path);
} else if (dir) {

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.177 2016/10/18 12:41:22 millert Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.178 2017/02/15 01:46:47 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
@ -969,23 +969,34 @@ static int
do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
{
struct sftp_statvfs st;
char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
char s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
char s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
unsigned long long ffree;
char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
char s_icapacity[16], s_dcapacity[16];
if (do_statvfs(conn, path, &st, 1) == -1)
return -1;
if (st.f_files == 0)
strlcpy(s_icapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_icapacity));
else {
snprintf(s_icapacity, sizeof(s_icapacity), "%3llu%%",
(unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) /
st.f_files));
}
if (st.f_blocks == 0)
strlcpy(s_dcapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_dcapacity));
else {
snprintf(s_dcapacity, sizeof(s_dcapacity), "%3llu%%",
(unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
st.f_blocks));
}
if (iflag) {
ffree = st.f_files ? (100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) / st.f_files) : 0;
printf(" Inodes Used Avail "
"(root) %%Capacity\n");
printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu %3llu%%\n",
printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu %s\n",
(unsigned long long)st.f_files,
(unsigned long long)(st.f_files - st.f_ffree),
(unsigned long long)st.f_favail,
(unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, ffree);
(unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, s_icapacity);
} else if (hflag) {
strlcpy(s_used, "error", sizeof(s_used));
strlcpy(s_avail, "error", sizeof(s_avail));
@ -996,21 +1007,18 @@ do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
fmt_scaled(st.f_bfree * st.f_frsize, s_root);
fmt_scaled(st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize, s_total);
printf(" Size Used Avail (root) %%Capacity\n");
printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB %3llu%%\n",
s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root,
(unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
st.f_blocks));
printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB %s\n",
s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root, s_dcapacity);
} else {
printf(" Size Used Avail "
"(root) %%Capacity\n");
printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu %3llu%%\n",
printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu %s\n",
(unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_blocks / 1024),
(unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize *
(st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / 1024),
(unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bavail / 1024),
(unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bfree / 1024),
(unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
st.f_blocks));
s_dcapacity);
}
return 0;
}

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.215 2016/11/30 03:07:37 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.218 2017/03/15 03:52:30 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#endif
#ifndef DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST
# define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/*"
# define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*"
#endif
typedef enum {
@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
static void
process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL;
char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
int r, version, success = 0;
Identity *id, *nxt;
Idtab *tab;
@ -851,6 +851,13 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(pin);
if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
provider, strerror(errno));
goto send;
}
debug("%s: remove %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) {
tab = idtab_lookup(version);
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
@ -858,18 +865,19 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
/* Skip file--based keys */
if (id->provider == NULL)
continue;
if (!strcmp(provider, id->provider)) {
if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
tab->nentries--;
}
}
}
if (pkcs11_del_provider(provider) == 0)
if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0)
success = 1;
else
error("process_remove_smartcard_key:"
" pkcs11_del_provider failed");
send:
free(provider);
send_status(e, success);
}
@ -1214,10 +1222,9 @@ static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
"usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Ddx] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
" [-P pkcs11_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
" ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -x Exit when the last client disconnects.\n");
exit(1);
}

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.292 2016/09/12 03:29:16 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.299 2017/03/10 04:26:06 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <locale.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "krl.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "utf8.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
@ -843,7 +845,7 @@ fingerprint_one_key(const struct sshkey *public, const char *comment)
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp,
mprintf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp,
comment ? comment : "no comment", sshkey_type(public));
if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
printf("%s\n", ra);
@ -1082,6 +1084,7 @@ known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx;
char *hashed, *cp, *hosts, *ohosts;
int has_wild = l->hosts && strcspn(l->hosts, "*?!") != strlen(l->hosts);
int was_hashed = l->hosts && l->hosts[0] == HASH_DELIM;
switch (l->status) {
case HKF_STATUS_OK:
@ -1090,11 +1093,10 @@ known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
* Don't hash hosts already already hashed, with wildcard
* characters or a CA/revocation marker.
*/
if ((l->match & HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED) != 0 ||
has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
if (was_hashed || has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
if (has_wild && !find_host) {
logit("%s:%ld: ignoring host name "
logit("%s:%lu: ignoring host name "
"with wildcard: %.64s", l->path,
l->linenum, l->hosts);
}
@ -1106,6 +1108,7 @@ known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
*/
ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(l->hosts);
while ((cp = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
lowercase(cp);
if ((hashed = host_hash(cp, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
fatal("hash_host failed");
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s %s\n", hashed, l->rawkey);
@ -1116,7 +1119,7 @@ known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
case HKF_STATUS_INVALID:
/* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */
ctx->invalid = 1;
logit("%s:%ld: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
@ -1150,14 +1153,14 @@ known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
*/
ctx->found_key = 1;
if (!quiet)
printf("# Host %s found: line %ld\n",
printf("# Host %s found: line %lu\n",
ctx->host, l->linenum);
}
return 0;
} else if (find_host) {
ctx->found_key = 1;
if (!quiet) {
printf("# Host %s found: line %ld %s\n",
printf("# Host %s found: line %lu %s\n",
ctx->host,
l->linenum, l->marker == MRK_CA ? "CA" :
(l->marker == MRK_REVOKE ? "REVOKED" : ""));
@ -1166,7 +1169,7 @@ known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
known_hosts_hash(l, ctx);
else if (print_fingerprint) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep);
printf("%s %s %s %s\n", ctx->host,
mprintf("%s %s %s %s\n", ctx->host,
sshkey_type(l->key), fp, l->comment);
free(fp);
} else
@ -1177,7 +1180,7 @@ known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
/* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */
if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
ctx->invalid = 1;
logit("%s:%ld: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
}
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
}
@ -1317,7 +1320,7 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
fatal("Failed to load key %s: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r));
}
if (comment)
printf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment);
mprintf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment);
/* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */
if (identity_new_passphrase) {
@ -1441,7 +1444,10 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw)
sshkey_free(private);
exit(1);
}
printf("Key now has comment '%s'\n", comment);
if (comment)
printf("Key now has comment '%s'\n", comment);
else
printf("Key now has no comment\n");
if (identity_comment) {
strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment));
@ -2203,11 +2209,17 @@ do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
exit(ret);
}
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
# define RSA1_USAGE " | rsa1"
#else
# define RSA1_USAGE ""
#endif
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1]\n"
"usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa%s]\n"
" [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]\n"
" ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]\n"
" ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
@ -2215,7 +2227,7 @@ usage(void)
" ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n"
" ssh-keygen -c [-P passphrase] [-C comment] [-f keyfile]\n"
" ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
" ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n");
" ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n", RSA1_USAGE);
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
fprintf(stderr,
" ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n");
@ -2280,6 +2292,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
seed_rng();
msetlocale();
/* we need this for the home * directory. */
pw = getpwuid(getuid());
if (!pw)

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.106 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.109 2017/03/10 04:26:06 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
*
@ -321,16 +321,18 @@ keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
}
static void
keyprint_one(char *host, struct sshkey *key)
keyprint_one(const char *host, struct sshkey *key)
{
char *hostport;
if (hash_hosts && (host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
fatal("host_hash failed");
const char *known_host, *hashed;
hostport = put_host_port(host, ssh_port);
lowercase(hostport);
if (hash_hosts && (hashed = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
fatal("host_hash failed");
known_host = hash_hosts ? hashed : hostport;
if (!get_cert)
fprintf(stdout, "%s ", hostport);
fprintf(stdout, "%s ", known_host);
sshkey_write(key, stdout);
fputs("\n", stdout);
free(hostport);
@ -752,10 +754,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
tname = strtok(optarg, ",");
while (tname) {
int type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname);
switch (type) {
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
case KEY_RSA1:
get_keytypes |= KT_RSA1;
break;
#endif
case KEY_DSA:
get_keytypes |= KT_DSA;
break;
@ -769,7 +774,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519;
break;
case KEY_UNSPEC:
fatal("unknown key type %s", tname);
default:
fatal("Unknown key type \"%s\"", tname);
}
tname = strtok(NULL, ",");
}

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.448 2016/12/06 07:48:01 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.451 2017/03/10 04:07:20 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -685,11 +685,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0)
cp = kex_alg_list('\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0)
cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, '\n');
cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0)
cp = sshkey_alg_list(1, 0, '\n');
cp = sshkey_alg_list(1, 0, 0, '\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0)
cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, '\n');
cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 0, '\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "protocol-version") == 0) {
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
cp = xstrdup("1\n2");
@ -1099,7 +1099,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
options.proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
snprintf(port_s, sizeof(port_s), "%d", options.jump_port);
xasprintf(&options.proxy_command,
"ssh%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%.*s -W %%h:%%p %s",
"ssh%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%.*s -W '[%%h]:%%p' %s",
/* Optional "-l user" argument if jump_user set */
options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : " -l ",
options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : options.jump_user,

View File

@ -50,4 +50,4 @@
# ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
# RekeyLimit 1G 1h
# VerifyHostKeyDNS yes
# VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20170305
# VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20170804

View File

@ -33,9 +33,9 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.240 2016/10/15 19:56:25 jmc Exp $
.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.242 2017/02/27 14:30:33 jmc Exp $
.\" $FreeBSD$
.Dd $Mdocdate: October 15 2016 $
.Dd $Mdocdate: February 27 2017 $
.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -417,6 +417,10 @@ If the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
.Pp
The supported ciphers are:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
@ -786,6 +790,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -809,6 +817,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -1029,6 +1041,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
@ -1104,6 +1120,10 @@ If the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
.Pp
The algorithms that contain
.Qq -etm
@ -1129,7 +1149,7 @@ However, this option disables host authentication for localhost.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no .
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts
Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up.
@ -1266,6 +1286,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
instead of replacing it.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -1650,7 +1674,7 @@ in
Specifies a string to append to the regular version string to identify
OS- or site-specific modifications.
The default is
.Dq FreeBSD-20170305 .
.Dq FreeBSD-20170804 .
The value
.Cm none
may be used to disable this.

View File

@ -40,7 +40,6 @@
#define addr_match_cidr_list Fssh_addr_match_cidr_list
#define addr_match_list Fssh_addr_match_list
#define addr_netmatch Fssh_addr_netmatch
#define addr_pton Fssh_addr_pton
#define addr_pton_cidr Fssh_addr_pton_cidr
#define ask_permission Fssh_ask_permission
#define atomicio Fssh_atomicio
@ -51,9 +50,10 @@
#define bandwidth_limit Fssh_bandwidth_limit
#define bandwidth_limit_init Fssh_bandwidth_limit_init
#define barrett_reduce Fssh_barrett_reduce
#define baud_to_speed Fssh_baud_to_speed
#define bcrypt_hash Fssh_bcrypt_hash
#define bcrypt_pbkdf Fssh_bcrypt_pbkdf
#define bf_ssh1_cipher Fssh_bf_ssh1_cipher
#define bind_permitted Fssh_bind_permitted
#define bitmap_clear_bit Fssh_bitmap_clear_bit
#define bitmap_free Fssh_bitmap_free
#define bitmap_from_string Fssh_bitmap_from_string
@ -110,7 +110,6 @@
#define buffer_put_short Fssh_buffer_put_short
#define buffer_put_string Fssh_buffer_put_string
#define cert_free Fssh_cert_free
#define cert_new Fssh_cert_new
#define chacha_encrypt_bytes Fssh_chacha_encrypt_bytes
#define chacha_ivsetup Fssh_chacha_ivsetup
#define chacha_keysetup Fssh_chacha_keysetup
@ -126,7 +125,6 @@
#define chan_rcvd_oclose Fssh_chan_rcvd_oclose
#define chan_read_failed Fssh_chan_read_failed
#define chan_send_eof2 Fssh_chan_send_eof2
#define chan_send_ieof1 Fssh_chan_send_ieof1
#define chan_send_oclose1 Fssh_chan_send_oclose1
#define chan_shutdown_read Fssh_chan_shutdown_read
#define chan_shutdown_write Fssh_chan_shutdown_write
@ -135,6 +133,7 @@
#define channel_add_permitted_opens Fssh_channel_add_permitted_opens
#define channel_after_select Fssh_channel_after_select
#define channel_by_id Fssh_channel_by_id
#define channel_by_remote_id Fssh_channel_by_remote_id
#define channel_cancel_cleanup Fssh_channel_cancel_cleanup
#define channel_cancel_lport_listener Fssh_channel_cancel_lport_listener
#define channel_cancel_rport_listener Fssh_channel_cancel_rport_listener
@ -162,7 +161,6 @@
#define channel_input_oclose Fssh_channel_input_oclose
#define channel_input_open_confirmation Fssh_channel_input_open_confirmation
#define channel_input_open_failure Fssh_channel_input_open_failure
#define channel_input_port_forward_request Fssh_channel_input_port_forward_request
#define channel_input_port_open Fssh_channel_input_port_open
#define channel_input_status_confirm Fssh_channel_input_status_confirm
#define channel_input_window_adjust Fssh_channel_input_window_adjust
@ -192,6 +190,8 @@
#define channel_pre_x11_open_13 Fssh_channel_pre_x11_open_13
#define channel_prepare_select Fssh_channel_prepare_select
#define channel_print_adm_permitted_opens Fssh_channel_print_adm_permitted_opens
#define channel_proxy_downstream Fssh_channel_proxy_downstream
#define channel_proxy_upstream Fssh_channel_proxy_upstream
#define channel_register_cleanup Fssh_channel_register_cleanup
#define channel_register_fds Fssh_channel_register_fds
#define channel_register_filter Fssh_channel_register_filter
@ -223,8 +223,10 @@
#define cipher_blocksize Fssh_cipher_blocksize
#define cipher_by_name Fssh_cipher_by_name
#define cipher_by_number Fssh_cipher_by_number
#define cipher_cleanup Fssh_cipher_cleanup
#define cipher_crypt Fssh_cipher_crypt
#define cipher_ctx_get_number Fssh_cipher_ctx_get_number
#define cipher_ctx_is_plaintext Fssh_cipher_ctx_is_plaintext
#define cipher_free Fssh_cipher_free
#define cipher_get_keycontext Fssh_cipher_get_keycontext
#define cipher_get_keyiv Fssh_cipher_get_keyiv
#define cipher_get_keyiv_len Fssh_cipher_get_keyiv_len
@ -254,7 +256,7 @@
#define compat_pkalg_proposal Fssh_compat_pkalg_proposal
#define compress_buffer Fssh_compress_buffer
#define connect_next Fssh_connect_next
#define connect_to Fssh_connect_to
#define connect_to_reason Fssh_connect_to_reason
#define convtime Fssh_convtime
#define crypto_hash_sha512 Fssh_crypto_hash_sha512
#define crypto_hashblocks_sha512 Fssh_crypto_hashblocks_sha512
@ -299,6 +301,7 @@
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_shortsc25519_from16bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_shortsc25519_from16bytes
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime
#define crypto_verify_32 Fssh_crypto_verify_32
#define daemonized Fssh_daemonized
#define dbl_p1p1 Fssh_dbl_p1p1
#define deattack_init Fssh_deattack_init
#define debug Fssh_debug
@ -325,11 +328,8 @@
#define enable_compat13 Fssh_enable_compat13
#define enable_compat20 Fssh_enable_compat20
#define error Fssh_error
#define evp_ssh1_3des Fssh_evp_ssh1_3des
#define evp_ssh1_bf Fssh_evp_ssh1_bf
#define export_dns_rr Fssh_export_dns_rr
#define fatal Fssh_fatal
#define filter_proposal Fssh_filter_proposal
#define fingerprint_b64 Fssh_fingerprint_b64
#define fingerprint_hex Fssh_fingerprint_hex
#define fmprintf Fssh_fmprintf
@ -412,7 +412,6 @@
#define kexgex_hash Fssh_kexgex_hash
#define kexgex_server Fssh_kexgex_server
#define key_add_private Fssh_key_add_private
#define key_alg_list Fssh_key_alg_list
#define key_cert_check_authority Fssh_key_cert_check_authority
#define key_cert_copy Fssh_key_cert_copy
#define key_certify Fssh_key_certify
@ -461,10 +460,10 @@
#define mac_setup Fssh_mac_setup
#define mac_valid Fssh_mac_valid
#define match Fssh_match
#define match_filter_list Fssh_match_filter_list
#define match_host_and_ip Fssh_match_host_and_ip
#define match_hostname Fssh_match_hostname
#define match_list Fssh_match_list
#define match_maybe_hashed Fssh_match_maybe_hashed
#define match_pattern Fssh_match_pattern
#define match_pattern_list Fssh_match_pattern_list
#define match_user Fssh_match_user
@ -478,7 +477,7 @@
#define mprintf Fssh_mprintf
#define ms_subtract_diff Fssh_ms_subtract_diff
#define ms_to_timeval Fssh_ms_to_timeval
#define mult Fssh_mult
#define msetlocale Fssh_msetlocale
#define mysignal Fssh_mysignal
#define newkeys_from_blob Fssh_newkeys_from_blob
#define newkeys_to_blob Fssh_newkeys_to_blob
@ -509,7 +508,6 @@
#define pkcs11_find Fssh_pkcs11_find
#define pkcs11_init Fssh_pkcs11_init
#define pkcs11_provider_finalize Fssh_pkcs11_provider_finalize
#define pkcs11_provider_unref Fssh_pkcs11_provider_unref
#define pkcs11_rsa_finish Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_finish
#define pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt
#define pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt
@ -526,7 +524,6 @@
#define port_open_helper Fssh_port_open_helper
#define prime_test Fssh_prime_test
#define proto_spec Fssh_proto_spec
#define put_bitmap Fssh_put_bitmap
#define put_host_port Fssh_put_host_port
#define put_u16 Fssh_put_u16
#define put_u32 Fssh_put_u32
@ -537,6 +534,7 @@
#define read_keyfile_line Fssh_read_keyfile_line
#define read_mux Fssh_read_mux
#define read_passphrase Fssh_read_passphrase
#define recip Fssh_recip
#define record_hostkey Fssh_record_hostkey
#define reduce_add_sub Fssh_reduce_add_sub
#define refresh_progress_meter Fssh_refresh_progress_meter
@ -563,11 +561,7 @@
#define sigdie Fssh_sigdie
#define snmprintf Fssh_snmprintf
#define sock_set_v6only Fssh_sock_set_v6only
#define square Fssh_square
#define ssh1_3des_cbc Fssh_ssh1_3des_cbc
#define ssh1_3des_cleanup Fssh_ssh1_3des_cleanup
#define ssh1_3des_init Fssh_ssh1_3des_init
#define ssh1_3des_iv Fssh_ssh1_3des_iv
#define speed_to_baud Fssh_speed_to_baud
#define ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms Fssh_ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms
#define ssh_add_hostkey Fssh_ssh_add_hostkey
#define ssh_add_identity_constrained Fssh_ssh_add_identity_constrained
@ -656,6 +650,7 @@
#define ssh_packet_get_int Fssh_ssh_packet_get_int
#define ssh_packet_get_int64 Fssh_ssh_packet_get_int64
#define ssh_packet_get_maxsize Fssh_ssh_packet_get_maxsize
#define ssh_packet_get_mux Fssh_ssh_packet_get_mux
#define ssh_packet_get_output Fssh_ssh_packet_get_output
#define ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags Fssh_ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags
#define ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout Fssh_ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout
@ -666,6 +661,7 @@
#define ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts Fssh_ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts
#define ssh_packet_is_interactive Fssh_ssh_packet_is_interactive
#define ssh_packet_is_rekeying Fssh_ssh_packet_is_rekeying
#define ssh_packet_log_type Fssh_ssh_packet_log_type
#define ssh_packet_need_rekeying Fssh_ssh_packet_need_rekeying
#define ssh_packet_next Fssh_ssh_packet_next
#define ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write Fssh_ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write
@ -695,11 +691,13 @@
#define ssh_packet_send_ignore Fssh_ssh_packet_send_ignore
#define ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts Fssh_ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts
#define ssh_packet_set_authenticated Fssh_ssh_packet_set_authenticated
#define ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks Fssh_ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks
#define ssh_packet_set_connection Fssh_ssh_packet_set_connection
#define ssh_packet_set_encryption_key Fssh_ssh_packet_set_encryption_key
#define ssh_packet_set_input_hook Fssh_ssh_packet_set_input_hook
#define ssh_packet_set_interactive Fssh_ssh_packet_set_interactive
#define ssh_packet_set_log_preamble Fssh_ssh_packet_set_log_preamble
#define ssh_packet_set_maxsize Fssh_ssh_packet_set_maxsize
#define ssh_packet_set_mux Fssh_ssh_packet_set_mux
#define ssh_packet_set_nonblocking Fssh_ssh_packet_set_nonblocking
#define ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags Fssh_ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags
#define ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits Fssh_ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits
@ -725,6 +723,7 @@
#define ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback Fssh_ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback
#define ssh_update_card Fssh_ssh_update_card
#define sshbuf_alloc Fssh_sshbuf_alloc
#define sshbuf_allocate Fssh_sshbuf_allocate
#define sshbuf_avail Fssh_sshbuf_avail
#define sshbuf_b64tod Fssh_sshbuf_b64tod
#define sshbuf_check_reserve Fssh_sshbuf_check_reserve
@ -783,6 +782,7 @@
#define sshbuf_set_max_size Fssh_sshbuf_set_max_size
#define sshbuf_set_parent Fssh_sshbuf_set_parent
#define sshkey_add_private Fssh_sshkey_add_private
#define sshkey_alg_list Fssh_sshkey_alg_list
#define sshkey_cert_check_authority Fssh_sshkey_cert_check_authority
#define sshkey_cert_copy Fssh_sshkey_cert_copy
#define sshkey_cert_type Fssh_sshkey_cert_type
@ -925,6 +925,5 @@
#define xcalloc Fssh_xcalloc
#define xcrypt Fssh_xcrypt
#define xmalloc Fssh_xmalloc
#define xmmap Fssh_xmmap
#define xreallocarray Fssh_xreallocarray
#define xstrdup Fssh_xstrdup

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.272 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.273 2017/03/10 03:22:40 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -1533,6 +1533,7 @@ maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, Key *private, char *comment,
if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 2 &&
!ask_permission("Add key %s (%s) to agent?", authfile, comment)) {
debug3("user denied adding this key");
close(auth_sock);
return;
}
@ -1541,4 +1542,5 @@ maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, Key *private, char *comment,
debug("identity added to agent: %s", authfile);
else
debug("could not add identity to agent: %s (%d)", authfile, r);
close(auth_sock);
}

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.79 2016/09/19 07:52:42 natano Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.80 2017/03/10 03:53:11 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -520,7 +520,8 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
cookie[i] = packet_get_char();
/* Get the public key. */
server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
if ((server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
bits = packet_get_int();
packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->e);
packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->n);
@ -532,7 +533,8 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
}
/* Get the host key. */
host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
if ((host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
bits = packet_get_int();
packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.251 2016/12/04 23:54:02 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.255 2017/03/11 23:40:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
@ -193,8 +193,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
}
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
(time_t)options.rekey_interval);
packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit,
options.rekey_interval);
/* start key exchange */
if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
@ -934,14 +934,14 @@ input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
char *info, *lang, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL;
char prompt[150];
const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias :
authctxt->host;
const char *host;
debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq");
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: "
"no authentication context");
host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host;
info = packet_get_string(NULL);
lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
@ -996,11 +996,11 @@ input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
}
static const char *
identity_sign_encode(struct identity *id)
key_sign_encode(const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state;
if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA) {
if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
switch (ssh->kex->rsa_sha2) {
case 256:
return "rsa-sha2-256";
@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ identity_sign_encode(struct identity *id)
return "rsa-sha2-512";
}
}
return key_ssh_name(id->key);
return key_ssh_name(key);
}
static int
@ -1017,30 +1017,49 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
{
Key *prv;
int ret;
const char *alg;
alg = identity_sign_encode(id);
/* the agent supports this key */
if (id->agent_fd != -1)
if (id->key != NULL && id->agent_fd != -1)
return ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp,
data, datalen, alg, compat);
data, datalen, key_sign_encode(id->key), compat);
/*
* we have already loaded the private key or
* the private key is stored in external hardware
*/
if (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT))
return (sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg,
compat));
if (id->key != NULL &&
(id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT)))
return (sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
key_sign_encode(id->key), compat));
/* load the private key from the file */
if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
ret = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat);
ret = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
key_sign_encode(prv), compat);
sshkey_free(prv);
return (ret);
}
static int
id_filename_matches(Identity *id, Identity *private_id)
{
const char *suffixes[] = { ".pub", "-cert.pub", NULL };
size_t len = strlen(id->filename), plen = strlen(private_id->filename);
size_t i, slen;
if (strcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename) == 0)
return 1;
for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) {
slen = strlen(suffixes[i]);
if (len > slen && plen == len - slen &&
strcmp(id->filename + (len - slen), suffixes[i]) == 0 &&
memcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename, plen) == 0)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
{
@ -1083,7 +1102,7 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
} else {
buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, identity_sign_encode(id));
buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_sign_encode(id->key));
}
buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen);
@ -1103,6 +1122,24 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
break;
}
}
/*
* Exact key matches are preferred, but also allow
* filename matches for non-PKCS#11/agent keys that
* didn't load public keys. This supports the case
* of keeping just a private key file and public
* certificate on disk.
*/
if (!matched && !id->isprivate && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
(id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) {
TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) {
if (private_id->key == NULL &&
id_filename_matches(id, private_id)) {
id = private_id;
matched = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (matched) {
debug2("%s: using private key \"%s\"%s for "
"certificate", __func__, id->filename,
@ -1181,7 +1218,7 @@ send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
packet_put_char(have_sig);
if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH))
packet_put_cstring(identity_sign_encode(id));
packet_put_cstring(key_sign_encode(id->key));
packet_put_string(blob, bloblen);
free(blob);
packet_send();
@ -1632,7 +1669,7 @@ ssh_keysign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
/* send # of sock, data to be signed */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock) != 0) ||
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, data, datalen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, b) == -1)

View File

@ -33,9 +33,9 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.287 2016/11/30 02:57:40 djm Exp $
.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.288 2017/01/30 23:27:39 dtucker Exp $
.\" $FreeBSD$
.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2016 $
.Dd $Mdocdate: January 30 2017 $
.Dt SSHD 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ and
files contain host public keys for all known hosts.
The global file should
be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is
maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host,
maintained automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host,
its key is added to the per-user file.
.Pp
Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional),

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.480 2016/12/09 03:04:29 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.485 2017/03/15 03:52:30 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -383,14 +383,14 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
{
u_int i;
int remote_major, remote_minor;
char *s, *newline = "\n";
char *s;
char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
*options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
options.version_addendum, newline);
options.version_addendum);
/* Send our protocol version identification. */
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
@ -1068,6 +1068,11 @@ server_listen(void)
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) {
verbose("socket: CLOEXEC: %s", strerror(errno));
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
/*
* Set socket options.
* Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
@ -1696,6 +1701,15 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
continue;
key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
pubkey = key_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], NULL);
if ((pubkey != NULL && pubkey->type == KEY_RSA1) ||
(key != NULL && key->type == KEY_RSA1)) {
verbose("Ignoring RSA1 key %s",
options.host_key_files[i]);
key_free(key);
key_free(pubkey);
continue;
}
if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL)
pubkey = key_demote(key);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
@ -2227,7 +2241,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit,
(time_t)options.rekey_interval);
options.rekey_interval);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
list_hostkey_types());

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.100 2016/08/15 12:32:04 naddy Exp $
# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.101 2017/03/14 07:19:07 djm Exp $
# $FreeBSD$
# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See
@ -42,7 +42,8 @@
#PubkeyAuthentication yes
# The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
#AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2
# but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
#AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
@ -95,7 +96,6 @@
#PrintMotd yes
#PrintLastLog yes
#TCPKeepAlive yes
#UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox
#PermitUserEnvironment no
#Compression delayed
#ClientAliveInterval 0
@ -106,7 +106,7 @@
#PermitTunnel no
#ChrootDirectory none
#UseBlacklist no
#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20170305
#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20170804
# no default banner path
#Banner none

View File

@ -33,9 +33,9 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.239 2016/11/30 03:00:05 djm Exp $
.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.243 2017/03/14 07:19:07 djm Exp $
.\" $FreeBSD$
.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2016 $
.Dd $Mdocdate: March 14 2017 $
.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -438,6 +438,10 @@ If the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
.Pp
The supported ciphers are:
.Pp
@ -651,6 +655,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -845,6 +853,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
The supported algorithms are:
.Pp
.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
@ -935,6 +947,10 @@ If the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
.Pp
The algorithms that contain
.Qq -etm
@ -1291,6 +1307,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -1496,33 +1516,11 @@ is enabled, you will not be able to run
as a non-root user.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process
to deal with incoming network traffic.
After successful authentication, another process will be created that has
the privilege of the authenticated user.
The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege
escalation by containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes.
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm no ,
or
.Cm sandbox .
If
.Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
is set to
.Cm sandbox
then the pre-authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional
restrictions.
The default is
.Cm sandbox .
.It Cm VersionAddendum
Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
sent by the server upon connection.
The default is
.Qq FreeBSD-20170305 .
.Qq FreeBSD-20170804 .
The value
.Cm none
may be used to disable this.
@ -1669,13 +1667,13 @@ The username.
.El
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %t, and %u.
accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
accepts the tokens %%, %h, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %K, %k, %h, %i, %s, %T, %t, and %u.
accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, %k, %s, %T, %t, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
accepts the tokens %%, %h, and %u.

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.41 2016/10/24 01:09:17 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.45 2017/03/10 04:07:20 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved.
@ -89,7 +89,9 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
{ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT",
KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
# ifdef WITH_SSH1
{ NULL, "RSA1", KEY_RSA1, 0, 0, 0 },
# endif
{ "ssh-rsa", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 0 },
{ "rsa-sha2-256", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 },
{ "rsa-sha2-512", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 },
@ -195,14 +197,16 @@ sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name)
}
char *
sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, char sep)
sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
{
char *tmp, *ret = NULL;
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (kt->name == NULL || kt->sigonly)
if (kt->name == NULL)
continue;
if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
continue;
if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
continue;
@ -1237,6 +1241,9 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
u_long bits;
#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
if (ret == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
cp = *cpp;
switch (ret->type) {
@ -3786,7 +3793,46 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL,
(char *)passphrase)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
unsigned long pem_err = ERR_peek_last_error();
int pem_reason = ERR_GET_REASON(pem_err);
/*
* Translate OpenSSL error codes to determine whether
* passphrase is required/incorrect.
*/
switch (ERR_GET_LIB(pem_err)) {
case ERR_LIB_PEM:
switch (pem_reason) {
case PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ:
case PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD:
case PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
goto out;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
case ERR_LIB_EVP:
switch (pem_reason) {
case EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
goto out;
case EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR:
case EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR:
#ifdef EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR
case EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR:
#endif
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
case ERR_LIB_ASN1:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA &&
@ -3860,6 +3906,8 @@ int
sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
@ -3882,9 +3930,11 @@ sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
return sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase,
keyp, commentp);
case KEY_UNSPEC:
if (sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp,
commentp) == 0)
return 0;
r = sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp,
commentp);
/* Do not fallback to PEM parser if only passphrase is wrong. */
if (r == 0 || r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
return r;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type,
passphrase, keyp);

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.14 2016/09/12 23:31:27 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.15 2017/03/10 04:07:20 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *);
const char *sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
const char *sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
char *sshkey_alg_list(int, int, char);
char *sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: utf8.c,v 1.3 2016/05/30 12:57:21 schwarze Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: utf8.c,v 1.5 2017/02/19 00:10:57 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2016 Ingo Schwarze <schwarze@openbsd.org>
*
@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ dangerous_locale(void) {
char *loc;
loc = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
return strcmp(loc, "US-ASCII") && strcmp(loc, "UTF-8");
return strcmp(loc, "US-ASCII") != 0 && strcmp(loc, "UTF-8") != 0 &&
strcmp(loc, "ANSI_X3.4-1968") != 0 && strcmp(loc, "646") != 0;
}
static int
@ -116,6 +117,7 @@ vasnmprintf(char **str, size_t maxsz, int *wp, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
sz = strlen(src) + 1;
if ((dst = malloc(sz)) == NULL) {
free(src);
ret = -1;
goto fail;
}

View File

@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.78 2016/12/19 04:55:51 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.79 2017/03/20 01:18:59 djm Exp $ */
/* $FreeBSD$ */
#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_7.4"
#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_7.5"
#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
#define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD "FreeBSD-20170305"
#define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD "FreeBSD-20170804"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)

View File

@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ SRCS+= ntoh.c
.PATH: ${LIBC_SRC}/string
SRCS+= bcmp.c bcopy.c bzero.c ffs.c fls.c \
memccpy.c memchr.c memcmp.c memcpy.c memmove.c memset.c \
qdivrem.c strcat.c strchr.c strcmp.c strcpy.c \
qdivrem.c strcat.c strchr.c strcmp.c strcpy.c stpcpy.c stpncpy.c \
strcspn.c strlcat.c strlcpy.c strlen.c strncat.c strncmp.c strncpy.c \
strpbrk.c strrchr.c strsep.c strspn.c strstr.c strtok.c swab.c
.if ${MACHINE_CPUARCH} == "arm"

View File

@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ MAN+= expand_number.3 flopen.3 fparseln.3 hexdump.3 \
property.3 pty.3 quotafile.3 realhostname.3 realhostname_sa.3 \
_secure_path.3 trimdomain.3 uucplock.3 pw_util.3
MAN+= login.conf.5
MLINKS+=flopen.3 flopenat.3
MLINKS+=kld.3 kld_isloaded.3 kld.3 kld_load.3
MLINKS+=login_auth.3 auth_cat.3 login_auth.3 auth_checknologin.3
MLINKS+=login_cap.3 login_close.3 login_cap.3 login_getcapbool.3 \

View File

@ -25,11 +25,12 @@
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd June 6, 2009
.Dd July 28, 2017
.Dt FLOPEN 3
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm flopen
.Nm flopen ,
.Nm flopenat
.Nd "Reliably open and lock a file"
.Sh LIBRARY
.Lb libutil
@ -40,6 +41,10 @@
.Fn flopen "const char *path" "int flags"
.Ft int
.Fn flopen "const char *path" "int flags" "mode_t mode"
.Ft int
.Fn flopenat "int fd" "const char *path" "int flags"
.Ft int
.Fn flopenat "int fd" "const char *path" "int flags" "mode_t mode"
.Sh DESCRIPTION
The
.Fn flopen
@ -79,6 +84,27 @@ argument is required if
.Va flags
includes
.Dv O_CREAT .
.Pp
The
.Fn flopenat
function is equivalent to the
.Fn flopen
function except in the case where the
.Fa path
specifies a relative path.
In this case the file to be opened is determined relative to the directory
associated with the file descriptor
.Fa fd
instead of the current working directory.
If
.Fn flopenat
is passed the special value
.Dv AT_FDCWD
in the
.Fa fd
parameter, the current working directory is used
and the behavior is identical to a call to
.Fn flopen .
.Sh RETURN VALUES
If successful,
.Fn flopen

View File

@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
* code's apparent simplicity; there would be no need for this function if it
* was easy to get right.
*/
int
flopen(const char *path, int flags, ...)
static int
vflopenat(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, va_list ap)
{
int fd, operation, serrno, trunc;
struct stat sb, fsb;
@ -58,11 +58,7 @@ flopen(const char *path, int flags, ...)
mode = 0;
if (flags & O_CREAT) {
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, flags);
mode = (mode_t)va_arg(ap, int); /* mode_t promoted to int */
va_end(ap);
}
operation = LOCK_EX;
@ -73,7 +69,7 @@ flopen(const char *path, int flags, ...)
flags &= ~O_TRUNC;
for (;;) {
if ((fd = open(path, flags, mode)) == -1)
if ((fd = openat(dirfd, path, flags, mode)) == -1)
/* non-existent or no access */
return (-1);
if (flock(fd, operation) == -1) {
@ -83,7 +79,7 @@ flopen(const char *path, int flags, ...)
errno = serrno;
return (-1);
}
if (stat(path, &sb) == -1) {
if (fstatat(dirfd, path, &sb, 0) == -1) {
/* disappeared from under our feet */
(void)close(fd);
continue;
@ -123,3 +119,27 @@ flopen(const char *path, int flags, ...)
return (fd);
}
}
int
flopen(const char *path, int flags, ...)
{
va_list ap;
int ret;
va_start(ap, flags);
ret = vflopenat(AT_FDCWD, path, flags, ap);
va_end(ap);
return (ret);
}
int
flopenat(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, ...)
{
va_list ap;
int ret;
va_start(ap, flags);
ret = vflopenat(dirfd, path, flags, ap);
va_end(ap);
return (ret);
}

View File

@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ int expand_number(const char *_buf, uint64_t *_num);
int extattr_namespace_to_string(int _attrnamespace, char **_string);
int extattr_string_to_namespace(const char *_string, int *_attrnamespace);
int flopen(const char *_path, int _flags, ...);
int flopenat(int _dirfd, const char *_path, int _flags, ...);
int forkpty(int *_amaster, char *_name,
struct termios *_termp, struct winsize *_winp);
void hexdump(const void *_ptr, int _length, const char *_hdr, int _flags);

View File

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd January 15, 2017
.Dd August 3, 2017
.Dt EHCI 4
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -69,16 +69,6 @@ but can be noticed since
.Tn USB
2.0 devices plugged in to the same
connector appear to connect to different USB buses.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ohci 4 ,
.Xr uhci 4 ,
.Xr usb 4 ,
.Xr xhci 4
.Sh HISTORY
The
.Nm
device driver first appeared in
.Fx 5.1 .
.Sh LOADER TUNABLES
When the kernel has been compiled with
.Cd options USB_DEBUG ,
@ -98,4 +88,27 @@ The default value is 0 (off).
.It Va hw.usb.ehci.no_hs
This tunable disables USB devices to attach like HIGH-speed ones and will force all attached devices to attach to the FULL- or LOW-speed companion controller.
The default value is 0 (off).
.Sh MIB Variables
The
.Nm
driver exposes the following variables in the
.Va hw.usb.ehci
branch of the
.Xr sysctl 3
MIB:
.Bl -tag -width ".Va debug"
.It Va debug
Debug output level, where 0 is debugging disabled and larger values increase
debug message verbosity.
Default is 0.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ohci 4 ,
.Xr uhci 4 ,
.Xr usb 4 ,
.Xr xhci 4
.Sh HISTORY
The
.Nm
device driver first appeared in
.Fx 5.1 .

View File

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd June 23, 2005
.Dd August 3, 2017
.Dt OHCI 4
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -59,6 +59,19 @@ NVIDIA nForce3
.It
Sun PCIO-2 (RIO USB)
.El
.Sh MIB Variables
The
.Nm
driver exposes the following variables in the
.Va hw.usb.ohci
branch of the
.Xr sysctl 3
MIB:
.Bl -tag -width ".Va debug"
.It Va debug
Debug output level, where 0 is debugging disabled and larger values increase
debug message verbosity.
Default is 0.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ehci 4 ,
.Xr uhci 4 ,

View File

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd April 26, 2017
.Dd August 3, 2017
.Dt UCOM 4
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -63,6 +63,21 @@ This means that normal programs such as
or
.Xr ppp 8
can be used to access the device.
.Sh MIB Variables
The
.Nm
driver exposes the following variables in the
.Va hw.usb.ucom
branch of the
.Xr sysctl 3
MIB:
.Bl -tag -width ".Va pps_mode"
.It Va debug
Debug output level, where 0 is debugging disabled and larger values increase
debug message verbosity.
Default is 0.
.It Va pps_mode
Enables and configure PPS capture mode as described below.
.Sh Pulse Per Second (PPS) Timing Interface
The
.Nm

View File

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd May 16, 2014
.Dd August 3, 2017
.Dt UGEN 4
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -291,6 +291,19 @@ and
.Va alt_index
should be set to
.Dv USB_CURRENT_ALT_INDEX .
.Sh MIB Variables
The
.Nm
driver exposes the following variables in the
.Va hw.usb.ugen
branch of the
.Xr sysctl 3
MIB:
.Bl -tag -width ".Va debug"
.It Va debug
Debug output level, where 0 is debugging disabled and larger values increase
debug message verbosity.
Default is 0.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width ".Pa /dev/ugen Ns Ar N Ns Pa \&. Ns Ar E" -compact
.It Pa /dev/ugen Ns Ar N Ns Pa \&. Ns Ar E

View File

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd April 20, 2005
.Dd August 3, 2017
.Dt UHCI 4
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -49,6 +49,19 @@ Intel 82371SB (PIIX3)
.It
VIA 83C572
.El
.Sh MIB Variables
The
.Nm
driver exposes the following variables in the
.Va hw.usb.uhci
branch of the
.Xr sysctl 3
MIB:
.Bl -tag -width ".Va debug"
.It Va debug
Debug output level, where 0 is debugging disabled and larger values increase
debug message verbosity.
Default is 0.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ehci 4 ,
.Xr ohci 4 ,

View File

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd November 22, 2006
.Dd August 3, 2017
.Dt UHID 4
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -127,6 +127,19 @@ Use
to send data to the device.
Data should be written in chunks of the
size prescribed by the report descriptor.
.Sh MIB Variables
The
.Nm
driver exposes the following variables in the
.Va hw.usb.uhid
branch of the
.Xr sysctl 3
MIB:
.Bl -tag -width ".Va debug"
.It Va debug
Debug output level, where 0 is debugging disabled and larger values increase
debug message verbosity.
Default is 0.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width ".Pa /dev/uhid?"
.It Pa /dev/uhid?

View File

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd November 22, 2006
.Dd August 3, 2017
.Dt UKBD 4
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -136,6 +136,19 @@ or
Do not allow the user to change the keymap.
Note that these options also affect the AT keyboard driver,
.Xr atkbd 4 .
.Sh MIB Variables
The
.Nm
driver exposes the following variables in the
.Va hw.usb.ukbd
branch of the
.Xr sysctl 3
MIB:
.Bl -tag -width ".Va debug"
.It Va debug
Debug output level, where 0 is debugging disabled and larger values increase
debug message verbosity.
Default is 0.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width ".Pa /dev/kbd*" -compact
.It Pa /dev/kbd*

View File

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd November 27, 2006
.Dd August 3, 2017
.Dt UMS 4
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -64,6 +64,19 @@ type device.
See
.Xr moused 8
for an explanation of these mouse types.
.Sh MIB Variables
The
.Nm
driver exposes the following variables in the
.Va hw.usb.ums
branch of the
.Xr sysctl 3
MIB:
.Bl -tag -width ".Va debug"
.It Va debug
Debug output level, where 0 is debugging disabled and larger values increase
debug message verbosity.
Default is 0.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width /dev/ums0 -compact
.It Pa /dev/ums0

View File

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd April 26, 2017
.Dd August 3, 2017
.Dt UPLCOM 4
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -180,6 +180,19 @@ YC-Cable USB-Serial Adapter
.It
Zeagle N2iTion3 Diving Computer
.El
.Sh MIB Variables
The
.Nm
driver exposes the following variables in the
.Va hw.usb.uplcom
branch of the
.Xr sysctl 3
MIB:
.Bl -tag -width ".Va debug"
.It Va debug
Debug output level, where 0 is debugging disabled and larger values increase
debug message verbosity.
Default is 0.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width "/dev/ttyU*.init" -compact
.It Pa /dev/ttyU*

View File

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd April 29, 2017
.Dd August 3, 2017
.Dt USB 4
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ Any interface specific driver can attach to the device.
.It
If none is found, generic interface class drivers can attach.
.El
.Sh MIB Variables
The
.Nm
driver exposes the following variables in the
.Va hw.usb
branch of the
.Xr sysctl 3
MIB:
.Bl -tag -width ".Va debug"
.It Va debug
Debug output level, where 0 is debugging disabled and larger values increase
debug message verbosity.
Default is 0.
.Sh SEE ALSO
The
.Tn USB

View File

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd May 17, 2011
.Dd August 3, 2017
.Dt XHCI 4
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -56,6 +56,19 @@ driver supports
.Tn XHCI
compatible controllers having PCI class 12 (serial bus),
subclass 3 (USB) and programming interface 48 (XHCI).
.Sh MIB Variables
The
.Nm
driver exposes the following variables in the
.Va hw.usb.xhci
branch of the
.Xr sysctl 3
MIB:
.Bl -tag -width ".Va debug"
.It Va debug
Debug output level, where 0 is debugging disabled and larger values increase
debug message verbosity.
Default is 0.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ehci 4 ,
.Xr ohci 4 ,

View File

@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ breakpoint(void)
__asm __volatile("int $3");
}
static __inline u_int
static __inline __pure2 u_int
bsfl(u_int mask)
{
u_int result;
@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ bsfl(u_int mask)
return (result);
}
static __inline u_long
static __inline __pure2 u_long
bsfq(u_long mask)
{
u_long result;
@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ bsfq(u_long mask)
return (result);
}
static __inline u_int
static __inline __pure2 u_int
bsrl(u_int mask)
{
u_int result;
@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ bsrl(u_int mask)
return (result);
}
static __inline u_long
static __inline __pure2 u_long
bsrq(u_long mask)
{
u_long result;
@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ enable_intr(void)
#define HAVE_INLINE_FFSL
static __inline int
static __inline __pure2 int
ffsl(long mask)
{
return (mask == 0 ? mask : (int)bsfq((u_long)mask) + 1);
@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ ffsl(long mask)
#define HAVE_INLINE_FFSLL
static __inline int
static __inline __pure2 int
ffsll(long long mask)
{
return (ffsl((long)mask));
@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ ffsll(long long mask)
#define HAVE_INLINE_FLS
static __inline int
static __inline __pure2 int
fls(int mask)
{
return (mask == 0 ? mask : (int)bsrl((u_int)mask) + 1);
@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ fls(int mask)
#define HAVE_INLINE_FLSL
static __inline int
static __inline __pure2 int
flsl(long mask)
{
return (mask == 0 ? mask : (int)bsrq((u_long)mask) + 1);
@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ flsl(long mask)
#define HAVE_INLINE_FLSLL
static __inline int
static __inline __pure2 int
flsll(long long mask)
{
return (flsl((long)mask));

View File

@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/rman.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <dev/iicbus/iicbus.h>
#include <dev/iicbus/iiconf.h>
#include <dev/gpio/gpiobusvar.h>
@ -59,7 +58,6 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <arm/allwinner/axp209reg.h>
#include "iicbus_if.h"
#include "gpio_if.h"
#include "regdev_if.h"
@ -602,7 +600,6 @@ enum AXP2XX_TYPE {
struct axp2xx_softc {
device_t dev;
uint32_t addr;
struct resource * res[1];
void * intrcookie;
struct intr_config_hook intr_hook;
@ -641,57 +638,15 @@ static struct resource_spec axp_res_spec[] = {
static int
axp2xx_read(device_t dev, uint8_t reg, uint8_t *data, uint8_t size)
{
struct axp2xx_softc *sc = device_get_softc(dev);
struct iic_msg msg[2];
msg[0].slave = sc->addr;
msg[0].flags = IIC_M_WR;
msg[0].len = 1;
msg[0].buf = &reg;
msg[1].slave = sc->addr;
msg[1].flags = IIC_M_RD;
msg[1].len = size;
msg[1].buf = data;
return (iicbus_transfer(dev, msg, 2));
return (iicdev_readfrom(dev, reg, data, size, IIC_INTRWAIT));
}
static int
axp2xx_write(device_t dev, uint8_t reg, uint8_t data)
{
uint8_t buffer[2];
struct axp2xx_softc *sc = device_get_softc(dev);
struct iic_msg msg[2];
int nmsgs = 0;
if (sc->type == AXP209) {
buffer[0] = reg;
buffer[1] = data;
msg[0].slave = sc->addr;
msg[0].flags = IIC_M_WR;
msg[0].len = 2;
msg[0].buf = buffer;
nmsgs = 1;
}
else if (sc->type == AXP221) {
msg[0].slave = sc->addr;
msg[0].flags = IIC_M_WR;
msg[0].len = 1;
msg[0].buf = &reg;
msg[1].slave = sc->addr;
msg[1].flags = IIC_M_WR;
msg[1].len = 1;
msg[1].buf = &data;
nmsgs = 2;
}
else
return (EINVAL);
return (iicbus_transfer(dev, msg, nmsgs));
return (iicdev_writeto(dev, reg, &data, sizeof(data), IIC_INTRWAIT));
}
static int
@ -1239,7 +1194,6 @@ axp2xx_start(void *pdev)
dev = pdev;
sc = device_get_softc(dev);
sc->addr = iicbus_get_addr(dev);
sc->dev = dev;
if (bootverbose) {
@ -1451,4 +1405,4 @@ EARLY_DRIVER_MODULE(ofw_gpiobus, axp2xx_pmu, ofw_gpiobus_driver,
DRIVER_MODULE(gpioc, axp2xx_pmu, gpioc_driver, gpioc_devclass,
0, 0);
MODULE_VERSION(axp2xx, 1);
MODULE_DEPEND(axp2xx, iicbus, 1, 1, 1);
MODULE_DEPEND(axp2xx, iicbus, IICBUS_MINVER, IICBUS_PREFVER, IICBUS_MAXVER);

View File

@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
#
# GENERIC-NODEBUG -- WITNESS and INVARIANTS free kernel configuration file
# for FreeBSD/arm
#
# This configuration file removes several debugging options, including
# WITNESS and INVARIANTS checking, which are known to have significant
# performance impact on running systems. When benchmarking new features
# this kernel should be used instead of the standard GENERIC.
# This kernel configuration should never appear outside of the HEAD
# of the FreeBSD tree.
#
# For more information on this file, please read the config(5) manual page,
# and/or the handbook section on Kernel Configuration Files:
#
# http://www.FreeBSD.org/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/kernelconfig-config.html
#
# The handbook is also available locally in /usr/share/doc/handbook
# if you've installed the doc distribution, otherwise always see the
# FreeBSD World Wide Web server (http://www.FreeBSD.org/) for the
# latest information.
#
# An exhaustive list of options and more detailed explanations of the
# device lines is also present in the ../../conf/NOTES and NOTES files.
# If you are in doubt as to the purpose or necessity of a line, check first
# in NOTES.
#
# $FreeBSD$
include GENERIC
ident GENERIC-NODEBUG
nooptions INVARIANTS
nooptions INVARIANT_SUPPORT
nooptions WITNESS
nooptions WITNESS_SKIPSPIN
nooptions BUF_TRACKING
nooptions DEADLKRES
nooptions FULL_BUF_TRACKING

View File

@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "gic_v3_reg.h"
#include "gic_v3_var.h"
static bus_get_domain_t gic_v3_get_domain;
static bus_read_ivar_t gic_v3_read_ivar;
static pic_disable_intr_t gic_v3_disable_intr;
@ -97,6 +98,7 @@ static device_method_t gic_v3_methods[] = {
DEVMETHOD(device_detach, gic_v3_detach),
/* Bus interface */
DEVMETHOD(bus_get_domain, gic_v3_get_domain),
DEVMETHOD(bus_read_ivar, gic_v3_read_ivar),
/* Interrupt controller interface */
@ -350,6 +352,19 @@ gic_v3_detach(device_t dev)
return (0);
}
static int
gic_v3_get_domain(device_t dev, device_t child, int *domain)
{
struct gic_v3_devinfo *di;
di = device_get_ivars(child);
if (di->gic_domain < 0)
return (ENOENT);
*domain = di->gic_domain;
return (0);
}
static int
gic_v3_read_ivar(device_t dev, device_t child, int which, uintptr_t *result)
{

View File

@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ gic_v3_fdt_attach(device_t dev)
/* OFW bus interface */
struct gic_v3_ofw_devinfo {
struct gic_v3_devinfo di_gic_dinfo;
struct ofw_bus_devinfo di_dinfo;
struct resource_list di_rl;
};
@ -281,6 +282,14 @@ gic_v3_ofw_bus_attach(device_t dev)
for (node = OF_child(parent); node > 0; node = OF_peer(node)) {
/* Allocate and populate devinfo. */
di = malloc(sizeof(*di), M_GIC_V3, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
/* Read the numa node, or -1 if there is none */
if (OF_getencprop(node, "numa-node-id",
&di->di_gic_dinfo.gic_domain,
sizeof(di->di_gic_dinfo.gic_domain)) <= 0) {
di->di_gic_dinfo.gic_domain = -1;
}
if (ofw_bus_gen_setup_devinfo(&di->di_dinfo, node)) {
if (bootverbose) {
device_printf(dev,

View File

@ -82,6 +82,11 @@ struct gic_v3_softc {
struct gic_v3_irqsrc *gic_irqs;
};
struct gic_v3_devinfo {
int gic_domain;
};
#define GIC_INTR_ISRC(sc, irq) (&sc->gic_irqs[irq].gi_isrc)
MALLOC_DECLARE(M_GIC_V3);

View File

@ -576,6 +576,12 @@ its_init_cpu(device_t dev, struct gicv3_its_softc *sc)
uint64_t xbaser, tmp;
uint32_t ctlr;
u_int cpuid;
int domain;
if (bus_get_domain(dev, &domain) == 0) {
if (PCPU_GET(domain) != domain)
return (0);
}
gicv3 = device_get_parent(dev);
cpuid = PCPU_GET(cpuid);

View File

@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#ifdef FDT
#include <dev/ofw/openfirm.h>
#include <dev/ofw/ofw_bus.h>
#include <dev/ofw/ofw_cpu.h>
#endif
@ -197,6 +198,10 @@ arm64_cpu_attach(device_t dev)
/* Set the device to start it later */
cpu_list[cpuid] = dev;
/* Try to read the numa node of this cpu */
OF_getencprop(ofw_bus_get_node(dev), "numa-node-id",
&__pcpu[cpuid].pc_domain, sizeof(__pcpu[cpuid].pc_domain));
return (0);
}

View File

@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2017 Eric McCorkle
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $FreeBSD$
*/
#ifndef _EFI_DRIVER_UTILS_H_
#define _EFI_DRIVER_UTILS_H_
#include <efi.h>
#include <efiprot.h>
extern EFI_STATUS install_driver(EFI_DRIVER_BINDING *driver);
extern EFI_STATUS connect_controllers(EFI_GUID *filter);
#endif

View File

@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2016 Eric McCorkle
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $FreeBSD$
*/
#ifndef _EFI_DRIVERS_H_
#define _EFI_DRIVERS_H_
#include <bootstrap.h>
typedef struct efi_driver_t {
const char *name;
void (*init)(void);
} efi_driver_t;
extern struct devsw efipart_dev;
extern int efipart_getdesc(struct devdesc *dev, char **out);
/* EFI drivers. */
extern const efi_driver_t fs_driver;
#endif

View File

@ -64,6 +64,11 @@ pdinfo_list_t *efiblk_get_pdinfo_list(struct devsw *dev);
void *efi_get_table(EFI_GUID *tbl);
int efi_getdev(void **vdev, const char *devspec, const char **path);
char *efi_fmtdev(void *vdev);
int efi_setcurrdev(struct env_var *ev, int flags, const void *value);
int efi_register_handles(struct devsw *, EFI_HANDLE *, EFI_HANDLE *, int);
EFI_HANDLE efi_find_handle(struct devsw *, int);
int efi_handle_lookup(EFI_HANDLE, struct devsw **, int *, uint64_t *);
@ -79,6 +84,7 @@ CHAR16 *efi_devpath_name(EFI_DEVICE_PATH *);
void efi_free_devpath_name(CHAR16 *);
int efi_status_to_errno(EFI_STATUS);
EFI_STATUS errno_to_efi_status(int errno);
void efi_time_init(void);
void efi_time_fini(void);

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