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MFC: (1.26) reject usernames that are longer than OPIE can handle.

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Approved by:	re (kensmith)
This commit is contained in:
des 2006-09-30 11:07:10 +00:00
parent 978437c538
commit 97272cbdd9
1 changed files with 13 additions and 4 deletions
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17
lib/libpam/modules/pam_opie/pam_opie.c
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@ -63,7 +63,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused,
int retval, i;
const char *(promptstr[]) = { "%s\nPassword: ", "%s\nPassword [echo on]: "};
char challenge[OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX];
char *user;
char principal[OPIE_PRINCIPAL_MAX];
const char *user;
char *response;
int style;
@ -74,13 +75,22 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused,
user = pwd->pw_name;
}
else {
retval = pam_get_user(pamh, (const char **)&user, NULL);
retval = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL);
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (retval);
}
PAM_LOG("Got user: %s", user);
/*
* Watch out: libopie feels entitled to truncate the user name
* passed to it if it's longer than OPIE_PRINCIPAL_MAX, which is
* not uncommon in Windows environments.
*/
if (strlen(user) >= sizeof(principal))
return (PAM_AUTH_ERR);
strlcpy(principal, user, sizeof(principal));
/*
* Don't call the OPIE atexit() handler when our program exits,
* since the module has been unloaded and we will SEGV.
@ -92,8 +102,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused,
* doesn't have an OPIE key, just fail rather than present the
* user with a bogus OPIE challenge.
*/
/* XXX generates a const warning because of incorrect prototype */
if (opiechallenge(&opie, (char *)user, challenge) != 0 &&
if (opiechallenge(&opie, principal, challenge) != 0 &&
openpam_get_option(pamh, PAM_OPT_NO_FAKE_PROMPTS))
return (PAM_AUTH_ERR);