Resolve conflicts.

crypto/openssh/LICENCE

@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
      * <http://www.core-sdi.com>
 
 3)
-    ssh-keygen was contributed by David Mazieres under a BSD-style
+    ssh-keyscan was contributed by David Mazieres under a BSD-style
     license.
 
      * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
@@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
 	Wayne Schroeder
 	William Jones
 	Darren Tucker
+	Sun Microsystems
 
      * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
      * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -329,4 +330,4 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
 
 
 ------
-$OpenBSD: LICENCE,v 1.18 2003/11/21 11:57:02 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: LICENCE,v 1.19 2004/08/30 09:18:08 markus Exp $

crypto/openssh/acconfig.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: acconfig.h,v 1.180 2004/08/16 13:12:06 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: acconfig.h,v 1.181 2005/02/25 23:07:38 dtucker Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 
 /*
@@ -53,9 +53,6 @@
 #undef SPT_TYPE
 #undef SPT_PADCHAR
 
-/* setgroups() NOOP allowed */
-#undef SETGROUPS_NOOP
-
 /* SCO workaround */
 #undef BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H
 

crypto/openssh/auth-chall.c

@@ -29,11 +29,13 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
 
 /* limited protocol v1 interface to kbd-interactive authentication */
 
 extern KbdintDevice *devices[];
 static KbdintDevice *device;
+extern ServerOptions options;
 
 char *
 get_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt)
@@ -42,6 +44,11 @@ get_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	u_int i, numprompts;
 	u_int *echo_on;
 
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		remove_kbdint_device("pam");
+#endif
+
 	device = devices[0]; /* we always use the 1st device for protocol 1 */
 	if (device == NULL)
 		return NULL;

crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c

@@ -188,6 +188,11 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
 	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
 
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam)
+		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+#endif
+
  out:
 	restore_uid();
 

crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
 
 /* Based on $xFreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des Exp $ */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id: auth-pam.c,v 1.114 2004/08/16 13:12:06 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: auth-pam.c,v 1.122 2005/05/25 06:18:10 dtucker Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -77,7 +77,17 @@ extern Buffer loginmsg;
 extern int compat20;
 extern u_int utmp_len;
 
+/* so we don't silently change behaviour */
 #ifdef USE_POSIX_THREADS
+# error "USE_POSIX_THREADS replaced by UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Formerly known as USE_POSIX_THREADS, using this is completely unsupported
+ * and generally a bad idea.  Use at own risk and do not expect support if
+ * this breaks.
+ */
+#ifdef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
 #include <pthread.h>
 /*
  * Avoid namespace clash when *not* using pthreads for systems *with*
@@ -99,7 +109,7 @@ struct pam_ctxt {
 static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
 static struct pam_ctxt *cleanup_ctxt;
 
-#ifndef USE_POSIX_THREADS
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
 /*
  * Simulate threads with processes.
  */
@@ -187,6 +197,7 @@ static int sshpam_account_status = -1;
 static char **sshpam_env = NULL;
 static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL;
 static const char *sshpam_password = NULL;
+static char badpw[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
 
 /* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
 #ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
@@ -255,7 +266,7 @@ import_environments(Buffer *b)
 
 	debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
 
-#ifndef USE_POSIX_THREADS
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
 	/* Import variables set by do_pam_account */
 	sshpam_account_status = buffer_get_int(b);
 	sshpam_password_change_required(buffer_get_int(b));
@@ -384,7 +395,7 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
 	struct pam_conv sshpam_conv;
 	int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
 	    PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
-#ifndef USE_POSIX_THREADS
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
 	extern char **environ;
 	char **env_from_pam;
 	u_int i;
@@ -428,7 +439,7 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
 
 	buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, "OK");
 
-#ifndef USE_POSIX_THREADS
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
 	/* Export variables set by do_pam_account */
 	buffer_put_int(&buffer, sshpam_account_status);
 	buffer_put_int(&buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange);
@@ -447,7 +458,7 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
 	buffer_put_int(&buffer, i);
 	for(i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++)
 		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, env_from_pam[i]);
-#endif /* USE_POSIX_THREADS */
+#endif /* UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK */
 
 	/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
 	ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, &buffer);
@@ -491,6 +502,51 @@ sshpam_null_conv(int n, struct pam_message **msg,
 
 static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL };
 
+static int
+sshpam_store_conv(int n, struct pam_message **msg,
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+	struct pam_response *reply;
+	int i;
+	size_t len;
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
+	*resp = NULL;
+
+	if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+	if ((reply = malloc(n * sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+	memset(reply, 0, n * sizeof(*reply));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+		switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+			len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+			buffer_append(&loginmsg, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), len);
+			buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\n", 1 );
+			reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+	*resp = reply;
+	return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+
+ fail:
+	for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		if (reply[i].resp != NULL)
+			xfree(reply[i].resp);
+	}
+	xfree(reply);
+	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv store_conv = { sshpam_store_conv, NULL };
+
 void
 sshpam_cleanup(void)
 {
@@ -528,7 +584,7 @@ sshpam_init(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	}
 	debug("PAM: initializing for \"%s\"", user);
 	sshpam_err =
-	    pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &null_conv, &sshpam_handle);
+	    pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &store_conv, &sshpam_handle);
 	sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
 
 	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
@@ -610,7 +666,7 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
 	size_t plen;
 	u_char type;
 	char *msg;
-	size_t len;
+	size_t len, mlen;
 
 	debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
 	buffer_init(&buffer);
@@ -623,22 +679,27 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
 	while (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_psock, &buffer) == 0) {
 		type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
 		msg = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
+		mlen = strlen(msg);
 		switch (type) {
 		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
 		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
 			*num = 1;
-			len = plen + strlen(msg) + 1;
+			len = plen + mlen + 1;
 			**prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, len);
-			plen += snprintf(**prompts + plen, len, "%s", msg);
+			strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
+			plen += mlen;
 			**echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON);
 			xfree(msg);
 			return (0);
 		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
 		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
 			/* accumulate messages */
-			len = plen + strlen(msg) + 2;
+			len = plen + mlen + 2;
 			**prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, len);
-			plen += snprintf(**prompts + plen, len, "%s\n", msg);
+			strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
+			plen += mlen;
+			strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen);
+			plen++;
 			xfree(msg);
 			break;
 		case PAM_SUCCESS:
@@ -652,6 +713,12 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
 				**prompts = NULL;
 			}
 			if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+				if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid ||
+				    (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+				    options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
+					fatal("Internal error: PAM auth "
+					    "succeeded when it should have "
+					    "failed");
 				import_environments(&buffer);
 				*num = 0;
 				**echo_on = 0;
@@ -697,7 +764,12 @@ sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	buffer_init(&buffer);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp);
+	if (sshpam_authctxt->valid &&
+	    (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
+	     options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES))
+		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp);
+	else
+		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, badpw);
 	if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, &buffer) == -1) {
 		buffer_free(&buffer);
 		return (-1);
@@ -760,11 +832,13 @@ finish_pam(void)
 u_int
 do_pam_account(void)
 {
+	debug("%s: called", __func__);
 	if (sshpam_account_status != -1)
 		return (sshpam_account_status);
 
 	sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0);
-	debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d", __func__, sshpam_err);
+	debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err,
+	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
 	
 	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
 		sshpam_account_status = 0;
@@ -794,7 +868,7 @@ void
 do_pam_setcred(int init)
 {
 	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
-	    (const void *)&null_conv);
+	    (const void *)&store_conv);
 	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
 		fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
 		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
@@ -895,51 +969,6 @@ do_pam_chauthtok(void)
 		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
 }
 
-static int
-sshpam_store_conv(int n, struct pam_message **msg,
-    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
-{
-	struct pam_response *reply;
-	int i;
-	size_t len;
-
-	debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
-	*resp = NULL;
-
-	if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
-		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-
-	if ((reply = malloc(n * sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
-		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-	memset(reply, 0, n * sizeof(*reply));
-
-	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
-		switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
-		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
-		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
-			len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
-			buffer_append(&loginmsg, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), len);
-			buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\n", 1 );
-			reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
-			break;
-		default:
-			goto fail;
-		}
-	}
-	*resp = reply;
-	return (PAM_SUCCESS);
-
- fail:
-	for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
-		if (reply[i].resp != NULL)
-			xfree(reply[i].resp);
-	}
-	xfree(reply);
-	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-}
-
-static struct pam_conv store_conv = { sshpam_store_conv, NULL };
-
 void
 do_pam_session(void)
 {
@@ -950,10 +979,21 @@ do_pam_session(void)
 		fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
 		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
 	sshpam_err = pam_open_session(sshpam_handle, 0);
-	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS)
-		fatal("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s",
+		sshpam_session_open = 1;
+	else {
+		sshpam_session_open = 0;
+		disable_forwarding();
+		error("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s",
 		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
-	sshpam_session_open = 1;
+	}
+
+}
+
+int
+is_pam_session_open(void)
+{
+	return sshpam_session_open;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1076,7 +1116,6 @@ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 {
 	int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
 	    PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
-	static char badpw[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
 
 	if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL)
 		fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to "

crypto/openssh/auth-pam.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: auth-pam.h,v 1.26 2004/05/30 10:43:59 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: auth-pam.h,v 1.27 2004/09/11 12:17:26 dtucker Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 
 /*
@@ -46,5 +46,6 @@ void free_pam_environment(char **);
 void sshpam_thread_cleanup(void);
 void sshpam_cleanup(void);
 int sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+int is_pam_session_open(void);
 
 #endif /* USE_PAM */

crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c

@@ -36,17 +36,26 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.31 2004/01/30 09:48:57 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.33 2005/01/24 11:47:13 dtucker Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
 
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
 extern ServerOptions options;
-int sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+extern login_cap_t *lc;
+#endif
+
+
+#define DAY		(24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
+#define TWO_WEEKS	(2L * 7 * DAY)	/* 2 weeks in seconds */
 
 void
 disable_forwarding(void)
@@ -64,7 +73,7 @@ int
 auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 {
 	struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw;
-	int ok = authctxt->valid;
+	int result, ok = authctxt->valid;
 #if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
 	static int expire_checked = 0;
 #endif
@@ -101,22 +110,57 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 #if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
 	if (!expire_checked) {
 		expire_checked = 1;
-		if (auth_shadow_pwexpired(authctxt)) {
+		if (auth_shadow_pwexpired(authctxt))
-			disable_forwarding();
 			authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
-		}
 	}
 #endif
-		
+	result = sys_auth_passwd(authctxt, password);
-	return (sys_auth_passwd(authctxt, password) && ok);
+	if (authctxt->force_pwchange)
+		disable_forwarding();
+	return (result && ok);
 }
 
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+static void
+warn_expiry(Authctxt *authctxt, auth_session_t *as)
+{
+	char buf[256];
+	quad_t pwtimeleft, actimeleft, daysleft, pwwarntime, acwarntime;
+
+	pwwarntime = acwarntime = TWO_WEEKS;
+
+	pwtimeleft = auth_check_change(as);
+	actimeleft = auth_check_expire(as);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	if (authctxt->valid) {
+		pwwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "password-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
+		    TWO_WEEKS);
+		acwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "expire-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
+		    TWO_WEEKS);
+	}
+#endif
+	if (pwtimeleft != 0 && pwtimeleft < pwwarntime) {
+		daysleft = pwtimeleft / DAY + 1;
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+		    "Your password will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
+		    daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
+		buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
+	}
+	if (actimeleft != 0 && actimeleft < acwarntime) {
+		daysleft = actimeleft / DAY + 1;
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+		    "Your account will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
+		    daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
+		buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
+	}
+}
+
 int
 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 {
 	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
 	auth_session_t *as;
+	static int expire_checked = 0;
 
 	as = auth_usercheck(pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh",
 	    (char *)password);
@@ -126,6 +170,10 @@ sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 		authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
 		return (1);
 	} else {
+		if (!expire_checked) {
+			expire_checked = 1;
+			warn_expiry(authctxt, as);
+		}
 		return (auth_close(as));
 	}
 }

crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.60 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.62 2004/12/11 01:48:56 dtucker Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.60 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
 #include "hostfile.h"
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
+#include "misc.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ extern u_char session_id[16];
  *   options bits e n comment
  * where bits, e and n are decimal numbers,
  * and comment is any string of characters up to newline.  The maximum
- * length of a line is 8000 characters.  See the documentation for a
+ * length of a line is SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES characters.  See sshd(8) for a
  * description of the options.
  */
 
@@ -152,7 +153,7 @@ auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key)
 int
 auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
 {
-	char line[8192], *file;
+	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *file;
 	int allowed = 0;
 	u_int bits;
 	FILE *f;
@@ -201,12 +202,10 @@ auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
 	 * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
 	 * user really has the corresponding private key.
 	 */
-	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
 		char *cp;
 		char *key_options;
 
-		linenum++;
-
 		/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
 		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
 			;

crypto/openssh/auth.c

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.56 2004/07/28 09:40:29 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.58 2005/03/14 11:44:42 dtucker Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "bufaux.h"
 #include "packet.h"
+#include "loginrec.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -144,7 +146,8 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0) {
+	if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
+	    options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
 		hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
 		ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
 	}
@@ -154,8 +157,9 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
 			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
 			    options.deny_users[i])) {
-				logit("User %.100s not allowed because listed in DenyUsers",
+				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
-				    pw->pw_name);
+				    "because listed in DenyUsers",
+				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
 				return 0;
 			}
 	}
@@ -167,16 +171,16 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 				break;
 		/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
 		if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
-			logit("User %.100s not allowed because not listed in AllowUsers",
+			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
-			    pw->pw_name);
+			    "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
 			return 0;
 		}
 	}
 	if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
 		/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
 		if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
-			logit("User %.100s not allowed because not in any group",
+			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
-			    pw->pw_name);
+			    "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
 			return 0;
 		}
 
@@ -185,8 +189,9 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 			if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
 			    options.num_deny_groups)) {
 				ga_free();
-				logit("User %.100s not allowed because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
+				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
-				    pw->pw_name);
+				    "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
+				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
 				return 0;
 			}
 		/*
@@ -197,15 +202,16 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 			if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
 			    options.num_allow_groups)) {
 				ga_free();
-				logit("User %.100s not allowed because none of user's groups are listed in AllowGroups",
+				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
-				    pw->pw_name);
+				    "because none of user's groups are listed "
+				    "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
 				return 0;
 			}
 		ga_free();
 	}
 
 #ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
-	if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw))
+	if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg))
 		return 0;
 #endif
 
@@ -241,8 +247,50 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
 	    info);
 
 #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
-	if (authenticated == 0 && strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
+	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
-		record_failed_login(authctxt->user, "ssh");
+	    (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
+	    strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
+		record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
+		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) {
+		ssh_audit_event_t event;
+
+		debug3("audit failed auth attempt, method %s euid %d",
+		    method, (int)geteuid());
+		/*
+		 * Because the auth loop is used in both monitor and slave,
+		 * we must be careful to send each event only once and with
+		 * enough privs to write the event.
+		 */
+		event = audit_classify_auth(method);
+		switch(event) {
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
+			if (geteuid() == 0)
+				audit_event(event);
+			break;
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+			/*
+			 * This is required to handle the case where privsep
+			 * is enabled but it's root logging in, since
+			 * use_privsep won't be cleared until after a
+			 * successful login.
+			 */
+			if (geteuid() == 0)
+				audit_event(event);
+			else
+				PRIVSEP(audit_event(event));
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("unknown authentication audit event %d", event);
+		}
+	}
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -466,8 +514,12 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
 		logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
 		    user, get_remote_ipaddr());
 #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
-		record_failed_login(user, "ssh");
+		record_failed_login(user,
+		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
 #endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+		audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
 		return (NULL);
 	}
 	if (!allowed_user(pw))

crypto/openssh/auth.h

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 
 #include "key.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
@@ -69,6 +70,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
 	char		*krb5_ccname;
 #endif
+	Buffer		*loginmsg;
 	void		*methoddata;
 };
 /*
@@ -131,6 +133,9 @@ int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *);
 #endif
 
 #include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+void remove_kbdint_device(const char *);
+
 void disable_forwarding(void);
 
 void	do_authentication(Authctxt *);
@@ -138,6 +143,7 @@ void	do_authentication2(Authctxt *);
 
 void	auth_log(Authctxt *, int, char *, char *);
 void	userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, char *);
+void	userauth_send_banner(const char *);
 int	auth_root_allowed(char *);
 
 char	*auth2_read_banner(void);
@@ -182,6 +188,8 @@ void	 auth_debug_reset(void);
 
 struct passwd *fakepw(void);
 
+int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+
 #define AUTH_FAIL_MSG "Too many authentication failures for %.100s"
 
 #ifdef SKEY

crypto/openssh/auth1.c

@@ -26,9 +26,11 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "session.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
 
 /*
  * convert ssh auth msg type into description
@@ -246,14 +248,33 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 #else
 		/* Special handling for root */
 		if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-		    !auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type)))
+		    !auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type))) {
 			authenticated = 0;
+# ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
+# endif
+		}
 #endif
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 		if (options.use_pam && authenticated &&
-		    !PRIVSEP(do_pam_account()))
+		    !PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
-			authenticated = 0;
+			char *msg;
+			size_t len;
+
+			error("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
+			   "configuration", authctxt->user);
+			len = buffer_len(&loginmsg);
+			buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
+			msg = buffer_ptr(&loginmsg);
+			/* strip trailing newlines */
+			if (len > 0)
+				while (len > 0 && msg[--len] == '\n')
+					msg[len] = '\0';
+			else
+				msg = "Access denied.";
+			packet_disconnect(msg);
+		}
 #endif
 
 		/* Log before sending the reply */
@@ -267,8 +288,12 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		if (authenticated)
 			return;
 
-		if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries)
+		if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
+#endif
 			packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
+		}
 
 		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
 		packet_send();

crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.21 2004/06/01 14:20:45 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.22 2005/01/19 13:11:47 dtucker Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "ssh2.h"
@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "dispatch.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
 
 static int auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *);
 static int send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *);
@@ -72,6 +76,21 @@ struct KbdintAuthctxt
 	u_int nreq;
 };
 
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+void
+remove_kbdint_device(const char *devname)
+{
+	int i, j;
+
+	for (i = 0; devices[i] != NULL; i++)
+		if (strcmp(devices[i]->name, devname) == 0) {
+			for (j = i; devices[j] != NULL; j++)
+				devices[j] = devices[j+1];
+			i--;
+		}
+}
+#endif
+
 static KbdintAuthctxt *
 kbdint_alloc(const char *devs)
 {
@@ -79,6 +98,11 @@ kbdint_alloc(const char *devs)
 	Buffer b;
 	int i;
 
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		remove_kbdint_device("pam");
+#endif
+
 	kbdintctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(KbdintAuthctxt));
 	if (strcmp(devs, "") == 0) {
 		buffer_init(&b);
@@ -275,12 +299,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	}
 	packet_check_eom();
 
-	if (authctxt->valid) {
+	res = kbdintctxt->device->respond(kbdintctxt->ctxt, nresp, response);
-		res = kbdintctxt->device->respond(kbdintctxt->ctxt,
-		    nresp, response);
-	} else {
-		res = -1;
-	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) {
 		memset(response[i], 'r', strlen(response[i]));
@@ -292,7 +311,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	switch (res) {
 	case 0:
 		/* Success! */
-		authenticated = 1;
+		authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0;
 		break;
 	case 1:
 		/* Authentication needs further interaction */

crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	xfree(lang);
 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
 	if (check_nt_auth(0, authctxt->pw) == 0)
-		return(0);
+		authenticated = 0;
 #endif
 	return authenticated;
 }

crypto/openssh/auth2.c

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "dispatch.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
@@ -46,6 +47,7 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 extern ServerOptions options;
 extern u_char *session_id2;
 extern u_int session_id2_len;
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
 
 /* methods */
 
@@ -173,6 +175,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 			if (options.use_pam)
 				PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
 #endif
 		}
 		setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
@@ -242,12 +247,26 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 
 	/* Special handling for root */
 	if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-	    !auth_root_allowed(method))
+	    !auth_root_allowed(method)) {
 		authenticated = 0;
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+		PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
+#endif
+	}
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-	if (options.use_pam && authenticated && !PRIVSEP(do_pam_account()))
+	if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
-		authenticated = 0;
+		if (!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
+			/* if PAM returned a message, send it to the user */
+			if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) {
+				buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
+				userauth_send_banner(buffer_ptr(&loginmsg));
+				packet_write_wait();
+			}
+			fatal("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
+			   "configuration", authctxt->user);
+		}
+	}
 #endif
 
 #ifdef _UNICOS
@@ -273,8 +292,12 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 		/* now we can break out */
 		authctxt->success = 1;
 	} else {
-		if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries)
+		if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
+#endif
 			packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
+		}
 		methods = authmethods_get();
 		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
 		packet_put_cstring(methods);

crypto/openssh/authfile.c

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.57 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.60 2004/12/11 01:48:56 dtucker Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.57 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
 #include "log.h"
 #include "authfile.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
+#include "misc.h"
 
 /* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */
 static const char authfile_id_string[] =
@@ -243,8 +244,10 @@ key_load_public_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename, char **commentp)
 		    filename, strerror(errno));
 		return NULL;
 	}
-	if (st.st_size > 1*1024*1024)
+	if (st.st_size > 1*1024*1024) {
-		close(fd);
+		error("key file %.200s too large", filename);
+		return NULL;
+	}
 	len = (size_t)st.st_size;		/* truncated */
 
 	buffer_init(&buffer);
@@ -335,6 +338,7 @@ key_load_private_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
 		return NULL;
 	}
 	if (st.st_size > 1*1024*1024) {
+		error("key file %.200s too large", filename);
 		close(fd);
 		return (NULL);
 	}
@@ -598,13 +602,14 @@ static int
 key_try_load_public(Key *k, const char *filename, char **commentp)
 {
 	FILE *f;
-	char line[4096];
+	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
 	char *cp;
+	u_long linenum = 0;
 
 	f = fopen(filename, "r");
 	if (f != NULL) {
-		while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+		while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line),
-			line[sizeof(line)-1] = '\0';
+			    &linenum) != -1) {
 			cp = line;
 			switch (*cp) {
 			case '#':

crypto/openssh/bufaux.c

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.32 2004/02/23 15:12:46 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.35 2005/03/10 22:01:05 deraadt Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
  * Stores an BIGNUM in the buffer with a 2-byte msb first bit count, followed
  * by (bits+7)/8 bytes of binary data, msb first.
  */
-void
+int
-buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
 {
 	int bits = BN_num_bits(value);
 	int bin_size = (bits + 7) / 8;
@@ -61,9 +61,11 @@ buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
 
 	/* Get the value of in binary */
 	oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf);
-	if (oi != bin_size)
+	if (oi != bin_size) {
-		fatal("buffer_put_bignum: BN_bn2bin() failed: oi %d != bin_size %d",
+		error("buffer_put_bignum_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: oi %d != bin_size %d",
 		    oi, bin_size);
+		return (-1);
+	}
 
 	/* Store the number of bits in the buffer in two bytes, msb first. */
 	PUT_16BIT(msg, bits);
@@ -73,36 +75,63 @@ buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
 
 	memset(buf, 0, bin_size);
 	xfree(buf);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	if (buffer_put_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_put_bignum: buffer error");
 }
 
 /*
  * Retrieves an BIGNUM from the buffer.
  */
-void
+int
-buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
 {
 	u_int bits, bytes;
 	u_char buf[2], *bin;
 
 	/* Get the number for bits. */
-	buffer_get(buffer, (char *) buf, 2);
+	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 2) == -1) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: invalid length");
+		return (-1);
+	}
 	bits = GET_16BIT(buf);
 	/* Compute the number of binary bytes that follow. */
 	bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
-	if (bytes > 8 * 1024)
+	if (bytes > 8 * 1024) {
-		fatal("buffer_get_bignum: cannot handle BN of size %d", bytes);
+		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d", bytes);
-	if (buffer_len(buffer) < bytes)
+		return (-1);
-		fatal("buffer_get_bignum: input buffer too small");
+	}
+	if (buffer_len(buffer) < bytes) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: input buffer too small");
+		return (-1);
+	}
 	bin = buffer_ptr(buffer);
 	BN_bin2bn(bin, bytes, value);
-	buffer_consume(buffer, bytes);
+	if (buffer_consume_ret(buffer, bytes) == -1) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: buffer_consume failed");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	if (buffer_get_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_get_bignum: buffer error");
 }
 
 /*
  * Stores an BIGNUM in the buffer in SSH2 format.
  */
-void
+int
-buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
 {
 	u_int bytes;
 	u_char *buf;
@@ -111,69 +140,140 @@ buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
 
 	if (BN_is_zero(value)) {
 		buffer_put_int(buffer, 0);
-		return;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (value->neg) {
+		error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported");
+		return (-1);
 	}
-	if (value->neg)
-		fatal("buffer_put_bignum2: negative numbers not supported");
 	bytes = BN_num_bytes(value) + 1; /* extra padding byte */
-	if (bytes < 2)
+	if (bytes < 2) {
-		fatal("buffer_put_bignum2: BN too small");
+		error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN too small");
+		return (-1);
+	}
 	buf = xmalloc(bytes);
-	buf[0] = '\0';
+	buf[0] = 0x00;
 	/* Get the value of in binary */
 	oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf+1);
-	if (oi != bytes-1)
+	if (oi != bytes-1) {
-		fatal("buffer_put_bignum2: BN_bn2bin() failed: "
+		error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: "
 		    "oi %d != bin_size %d", oi, bytes);
+		xfree(buf);
+		return (-1);
+	}
 	hasnohigh = (buf[1] & 0x80) ? 0 : 1;
 	buffer_put_string(buffer, buf+hasnohigh, bytes-hasnohigh);
 	memset(buf, 0, bytes);
 	xfree(buf);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	if (buffer_put_bignum2_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_put_bignum2: buffer error");
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	u_int len;
+	u_char *bin;
+
+	if ((bin = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &len)) == NULL) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: invalid bignum");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	if (len > 0 && (bin[0] & 0x80)) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (len > 8 * 1024) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d", len);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	BN_bin2bn(bin, len, value);
+	xfree(bin);
+	return (0);
 }
 
 void
 buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
 {
-	u_int len;
+	if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
-	u_char *bin = buffer_get_string(buffer, &len);
+		fatal("buffer_get_bignum2: buffer error");
-
-	if (len > 0 && (bin[0] & 0x80))
-		fatal("buffer_get_bignum2: negative numbers not supported");
-	if (len > 8 * 1024)
-		fatal("buffer_get_bignum2: cannot handle BN of size %d", len);
-	BN_bin2bn(bin, len, value);
-	xfree(bin);
 }
 
 /*
  * Returns integers from the buffer (msb first).
  */
 
-u_short
+int
-buffer_get_short(Buffer *buffer)
+buffer_get_short_ret(u_short *ret, Buffer *buffer)
 {
 	u_char buf[2];
 
-	buffer_get(buffer, (char *) buf, 2);
+	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 2) == -1)
-	return GET_16BIT(buf);
+		return (-1);
+	*ret = GET_16BIT(buf);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+u_short
+buffer_get_short(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	u_short ret;
+
+	if (buffer_get_short_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_get_short: buffer error");
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_int_ret(u_int *ret, Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	u_char buf[4];
+
+	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 4) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	*ret = GET_32BIT(buf);
+	return (0);
 }
 
 u_int
 buffer_get_int(Buffer *buffer)
 {
-	u_char buf[4];
+	u_int ret;
 
-	buffer_get(buffer, (char *) buf, 4);
+	if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1)
-	return GET_32BIT(buf);
+		fatal("buffer_get_int: buffer error");
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_int64_ret(u_int64_t *ret, Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	u_char buf[8];
+
+	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 8) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	*ret = GET_64BIT(buf);
+	return (0);
 }
 
 u_int64_t
 buffer_get_int64(Buffer *buffer)
 {
-	u_char buf[8];
+	u_int64_t ret;
 
-	buffer_get(buffer, (char *) buf, 8);
+	if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1)
-	return GET_64BIT(buf);
+		fatal("buffer_get_int: buffer error");
+
+	return (ret);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -215,25 +315,41 @@ buffer_put_int64(Buffer *buffer, u_int64_t value)
  * to the returned string, and is not counted in length.
  */
 void *
-buffer_get_string(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
+buffer_get_string_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
 {
 	u_char *value;
 	u_int len;
 
 	/* Get the length. */
 	len = buffer_get_int(buffer);
-	if (len > 256 * 1024)
+	if (len > 256 * 1024) {
-		fatal("buffer_get_string: bad string length %u", len);
+		error("buffer_get_string_ret: bad string length %u", len);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
 	/* Allocate space for the string.  Add one byte for a null character. */
 	value = xmalloc(len + 1);
 	/* Get the string. */
-	buffer_get(buffer, value, len);
+	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, value, len) == -1) {
+		error("buffer_get_string_ret: buffer_get failed");
+		xfree(value);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
 	/* Append a null character to make processing easier. */
 	value[len] = 0;
 	/* Optionally return the length of the string. */
 	if (length_ptr)
 		*length_ptr = len;
-	return value;
+	return (value);
+}
+
+void *
+buffer_get_string(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+	void *ret;
+
+	if ((ret = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, length_ptr)) == NULL)
+		fatal("buffer_get_string: buffer error");
+	return (ret);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -256,12 +372,23 @@ buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *buffer, const char *s)
 /*
  * Returns a character from the buffer (0 - 255).
  */
+int
+buffer_get_char_ret(char *ret, Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, ret, 1) == -1) {
+		error("buffer_get_char_ret: buffer_get_ret failed");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
 int
 buffer_get_char(Buffer *buffer)
 {
 	char ch;
 
-	buffer_get(buffer, &ch, 1);
+	if (buffer_get_char_ret(&ch, buffer) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_get_char: buffer error");
 	return (u_char) ch;
 }
 

crypto/openssh/canohost.c

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.41 2004/07/21 11:51:29 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.42 2005/02/18 03:05:53 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.41 2004/07/21 11:51:29 djm Exp $");
 #include "canohost.h"
 
 static void check_ip_options(int, char *);
-static void ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *, socklen_t *);
 
 /*
  * Return the canonical name of the host at the other end of the socket. The
@@ -166,7 +165,7 @@ check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr)
 #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
 }
 
-static void
+void
 ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
 {
 	struct sockaddr_in6 *a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr;
@@ -232,6 +231,7 @@ get_socket_address(int sock, int remote, int flags)
 	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
 	socklen_t addrlen;
 	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
+	int r;
 
 	/* Get IP address of client. */
 	addrlen = sizeof(addr);
@@ -251,10 +251,13 @@ get_socket_address(int sock, int remote, int flags)
 	if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET6)
 		addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
 
+	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&addr, &addrlen);
+
 	/* Get the address in ascii. */
-	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
+	if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop,
-	    NULL, 0, flags) != 0) {
+	    sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, flags)) != 0) {
-		error("get_socket_address: getnameinfo %d failed", flags);
+		error("get_socket_address: getnameinfo %d failed: %s", flags,
+		    r == EAI_SYSTEM ? strerror(errno) : gai_strerror(r));
 		return NULL;
 	}
 	return xstrdup(ntop);
@@ -330,6 +333,7 @@ get_sock_port(int sock, int local)
 	struct sockaddr_storage from;
 	socklen_t fromlen;
 	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	int r;
 
 	/* Get IP address of client. */
 	fromlen = sizeof(from);
@@ -351,9 +355,10 @@ get_sock_port(int sock, int local)
 		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
 
 	/* Return port number. */
-	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, NULL, 0,
+	if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, NULL, 0,
-	    strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0)
+	    strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0)
-		fatal("get_sock_port: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICSERV failed");
+		fatal("get_sock_port: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICSERV failed: %s",
+		    r == EAI_SYSTEM ? strerror(errno) : gai_strerror(r));
 	return atoi(strport);
 }
 

crypto/openssh/channels.c

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.209 2004/08/11 21:43:04 avsm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.214 2005/03/14 11:46:56 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.209 2004/08/11 21:43:04 avsm Exp $");
 
 /* -- channel core */
 
+#define CHAN_RBUF	16*1024
+
 /*
  * Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels.  The array is
  * dynamically extended as needed.
@@ -712,6 +714,9 @@ channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 {
 	u_int limit = compat20 ? c->remote_window : packet_get_maxsize();
 
+	/* check buffer limits */
+	limit = MIN(limit, (BUFFER_MAX_LEN - BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK - CHAN_RBUF));
+
 	if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN &&
 	    limit > 0 &&
 	    buffer_len(&c->input) < limit)
@@ -1018,7 +1023,7 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 		debug2("channel %d: only socks5 connect supported", c->self);
 		return -1;
 	}
-	switch(s5_req.atyp){
+	switch (s5_req.atyp){
 	case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4:
 		addrlen = 4;
 		af = AF_INET;
@@ -1360,7 +1365,7 @@ channel_post_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 static int
 channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 {
-	char buf[16*1024];
+	char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
 	int len;
 
 	if (c->rfd != -1 &&
@@ -1454,7 +1459,7 @@ channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 static int
 channel_handle_efd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 {
-	char buf[16*1024];
+	char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
 	int len;
 
 /** XXX handle drain efd, too */
@@ -2179,14 +2184,14 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener(int type, const char *listen_addr, u_short listen_por
     const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int gateway_ports)
 {
 	Channel *c;
-	int success, sock, on = 1;
+	int sock, r, success = 0, on = 1, wildcard = 0, is_client;
 	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
-	const char *host;
+	const char *host, *addr;
 	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
 
-	success = 0;
 	host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ?
 	    listen_addr : host_to_connect;
+	is_client = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER);
 
 	if (host == NULL) {
 		error("No forward host name.");
@@ -2197,17 +2202,61 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener(int type, const char *listen_addr, u_short listen_por
 		return success;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Determine whether or not a port forward listens to loopback,
+	 * specified address or wildcard. On the client, a specified bind
+	 * address will always override gateway_ports. On the server, a
+	 * gateway_ports of 1 (``yes'') will override the client's
+	 * specification and force a wildcard bind, whereas a value of 2
+	 * (``clientspecified'') will bind to whatever address the client
+	 * asked for.
+	 *
+	 * Special-case listen_addrs are:
+	 *
+	 * "0.0.0.0"               -> wildcard v4/v6 if SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR
+	 * "" (empty string), "*"  -> wildcard v4/v6
+	 * "localhost"             -> loopback v4/v6
+	 */
+	addr = NULL;
+	if (listen_addr == NULL) {
+		/* No address specified: default to gateway_ports setting */
+		if (gateway_ports)
+			wildcard = 1;
+	} else if (gateway_ports || is_client) {
+		if (((datafellows & SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR) &&
+		    strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") == 0) ||
+		    *listen_addr == '\0' || strcmp(listen_addr, "*") == 0 ||
+		    (!is_client && gateway_ports == 1))
+			wildcard = 1;
+		else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "localhost") != 0)
+			addr = listen_addr;
+	}
+
+	debug3("channel_setup_fwd_listener: type %d wildcard %d addr %s",
+	    type, wildcard, (addr == NULL) ? "NULL" : addr);
+
 	/*
 	 * getaddrinfo returns a loopback address if the hostname is
 	 * set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE
 	 */
 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
 	hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
-	hints.ai_flags = gateway_ports ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
+	hints.ai_flags = wildcard ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
 	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", listen_port);
-	if (getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop) != 0)
+	if ((r = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
-		packet_disconnect("getaddrinfo: fatal error");
+		if (addr == NULL) {
+			/* This really shouldn't happen */
+			packet_disconnect("getaddrinfo: fatal error: %s",
+			    gai_strerror(r));
+		} else {
+			verbose("channel_setup_fwd_listener: "
+			    "getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", addr, gai_strerror(r));
+			packet_send_debug("channel_setup_fwd_listener: "
+			    "getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", addr, gai_strerror(r));
+		}
+		aitop = NULL;
+	}
 
 	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
 		if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
@@ -2273,13 +2322,13 @@ channel_cancel_rport_listener(const char *host, u_short port)
 	u_int i;
 	int found = 0;
 
-	for(i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
 		Channel *c = channels[i];
 
 		if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER &&
 		    strncmp(c->path, host, sizeof(c->path)) == 0 &&
 		    c->listening_port == port) {
-			debug2("%s: close clannel %d", __func__, i);
+			debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
 			channel_free(c);
 			found = 1;
 		}
@@ -2290,11 +2339,12 @@ channel_cancel_rport_listener(const char *host, u_short port)
 
 /* protocol local port fwd, used by ssh (and sshd in v1) */
 int
-channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(u_short listen_port,
+channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port,
     const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int gateway_ports)
 {
 	return channel_setup_fwd_listener(SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER,
-	    NULL, listen_port, host_to_connect, port_to_connect, gateway_ports);
+	    listen_host, listen_port, host_to_connect, port_to_connect,
+	    gateway_ports);
 }
 
 /* protocol v2 remote port fwd, used by sshd */
@@ -2312,7 +2362,7 @@ channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(const char *listen_address,
  */
 
 void
-channel_request_remote_forwarding(u_short listen_port,
+channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port,
     const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect)
 {
 	int type, success = 0;
@@ -2323,7 +2373,14 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(u_short listen_port,
 
 	/* Send the forward request to the remote side. */
 	if (compat20) {
-		const char *address_to_bind = "0.0.0.0";
+		const char *address_to_bind;
+		if (listen_host == NULL)
+			address_to_bind = "localhost";
+		else if (*listen_host == '\0' || strcmp(listen_host, "*") == 0)
+			address_to_bind = "";
+		else
+			address_to_bind = listen_host;
+
 		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
 		packet_put_cstring("tcpip-forward");
 		packet_put_char(1);			/* boolean: want reply */
@@ -2369,10 +2426,9 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(u_short listen_port,
  * local side.
  */
 void
-channel_request_rforward_cancel(u_short port)
+channel_request_rforward_cancel(const char *host, u_short port)
 {
 	int i;
-	const char *address_to_bind = "0.0.0.0";
 
 	if (!compat20)
 		return;
@@ -2389,7 +2445,7 @@ channel_request_rforward_cancel(u_short port)
 	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
 	packet_put_cstring("cancel-tcpip-forward");
 	packet_put_char(0);
-	packet_put_cstring(address_to_bind);
+	packet_put_cstring(host == NULL ? "" : host);
 	packet_put_int(port);
 	packet_send();
 
@@ -2430,7 +2486,8 @@ channel_input_port_forward_request(int is_root, int gateway_ports)
 #endif
 
 	/* Initiate forwarding */
-	channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(port, hostname, host_port, gateway_ports);
+	channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(NULL, port, hostname,
+	    host_port, gateway_ports);
 
 	/* Free the argument string. */
 	xfree(hostname);
@@ -2577,7 +2634,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
 	struct winsize ws;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
-		if (channels[i] == NULL ||
+		if (channels[i] == NULL || !channels[i]->client_tty ||
 		    channels[i]->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
 			continue;
 		if (ioctl(channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)

crypto/openssh/channels.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.74 2004/08/11 21:43:04 avsm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.76 2005/03/01 10:09:52 djm Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ struct Channel {
 	int     ctl_fd;		/* control fd (client sharing) */
 	int     isatty;		/* rfd is a tty */
 	int     wfd_isatty;	/* wfd is a tty */
+	int	client_tty;	/* (client) TTY has been requested */
 	int     force_drain;	/* force close on iEOF */
 	int     delayed;		/* fdset hack */
 	Buffer  input;		/* data read from socket, to be sent over
@@ -202,9 +203,11 @@ void	 channel_clear_permitted_opens(void);
 void     channel_input_port_forward_request(int, int);
 int	 channel_connect_to(const char *, u_short);
 int	 channel_connect_by_listen_address(u_short);
-void	 channel_request_remote_forwarding(u_short, const char *, u_short);
+void	 channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *, u_short,
-void	 channel_request_rforward_cancel(u_short port);
+	     const char *, u_short);
-int	 channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(u_short, const char *, u_short, int);
+int	 channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short,
+	     const char *, u_short, int);
+void	 channel_request_rforward_cancel(const char *host, u_short port);
 int	 channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short, int);
 int	 channel_cancel_rport_listener(const char *, u_short);
 

crypto/openssh/cipher.c

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.71 2004/07/28 09:40:29 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.73 2005/01/23 10:18:12 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ cipher_by_name(const char *name)
 {
 	Cipher *c;
 	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
-		if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+		if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
 			return c;
 	return NULL;
 }
@@ -199,8 +199,10 @@ cipher_number(const char *name)
 	Cipher *c;
 	if (name == NULL)
 		return -1;
-	c = cipher_by_name(name);
+	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
-	return (c==NULL) ? -1 : c->number;
+		if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+			return c->number;
+	return -1;
 }
 
 char *

crypto/openssh/compat.c

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.70 2003/11/02 11:01:03 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.71 2005/03/01 10:09:52 djm Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "buffer.h"
@@ -63,24 +63,28 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version)
 		  "OpenSSH_2.1*,"
 		  "OpenSSH_2.2*",	SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_BANNER|
 					SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|
-					SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
+					SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
 		{ "OpenSSH_2.3.0*",	SSH_BUG_BANNER|SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|
 					SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|
-					SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
+					SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
 		{ "OpenSSH_2.3.*",	SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX|
-					SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
+					SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|
+					SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
 		{ "OpenSSH_2.5.0p1*,"
 		  "OpenSSH_2.5.1p1*",
 					SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX|
-					SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
+					SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|
+					SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
 		{ "OpenSSH_2.5.0*,"
 		  "OpenSSH_2.5.1*,"
 		  "OpenSSH_2.5.2*",	SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|
-					SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
+					SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
-		{ "OpenSSH_2.5.3*",	SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
+		{ "OpenSSH_2.5.3*",	SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|
+					SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
 		{ "OpenSSH_2.*,"
 		  "OpenSSH_3.0*,"
-		  "OpenSSH_3.1*",	SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
+		  "OpenSSH_3.1*",	SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
+		{ "OpenSSH_3.*",	SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR },
 		{ "Sun_SSH_1.0*",	SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
 		{ "OpenSSH*",		0 },
 		{ "*MindTerm*",		0 },

crypto/openssh/compat.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.38 2004/07/11 17:48:47 deraadt Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.39 2005/03/01 10:09:52 djm Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
 #define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF		0x00200000
 #define SSH_BUG_PROBE		0x00400000
 #define SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX	0x00800000
+#define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR	0x01000000
 
 void     enable_compat13(void);
 void     enable_compat20(void);

crypto/openssh/hostfile.c

@@ -36,13 +36,102 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.32 2003/11/10 16:23:41 jakob Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.34 2005/03/10 22:01:05 deraadt Exp $");
+
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
 
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "match.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+static int
+extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, char *salt, size_t salt_len)
+{
+	char *p, *b64salt;
+	u_int b64len;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (l < sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: string too short");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (strncmp(s, HASH_MAGIC, sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: invalid magic identifier");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	s += sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1;
+	l -= sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1;
+	if ((p = memchr(s, HASH_DELIM, l)) == NULL) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: missing salt termination character");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	b64len = p - s;
+	/* Sanity check */
+	if (b64len == 0 || b64len > 1024) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: bad encoded salt length %u", b64len);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	b64salt = xmalloc(1 + b64len);
+	memcpy(b64salt, s, b64len);
+	b64salt[b64len] = '\0';
+
+	ret = __b64_pton(b64salt, salt, salt_len);
+	xfree(b64salt);
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: salt decode error");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (ret != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: expected salt len %u, got %u",
+		    salt_len, ret);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+char *
+host_hash(const char *host, const char *name_from_hostfile, u_int src_len)
+{
+	const EVP_MD *md = EVP_sha1();
+	HMAC_CTX mac_ctx;
+	char salt[256], result[256], uu_salt[512], uu_result[512];
+	static char encoded[1024];
+	u_int i, len;
+
+	len = EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+	if (name_from_hostfile == NULL) {
+		/* Create new salt */
+		for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+			salt[i] = arc4random();
+	} else {
+		/* Extract salt from known host entry */
+		if (extract_salt(name_from_hostfile, src_len, salt,
+		    sizeof(salt)) == -1)
+			return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	HMAC_Init(&mac_ctx, salt, len, md);
+	HMAC_Update(&mac_ctx, host, strlen(host));
+	HMAC_Final(&mac_ctx, result, NULL);
+	HMAC_cleanup(&mac_ctx);
+
+	if (__b64_ntop(salt, len, uu_salt, sizeof(uu_salt)) == -1 ||
+	    __b64_ntop(result, len, uu_result, sizeof(uu_result)) == -1)
+		fatal("host_hash: __b64_ntop failed");
+
+	snprintf(encoded, sizeof(encoded), "%s%s%c%s", HASH_MAGIC, uu_salt,
+	    HASH_DELIM, uu_result);
+
+	return (encoded);
+}
 
 /*
  * Parses an RSA (number of bits, e, n) or DSA key from a string.  Moves the
@@ -104,7 +193,7 @@ check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(const char *filename,
 	char line[8192];
 	int linenum = 0;
 	u_int kbits;
-	char *cp, *cp2;
+	char *cp, *cp2, *hashed_host;
 	HostStatus end_return;
 
 	debug3("check_host_in_hostfile: filename %s", filename);
@@ -137,8 +226,18 @@ check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(const char *filename,
 			;
 
 		/* Check if the host name matches. */
-		if (match_hostname(host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp)) != 1)
+		if (match_hostname(host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp)) != 1) {
-			continue;
+			if (*cp != HASH_DELIM)
+				continue;
+			hashed_host = host_hash(host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp));
+			if (hashed_host == NULL) {
+				debug("Invalid hashed host line %d of %s",
+				    linenum, filename);
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (strncmp(hashed_host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp)) != 0)
+				continue;
+		}
 
 		/* Got a match.  Skip host name. */
 		cp = cp2;
@@ -211,16 +310,28 @@ lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(const char *filename, const char *host,
  */
 
 int
-add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, const Key *key)
+add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, const Key *key,
+    int store_hash)
 {
 	FILE *f;
 	int success = 0;
+	char *hashed_host;
+
 	if (key == NULL)
 		return 1;	/* XXX ? */
 	f = fopen(filename, "a");
 	if (!f)
 		return 0;
-	fprintf(f, "%s ", host);
+
+	if (store_hash) {
+		if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
+			error("add_host_to_hostfile: host_hash failed");
+			fclose(f);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	fprintf(f, "%s ", store_hash ? hashed_host : host);
+
 	if (key_write(key, f)) {
 		success = 1;
 	} else {

crypto/openssh/includes.h

@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ __RCSID(msg)
  * On HP-UX 11.11, shadow.h and prot.h provide conflicting declarations
  * of getspnam when _INCLUDE__STDC__ is defined, so we unset it here.
  */
-#ifdef __hpux
+#ifdef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS
 # ifdef _INCLUDE__STDC__
 #  undef _INCLUDE__STDC__
 # endif

crypto/openssh/key.c

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.56 2004/07/28 09:40:29 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.57 2004/10/29 23:57:05 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
@@ -681,8 +681,8 @@ Key *
 key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
 {
 	Buffer b;
-	char *ktype;
 	int rlen, type;
+	char *ktype = NULL;
 	Key *key = NULL;
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_PK
@@ -690,24 +690,38 @@ key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
 #endif
 	buffer_init(&b);
 	buffer_append(&b, blob, blen);
-	ktype = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if ((ktype = buffer_get_string_ret(&b, NULL)) == NULL) {
+		error("key_from_blob: can't read key type");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	type = key_type_from_name(ktype);
 
 	switch (type) {
 	case KEY_RSA:
 		key = key_new(type);
-		buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->e);
+		if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->e) == -1 ||
-		buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->n);
+		    buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->n) == -1) {
+			error("key_from_blob: can't read rsa key");
+			key_free(key);
+			key = NULL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 #ifdef DEBUG_PK
 		RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
 #endif
 		break;
 	case KEY_DSA:
 		key = key_new(type);
-		buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->p);
+		if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->p) == -1 ||
-		buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->q);
+		    buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->q) == -1 ||
-		buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->g);
+		    buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->g) == -1 ||
-		buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->pub_key);
+		    buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->pub_key) == -1) {
+			error("key_from_blob: can't read dsa key");
+			key_free(key);
+			key = NULL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 #ifdef DEBUG_PK
 		DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8);
 #endif
@@ -717,12 +731,14 @@ key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
 		break;
 	default:
 		error("key_from_blob: cannot handle type %s", ktype);
-		break;
+		goto out;
 	}
 	rlen = buffer_len(&b);
 	if (key != NULL && rlen != 0)
 		error("key_from_blob: remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen);
-	xfree(ktype);
+ out:
+	if (ktype != NULL)
+		xfree(ktype);
 	buffer_free(&b);
 	return key;
 }

crypto/openssh/monitor.c

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.61 2004/07/17 05:31:41 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.63 2005/03/10 22:01:05 deraadt Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
@@ -152,6 +152,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
+#endif
+
 static Authctxt *authctxt;
 static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
 
@@ -195,6 +200,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
 #endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+#endif
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH,mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
@@ -220,6 +228,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
+#endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -247,6 +259,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
 #endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
@@ -255,6 +270,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
+#endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -300,6 +319,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 	authctxt = _authctxt;
 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
 
+	authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
+
 	if (compat20) {
 		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
 
@@ -618,6 +639,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	if (options.use_pam)
 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
 #endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, 1);
+#endif
 
 	return (0);
 }
@@ -819,6 +843,9 @@ mm_answer_pam_account(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	ret = do_pam_account();
 
 	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
+	buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg));
+	buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
 
 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
 
@@ -960,7 +987,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
 
 	if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
-		switch(type) {
+		switch (type) {
 		case MM_USERKEY:
 			allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
 			    user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
@@ -1306,7 +1333,7 @@ mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	int rsafail;
 
 	/* Turn off permissions */
-	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
 
 	if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
@@ -1497,6 +1524,48 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
 	exit(res);
 }
 
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+/* Report that an audit event occurred */
+int
+mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	ssh_audit_event_t event;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	event = buffer_get_int(m);
+	switch(event) {
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
+		audit_event(event);
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_int len;
+	char *cmd;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+	cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+	/* sanity check command, if so how? */
+	audit_run_command(cmd);
+	xfree(cmd);
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
 void
 monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
 {

crypto/openssh/monitor.h

@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY,
 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND,
 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX,
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND,
 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM
 };
 

crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c

@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
 extern Buffer input, output;
 extern Buffer loginmsg;
 extern ServerOptions options;
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
 
 int
 mm_is_monitor(void)
@@ -717,6 +718,7 @@ mm_do_pam_account(void)
 {
 	Buffer m;
 	u_int ret;
+	char *msg;
 
 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
 	if (!options.use_pam)
@@ -728,6 +730,9 @@ mm_do_pam_account(void)
 	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
 	    MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
 	ret = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	msg = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
+	xfree(msg);
 
 	buffer_free(&m);
 
@@ -1099,6 +1104,36 @@ mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16])
 	return (success);
 }
 
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+void
+mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, event);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, &m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+void
+mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 OM_uint32
 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid)

crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h

@@ -75,6 +75,12 @@ int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+#include "audit.h"
+void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+#endif
+
 struct Session;
 void mm_terminate(void);
 int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, int);

crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: fake-rfc2553.h,v 1.8 2004/02/10 02:05:41 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: fake-rfc2553.h,v 1.10 2005/02/11 07:32:13 dtucker Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 
 /*
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ struct sockaddr_in6 {
 # define EAI_NODATA	1
 # define EAI_MEMORY	2
 # define EAI_NONAME	3
+# define EAI_SYSTEM	4
 #endif
 
 #ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO

crypto/openssh/readconf.c

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.134 2004/07/11 17:48:47 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.139 2005/03/10 22:01:05 deraadt Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
 	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
-	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster,
+	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oHashKnownHosts,
 	oVersionAddendum,
 	oDeprecated, oUnsupported
 } OpCodes;
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "sendenv", oSendEnv },
 	{ "controlpath", oControlPath },
 	{ "controlmaster", oControlMaster },
+	{ "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts },
 	{ "versionaddendum", oVersionAddendum },
 	{ NULL, oBadOption }
 };
@@ -209,21 +210,23 @@ static struct {
  */
 
 void
-add_local_forward(Options *options, u_short port, const char *host,
+add_local_forward(Options *options, const Forward *newfwd)
-		  u_short host_port)
 {
 	Forward *fwd;
 #ifndef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT
 	extern uid_t original_real_uid;
-	if (port < IPPORT_RESERVED && original_real_uid != 0)
+	if (newfwd->listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && original_real_uid != 0)
 		fatal("Privileged ports can only be forwarded by root.");
 #endif
 	if (options->num_local_forwards >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
 		fatal("Too many local forwards (max %d).", SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION);
 	fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++];
-	fwd->port = port;
+
-	fwd->host = xstrdup(host);
+	fwd->listen_host = (newfwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
-	fwd->host_port = host_port;
+	    NULL : xstrdup(newfwd->listen_host);
+	fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
+	fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(newfwd->connect_host);
+	fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -232,17 +235,19 @@ add_local_forward(Options *options, u_short port, const char *host,
  */
 
 void
-add_remote_forward(Options *options, u_short port, const char *host,
+add_remote_forward(Options *options, const Forward *newfwd)
-		   u_short host_port)
 {
 	Forward *fwd;
 	if (options->num_remote_forwards >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
 		fatal("Too many remote forwards (max %d).",
 		    SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION);
 	fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++];
-	fwd->port = port;
+
-	fwd->host = xstrdup(host);
+	fwd->listen_host = (newfwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
-	fwd->host_port = host_port;
+	    NULL : xstrdup(newfwd->listen_host);
+	fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
+	fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(newfwd->connect_host);
+	fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
 }
 
 static void
@@ -250,11 +255,17 @@ clear_forwardings(Options *options)
 {
 	int i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) {
-		xfree(options->local_forwards[i].host);
+		if (options->local_forwards[i].listen_host != NULL)
+			xfree(options->local_forwards[i].listen_host);
+		xfree(options->local_forwards[i].connect_host);
+	}
 	options->num_local_forwards = 0;
-	for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) {
-		xfree(options->remote_forwards[i].host);
+		if (options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host != NULL)
+			xfree(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host);
+		xfree(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_host);
+	}
 	options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
 }
 
@@ -287,14 +298,13 @@ process_config_line(Options *options, const char *host,
 		    char *line, const char *filename, int linenum,
 		    int *activep)
 {
-	char buf[256], *s, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg;
+	char *s, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2, fwdarg[256];
 	int opcode, *intptr, value;
 	size_t len;
-	u_short fwd_port, fwd_host_port;
+	Forward fwd;
-	char sfwd_host_port[6];
 
 	/* Strip trailing whitespace */
-	for(len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) {
+	for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) {
 		if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL)
 			break;
 		line[len] = '\0';
@@ -648,30 +658,26 @@ process_config_line(Options *options, const char *host,
 	case oLocalForward:
 	case oRemoteForward:
 		arg = strdelim(&s);
-		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+		if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.",
 			    filename, linenum);
-		if ((fwd_port = a2port(arg)) == 0)
+		arg2 = strdelim(&s);
-			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad listen port.",
+		if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing target argument.",
 			    filename, linenum);
-		arg = strdelim(&s);
+
-		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+		/* construct a string for parse_forward */
-			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing second argument.",
+		snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg, arg2);
-			    filename, linenum);
+
-		if (sscanf(arg, "%255[^:]:%5[0-9]", buf, sfwd_host_port) != 2 &&
+		if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg) == 0)
-		    sscanf(arg, "%255[^/]/%5[0-9]", buf, sfwd_host_port) != 2)
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.",
 			    filename, linenum);
-		if ((fwd_host_port = a2port(sfwd_host_port)) == 0)
+
-			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding port.",
-			    filename, linenum);
 		if (*activep) {
 			if (opcode == oLocalForward)
-				add_local_forward(options, fwd_port, buf,
+				add_local_forward(options, &fwd);
-				    fwd_host_port);
 			else if (opcode == oRemoteForward)
-				add_remote_forward(options, fwd_port, buf,
+				add_remote_forward(options, &fwd);
-				    fwd_host_port);
 		}
 		break;
 
@@ -680,12 +686,25 @@ process_config_line(Options *options, const char *host,
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.",
 			    filename, linenum);
-		fwd_port = a2port(arg);
+		memset(&fwd, '\0', sizeof(fwd));
-		if (fwd_port == 0)
+		fwd.connect_host = "socks";
+		fwd.listen_host = hpdelim(&arg);
+		if (fwd.listen_host == NULL ||
+		    strlen(fwd.listen_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (arg) {
+			fwd.listen_port = a2port(arg);
+			fwd.listen_host = cleanhostname(fwd.listen_host);
+		} else {
+			fwd.listen_port = a2port(fwd.listen_host);
+			fwd.listen_host = "";
+		}
+		if (fwd.listen_port == 0)
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Badly formatted port number.",
 			    filename, linenum);
 		if (*activep)
-			add_local_forward(options, fwd_port, "socks", 0);
+			add_local_forward(options, &fwd);
 		break;
 
 	case oClearAllForwardings:
@@ -761,6 +780,8 @@ process_config_line(Options *options, const char *host,
 			if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL)
 				fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.",
 				    filename, linenum);
+			if (!*activep)
+				continue;
 			if (options->num_send_env >= MAX_SEND_ENV)
 				fatal("%s line %d: too many send env.",
 				    filename, linenum);
@@ -777,6 +798,10 @@ process_config_line(Options *options, const char *host,
 		intptr = &options->control_master;
 		goto parse_yesnoask;
 
+	case oHashKnownHosts:
+		intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
 	case oVersionAddendum:
 		ssh_version_set_addendum(strtok(s, "\n"));
 		do {
@@ -927,6 +952,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
 	options->num_send_env = 0;
 	options->control_path = NULL;
 	options->control_master = -1;
+	options->hash_known_hosts = -1;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1049,9 +1075,76 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 		options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
 	if (options->control_master == -1)
 		options->control_master = 0;
+	if (options->hash_known_hosts == -1)
+		options->hash_known_hosts = 0;
 	/* options->proxy_command should not be set by default */
 	/* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */
 	/* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */
 	/* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */
 	/* options->preferred_authentications will be set in ssh */
 }
+
+/*
+ * parse_forward
+ * parses a string containing a port forwarding specification of the form:
+ *	[listenhost:]listenport:connecthost:connectport
+ * returns number of arguments parsed or zero on error
+ */
+int
+parse_forward(Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec)
+{
+	int i;
+	char *p, *cp, *fwdarg[4];
+
+	memset(fwd, '\0', sizeof(*fwd));
+
+	cp = p = xstrdup(fwdspec);
+
+	/* skip leading spaces */
+	while (*cp && isspace(*cp))
+		cp++;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
+		if ((fwdarg[i] = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
+			break;
+
+	/* Check for trailing garbage in 4-arg case*/
+	if (cp != NULL)
+		i = 0;	/* failure */
+
+	switch (i) {
+	case 3:
+		fwd->listen_host = NULL;
+		fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdarg[0]);
+		fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(fwdarg[1]));
+		fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdarg[2]);
+		break;
+
+	case 4:
+		fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(fwdarg[0]));
+		fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdarg[1]);
+		fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(fwdarg[2]));
+		fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdarg[3]);
+		break;
+	default:
+		i = 0; /* failure */
+	}
+
+	xfree(p);
+
+	if (fwd->listen_port == 0 && fwd->connect_port == 0)
+		goto fail_free;
+
+	if (fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
+	    strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
+		goto fail_free;
+
+	return (i);
+
+ fail_free:
+	if (fwd->connect_host != NULL)
+		xfree(fwd->connect_host);
+	if (fwd->listen_host != NULL)
+		xfree(fwd->listen_host);
+	return (0);
+}

crypto/openssh/readconf.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.64 2004/07/11 17:48:47 deraadt Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.66 2005/03/01 10:40:27 djm Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -21,9 +21,10 @@
 /* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */
 
 typedef struct {
-	u_short	  port;		/* Port to forward. */
+	char	 *listen_host;		/* Host (address) to listen on. */
-	char	 *host;		/* Host to connect. */
+	u_short	  listen_port;		/* Port to forward. */
-	u_short	  host_port;	/* Port to connect on host. */
+	char	 *connect_host;		/* Host to connect. */
+	u_short	  connect_port;		/* Port to connect on connect_host. */
 }       Forward;
 /* Data structure for representing option data. */
 
@@ -111,17 +112,20 @@ typedef struct {
 
 	char	*control_path;
 	int	control_master;
+
+	int	hash_known_hosts;
 }       Options;
 
 
 void     initialize_options(Options *);
 void     fill_default_options(Options *);
 int	 read_config_file(const char *, const char *, Options *, int);
+int	 parse_forward(Forward *, const char *);
 
 int
 process_config_line(Options *, const char *, char *, const char *, int, int *);
 
-void	 add_local_forward(Options *, u_short, const char *, u_short);
+void	 add_local_forward(Options *, const Forward *);
-void	 add_remote_forward(Options *, u_short, const char *, u_short);
+void	 add_remote_forward(Options *, const Forward *);
 
 #endif				/* READCONF_H */

crypto/openssh/scp.c

@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.117 2004/08/11 21:44:32 avsm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.121 2005/04/02 12:41:16 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
@@ -108,8 +108,10 @@ pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1;
 static void
 killchild(int signo)
 {
-	if (do_cmd_pid > 1)
+	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo);
+		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
+	}
 
 	_exit(1);
 }
@@ -359,20 +361,21 @@ void
 toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	int i, len;
-	char *bp, *host, *src, *suser, *thost, *tuser;
+	char *bp, *host, *src, *suser, *thost, *tuser, *arg;
 
 	*targ++ = 0;
 	if (*targ == 0)
 		targ = ".";
 
-	if ((thost = strrchr(argv[argc - 1], '@'))) {
+	arg = xstrdup(argv[argc - 1]);
+	if ((thost = strrchr(arg, '@'))) {
 		/* user@host */
 		*thost++ = 0;
-		tuser = argv[argc - 1];
+		tuser = arg;
 		if (*tuser == '\0')
 			tuser = NULL;
 	} else {
-		thost = argv[argc - 1];
+		thost = arg;
 		tuser = NULL;
 	}
 
@@ -726,7 +729,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
 
 #define	atime	tv[0]
 #define	mtime	tv[1]
-#define	SCREWUP(str)	do { why = str; goto screwup; } while (0)
+#define	SCREWUP(str)	{ why = str; goto screwup; }
 
 	setimes = targisdir = 0;
 	mask = umask(0);

crypto/openssh/servconf.c

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.137 2004/08/13 11:09:24 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.140 2005/03/10 22:01:05 deraadt Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, u_short);
 static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, u_short);
 
-/* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */
-extern int IPv4or6;
 /* Use of privilege separation or not */
 extern int use_privsep;
 
@@ -46,6 +44,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->num_ports = 0;
 	options->ports_from_cmdline = 0;
 	options->listen_addrs = NULL;
+	options->address_family = -1;
 	options->num_host_key_files = 0;
 	options->pid_file = NULL;
 	options->server_key_bits = -1;
@@ -261,7 +260,8 @@ typedef enum {
 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
 	sKerberosGetAFSToken,
 	sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
-	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress,
+	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
 	sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
@@ -339,6 +339,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
 	{ "checkmail", sDeprecated },
 	{ "listenaddress", sListenAddress },
+	{ "addressfamily", sAddressFamily },
 	{ "printmotd", sPrintMotd },
 	{ "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog },
 	{ "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts },
@@ -406,6 +407,8 @@ add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, u_short port)
 
 	if (options->num_ports == 0)
 		options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+	if (options->address_family == -1)
+		options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
 	if (port == 0)
 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++)
 			add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, options->ports[i]);
@@ -421,7 +424,7 @@ add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, u_short port)
 	int gaierr;
 
 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
-	hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+	hints.ai_family = options->address_family;
 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
 	hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
 	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
@@ -442,6 +445,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 	char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p;
 	int *intptr, value, i, n;
 	ServerOpCodes opcode;
+	u_short port;
 
 	cp = line;
 	arg = strdelim(&cp);
@@ -514,39 +518,40 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 
 	case sListenAddress:
 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
-		if (!arg || *arg == '\0' || strncmp(arg, "[]", 2) == 0)
+		if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
-			fatal("%s line %d: missing inet addr.",
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing address",
 			    filename, linenum);
-		if (*arg == '[') {
+		p = hpdelim(&arg);
-			if ((p = strchr(arg, ']')) == NULL)
+		if (p == NULL)
-				fatal("%s line %d: bad ipv6 inet addr usage.",
+			fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage",
-				    filename, linenum);
+			    filename, linenum);
-			arg++;
+		p = cleanhostname(p);
-			memmove(p, p+1, strlen(p+1)+1);
+		if (arg == NULL)
-		} else if (((p = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL) ||
+			port = 0;
-			    (strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL)) {
+		else if ((port = a2port(arg)) == 0)
-			add_listen_addr(options, arg, 0);
+			fatal("%s line %d: bad port number", filename, linenum);
-			break;
-		}
-		if (*p == ':') {
-			u_short port;
 
-			p++;
+		add_listen_addr(options, p, port);
-			if (*p == '\0')
+
-				fatal("%s line %d: bad inet addr:port usage.",
+		break;
-				    filename, linenum);
+
-			else {
+	case sAddressFamily:
-				*(p-1) = '\0';
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
-				if ((port = a2port(p)) == 0)
+		intptr = &options->address_family;
-					fatal("%s line %d: bad port number.",
+		if (options->listen_addrs != NULL)
-					    filename, linenum);
+			fatal("%s line %d: address family must be specified before "
-				add_listen_addr(options, arg, port);
+			    "ListenAddress.", filename, linenum);
-			}
+		if (strcasecmp(arg, "inet") == 0)
-		} else if (*p == '\0')
+			value = AF_INET;
-			add_listen_addr(options, arg, 0);
+		else if (strcasecmp(arg, "inet6") == 0)
+			value = AF_INET6;
+		else if (strcasecmp(arg, "any") == 0)
+			value = AF_UNSPEC;
 		else
-			fatal("%s line %d: bad inet addr usage.",
+			fatal("%s line %d: unsupported address family \"%s\".",
-			    filename, linenum);
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+		if (*intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
 		break;
 
 	case sHostKeyFile:
@@ -725,7 +730,23 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 
 	case sGatewayPorts:
 		intptr = &options->gateway_ports;
-		goto parse_flag;
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing yes/no/clientspecified "
+			    "argument.", filename, linenum);
+		value = 0;	/* silence compiler */
+		if (strcmp(arg, "clientspecified") == 0)
+			value = 2;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0)
+			value = 1;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0)
+			value = 0;
+		else
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/no/clientspecified "
+			    "argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg);
+		if (*intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
 
 	case sUseDNS:
 		intptr = &options->use_dns;
@@ -992,7 +1013,7 @@ parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, Buffer *conf)
 
 	obuf = cbuf = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(conf));
 	linenum = 1;
-	while((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) {
+	while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) {
 		if (process_server_config_line(options, cp, filename,
 		    linenum++) != 0)
 			bad_options++;

crypto/openssh/servconf.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.70 2004/06/24 19:30:54 djm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.71 2004/12/23 23:11:00 djm Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ typedef struct {
 	u_short ports[MAX_PORTS];	/* Port number to listen on. */
 	char   *listen_addr;		/* Address on which the server listens. */
 	struct addrinfo *listen_addrs;	/* Addresses on which the server listens. */
+	int     address_family;		/* Address family used by the server. */
 	char   *host_key_files[MAX_HOSTKEYS];	/* Files containing host keys. */
 	int     num_host_key_files;     /* Number of files for host keys. */
 	char   *pid_file;	/* Where to put our pid */

crypto/openssh/session.c

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.180 2004/07/28 09:40:29 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.181 2004/12/23 17:35:48 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
@@ -246,6 +246,10 @@ do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	u_int proto_len, data_len, dlen, compression_level = 0;
 
 	s = session_new();
+	if (s == NULL) {
+		error("no more sessions");
+		return;
+	}
 	s->authctxt = authctxt;
 	s->pw = authctxt->pw;
 
@@ -662,11 +666,15 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
 		debug("Forced command '%.900s'", command);
 	}
 
-#ifdef GSSAPI
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-	if (options.gss_authentication) {
+	if (command != NULL)
-		temporarily_use_uid(s->pw);
+		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
-		ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
+	else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
-		restore_uid();
+		char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
+
+		if (shell[0] == '\0')	/* empty shell means /bin/sh */
+			shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
+		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
 	}
 #endif
 
@@ -1002,7 +1010,13 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
 	 * The Windows environment contains some setting which are
 	 * important for a running system. They must not be dropped.
 	 */
-	copy_environment(environ, &env, &envsize);
+	{
+		char **p;
+
+		p = fetch_windows_environment();
+		copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
+		free_windows_environment(p);
+	}
 #endif
 
 	if (getenv("TZ"))
@@ -1111,14 +1125,24 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TMPDIR", cray_tmpdir);
 #endif /* _UNICOS */
 
+	/*
+	 * Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it
+	 * must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or
+	 * SIA), so copy it to the child.
+	 */
+	{
+		char *cp;
+
+		if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL)
+			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
+	}
+
 #ifdef _AIX
 	{
 		char *cp;
 
 		if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL)
 			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp);
-		if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL)
-			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
 		read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment");
 	}
 #endif
@@ -1278,6 +1302,13 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
 # ifdef __bsdi__
 		setpgid(0, 0);
 # endif
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+		if (options.gss_authentication) {
+			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+			ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
+			restore_uid();
+		}
+#endif
 # ifdef USE_PAM
 		if (options.use_pam) {
 			do_pam_session();
@@ -1308,6 +1339,13 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
 			exit(1);
 		}
 		endgrent();
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+		if (options.gss_authentication) {
+			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+			ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
+			restore_uid();
+		}
+#endif
 # ifdef USE_PAM
 		/*
 		 * PAM credentials may take the form of supplementary groups.
@@ -1345,7 +1383,12 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s)
 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
 		fprintf(stderr,
 		    "You must change your password now and login again!\n");
+#ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
+		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
+		    (char *)NULL);
+#else
 		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", (char *)NULL);
+#endif
 		perror("passwd");
 	} else {
 		fprintf(stderr,
@@ -1462,11 +1505,19 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 		 * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
 		 * login then display them too.
 		 */
-		if (command == NULL)
+		if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
 			display_loginmsg();
 #endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
 	}
 
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login && !is_pam_session_open()) {
+		debug3("PAM session not opened, exiting");
+		display_loginmsg();
+		exit(254);
+	}
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * Get the shell from the password data.  An empty shell field is
 	 * legal, and means /bin/sh.

crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.70 2004/05/08 00:21:31 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.71 2005/03/10 22:01:06 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 			goto done;
 		}
 
-		for(i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) {
+		for (i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) {
 			snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
 			    default_files[i]);
 			if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		if (count == 0)
 			ret = 1;
 	} else {
-		for(i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+		for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
 			if (do_file(ac, deleting, argv[i]) == -1)
 				ret = 1;
 		}

crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.120 2004/08/11 21:43:05 avsm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.122 2004/10/29 22:53:56 djm Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -169,23 +169,15 @@ lookup_identity(Key *key, int version)
 static int
 confirm_key(Identity *id)
 {
-	char *p, prompt[1024];
+	char *p;
 	int ret = -1;
 
 	p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-	snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Allow use of key %s?\n"
+	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
-	    "Key fingerprint %s.", id->comment, p);
+	    id->comment, p))
+		ret = 0;
 	xfree(p);
-	p = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF);
+
-	if (p != NULL) {
-		/*
-		 * Accept empty responses and responses consisting
-		 * of the word "yes" as affirmative.
-		 */
-		if (*p == '\0' || *p == '\n' || strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0)
-			ret = 0;
-		xfree(p);
-	}
 	return (ret);
 }
 
@@ -1011,9 +1003,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
 	struct rlimit rlim;
 #endif
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
 	int prev_mask;
-#endif
 	extern int optind;
 	extern char *optarg;
 	pid_t pid;
@@ -1126,24 +1116,20 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
 	if (sock < 0) {
 		perror("socket");
+		*socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
 		cleanup_exit(1);
 	}
 	memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
 	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, socket_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
 	prev_mask = umask(0177);
-#endif
 	if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
 		perror("bind");
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+		*socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
 		umask(prev_mask);
-#endif
 		cleanup_exit(1);
 	}
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
 	umask(prev_mask);
-#endif
 	if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) {
 		perror("listen");
 		cleanup_exit(1);

crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.50 2004/08/11 21:44:32 avsm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.52 2005/03/01 15:47:14 jmc Exp $");
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.50 2004/08/11 21:44:32 avsm Exp $");
 #include "log.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "misc.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 
 /* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6.  This can be set on the command line.
    Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */
@@ -41,6 +42,8 @@ int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
 
 int get_keytypes = KT_RSA1;	/* Get only RSA1 keys by default */
 
+int hash_hosts = 0;		/* Hash hostname on output */
+
 #define MAXMAXFD 256
 
 /* The number of seconds after which to give up on a TCP connection */
@@ -366,10 +369,14 @@ keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
 static void
 keyprint(con *c, Key *key)
 {
+	char *host = c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name;
+
 	if (!key)
 		return;
+	if (hash_hosts && (host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
+		fatal("host_hash failed");
 
-	fprintf(stdout, "%s ", c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name);
+	fprintf(stdout, "%s ", host);
 	key_write(key, stdout);
 	fputs("\n", stdout);
 }
@@ -676,7 +683,7 @@ fatal(const char *fmt,...)
 static void
 usage(void)
 {
-	fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-v46] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type] [-f file]\n"
+	fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-46Hv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]\n"
 	    "\t\t   [host | addrlist namelist] [...]\n",
 	    __progname);
 	exit(1);
@@ -700,8 +707,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	if (argc <= 1)
 		usage();
 
-	while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "v46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) {
+	while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "Hv46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) {
 		switch (opt) {
+		case 'H':
+			hash_hosts = 1;
+			break;
 		case 'p':
 			ssh_port = a2port(optarg);
 			if (ssh_port == 0) {

crypto/openssh/ssh.1

@@ -341,7 +341,6 @@ The user should not manually set
 .Ev DISPLAY .
 Forwarding of X11 connections can be
 configured on the command line or in configuration files.
-Take note that X11 forwarding can represent a security hazard.
 .Pp
 The
 .Ev DISPLAY

crypto/openssh/ssh.c

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.224 2004/07/28 09:40:29 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.234 2005/03/10 22:01:06 deraadt Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -145,6 +145,9 @@ pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0;
 /* fd to control socket */
 int control_fd = -1;
 
+/* Multiplexing control command */
+static u_int mux_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN;
+
 /* Only used in control client mode */
 volatile sig_atomic_t control_client_terminate = 0;
 u_int control_server_pid = 0;
@@ -155,10 +158,12 @@ static void
 usage(void)
 {
 	fprintf(stderr,
-"usage: ssh [-1246AaCfghkMNnqsTtVvXxY] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n"
+"usage: ssh [-1246AaCfgkMNnqsTtVvXxY] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n"
-"           [-D port] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-i identity_file]\n"
+"           [-D port] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile]\n"
-"           [-L port:host:hostport] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-o option]\n"
+"           [-i identity_file] [-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport]\n"
-"           [-p port] [-R port:host:hostport] [-S ctl] [user@]hostname [command]\n"
+"           [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n"
+"           [-R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-S ctl_path]\n"
+"           [user@]hostname [command]\n"
 	);
 	exit(1);
 }
@@ -175,14 +180,13 @@ int
 main(int ac, char **av)
 {
 	int i, opt, exit_status;
-	u_short fwd_port, fwd_host_port;
-	char sfwd_port[6], sfwd_host_port[6];
 	char *p, *cp, *line, buf[256];
 	struct stat st;
 	struct passwd *pw;
 	int dummy;
 	extern int optind, optreset;
 	extern char *optarg;
+	Forward fwd;
 
 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
 	init_rng();
@@ -237,7 +241,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 
 again:
 	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av,
-	    "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvxACD:F:I:L:MNPR:S:TVXY")) != -1) {
+	    "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvxACD:F:I:L:MNO:PR:S:TVXY")) != -1) {
 		switch (opt) {
 		case '1':
 			options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1;
@@ -271,6 +275,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		case 'g':
 			options.gateway_ports = 1;
 			break;
+		case 'O':
+			if (strcmp(optarg, "check") == 0)
+				mux_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "exit") == 0)
+				mux_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE;
+			else
+				fatal("Invalid multiplex command.");
+			break;
 		case 'P':	/* deprecated */
 			options.use_privileged_port = 0;
 			break;
@@ -286,7 +298,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		case 'i':
 			if (stat(optarg, &st) < 0) {
 				fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
-				    "does not exist.\n", optarg);
+				    "not accessible: %s.\n", optarg,
+				    strerror(errno));
 				break;
 			}
 			if (options.num_identity_files >=
@@ -317,10 +330,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 					options.log_level++;
 				break;
 			}
-			/* fallthrough */
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
 		case 'V':
 			fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
-			    SSH_VERSION, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
+			    SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
 			if (opt == 'V')
 				exit(0);
 			break;
@@ -389,39 +402,51 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			break;
 
 		case 'L':
-		case 'R':
+			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg))
-			if (sscanf(optarg, "%5[0123456789]:%255[^:]:%5[0123456789]",
+				add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
-			    sfwd_port, buf, sfwd_host_port) != 3 &&
+			else {
-			    sscanf(optarg, "%5[0123456789]/%255[^/]/%5[0123456789]",
-			    sfwd_port, buf, sfwd_host_port) != 3) {
 				fprintf(stderr,
-				    "Bad forwarding specification '%s'\n",
+				    "Bad local forwarding specification '%s'\n",
 				    optarg);
-				usage();
-				/* NOTREACHED */
-			}
-			if ((fwd_port = a2port(sfwd_port)) == 0 ||
-			    (fwd_host_port = a2port(sfwd_host_port)) == 0) {
-				fprintf(stderr,
-				    "Bad forwarding port(s) '%s'\n", optarg);
 				exit(1);
 			}
-			if (opt == 'L')
+			break;
-				add_local_forward(&options, fwd_port, buf,
+
-				    fwd_host_port);
+		case 'R':
-			else if (opt == 'R')
+			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg)) {
-				add_remote_forward(&options, fwd_port, buf,
+				add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
-				    fwd_host_port);
+			} else {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Bad remote forwarding specification "
+				    "'%s'\n", optarg);
+				exit(1);
+			}
 			break;
 
 		case 'D':
-			fwd_port = a2port(optarg);
+			cp = p = xstrdup(optarg);
-			if (fwd_port == 0) {
+			memset(&fwd, '\0', sizeof(fwd));
+			fwd.connect_host = "socks";
+			if ((fwd.listen_host = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Bad dynamic forwarding "
+				    "specification '%.100s'\n", optarg);
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			if (cp != NULL) {
+				fwd.listen_port = a2port(cp);
+				fwd.listen_host = cleanhostname(fwd.listen_host);
+			} else {
+				fwd.listen_port = a2port(fwd.listen_host);
+				fwd.listen_host = "";
+			}
+
+			if (fwd.listen_port == 0) {
 				fprintf(stderr, "Bad dynamic port '%s'\n",
 				    optarg);
 				exit(1);
 			}
-			add_local_forward(&options, fwd_port, "socks", 0);
+			add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
+			xfree(p);
 			break;
 
 		case 'C':
@@ -847,14 +872,19 @@ ssh_init_forwarding(void)
 
 	/* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */
 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
-		debug("Connections to local port %d forwarded to remote address %.200s:%d",
+		debug("Local connections to %.200s:%d forwarded to remote "
-		    options.local_forwards[i].port,
+		    "address %.200s:%d",
-		    options.local_forwards[i].host,
+		    (options.local_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
-		    options.local_forwards[i].host_port);
+		    (options.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
+		    options.local_forwards[i].listen_host,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].listen_port,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].connect_host,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].connect_port);
 		success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(
-		    options.local_forwards[i].port,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].listen_host,
-		    options.local_forwards[i].host,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].listen_port,
-		    options.local_forwards[i].host_port,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].connect_host,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].connect_port,
 		    options.gateway_ports);
 	}
 	if (i > 0 && success == 0)
@@ -862,14 +892,19 @@ ssh_init_forwarding(void)
 
 	/* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */
 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
-		debug("Connections to remote port %d forwarded to local address %.200s:%d",
+		debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to "
-		    options.remote_forwards[i].port,
+		    "local address %.200s:%d",
-		    options.remote_forwards[i].host,
+		    (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ? 
-		    options.remote_forwards[i].host_port);
+		    (options.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : 
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host,
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
 		channel_request_remote_forwarding(
-		    options.remote_forwards[i].port,
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host,
-		    options.remote_forwards[i].host,
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
-		    options.remote_forwards[i].host_port);
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -1045,12 +1080,12 @@ client_global_request_reply_fwd(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		return;
 	debug("remote forward %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d",
 	    type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
-	    options.remote_forwards[i].port,
+	    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
-	    options.remote_forwards[i].host,
+	    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
-	    options.remote_forwards[i].host_port);
+	    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)
-		logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed for listen port %d",
+		logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed for listen "
-		    options.remote_forwards[i].port);
+		    "port %d", options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port);
 }
 
 static void
@@ -1078,7 +1113,7 @@ ssh_control_listener(void)
 	old_umask = umask(0177);
 	if (bind(control_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
 		control_fd = -1;
-		if (errno == EINVAL)
+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EADDRINUSE)
 			fatal("ControlSocket %s already exists",
 			    options.control_path);
 		else
@@ -1267,10 +1302,20 @@ static void
 control_client(const char *path)
 {
 	struct sockaddr_un addr;
-	int i, r, sock, exitval, num_env, addr_len;
+	int i, r, fd, sock, exitval, num_env, addr_len;
 	Buffer m;
-	char *cp;
+	char *term;
 	extern char **environ;
+	u_int  flags;
+
+	if (stdin_null_flag) {
+		if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+			fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
+		if (dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
+			fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+		if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
+			close(fd);
+	}
 
 	memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
 	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
@@ -1287,26 +1332,52 @@ control_client(const char *path)
 	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1)
 		fatal("Couldn't connect to %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
 
-	if ((cp = getenv("TERM")) == NULL)
+	if ((term = getenv("TERM")) == NULL)
-		cp = "";
+		term = "";
+
+	flags = 0;
+	if (tty_flag)
+		flags |= SSHMUX_FLAG_TTY;
+	if (subsystem_flag)
+		flags |= SSHMUX_FLAG_SUBSYS;
 
 	buffer_init(&m);
 
-	/* Get PID of controlee */
+	/* Send our command to server */
+	buffer_put_int(&m, mux_command);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, flags);
+	if (ssh_msg_send(sock, /* version */1, &m) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: msg_send", __func__);
+	buffer_clear(&m);
+
+	/* Get authorisation status and PID of controlee */
 	if (ssh_msg_recv(sock, &m) == -1)
 		fatal("%s: msg_recv", __func__);
-	if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 0)
+	if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 1)
 		fatal("%s: wrong version", __func__);
-	/* Connection allowed? */
 	if (buffer_get_int(&m) != 1)
 		fatal("Connection to master denied");
 	control_server_pid = buffer_get_int(&m);
 
 	buffer_clear(&m);
-	buffer_put_int(&m, tty_flag);
-	buffer_put_int(&m, subsystem_flag);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&m, cp);
 
+	switch (mux_command) {
+	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK:
+		fprintf(stderr, "Master running (pid=%d)\r\n",
+		    control_server_pid);
+		exit(0);
+	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE:
+		fprintf(stderr, "Exit request sent.\r\n");
+		exit(0);
+	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
+		/* continue below */
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("silly mux_command %d", mux_command);
+	}
+
+	/* SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN */
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, term);
 	buffer_append(&command, "\0", 1);
 	buffer_put_cstring(&m, buffer_ptr(&command));
 
@@ -1328,7 +1399,7 @@ control_client(const char *path)
 			}
 	}
 
-	if (ssh_msg_send(sock, /* version */0, &m) == -1)
+	if (ssh_msg_send(sock, /* version */1, &m) == -1)
 		fatal("%s: msg_send", __func__);
 
 	mm_send_fd(sock, STDIN_FILENO);
@@ -1339,10 +1410,11 @@ control_client(const char *path)
 	buffer_clear(&m);
 	if (ssh_msg_recv(sock, &m) == -1)
 		fatal("%s: msg_recv", __func__);
-	if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 0)
+	if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: master returned error", __func__);
+		fatal("%s: wrong version", __func__);
 	buffer_free(&m);
 
+	signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
 	signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
 	signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
 	signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);

crypto/openssh/ssh.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.75 2003/12/02 17:01:15 markus Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.76 2004/12/06 11:41:03 dtucker Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@
  */
 #define SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES		100
 
+/*
+ * Maximum length of lines in authorized_keys file.
+ * Current value permits 16kbit RSA and RSA1 keys and 8kbit DSA keys, with
+ * some room for options and comments.
+ */
+#define SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES		8192
+
 /*
  * Major protocol version.  Different version indicates major incompatibility
  * that prevents communication.

crypto/openssh/ssh_config

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.19 2003/08/13 08:46:31 markus Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.20 2005/01/28 09:45:53 dtucker Exp $
 #	$FreeBSD$
 
 # This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file.  See
@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@
 # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
 # configuration file, and defaults at the end.
 
-# Site-wide defaults for various options
+# Site-wide defaults for some commonly used options.  For a comprehensive
+# list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
+# ssh_config(5) man page.
 
 # Host *
 #   ForwardAgent no
@@ -36,4 +38,4 @@
 #   Cipher 3des
 #   Ciphers aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc
 #   EscapeChar ~
-#   VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20041028
+#   VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20050605

crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.38 2004/06/26 09:11:14 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.49 2005/03/16 11:10:38 jmc Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ system-wide configuration file
 .Pp
 For each parameter, the first obtained value
 will be used.
-The configuration files contain sections bracketed by
+The configuration files contain sections separated by
 .Dq Host
 specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that
 match one of the patterns given in the specification.
@@ -121,9 +121,9 @@ Specifies which address family to use when connecting.
 Valid arguments are
 .Dq any ,
 .Dq inet
-(Use IPv4 only) or
+(use IPv4 only) or
 .Dq inet6
-(Use IPv6 only.)
+(use IPv6 only).
 .It Cm BatchMode
 If set to
 .Dq yes ,
@@ -360,11 +360,16 @@ option is also enabled.
 If this option is set to
 .Dq yes
 then remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display.
+.Pp
 If this option is set to
 .Dq no
 then remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented
 from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11
 clients.
+Furthermore, the
+.Xr xauth 1
+token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes.
+Remote clients will be refused access after this time.
 .Pp
 The default is
 .Dq no .
@@ -403,6 +408,22 @@ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
 The default is
 .Dq no .
 Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm HashKnownHosts
+Indicates that
+.Nm ssh
+should hash host names and addresses when they are added to
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts .
+These hashed names may be used normally by
+.Nm ssh
+and
+.Nm sshd ,
+but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
+be disclosed.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that hashing of names and addresses will not be retrospectively applied
+to existing known hosts files, but these may be manually hashed using
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
 .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
 Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
 authentication.
@@ -468,16 +489,41 @@ This option is intented for situations where
 offers many different identities.
 The default is
 .Dq no .
+.It Cm KbdInteractiveDevices
+Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication.
+Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
+The default is to use the server specified list.
 .It Cm LocalForward
 Specifies that a TCP/IP port on the local machine be forwarded over
 the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine.
-The first argument must be a port number, and the second must be
+The first argument must be
-.Ar host:port .
+.Sm off
-IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax:
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
-.Ar host/port .
+.Sm on
-Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
+and the second argument must be
-forwardings can be given on the command line.
+.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport .
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets or
+by using an alternative syntax:
+.Oo Ar bind_address Ns / Oc Ns Ar port
+and
+.Ar host Ns / Ns Ar hostport .
+Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
+given on the command line.
 Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+setting.
+However, an explicit
+.Ar bind_address
+may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
+The
+.Ar bind_address
+of
+.Dq localhost
+indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
+empty address or
+.Sq *
+indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
 .It Cm LogLevel
 Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
 .Nm ssh .
@@ -522,9 +568,9 @@ Default is 22.
 .It Cm PreferredAuthentications
 Specifies the order in which the client should try protocol 2
 authentication methods.
-This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.
+This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.\&
 .Cm keyboard-interactive )
-over another method (e.g.
+over another method (e.g.\&
 .Cm password )
 The default for this option is:
 .Dq hostbased,publickey,keyboard-interactive,password .
@@ -583,13 +629,36 @@ This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 .It Cm RemoteForward
 Specifies that a TCP/IP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
 the secure channel to the specified host and port from the local machine.
-The first argument must be a port number, and the second must be
+The first argument must be
-.Ar host:port .
+.Sm off
-IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax:
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
-.Ar host/port .
+.Sm on
+and the second argument must be
+.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport .
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets
+or by using an alternative syntax:
+.Oo Ar bind_address Ns / Oc Ns Ar port
+and
+.Ar host Ns / Ns Ar hostport .
 Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
 forwardings can be given on the command line.
 Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Ar bind_address
+is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses.
+If the
+.Ar bind_address
+is
+.Ql *
+or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all
+interfaces.
+Specifying a remote
+.Ar bind_address
+will only succeed if the server's
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+option is enabled (see
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ) .
 .It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
 Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA host
 authentication.
@@ -783,7 +852,7 @@ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 Specifies a string to append to the regular version string to identify
 OS- or site-specific modifications.
 The default is
-.Dq FreeBSD-20041028 .
+.Dq FreeBSD-20050605 .
 .It Cm XAuthLocation
 Specifies the full pathname of the
 .Xr xauth 1

crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.158 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.162 2005/03/10 22:01:06 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 
@@ -247,13 +247,13 @@ timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
 	tv.tv_sec = timeout;
 	tv.tv_usec = 0;
 
-	for(;;) {
+	for (;;) {
 		rc = select(sockfd + 1, NULL, fdset, NULL, &tv);
 		if (rc != -1 || errno != EINTR)
 			break;
 	}
 
-	switch(rc) {
+	switch (rc) {
 	case 0:
 		/* Timed out */
 		errno = ETIMEDOUT;
@@ -297,12 +297,6 @@ timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
  * second).  If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h
  * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact
  * the daemon.
- * Return values:
- *    0 for OK
- *    ECONNREFUSED if we got a "Connection Refused" by the peer on any address
- *    ECONNABORTED if we failed without a "Connection refused"
- * Suitable error messages for the connection failure will already have been
- * printed.
  */
 int
 ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
@@ -315,12 +309,6 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
 	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
 	struct servent *sp;
-	/*
-	 * Did we get only other errors than "Connection refused" (which
-	 * should block fallback to rsh and similar), or did we get at least
-	 * one "Connection refused"?
-	 */
-	int full_failure = 1;
 
 	debug2("ssh_connect: needpriv %d", needpriv);
 
@@ -381,8 +369,6 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 				memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
 				break;
 			} else {
-				if (errno == ECONNREFUSED)
-					full_failure = 0;
 				debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s",
 				    ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
 				/*
@@ -408,9 +394,9 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 
 	/* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */
 	if (attempt >= connection_attempts) {
-		logit("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
+		error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
 		    host, strport, strerror(errno));
-		return full_failure ? ECONNABORTED : ECONNREFUSED;
+		return (-1);
 	}
 
 	debug("Connection established.");
@@ -568,7 +554,7 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 	char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp;
 	HostStatus host_status;
 	HostStatus ip_status;
-	int local = 0, host_ip_differ = 0;
+	int r, local = 0, host_ip_differ = 0;
 	int salen;
 	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
 	char msg[1024];
@@ -692,7 +678,7 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 				    "'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.",
 				    type, ip);
 			else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, ip,
-			    host_key))
+			    host_key, options.hash_known_hosts))
 				logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP "
 				    "address '%.128s' to the list of known "
 				    "hosts (%.30s).", type, ip, user_hostfile);
@@ -748,17 +734,33 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 			if (!confirm(msg))
 				goto fail;
 		}
-		if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
-			snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip);
-			hostp = hostline;
-		} else
-			hostp = host;
-
 		/*
 		 * If not in strict mode, add the key automatically to the
 		 * local known_hosts file.
 		 */
-		if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, hostp, host_key))
+		if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
+			snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s",
+			    host, ip);
+			hostp = hostline;
+			if (options.hash_known_hosts) {
+				/* Add hash of host and IP separately */
+				r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, host,
+				    host_key, options.hash_known_hosts) &&
+				    add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, ip,
+				    host_key, options.hash_known_hosts);
+			} else {
+				/* Add unhashed "host,ip" */
+				r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile,
+				    hostline, host_key,
+				    options.hash_known_hosts);
+			}
+		} else {
+			r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, host, host_key,
+			    options.hash_known_hosts);
+			hostp = host;
+		}
+
+		if (!r)
 			logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known "
 			    "hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfile);
 		else

crypto/openssh/sshd.8

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.201 2004/05/02 11:54:31 dtucker Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.206 2005/03/01 14:59:49 jmc Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSHD 8
@@ -107,8 +107,6 @@ to use from those offered by the server.
 Next, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
 The client tries to authenticate itself using
 .Em .rhosts
-authentication,
-.Em .rhosts
 authentication combined with RSA host
 authentication, RSA challenge-response authentication, or password
 based authentication.
@@ -136,11 +134,6 @@ or
 .Ql \&*NP\&*
 ).
 .Pp
-.Em rhosts
-authentication is normally disabled
-because it is fundamentally insecure, but can be enabled in the server
-configuration file if desired.
-System security is not improved unless
 .Nm rshd ,
 .Nm rlogind ,
 and
@@ -428,7 +421,9 @@ or
 .Dq ssh-rsa .
 .Pp
 Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long
-(because of the size of the public key encoding).
+(because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of
+8 kilobytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA
+keys up to 16 kilobits.
 You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the
 .Pa identity.pub ,
 .Pa id_dsa.pub
@@ -559,6 +554,14 @@ to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated
 pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another
 pattern on the line.
 .Pp
+Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names
+and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed.
+Hashed hostnames start with a
+.Ql |
+character.
+Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above
+negation or wildcard operators may be applied.
+.Pp
 Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key; they
 can be obtained, e.g., from
 .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub .
@@ -590,6 +593,11 @@ and adding the host names at the front.
 closenet,...,130.233.208.41 1024 37 159...93 closenet.hut.fi
 cvs.openbsd.org,199.185.137.3 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
 .Ed
+.Bd -literal
+# A hashed hostname
+|1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa
+AAAA1234.....=
+.Ed
 .Sh FILES
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
 .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
@@ -658,6 +666,20 @@ These files should be writable only by root/the owner.
 should be world-readable, and
 .Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
 can, but need not be, world-readable.
+.It Pa /etc/motd
+See
+.Xr motd 5 .
+.It Pa $HOME/.hushlogin
+This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
+.Pa /etc/motd ,
+if
+.Cm PrintLastLog
+and
+.Cm PrintMotd ,
+respectively,
+are enabled.
+It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by
+.Cm Banner .
 .It Pa /etc/nologin
 If this file exists,
 .Nm
@@ -671,7 +693,11 @@ Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
 Further details are described in
 .Xr hosts_access 5 .
 .It Pa $HOME/.rhosts
-This file contains host-username pairs, separated by a space, one per
+This file is used during
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+and
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+and contains host-username pairs, separated by a space, one per
 line.
 The given user on the corresponding host is permitted to log in
 without a password.
@@ -692,7 +718,9 @@ However, this file is
 not used by rlogin and rshd, so using this permits access using SSH only.
 .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
 This file is used during
-.Em rhosts
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+and
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication
 authentication.
 In the simplest form, this file contains host names, one per line.
 Users on
@@ -711,7 +739,7 @@ Negated entries start with
 If the client host/user is successfully matched in this file, login is
 automatically permitted provided the client and server user names are the
 same.
-Additionally, successful RSA host authentication is normally required.
+Additionally, successful client host key authentication is required.
 This file must be writable only by root; it is recommended
 that it be world-readable.
 .Pp

crypto/openssh/sshd.c

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.301 2004/08/11 11:50:09 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.308 2005/02/08 22:24:57 dtucker Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
@@ -116,12 +116,6 @@ ServerOptions options;
 /* Name of the server configuration file. */
 char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
 
-/*
- * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6.  This can be set on the command line.
- * Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6.
- */
-int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
-
 /*
  * Debug mode flag.  This can be set on the command line.  If debug
  * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
@@ -755,7 +749,7 @@ get_hostkey_index(Key *key)
 static int
 drop_connection(int startups)
 {
-	double p, r;
+	int p, r;
 
 	if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
 		return 0;
@@ -766,12 +760,11 @@ drop_connection(int startups)
 
 	p  = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
 	p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
-	p /= (double) (options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin);
+	p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
 	p += options.max_startups_rate;
-	p /= 100.0;
+	r = arc4random() % 100;
-	r = arc4random() / (double) UINT_MAX;
 
-	debug("drop_connection: p %g, r %g", p, r);
+	debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
 	return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
 }
 
@@ -779,7 +772,7 @@ static void
 usage(void)
 {
 	fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
-	    SSH_VERSION, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
+	    SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
 	fprintf(stderr,
 "usage: sshd [-46Ddeiqt] [-b bits] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
 "            [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
@@ -889,7 +882,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
 	char *line;
 	int listen_sock, maxfd;
-	int startup_p[2], config_s[2];
+	int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }, config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
 	int startups = 0;
 	Key *key;
 	Authctxt *authctxt;
@@ -926,10 +919,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:dDeiqrtQR46")) != -1) {
 		switch (opt) {
 		case '4':
-			IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
+			options.address_family = AF_INET;
 			break;
 		case '6':
-			IPv4or6 = AF_INET6;
+			options.address_family = AF_INET6;
 			break;
 		case 'f':
 			config_file_name = optarg;
@@ -1030,7 +1023,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
 
 	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
-	channel_set_af(IPv4or6);
 
 	/*
 	 * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
@@ -1043,13 +1035,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	    SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
 	    log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
 
-#ifdef _AIX
 	/*
 	 * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
 	 * root's environment
 	 */ 
-	unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
+	if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
-#endif /* _AIX */
+		unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
+
 #ifdef _UNICOS
 	/* Cray can define user privs drop all privs now!
 	 * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems!
@@ -1080,13 +1072,16 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
 	fill_default_server_options(&options);
 
+	/* set default channel AF */
+	channel_set_af(options.address_family);
+
 	/* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
 	if (optind < ac) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
 		exit(1);
 	}
 
-	debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION);
+	debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE);
 
 	/* load private host keys */
 	sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files *
@@ -1202,7 +1197,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	}
 
 	/* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
-	if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag)
+	if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag))
 		log_stderr = 1;
 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
 
@@ -1278,10 +1273,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
 				fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
 				    "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
-			if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+			if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
 			    ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
-			    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
+			    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
-				error("getnameinfo failed");
+				error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
+				    (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) :
+				    strerror(errno));
 				continue;
 			}
 			/* Create socket for listening. */
@@ -1512,7 +1509,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 						sock_in = newsock;
 						sock_out = newsock;
 						log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
-						close(config_s[0]);
+						if (rexec_flag)
+							close(config_s[0]);
 						break;
 					}
 				}
@@ -1648,6 +1646,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	remote_port = get_remote_port();
 	remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
 
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
+#endif
 #ifdef LIBWRAP
 	/* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
 	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
@@ -1684,23 +1685,22 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 
 	packet_set_nonblocking();
 
-	/* prepare buffers to collect authentication messages */
-	buffer_init(&loginmsg);
-
 	/* allocate authentication context */
 	authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
 
+	authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
+
 	/* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
 	the_authctxt = authctxt;
 
+	/* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
+	buffer_init(&loginmsg);
+
 	if (use_privsep)
 		if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
 			goto authenticated;
 
-	/* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
-	buffer_init(&loginmsg);
-
 	/* perform the key exchange */
 	/* authenticate user and start session */
 	if (compat20) {
@@ -1720,6 +1720,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	}
 
  authenticated:
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
 	 * file descriptor passing.
@@ -1742,6 +1746,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		finish_pam();
 #endif /* USE_PAM */
 
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
+#endif
+
 	packet_close();
 
 	if (use_privsep)
@@ -2033,5 +2041,10 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
 {
 	if (the_authctxt)
 		do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
+	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+		audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
+#endif
 	_exit(i);
 }

crypto/openssh/sshd_config

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.69 2004/05/23 23:59:53 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.70 2004/12/23 23:11:00 djm Exp $
 #	$FreeBSD$
 
 # This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file.  See
@@ -14,10 +14,11 @@
 # Note that some of FreeBSD's defaults differ from OpenBSD's, and
 # FreeBSD has a few additional options.
 
-#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20041028
+#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20050605
 
 #Port 22
 #Protocol 2
+#AddressFamily any
 #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
 #ListenAddress ::
 

crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.35 2004/06/26 09:14:40 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.40 2005/03/18 17:05:00 jmc Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
@@ -84,6 +84,17 @@ Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted
 user environments.
 For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive.
 The default is not to accept any environment variables.
+.It Cm AddressFamily
+Specifies which address family should be used by
+.Nm sshd .
+Valid arguments are
+.Dq any ,
+.Dq inet
+(use IPv4 only) or
+.Dq inet6
+(use IPv6 only).
+The default is
+.Dq any .
 .It Cm AllowGroups
 This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
 by spaces.
@@ -253,12 +264,15 @@ This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
 .Cm GatewayPorts
 can be used to specify that
 .Nm sshd
-should bind remote port forwardings to the wildcard address,
+should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus
-thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports.
+allowing other hosts to connect.
-The argument must be
+The argument may be
+.Dq no
+to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only,
 .Dq yes
-or
+to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or
-.Dq no .
+.Dq clientspecified
+to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound.
 The default is
 .Dq no .
 .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
@@ -476,7 +490,7 @@ server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.
 The default is
 .Dq no .
 .It Cm PermitRootLogin
-Specifies whether root can login using
+Specifies whether root can log in using
 .Xr ssh 1 .
 The argument must be
 .Dq yes ,
@@ -496,9 +510,7 @@ the root user may be allowed in with its password even if
 .Pp
 If this option is set to
 .Dq without-password
-password authentication is disabled for root.  Note that other authentication
+password authentication is disabled for root.
-methods (e.g., keyboard-interactive/PAM) may still allow root to login using
-a password.
 .Pp
 If this option is set to
 .Dq forced-commands-only
@@ -512,7 +524,7 @@ All other authentication methods are disabled for root.
 .Pp
 If this option is set to
 .Dq no
-root is not allowed to login.
+root is not allowed to log in.
 .It Cm PermitUserEnvironment
 Specifies whether
 .Pa ~/.ssh/environment
@@ -544,7 +556,8 @@ See also
 .It Cm PrintLastLog
 Specifies whether
 .Nm sshd
-should print the date and time when the user last logged in.
+should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs
+in interactively.
 The default is
 .Dq yes .
 .It Cm PrintMotd
@@ -647,7 +660,7 @@ To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
 .It Cm UseDNS
 Specifies whether
 .Nm sshd
-should lookup the remote host name and check that
+should look up the remote host name and check that
 the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the
 very same IP address.
 The default is
@@ -707,7 +720,7 @@ The default is
 Specifies a string to append to the regular version string to identify
 OS- or site-specific modifications.
 The default is
-.Dq FreeBSD-20041028 .
+.Dq FreeBSD-20050605 .
 .It Cm X11DisplayOffset
 Specifies the first display number available for
 .Nm sshd Ns 's

crypto/openssh/version.h

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.42 2004/08/16 08:17:01 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.44 2005/03/16 21:17:39 markus Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 
 #ifndef SSH_VERSION
 
 #define SSH_VERSION             (ssh_version_get())
-#define SSH_VERSION_BASE        "OpenSSH_3.9p1"
+#define SSH_RELEASE             (ssh_version_get())
+#define SSH_VERSION_BASE        "OpenSSH_4.1p1"
 #define SSH_VERSION_ADDENDUM    "FreeBSD-20041028"
 
 const char *ssh_version_get(void);