Correct multiple security issues in how libarchive handles corrupt

tar archives, including a potentially exploitable buffer overflow.

Approved by:	re (kensmith, security blanket)
Reviewed by:	kientzle
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-07:05.libarchive
This commit is contained in:
cperciva 2007-07-12 15:00:28 +00:00
parent ffeb100042
commit a337e4787d
2 changed files with 104 additions and 41 deletions

View File

@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ LDADD= -lbz2 -lz
# Major: Bumped ONLY when API/ABI breakage happens (see SHLIB_MAJOR)
# Minor: Bumped when significant new features are added
# Revision: Bumped on any notable change
VERSION= 2.2.3
VERSION= 2.2.4
ARCHIVE_API_MAJOR!= echo ${VERSION} | sed -e 's/[^0-9]/./g' -e 's/\..*//'
ARCHIVE_API_MINOR!= echo ${VERSION} | sed -e 's/[^0-9]/./g' -e 's/[0-9]*\.//' -e 's/\..*//'

View File

@ -690,7 +690,13 @@ tar_read_header(struct archive_read *a, struct tar *tar,
}
}
--tar->header_recursion_depth;
return (err);
/* We return warnings or success as-is. Anything else is fatal. */
if (err == ARCHIVE_WARN || err == ARCHIVE_OK)
return (err);
if (err == ARCHIVE_EOF)
/* EOF when recursively reading a header is bad. */
archive_set_error(&a->archive, EINVAL, "Damaged tar archive");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/*
@ -761,32 +767,55 @@ static int
header_Solaris_ACL(struct archive_read *a, struct tar *tar,
struct archive_entry *entry, const void *h)
{
int err, err2;
char *p;
const struct archive_entry_header_ustar *header;
size_t size;
int err;
char *acl, *p;
wchar_t *wp;
/*
* read_body_to_string adds a NUL terminator, but we need a little
* more to make sure that we don't overrun acl_text later.
*/
header = (const struct archive_entry_header_ustar *)h;
size = tar_atol(header->size, sizeof(header->size));
err = read_body_to_string(a, tar, &(tar->acl_text), h);
err2 = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry);
err = err_combine(err, err2);
/* XXX Ensure p doesn't overrun acl_text */
if (err != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (err);
err = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry);
if ((err != ARCHIVE_OK) && (err != ARCHIVE_WARN))
return (err);
/* Skip leading octal number. */
/* XXX TODO: Parse the octal number and sanity-check it. */
p = tar->acl_text.s;
while (*p != '\0')
p = acl = tar->acl_text.s;
while (*p != '\0' && p < acl + size)
p++;
p++;
wp = (wchar_t *)malloc((strlen(p) + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t));
if (wp != NULL) {
utf8_decode(wp, p, strlen(p));
err2 = __archive_entry_acl_parse_w(entry, wp,
ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
err = err_combine(err, err2);
free(wp);
if (p >= acl + size) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Malformed Solaris ACL attribute");
return(ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
/* Skip leading octal number. */
size -= (p - acl);
acl = p;
while (*p != '\0' && p < acl + size)
p++;
wp = (wchar_t *)malloc((p - acl + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t));
if (wp == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate work buffer for ACL parsing");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
utf8_decode(wp, acl, p - acl);
err = __archive_entry_acl_parse_w(entry, wp,
ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
free(wp);
return (err);
}
@ -797,15 +826,17 @@ static int
header_longlink(struct archive_read *a, struct tar *tar,
struct archive_entry *entry, const void *h)
{
int err, err2;
int err;
err = read_body_to_string(a, tar, &(tar->longlink), h);
err2 = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry);
if (err == ARCHIVE_OK && err2 == ARCHIVE_OK) {
/* Set symlink if symlink already set, else hardlink. */
archive_entry_set_link(entry, tar->longlink.s);
}
return (err_combine(err, err2));
if (err != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (err);
err = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry);
if ((err != ARCHIVE_OK) && (err != ARCHIVE_WARN))
return (err);
/* Set symlink if symlink already set, else hardlink. */
archive_entry_set_link(entry, tar->longlink.s);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
/*
@ -815,14 +846,17 @@ static int
header_longname(struct archive_read *a, struct tar *tar,
struct archive_entry *entry, const void *h)
{
int err, err2;
int err;
err = read_body_to_string(a, tar, &(tar->longname), h);
if (err != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (err);
/* Read and parse "real" header, then override name. */
err2 = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry);
if (err == ARCHIVE_OK && err2 == ARCHIVE_OK)
archive_entry_set_pathname(entry, tar->longname.s);
return (err_combine(err, err2));
err = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry);
if ((err != ARCHIVE_OK) && (err != ARCHIVE_WARN))
return (err);
archive_entry_set_pathname(entry, tar->longname.s);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
@ -855,6 +889,11 @@ read_body_to_string(struct archive_read *a, struct tar *tar,
(void)tar; /* UNUSED */
header = (const struct archive_entry_header_ustar *)h;
size = tar_atol(header->size, sizeof(header->size));
if ((size > 1048576) || (size < 0)) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, EINVAL,
"Special header too large");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* Read the body into the string. */
archive_string_ensure(as, size+1);
@ -862,6 +901,8 @@ read_body_to_string(struct archive_read *a, struct tar *tar,
dest = as->s;
while (padded_size > 0) {
bytes_read = (a->decompressor->read_ahead)(a, &src, padded_size);
if (bytes_read == 0)
return (ARCHIVE_EOF);
if (bytes_read < 0)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
if (bytes_read > padded_size)
@ -1052,11 +1093,13 @@ static int
header_pax_global(struct archive_read *a, struct tar *tar,
struct archive_entry *entry, const void *h)
{
int err, err2;
int err;
err = read_body_to_string(a, tar, &(tar->pax_global), h);
err2 = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry);
return (err_combine(err, err2));
if (err != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (err);
err = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry);
return (err);
}
static int
@ -1065,10 +1108,14 @@ header_pax_extensions(struct archive_read *a, struct tar *tar,
{
int err, err2;
read_body_to_string(a, tar, &(tar->pax_header), h);
err = read_body_to_string(a, tar, &(tar->pax_header), h);
if (err != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (err);
/* Parse the next header. */
err = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry);
if ((err != ARCHIVE_OK) && (err != ARCHIVE_WARN))
return (err);
/*
* TODO: Parse global/default options into 'entry' struct here
@ -1165,8 +1212,11 @@ pax_header(struct archive_read *a, struct tar *tar,
l--;
break;
}
if (*p < '0' || *p > '9')
return (-1);
if (*p < '0' || *p > '9') {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Ignoring malformed pax extended attributes");
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
line_length *= 10;
line_length += *p - '0';
if (line_length > 999999) {
@ -1178,8 +1228,19 @@ pax_header(struct archive_read *a, struct tar *tar,
l--;
}
if (line_length > attr_length)
return (0);
/*
* Parsed length must be no bigger than available data,
* at least 1, and the last character of the line must
* be '\n'.
*/
if (line_length > attr_length
|| line_length < 1
|| attr[line_length - 1] != '\n')
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Ignoring malformed pax extended attribute");
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
/* Ensure pax_entry buffer is big enough. */
if (tar->pax_entry_length <= line_length) {
@ -1962,18 +2023,20 @@ readline(struct archive_read *a, struct tar *tar, const char **start)
memcpy(tar->line.s + total_size, t, bytes_read);
(a->decompressor->consume)(a, bytes_read);
total_size += bytes_read;
/* If we found '\n', clean up and return. */
if (p != NULL) {
*start = tar->line.s;
return (total_size);
}
/* Read some more. */
bytes_read = (a->decompressor->read_ahead)(a, &t, 1);
if (bytes_read <= 0)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
s = t; /* Start of line? */
p = memchr(t, '\n', bytes_read);
/* If we found '\n', finish the line. */
/* If we found '\n', trim the read. */
if (p != NULL) {
bytes_read = 1 + ((const char *)p) - s;
(a->decompressor->consume)(a, bytes_read);
*start = tar->line.s;
return (total_size + bytes_read);
}
}
}