From b4b831ef39a3e2f33a3acd094eac471c502ec259 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ruslan Ermilov Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2004 15:00:29 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] - Added rad_demangle() for demangling user-passwords (needed for MS-CHAPv1 MPPE-keys). - Added rad_demangle_mppe_key() for demangling mppe-keys (needed for MPPE-keys). - Added some typecasts for avoiding compiler warnings. - Fix: better handle wrong usage of the lib (if the programmer has not called rad_create_request() but rad_put_*(), then a weird error message was returned). - Added a new function for putting the Message-Authenticator. - Verify the Message-Authenticator, if it was found inside a response packet and silently drop the packet, if the validation failed. - Implicitly put the Message-Authenticator, if the EAP-Message attribute was added. - Added some missing defines. Submitted by: Michael Bretterklieber PR: 46555 --- Makefile.inc1 | 7 +- lib/libradius/Makefile | 13 +- lib/libradius/libradius.3 | 78 +++++++- lib/libradius/radlib.c | 325 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- lib/libradius/radlib.h | 14 ++ lib/libradius/radlib_private.h | 3 + lib/libradius/radlib_vs.h | 14 +- 7 files changed, 421 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/Makefile.inc1 b/Makefile.inc1 index 1dc55e1b59db..1d3c02f83c60 100644 --- a/Makefile.inc1 +++ b/Makefile.inc1 @@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ _prebuild_libs+= lib/libcom_err lib/libcrypt lib/libexpat \ lib/libsbuf lib/libtacplus lib/libutil lib/libypclnt \ lib/libz lib/msun -lib/libopie__L lib/libradius__L lib/libtacplus__L: lib/libmd__L +lib/libopie__L lib/libtacplus__L: lib/libmd__L lib/libypclnt__L: lib/librpcsvc__L _generic_libs+= lib @@ -909,6 +909,7 @@ _generic_libs+= lib .if !defined(NOCRYPT) .if !defined(NO_OPENSSL) _prebuild_libs+= secure/lib/libcrypto secure/lib/libssl +lib/libradius__L: secure/lib/libssl__L .if !defined(NO_OPENSSH) _prebuild_libs+= secure/lib/libssh secure/lib/libssh__L: secure/lib/libcrypto__L lib/libz__L @@ -917,6 +918,10 @@ secure/lib/libssh__L: secure/lib/libcrypto__L lib/libz__L _generic_libs+= secure/lib .endif +.if defined(NOCRYPT) || defined(NO_OPENSSL) +lib/libradius__L: lib/libmd__L +.endif + _generic_libs+= usr.bin/lex/lib .if ${MACHINE_ARCH} == "i386" diff --git a/lib/libradius/Makefile b/lib/libradius/Makefile index f2a766882eb2..0f2eb88bbd6a 100644 --- a/lib/libradius/Makefile +++ b/lib/libradius/Makefile @@ -22,15 +22,22 @@ # OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF # SUCH DAMAGE. # -# $FreeBSD$ +# $FreeBSD$ LIB= radius SRCS= radlib.c INCS= radlib.h radlib_vs.h CFLAGS+= -Wall -DPADD= ${LIBMD} -LDADD= -lmd SHLIB_MAJOR= 1 MAN= libradius.3 radius.conf.5 +.if defined(NOCRYPT) || defined(NO_OPENSSL) +DPADD= ${LIBMD} +LDADD= -lmd +.else +DPADD= ${LIBSSL} +LDADD= -lssl +CFLAGS+= -DWITH_SSL +.endif + .include diff --git a/lib/libradius/libradius.3 b/lib/libradius/libradius.3 index fe856b497e5c..095d6e9a58aa 100644 --- a/lib/libradius/libradius.3 +++ b/lib/libradius/libradius.3 @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ .\" .\" $FreeBSD$ .\" -.Dd June 12, 2002 +.Dd April 27, 2004 .Dt LIBRADIUS 3 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ .Ft int .Fn rad_put_string "struct rad_handle *h" "int type" "const char *str" .Ft int +.Fn rad_put_message_authentic "struct rad_handle *h" +.Ft int .Fn rad_put_vendor_addr "struct rad_handle *h" "int vendor" "int type" "struct in_addr addr" .Ft int .Fn rad_put_vendor_attr "struct rad_handle *h" "int vendor" "int type" "const void *data" "size_t len" @@ -80,6 +82,10 @@ .Fn rad_send_request "struct rad_handle *h" .Ft "const char *" .Fn rad_server_secret "struct rad_handle *h" +.Ft u_char * +.Fn rad_demangle "struct rad_handle *h" "const void *mangled" "size_t mlen" +.Ft u_char * +.Fn rad_demangle_mppe_key "struct rad_handle *h" "const void *mangled" "size_t mlen" "size_t *len" .Ft "const char *" .Fn rad_strerror "struct rad_handle *h" .Sh DESCRIPTION @@ -87,7 +93,7 @@ The .Nm library implements the client side of the Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS). -RADIUS, defined in RFCs 2138 and 2139, +RADIUS, defined in RFCs 2865 and 2866, allows clients to perform authentication and accounting by means of network requests to remote servers. .Ss Initialization @@ -232,6 +238,22 @@ argument points to an array of bytes, and the .Fa len argument specifies its length. .Pp +It is possible adding the Message-Authenticator to the request. +This is an HMAC-MD5 hash of the entire Access-Request packet (see RFC 3579). +This attribute must be present in any packet that includes an EAP-Message +attribute. +It can be added by using the +.Fn rad_put_message_authentic +function. +The +.Nm +library +calculates the HMAC-MD5 hash implicitly before sending the request. +If the Message-Authenticator was found inside the response packet, +then the packet is silently dropped, if the validation failed. +In order to get this feature, the library should be compiled with +OpenSSL support. +.Pp The .Fn rad_put_X functions return 0 on success, or \-1 if an error occurs. @@ -395,6 +417,26 @@ The .Fn rad_server_secret returns the secret shared with the current RADIUS server according to the supplied rad_handle. +.Pp +The +.Fn rad_demangle +function demangles attributes containing passwords and MS-CHAPv1 MPPE-Keys. +The return value is +.Dv NULL +on failure, or the plaintext attribute. +This value should be freed using +.Xr free 3 +when it is no longer needed. +.Pp +The +.Fn rad_demangle_mppe_key +function demangles the send- and recv-keys when using MPPE (see RFC 2548). +The return value is +.Dv NULL +on failure, or the plaintext attribute. +This value should be freed using +.Xr free 3 +when it is no longer needed. .Ss Obtaining Error Messages Those functions which accept a .Vt "struct rad_handle *" @@ -434,6 +476,8 @@ which can be retrieved using .It .Fn rad_put_string .It +.Fn rad_put_message_authentic +.It .Fn rad_init_send_request .It .Fn rad_continue_send_request @@ -457,6 +501,20 @@ without recording an error message. .It .Fn rad_cvt_string .El +.Pp +The following functions return a +.No non- Ns Dv NULL +pointer on success. +If they fail, they return +.Dv NULL , +with recording an error message. +.Pp +.Bl -item -offset indent -compact +.It +.Fn rad_demangle +.It +.Fn rad_demangle_mppe_key +.El .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width indent .It Pa /etc/radius.conf @@ -466,12 +524,22 @@ without recording an error message. .Rs .%A "C. Rigney, et al" .%T "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)" -.%O "RFC 2138" +.%O "RFC 2865" .Re .Rs .%A "C. Rigney" .%T "RADIUS Accounting" -.%O "RFC 2139" +.%O "RFC 2866" +.Re +.Rs +.%A G. Zorn +.%T "Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS attributes" +.%O RFC 2548 +.Re +.Rs +.%A C. Rigney, et al +.%T "RADIUS extensions" +.%O RFC 2869 .Re .Sh AUTHORS .An -nosplit @@ -483,3 +551,5 @@ project by Juniper Networks, Inc. .An Oleg Semyonov subsequently added the ability to perform RADIUS accounting. +Later additions and changes by +.An Michael Bretterklieber . diff --git a/lib/libradius/radlib.c b/lib/libradius/radlib.c index 702b06f12fe9..3460db5604b3 100644 --- a/lib/libradius/radlib.c +++ b/lib/libradius/radlib.c @@ -32,9 +32,21 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include +#ifdef WITH_SSL +#include +#include +#define MD5Init MD5_Init +#define MD5Update MD5_Update +#define MD5Final MD5_Final +#else +#define MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH 16 +#include +#endif + +/* We need the MPPE_KEY_LEN define */ +#include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -50,6 +62,7 @@ static void generr(struct rad_handle *, const char *, ...) __printflike(2, 3); static void insert_scrambled_password(struct rad_handle *, int); static void insert_request_authenticator(struct rad_handle *, int); +static void insert_message_authenticator(struct rad_handle *, int); static int is_valid_response(struct rad_handle *, int, const struct sockaddr_in *); static int put_password_attr(struct rad_handle *, int, @@ -82,7 +95,7 @@ static void insert_scrambled_password(struct rad_handle *h, int srv) { MD5_CTX ctx; - unsigned char md5[16]; + unsigned char md5[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; const struct rad_server *srvp; int padded_len; int pos; @@ -129,6 +142,31 @@ insert_request_authenticator(struct rad_handle *h, int srv) MD5Final(&h->request[POS_AUTH], &ctx); } +static void +insert_message_authenticator(struct rad_handle *h, int srv) +{ +#ifdef WITH_SSL + u_char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + u_int md_len; + const struct rad_server *srvp; + HMAC_CTX ctx; + srvp = &h->servers[srv]; + + if (h->authentic_pos != 0) { + HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx); + HMAC_Init(&ctx, srvp->secret, strlen(srvp->secret), EVP_md5()); + HMAC_Update(&ctx, &h->request[POS_CODE], POS_AUTH - POS_CODE); + HMAC_Update(&ctx, &h->request[POS_AUTH], LEN_AUTH); + HMAC_Update(&ctx, &h->request[POS_ATTRS], + h->req_len - POS_ATTRS); + HMAC_Final(&ctx, md, &md_len); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + HMAC_cleanup(&ctx); + memcpy(&h->request[h->authentic_pos + 2], md, md_len); + } +#endif +} + /* * Return true if the current response is valid for a request to the * specified server. @@ -138,9 +176,14 @@ is_valid_response(struct rad_handle *h, int srv, const struct sockaddr_in *from) { MD5_CTX ctx; - unsigned char md5[16]; + unsigned char md5[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; const struct rad_server *srvp; int len; +#ifdef WITH_SSL + HMAC_CTX hctx; + u_char resp[MSGSIZE], md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + int pos, md_len; +#endif srvp = &h->servers[srv]; @@ -167,6 +210,44 @@ is_valid_response(struct rad_handle *h, int srv, if (memcmp(&h->response[POS_AUTH], md5, sizeof md5) != 0) return 0; +#ifdef WITH_SSL + /* + * For non accounting responses check the message authenticator, + * if any. + */ + if (h->response[POS_CODE] != RAD_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE) { + + memcpy(resp, h->response, MSGSIZE); + pos = POS_ATTRS; + + /* Search and verify the Message-Authenticator */ + while (pos < len - 2) { + + if (h->response[pos] == RAD_MESSAGE_AUTHENTIC) { + /* zero fill the Message-Authenticator */ + memset(&resp[pos + 2], 0, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH); + + HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); + HMAC_Init(&hctx, srvp->secret, + strlen(srvp->secret), EVP_md5()); + HMAC_Update(&hctx, &h->response[POS_CODE], + POS_AUTH - POS_CODE); + HMAC_Update(&hctx, &h->request[POS_AUTH], + LEN_AUTH); + HMAC_Update(&hctx, &resp[POS_ATTRS], + h->resp_len - POS_ATTRS); + HMAC_Final(&hctx, md, &md_len); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + HMAC_cleanup(&hctx); + if (memcmp(md, &h->response[pos + 2], + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) + return 0; + break; + } + pos += h->response[pos + 1]; + } + } +#endif return 1; } @@ -244,7 +325,7 @@ rad_add_server(struct rad_handle *h, const char *host, int port, sizeof srvp->addr.sin_addr); } if (port != 0) - srvp->addr.sin_port = htons(port); + srvp->addr.sin_port = htons((u_short)port); else { struct servent *sent; @@ -482,6 +563,8 @@ rad_continue_send_request(struct rad_handle *h, int selected, int *fd, if (h->pass_pos != 0) insert_scrambled_password(h, h->srv); + insert_message_authenticator(h, h->srv); + /* Send the request */ n = sendto(h->fd, h->request, h->req_len, 0, (const struct sockaddr *)&h->servers[h->srv].addr, @@ -514,11 +597,12 @@ rad_create_request(struct rad_handle *h, int code) for (i = 0; i < LEN_AUTH; i += 2) { long r; r = random(); - h->request[POS_AUTH+i] = r; - h->request[POS_AUTH+i+1] = r >> 8; + h->request[POS_AUTH+i] = (u_char)r; + h->request[POS_AUTH+i+1] = (u_char)(r >> 8); } h->req_len = POS_ATTRS; clear_password(h); + h->request_created = 1; return 0; } @@ -570,7 +654,7 @@ rad_get_attr(struct rad_handle *h, const void **value, size_t *len) } type = h->response[h->resp_pos++]; *len = h->response[h->resp_pos++] - 2; - if (h->resp_pos + *len > h->resp_len) { + if (h->resp_pos + (int)*len > h->resp_len) { generr(h, "Malformed attribute in response"); return -1; } @@ -612,18 +696,23 @@ rad_init_send_request(struct rad_handle *h, int *fd, struct timeval *tv) if (h->request[POS_CODE] == RAD_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST) { /* Make sure no password given */ if (h->pass_pos || h->chap_pass) { - generr(h, "User or Chap Password in accounting request"); + generr(h, "User or Chap Password" + " in accounting request"); return -1; } } else { - /* Make sure the user gave us a password */ - if (h->pass_pos == 0 && !h->chap_pass) { - generr(h, "No User or Chap Password attributes given"); - return -1; - } - if (h->pass_pos != 0 && h->chap_pass) { - generr(h, "Both User and Chap Password attributes given"); - return -1; + if (h->eap_msg == 0) { + /* Make sure the user gave us a password */ + if (h->pass_pos == 0 && !h->chap_pass) { + generr(h, "No User or Chap Password" + " attributes given"); + return -1; + } + if (h->pass_pos != 0 && h->chap_pass) { + generr(h, "Both User and Chap Password" + " attributes given"); + return -1; + } } } @@ -671,7 +760,10 @@ rad_auth_open(void) h->pass_len = 0; h->pass_pos = 0; h->chap_pass = 0; + h->authentic_pos = 0; h->type = RADIUS_AUTH; + h->request_created = 0; + h->eap_msg = 0; } return h; } @@ -704,12 +796,41 @@ rad_put_attr(struct rad_handle *h, int type, const void *value, size_t len) { int result; - if (type == RAD_USER_PASSWORD) + if (!h->request_created) { + generr(h, "Please call rad_create_request()" + " before putting attributes"); + return -1; + } + + if (h->request[POS_CODE] == RAD_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST) { + if (type == RAD_EAP_MESSAGE) { + generr(h, "EAP-Message attribute is not valid" + " in accounting requests"); + return -1; + } + } + + /* + * When proxying EAP Messages, the Message Authenticator + * MUST be present; see RFC 3579. + */ + if (type == RAD_EAP_MESSAGE) { + if (rad_put_message_authentic(h) == -1) + return -1; + } + + if (type == RAD_USER_PASSWORD) { result = put_password_attr(h, type, value, len); - else { + } else if (type == RAD_MESSAGE_AUTHENTIC) { + result = rad_put_message_authentic(h); + } else { result = put_raw_attr(h, type, value, len); - if (result == 0 && type == RAD_CHAP_PASSWORD) - h->chap_pass = 1; + if (result == 0) { + if (type == RAD_CHAP_PASSWORD) + h->chap_pass = 1; + else if (type == RAD_EAP_MESSAGE) + h->eap_msg = 1; + } } return result; @@ -730,6 +851,32 @@ rad_put_string(struct rad_handle *h, int type, const char *str) return rad_put_attr(h, type, str, strlen(str)); } +int +rad_put_message_authentic(struct rad_handle *h) +{ +#ifdef WITH_SSL + u_char md_zero[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + + if (h->request[POS_CODE] == RAD_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST) { + generr(h, "Message-Authenticator is not valid" + " in accounting requests"); + return -1; + } + + if (h->authentic_pos == 0) { + h->authentic_pos = h->req_len; + memset(md_zero, 0, sizeof(md_zero)); + return (put_raw_attr(h, RAD_MESSAGE_AUTHENTIC, md_zero, + sizeof(md_zero))); + } + return 0; +#else + generr(h, "Message Authenticator not supported," + " please recompile libradius with SSL support"); + return -1; +#endif +} + /* * Returns the response type code on success, or -1 on failure. */ @@ -893,6 +1040,12 @@ rad_put_vendor_attr(struct rad_handle *h, int vendor, int type, struct vendor_attribute *attr; int res; + if (!h->request_created) { + generr(h, "Please call rad_create_request()" + " before putting attributes"); + return -1; + } + if ((attr = malloc(len + 6)) == NULL) { generr(h, "malloc failure (%d bytes)", len + 6); return -1; @@ -940,6 +1093,138 @@ rad_request_authenticator(struct rad_handle *h, char *buf, size_t len) return (LEN_AUTH); } +u_char * +rad_demangle(struct rad_handle *h, const void *mangled, size_t mlen) +{ + char R[LEN_AUTH]; + const char *S; + int i, Ppos; + MD5_CTX Context; + u_char b[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], *C, *demangled; + + if ((mlen % 16 != 0) || mlen > 128) { + generr(h, "Cannot interpret mangled data of length %lu", + (u_long)mlen); + return NULL; + } + + C = (u_char *)mangled; + + /* We need the shared secret as Salt */ + S = rad_server_secret(h); + + /* We need the request authenticator */ + if (rad_request_authenticator(h, R, sizeof R) != LEN_AUTH) { + generr(h, "Cannot obtain the RADIUS request authenticator"); + return NULL; + } + + demangled = malloc(mlen); + if (!demangled) + return NULL; + + MD5Init(&Context); + MD5Update(&Context, S, strlen(S)); + MD5Update(&Context, R, LEN_AUTH); + MD5Final(b, &Context); + Ppos = 0; + while (mlen) { + + mlen -= 16; + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + demangled[Ppos++] = C[i] ^ b[i]; + + if (mlen) { + MD5Init(&Context); + MD5Update(&Context, S, strlen(S)); + MD5Update(&Context, C, 16); + MD5Final(b, &Context); + } + + C += 16; + } + + return demangled; +} + +u_char * +rad_demangle_mppe_key(struct rad_handle *h, const void *mangled, + size_t mlen, size_t *len) +{ + char R[LEN_AUTH]; /* variable names as per rfc2548 */ + const char *S; + u_char b[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], *demangled; + const u_char *A, *C; + MD5_CTX Context; + int Slen, i, Clen, Ppos; + u_char *P; + + if (mlen % 16 != SALT_LEN) { + generr(h, "Cannot interpret mangled data of length %lu", + (u_long)mlen); + return NULL; + } + + /* We need the RADIUS Request-Authenticator */ + if (rad_request_authenticator(h, R, sizeof R) != LEN_AUTH) { + generr(h, "Cannot obtain the RADIUS request authenticator"); + return NULL; + } + + A = (const u_char *)mangled; /* Salt comes first */ + C = (const u_char *)mangled + SALT_LEN; /* Then the ciphertext */ + Clen = mlen - SALT_LEN; + S = rad_server_secret(h); /* We need the RADIUS secret */ + Slen = strlen(S); + P = alloca(Clen); /* We derive our plaintext */ + + MD5Init(&Context); + MD5Update(&Context, S, Slen); + MD5Update(&Context, R, LEN_AUTH); + MD5Update(&Context, A, SALT_LEN); + MD5Final(b, &Context); + Ppos = 0; + + while (Clen) { + Clen -= 16; + + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + P[Ppos++] = C[i] ^ b[i]; + + if (Clen) { + MD5Init(&Context); + MD5Update(&Context, S, Slen); + MD5Update(&Context, C, 16); + MD5Final(b, &Context); + } + + C += 16; + } + + /* + * The resulting plain text consists of a one-byte length, the text and + * maybe some padding. + */ + *len = *P; + if (*len > mlen - 1) { + generr(h, "Mangled data seems to be garbage %d %d", + *len, mlen-1); + return NULL; + } + + if (*len > MPPE_KEY_LEN * 2) { + generr(h, "Key to long (%d) for me max. %d", + *len, MPPE_KEY_LEN * 2); + return NULL; + } + demangled = malloc(*len); + if (!demangled) + return NULL; + + memcpy(demangled, P + 1, *len); + return demangled; +} + const char * rad_server_secret(struct rad_handle *h) { diff --git a/lib/libradius/radlib.h b/lib/libradius/radlib.h index b4c473af2c4e..2c42c3a9f40e 100644 --- a/lib/libradius/radlib.h +++ b/lib/libradius/radlib.h @@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ #include #include +/* Limits */ +#define RAD_MAX_ATTR_LEN 253 + /* Message types */ #define RAD_ACCESS_REQUEST 1 #define RAD_ACCESS_ACCEPT 2 @@ -98,6 +101,9 @@ #define RAD_FRAMED_APPLETALK_NETWORK 38 /* Integer */ #define RAD_FRAMED_APPLETALK_ZONE 39 /* Integer */ /* reserved for accounting 40-59 */ +#define RAD_ACCT_INPUT_GIGAWORDS 52 +#define RAD_ACCT_OUTPUT_GIGAWORDS 53 + #define RAD_CHAP_CHALLENGE 60 /* String */ #define RAD_NAS_PORT_TYPE 61 /* Integer */ #define RAD_ASYNC 0 @@ -123,6 +129,9 @@ #define RAD_PORT_LIMIT 62 /* Integer */ #define RAD_LOGIN_LAT_PORT 63 /* Integer */ #define RAD_CONNECT_INFO 77 /* String */ +#define RAD_EAP_MESSAGE 79 /* Octets */ +#define RAD_MESSAGE_AUTHENTIC 80 /* Octets */ +#define RAD_ACCT_INTERIM_INTERVAL 85 /* Integer */ #define RAD_NAS_IPV6_ADDRESS 95 /* IPv6 address */ #define RAD_FRAMED_INTERFACE_ID 96 /* 8 octets */ #define RAD_FRAMED_IPV6_PREFIX 97 /* Octets */ @@ -134,6 +143,7 @@ #define RAD_ACCT_STATUS_TYPE 40 /* Integer */ #define RAD_START 1 #define RAD_STOP 2 + #define RAD_UPDATE 3 #define RAD_ACCOUNTING_ON 7 #define RAD_ACCOUNTING_OFF 8 #define RAD_ACCT_DELAY_TIME 41 /* Integer */ @@ -196,11 +206,15 @@ int rad_put_attr(struct rad_handle *, int, int rad_put_int(struct rad_handle *, int, u_int32_t); int rad_put_string(struct rad_handle *, int, const char *); +int rad_put_message_authentic(struct rad_handle *); ssize_t rad_request_authenticator(struct rad_handle *, char *, size_t); int rad_send_request(struct rad_handle *); const char *rad_server_secret(struct rad_handle *); const char *rad_strerror(struct rad_handle *); +u_char *rad_demangle(struct rad_handle *, const void *, + size_t); + __END_DECLS #endif /* _RADLIB_H_ */ diff --git a/lib/libradius/radlib_private.h b/lib/libradius/radlib_private.h index 251c1bdec200..d323cbd5fcc9 100644 --- a/lib/libradius/radlib_private.h +++ b/lib/libradius/radlib_private.h @@ -76,11 +76,14 @@ struct rad_handle { int ident; /* Current identifier value */ char errmsg[ERRSIZE]; /* Most recent error message */ unsigned char request[MSGSIZE]; /* Request to send */ + char request_created; /* rad_create_request() called? */ int req_len; /* Length of request */ char pass[PASSSIZE]; /* Cleartext password */ int pass_len; /* Length of cleartext password */ int pass_pos; /* Position of scrambled password */ char chap_pass; /* Have we got a CHAP_PASSWORD ? */ + int authentic_pos; /* Position of message authenticator */ + char eap_msg; /* Are we an EAP Proxy? */ unsigned char response[MSGSIZE]; /* Response received */ int resp_len; /* Length of response */ int resp_pos; /* Current position scanning attrs */ diff --git a/lib/libradius/radlib_vs.h b/lib/libradius/radlib_vs.h index 6954566bc9e0..8b3a75e79d6a 100644 --- a/lib/libradius/radlib_vs.h +++ b/lib/libradius/radlib_vs.h @@ -66,15 +66,19 @@ #define RAD_MICROSOFT_MS_SECONDARY_NBNS_SERVER 31 #define RAD_MICROSOFT_MS_ARAP_CHALLENGE 33 +#define SALT_LEN 2 + struct rad_handle; __BEGIN_DECLS -int rad_get_vendor_attr(u_int32_t *, const void **, size_t *); -int rad_put_vendor_addr(struct rad_handle *, int, int, struct in_addr); -int rad_put_vendor_attr(struct rad_handle *, int, int, const void *, +int rad_get_vendor_attr(u_int32_t *, const void **, size_t *); +int rad_put_vendor_addr(struct rad_handle *, int, int, struct in_addr); +int rad_put_vendor_attr(struct rad_handle *, int, int, const void *, size_t); -int rad_put_vendor_int(struct rad_handle *, int, int, u_int32_t); -int rad_put_vendor_string(struct rad_handle *, int, int, const char *); +int rad_put_vendor_int(struct rad_handle *, int, int, u_int32_t); +int rad_put_vendor_string(struct rad_handle *, int, int, const char *); +u_char *rad_demangle_mppe_key(struct rad_handle *, const void *, size_t, + size_t *); __END_DECLS #endif /* _RADLIB_VS_H_ */