From 8c3f9abd70b3f447a4795c1b00b386b044fb322d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jung-uk Kim Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 18:59:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Import OpenSSL 1.1.1a. --- CHANGES | 37 ++- Configure | 79 ++++- INSTALL | 10 +- NEWS | 5 + README | 2 +- apps/app_rand.c | 3 +- apps/apps.c | 6 + apps/apps.h | 6 +- apps/ca.c | 21 +- apps/ocsp.c | 2 + apps/openssl.cnf | 2 - apps/opt.c | 1 - apps/rehash.c | 2 +- apps/rsa.c | 7 +- apps/s_cb.c | 3 +- apps/s_server.c | 10 +- apps/speed.c | 2 +- apps/x509.c | 4 +- crypto/LPdir_unix.c | 2 +- crypto/async/arch/async_posix.h | 3 +- crypto/bio/b_sock2.c | 2 + crypto/bio/bio_lib.c | 4 +- crypto/bio/bss_log.c | 5 + crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c | 8 +- crypto/bn/bn_exp.c | 2 +- crypto/bn/bn_lib.c | 42 +-- crypto/build.info | 2 +- crypto/conf/conf_api.c | 5 +- crypto/conf/conf_mod.c | 7 +- crypto/cryptlib.c | 2 +- crypto/ct/ct_log.c | 2 +- crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c | 6 + crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 61 +++- crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c | 4 +- crypto/ec/ec_mult.c | 6 +- crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c | 4 +- crypto/ec/ecdh_kdf.c | 19 +- crypto/engine/eng_devcrypto.c | 132 ++++---- crypto/engine/eng_list.c | 3 +- crypto/err/openssl.txt | 1 + crypto/evp/e_aes.c | 2 +- crypto/evp/e_rc2.c | 10 +- crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c | 6 +- crypto/getenv.c | 31 ++ crypto/include/internal/ec_int.h | 8 + crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h | 7 +- crypto/kdf/hkdf.c | 14 +- crypto/mem_sec.c | 50 ++-- crypto/o_fopen.c | 4 +- crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c | 18 +- crypto/poly1305/poly1305_ieee754.c | 2 +- crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c | 12 +- crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c | 225 +++++++++----- crypto/rand/rand_err.c | 1 + crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h | 69 +++-- crypto/rand/rand_lib.c | 136 ++++++--- crypto/rand/rand_unix.c | 56 ++-- crypto/rand/randfile.c | 44 ++- crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c | 16 +- crypto/rsa/rsa_meth.c | 4 +- crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c | 3 +- crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-s390x.pl | 4 +- crypto/sha/asm/sha512p8-ppc.pl | 29 +- crypto/siphash/siphash.c | 14 +- crypto/sm2/sm2_crypt.c | 5 +- crypto/sm2/sm2_sign.c | 1 + crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c | 18 ++ crypto/x509/by_dir.c | 2 +- crypto/x509/by_file.c | 2 +- crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 11 +- doc/man1/ca.pod | 6 +- doc/man1/enc.pod | 48 ++- doc/man1/openssl.pod | 57 ++++ doc/man1/req.pod | 6 +- doc/man1/rsa.pod | 25 +- doc/man1/s_server.pod | 14 +- doc/man1/storeutl.pod | 7 +- doc/man1/x509.pod | 11 +- doc/man3/DES_random_key.pod | 28 +- doc/man3/EVP_DigestInit.pod | 5 +- doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod | 283 ++++++++++++++++-- doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md.pod | 4 +- .../EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md.pod | 4 +- doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.pod | 35 ++- doc/man3/EVP_aes.pod | 8 +- doc/man3/EVP_aria.pod | 8 +- doc/man3/EVP_bf_cbc.pod | 5 +- doc/man3/EVP_camellia.pod | 8 +- doc/man3/EVP_cast5_cbc.pod | 5 +- doc/man3/EVP_des.pod | 36 ++- doc/man3/EVP_idea_cbc.pod | 5 +- doc/man3/EVP_md5.pod | 4 +- doc/man3/EVP_rc2_cbc.pod | 5 +- doc/man3/EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cbc.pod | 5 +- doc/man3/EVP_seed_cbc.pod | 5 +- doc/man3/EVP_sm4_cbc.pod | 3 + doc/man3/OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER.pod | 7 +- doc/man3/RSA_meth_new.pod | 4 +- doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list.pod | 148 +++++++-- doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod | 5 +- doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod | 103 ------- doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown.pod | 6 +- doc/man3/SSL_get_client_CA_list.pod | 62 ---- doc/man3/SSL_get_error.pod | 2 +- doc/man3/SSL_get_peer_signature_nid.pod | 12 +- doc/man3/SSL_get_peer_tmp_key.pod | 53 ++++ doc/man3/SSL_get_server_tmp_key.pod | 43 --- doc/man3/SSL_set_bio.pod | 4 +- doc/man3/SSL_set_shutdown.pod | 10 +- doc/man3/SSL_shutdown.pod | 78 +++-- doc/man7/RAND_DRBG.pod | 2 +- e_os.h | 15 +- include/internal/cryptlib.h | 2 + include/internal/tsan_assist.h | 6 + include/openssl/cryptoerr.h | 3 + include/openssl/ec.h | 13 +- include/openssl/ocsp.h | 3 - include/openssl/opensslv.h | 4 +- include/openssl/rand_drbg.h | 24 +- include/openssl/randerr.h | 1 + include/openssl/rsa.h | 6 +- include/openssl/ssl.h | 18 +- include/openssl/symhacks.h | 17 +- include/openssl/tls1.h | 1 + ssl/d1_lib.c | 93 +++--- ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c | 5 +- ssl/record/record.h | 6 +- ssl/record/record_locl.h | 2 - ssl/record/ssl3_record.c | 25 ++ ssl/s3_cbc.c | 7 +- ssl/s3_enc.c | 8 +- ssl/s3_lib.c | 24 +- ssl/ssl_cert.c | 17 +- ssl/ssl_ciph.c | 2 +- ssl/ssl_lib.c | 62 +++- ssl/ssl_locl.h | 22 +- ssl/statem/extensions.c | 12 +- ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c | 13 +- ssl/statem/statem.c | 5 +- ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c | 12 + ssl/statem/statem_lib.c | 59 +++- ssl/statem/statem_locl.h | 3 +- ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c | 44 +-- ssl/t1_lib.c | 45 +++ ssl/tls13_enc.c | 16 +- 145 files changed, 2064 insertions(+), 1028 deletions(-) create mode 100644 crypto/getenv.c delete mode 100644 doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod delete mode 100644 doc/man3/SSL_get_client_CA_list.pod create mode 100644 doc/man3/SSL_get_peer_tmp_key.pod delete mode 100644 doc/man3/SSL_get_server_tmp_key.pod diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index 0d66a556b7b6..4b68f4832909 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -7,6 +7,42 @@ https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate release branch. + Changes between 1.1.1 and 1.1.1a [20 Nov 2018] + + *) Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation + + The OpenSSL DSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a + timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing + algorithm to recover the private key. + + This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser. + (CVE-2018-0734) + [Paul Dale] + + *) Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation + + The OpenSSL ECDSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a + timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing + algorithm to recover the private key. + + This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 25th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser. + (CVE-2018-0735) + [Paul Dale] + + *) Added EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_63 and ecdh_KDF_X9_63() as replacements for + the EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62 KDF type and ECDH_KDF_X9_62(). The old names + are retained for backwards compatibility. + [Antoine Salon] + + *) Fixed the issue that RAND_add()/RAND_seed() silently discards random input + if its length exceeds 4096 bytes. The limit has been raised to a buffer size + of two gigabytes and the error handling improved. + + This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Dr. Falko Strenzke. It has been + categorized as a normal bug, not a security issue, because the DRBG reseeds + automatically and is fully functional even without additional randomness + provided by the application. + Changes between 1.1.0i and 1.1.1 [11 Sep 2018] *) Add a new ClientHello callback. Provides a callback interface that gives @@ -13103,4 +13139,3 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k *) A minor bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c where there would always be 4 0 bytes sent in the client random. [Edward Bishop ] - diff --git a/Configure b/Configure index 3baa8ce016f8..d5dc36c285ba 100755 --- a/Configure +++ b/Configure @@ -1013,13 +1013,18 @@ if (scalar(@seed_sources) == 0) { if (scalar(grep { $_ eq 'none' } @seed_sources) > 0) { die "Cannot seed with none and anything else" if scalar(@seed_sources) > 1; warn <<_____ if scalar(@seed_sources) == 1; -You have selected the --with-rand-seed=none option, which effectively disables -automatic reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator. All operations depending -on the random generator such as creating keys will not work unless the random -generator is seeded manually by the application. -Please read the 'Note on random number generation' section in the INSTALL -instructions and the RAND_DRBG(7) manual page for more details. +============================== WARNING =============================== +You have selected the --with-rand-seed=none option, which effectively +disables automatic reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator. +All operations depending on the random generator such as creating keys +will not work unless the random generator is seeded manually by the +application. + +Please read the 'Note on random number generation' section in the +INSTALL instructions and the RAND_DRBG(7) manual page for more details. +============================== WARNING =============================== + _____ } push @{$config{openssl_other_defines}}, @@ -2174,6 +2179,16 @@ EOF # Massage the result + # If the user configured no-shared, we allow no shared sources + if ($disabled{shared}) { + foreach (keys %{$unified_info{shared_sources}}) { + foreach (keys %{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$_}}) { + delete $unified_info{sources}->{$_}; + } + } + $unified_info{shared_sources} = {}; + } + # If we depend on a header file or a perl module, add an inclusion of # its directory to allow smoothe inclusion foreach my $dest (keys %{$unified_info{depends}}) { @@ -2198,8 +2213,8 @@ EOF next unless defined($unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{$k}); my @incs = reverse @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{$k}}; foreach my $obj (grep /\.o$/, - (keys %{$unified_info{sources}->{$dest}}, - keys %{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$dest}})) { + (keys %{$unified_info{sources}->{$dest} // {}}, + keys %{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$dest} // {}})) { foreach my $inc (@incs) { unshift @{$unified_info{includes}->{$obj}->{$k}}, $inc unless grep { $_ eq $inc } @{$unified_info{includes}->{$obj}->{$k}}; @@ -2238,6 +2253,42 @@ EOF [ @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{source}} ]; } } + + # For convenience collect information regarding directories where + # files are generated, those generated files and the end product + # they end up in where applicable. Then, add build rules for those + # directories + my %loopinfo = ( "lib" => [ @{$unified_info{libraries}} ], + "dso" => [ @{$unified_info{engines}} ], + "bin" => [ @{$unified_info{programs}} ], + "script" => [ @{$unified_info{scripts}} ] ); + foreach my $type (keys %loopinfo) { + foreach my $product (@{$loopinfo{$type}}) { + my %dirs = (); + my $pd = dirname($product); + + foreach (@{$unified_info{sources}->{$product} // []}, + @{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$product} // []}) { + my $d = dirname($_); + + # We don't want to create targets for source directories + # when building out of source + next if ($config{sourcedir} ne $config{builddir} + && $d =~ m|^\Q$config{sourcedir}\E|); + # We already have a "test" target, and the current directory + # is just silly to make a target for + next if $d eq "test" || $d eq "."; + + $dirs{$d} = 1; + push @{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$d}->{deps}}, $_ + if $d ne $pd; + } + foreach (keys %dirs) { + push @{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$_}->{products}->{$type}}, + $product; + } + } + } } # For the schemes that need it, we provide the old *_obj configs @@ -2712,10 +2763,16 @@ print <<"EOF"; ********************************************************************** *** *** -*** If you want to report a building issue, please include the *** -*** output from this command: *** +*** OpenSSL has been successfully configured *** *** *** -*** perl configdata.pm --dump *** +*** If you encounter a problem while building, please open an *** +*** issue on GitHub *** +*** and include the output from the following command: *** +*** *** +*** perl configdata.pm --dump *** +*** *** +*** (If you are new to OpenSSL, you might want to consult the *** +*** 'Troubleshooting' section in the INSTALL file first) *** *** *** ********************************************************************** EOF diff --git a/INSTALL b/INSTALL index ff0aa6d12792..4ce6651b6b34 100644 --- a/INSTALL +++ b/INSTALL @@ -614,8 +614,8 @@ Windows, and as a comma separated list of libraries on VMS. RANLIB The library archive indexer. - RC The Windows resources manipulator. - RCFLAGS Flags for the Windows reources manipulator. + RC The Windows resource compiler. + RCFLAGS Flags for the Windows resource compiler. RM The command to remove files and directories. These cannot be mixed with compiling / linking flags given @@ -969,7 +969,7 @@ BUILDFILE Use a different build file name than the platform default - ("Makefile" on Unixly platforms, "makefile" on native Windows, + ("Makefile" on Unix-like platforms, "makefile" on native Windows, "descrip.mms" on OpenVMS). This requires that there is a corresponding build file template. See Configurations/README for further information. @@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ part of the file name, i.e. for OpenSSL 1.1.x, 1.1 is somehow part of the name. - On most POSIXly platforms, shared libraries are named libcrypto.so.1.1 + On most POSIX platforms, shared libraries are named libcrypto.so.1.1 and libssl.so.1.1. on Cygwin, shared libraries are named cygcrypto-1.1.dll and cygssl-1.1.dll @@ -1202,7 +1202,7 @@ The seeding method can be configured using the --with-rand-seed option, which can be used to specify a comma separated list of seed methods. However in most cases OpenSSL will choose a suitable default method, - so it is not necessary to explicitely provide this option. Note also + so it is not necessary to explicitly provide this option. Note also that not all methods are available on all platforms. I) On operating systems which provide a suitable randomness source (in diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS index 45c183c9b291..b95e93027f83 100644 --- a/NEWS +++ b/NEWS @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL release. For more details please read the CHANGES file. + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1 and OpenSSL 1.1.1a [20 Nov 2018] + + o Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0734) + o Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0735) + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0i and OpenSSL 1.1.1 [11 Sep 2018] o Support for TLSv1.3 added (see https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/TLS1.3 diff --git a/README b/README index e70acb3139b6..affb172e8ba8 100644 --- a/README +++ b/README @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ - OpenSSL 1.1.1 11 Sep 2018 + OpenSSL 1.1.1a 20 Nov 2018 Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson diff --git a/apps/app_rand.c b/apps/app_rand.c index 28caad41a7d8..2b0bbde03423 100644 --- a/apps/app_rand.c +++ b/apps/app_rand.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ void app_RAND_load_conf(CONF *c, const char *section) if (RAND_load_file(randfile, -1) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't load %s into RNG\n", randfile); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); - return; } if (save_rand_file == NULL) save_rand_file = OPENSSL_strdup(randfile); diff --git a/apps/apps.c b/apps/apps.c index 9be656054a45..653e3973e04d 100644 --- a/apps/apps.c +++ b/apps/apps.c @@ -1831,6 +1831,12 @@ X509_NAME *parse_name(const char *cp, long chtype, int canmulti) opt_getprog(), typestr); continue; } + if (*valstr == '\0') { + BIO_printf(bio_err, + "%s: No value provided for Subject Attribute %s, skipped\n", + opt_getprog(), typestr); + continue; + } if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n, nid, chtype, valstr, strlen((char *)valstr), -1, ismulti ? -1 : 0)) diff --git a/apps/apps.h b/apps/apps.h index 5b98d27500ce..d9eb650eb211 100644 --- a/apps/apps.h +++ b/apps/apps.h @@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ typedef struct string_int_pair_st { # define OPT_FMT_SMIME (1L << 3) # define OPT_FMT_ENGINE (1L << 4) # define OPT_FMT_MSBLOB (1L << 5) -# define OPT_FMT_NETSCAPE (1L << 6) +/* (1L << 6) was OPT_FMT_NETSCAPE, but wasn't used */ # define OPT_FMT_NSS (1L << 7) # define OPT_FMT_TEXT (1L << 8) # define OPT_FMT_HTTP (1L << 9) @@ -378,8 +378,8 @@ typedef struct string_int_pair_st { # define OPT_FMT_PDS (OPT_FMT_PEMDER | OPT_FMT_SMIME) # define OPT_FMT_ANY ( \ OPT_FMT_PEMDER | OPT_FMT_PKCS12 | OPT_FMT_SMIME | \ - OPT_FMT_ENGINE | OPT_FMT_MSBLOB | OPT_FMT_NETSCAPE | \ - OPT_FMT_NSS | OPT_FMT_TEXT | OPT_FMT_HTTP | OPT_FMT_PVK) + OPT_FMT_ENGINE | OPT_FMT_MSBLOB | OPT_FMT_NSS | \ + OPT_FMT_TEXT | OPT_FMT_HTTP | OPT_FMT_PVK) char *opt_progname(const char *argv0); char *opt_getprog(void); diff --git a/apps/ca.c b/apps/ca.c index 48f7cd197387..69207c0662ed 100644 --- a/apps/ca.c +++ b/apps/ca.c @@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ int ca_main(int argc, char **argv) /* * outdir is a directory spec, but access() for VMS demands a * filename. We could use the DEC C routine to convert the - * directory syntax to Unixly, and give that to app_isdir, + * directory syntax to Unix, and give that to app_isdir, * but for now the fopen will catch the error if it's not a * directory */ @@ -976,7 +976,7 @@ int ca_main(int argc, char **argv) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Write out database with %d new entries\n", sk_X509_num(cert_sk)); - if (!rand_ser + if (serialfile != NULL && !save_serial(serialfile, "new", serial, NULL)) goto end; @@ -1044,7 +1044,8 @@ int ca_main(int argc, char **argv) if (sk_X509_num(cert_sk)) { /* Rename the database and the serial file */ - if (!rotate_serial(serialfile, "new", "old")) + if (serialfile != NULL + && !rotate_serial(serialfile, "new", "old")) goto end; if (!rotate_index(dbfile, "new", "old")) @@ -1177,10 +1178,9 @@ int ca_main(int argc, char **argv) } /* we have a CRL number that need updating */ - if (crlnumberfile != NULL) - if (!rand_ser - && !save_serial(crlnumberfile, "new", crlnumber, NULL)) - goto end; + if (crlnumberfile != NULL + && !save_serial(crlnumberfile, "new", crlnumber, NULL)) + goto end; BN_free(crlnumber); crlnumber = NULL; @@ -1195,9 +1195,10 @@ int ca_main(int argc, char **argv) PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL(Sout, crl); - if (crlnumberfile != NULL) /* Rename the crlnumber file */ - if (!rotate_serial(crlnumberfile, "new", "old")) - goto end; + /* Rename the crlnumber file */ + if (crlnumberfile != NULL + && !rotate_serial(crlnumberfile, "new", "old")) + goto end; } /*****************************************************************/ diff --git a/apps/ocsp.c b/apps/ocsp.c index eb822c2696eb..7fd78624bbcc 100644 --- a/apps/ocsp.c +++ b/apps/ocsp.c @@ -950,6 +950,7 @@ static void spawn_loop(void) sleep(30); break; case 0: /* child */ + OPENSSL_free(kidpids); signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); if (termsig) @@ -976,6 +977,7 @@ static void spawn_loop(void) } /* The loop above can only break on termsig */ + OPENSSL_free(kidpids); syslog(LOG_INFO, "terminating on signal: %d", termsig); killall(0, kidpids); } diff --git a/apps/openssl.cnf b/apps/openssl.cnf index 7d1a8bb6e7f0..6df2878d5021 100644 --- a/apps/openssl.cnf +++ b/apps/openssl.cnf @@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ # This definition stops the following lines choking if HOME isn't # defined. HOME = . -RANDFILE = $ENV::HOME/.rnd # Extra OBJECT IDENTIFIER info: #oid_file = $ENV::HOME/.oid @@ -57,7 +56,6 @@ crlnumber = $dir/crlnumber # the current crl number # must be commented out to leave a V1 CRL crl = $dir/crl.pem # The current CRL private_key = $dir/private/cakey.pem# The private key -RANDFILE = $dir/private/.rand # private random number file x509_extensions = usr_cert # The extensions to add to the cert diff --git a/apps/opt.c b/apps/opt.c index cc1418449e29..666856535d5e 100644 --- a/apps/opt.c +++ b/apps/opt.c @@ -168,7 +168,6 @@ static OPT_PAIR formats[] = { {"smime", OPT_FMT_SMIME}, {"engine", OPT_FMT_ENGINE}, {"msblob", OPT_FMT_MSBLOB}, - {"netscape", OPT_FMT_NETSCAPE}, {"nss", OPT_FMT_NSS}, {"text", OPT_FMT_TEXT}, {"http", OPT_FMT_HTTP}, diff --git a/apps/rehash.c b/apps/rehash.c index de7217cb1003..bb41d3129f9c 100644 --- a/apps/rehash.c +++ b/apps/rehash.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* * Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. - * Copyright (c) 2013-2014 Timo Teräs + * Copyright (c) 2013-2014 Timo Teräs * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff --git a/apps/rsa.c b/apps/rsa.c index 6458b3d9c5aa..fdd02dce3241 100644 --- a/apps/rsa.c +++ b/apps/rsa.c @@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ typedef enum OPTION_choice { const OPTIONS rsa_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, - {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'f', "Input format, one of DER NET PEM"}, - {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'f', "Output format, one of DER NET PEM PVK"}, + {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'f', "Input format, one of DER PEM"}, + {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'f', "Output format, one of DER PEM PVK"}, {"in", OPT_IN, 's', "Input file"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"pubin", OPT_PUBIN, '-', "Expect a public key in input file"}, @@ -269,6 +269,9 @@ int rsa_main(int argc, char **argv) } else if (outformat == FORMAT_MSBLOB || outformat == FORMAT_PVK) { EVP_PKEY *pk; pk = EVP_PKEY_new(); + if (pk == NULL) + goto end; + EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pk, rsa); if (outformat == FORMAT_PVK) { if (pubin) { diff --git a/apps/s_cb.c b/apps/s_cb.c index 46b386428461..2d4568f40ccb 100644 --- a/apps/s_cb.c +++ b/apps/s_cb.c @@ -394,7 +394,8 @@ int ssl_print_groups(BIO *out, SSL *s, int noshared) int ssl_print_tmp_key(BIO *out, SSL *s) { EVP_PKEY *key; - if (!SSL_get_server_tmp_key(s, &key)) + + if (!SSL_get_peer_tmp_key(s, &key)) return 1; BIO_puts(out, "Server Temp Key: "); switch (EVP_PKEY_id(key)) { diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c index e3bb1a672d01..ac7dca607ba4 100644 --- a/apps/s_server.c +++ b/apps/s_server.c @@ -193,9 +193,8 @@ static int psk_find_session_cb(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *identity, if (strlen(psk_identity) != identity_len || memcmp(psk_identity, identity, identity_len) != 0) { - BIO_printf(bio_s_out, - "PSK warning: client identity not what we expected" - " (got '%s' expected '%s')\n", identity, psk_identity); + *sess = NULL; + return 1; } if (psksess != NULL) { @@ -1622,6 +1621,11 @@ int s_server_main(int argc, char *argv[]) goto end; } #endif + if (early_data && (www > 0 || rev)) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, + "Can't use -early_data in combination with -www, -WWW, -HTTP, or -rev\n"); + goto end; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP) { diff --git a/apps/speed.c b/apps/speed.c index a4879179e414..40e990408ab9 100644 --- a/apps/speed.c +++ b/apps/speed.c @@ -2896,7 +2896,7 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv) if (rsa_count <= 1) { /* if longer than 10s, don't do any more */ - for (testnum++; testnum < EC_NUM; testnum++) + for (testnum++; testnum < ECDSA_NUM; testnum++) ecdsa_doit[testnum] = 0; } } diff --git a/apps/x509.c b/apps/x509.c index d40960c0b93f..81291a9a4f90 100644 --- a/apps/x509.c +++ b/apps/x509.c @@ -67,10 +67,10 @@ typedef enum OPTION_choice { const OPTIONS x509_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'f', - "Input format - default PEM (one of DER, NET or PEM)"}, + "Input format - default PEM (one of DER or PEM)"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file - default stdin"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'f', - "Output format - default PEM (one of DER, NET or PEM)"}, + "Output format - default PEM (one of DER or PEM)"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file - default stdout"}, {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'F', "Private key format - default PEM"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Private key password/pass-phrase source"}, diff --git a/crypto/LPdir_unix.c b/crypto/LPdir_unix.c index 356089d7fd34..b1022895c855 100644 --- a/crypto/LPdir_unix.c +++ b/crypto/LPdir_unix.c @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ #endif /* - * The POSIXly macro for the maximum number of characters in a file path is + * The POSIX macro for the maximum number of characters in a file path is * NAME_MAX. However, some operating systems use PATH_MAX instead. * Therefore, it seems natural to first check for PATH_MAX and use that, and * if it doesn't exist, use NAME_MAX. diff --git a/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.h b/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.h index b07c2cb01beb..62449fe60e04 100644 --- a/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.h +++ b/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.h @@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ # include -# if _POSIX_VERSION >= 200112L +# if _POSIX_VERSION >= 200112L \ + && (_POSIX_VERSION < 200809L || defined(__GLIBC__)) # include diff --git a/crypto/bio/b_sock2.c b/crypto/bio/b_sock2.c index 823732d64e1a..5d82ab22dc30 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/b_sock2.c +++ b/crypto/bio/b_sock2.c @@ -133,7 +133,9 @@ int BIO_connect(int sock, const BIO_ADDR *addr, int options) */ int BIO_bind(int sock, const BIO_ADDR *addr, int options) { +# ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS int on = 1; +# endif if (sock == -1) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_BIND, BIO_R_INVALID_SOCKET); diff --git a/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c b/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c index 95eef7d4bf5b..ca375b911ae8 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c +++ b/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static long bio_call_callback(BIO *b, int oper, const char *argp, size_t len, argi = (int)len; } - if (inret && (oper & BIO_CB_RETURN) && bareoper != BIO_CB_CTRL) { + if (inret > 0 && (oper & BIO_CB_RETURN) && bareoper != BIO_CB_CTRL) { if (*processed > INT_MAX) return -1; inret = *processed; @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static long bio_call_callback(BIO *b, int oper, const char *argp, size_t len, ret = b->callback(b, oper, argp, argi, argl, inret); - if (ret >= 0 && (oper & BIO_CB_RETURN) && bareoper != BIO_CB_CTRL) { + if (ret > 0 && (oper & BIO_CB_RETURN) && bareoper != BIO_CB_CTRL) { *processed = (size_t)ret; ret = 1; } diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_log.c b/crypto/bio/bss_log.c index 4324f2412681..e9ab932ec295 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/bss_log.c +++ b/crypto/bio/bss_log.c @@ -408,4 +408,9 @@ static void xcloselog(BIO *bp) # endif /* Unix */ +#else /* NO_SYSLOG */ +const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_log(void) +{ + return NULL; +} #endif /* NO_SYSLOG */ diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c index d38f33716477..31839ba060fa 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c +++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -64,12 +64,6 @@ * machine. */ -# if defined(_WIN64) || !defined(__LP64__) -# define BN_ULONG unsigned long long -# else -# define BN_ULONG unsigned long -# endif - # undef mul # undef mul_add diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c index 2c92d7eac9d5..c026ffcb339c 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c @@ -1077,7 +1077,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, * is not only slower but also makes each bit vulnerable to * EM (and likely other) side-channel attacks like One&Done * (for details see "One&Done: A Single-Decryption EM-Based - * Attack on OpenSSL’s Constant-Time Blinded RSA" by M. Alam, + * Attack on OpenSSL's Constant-Time Blinded RSA" by M. Alam, * H. Khan, M. Dey, N. Sinha, R. Callan, A. Zajic, and * M. Prvulovic, in USENIX Security'18) */ diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c index 266a3dd3046b..80f910c80779 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c @@ -767,26 +767,30 @@ void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords) b->neg ^= t; /*- - * Idea behind BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA is actually to - * indicate that data may not be written to. - * Intention is actually to treat it as it's - * read-only data, and some (if not most) of it does - * reside in read-only segment. In other words - * observation of BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA in - * BN_consttime_swap should be treated as fatal - * condition. It would either cause SEGV or - * effectively cause data corruption. - * BN_FLG_MALLOCED refers to BN structure itself, - * and hence must be preserved. Remaining flags are - * BN_FLG_CONSTIME and BN_FLG_SECURE. Latter must be - * preserved, because it determines how x->d was - * allocated and hence how to free it. This leaves - * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME that one can do something about. - * To summarize it's sufficient to mask and swap - * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME alone. BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA should - * be treated as fatal. + * BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA: indicates that data may not be written to. Intention + * is actually to treat it as it's read-only data, and some (if not most) + * of it does reside in read-only segment. In other words observation of + * BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA in BN_consttime_swap should be treated as fatal + * condition. It would either cause SEGV or effectively cause data + * corruption. + * + * BN_FLG_MALLOCED: refers to BN structure itself, and hence must be + * preserved. + * + * BN_FLG_SECURE: must be preserved, because it determines how x->d was + * allocated and hence how to free it. + * + * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME: sufficient to mask and swap + * + * BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP: indicates that we haven't called bn_correct_top() on + * the data, so the d array may be padded with additional 0 values (i.e. + * top could be greater than the minimal value that it could be). We should + * be swapping it */ - t = ((a->flags ^ b->flags) & BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) & condition; + +#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP_FLAGS (BN_FLG_CONSTTIME | BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP) + + t = ((a->flags ^ b->flags) & BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP_FLAGS) & condition; a->flags ^= t; b->flags ^= t; diff --git a/crypto/build.info b/crypto/build.info index b515b7318efb..2c619c62e843 100644 --- a/crypto/build.info +++ b/crypto/build.info @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ LIBS=../libcrypto SOURCE[../libcrypto]=\ cryptlib.c mem.c mem_dbg.c cversion.c ex_data.c cpt_err.c \ ebcdic.c uid.c o_time.c o_str.c o_dir.c o_fopen.c ctype.c \ - threads_pthread.c threads_win.c threads_none.c \ + threads_pthread.c threads_win.c threads_none.c getenv.c \ o_init.c o_fips.c mem_sec.c init.c {- $target{cpuid_asm_src} -} \ {- $target{uplink_aux_src} -} EXTRA= ../ms/uplink-x86.pl ../ms/uplink.c ../ms/applink.c \ diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_api.c b/crypto/conf/conf_api.c index 72fe2da1ad78..5e57d749ce5e 100644 --- a/crypto/conf/conf_api.c +++ b/crypto/conf/conf_api.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ /* Part of the code in here was originally in conf.c, which is now removed */ #include "e_os.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include @@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ char *_CONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *section, if (v != NULL) return v->value; if (strcmp(section, "ENV") == 0) { - p = getenv(name); + p = ossl_safe_getenv(name); if (p != NULL) return p; } @@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ char *_CONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *section, else return NULL; } else - return getenv(name); + return ossl_safe_getenv(name); } static unsigned long conf_value_hash(const CONF_VALUE *v) diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c b/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c index df53609cc47e..51f262e774dd 100644 --- a/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c +++ b/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c @@ -480,11 +480,8 @@ char *CONF_get1_default_config_file(void) char *file, *sep = ""; int len; - if (!OPENSSL_issetugid()) { - file = getenv("OPENSSL_CONF"); - if (file) - return OPENSSL_strdup(file); - } + if ((file = ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_CONF")) != NULL) + return OPENSSL_strdup(file); len = strlen(X509_get_default_cert_area()); #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS diff --git a/crypto/cryptlib.c b/crypto/cryptlib.c index b1e535a69596..1cd77c96d2f7 100644 --- a/crypto/cryptlib.c +++ b/crypto/cryptlib.c @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ int OPENSSL_isservice(void) if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p == NULL) { HANDLE mod = GetModuleHandle(NULL); - FARPROC f; + FARPROC f = NULL; if (mod != NULL) f = GetProcAddress(mod, "_OPENSSL_isservice"); diff --git a/crypto/ct/ct_log.c b/crypto/ct/ct_log.c index be6681dca74e..c1bca3e1415e 100644 --- a/crypto/ct/ct_log.c +++ b/crypto/ct/ct_log.c @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static int ctlog_new_from_conf(CTLOG **ct_log, const CONF *conf, const char *sec int CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file(CTLOG_STORE *store) { - const char *fpath = getenv(CTLOG_FILE_EVP); + const char *fpath = ossl_safe_getenv(CTLOG_FILE_EVP); if (fpath == NULL) fpath = CTLOG_FILE; diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c index 46f4f01ee0e4..383d853b6d37 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c @@ -327,6 +327,12 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N, if (mctx == NULL) goto err; + /* make sure L > N, otherwise we'll get trapped in an infinite loop */ + if (L <= N) { + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS); + goto err; + } + if (evpmd == NULL) { if (N == 160) evpmd = EVP_sha1(); diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c index ac1f65a51a75..7a0b0874c54e 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include "internal/bn_int.h" #include #include #include "dsa_locl.h" @@ -23,6 +24,8 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa); static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa); +static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q, + BN_CTX *ctx); static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = { "OpenSSL DSA method", @@ -178,9 +181,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, { BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *k, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp; - BIGNUM *l, *m; + BIGNUM *l; int ret = 0; - int q_bits; + int q_bits, q_words; if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); @@ -189,8 +192,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, k = BN_new(); l = BN_new(); - m = BN_new(); - if (k == NULL || l == NULL || m == NULL) + if (k == NULL || l == NULL) goto err; if (ctx_in == NULL) { @@ -201,9 +203,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, /* Preallocate space */ q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); - if (!BN_set_bit(k, q_bits) - || !BN_set_bit(l, q_bits) - || !BN_set_bit(m, q_bits)) + q_words = bn_get_top(dsa->q); + if (!bn_wexpand(k, q_words + 2) + || !bn_wexpand(l, q_words + 2)) goto err; /* Get random k */ @@ -221,6 +223,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, } while (BN_is_zero(k)); BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(l, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p, @@ -238,14 +241,17 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is * one bit longer than the modulus. * - * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic - * conditional copy. + * There are some concerns about the efficacy of doing this. More + * specificly refer to the discussion starting with: + * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486#discussion_r228323705 + * The fix is to rework BN so these gymnastics aren't required. */ if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q) - || !BN_add(m, l, dsa->q) - || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(l) > q_bits ? l : m)) + || !BN_add(k, l, dsa->q)) goto err; + BN_consttime_swap(BN_is_bit_set(l, q_bits), k, l, q_words + 2); + if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) { if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx, dsa->method_mont_p)) @@ -258,8 +264,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; - /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ - if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) + /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ + if ((kinv = dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; BN_clear_free(*kinvp); @@ -273,7 +279,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_clear_free(k); BN_clear_free(l); - BN_clear_free(m); return ret; } @@ -393,3 +398,31 @@ static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa) BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p); return 1; } + +/* + * Compute the inverse of k modulo q. + * Since q is prime, Fermat's Little Theorem applies, which reduces this to + * mod-exp operation. Both the exponent and modulus are public information + * so a mod-exp that doesn't leak the base is sufficient. A newly allocated + * BIGNUM is returned which the caller must free. + */ +static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q, + BN_CTX *ctx) +{ + BIGNUM *res = NULL; + BIGNUM *r, *e; + + if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) + return NULL; + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) != NULL + && BN_set_word(r, 2) + && BN_sub(e, q, r) + && BN_mod_exp_mont(r, k, e, q, ctx, NULL)) + res = r; + else + BN_free(r); + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + return res; +} diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c b/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c index 21302685d877..a3164b5b2ed9 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c @@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ static int ecdh_cms_set_kdf_param(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, int eckdf_nid) if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(pctx, cofactor) <= 0) return 0; - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type(pctx, EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62) <= 0) + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type(pctx, EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_63) <= 0) return 0; kdf_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(kdfmd_nid); @@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ static int ecdh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) ecdh_nid = NID_dh_cofactor_kdf; if (kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE) { - kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62; + kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_63; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type(pctx, kdf_type) <= 0) goto err; } else diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c index 7e1b3650e76a..0e0a5e1394af 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c @@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, */ cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality); group_top = bn_get_top(cardinality); - if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 1) == NULL) - || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 1) == NULL)) { + if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 2) == NULL) + || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 2) == NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, * k := scalar + 2*cardinality */ kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits); - BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 1); + BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 2); group_top = bn_get_top(group->field); if ((bn_wexpand(s->X, group_top) == NULL) diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c b/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c index 5bee031b9201..f4ad0749ef45 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static int pkey_ec_kdf_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, if (!pkey_ec_derive(ctx, ktmp, &ktmplen)) goto err; /* Do KDF stuff */ - if (!ECDH_KDF_X9_62(key, *keylen, ktmp, ktmplen, + if (!ecdh_KDF_X9_63(key, *keylen, ktmp, ktmplen, dctx->kdf_ukm, dctx->kdf_ukmlen, dctx->kdf_md)) goto err; rv = 1; @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int pkey_ec_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE: if (p1 == -2) return dctx->kdf_type; - if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE && p1 != EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62) + if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE && p1 != EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_63) return -2; dctx->kdf_type = p1; return 1; diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecdh_kdf.c b/crypto/ec/ecdh_kdf.c index d47486eb346d..d686f9d897df 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecdh_kdf.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecdh_kdf.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -10,12 +10,13 @@ #include #include #include +#include "ec_lcl.h" -/* Key derivation function from X9.62/SECG */ +/* Key derivation function from X9.63/SECG */ /* Way more than we will ever need */ #define ECDH_KDF_MAX (1 << 30) -int ECDH_KDF_X9_62(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, +int ecdh_KDF_X9_63(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, const unsigned char *Z, size_t Zlen, const unsigned char *sinfo, size_t sinfolen, const EVP_MD *md) @@ -66,3 +67,15 @@ int ECDH_KDF_X9_62(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return rv; } + +/*- + * The old name for ecdh_KDF_X9_63 + * Retained for ABI compatibility + */ +int ECDH_KDF_X9_62(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, + const unsigned char *Z, size_t Zlen, + const unsigned char *sinfo, size_t sinfolen, + const EVP_MD *md) +{ + return ecdh_KDF_X9_63(out, outlen, Z, Zlen, sinfo, sinfolen, md); +} diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_devcrypto.c b/crypto/engine/eng_devcrypto.c index 9deaf5c6188c..4a0ba09a38be 100644 --- a/crypto/engine/eng_devcrypto.c +++ b/crypto/engine/eng_devcrypto.c @@ -28,6 +28,13 @@ # define CHECK_BSD_STYLE_MACROS #endif +/* + * ONE global file descriptor for all sessions. This allows operations + * such as digest session data copying (see digest_copy()), but is also + * saner... why re-open /dev/crypto for every session? + */ +static int cfd; + /****************************************************************************** * * Ciphers @@ -39,7 +46,6 @@ *****/ struct cipher_ctx { - int cfd; struct session_op sess; /* to pass from init to do_cipher */ @@ -69,7 +75,7 @@ static const struct cipher_data_st { { NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 192 / 8, 16, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, CRYPTO_AES_CBC }, { NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 256 / 8, 16, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, CRYPTO_AES_CBC }, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 - { NID_rc4, 1, 16, 0, CRYPTO_ARC4 }, + { NID_rc4, 1, 16, 0, EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER, CRYPTO_ARC4 }, #endif #if !defined(CHECK_BSD_STYLE_MACROS) || defined(CRYPTO_AES_CTR) { NID_aes_128_ctr, 16, 128 / 8, 16, EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE, CRYPTO_AES_CTR }, @@ -135,19 +141,13 @@ static int cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const struct cipher_data_st *cipher_d = get_cipher_data(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(ctx)); - if ((cipher_ctx->cfd = open("/dev/crypto", O_RDWR, 0)) < 0) { - SYSerr(SYS_F_OPEN, errno); - return 0; - } - memset(&cipher_ctx->sess, 0, sizeof(cipher_ctx->sess)); cipher_ctx->sess.cipher = cipher_d->devcryptoid; cipher_ctx->sess.keylen = cipher_d->keylen; cipher_ctx->sess.key = (void *)key; cipher_ctx->op = enc ? COP_ENCRYPT : COP_DECRYPT; - if (ioctl(cipher_ctx->cfd, CIOCGSESSION, &cipher_ctx->sess) < 0) { + if (ioctl(cfd, CIOCGSESSION, &cipher_ctx->sess) < 0) { SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, errno); - close(cipher_ctx->cfd); return 0; } @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static int cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, cryp.flags = COP_FLAG_WRITE_IV; #endif - if (ioctl(cipher_ctx->cfd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp) < 0) { + if (ioctl(cfd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp) < 0) { SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, errno); return 0; } @@ -212,14 +212,10 @@ static int cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) struct cipher_ctx *cipher_ctx = (struct cipher_ctx *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx); - if (ioctl(cipher_ctx->cfd, CIOCFSESSION, &cipher_ctx->sess) < 0) { + if (ioctl(cfd, CIOCFSESSION, &cipher_ctx->sess.ses) < 0) { SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, errno); return 0; } - if (close(cipher_ctx->cfd) < 0) { - SYSerr(SYS_F_CLOSE, errno); - return 0; - } return 1; } @@ -233,14 +229,10 @@ static int known_cipher_nids[OSSL_NELEM(cipher_data)]; static int known_cipher_nids_amount = -1; /* -1 indicates not yet initialised */ static EVP_CIPHER *known_cipher_methods[OSSL_NELEM(cipher_data)] = { NULL, }; -static void prepare_cipher_methods() +static void prepare_cipher_methods(void) { size_t i; struct session_op sess; - int cfd; - - if ((cfd = open("/dev/crypto", O_RDWR, 0)) < 0) - return; memset(&sess, 0, sizeof(sess)); sess.key = (void *)"01234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789"; @@ -255,7 +247,7 @@ static void prepare_cipher_methods() sess.cipher = cipher_data[i].devcryptoid; sess.keylen = cipher_data[i].keylen; if (ioctl(cfd, CIOCGSESSION, &sess) < 0 - || ioctl(cfd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess) < 0) + || ioctl(cfd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess.ses) < 0) continue; if ((known_cipher_methods[i] = @@ -281,8 +273,6 @@ static void prepare_cipher_methods() cipher_data[i].nid; } } - - close(cfd); } static const EVP_CIPHER *get_cipher_method(int nid) @@ -308,7 +298,7 @@ static void destroy_cipher_method(int nid) known_cipher_methods[i] = NULL; } -static void destroy_all_cipher_methods() +static void destroy_all_cipher_methods(void) { size_t i; @@ -329,11 +319,12 @@ static int devcrypto_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, /* * We only support digests if the cryptodev implementation supports multiple - * data updates. Otherwise, we would be forced to maintain a cache, which is - * perilous if there's a lot of data coming in (if someone wants to checksum - * an OpenSSL tarball, for example). + * data updates and session copying. Otherwise, we would be forced to maintain + * a cache, which is perilous if there's a lot of data coming in (if someone + * wants to checksum an OpenSSL tarball, for example). */ -#if defined(COP_FLAG_UPDATE) && defined(COP_FLAG_FINAL) +#if defined(CIOCCPHASH) && defined(COP_FLAG_UPDATE) && defined(COP_FLAG_FINAL) +#define IMPLEMENT_DIGEST /****************************************************************************** * @@ -346,7 +337,6 @@ static int devcrypto_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, *****/ struct digest_ctx { - int cfd; struct session_op sess; int init; }; @@ -413,19 +403,12 @@ static int digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) const struct digest_data_st *digest_d = get_digest_data(EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)); - if (digest_ctx->init == 0 - && (digest_ctx->cfd = open("/dev/crypto", O_RDWR, 0)) < 0) { - SYSerr(SYS_F_OPEN, errno); - return 0; - } - digest_ctx->init = 1; memset(&digest_ctx->sess, 0, sizeof(digest_ctx->sess)); digest_ctx->sess.mac = digest_d->devcryptoid; - if (ioctl(digest_ctx->cfd, CIOCGSESSION, &digest_ctx->sess) < 0) { + if (ioctl(cfd, CIOCGSESSION, &digest_ctx->sess) < 0) { SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, errno); - close(digest_ctx->cfd); return 0; } @@ -444,7 +427,7 @@ static int digest_op(struct digest_ctx *ctx, const void *src, size_t srclen, cryp.dst = NULL; cryp.mac = res; cryp.flags = flags; - return ioctl(ctx->cfd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp); + return ioctl(cfd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp); } static int digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) @@ -472,7 +455,7 @@ static int digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, errno); return 0; } - if (ioctl(digest_ctx->cfd, CIOCFSESSION, &digest_ctx->sess) < 0) { + if (ioctl(cfd, CIOCFSESSION, &digest_ctx->sess.ses) < 0) { SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, errno); return 0; } @@ -480,16 +463,38 @@ static int digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) return 1; } -static int digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) +static int digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from) { - struct digest_ctx *digest_ctx = - (struct digest_ctx *)EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx); + struct digest_ctx *digest_from = + (struct digest_ctx *)EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(from); + struct digest_ctx *digest_to = + (struct digest_ctx *)EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(to); + struct cphash_op cphash; - if (close(digest_ctx->cfd) < 0) { - SYSerr(SYS_F_CLOSE, errno); + if (digest_from == NULL) + return 1; + + if (digest_from->init != 1) { + SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, EINVAL); return 0; } + if (!digest_init(to)) { + SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, errno); + return 0; + } + + cphash.src_ses = digest_from->sess.ses; + cphash.dst_ses = digest_to->sess.ses; + if (ioctl(cfd, CIOCCPHASH, &cphash) < 0) { + SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTL, errno); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static int digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) +{ return 1; } @@ -502,14 +507,10 @@ static int known_digest_nids[OSSL_NELEM(digest_data)]; static int known_digest_nids_amount = -1; /* -1 indicates not yet initialised */ static EVP_MD *known_digest_methods[OSSL_NELEM(digest_data)] = { NULL, }; -static void prepare_digest_methods() +static void prepare_digest_methods(void) { size_t i; struct session_op sess; - int cfd; - - if ((cfd = open("/dev/crypto", O_RDWR, 0)) < 0) - return; memset(&sess, 0, sizeof(sess)); @@ -522,7 +523,7 @@ static void prepare_digest_methods() */ sess.mac = digest_data[i].devcryptoid; if (ioctl(cfd, CIOCGSESSION, &sess) < 0 - || ioctl(cfd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess) < 0) + || ioctl(cfd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess.ses) < 0) continue; if ((known_digest_methods[i] = EVP_MD_meth_new(digest_data[i].nid, @@ -532,6 +533,7 @@ static void prepare_digest_methods() || !EVP_MD_meth_set_init(known_digest_methods[i], digest_init) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_update(known_digest_methods[i], digest_update) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_final(known_digest_methods[i], digest_final) + || !EVP_MD_meth_set_copy(known_digest_methods[i], digest_copy) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup(known_digest_methods[i], digest_cleanup) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(known_digest_methods[i], sizeof(struct digest_ctx))) { @@ -541,8 +543,6 @@ static void prepare_digest_methods() known_digest_nids[known_digest_nids_amount++] = digest_data[i].nid; } } - - close(cfd); } static const EVP_MD *get_digest_method(int nid) @@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ static void destroy_digest_method(int nid) known_digest_methods[i] = NULL; } -static void destroy_all_digest_methods() +static void destroy_all_digest_methods(void) { size_t i; @@ -598,9 +598,12 @@ static int devcrypto_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, static int devcrypto_unload(ENGINE *e) { destroy_all_cipher_methods(); -#if defined(COP_FLAG_UPDATE) && defined(COP_FLAG_FINAL) +#ifdef IMPLEMENT_DIGEST destroy_all_digest_methods(); #endif + + close(cfd); + return 1; } /* @@ -611,23 +614,30 @@ void engine_load_devcrypto_int() { ENGINE *e = NULL; - if (access("/dev/crypto", R_OK | W_OK) < 0) { - fprintf(stderr, - "/dev/crypto not present, not enabling devcrypto engine\n"); + if ((cfd = open("/dev/crypto", O_RDWR, 0)) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Could not open /dev/crypto: %s\n", strerror(errno)); return; } prepare_cipher_methods(); -#if defined(COP_FLAG_UPDATE) && defined(COP_FLAG_FINAL) +#ifdef IMPLEMENT_DIGEST prepare_digest_methods(); #endif - if ((e = ENGINE_new()) == NULL) + if ((e = ENGINE_new()) == NULL + || !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, devcrypto_unload)) { + ENGINE_free(e); + /* + * We know that devcrypto_unload() won't be called when one of the + * above two calls have failed, so we close cfd explicitly here to + * avoid leaking resources. + */ + close(cfd); return; + } if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, "devcrypto") || !ENGINE_set_name(e, "/dev/crypto engine") - || !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, devcrypto_unload) /* * Asymmetric ciphers aren't well supported with /dev/crypto. Among the BSD @@ -664,7 +674,7 @@ void engine_load_devcrypto_int() # endif #endif || !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, devcrypto_ciphers) -#if defined(COP_FLAG_UPDATE) && defined(COP_FLAG_FINAL) +#ifdef IMPLEMENT_DIGEST || !ENGINE_set_digests(e, devcrypto_digests) #endif ) { diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_list.c b/crypto/engine/eng_list.c index 4bc7ea173cdc..45c339c54157 100644 --- a/crypto/engine/eng_list.c +++ b/crypto/engine/eng_list.c @@ -317,8 +317,7 @@ ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id) * Prevent infinite recursion if we're looking for the dynamic engine. */ if (strcmp(id, "dynamic")) { - if (OPENSSL_issetugid() - || (load_dir = getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == NULL) + if ((load_dir = ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == NULL) load_dir = ENGINESDIR; iterator = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic"); if (!iterator || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "ID", id, 0) || diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt index 2c8572ba64ad..5003d8735a4d 100644 --- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt +++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt @@ -1014,6 +1014,7 @@ RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ACQUIRE_ENTROPY:122:rand_pool_acquire_entropy RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD:103:rand_pool_add RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_BEGIN:113:rand_pool_add_begin RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_END:114:rand_pool_add_end +RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ATTACH:124:rand_pool_attach RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED:115:rand_pool_bytes_needed RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW:116:rand_pool_new RAND_F_RAND_WRITE_FILE:112:RAND_write_file diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c index 0add393276bc..39eb4f379a99 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c +++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c @@ -2241,7 +2241,7 @@ static int s390x_aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set) { /*- - * In case message length was not previously set explicitely via + * In case message length was not previously set explicitly via * Update(), set it now. */ ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx); diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c b/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c index 80afe316d764..aa0d14018687 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c +++ b/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ static int rc2_meth_to_magic(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *e) { int i; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(e, EVP_CTRL_GET_RC2_KEY_BITS, 0, &i); + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(e, EVP_CTRL_GET_RC2_KEY_BITS, 0, &i) <= 0) + return 0; if (i == 128) return RC2_128_MAGIC; else if (i == 64) @@ -136,8 +137,9 @@ static int rc2_get_asn1_type_and_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type) return -1; if (i > 0 && !EVP_CipherInit_ex(c, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv, -1)) return -1; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c, EVP_CTRL_SET_RC2_KEY_BITS, key_bits, NULL); - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(c, key_bits / 8) <= 0) + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c, EVP_CTRL_SET_RC2_KEY_BITS, key_bits, + NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(c, key_bits / 8) <= 0) return -1; } return i; diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c index 633cb8863d6d..7fbf895e0732 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c +++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c @@ -837,21 +837,21 @@ void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_check(const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pcheck) (EVP_PKEY *pkey)) { - if (*pcheck) + if (pcheck != NULL) *pcheck = pmeth->check; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_public_check(const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pcheck) (EVP_PKEY *pkey)) { - if (*pcheck) + if (pcheck != NULL) *pcheck = pmeth->public_check; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_param_check(const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pcheck) (EVP_PKEY *pkey)) { - if (*pcheck) + if (pcheck != NULL) *pcheck = pmeth->param_check; } diff --git a/crypto/getenv.c b/crypto/getenv.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7e98b645b0d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/getenv.c @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE +# define _GNU_SOURCE +#endif + +#include +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" + +char *ossl_safe_getenv(const char *name) +{ +#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) +# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 17) +# define SECURE_GETENV + return secure_getenv(name); +# endif +#endif + +#ifndef SECURE_GETENV + if (OPENSSL_issetugid()) + return NULL; + return getenv(name); +#endif +} diff --git a/crypto/include/internal/ec_int.h b/crypto/include/internal/ec_int.h index bb4b5129d001..182c39cc8056 100644 --- a/crypto/include/internal/ec_int.h +++ b/crypto/include/internal/ec_int.h @@ -41,5 +41,13 @@ __owur int ec_group_do_inverse_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *res, const BIGNUM *x, BN_CTX *ctx); +/*- + * ECDH Key Derivation Function as defined in ANSI X9.63 + */ +int ecdh_KDF_X9_63(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, + const unsigned char *Z, size_t Zlen, + const unsigned char *sinfo, size_t sinfolen, + const EVP_MD *md); + # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #endif diff --git a/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h b/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h index d91ee4c9342c..888cab1b8f66 100644 --- a/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h +++ b/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h @@ -45,18 +45,21 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg, void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen); -size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(unsigned char **pout, size_t max_len); +size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char **pout); -void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen); +void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out); /* * RAND_POOL functions */ RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, size_t min_len, size_t max_len); +RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, + size_t entropy); void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool); const unsigned char *rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool); unsigned char *rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool); +void rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer); size_t rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool); size_t rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool); diff --git a/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c b/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c index ec6090ad6a7b..ae46fad609ac 100644 --- a/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c +++ b/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c @@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static int pkey_hkdf_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, return -2; } +static int pkey_hkdf_derive_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) +{ + HKDF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data; + + OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->key, kctx->key_len); + OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->salt, kctx->salt_len); + OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->info, kctx->info_len); + memset(kctx, 0, sizeof(*kctx)); + + return 1; +} + static int pkey_hkdf_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen) { @@ -236,7 +248,7 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD hkdf_pkey_meth = { 0, 0, - 0, + pkey_hkdf_derive_init, pkey_hkdf_derive, pkey_hkdf_ctrl, pkey_hkdf_ctrl_str diff --git a/crypto/mem_sec.c b/crypto/mem_sec.c index c4190bed3348..9e0f6702f406 100644 --- a/crypto/mem_sec.c +++ b/crypto/mem_sec.c @@ -20,12 +20,8 @@ #include -/* e_os.h includes unistd.h, which defines _POSIX_VERSION */ -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SECURE_MEMORY) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) \ - && ( (defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200112L) \ - || defined(__sun) || defined(__hpux) || defined(__sgi) \ - || defined(__osf__) ) -# define IMPLEMENTED +/* e_os.h defines OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY if secure memory can be implemented */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY # include # include # include @@ -51,7 +47,7 @@ # define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS #endif -#ifdef IMPLEMENTED +#ifdef OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY static size_t secure_mem_used; static int secure_mem_initialized; @@ -71,7 +67,7 @@ static int sh_allocated(const char *ptr); int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(size_t size, int minsize) { -#ifdef IMPLEMENTED +#ifdef OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY int ret = 0; if (!secure_mem_initialized) { @@ -89,12 +85,12 @@ int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(size_t size, int minsize) return ret; #else return 0; -#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY */ } int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done(void) { -#ifdef IMPLEMENTED +#ifdef OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY if (secure_mem_used == 0) { sh_done(); secure_mem_initialized = 0; @@ -102,22 +98,22 @@ int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done(void) sec_malloc_lock = NULL; return 1; } -#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY */ return 0; } int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized(void) { -#ifdef IMPLEMENTED +#ifdef OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY return secure_mem_initialized; #else return 0; -#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY */ } void *CRYPTO_secure_malloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line) { -#ifdef IMPLEMENTED +#ifdef OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY void *ret; size_t actual_size; @@ -132,12 +128,12 @@ void *CRYPTO_secure_malloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line) return ret; #else return CRYPTO_malloc(num, file, line); -#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY */ } void *CRYPTO_secure_zalloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line) { -#ifdef IMPLEMENTED +#ifdef OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY if (secure_mem_initialized) /* CRYPTO_secure_malloc() zeroes allocations when it is implemented */ return CRYPTO_secure_malloc(num, file, line); @@ -147,7 +143,7 @@ void *CRYPTO_secure_zalloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line) void CRYPTO_secure_free(void *ptr, const char *file, int line) { -#ifdef IMPLEMENTED +#ifdef OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY size_t actual_size; if (ptr == NULL) @@ -164,13 +160,13 @@ void CRYPTO_secure_free(void *ptr, const char *file, int line) CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(sec_malloc_lock); #else CRYPTO_free(ptr, file, line); -#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY */ } void CRYPTO_secure_clear_free(void *ptr, size_t num, const char *file, int line) { -#ifdef IMPLEMENTED +#ifdef OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY size_t actual_size; if (ptr == NULL) @@ -191,12 +187,12 @@ void CRYPTO_secure_clear_free(void *ptr, size_t num, return; OPENSSL_cleanse(ptr, num); CRYPTO_free(ptr, file, line); -#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY */ } int CRYPTO_secure_allocated(const void *ptr) { -#ifdef IMPLEMENTED +#ifdef OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY int ret; if (!secure_mem_initialized) @@ -207,21 +203,21 @@ int CRYPTO_secure_allocated(const void *ptr) return ret; #else return 0; -#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY */ } size_t CRYPTO_secure_used(void) { -#ifdef IMPLEMENTED +#ifdef OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY return secure_mem_used; #else return 0; -#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY */ } size_t CRYPTO_secure_actual_size(void *ptr) { -#ifdef IMPLEMENTED +#ifdef OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY size_t actual_size; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(sec_malloc_lock); @@ -239,7 +235,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_secure_actual_size(void *ptr) /* * SECURE HEAP IMPLEMENTATION */ -#ifdef IMPLEMENTED +#ifdef OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY /* @@ -647,4 +643,4 @@ static size_t sh_actual_size(char *ptr) OPENSSL_assert(sh_testbit(ptr, list, sh.bittable)); return sh.arena_size / (ONE << list); } -#endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY */ diff --git a/crypto/o_fopen.c b/crypto/o_fopen.c index f08f99b414f5..7d51ad725426 100644 --- a/crypto/o_fopen.c +++ b/crypto/o_fopen.c @@ -25,14 +25,12 @@ # endif # endif +#include "e_os.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO) # include -# ifdef _WIN32 -# include -# endif # ifdef __DJGPP__ # include # endif diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c index 88d1d66324e3..0cbbed364a21 100644 --- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c +++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c @@ -7,13 +7,13 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ -# include -# include "internal/cryptlib.h" -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include "p12_lcl.h" +#include +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "p12_lcl.h" int PKCS12_mac_present(const PKCS12 *p12) { @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ void PKCS12_get0_mac(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pmac, } } -# define TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN 32 +#define TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN 32 static int pkcs12_gen_gost_mac_key(const char *pass, int passlen, const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, if ((md_type_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_94 || md_type_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256 || md_type_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512) - && !getenv("LEGACY_GOST_PKCS12")) { + && ossl_safe_getenv("LEGACY_GOST_PKCS12") == NULL) { md_size = TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN; if (!pkcs12_gen_gost_mac_key(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, md_size, key, md_type)) { diff --git a/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_ieee754.c b/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_ieee754.c index 995a02e5c139..7cfd968645ff 100644 --- a/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_ieee754.c +++ b/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_ieee754.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016-20018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c index fe15164451e8..a243361b56e4 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c +++ b/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c @@ -402,10 +402,10 @@ int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg) if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) { /* df initialisation */ static const unsigned char df_key[32] = { - 0x00,0x01,0x02,0x03,0x04,0x05,0x06,0x07, - 0x08,0x09,0x0a,0x0b,0x0c,0x0d,0x0e,0x0f, - 0x10,0x11,0x12,0x13,0x14,0x15,0x16,0x17, - 0x18,0x19,0x1a,0x1b,0x1c,0x1d,0x1e,0x1f + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f }; if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL) @@ -417,9 +417,9 @@ int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg) return 0; drbg->min_entropylen = ctr->keylen; - drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * drbg->min_entropylen; + drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; drbg->min_noncelen = drbg->min_entropylen / 2; - drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * drbg->min_noncelen; + drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH; } else { diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c index 729b49c94372..a13282181d6d 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c @@ -82,6 +82,10 @@ static unsigned int slave_reseed_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL; static time_t master_reseed_time_interval = MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL; static time_t slave_reseed_time_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL; +/* A logical OR of all used DRBG flag bits (currently there is only one) */ +static const unsigned int rand_drbg_used_flags = + RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF; + static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent); static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure, @@ -105,16 +109,27 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags) flags = rand_drbg_flags; } + /* If set is called multiple times - clear the old one */ + if (drbg->type != 0 && (type != drbg->type || flags != drbg->flags)) { + drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg); + rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool); + drbg->adin_pool = NULL; + } + drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED; drbg->flags = flags; drbg->type = type; switch (type) { default: + drbg->type = 0; + drbg->flags = 0; + drbg->meth = NULL; RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE); return 0; case 0: /* Uninitialized; that's okay. */ + drbg->meth = NULL; return 1; case NID_aes_128_ctr: case NID_aes_192_ctr: @@ -123,8 +138,10 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags) break; } - if (ret == 0) + if (ret == 0) { + drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG); + } return ret; } @@ -147,7 +164,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags) break; } - if ((flags & ~RAND_DRBG_USED_FLAGS) != 0) { + if ((flags & ~rand_drbg_used_flags) != 0) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_FLAGS); return 0; } @@ -224,11 +241,8 @@ static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure, return drbg; -err: - if (drbg->secure) - OPENSSL_secure_free(drbg); - else - OPENSSL_free(drbg); + err: + RAND_DRBG_free(drbg); return NULL; } @@ -253,6 +267,7 @@ void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg) if (drbg->meth != NULL) drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg); + rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data); @@ -312,11 +327,18 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen; } + drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter); + if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) { + drbg->reseed_next_counter++; + if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter) + drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1; + } + if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL) entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, min_entropy, min_entropylen, max_entropylen, 0); if (entropylen < min_entropylen - || entropylen > max_entropylen) { + || entropylen > max_entropylen) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY); goto end; } @@ -337,29 +359,15 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, } drbg->state = DRBG_READY; - drbg->generate_counter = 0; + drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1; drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL); - if (drbg->reseed_counter > 0) { - if (drbg->parent == NULL) - drbg->reseed_counter++; - else - drbg->reseed_counter = drbg->parent->reseed_counter; - } + tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter); -end: + end: if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL) drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen); - if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce!= NULL ) + if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce != NULL) drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen); - if (drbg->pool != NULL) { - if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, - RAND_R_ERROR_ENTROPY_POOL_WAS_IGNORED); - drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; - } - rand_pool_free(drbg->pool); - drbg->pool = NULL; - } if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) return 1; return 0; @@ -375,6 +383,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) { if (drbg->meth == NULL) { + drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_UNINSTANTIATE, RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED); return 0; @@ -419,13 +428,21 @@ int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, } drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; + + drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter); + if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) { + drbg->reseed_next_counter++; + if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter) + drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1; + } + if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL) entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength, drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen, prediction_resistance); if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen - || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) { + || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY); goto end; } @@ -434,16 +451,11 @@ int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, goto end; drbg->state = DRBG_READY; - drbg->generate_counter = 0; + drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1; drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL); - if (drbg->reseed_counter > 0) { - if (drbg->parent == NULL) - drbg->reseed_counter++; - else - drbg->reseed_counter = drbg->parent->reseed_counter; - } + tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter); -end: + end: if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL) drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen); if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) @@ -475,10 +487,12 @@ int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg, const unsigned char *adin = NULL; size_t adinlen = 0; - if (drbg->pool != NULL) { + if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - rand_pool_free(drbg->pool); - drbg->pool = NULL; + drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; + rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool); + drbg->seed_pool = NULL; + return 0; } if (buffer != NULL) { @@ -486,24 +500,25 @@ int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg, if (drbg->max_entropylen < len) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG); + drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; return 0; } if (entropy > 8 * len) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ENTROPY_OUT_OF_RANGE); + drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; return 0; } /* will be picked up by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback */ - drbg->pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, len, len); - if (drbg->pool == NULL) + drbg->seed_pool = rand_pool_attach(buffer, len, entropy); + if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) return 0; - - rand_pool_add(drbg->pool, buffer, len, entropy); } else { if (drbg->max_adinlen < len) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG); + drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; return 0; } adin = buffer; @@ -543,14 +558,8 @@ int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg, } } - /* check whether a given entropy pool was cleared properly during reseed */ - if (drbg->pool != NULL) { - drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - rand_pool_free(drbg->pool); - drbg->pool = NULL; - return 0; - } + rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool); + drbg->seed_pool = NULL; return drbg->state == DRBG_READY; } @@ -600,7 +609,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, } if (drbg->reseed_interval > 0) { - if (drbg->generate_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval) + if (drbg->reseed_gen_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval) reseed_required = 1; } if (drbg->reseed_time_interval > 0) { @@ -609,8 +618,11 @@ int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, || now - drbg->reseed_time >= drbg->reseed_time_interval) reseed_required = 1; } - if (drbg->reseed_counter > 0 && drbg->parent != NULL) { - if (drbg->reseed_counter != drbg->parent->reseed_counter) + if (drbg->parent != NULL) { + unsigned int reseed_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter); + if (reseed_counter > 0 + && tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter) + != reseed_counter) reseed_required = 1; } @@ -629,7 +641,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, return 0; } - drbg->generate_counter++; + drbg->reseed_gen_counter++; return 1; } @@ -647,9 +659,18 @@ int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) unsigned char *additional = NULL; size_t additional_len; size_t chunk; - size_t ret; + size_t ret = 0; - additional_len = rand_drbg_get_additional_data(&additional, drbg->max_adinlen); + if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL) { + if (drbg->type == 0) + goto err; + drbg->adin_pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, drbg->max_adinlen); + if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL) + goto err; + } + + additional_len = rand_drbg_get_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool, + &additional); for ( ; outlen > 0; outlen -= chunk, out += chunk) { chunk = outlen; @@ -661,9 +682,9 @@ int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) } ret = 1; -err: - if (additional_len != 0) - OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(additional, additional_len); + err: + if (additional != NULL) + rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool, additional); return ret; } @@ -682,7 +703,8 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg, RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce, RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce) { - if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) + if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED + || drbg->parent != NULL) return 0; drbg->get_entropy = get_entropy; drbg->cleanup_entropy = cleanup_entropy; @@ -859,7 +881,7 @@ static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent) goto err; /* enable seed propagation */ - drbg->reseed_counter = 1; + tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, 1); /* * Ignore instantiation error to support just-in-time instantiation. @@ -948,11 +970,49 @@ static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count) return ret; } +/* + * Calculates the minimum length of a full entropy buffer + * which is necessary to seed (i.e. instantiate) the DRBG + * successfully. + */ +size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg) +{ + /* + * If no os entropy source is available then RAND_seed(buffer, bufsize) + * is expected to succeed if and only if the buffer length satisfies + * the following requirements, which follow from the calculations + * in RAND_DRBG_instantiate(). + */ + size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength; + size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen; + + /* + * Extra entropy for the random nonce in the absence of a + * get_nonce callback, see comment in RAND_DRBG_instantiate(). + */ + if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) { + min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2; + min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen; + } + + /* + * Convert entropy requirement from bits to bytes + * (dividing by 8 without rounding upwards, because + * all entropy requirements are divisible by 8). + */ + min_entropy >>= 3; + + /* Return a value that satisfies both requirements */ + return min_entropy > min_entropylen ? min_entropy : min_entropylen; +} + /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_add() method */ static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness) { int ret = 0; RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master(); + size_t buflen; + size_t seedlen; if (drbg == NULL) return 0; @@ -960,20 +1020,49 @@ static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness) if (num < 0 || randomness < 0.0) return 0; - if (randomness > (double)drbg->max_entropylen) { + rand_drbg_lock(drbg); + seedlen = rand_drbg_seedlen(drbg); + + buflen = (size_t)num; + + if (buflen < seedlen || randomness < (double) seedlen) { +#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) + /* + * If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail + * inevitably. So we use a trick to mix the buffer contents into + * the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: we generate a + * dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data. + * Note: This won't work with RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF. + */ + unsigned char dummy[1]; + + ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, dummy, sizeof(dummy), 0, buf, buflen); + rand_drbg_unlock(drbg); + return ret; +#else + /* + * If an os entropy source is avaible then we declare the buffer content + * as additional data by setting randomness to zero and trigger a regular + * reseeding. + */ + randomness = 0.0; +#endif + } + + + if (randomness > (double)seedlen) { /* * The purpose of this check is to bound |randomness| by a * relatively small value in order to prevent an integer * overflow when multiplying by 8 in the rand_drbg_restart() - * call below. + * call below. Note that randomness is measured in bytes, + * not bits, so this value corresponds to eight times the + * security strength. */ - return 0; + randomness = (double)seedlen; } - rand_drbg_lock(drbg); - ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, buf, - (size_t)(unsigned int)num, - (size_t)(8*randomness)); + ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, buf, buflen, (size_t)(8 * randomness)); rand_drbg_unlock(drbg); return ret; diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_err.c b/crypto/rand/rand_err.c index 31480a682838..6a870455d50a 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_err.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_err.c @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_functs[] = { {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_BEGIN, 0), "rand_pool_add_begin"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_END, 0), "rand_pool_add_end"}, + {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ATTACH, 0), "rand_pool_attach"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED, 0), "rand_pool_bytes_needed"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, 0), "rand_pool_new"}, diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h index 94ffc96f20e2..c3e9804dc07e 100755 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h @@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ # include # include # include +# include "internal/tsan_assist.h" + +# include "internal/numbers.h" /* How many times to read the TSC as a randomness source. */ # define TSC_READ_COUNT 4 @@ -32,18 +35,42 @@ -/* Max size of additional input and personalization string. */ -# define DRBG_MAX_LENGTH 4096 +/* + * Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string) + * + * NIST SP800 90Ar1 allows a maximum of (1 << 35) bits i.e., (1 << 32) bytes. + * + * We lower it to 'only' INT32_MAX bytes, which is equivalent to 2 gigabytes. + */ +# define DRBG_MAX_LENGTH INT32_MAX + + /* - * The quotient between max_{entropy,nonce}len and min_{entropy,nonce}len + * Maximum allocation size for RANDOM_POOL buffers * - * The current factor is large enough that the RAND_POOL can store a - * random input which has a lousy entropy rate of 0.0625 bits per byte. - * This input will be sent through the derivation function which 'compresses' - * the low quality input into a high quality output. + * The max_len value for the buffer provided to the rand_drbg_get_entropy() + * callback is currently 2^31 bytes (2 gigabytes), if a derivation function + * is used. Since this is much too large to be allocated, the rand_pool_new() + * function chooses more modest values as default pool length, bounded + * by RAND_POOL_MIN_LENGTH and RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH + * + * The choice of the RAND_POOL_FACTOR is large enough such that the + * RAND_POOL can store a random input which has a lousy entropy rate of + * 8/256 (= 0.03125) bits per byte. This input will be sent through the + * derivation function which 'compresses' the low quality input into a + * high quality output. + * + * The factor 1.5 below is the pessimistic estimate for the extra amount + * of entropy required when no get_nonce() callback is defined. + */ +# define RAND_POOL_FACTOR 256 +# define RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH (RAND_POOL_FACTOR * \ + 3 * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 16)) +/* + * = (RAND_POOL_FACTOR * \ + * 1.5 * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8)) */ -# define DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR 128 /* DRBG status values */ @@ -54,7 +81,7 @@ typedef enum drbg_status_e { } DRBG_STATUS; -/* intantiate */ +/* instantiate */ typedef int (*RAND_DRBG_instantiate_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx, const unsigned char *ent, size_t entlen, @@ -68,7 +95,7 @@ typedef int (*RAND_DRBG_reseed_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx, size_t entlen, const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen); -/* generat output */ +/* generate output */ typedef int (*RAND_DRBG_generate_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, @@ -122,10 +149,12 @@ struct rand_pool_st { unsigned char *buffer; /* points to the beginning of the random pool */ size_t len; /* current number of random bytes contained in the pool */ + int attached; /* true pool was attached to existing buffer */ + size_t min_len; /* minimum number of random bytes requested */ size_t max_len; /* maximum number of random bytes (allocated buffer size) */ size_t entropy; /* current entropy count in bits */ - size_t requested_entropy; /* requested entropy count in bits */ + size_t entropy_requested; /* requested entropy count in bits */ }; /* @@ -139,7 +168,7 @@ struct rand_drbg_st { int type; /* the nid of the underlying algorithm */ /* * Stores the value of the rand_fork_count global as of when we last - * reseeded. The DRG reseeds automatically whenever drbg->fork_count != + * reseeded. The DRBG reseeds automatically whenever drbg->fork_count != * rand_fork_count. Used to provide fork-safety and reseed this DRBG in * the child process. */ @@ -147,14 +176,19 @@ struct rand_drbg_st { unsigned short flags; /* various external flags */ /* - * The random pool is used by RAND_add()/drbg_add() to attach random + * The random_data is used by RAND_add()/drbg_add() to attach random * data to the global drbg, such that the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback * can pull it during instantiation and reseeding. This is necessary to * reconcile the different philosophies of the RAND and the RAND_DRBG * with respect to how randomness is added to the RNG during reseeding * (see PR #4328). */ - struct rand_pool_st *pool; + struct rand_pool_st *seed_pool; + + /* + * Auxiliary pool for additional data. + */ + struct rand_pool_st *adin_pool; /* * The following parameters are setup by the per-type "init" function. @@ -180,7 +214,7 @@ struct rand_drbg_st { size_t max_perslen, max_adinlen; /* Counts the number of generate requests since the last reseed. */ - unsigned int generate_counter; + unsigned int reseed_gen_counter; /* * Maximum number of generate requests until a reseed is required. * This value is ignored if it is zero. @@ -203,7 +237,8 @@ struct rand_drbg_st { * is added by RAND_add() or RAND_seed() will have an immediate effect on * the output of RAND_bytes() resp. RAND_priv_bytes(). */ - unsigned int reseed_counter; + TSAN_QUALIFIER unsigned int reseed_prop_counter; + unsigned int reseed_next_counter; size_t seedlen; DRBG_STATUS state; @@ -245,7 +280,7 @@ extern int rand_fork_count; /* DRBG helpers */ int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg, const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy); - +size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg); /* locking api */ int rand_drbg_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg); int rand_drbg_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg); diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c index e9bc9522101c..d8639c4a03f3 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ int rand_fork_count; static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_nonce_lock; static int rand_nonce_count; -static int rand_cleaning_up = 0; +static int rand_inited = 0; #ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC /* @@ -146,17 +146,13 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, return 0; } - pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, min_len, max_len); - if (pool == NULL) - return 0; - - if (drbg->pool) { - rand_pool_add(pool, - rand_pool_buffer(drbg->pool), - rand_pool_length(drbg->pool), - rand_pool_entropy(drbg->pool)); - rand_pool_free(drbg->pool); - drbg->pool = NULL; + if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) { + pool = drbg->seed_pool; + pool->entropy_requested = entropy; + } else { + pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, min_len, max_len); + if (pool == NULL) + return 0; } if (drbg->parent) { @@ -178,6 +174,8 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, prediction_resistance, NULL, 0) != 0) bytes = bytes_needed; + drbg->reseed_next_counter + = tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter); rand_drbg_unlock(drbg->parent); rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); @@ -206,7 +204,8 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, } err: - rand_pool_free(pool); + if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) + rand_pool_free(pool); return ret; } @@ -217,7 +216,8 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) { - OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen); + if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) + OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen); } @@ -279,14 +279,9 @@ void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg, * On success it allocates a buffer at |*pout| and returns the length of * the data. The buffer should get freed using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(). */ -size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(unsigned char **pout, size_t max_len) +size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char **pout) { size_t ret = 0; - RAND_POOL *pool; - - pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, max_len); - if (pool == NULL) - return 0; if (rand_pool_add_additional_data(pool) == 0) goto err; @@ -295,14 +290,12 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(unsigned char **pout, size_t max_len) *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool); err: - rand_pool_free(pool); - return ret; } -void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) +void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out) { - OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen); + rand_pool_reattach(pool, out); } void rand_fork(void) @@ -326,13 +319,15 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init) if (rand_nonce_lock == NULL) goto err2; - if (!rand_cleaning_up && !rand_pool_init()) + if (!rand_pool_init()) goto err3; + rand_inited = 1; return 1; err3: - rand_pool_cleanup(); + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_nonce_lock); + rand_nonce_lock = NULL; err2: CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock); rand_meth_lock = NULL; @@ -348,7 +343,8 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth; - rand_cleaning_up = 1; + if (!rand_inited) + return; if (meth != NULL && meth->cleanup != NULL) meth->cleanup(); @@ -362,6 +358,7 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void) rand_meth_lock = NULL; CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_nonce_lock); rand_nonce_lock = NULL; + rand_inited = 0; } /* @@ -370,7 +367,8 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void) */ void RAND_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) { - rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(keep); + if (RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init)) + rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(keep); } /* @@ -405,7 +403,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void) /* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */ pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8, - DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8)); + RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH); if (pool == NULL) return 0; @@ -430,17 +428,18 @@ int RAND_poll(void) * Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool */ -RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) +RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) { RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool)); if (pool == NULL) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; + return NULL; } pool->min_len = min_len; - pool->max_len = max_len; + pool->max_len = (max_len > RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH) ? + RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH : max_len; pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->max_len); if (pool->buffer == NULL) { @@ -448,7 +447,7 @@ RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) goto err; } - pool->requested_entropy = entropy; + pool->entropy_requested = entropy_requested; return pool; @@ -457,6 +456,38 @@ RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) return NULL; } +/* + * Attach new random pool to the given buffer + * + * This function is intended to be used only for feeding random data + * provided by RAND_add() and RAND_seed() into the DRBG. + */ +RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, + size_t entropy) +{ + RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool)); + + if (pool == NULL) { + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ATTACH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * The const needs to be cast away, but attached buffers will not be + * modified (in contrary to allocated buffers which are zeroed and + * freed in the end). + */ + pool->buffer = (unsigned char *) buffer; + pool->len = len; + + pool->attached = 1; + + pool->min_len = pool->max_len = pool->len; + pool->entropy = entropy; + + return pool; +} + /* * Free |pool|, securely erasing its buffer. */ @@ -465,7 +496,14 @@ void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool) if (pool == NULL) return; - OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->max_len); + /* + * Although it would be advisable from a cryptographical viewpoint, + * we are not allowed to clear attached buffers, since they are passed + * to rand_pool_attach() as `const unsigned char*`. + * (see corresponding comment in rand_pool_attach()). + */ + if (!pool->attached) + OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->max_len); OPENSSL_free(pool); } @@ -496,15 +534,27 @@ size_t rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool) /* * Detach the |pool| buffer and return it to the caller. * It's the responsibility of the caller to free the buffer - * using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(). + * using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() or to re-attach it + * again to the pool using rand_pool_reattach(). */ unsigned char *rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool) { unsigned char *ret = pool->buffer; pool->buffer = NULL; + pool->entropy = 0; return ret; } +/* + * Re-attach the |pool| buffer. It is only allowed to pass + * the |buffer| which was previously detached from the same pool. + */ +void rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer) +{ + pool->buffer = buffer; + OPENSSL_cleanse(pool->buffer, pool->len); + pool->len = 0; +} /* * If |entropy_factor| bits contain 1 bit of entropy, how many bytes does one @@ -524,7 +574,7 @@ unsigned char *rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool) */ size_t rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool) { - if (pool->entropy < pool->requested_entropy) + if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested) return 0; if (pool->len < pool->min_len) @@ -540,8 +590,8 @@ size_t rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool) size_t rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool) { - if (pool->entropy < pool->requested_entropy) - return pool->requested_entropy - pool->entropy; + if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested) + return pool->entropy_requested - pool->entropy; return 0; } @@ -601,6 +651,11 @@ int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool, return 0; } + if (pool->buffer == NULL) { + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (len > 0) { memcpy(pool->buffer + pool->len, buffer, len); pool->len += len; @@ -632,6 +687,11 @@ unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len) return NULL; } + if (pool->buffer == NULL) { + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_BEGIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + return pool->buffer + pool->len; } diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c index 9c62a04ebf89..9d8ffdd53796 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c @@ -77,6 +77,17 @@ static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void); # endif #endif /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) || defined(__DJGPP__) */ +#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) +/* none means none. this simplifies the following logic */ +# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS +# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM +# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM +# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM +# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC +# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU +# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD +#endif + #if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)) && \ !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) # error "UEFI and VXWorks only support seeding NONE" @@ -86,8 +97,6 @@ static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void); || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \ || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)) -static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen); - # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS) # ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS @@ -244,6 +253,7 @@ static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen) } # endif +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) /* * syscall_random(): Try to get random data using a system call * returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or < 0 on error. @@ -254,7 +264,7 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen) * Note: 'buflen' equals the size of the buffer which is used by the * get_entropy() callback of the RAND_DRBG. It is roughly bounded by * - * 2 * DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8) = 2^13 + * 2 * RAND_POOL_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8) = 2^14 * * which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion * between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check. @@ -302,8 +312,9 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen) return -1; # endif } +# endif /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) */ -#if !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) && defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) static const char *random_device_paths[] = { DEVRANDOM }; static struct random_device { int fd; @@ -375,21 +386,13 @@ static void close_random_device(size_t n) rd->fd = -1; } -static void open_random_devices(void) -{ - size_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(random_devices); i++) - (void)get_random_device(i); -} - int rand_pool_init(void) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(random_devices); i++) random_devices[i].fd = -1; - open_random_devices(); + return 1; } @@ -403,16 +406,13 @@ void rand_pool_cleanup(void) void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) { - if (keep) - open_random_devices(); - else + if (!keep) rand_pool_cleanup(); + keep_random_devices_open = keep; } -# else /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) - * || !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) - */ +# else /* !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */ int rand_pool_init(void) { @@ -427,9 +427,7 @@ void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) { } -# endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) - * && defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) - */ +# endif /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */ /* * Try the various seeding methods in turn, exit when successful. @@ -450,14 +448,14 @@ void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) */ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) { -# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); # else size_t bytes_needed; size_t entropy_available = 0; unsigned char *buffer; -# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) { ssize_t bytes; /* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */ @@ -487,7 +485,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) } # endif -# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); { size_t i; @@ -524,19 +522,19 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) } # endif -# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC) entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool); if (entropy_available > 0) return entropy_available; # endif -# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU) entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool); if (entropy_available > 0) return entropy_available; # endif -# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD) bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); if (bytes_needed > 0) { static const char *paths[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL }; @@ -577,7 +575,7 @@ int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool) /* * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to - * ensure that the nonce is unique whith high probability for + * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for * different process instances. */ data.pid = getpid(); diff --git a/crypto/rand/randfile.c b/crypto/rand/randfile.c index c652ddcf1e6c..1b737d1ba2ba 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/randfile.c +++ b/crypto/rand/randfile.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS @@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ # define S_ISREG(m) ((m) & S_IFREG) # endif -#define RAND_FILE_SIZE 1024 +#define RAND_BUF_SIZE 1024 #define RFILE ".rnd" #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS @@ -74,7 +75,16 @@ static __FILE_ptr32 (*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) = */ int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes) { - unsigned char buf[RAND_FILE_SIZE]; + /* + * The load buffer size exceeds the chunk size by the comfortable amount + * of 'RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH' bytes (not bits!). This is done on purpose + * to avoid calling RAND_add() with a small final chunk. Instead, such + * a small final chunk will be added together with the previous chunk + * (unless it's the only one). + */ +#define RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE (RAND_BUF_SIZE + RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH) + unsigned char buf[RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE]; + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO struct stat sb; #endif @@ -98,8 +108,12 @@ int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes) return -1; } - if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode) && bytes < 0) - bytes = 256; + if (bytes < 0) { + if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) + bytes = sb.st_size; + else + bytes = RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH; + } #endif /* * On VMS, setbuf() will only take 32-bit pointers, and a compilation @@ -124,9 +138,9 @@ int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes) for ( ; ; ) { if (bytes > 0) - n = (bytes < RAND_FILE_SIZE) ? (int)bytes : RAND_FILE_SIZE; + n = (bytes <= RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE) ? (int)bytes : RAND_BUF_SIZE; else - n = RAND_FILE_SIZE; + n = RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE; i = fread(buf, 1, n, in); #ifdef EINTR if (ferror(in) && errno == EINTR){ @@ -148,12 +162,18 @@ int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes) OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf)); fclose(in); + if (!RAND_status()) { + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR); + ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file); + return -1; + } + return ret; } int RAND_write_file(const char *file) { - unsigned char buf[RAND_FILE_SIZE]; + unsigned char buf[RAND_BUF_SIZE]; int ret = -1; FILE *out = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO @@ -222,9 +242,9 @@ int RAND_write_file(const char *file) chmod(file, 0600); #endif - ret = fwrite(buf, 1, RAND_FILE_SIZE, out); + ret = fwrite(buf, 1, RAND_BUF_SIZE, out); fclose(out); - OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, RAND_FILE_SIZE); + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, RAND_BUF_SIZE); return ret; } @@ -262,11 +282,9 @@ const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size) } } #else - if (OPENSSL_issetugid() != 0) { + if ((s = ossl_safe_getenv("RANDFILE")) == NULL || *s == '\0') { use_randfile = 0; - } else if ((s = getenv("RANDFILE")) == NULL || *s == '\0') { - use_randfile = 0; - s = getenv("HOME"); + s = ossl_safe_getenv("HOME"); } #endif diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c index 72d1b5e0715d..49c34b7c36c9 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c @@ -125,8 +125,8 @@ void RSA_free(RSA *r) CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock); - BN_clear_free(r->n); - BN_clear_free(r->e); + BN_free(r->n); + BN_free(r->e); BN_clear_free(r->d); BN_clear_free(r->p); BN_clear_free(r->q); @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) r->e = e; } if (d != NULL) { - BN_free(r->d); + BN_clear_free(r->d); r->d = d; } @@ -213,11 +213,11 @@ int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) return 0; if (p != NULL) { - BN_free(r->p); + BN_clear_free(r->p); r->p = p; } if (q != NULL) { - BN_free(r->q); + BN_clear_free(r->q); r->q = q; } @@ -235,15 +235,15 @@ int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) return 0; if (dmp1 != NULL) { - BN_free(r->dmp1); + BN_clear_free(r->dmp1); r->dmp1 = dmp1; } if (dmq1 != NULL) { - BN_free(r->dmq1); + BN_clear_free(r->dmq1); r->dmq1 = dmq1; } if (iqmp != NULL) { - BN_free(r->iqmp); + BN_clear_free(r->iqmp); r->iqmp = iqmp; } diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_meth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_meth.c index f5880a73d0f7..def19f375f92 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_meth.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_meth.c @@ -163,13 +163,13 @@ int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, /* Can be null */ int (*RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) - (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) + (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) { return meth->rsa_mod_exp; } int RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *meth, - int (*mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, + int (*mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)) { meth->rsa_mod_exp = mod_exp; diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c index d581777eec9b..2b1b006c2801 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c @@ -680,10 +680,11 @@ static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) */ || !bn_mod_sub_fixed_top(r1, r1, m1, rsa->p) - /* r0 = r0 * iqmp mod p */ + /* r1 = r1 * iqmp mod p */ || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(r1, r1, rsa->_method_mod_p, ctx) || !bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r1, r1, rsa->iqmp, rsa->_method_mod_p, ctx) + /* r0 = r1 * q + m1 */ || !bn_mul_fixed_top(r0, r1, rsa->q, ctx) || !bn_mod_add_fixed_top(r0, r0, m1, rsa->n)) goto err; diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-s390x.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-s390x.pl index 3bce19be9ea4..1184cf233eba 100755 --- a/crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-s390x.pl +++ b/crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-s390x.pl @@ -432,9 +432,9 @@ SHA3_absorb: lrvg %r0,0($inp) la $inp,8($inp) xg %r0,0(%r1) - la %r1,8(%r1) a${g}hi $len,-8 - stg %r0,-8(%r1) + stg %r0,0(%r1) + la %r1,8(%r1) brct $bsz,.Lblock_absorb stm${g} $inp,$len,$frame+3*$SIZE_T($sp) diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512p8-ppc.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512p8-ppc.pl index 2792800b475c..0d4fdd292c07 100755 --- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512p8-ppc.pl +++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512p8-ppc.pl @@ -166,8 +166,8 @@ $func: addi r11,r11,32 stvx v30,r10,$sp stvx v31,r11,$sp - li r11,-4096+255 - stw $vrsave,`$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T-4`($sp) # save vrsave + li r11,-4096+255 # 0xfffff0ff + stw $vrsave,`$FRAME-6*$SIZE_T-4`($sp) # save vrsave li $x10,0x10 $PUSH r26,`$FRAME-6*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x20,0x20 @@ -286,24 +286,17 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8); stvx_u $G,$x30,$ctx ___ $code.=<<___; - li r10,`$LOCALS+15` + addi $offload,$sp,`$LOCALS+15` mtlr $lrsave - li r11,`$LOCALS+31` mtspr 256,$vrsave - lvx v24,r10,$sp # ABI says so - addi r10,r10,32 - lvx v25,r11,$sp - addi r11,r11,32 - lvx v26,r10,$sp - addi r10,r10,32 - lvx v27,r11,$sp - addi r11,r11,32 - lvx v28,r10,$sp - addi r10,r10,32 - lvx v29,r11,$sp - addi r11,r11,32 - lvx v30,r10,$sp - lvx v31,r11,$sp + lvx v24,$x00,$offload # ABI says so + lvx v25,$x10,$offload + lvx v26,$x20,$offload + lvx v27,$x30,$offload + lvx v28,$x40,$offload + lvx v29,$x50,$offload + lvx v30,$x60,$offload + lvx v31,$x70,$offload $POP r26,`$FRAME-6*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r27,`$FRAME-5*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r28,`$FRAME-4*$SIZE_T`($sp) diff --git a/crypto/siphash/siphash.c b/crypto/siphash/siphash.c index ff84a29f8215..be74a38d934d 100644 --- a/crypto/siphash/siphash.c +++ b/crypto/siphash/siphash.c @@ -94,7 +94,19 @@ int SipHash_set_hash_size(SIPHASH *ctx, size_t hash_size) && hash_size != SIPHASH_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE) return 0; - ctx->hash_size = hash_size; + /* + * It's possible that the key was set first. If the hash size changes, + * we need to adjust v1 (see SipHash_Init(). + */ + + /* Start by adjusting the stored size, to make things easier */ + ctx->hash_size = siphash_adjust_hash_size(ctx->hash_size); + + /* Now, adjust ctx->v1 if the old and the new size differ */ + if ((size_t)ctx->hash_size != hash_size) { + ctx->v1 ^= 0xee; + ctx->hash_size = hash_size; + } return 1; } diff --git a/crypto/sm2/sm2_crypt.c b/crypto/sm2/sm2_crypt.c index 9c69a4505487..4389fc731edd 100644 --- a/crypto/sm2/sm2_crypt.c +++ b/crypto/sm2/sm2_crypt.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include "internal/sm2.h" #include "internal/sm2err.h" +#include "internal/ec_int.h" /* ecdh_KDF_X9_63() */ #include #include #include @@ -203,7 +204,7 @@ int sm2_encrypt(const EC_KEY *key, } /* X9.63 with no salt happens to match the KDF used in SM2 */ - if (!ECDH_KDF_X9_62(msg_mask, msg_len, x2y2, 2 * field_size, NULL, 0, + if (!ecdh_KDF_X9_63(msg_mask, msg_len, x2y2, 2 * field_size, NULL, 0, digest)) { SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto done; @@ -344,7 +345,7 @@ int sm2_decrypt(const EC_KEY *key, if (BN_bn2binpad(x2, x2y2, field_size) < 0 || BN_bn2binpad(y2, x2y2 + field_size, field_size) < 0 - || !ECDH_KDF_X9_62(msg_mask, msg_len, x2y2, 2 * field_size, NULL, 0, + || !ecdh_KDF_X9_63(msg_mask, msg_len, x2y2, 2 * field_size, NULL, 0, digest)) { SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto done; diff --git a/crypto/sm2/sm2_sign.c b/crypto/sm2/sm2_sign.c index e594ffd10a0b..0f9c14cb5f4c 100644 --- a/crypto/sm2/sm2_sign.c +++ b/crypto/sm2/sm2_sign.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include "internal/sm2.h" #include "internal/sm2err.h" #include "internal/ec_int.h" /* ec_group_do_inverse_ord() */ +#include "internal/numbers.h" #include #include #include diff --git a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c index 45d48202b561..6b996134df49 100644 --- a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c +++ b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c @@ -415,6 +415,24 @@ static int open_console(UI *ui) is_a_tty = 0; else # endif +# ifdef ENXIO + /* + * Solaris can return ENXIO. + * This should be ok + */ + if (errno == ENXIO) + is_a_tty = 0; + else +# endif +# ifdef EIO + /* + * Linux can return EIO. + * This should be ok + */ + if (errno == EIO) + is_a_tty = 0; + else +# endif # ifdef ENODEV /* * MacOS X returns ENODEV (Operation not supported by device), diff --git a/crypto/x509/by_dir.c b/crypto/x509/by_dir.c index 11ac52ce3c55..b3760dbadf3a 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/by_dir.c +++ b/crypto/x509/by_dir.c @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int dir_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp, long argl, switch (cmd) { case X509_L_ADD_DIR: if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) { - const char *dir = getenv(X509_get_default_cert_dir_env()); + const char *dir = ossl_safe_getenv(X509_get_default_cert_dir_env()); if (dir) ret = add_cert_dir(ld, dir, X509_FILETYPE_PEM); diff --git a/crypto/x509/by_file.c b/crypto/x509/by_file.c index 78d7fbdf4488..244512c9352b 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/by_file.c +++ b/crypto/x509/by_file.c @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static int by_file_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp, switch (cmd) { case X509_L_FILE_LOAD: if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) { - file = getenv(X509_get_default_cert_file_env()); + file = ossl_safe_getenv(X509_get_default_cert_file_env()); if (file) ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file(ctx, file, X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0); diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c index 3a60d412daf8..61e81922b4da 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c @@ -517,15 +517,14 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */ if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca)) return 0; - /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ - if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) - && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) - && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { + /* Check pathlen */ + if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) + && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length))) { if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED)) return 0; } - /* Increment path length if not self issued */ - if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) + /* Increment path length if not a self issued intermediate CA */ + if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0) plen++; /* * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate diff --git a/doc/man1/ca.pod b/doc/man1/ca.pod index 9b282e6479a8..e998eabf8358 100644 --- a/doc/man1/ca.pod +++ b/doc/man1/ca.pod @@ -250,8 +250,10 @@ for all available algorithms. =item B<-subj arg> Supersedes subject name given in the request. -The arg must be formatted as I, -characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), no spaces are skipped. +The arg must be formatted as I. +Keyword characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), and whitespace is retained. +Empty values are permitted, but the corresponding type will not be included +in the resulting certificate. =item B<-utf8> diff --git a/doc/man1/enc.pod b/doc/man1/enc.pod index 01cca4ea93f1..2136a9497849 100644 --- a/doc/man1/enc.pod +++ b/doc/man1/enc.pod @@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ ones provided by configured engines. The B program does not support authenticated encryption modes like CCM and GCM, and will not support such modes in the future. The B interface by necessity must begin streaming output (e.g., -to standard output when B<-out> is not used before the authentication +to standard output when B<-out> is not used) before the authentication tag could be validated, leading to the usage of B in pipelines that begin processing untrusted data and are not capable of rolling back upon authentication failure. The AEAD modes currently in common @@ -277,6 +277,7 @@ standard data format and performs the needed key/iv/nonce management. bf-cbc Blowfish in CBC mode bf Alias for bf-cbc + blowfish Alias for bf-cbc bf-cfb Blowfish in CFB mode bf-ecb Blowfish in ECB mode bf-ofb Blowfish in OFB mode @@ -288,6 +289,8 @@ standard data format and performs the needed key/iv/nonce management. cast5-ecb CAST5 in ECB mode cast5-ofb CAST5 in OFB mode + chacha20 ChaCha20 algorithm + des-cbc DES in CBC mode des Alias for des-cbc des-cfb DES in CFB mode @@ -334,6 +337,19 @@ standard data format and performs the needed key/iv/nonce management. rc5-ecb RC5 cipher in ECB mode rc5-ofb RC5 cipher in OFB mode + seed-cbc SEED cipher in CBC mode + seed Alias for seed-cbc + seed-cfb SEED cipher in CFB mode + seed-ecb SEED cipher in ECB mode + seed-ofb SEED cipher in OFB mode + + sm4-cbc SM4 cipher in CBC mode + sm4 Alias for sm4-cbc + sm4-cfb SM4 cipher in CFB mode + sm4-ctr SM4 cipher in CTR mode + sm4-ecb SM4 cipher in ECB mode + sm4-ofb SM4 cipher in OFB mode + aes-[128|192|256]-cbc 128/192/256 bit AES in CBC mode aes[128|192|256] Alias for aes-[128|192|256]-cbc aes-[128|192|256]-cfb 128/192/256 bit AES in 128 bit CFB mode @@ -343,6 +359,15 @@ standard data format and performs the needed key/iv/nonce management. aes-[128|192|256]-ecb 128/192/256 bit AES in ECB mode aes-[128|192|256]-ofb 128/192/256 bit AES in OFB mode + aria-[128|192|256]-cbc 128/192/256 bit ARIA in CBC mode + aria[128|192|256] Alias for aria-[128|192|256]-cbc + aria-[128|192|256]-cfb 128/192/256 bit ARIA in 128 bit CFB mode + aria-[128|192|256]-cfb1 128/192/256 bit ARIA in 1 bit CFB mode + aria-[128|192|256]-cfb8 128/192/256 bit ARIA in 8 bit CFB mode + aria-[128|192|256]-ctr 128/192/256 bit ARIA in CTR mode + aria-[128|192|256]-ecb 128/192/256 bit ARIA in ECB mode + aria-[128|192|256]-ofb 128/192/256 bit ARIA in OFB mode + camellia-[128|192|256]-cbc 128/192/256 bit Camellia in CBC mode camellia[128|192|256] Alias for camellia-[128|192|256]-cbc camellia-[128|192|256]-cfb 128/192/256 bit Camellia in 128 bit CFB mode @@ -362,26 +387,25 @@ Decode the same file openssl base64 -d -in file.b64 -out file.bin -Encrypt a file using triple DES in CBC mode using a prompted password: +Encrypt a file using AES-128 using a prompted password +and PBKDF2 key derivation: - openssl des3 -salt -in file.txt -out file.des3 + openssl enc -aes128 -pbkdf2 -in file.txt -out file.aes128 Decrypt a file using a supplied password: - openssl des3 -d -salt -in file.des3 -out file.txt -k mypassword + openssl enc -aes128 -pbkdf2 -d -in file.aes128 -out file.txt \ + -pass pass: Encrypt a file then base64 encode it (so it can be sent via mail for example) -using Blowfish in CBC mode: +using AES-256 in CTR mode and PBKDF2 key derivation: - openssl bf -a -salt -in file.txt -out file.bf + openssl enc -aes-256-ctr -pbkdf2 -a -in file.txt -out file.aes256 -Base64 decode a file then decrypt it: +Base64 decode a file then decrypt it using a password supplied in a file: - openssl bf -d -salt -a -in file.bf -out file.txt - -Decrypt some data using a supplied 40 bit RC4 key: - - openssl rc4-40 -in file.rc4 -out file.txt -K 0102030405 + openssl enc -aes-256-ctr -pbkdf2 -d -a -in file.aes256 -out file.txt \ + -pass file: =head1 BUGS diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl.pod b/doc/man1/openssl.pod index c656a34ec032..a39cf963d988 100644 --- a/doc/man1/openssl.pod +++ b/doc/man1/openssl.pod @@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ The B program provides a rich variety of commands (I in the SYNOPSIS above), each of which often has a wealth of options and arguments (I and I in the SYNOPSIS). +Detailed documentation and use cases for most standard subcommands are available +(e.g., L or L). + Many commands use an external configuration file for some or all of their arguments and have a B<-config> option to specify that file. The environment variable B can be used to specify @@ -369,8 +372,38 @@ SM3 Digest =head2 Encoding and Cipher Commands +The following aliases provide convenient access to the most used encodings +and ciphers. + +Depending on how OpenSSL was configured and built, not all ciphers listed +here may be present. See L for more information and command usage. + =over 4 +=item B, B, B, B, B, B + +AES-128 Cipher + +=item B, B, B, B, B, B + +AES-192 Cipher + +=item B, B, B, B, B, B + +AES-256 Cipher + +=item B, B, B, B, B, B + +Aria-128 Cipher + +=item B, B, B, B, B, B + +Aria-192 Cipher + +=item B, B, B, B, B, B + +Aria-256 Cipher + =item B Base64 Encoding @@ -379,6 +412,18 @@ Base64 Encoding Blowfish Cipher +=item B, B, B, B, B, B + +Camellia-128 Cipher + +=item B, B, B, B, B, B + +Camellia-192 Cipher + +=item B, B, B, B, B, B + +Camellia-256 Cipher + =item B, B CAST Cipher @@ -387,6 +432,10 @@ CAST Cipher CAST5 Cipher +=item B + +Chacha20 Cipher + =item B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B DES Cipher @@ -411,6 +460,14 @@ RC4 Cipher RC5 Cipher +=item B, B, B, B, B + +SEED Cipher + +=item B, B, B, B, B, B + +SM4 Cipher + =back =head1 OPTIONS diff --git a/doc/man1/req.pod b/doc/man1/req.pod index 113cd9b6c985..c76d63d6fd81 100644 --- a/doc/man1/req.pod +++ b/doc/man1/req.pod @@ -221,8 +221,10 @@ see L. Sets subject name for new request or supersedes the subject name when processing a request. -The arg must be formatted as I, -characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), no spaces are skipped. +The arg must be formatted as I. +Keyword characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), and whitespace is retained. +Empty values are permitted, but the corresponding type will not be included +in the request. =item B<-multivalue-rdn> diff --git a/doc/man1/rsa.pod b/doc/man1/rsa.pod index 14a8fb1e2989..37f64616c00f 100644 --- a/doc/man1/rsa.pod +++ b/doc/man1/rsa.pod @@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ rsa - RSA key processing tool B B [B<-help>] -[B<-inform PEM|NET|DER>] -[B<-outform PEM|NET|DER>] +[B<-inform PEM|DER>] +[B<-outform PEM|DER>] [B<-in filename>] [B<-passin arg>] [B<-out filename>] @@ -53,16 +53,15 @@ utility. Print out a usage message. -=item B<-inform DER|NET|PEM> +=item B<-inform DER|PEM> This specifies the input format. The B option uses an ASN1 DER encoded form compatible with the PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey or SubjectPublicKeyInfo format. The B form is the default format: it consists of the B format base64 encoded with additional header and footer lines. On input PKCS#8 format private -keys are also accepted. The B form is a format is described in the B -section. +keys are also accepted. -=item B<-outform DER|NET|PEM> +=item B<-outform DER|PEM> This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning and default as the B<-inform> option. @@ -158,17 +157,6 @@ The PEM B format uses the header and footer lines: -----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY----- -----END RSA PUBLIC KEY----- -The B form is a format compatible with older Netscape servers -and Microsoft IIS .key files, this uses unsalted RC4 for its encryption. -It is not very secure and so should only be used when necessary. - -Some newer version of IIS have additional data in the exported .key -files. To use these with the utility, view the file with a binary editor -and look for the string "private-key", then trace back to the byte -sequence 0x30, 0x82 (this is an ASN1 SEQUENCE). Copy all the data -from this point onwards to another file and use that as the input -to the B utility with the B<-inform NET> option. - =head1 EXAMPLES To remove the pass phrase on an RSA private key: @@ -197,9 +185,6 @@ Output the public part of a private key in B format: =head1 BUGS -The command line password arguments don't currently work with -B format. - There should be an option that automatically handles .key files, without having to manually edit them. diff --git a/doc/man1/s_server.pod b/doc/man1/s_server.pod index 07016fc46131..f4c4eda35313 100644 --- a/doc/man1/s_server.pod +++ b/doc/man1/s_server.pod @@ -405,13 +405,14 @@ Inhibit printing of session and certificate information. Sends a status message back to the client when it connects. This includes information about the ciphers used and various session parameters. The output is in HTML format so this option will normally be used with a -web browser. +web browser. Cannot be used in conjunction with B<-early_data>. =item B<-WWW> Emulates a simple web server. Pages will be resolved relative to the current directory, for example if the URL https://myhost/page.html is -requested the file ./page.html will be loaded. +requested the file ./page.html will be loaded. Cannot be used in conjunction +with B<-early_data>. =item B<-tlsextdebug> @@ -423,7 +424,8 @@ Emulates a simple web server. Pages will be resolved relative to the current directory, for example if the URL https://myhost/page.html is requested the file ./page.html will be loaded. The files loaded are assumed to contain a complete and correct HTTP response (lines that -are part of the HTTP response line and headers must end with CRLF). +are part of the HTTP response line and headers must end with CRLF). Cannot be +used in conjunction with B<-early_data>. =item B<-id_prefix val> @@ -488,7 +490,8 @@ output. =item B<-rev> Simple test server which just reverses the text received from the client -and sends it back to the server. Also sets B<-brief>. +and sends it back to the server. Also sets B<-brief>. Cannot be used in +conjunction with B<-early_data>. =item B<-async> @@ -711,7 +714,8 @@ greater than or equal to 0. =item B<-early_data> -Accept early data where possible. +Accept early data where possible. Cannot be used in conjunction with B<-www>, +B<-WWW>, B<-HTTP> or B<-rev>. =item B<-anti_replay>, B<-no_anti_replay> diff --git a/doc/man1/storeutl.pod b/doc/man1/storeutl.pod index 3f26ab500b83..083f0282469e 100644 --- a/doc/man1/storeutl.pod +++ b/doc/man1/storeutl.pod @@ -82,8 +82,11 @@ returned. =item B<-subject arg> Search for an object having the subject name B. -The arg must be formatted as I, -characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), no spaces are skipped. +The arg must be formatted as I. +Keyword characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), and whitespace is retained. +Empty values are permitted but are ignored for the search. That is, +a search with an empty value will have the same effect as not specifying +the type at all. =item B<-issuer arg> diff --git a/doc/man1/x509.pod b/doc/man1/x509.pod index 6e4d28815530..547da5da2368 100644 --- a/doc/man1/x509.pod +++ b/doc/man1/x509.pod @@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ x509 - Certificate display and signing utility B B [B<-help>] -[B<-inform DER|PEM|NET>] -[B<-outform DER|PEM|NET>] +[B<-inform DER|PEM>] +[B<-outform DER|PEM>] [B<-keyform DER|PEM>] [B<-CAform DER|PEM>] [B<-CAkeyform DER|PEM>] @@ -86,16 +86,15 @@ various sections. Print out a usage message. -=item B<-inform DER|PEM|NET> +=item B<-inform DER|PEM> This specifies the input format normally the command will expect an X509 certificate but this can change if other options such as B<-req> are present. The DER format is the DER encoding of the certificate and PEM is the base64 encoding of the DER encoding with header and footer lines -added. The NET option is an obscure Netscape server format that is now -obsolete. The default format is PEM. +added. The default format is PEM. -=item B<-outform DER|PEM|NET> +=item B<-outform DER|PEM> This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning and default as the B<-inform> option. diff --git a/doc/man3/DES_random_key.pod b/doc/man3/DES_random_key.pod index f543bea1ee7b..6e0394d637b2 100644 --- a/doc/man3/DES_random_key.pod +++ b/doc/man3/DES_random_key.pod @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ algorithm. There are two phases to the use of DES encryption. The first is the generation of a I from a key, the second is the -actual encryption. A DES key is of type I. This type is +actual encryption. A DES key is of type I. This type consists of 8 bytes with odd parity. The least significant bit in each byte is the parity bit. The key schedule is an expanded form of the key; it is used to speed the encryption process. @@ -170,42 +170,42 @@ of 24 bytes. This is much better than CBC DES. DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt() implements outer triple CBC DES encryption with three keys. This means that each DES operation inside the CBC mode is -an C. This mode is used by SSL. +C. This mode is used by SSL. The DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt() macro implements two-key Triple-DES by reusing I for the final encryption. C. This form of Triple-DES is used by the RSAREF library. -DES_pcbc_encrypt() encrypt/decrypts using the propagating cipher block +DES_pcbc_encrypt() encrypts/decrypts using the propagating cipher block chaining mode used by Kerberos v4. Its parameters are the same as DES_ncbc_encrypt(). -DES_cfb_encrypt() encrypt/decrypts using cipher feedback mode. This -method takes an array of characters as input and outputs and array of +DES_cfb_encrypt() encrypts/decrypts using cipher feedback mode. This +method takes an array of characters as input and outputs an array of characters. It does not require any padding to 8 character groups. Note: the I variable is changed and the new changed value needs to be passed to the next call to this function. Since this function runs a complete DES ECB encryption per I, this function is only -suggested for use when sending small numbers of characters. +suggested for use when sending a small number of characters. DES_cfb64_encrypt() -implements CFB mode of DES with 64bit feedback. Why is this +implements CFB mode of DES with 64-bit feedback. Why is this useful you ask? Because this routine will allow you to encrypt an -arbitrary number of bytes, no 8 byte padding. Each call to this +arbitrary number of bytes, without 8 byte padding. Each call to this routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec and num. num contains 'how far' we are though ivec. If this does -not make much sense, read more about cfb mode of DES :-). +not make much sense, read more about CFB mode of DES. DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt() and DES_ede2_cfb64_encrypt() is the same as DES_cfb64_encrypt() except that Triple-DES is used. DES_ofb_encrypt() encrypts using output feedback mode. This method -takes an array of characters as input and outputs and array of +takes an array of characters as input and outputs an array of characters. It does not require any padding to 8 character groups. Note: the I variable is changed and the new changed value needs to be passed to the next call to this function. Since this function runs -a complete DES ECB encryption per numbits, this function is only -suggested for use when sending small numbers of characters. +a complete DES ECB encryption per I, this function is only +suggested for use when sending a small number of characters. DES_ofb64_encrypt() is the same as DES_cfb64_encrypt() using Output Feed Back mode. @@ -232,10 +232,10 @@ The following are DES-based transformations: DES_fcrypt() is a fast version of the Unix crypt(3) function. This version takes only a small amount of space relative to other fast -crypt() implementations. This is different to the normal crypt in +crypt() implementations. This is different to the normal crypt() in that the third parameter is the buffer that the return value is written into. It needs to be at least 14 bytes long. This function -is thread safe, unlike the normal crypt. +is thread safe, unlike the normal crypt(). DES_crypt() is a faster replacement for the normal system crypt(). This function calls DES_fcrypt() with a static array passed as the diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_DigestInit.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_DigestInit.pod index 0fedd17ce6c6..5ecbcc5e8992 100644 --- a/doc/man3/EVP_DigestInit.pod +++ b/doc/man3/EVP_DigestInit.pod @@ -310,16 +310,17 @@ This example digests the data "Test Message\n" and "Hello World\n", using the digest name passed on the command line. #include + #include #include - main(int argc, char *argv[]) + int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx; const EVP_MD *md; char mess1[] = "Test Message\n"; char mess2[] = "Hello World\n"; unsigned char md_value[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - int md_len, i; + unsigned int md_len, i; if (argv[1] == NULL) { printf("Usage: mdtest digestname\n"); diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod index e1a107c06e3c..4982e9205305 100644 --- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod +++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod @@ -4,20 +4,55 @@ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl, EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_uint64, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_md, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_mac_key, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_subprime_len, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_generator, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_type, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_rfc5114, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dhx_rfc5114, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_pad, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_nid, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_type, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_type, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_oid, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_oid, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_md, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_md, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_outlen, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_outlen, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_ukm, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_ukm, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_param_enc, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_cofactor_mode, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_type, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_md, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_md, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_outlen, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_outlen, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_ecdh_kdf_ukm, +EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_ecdh_kdf_ukm, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id_len - algorithm specific control operations @@ -27,9 +62,13 @@ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id_len int EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int keytype, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_uint64(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int keytype, int optype, + int cmd, uint64_t value); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, const char *md); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **pmd); @@ -38,22 +77,58 @@ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id_len #include int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *pad); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int len); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *len); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int mbits); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int primes); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *label, int len); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label); #include + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int nbits); #include + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int len); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_subprime_len(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int len); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_generator(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int gen); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_type(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_pad(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_nid(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int nid); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_rfc5114(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int rfc5114); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dhx_rfc5114(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int rfc5114); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_type(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int kdf); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_type(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_oid(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, ASN1_OBJECT *oid); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_oid(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, ASN1_OBJECT **oid); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_outlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int len); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_outlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *len); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *ukm, int len); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **ukm); #include + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int nid); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_param_enc(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int param_enc); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int cofactor_mode); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_cofactor_mode(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int kdf); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_type(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_outlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int len); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_outlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *len); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *ukm, int len); + int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **ukm); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *id, size_t id_len); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *id); @@ -73,6 +148,9 @@ and B is MAC key. This is used by Poly1305, SipHash, HMAC and CMAC. Applications will not normally call EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() directly but will instead call one of the algorithm specific macros below. +The function EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_uint64() is a wrapper that directly passes a +uint64 value as B to EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(). + The function EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str() allows an application to send an algorithm specific control operation to a context B in string form. This is intended to be used for options specified on the command line or in text @@ -80,6 +158,9 @@ files. The commands supported are documented in the openssl utility command line pages for the option B<-pkeyopt> which is supported by the B, B and B commands. +The function EVP_PKEY_CTX_md() sends a message digest control operation +to the context B. The message digest is specified by its name B. + All the remaining "functions" are implemented as macros. The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md() macro sets the message digest type used @@ -99,12 +180,14 @@ L or similar functions instead of this macro. The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_mac_key() macro can be used with any of the algorithms supported by the L function. -The macro EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding() sets the RSA padding mode for B. -The B parameter can take the value RSA_PKCS1_PADDING for PKCS#1 padding, -RSA_SSLV23_PADDING for SSLv23 padding, RSA_NO_PADDING for no padding, -RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING for OAEP padding (encrypt and decrypt only), -RSA_X931_PADDING for X9.31 padding (signature operations only) and -RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING (sign and verify only). +=head2 RSA parameters + +The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding() macro sets the RSA padding mode for B. +The B parameter can take the value B for PKCS#1 +padding, B for SSLv23 padding, B for +no padding, B for OAEP padding (encrypt and +decrypt only), B for X9.31 padding (signature operations +only) and B (sign and verify only). Two RSA padding modes behave differently if EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md() is used. If this macro is called for PKCS#1 padding the plaintext buffer is @@ -116,41 +199,154 @@ padding for RSA the algorithm identifier byte is added or checked and removed if this control is called. If it is not called then the first byte of the plaintext buffer is expected to be the algorithm identifier byte. +The EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding() macro gets the RSA padding mode for B. + The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen() macro sets the RSA PSS salt length to -B as its name implies it is only supported for PSS padding. Three special -values are supported: RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST sets the salt length to the -digest length, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX sets the salt length to the maximum -permissible value. When verifying RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO causes the salt length +B. As its name implies it is only supported for PSS padding. Three special +values are supported: B sets the salt length to the +digest length, B sets the salt length to the maximum +permissible value. When verifying B causes the salt length to be automatically determined based on the B block structure. If this macro is not called maximum salt length is used when signing and auto detection when verifying is used by default. +The EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen() macro gets the RSA PSS salt length +for B. The padding mode must have been set to B. + The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits() macro sets the RSA key length for RSA key generation to B. If not specified 1024 bits is used. The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp() macro sets the public exponent value -for RSA key generation to B currently it should be an odd integer. The +for RSA key generation to B. Currently it should be an odd integer. The B pointer is used internally by this function so it should not be -modified or free after the call. If this macro is not called then 65537 is used. +modified or freed after the call. If not specified 65537 is used. -The macro EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits() sets the number of bits used +The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes() macro sets the number of primes for +RSA key generation to B. If not specified 2 is used. + +The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md() macro sets the MGF1 digest for RSA padding +schemes to B. If not explicitly set the signing digest is used. The +padding mode must have been set to B +or B. + +The EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md() macro gets the MGF1 digest for B. +If not explicitly set the signing digest is used. The padding mode must have +been set to B or B. + +The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md() macro sets the message digest type used +in RSA OAEP to B. The padding mode must have been set to +B. + +The EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md() macro gets the message digest type used +in RSA OAEP to B. The padding mode must have been set to +B. + +The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label() macro sets the RSA OAEP label to +B