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Import OpenSSL 1.1.1g.

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This commit is contained in:
jkim 2020-04-21 19:07:46 +00:00
parent 8a3b2571b4
commit e1fb55eb00
40 changed files with 1736 additions and 611 deletions
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21
CHANGES
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@ -7,6 +7,27 @@
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
release branch.
Changes between 1.1.1f and 1.1.1g [21 Apr 2020]
*) Fixed segmentation fault in SSL_check_chain()
Server or client applications that call the SSL_check_chain() function
during or after a TLS 1.3 handshake may crash due to a NULL pointer
dereference as a result of incorrect handling of the
"signature_algorithms_cert" TLS extension. The crash occurs if an invalid
or unrecognised signature algorithm is received from the peer. This could
be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial of Service attack.
(CVE-2020-1967)
[Benjamin Kaduk]
*) Added AES consttime code for no-asm configurations
an optional constant time support for AES was added
when building openssl for no-asm.
Enable with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_AES_CONST_TIME
Disable with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_NO_AES_CONST_TIME
At this time this feature is by default disabled.
It will be enabled by default in 3.0.
[Bernd Edlinger]
Changes between 1.1.1e and 1.1.1f [31 Mar 2020]
*) Revert the change of EOF detection while reading in libssl to avoid

2
FREEBSD-upgrade
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@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ First, read http://wiki.freebsd.org/SubversionPrimer/VendorImports
# Xlist
setenv XLIST /FreeBSD/work/openssl/svn-FREEBSD-files/FREEBSD-Xlist
setenv FSVN "svn+ssh://repo.freebsd.org/base"
setenv OSSLVER 1.1.1e
setenv OSSLVER 1.1.1g
###setenv OSSLTAG v`echo ${OSSLVER} | tr . _`

6
INSTALL
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@ -535,9 +535,9 @@
conjunction with the "-DPEDANTIC" option (or the
--strict-warnings option).
no-ui
Don't build with the "UI" capability (i.e. the set of
features enabling text based prompts).
no-ui-console
Don't build with the "UI" console method (i.e. the "UI"
method that enables text based console prompts).
enable-unit-test
Enable additional unit test APIs. This should not typically

4
NEWS
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@ -5,6 +5,10 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1f and OpenSSL 1.1.1g [21 Apr 2020]
o Fixed segmentation fault in SSL_check_chain() (CVE-2020-1967)
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1e and OpenSSL 1.1.1f [31 Mar 2020]
o Revert the unexpected EOF reporting via SSL_ERROR_SSL

2
README
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
OpenSSL 1.1.1f 31 Mar 2020
OpenSSL 1.1.1g 21 Apr 2020
Copyright (c) 1998-2020 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson

53
apps/build.info
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@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
{- our @apps_openssl_src =
qw(openssl.c
asn1pars.c ca.c ciphers.c cms.c crl.c crl2p7.c dgst.c dhparam.c
dsa.c dsaparam.c ec.c ecparam.c enc.c engine.c errstr.c gendsa.c
genpkey.c genrsa.c nseq.c ocsp.c passwd.c pkcs12.c pkcs7.c pkcs8.c
pkey.c pkeyparam.c pkeyutl.c prime.c rand.c req.c rsa.c rsautl.c
asn1pars.c ca.c ciphers.c cms.c crl.c crl2p7.c dgst.c
enc.c errstr.c
genpkey.c nseq.c passwd.c pkcs7.c pkcs8.c
pkey.c pkeyparam.c pkeyutl.c prime.c rand.c req.c
s_client.c s_server.c s_time.c sess_id.c smime.c speed.c spkac.c
srp.c ts.c verify.c version.c x509.c rehash.c storeutl.c);
verify.c version.c x509.c rehash.c storeutl.c);
our @apps_lib_src =
( qw(apps.c opt.c s_cb.c s_socket.c app_rand.c bf_prefix.c),
split(/\s+/, $target{apps_aux_src}) );
our @apps_init_src = split(/\s+/, $target{apps_init_src});
"" -}
IF[{- !$disabled{apps} -}]
LIBS_NO_INST=libapps.a
SOURCE[libapps.a]={- join(" ", @apps_lib_src) -}
@ -21,7 +22,47 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{apps} -}]
SOURCE[openssl]={- join(" ", @apps_openssl_src) -}
INCLUDE[openssl]=.. ../include
DEPEND[openssl]=libapps.a ../libssl
IF[{- !$disabled{'des'} -}]
SOURCE[openssl]=pkcs12.c
DEPEND[pkcs12.o]=progs.h
ENDIF
IF[{- !$disabled{'ec'} -}]
SOURCE[openssl]=ec.c ecparam.c
DEPEND[ec.o]=progs.h
DEPEND[ecparam.o]=progs.h
ENDIF
IF[{- !$disabled{'ocsp'} -}]
SOURCE[openssl]=ocsp.c
DEPEND[ocsp.o]=progs.h
ENDIF
IF[{- !$disabled{'srp'} -}]
SOURCE[openssl]=srp.c
DEPEND[srp.o]=progs.h
ENDIF
IF[{- !$disabled{'ts'} -}]
SOURCE[openssl]=ts.c
DEPEND[ts.o]=progs.h
ENDIF
IF[{- !$disabled{'dh'} -}]
SOURCE[openssl]=dhparam.c
DEPEND[dhparam.o]=progs.h
ENDIF
IF[{- !$disabled{'dsa'} -}]
SOURCE[openssl]=dsa.c dsaparam.c gendsa.c
DEPEND[dsa.o]=progs.h
DEPEND[dsaparam.o]=progs.h
DEPEND[gendsa.o]=progs.h
ENDIF
IF[{- !$disabled{'engine'} -}]
SOURCE[openssl]=engine.c
DEPEND[engine.o]=progs.h
ENDIF
IF[{- !$disabled{'rsa'} -}]
SOURCE[openssl]=rsa.c rsautl.c genrsa.c
DEPEND[rsa.o]=progs.h
DEPEND[rsautl.o]=progs.h
DEPEND[genrsa.o]=progs.h
ENDIF
IF[{- $config{target} =~ /^(?:Cygwin|mingw|VC-)/ -}]
GENERATE[openssl.rc]=../util/mkrc.pl openssl
SOURCE[openssl]=openssl.rc

7
apps/dhparam.c
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -8,10 +8,6 @@
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
@ -376,4 +372,3 @@ static int dh_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb)
(void)BIO_flush(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb));
return 1;
}
#endif

7
apps/dsa.c
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -8,10 +8,6 @@
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -262,4 +258,3 @@ int dsa_main(int argc, char **argv)
OPENSSL_free(passout);
return ret;
}
#endif

7
apps/dsaparam.c
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -8,10 +8,6 @@
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
@ -255,4 +251,3 @@ static int dsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb)
(void)BIO_flush(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb));
return 1;
}
#endif

7
apps/ec.c
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -8,10 +8,6 @@
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -280,4 +276,3 @@ int ec_main(int argc, char **argv)
OPENSSL_free(passout);
return ret;
}
#endif

8
apps/ecparam.c
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@ -9,10 +9,6 @@
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
@ -446,5 +442,3 @@ int ecparam_main(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_free_all(out);
return ret;
}
#endif

7
apps/engine.c
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -8,10 +8,6 @@
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
#include "apps.h"
#include "progs.h"
#include <stdio.h>
@ -486,4 +482,3 @@ int engine_main(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_free_all(out);
return ret;
}
#endif

7
apps/gendsa.c
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -8,10 +8,6 @@
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
@ -143,4 +139,3 @@ int gendsa_main(int argc, char **argv)
OPENSSL_free(passout);
return ret;
}
#endif

7
apps/genrsa.c
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -8,10 +8,6 @@
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
@ -198,4 +194,3 @@ static int genrsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb)
(void)BIO_flush(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb));
return 1;
}
#endif

7
apps/ocsp.c
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -9,9 +9,6 @@
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
# define _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED/* So fd_set and friends get properly defined
* on OpenVMS */
@ -1624,5 +1621,3 @@ OCSP_RESPONSE *process_responder(OCSP_REQUEST *req,
return resp;
}
#endif
#endif

8
apps/pkcs12.c
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 1999-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -8,10 +8,6 @@
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES)
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -976,5 +972,3 @@ static int set_pbe(int *ppbe, const char *str)
}
return 1;
}
#endif

7
apps/rsa.c
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -8,10 +8,6 @@
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -313,4 +309,3 @@ int rsa_main(int argc, char **argv)
OPENSSL_free(passout);
return ret;
}
#endif

7
apps/rsautl.c
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -8,10 +8,6 @@
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
#include "apps.h"
#include "progs.h"
#include <string.h>
@ -279,4 +275,3 @@ int rsautl_main(int argc, char **argv)
OPENSSL_free(passin);
return ret;
}
#endif

3
apps/s_time.c
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ const OPTIONS s_time_options[] = {
{"key", OPT_KEY, '<', "File with key, PEM; default is -cert file"},
{"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "PEM format directory of CA's"},
{"cafile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "PEM format file of CA's"},
{"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "PEM format file of CA's"},
{"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-',
"Do not load the default certificates file"},
{"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-',

7
apps/srp.c
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2004-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2004-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2004, EdelKey Project. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@ -12,10 +12,6 @@
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -610,4 +606,3 @@ int srp_main(int argc, char **argv)
release_engine(e);
return ret;
}
#endif

6
apps/ts.c
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -8,9 +8,6 @@
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TS
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -984,4 +981,3 @@ static int verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ok;
}
#endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_TS */

985
crypto/aes/aes_core.c
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -43,7 +43,988 @@
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include "aes_local.h"
#ifndef AES_ASM
#if defined(OPENSSL_AES_CONST_TIME) && !defined(AES_ASM)
typedef union {
unsigned char b[8];
u32 w[2];
u64 d;
} uni;
/*
* Compute w := (w * x) mod (x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^1 + 1)
* Therefore the name "xtime".
*/
static void XtimeWord(u32 *w)
{
u32 a, b;
a = *w;
b = a & 0x80808080u;
a ^= b;
b -= b >> 7;
b &= 0x1B1B1B1Bu;
b ^= a << 1;
*w = b;
}
static void XtimeLong(u64 *w)
{
u64 a, b;
a = *w;
b = a & 0x8080808080808080uLL;
a ^= b;
b -= b >> 7;
b &= 0x1B1B1B1B1B1B1B1BuLL;
b ^= a << 1;
*w = b;
}
/*
* This computes w := S * w ^ -1 + c, where c = {01100011}.
* Instead of using GF(2^8) mod (x^8+x^4+x^3+x+1} we do the inversion
* in GF(GF(GF(2^2)^2)^2) mod (X^2+X+8)
* and GF(GF(2^2)^2) mod (X^2+X+2)
* and GF(2^2) mod (X^2+X+1)
* The first part of the algorithm below transfers the coordinates
* {0x01,0x02,0x04,0x08,0x10,0x20,0x40,0x80} =>
* {1,Y,Y^2,Y^3,Y^4,Y^5,Y^6,Y^7} with Y=0x41:
* {0x01,0x41,0x66,0x6c,0x56,0x9a,0x58,0xc4}
* The last part undoes the coordinate transfer and the final affine
* transformation S:
* b[i] = b[i] + b[(i+4)%8] + b[(i+5)%8] + b[(i+6)%8] + b[(i+7)%8] + c[i]
* in one step.
* The multiplication in GF(2^2^2^2) is done in ordinary coords:
* A = (a0*1 + a1*x^4)
* B = (b0*1 + b1*x^4)
* AB = ((a0*b0 + 8*a1*b1)*1 + (a1*b0 + (a0+a1)*b1)*x^4)
* When A = (a0,a1) is given we want to solve AB = 1:
* (a) 1 = a0*b0 + 8*a1*b1
* (b) 0 = a1*b0 + (a0+a1)*b1
* => multiply (a) by a1 and (b) by a0
* (c) a1 = a1*a0*b0 + (8*a1*a1)*b1
* (d) 0 = a1*a0*b0 + (a0*a0+a1*a0)*b1
* => add (c) + (d)
* (e) a1 = (a0*a0 + a1*a0 + 8*a1*a1)*b1
* => therefore
* b1 = (a0*a0 + a1*a0 + 8*a1*a1)^-1 * a1
* => and adding (a1*b0) to (b) we get
* (f) a1*b0 = (a0+a1)*b1
* => therefore
* b0 = (a0*a0 + a1*a0 + 8*a1*a1)^-1 * (a0+a1)
* Note this formula also works for the case
* (a0+a1)*a0 + 8*a1*a1 = 0
* if the inverse element for 0^-1 is mapped to 0.
* Repeat the same for GF(2^2^2) and GF(2^2).
* We get the following algorithm:
* inv8(a0,a1):
* x0 = a0^a1
* [y0,y1] = mul4([x0,a1],[a0,a1]); (*)
* y1 = mul4(8,y1);
* t = inv4(y0^y1);
* [b0,b1] = mul4([x0,a1],[t,t]); (*)
* return [b0,b1];
* The non-linear multiplies (*) can be done in parallel at no extra cost.
*/
static void SubWord(u32 *w)
{
u32 x, y, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6;
x = *w;
y = ((x & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((x & 0x01010101u) << 7);
x &= 0xDDDDDDDDu;
x ^= y & 0x57575757u;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x1C1C1C1Cu;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x4A4A4A4Au;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x42424242u;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x64646464u;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7);
x ^= y & 0xE0E0E0E0u;
a1 = x;
a1 ^= (x & 0xF0F0F0F0u) >> 4;
a2 = ((x & 0xCCCCCCCCu) >> 2) | ((x & 0x33333333u) << 2);
a3 = x & a1;
a3 ^= (a3 & 0xAAAAAAAAu) >> 1;
a3 ^= (((x << 1) & a1) ^ ((a1 << 1) & x)) & 0xAAAAAAAAu;
a4 = a2 & a1;
a4 ^= (a4 & 0xAAAAAAAAu) >> 1;
a4 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a1) ^ ((a1 << 1) & a2)) & 0xAAAAAAAAu;
a5 = (a3 & 0xCCCCCCCCu) >> 2;
a3 ^= ((a4 << 2) ^ a4) & 0xCCCCCCCCu;
a4 = a5 & 0x22222222u;
a4 |= a4 >> 1;
a4 ^= (a5 << 1) & 0x22222222u;
a3 ^= a4;
a5 = a3 & 0xA0A0A0A0u;
a5 |= a5 >> 1;
a5 ^= (a3 << 1) & 0xA0A0A0A0u;
a4 = a5 & 0xC0C0C0C0u;
a6 = a4 >> 2;
a4 ^= (a5 << 2) & 0xC0C0C0C0u;
a5 = a6 & 0x20202020u;
a5 |= a5 >> 1;
a5 ^= (a6 << 1) & 0x20202020u;
a4 |= a5;
a3 ^= a4 >> 4;
a3 &= 0x0F0F0F0Fu;
a2 = a3;
a2 ^= (a3 & 0x0C0C0C0Cu) >> 2;
a4 = a3 & a2;
a4 ^= (a4 & 0x0A0A0A0A0Au) >> 1;
a4 ^= (((a3 << 1) & a2) ^ ((a2 << 1) & a3)) & 0x0A0A0A0Au;
a5 = a4 & 0x08080808u;
a5 |= a5 >> 1;
a5 ^= (a4 << 1) & 0x08080808u;
a4 ^= a5 >> 2;
a4 &= 0x03030303u;
a4 ^= (a4 & 0x02020202u) >> 1;
a4 |= a4 << 2;
a3 = a2 & a4;
a3 ^= (a3 & 0x0A0A0A0Au) >> 1;
a3 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a4) ^ ((a4 << 1) & a2)) & 0x0A0A0A0Au;
a3 |= a3 << 4;
a2 = ((a1 & 0xCCCCCCCCu) >> 2) | ((a1 & 0x33333333u) << 2);
x = a1 & a3;
x ^= (x & 0xAAAAAAAAu) >> 1;
x ^= (((a1 << 1) & a3) ^ ((a3 << 1) & a1)) & 0xAAAAAAAAu;
a4 = a2 & a3;
a4 ^= (a4 & 0xAAAAAAAAu) >> 1;
a4 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a3) ^ ((a3 << 1) & a2)) & 0xAAAAAAAAu;
a5 = (x & 0xCCCCCCCCu) >> 2;
x ^= ((a4 << 2) ^ a4) & 0xCCCCCCCCu;
a4 = a5 & 0x22222222u;
a4 |= a4 >> 1;
a4 ^= (a5 << 1) & 0x22222222u;
x ^= a4;
y = ((x & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((x & 0x01010101u) << 7);
x &= 0x39393939u;
x ^= y & 0x3F3F3F3Fu;
y = ((y & 0xFCFCFCFCu) >> 2) | ((y & 0x03030303u) << 6);
x ^= y & 0x97979797u;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x9B9B9B9Bu;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x3C3C3C3Cu;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7);
x ^= y & 0xDDDDDDDDu;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x72727272u;
x ^= 0x63636363u;
*w = x;
}
static void SubLong(u64 *w)
{
u64 x, y, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6;
x = *w;
y = ((x & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((x & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x &= 0xDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDuLL;
x ^= y & 0x5757575757575757uLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x1C1C1C1C1C1C1C1CuLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x4A4A4A4A4A4A4A4AuLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x4242424242424242uLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x6464646464646464uLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0xE0E0E0E0E0E0E0E0uLL;
a1 = x;
a1 ^= (x & 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0uLL) >> 4;
a2 = ((x & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL) >> 2) | ((x & 0x3333333333333333uLL) << 2);
a3 = x & a1;
a3 ^= (a3 & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL) >> 1;
a3 ^= (((x << 1) & a1) ^ ((a1 << 1) & x)) & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL;
a4 = a2 & a1;
a4 ^= (a4 & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL) >> 1;
a4 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a1) ^ ((a1 << 1) & a2)) & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL;
a5 = (a3 & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL) >> 2;
a3 ^= ((a4 << 2) ^ a4) & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL;
a4 = a5 & 0x2222222222222222uLL;
a4 |= a4 >> 1;
a4 ^= (a5 << 1) & 0x2222222222222222uLL;
a3 ^= a4;
a5 = a3 & 0xA0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0uLL;
a5 |= a5 >> 1;
a5 ^= (a3 << 1) & 0xA0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0uLL;
a4 = a5 & 0xC0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0uLL;
a6 = a4 >> 2;
a4 ^= (a5 << 2) & 0xC0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0uLL;
a5 = a6 & 0x2020202020202020uLL;
a5 |= a5 >> 1;
a5 ^= (a6 << 1) & 0x2020202020202020uLL;
a4 |= a5;
a3 ^= a4 >> 4;
a3 &= 0x0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0FuLL;
a2 = a3;
a2 ^= (a3 & 0x0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0CuLL) >> 2;
a4 = a3 & a2;
a4 ^= (a4 & 0x0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0AuLL) >> 1;
a4 ^= (((a3 << 1) & a2) ^ ((a2 << 1) & a3)) & 0x0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0AuLL;
a5 = a4 & 0x0808080808080808uLL;
a5 |= a5 >> 1;
a5 ^= (a4 << 1) & 0x0808080808080808uLL;
a4 ^= a5 >> 2;
a4 &= 0x0303030303030303uLL;
a4 ^= (a4 & 0x0202020202020202uLL) >> 1;
a4 |= a4 << 2;
a3 = a2 & a4;
a3 ^= (a3 & 0x0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0AuLL) >> 1;
a3 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a4) ^ ((a4 << 1) & a2)) & 0x0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0AuLL;
a3 |= a3 << 4;
a2 = ((a1 & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL) >> 2) | ((a1 & 0x3333333333333333uLL) << 2);
x = a1 & a3;
x ^= (x & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL) >> 1;
x ^= (((a1 << 1) & a3) ^ ((a3 << 1) & a1)) & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL;
a4 = a2 & a3;
a4 ^= (a4 & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL) >> 1;
a4 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a3) ^ ((a3 << 1) & a2)) & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL;
a5 = (x & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL) >> 2;
x ^= ((a4 << 2) ^ a4) & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL;
a4 = a5 & 0x2222222222222222uLL;
a4 |= a4 >> 1;
a4 ^= (a5 << 1) & 0x2222222222222222uLL;
x ^= a4;
y = ((x & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((x & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x &= 0x3939393939393939uLL;
x ^= y & 0x3F3F3F3F3F3F3F3FuLL;
y = ((y & 0xFCFCFCFCFCFCFCFCuLL) >> 2) | ((y & 0x0303030303030303uLL) << 6);
x ^= y & 0x9797979797979797uLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x9B9B9B9B9B9B9B9BuLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3CuLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0xDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDuLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x7272727272727272uLL;
x ^= 0x6363636363636363uLL;
*w = x;
}
/*
* This computes w := (S^-1 * (w + c))^-1
*/
static void InvSubLong(u64 *w)
{
u64 x, y, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6;
x = *w;
x ^= 0x6363636363636363uLL;
y = ((x & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((x & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x &= 0xFDFDFDFDFDFDFDFDuLL;
x ^= y & 0x5E5E5E5E5E5E5E5EuLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0xF3F3F3F3F3F3F3F3uLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0xF5F5F5F5F5F5F5F5uLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x7878787878787878uLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x7777777777777777uLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x1515151515151515uLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0xA5A5A5A5A5A5A5A5uLL;
a1 = x;
a1 ^= (x & 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0uLL) >> 4;
a2 = ((x & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL) >> 2) | ((x & 0x3333333333333333uLL) << 2);
a3 = x & a1;
a3 ^= (a3 & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL) >> 1;
a3 ^= (((x << 1) & a1) ^ ((a1 << 1) & x)) & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL;
a4 = a2 & a1;
a4 ^= (a4 & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL) >> 1;
a4 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a1) ^ ((a1 << 1) & a2)) & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL;
a5 = (a3 & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL) >> 2;
a3 ^= ((a4 << 2) ^ a4) & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL;
a4 = a5 & 0x2222222222222222uLL;
a4 |= a4 >> 1;
a4 ^= (a5 << 1) & 0x2222222222222222uLL;
a3 ^= a4;
a5 = a3 & 0xA0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0uLL;
a5 |= a5 >> 1;
a5 ^= (a3 << 1) & 0xA0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0uLL;
a4 = a5 & 0xC0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0uLL;
a6 = a4 >> 2;
a4 ^= (a5 << 2) & 0xC0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0uLL;
a5 = a6 & 0x2020202020202020uLL;
a5 |= a5 >> 1;
a5 ^= (a6 << 1) & 0x2020202020202020uLL;
a4 |= a5;
a3 ^= a4 >> 4;
a3 &= 0x0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0FuLL;
a2 = a3;
a2 ^= (a3 & 0x0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0CuLL) >> 2;
a4 = a3 & a2;
a4 ^= (a4 & 0x0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0AuLL) >> 1;
a4 ^= (((a3 << 1) & a2) ^ ((a2 << 1) & a3)) & 0x0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0AuLL;
a5 = a4 & 0x0808080808080808uLL;
a5 |= a5 >> 1;
a5 ^= (a4 << 1) & 0x0808080808080808uLL;
a4 ^= a5 >> 2;
a4 &= 0x0303030303030303uLL;
a4 ^= (a4 & 0x0202020202020202uLL) >> 1;
a4 |= a4 << 2;
a3 = a2 & a4;
a3 ^= (a3 & 0x0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0AuLL) >> 1;
a3 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a4) ^ ((a4 << 1) & a2)) & 0x0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0AuLL;
a3 |= a3 << 4;
a2 = ((a1 & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL) >> 2) | ((a1 & 0x3333333333333333uLL) << 2);
x = a1 & a3;
x ^= (x & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL) >> 1;
x ^= (((a1 << 1) & a3) ^ ((a3 << 1) & a1)) & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL;
a4 = a2 & a3;
a4 ^= (a4 & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL) >> 1;
a4 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a3) ^ ((a3 << 1) & a2)) & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL;
a5 = (x & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL) >> 2;
x ^= ((a4 << 2) ^ a4) & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL;
a4 = a5 & 0x2222222222222222uLL;
a4 |= a4 >> 1;
a4 ^= (a5 << 1) & 0x2222222222222222uLL;
x ^= a4;
y = ((x & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((x & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x &= 0xB5B5B5B5B5B5B5B5uLL;
x ^= y & 0x4040404040404040uLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x8080808080808080uLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x1616161616161616uLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0xEBEBEBEBEBEBEBEBuLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x9797979797979797uLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0xFBFBFBFBFBFBFBFBuLL;
y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7);
x ^= y & 0x7D7D7D7D7D7D7D7DuLL;
*w = x;
}
static void ShiftRows(u64 *state)
{
unsigned char s[4];
unsigned char *s0;
int r;
s0 = (unsigned char *)state;
for (r = 0; r < 4; r++) {
s[0] = s0[0*4 + r];
s[1] = s0[1*4 + r];
s[2] = s0[2*4 + r];
s[3] = s0[3*4 + r];
s0[0*4 + r] = s[(r+0) % 4];
s0[1*4 + r] = s[(r+1) % 4];
s0[2*4 + r] = s[(r+2) % 4];
s0[3*4 + r] = s[(r+3) % 4];
}
}
static void InvShiftRows(u64 *state)
{
unsigned char s[4];
unsigned char *s0;
int r;
s0 = (unsigned char *)state;
for (r = 0; r < 4; r++) {
s[0] = s0[0*4 + r];
s[1] = s0[1*4 + r];
s[2] = s0[2*4 + r];
s[3] = s0[3*4 + r];
s0[0*4 + r] = s[(4-r) % 4];
s0[1*4 + r] = s[(5-r) % 4];
s0[2*4 + r] = s[(6-r) % 4];
s0[3*4 + r] = s[(7-r) % 4];
}
}
static void MixColumns(u64 *state)
{
uni s1;
uni s;
int c;
for (c = 0; c < 2; c++) {
s1.d = state[c];
s.d = s1.d;
s.d ^= ((s.d & 0xFFFF0000FFFF0000uLL) >> 16)
| ((s.d & 0x0000FFFF0000FFFFuLL) << 16);
s.d ^= ((s.d & 0xFF00FF00FF00FF00uLL) >> 8)
| ((s.d & 0x00FF00FF00FF00FFuLL) << 8);
s.d ^= s1.d;
XtimeLong(&s1.d);
s.d ^= s1.d;
s.b[0] ^= s1.b[1];
s.b[1] ^= s1.b[2];
s.b[2] ^= s1.b[3];
s.b[3] ^= s1.b[0];
s.b[4] ^= s1.b[5];
s.b[5] ^= s1.b[6];
s.b[6] ^= s1.b[7];
s.b[7] ^= s1.b[4];
state[c] = s.d;
}
}
static void InvMixColumns(u64 *state)
{
uni s1;
uni s;
int c;
for (c = 0; c < 2; c++) {
s1.d = state[c];
s.d = s1.d;
s.d ^= ((s.d & 0xFFFF0000FFFF0000uLL) >> 16)
| ((s.d & 0x0000FFFF0000FFFFuLL) << 16);
s.d ^= ((s.d & 0xFF00FF00FF00FF00uLL) >> 8)
| ((s.d & 0x00FF00FF00FF00FFuLL) << 8);
s.d ^= s1.d;
XtimeLong(&s1.d);
s.d ^= s1.d;
s.b[0] ^= s1.b[1];
s.b[1] ^= s1.b[2];
s.b[2] ^= s1.b[3];
s.b[3] ^= s1.b[0];
s.b[4] ^= s1.b[5];
s.b[5] ^= s1.b[6];
s.b[6] ^= s1.b[7];
s.b[7] ^= s1.b[4];
XtimeLong(&s1.d);
s1.d ^= ((s1.d & 0xFFFF0000FFFF0000uLL) >> 16)
| ((s1.d & 0x0000FFFF0000FFFFuLL) << 16);
s.d ^= s1.d;
XtimeLong(&s1.d);
s1.d ^= ((s1.d & 0xFF00FF00FF00FF00uLL) >> 8)
| ((s1.d & 0x00FF00FF00FF00FFuLL) << 8);
s.d ^= s1.d;
state[c] = s.d;
}
}
static void AddRoundKey(u64 *state, const u64 *w)
{
state[0] ^= w[0];
state[1] ^= w[1];
}
static void Cipher(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
const u64 *w, int nr)
{
u64 state[2];
int i;
memcpy(state, in, 16);
AddRoundKey(state, w);
for (i = 1; i < nr; i++) {
SubLong(&state[0]);
SubLong(&state[1]);
ShiftRows(state);
MixColumns(state);
AddRoundKey(state, w + i*2);
}
SubLong(&state[0]);
SubLong(&state[1]);
ShiftRows(state);
AddRoundKey(state, w + nr*2);
memcpy(out, state, 16);
}
static void InvCipher(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
const u64 *w, int nr)
{
u64 state[2];
int i;
memcpy(state, in, 16);
AddRoundKey(state, w + nr*2);
for (i = nr - 1; i > 0; i--) {
InvShiftRows(state);
InvSubLong(&state[0]);
InvSubLong(&state[1]);
AddRoundKey(state, w + i*2);
InvMixColumns(state);
}
InvShiftRows(state);
InvSubLong(&state[0]);
InvSubLong(&state[1]);
AddRoundKey(state, w);
memcpy(out, state, 16);
}
static void RotWord(u32 *x)
{
unsigned char *w0;
unsigned char tmp;
w0 = (unsigned char *)x;
tmp = w0[0];
w0[0] = w0[1];
w0[1] = w0[2];
w0[2] = w0[3];
w0[3] = tmp;
}
static void KeyExpansion(const unsigned char *key, u64 *w,
int nr, int nk)
{
u32 rcon;
uni prev;
u32 temp;
int i, n;
memcpy(w, key, nk*4);
memcpy(&rcon, "\1\0\0\0", 4);
n = nk/2;
prev.d = w[n-1];
for (i = n; i < (nr+1)*2; i++) {
temp = prev.w[1];
if (i % n == 0) {
RotWord(&temp);
SubWord(&temp);
temp ^= rcon;
XtimeWord(&rcon);
} else if (nk > 6 && i % n == 2) {
SubWord(&temp);
}
prev.d = w[i-n];
prev.w[0] ^= temp;
prev.w[1] ^= prev.w[0];
w[i] = prev.d;
}
}
/**
* Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule.
*/
int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
AES_KEY *key)
{
u64 *rk;
if (!userKey || !key)
return -1;
if (bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256)
return -2;
rk = (u64*)key->rd_key;
if (bits == 128)
key->rounds = 10;
else if (bits == 192)
key->rounds = 12;
else
key->rounds = 14;
KeyExpansion(userKey, rk, key->rounds, bits/32);
return 0;
}
/**
* Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule.
*/
int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
AES_KEY *key)
{
return AES_set_encrypt_key(userKey, bits, key);
}
/*
* Encrypt a single block
* in and out can overlap
*/
void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
const AES_KEY *key)
{
const u64 *rk;
assert(in && out && key);
rk = (u64*)key->rd_key;
Cipher(in, out, rk, key->rounds);
}
/*
* Decrypt a single block
* in and out can overlap
*/
void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
const AES_KEY *key)
{
const u64 *rk;
assert(in && out && key);
rk = (u64*)key->rd_key;
InvCipher(in, out, rk, key->rounds);
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT
void AES_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
const unsigned char *ivec);
static void RawToBits(const u8 raw[64], u64 bits[8])
{
int i, j;
u64 in, out;
memset(bits, 0, 64);
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
in = 0;
for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
in |= ((u64)raw[i * 8 + j]) << (8 * j);
out = in & 0xF0F0F0F00F0F0F0FuLL;
out |= (in & 0x0F0F0F0F00000000uLL) >> 28;
out |= (in & 0x00000000F0F0F0F0uLL) << 28;
in = out & 0xCCCC3333CCCC3333uLL;
in |= (out & 0x3333000033330000uLL) >> 14;
in |= (out & 0x0000CCCC0000CCCCuLL) << 14;
out = in & 0xAA55AA55AA55AA55uLL;
out |= (in & 0x5500550055005500uLL) >> 7;
out |= (in & 0x00AA00AA00AA00AAuLL) << 7;
for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
bits[j] |= (out & 0xFFuLL) << (8 * i);
out = out >> 8;
}
}
}
static void BitsToRaw(const u64 bits[8], u8 raw[64])
{
int i, j;
u64 in, out;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
in = 0;
for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
in |= ((bits[j] >> (8 * i)) & 0xFFuLL) << (8 * j);
out = in & 0xF0F0F0F00F0F0F0FuLL;
out |= (in & 0x0F0F0F0F00000000uLL) >> 28;
out |= (in & 0x00000000F0F0F0F0uLL) << 28;
in = out & 0xCCCC3333CCCC3333uLL;
in |= (out & 0x3333000033330000uLL) >> 14;
in |= (out & 0x0000CCCC0000CCCCuLL) << 14;
out = in & 0xAA55AA55AA55AA55uLL;
out |= (in & 0x5500550055005500uLL) >> 7;
out |= (in & 0x00AA00AA00AA00AAuLL) << 7;
for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
raw[i * 8 + j] = (u8)out;
out = out >> 8;
}
}
}
static void BitsXtime(u64 state[8])
{
u64 b;
b = state[7];
state[7] = state[6];
state[6] = state[5];
state[5] = state[4];
state[4] = state[3] ^ b;
state[3] = state[2] ^ b;
state[2] = state[1];
state[1] = state[0] ^ b;
state[0] = b;
}
/*
* This S-box implementation follows a circuit described in
* Boyar and Peralta: "A new combinational logic minimization
* technique with applications to cryptology."
* https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/191.pdf
*
* The math is similar to above, in that it uses
* a tower field of GF(2^2^2^2) but with a different
* basis representation, that is better suited to
* logic designs.
*/
static void BitsSub(u64 state[8])
{
u64 x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7;
u64 y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6, y7, y8, y9, y10, y11;
u64 y12, y13, y14, y15, y16, y17, y18, y19, y20, y21;
u64 t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9, t10, t11;
u64 t12, t13, t14, t15, t16, t17, t18, t19, t20, t21;
u64 t22, t23, t24, t25, t26, t27, t28, t29, t30, t31;
u64 t32, t33, t34, t35, t36, t37, t38, t39, t40, t41;
u64 t42, t43, t44, t45, t46, t47, t48, t49, t50, t51;
u64 t52, t53, t54, t55, t56, t57, t58, t59, t60, t61;
u64 t62, t63, t64, t65, t66, t67;
u64 z0, z1, z2, z3, z4, z5, z6, z7, z8, z9, z10, z11;
u64 z12, z13, z14, z15, z16, z17;
u64 s0, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7;
x7 = state[0];
x6 = state[1];
x5 = state[2];
x4 = state[3];
x3 = state[4];
x2 = state[5];
x1 = state[6];
x0 = state[7];
y14 = x3 ^ x5;
y13 = x0 ^ x6;
y9 = x0 ^ x3;
y8 = x0 ^ x5;
t0 = x1 ^ x2;
y1 = t0 ^ x7;
y4 = y1 ^ x3;
y12 = y13 ^ y14;
y2 = y1 ^ x0;
y5 = y1 ^ x6;
y3 = y5 ^ y8;
t1 = x4 ^ y12;
y15 = t1 ^ x5;
y20 = t1 ^ x1;
y6 = y15 ^ x7;
y10 = y15 ^ t0;
y11 = y20 ^ y9;
y7 = x7 ^ y11;
y17 = y10 ^ y11;
y19 = y10 ^ y8;
y16 = t0 ^ y11;
y21 = y13 ^ y16;
y18 = x0 ^ y16;
t2 = y12 & y15;
t3 = y3 & y6;
t4 = t3 ^ t2;
t5 = y4 & x7;
t6 = t5 ^ t2;
t7 = y13 & y16;
t8 = y5 & y1;
t9 = t8 ^ t7;
t10 = y2 & y7;
t11 = t10 ^ t7;
t12 = y9 & y11;
t13 = y14 & y17;
t14 = t13 ^ t12;
t15 = y8 & y10;
t16 = t15 ^ t12;
t17 = t4 ^ t14;
t18 = t6 ^ t16;
t19 = t9 ^ t14;
t20 = t11 ^ t16;
t21 = t17 ^ y20;
t22 = t18 ^ y19;
t23 = t19 ^ y21;
t24 = t20 ^ y18;
t25 = t21 ^ t22;
t26 = t21 & t23;
t27 = t24 ^ t26;
t28 = t25 & t27;
t29 = t28 ^ t22;
t30 = t23 ^ t24;
t31 = t22 ^ t26;
t32 = t31 & t30;
t33 = t32 ^ t24;
t34 = t23 ^ t33;
t35 = t27 ^ t33;
t36 = t24 & t35;
t37 = t36 ^ t34;
t38 = t27 ^ t36;
t39 = t29 & t38;
t40 = t25 ^ t39;
t41 = t40 ^ t37;
t42 = t29 ^ t33;
t43 = t29 ^ t40;
t44 = t33 ^ t37;
t45 = t42 ^ t41;
z0 = t44 & y15;
z1 = t37 & y6;
z2 = t33 & x7;
z3 = t43 & y16;
z4 = t40 & y1;
z5 = t29 & y7;
z6 = t42 & y11;
z7 = t45 & y17;
z8 = t41 & y10;
z9 = t44 & y12;
z10 = t37 & y3;
z11 = t33 & y4;
z12 = t43 & y13;
z13 = t40 & y5;
z14 = t29 & y2;
z15 = t42 & y9;
z16 = t45 & y14;
z17 = t41 & y8;
t46 = z15 ^ z16;
t47 = z10 ^ z11;
t48 = z5 ^ z13;
t49 = z9 ^ z10;
t50 = z2 ^ z12;
t51 = z2 ^ z5;
t52 = z7 ^ z8;
t53 = z0 ^ z3;
t54 = z6 ^ z7;
t55 = z16 ^ z17;
t56 = z12 ^ t48;
t57 = t50 ^ t53;
t58 = z4 ^ t46;
t59 = z3 ^ t54;
t60 = t46 ^ t57;
t61 = z14 ^ t57;
t62 = t52 ^ t58;
t63 = t49 ^ t58;
t64 = z4 ^ t59;
t65 = t61 ^ t62;
t66 = z1 ^ t63;
s0 = t59 ^ t63;
s6 = ~(t56 ^ t62);
s7 = ~(t48 ^ t60);
t67 = t64 ^ t65;
s3 = t53 ^ t66;
s4 = t51 ^ t66;
s5 = t47 ^ t65;
s1 = ~(t64 ^ s3);
s2 = ~(t55 ^ t67);
state[0] = s7;
state[1] = s6;
state[2] = s5;
state[3] = s4;
state[4] = s3;
state[5] = s2;
state[6] = s1;
state[7] = s0;
}
static void BitsShiftRows(u64 state[8])
{
u64 s, s0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
s = state[i];
s0 = s & 0x1111111111111111uLL;
s0 |= ((s & 0x2220222022202220uLL) >> 4) | ((s & 0x0002000200020002uLL) << 12);
s0 |= ((s & 0x4400440044004400uLL) >> 8) | ((s & 0x0044004400440044uLL) << 8);
s0 |= ((s & 0x8000800080008000uLL) >> 12) | ((s & 0x0888088808880888uLL) << 4);
state[i] = s0;
}
}
static void BitsMixColumns(u64 state[8])
{
u64 s1, s;
u64 s0[8];
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
s1 = state[i];
s = s1;
s ^= ((s & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL) >> 2) | ((s & 0x3333333333333333uLL) << 2);
s ^= ((s & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL) >> 1) | ((s & 0x5555555555555555uLL) << 1);
s ^= s1;
s0[i] = s;
}
BitsXtime(state);
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
s1 = state[i];
s = s0[i];
s ^= s1;
s ^= ((s1 & 0xEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEuLL) >> 1) | ((s1 & 0x1111111111111111uLL) << 3);
state[i] = s;
}
}
static void BitsAddRoundKey(u64 state[8], const u64 key[8])
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
state[i] ^= key[i];
}
void AES_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
const unsigned char *ivec)
{
struct {
u8 cipher[64];
u64 state[8];
u64 rd_key[AES_MAXNR + 1][8];
} *bs;
u32 ctr32;
int i;
ctr32 = GETU32(ivec + 12);
if (blocks >= 4
&& (bs = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*bs)))) {
for (i = 0; i < key->rounds + 1; i++) {
memcpy(bs->cipher + 0, &key->rd_key[4 * i], 16);
memcpy(bs->cipher + 16, bs->cipher, 16);
memcpy(bs->cipher + 32, bs->cipher, 32);
RawToBits(bs->cipher, bs->rd_key[i]);
}
while (blocks) {
memcpy(bs->cipher, ivec, 12);
PUTU32(bs->cipher + 12, ctr32);
ctr32++;
memcpy(bs->cipher + 16, ivec, 12);
PUTU32(bs->cipher + 28, ctr32);
ctr32++;
memcpy(bs->cipher + 32, ivec, 12);
PUTU32(bs->cipher + 44, ctr32);
ctr32++;
memcpy(bs->cipher + 48, ivec, 12);
PUTU32(bs->cipher + 60, ctr32);
ctr32++;
RawToBits(bs->cipher, bs->state);
BitsAddRoundKey(bs->state, bs->rd_key[0]);
for (i = 1; i < key->rounds; i++) {
BitsSub(bs->state);
BitsShiftRows(bs->state);
BitsMixColumns(bs->state);
BitsAddRoundKey(bs->state, bs->rd_key[i]);
}
BitsSub(bs->state);
BitsShiftRows(bs->state);
BitsAddRoundKey(bs->state, bs->rd_key[key->rounds]);
BitsToRaw(bs->state, bs->cipher);
for (i = 0; i < 64 && blocks; i++) {
out[i] = in[i] ^ bs->cipher[i];
if ((i & 15) == 15)
blocks--;
}
in += i;
out += i;
}
OPENSSL_clear_free(bs, sizeof(*bs));
} else {
unsigned char cipher[16];
while (blocks) {
memcpy(cipher, ivec, 12);
PUTU32(cipher + 12, ctr32);
AES_encrypt(cipher, cipher, key);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
out[i] = in[i] ^ cipher[i];
in += 16;
out += 16;
ctr32++;
blocks--;
}
}
}
# endif
#elif !defined(AES_ASM)
/*-
Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03];
Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01];

3
crypto/aes/aes_local.h
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
# define PUTU32(ct, st) { (ct)[0] = (u8)((st) >> 24); (ct)[1] = (u8)((st) >> 16); (ct)[2] = (u8)((st) >> 8); (ct)[3] = (u8)(st); }
# endif
typedef unsigned long long u64;
# ifdef AES_LONG
typedef unsigned long u32;
# else

21
crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -268,18 +268,29 @@ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_dup(const ASN1_STRING *str)
return ret;
}
int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *_data, int len)
int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *_data, int len_in)
{
unsigned char *c;
const char *data = _data;
size_t len;
if (len < 0) {
if (len_in < 0) {
if (data == NULL)
return 0;
else
len = strlen(data);
} else {
len = (size_t)len_in;
}
if ((str->length <= len) || (str->data == NULL)) {
/*
* Verify that the length fits within an integer for assignment to
* str->length below. The additional 1 is subtracted to allow for the
* '\0' terminator even though this isn't strictly necessary.
*/
if (len > INT_MAX - 1) {
ASN1err(0, ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
if ((size_t)str->length <= len || str->data == NULL) {
c = str->data;
str->data = OPENSSL_realloc(c, len + 1);
if (str->data == NULL) {

9
crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c
View File

@ -222,10 +222,10 @@ static int acpt_state(BIO *b, BIO_ACCEPT *c)
break;
case ACPT_S_CREATE_SOCKET:
ret = BIO_socket(BIO_ADDRINFO_family(c->addr_iter),
s = BIO_socket(BIO_ADDRINFO_family(c->addr_iter),
BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(c->addr_iter),
BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(c->addr_iter), 0);
if (ret == (int)INVALID_SOCKET) {
if (s == (int)INVALID_SOCKET) {
SYSerr(SYS_F_SOCKET, get_last_socket_error());
ERR_add_error_data(4,
"hostname=", c->param_addr,
@ -233,9 +233,10 @@ static int acpt_state(BIO *b, BIO_ACCEPT *c)
BIOerr(BIO_F_ACPT_STATE, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_SOCKET);
goto exit_loop;
}
c->accept_sock = ret;
b->num = ret;
c->accept_sock = s;
b->num = s;
c->state = ACPT_S_LISTEN;
s = -1;
break;
case ACPT_S_LISTEN:

4
crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -1297,5 +1297,7 @@ int ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *r)
i = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&bs, NULL);
i += i; /* r and s */
ret = ASN1_object_size(1, i, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
if (ret < 0)
return 0;
return ret;
}

10
crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@ -1007,14 +1007,14 @@ int EC_POINTs_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
size_t i = 0;
BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 0)) {
return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
}
if (!ec_point_is_compat(r, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
if (scalar == NULL && num == 0)
return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(points[i], group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);

29
crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@ -260,16 +260,9 @@ int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
goto err;
}
/*-
* Apply coordinate blinding for EC_POINT.
*
* The underlying EC_METHOD can optionally implement this function:
* ec_point_blind_coordinates() returns 0 in case of errors or 1 on
* success or if coordinate blinding is not implemented for this
* group.
*/
if (!ec_point_blind_coordinates(group, p, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, EC_R_POINT_COORDINATES_BLIND_FAILURE);
/* ensure input point is in affine coords for ladder step efficiency */
if (!p->Z_is_one && !EC_POINT_make_affine(group, p, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
@ -747,6 +740,20 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
if (r_is_at_infinity) {
if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1]))
goto err;
/*-
* Apply coordinate blinding for EC_POINT.
*
* The underlying EC_METHOD can optionally implement this function:
* ec_point_blind_coordinates() returns 0 in case of errors or 1 on
* success or if coordinate blinding is not implemented for this
* group.
*/
if (!ec_point_blind_coordinates(group, r, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_POINT_COORDINATES_BLIND_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
r_is_at_infinity = 0;
} else {
if (!EC_POINT_add

305
crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
@ -1372,6 +1372,7 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
* Computes the multiplicative inverse of a in GF(p), storing the result in r.
* If a is zero (or equivalent), you'll get a EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT error.
* Since we don't have a Mont structure here, SCA hardening is with blinding.
* NB: "a" must be in _decoded_ form. (i.e. field_decode must precede.)
*/
int ec_GFp_simple_field_inv(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
BN_CTX *ctx)
@ -1431,112 +1432,133 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_blind_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p,
temp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (temp == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_BLIND_COORDINATES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
goto end;
}
/* make sure lambda is not zero */
/*-
* Make sure lambda is not zero.
* If the RNG fails, we cannot blind but nevertheless want
* code to continue smoothly and not clobber the error stack.
*/
do {
if (!BN_priv_rand_range(lambda, group->field)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_BLIND_COORDINATES, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
ERR_set_mark();
ret = BN_priv_rand_range(lambda, group->field);
ERR_pop_to_mark();
if (ret == 0) {
ret = 1;
goto end;
}
} while (BN_is_zero(lambda));
/* if field_encode defined convert between representations */
if (group->meth->field_encode != NULL
if ((group->meth->field_encode != NULL
&& !group->meth->field_encode(group, lambda, lambda, ctx))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, p->Z, p->Z, lambda, ctx))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, temp, lambda, ctx))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, p->X, p->X, temp, ctx))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, temp, temp, lambda, ctx))
goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, p->Y, p->Y, temp, ctx))
goto err;
p->Z_is_one = 0;
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, p->Z, p->Z, lambda, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, temp, lambda, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, p->X, p->X, temp, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, temp, temp, lambda, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, p->Y, p->Y, temp, ctx))
goto end;
p->Z_is_one = 0;
ret = 1;
err:
end:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
/*-
* Set s := p, r := 2p.
* Input:
* - p: affine coordinates
*
* Output:
* - s := p, r := 2p: blinded projective (homogeneous) coordinates
*
* For doubling we use Formula 3 from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel elliptic curve
* multiplication resistant against side channel attacks" appendix, as described
* at
* multiplication resistant against side channel attacks" appendix, described at
* https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#doubling-dbl-2002-it-2
* simplified for Z1=1.
*
* The input point p will be in randomized Jacobian projective coords:
* x = X/Z**2, y=Y/Z**3
*
* The output points p, s, and r are converted to standard (homogeneous)
* projective coords:
* x = X/Z, y=Y/Z
* Blinding uses the equivalence relation (\lambda X, \lambda Y, \lambda Z)
* for any non-zero \lambda that holds for projective (homogeneous) coords.
*/
int ec_GFp_simple_ladder_pre(const EC_GROUP *group,
EC_POINT *r, EC_POINT *s,
EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *t1, *t2, *t3, *t4, *t5, *t6 = NULL;
BIGNUM *t1, *t2, *t3, *t4, *t5 = NULL;
t1 = r->Z;
t2 = r->Y;
t1 = s->Z;
t2 = r->Z;
t3 = s->X;
t4 = r->X;
t5 = s->Y;
t6 = s->Z;
/* convert p: (X,Y,Z) -> (XZ,Y,Z**3) */
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, p->X, p->X, p->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t1, p->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, p->Z, p->Z, t1, ctx)
/* r := 2p */
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t2, p->X, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t3, p->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t3, group->a, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t5, t2, t4, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t2, t2, t4, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t5, t5, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, t3, group->b, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, p->X, p->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t1, t6, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_lshift_quick(t4, t4, 3, group->field)
if (!p->Z_is_one /* r := 2p */
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t3, p->X, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t4, t3, group->a, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t4, t4, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, p->X, group->b, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_lshift_quick(t5, t5, 3, group->field)
/* r->X coord output */
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(r->X, t5, t4, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, t1, t2, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, t3, t6, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t1, t1, t2, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(r->X, t4, t5, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t1, t3, group->a, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, p->X, t1, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t2, group->b, t2, group->field)
/* r->Z coord output */
|| !BN_mod_lshift_quick(r->Z, t1, 2, group->field)
|| !EC_POINT_copy(s, p))
|| !BN_mod_lshift_quick(r->Z, t2, 2, group->field))
return 0;
/* make sure lambda (r->Y here for storage) is not zero */
do {
if (!BN_priv_rand_range(r->Y, group->field))
return 0;
} while (BN_is_zero(r->Y));
/* make sure lambda (s->Z here for storage) is not zero */
do {
if (!BN_priv_rand_range(s->Z, group->field))
return 0;
} while (BN_is_zero(s->Z));
/* if field_encode defined convert between representations */
if (group->meth->field_encode != NULL
&& (!group->meth->field_encode(group, r->Y, r->Y, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_encode(group, s->Z, s->Z, ctx)))
return 0;
/* blind r and s independently */
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, r->Z, r->Z, r->Y, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->X, r->X, r->Y, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, s->X, p->X, s->Z, ctx)) /* s := p */
return 0;
r->Z_is_one = 0;
s->Z_is_one = 0;
p->Z_is_one = 0;
return 1;
}
/*-
* Input:
* - s, r: projective (homogeneous) coordinates
* - p: affine coordinates
*
* Output:
* - s := r + s, r := 2r: projective (homogeneous) coordinates
*
* Differential addition-and-doubling using Eq. (9) and (10) from Izu-Takagi
* "A fast parallel elliptic curve multiplication resistant against side channel
* attacks", as described at
* https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-ladd-2002-it-4
* https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-mladd-2002-it-4
*/
int ec_GFp_simple_ladder_step(const EC_GROUP *group,
EC_POINT *r, EC_POINT *s,
EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
int ret = 0;
BIGNUM *t0, *t1, *t2, *t3, *t4, *t5, *t6, *t7 = NULL;
BIGNUM *t0, *t1, *t2, *t3, *t4, *t5, *t6 = NULL;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@ -1546,50 +1568,47 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_ladder_step(const EC_GROUP *group,
t4 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t5 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t6 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t7 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t7 == NULL
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, r->X, s->X, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, r->Z, s->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, r->X, s->Z, ctx)
if (t6 == NULL
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, r->X, s->X, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, r->Z, s->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, r->X, s->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, r->Z, s->X, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, group->a, t1, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t0, t0, t4, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t4, t3, t2, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, t4, t0, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t1, t1, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_lshift_quick(t7, group->b, 2, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, t7, t1, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t0, t0, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t0, t1, t0, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t1, t2, t3, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t1, t1, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, t1, p->X, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, p->Z, t0, ctx)
/* s->X coord output */
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(s->X, t0, t3, group->field)
/* s->Z coord output */
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, s->Z, p->Z, t1, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t3, r->X, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t2, r->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t2, group->a, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t5, r->X, r->Z, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t5, t5, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t5, t5, t3, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t5, t5, t2, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t6, t3, t4, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t6, t6, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, t2, t5, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, t7, t0, ctx)
/* r->X coord output */
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(r->X, t6, t0, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, group->a, t0, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t5, t6, t5, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t6, t3, t4, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t3, t2, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t7, t3, t7, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, t5, t6, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, t6, t5, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t0, t0, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_lshift_quick(t2, group->b, 2, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, t2, t0, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t5, t5, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t3, t4, t3, group->field)
/* s->Z coord output */
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, s->Z, t3, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, s->Z, p->X, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t0, t0, t5, group->field)
/* s->X coord output */
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(s->X, t0, t4, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t4, r->X, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t5, r->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, t5, group->a, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t1, r->X, r->Z, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t1, t1, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t1, t1, t4, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t1, t1, t5, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t3, t4, t6, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t3, t3, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, t5, t1, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, t2, t0, ctx)
/* r->X coord output */
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(r->X, t3, t0, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t3, t4, t6, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t4, t5, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t4, t2, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, t1, t3, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t1, t1, group->field)
/* r->Z coord output */
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(r->Z, t7, t5, group->field))
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(r->Z, t4, t1, group->field))
goto err;
ret = 1;
@ -1600,17 +1619,23 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_ladder_step(const EC_GROUP *group,
}
/*-
* Recovers the y-coordinate of r using Eq. (8) from Brier-Joye, "Weierstrass
* Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks", modified to work in projective
* coordinates and return r in Jacobian projective coordinates.
* Input:
* - s, r: projective (homogeneous) coordinates
* - p: affine coordinates
*
* X4 = two*Y1*X2*Z3*Z2*Z1;
* Y4 = two*b*Z3*SQR(Z2*Z1) + Z3*(a*Z2*Z1+X1*X2)*(X1*Z2+X2*Z1) - X3*SQR(X1*Z2-X2*Z1);
* Z4 = two*Y1*Z3*SQR(Z2)*Z1;
* Output:
* - r := (x,y): affine coordinates
*
* Recovers the y-coordinate of r using Eq. (8) from Brier-Joye, "Weierstrass
* Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks", modified to work in mixed
* projective coords, i.e. p is affine and (r,s) in projective (homogeneous)
* coords, and return r in affine coordinates.
*
* X4 = two*Y1*X2*Z3*Z2;
* Y4 = two*b*Z3*SQR(Z2) + Z3*(a*Z2+X1*X2)*(X1*Z2+X2) - X3*SQR(X1*Z2-X2);
* Z4 = two*Y1*Z3*SQR(Z2);
*
* Z4 != 0 because:
* - Z1==0 implies p is at infinity, which would have caused an early exit in
* the caller;
* - Z2==0 implies r is at infinity (handled by the BN_is_zero(r->Z) branch);
* - Z3==0 implies s is at infinity (handled by the BN_is_zero(s->Z) branch);
* - Y1==0 implies p has order 2, so either r or s are infinity and handled by
@ -1627,11 +1652,7 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_ladder_post(const EC_GROUP *group,
return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
if (BN_is_zero(s->Z)) {
/* (X,Y,Z) -> (XZ,YZ**2,Z) */
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, r->X, p->X, p->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, r->Z, p->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->Y, p->Y, r->Z, ctx)
|| !BN_copy(r->Z, p->Z)
if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, p)
|| !EC_POINT_invert(group, r, ctx))
return 0;
return 1;
@ -1647,38 +1668,46 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_ladder_post(const EC_GROUP *group,
t6 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t6 == NULL
|| !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t0, p->Y, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, r->X, p->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, r->Z, s->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, t1, t2, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, t2, t0, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, r->Z, p->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t4, t2, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t5, group->b, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t4, t5, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, t2, group->a, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, r->X, p->X, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t5, t6, t5, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, r->Z, p->X, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t2, t6, t1, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, t5, t2, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t6, t6, t1, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t6, t6, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, t6, s->X, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t4, t5, t4, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t4, s->Z, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t4, t4, t6, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t5, r->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->Z, p->Z, s->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->Z, t5, r->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->Z, r->Z, t0, ctx)
/* t3 := X, t4 := Y */
/* (X,Y,Z) -> (XZ,YZ**2,Z) */
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->X, t3, r->Z, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t4, p->Y, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, r->X, t4, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, s->Z, t6, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, r->Z, t6, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t1, group->b, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, s->Z, t1, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t3, r->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->Y, t4, t3, ctx))
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, t3, t1, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, r->Z, group->a, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, p->X, r->X, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t1, t1, t6, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, s->Z, t1, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, p->X, r->Z, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t6, r->X, t0, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, t6, t1, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t6, t6, t2, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t0, t0, r->X, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t0, t0, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, t0, s->X, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t0, t6, t0, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, s->Z, t4, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, t3, t1, ctx)
|| (group->meth->field_decode != NULL
&& !group->meth->field_decode(group, t1, t1, ctx))
|| !group->meth->field_inv(group, t1, t1, ctx)
|| (group->meth->field_encode != NULL
&& !group->meth->field_encode(group, t1, t1, ctx))
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->X, t5, t1, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->Y, t0, t1, ctx))
goto err;
if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != NULL) {
if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, r->Z, ctx))
goto err;
} else {
if (!BN_one(r->Z))
goto err;
}
r->Z_is_one = 1;
ret = 1;
err:

5
crypto/evp/e_aes.c
View File

@ -130,6 +130,11 @@ void bsaes_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1,
const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]);
#endif
#if !defined(AES_ASM) && !defined(AES_CTR_ASM) \
&& defined(OPENSSL_AES_CONST_TIME) \
&& !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
# define AES_CTR_ASM
#endif
#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
void AES_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,

2
crypto/rand/build.info
View File

@ -2,3 +2,5 @@ LIBS=../../libcrypto
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \
rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c drbg_lib.c drbg_ctr.c
INCLUDE[drbg_ctr.o]=../modes

25
crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2011-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -12,28 +12,25 @@
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
#include "modes_local.h"
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
#include "rand_local.h"
/*
* Implementation of NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG.
*/
static void inc_128(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
{
int i;
unsigned char c;
unsigned char *p = &ctr->V[15];
unsigned char *p = &ctr->V[0];
u32 n = 16, c = 1;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++, p--) {
c = *p;
c++;
*p = c;
if (c != 0) {
/* If we didn't wrap around, we're done. */
break;
}
}
do {
--n;
c += p[n];
p[n] = (u8)c;
c >>= 8;
} while (n);
}
static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)

6
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
View File

@ -508,6 +508,12 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ret = 1;
break;
}
if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
&& x->ex_pathlen != -1
&& (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
ret = 0;
}
if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK))
return 0;
/* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */

14
crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
View File

@ -384,12 +384,16 @@ static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
if (bs->ca)
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
if (bs->pathlen) {
if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
|| !bs->ca) {
if (bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
x->ex_pathlen = 0;
} else
} else {
x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
if (!bs->ca && x->ex_pathlen != 0) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
x->ex_pathlen = 0;
}
}
} else
x->ex_pathlen = -1;
BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
@ -545,9 +549,11 @@ static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
* return codes:
* 0 not a CA
* 1 is a CA
* 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA
* 2 Only possible in older versions of openSSL when basicConstraints are absent
* new versions will not return this value. May be a CA
* 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1.
* 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
* 5 Netscape specific CA Flags present
*/
static int check_ca(const X509 *x)

4
doc/man1/s_time.pod
View File

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_time>
[B<-cert filename>]
[B<-key filename>]
[B<-CApath directory>]
[B<-cafile filename>]
[B<-CAfile filename>]
[B<-no-CAfile>]
[B<-no-CApath>]
[B<-reuse>]
@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ L<s_client(1)>, L<s_server(1)>, L<ciphers(1)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2004-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2004-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy

9
doc/man3/EVP_aes.pod
View File

@ -160,6 +160,13 @@ In particular, XTS-AES-128 (B<EVP_aes_128_xts>) takes input of a 256-bit key to
achieve AES 128-bit security, and XTS-AES-256 (B<EVP_aes_256_xts>) takes input
of a 512-bit key to achieve AES 256-bit security.
The XTS implementation in OpenSSL does not support streaming. That is there must
only be one L<EVP_EncryptUpdate(3)> call per L<EVP_EncryptInit_ex(3)> call (and
similarly with the "Decrypt" functions).
The I<iv> parameter to L<EVP_EncryptInit_ex(3)> or L<EVP_DecryptInit_ex(3)> is
the XTS "tweak" value.
=back
=head1 RETURN VALUES
@ -176,7 +183,7 @@ L<EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2017-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy

6
doc/man3/RAND_set_rand_method.pod
View File

@ -33,10 +33,10 @@ RAND_get_rand_method() returns a pointer to the current B<RAND_METHOD>.
=head1 THE RAND_METHOD STRUCTURE
typedef struct rand_meth_st {
void (*seed)(const void *buf, int num);
int (*seed)(const void *buf, int num);
int (*bytes)(unsigned char *buf, int num);
void (*cleanup)(void);
void (*add)(const void *buf, int num, int randomness);
int (*add)(const void *buf, int num, double entropy);
int (*pseudorand)(unsigned char *buf, int num);
int (*status)(void);
} RAND_METHOD;
@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ L<RAND(7)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy

74
doc/man3/X509_check_purpose.pod Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
=pod
=head1 NAME
X509_check_purpose - Check the purpose of a certificate
=head1 SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
=head1 DESCRIPTION
This function checks if certificate I<x> was created with the purpose
represented by I<id>. If I<ca> is nonzero, then certificate I<x> is
checked to determine if it's a possible CA with various levels of certainty
possibly returned.
Below are the potential ID's that can be checked:
# define X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT 1
# define X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER 2
# define X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER 3
# define X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN 4
# define X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT 5
# define X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN 6
# define X509_PURPOSE_ANY 7
# define X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER 8
# define X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN 9
=head1 RETURN VALUES
For non-CA checks
=over 4
=item -1 an error condition has occured
=item E<32>1 if the certificate was created to perform the purpose represented by I<id>
=item E<32>0 if the certificate was not created to perform the purpose represented by I<id>
=back
For CA checks the below integers could be returned with the following meanings:
=over 4
=item -1 an error condition has occured
=item E<32>0 not a CA or does not have the purpose represented by I<id>
=item E<32>1 is a CA.
=item E<32>2 Only possible in old versions of openSSL when basicConstraints are absent.
New versions will not return this value. May be a CA
=item E<32>3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1.
=item E<32>4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
=item E<32>5 legacy Netscape specific CA Flags present
=back
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use this
file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file
LICENSE in the source distribution or at L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
=cut

4
include/openssl/opensslv.h
View File

@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ extern "C" {
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1010106fL
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.1.1f 31 Mar 2020"
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1010107fL
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.1.1g 21 Apr 2020"
/*-
* The macros below are to be used for shared library (.so, .dll, ...)

2
ssl/t1_lib.c
View File

@ -2130,7 +2130,7 @@ static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
: s->shared_sigalgs[i];
if (sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
return 1;
}
return 0;