From e4d185768e49323a6fa2340af697fa1ff2970da9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: andrew Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2017 16:28:40 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Start to use the User and Privileged execute-never bits in the arm64 pagetables. This sets both bits when entering an address we know shouldn't be executed. I expect we could mark all userspace pages as Privileged execute-never to ensure the kernel doesn't branch to one of these addresses. While here add the ARMv8.1 upper attributes. Reviewed by: alc, kib (previous version) MFC after: 1 week Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10360 --- sys/arm64/arm64/pmap.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------- sys/arm64/include/pte.h | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/sys/arm64/arm64/pmap.c b/sys/arm64/arm64/pmap.c index 55aa402eb1c9..b2255588ed52 100644 --- a/sys/arm64/arm64/pmap.c +++ b/sys/arm64/arm64/pmap.c @@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ pmap_bootstrap_dmap(vm_offset_t kern_l1, vm_paddr_t min_pa, vm_paddr_t max_pa) l1_slot = ((va - DMAP_MIN_ADDRESS) >> L1_SHIFT); pmap_load_store(&pagetable_dmap[l1_slot], - (pa & ~L1_OFFSET) | ATTR_DEFAULT | + (pa & ~L1_OFFSET) | ATTR_DEFAULT | ATTR_XN | ATTR_IDX(CACHED_MEMORY) | L1_BLOCK); } @@ -2428,14 +2428,16 @@ pmap_protect(pmap_t pmap, vm_offset_t sva, vm_offset_t eva, vm_prot_t prot) { vm_offset_t va, va_next; pd_entry_t *l0, *l1, *l2; - pt_entry_t *l3p, l3; + pt_entry_t *l3p, l3, nbits; - if ((prot & VM_PROT_READ) == VM_PROT_NONE) { + KASSERT((prot & ~VM_PROT_ALL) == 0, ("invalid prot %x", prot)); + if (prot == VM_PROT_NONE) { pmap_remove(pmap, sva, eva); return; } - if ((prot & VM_PROT_WRITE) == VM_PROT_WRITE) + if ((prot & (VM_PROT_WRITE | VM_PROT_EXECUTE)) == + (VM_PROT_WRITE | VM_PROT_EXECUTE)) return; PMAP_LOCK(pmap); @@ -2480,17 +2482,25 @@ pmap_protect(pmap_t pmap, vm_offset_t sva, vm_offset_t eva, vm_prot_t prot) for (l3p = pmap_l2_to_l3(l2, sva); sva != va_next; l3p++, sva += L3_SIZE) { l3 = pmap_load(l3p); - if (pmap_l3_valid(l3)) { + if (!pmap_l3_valid(l3)) + continue; + + nbits = 0; + if ((prot & VM_PROT_WRITE) == 0) { if ((l3 & ATTR_SW_MANAGED) && pmap_page_dirty(l3)) { vm_page_dirty(PHYS_TO_VM_PAGE(l3 & ~ATTR_MASK)); } - pmap_set(l3p, ATTR_AP(ATTR_AP_RO)); - PTE_SYNC(l3p); - /* XXX: Use pmap_invalidate_range */ - pmap_invalidate_page(pmap, va); + nbits |= ATTR_AP(ATTR_AP_RO); } + if ((prot & VM_PROT_EXECUTE) == 0) + nbits |= ATTR_XN; + + pmap_set(l3p, nbits); + PTE_SYNC(l3p); + /* XXX: Use pmap_invalidate_range */ + pmap_invalidate_page(pmap, va); } } PMAP_UNLOCK(pmap); @@ -2709,6 +2719,8 @@ pmap_enter(pmap_t pmap, vm_offset_t va, vm_page_t m, vm_prot_t prot, L3_PAGE); if ((prot & VM_PROT_WRITE) == 0) new_l3 |= ATTR_AP(ATTR_AP_RO); + if ((prot & VM_PROT_EXECUTE) == 0) + new_l3 |= ATTR_XN; if ((flags & PMAP_ENTER_WIRED) != 0) new_l3 |= ATTR_SW_WIRED; if ((va >> 63) == 0) @@ -3115,6 +3127,8 @@ pmap_enter_quick_locked(pmap_t pmap, vm_offset_t va, vm_page_t m, pa = VM_PAGE_TO_PHYS(m) | ATTR_DEFAULT | ATTR_IDX(m->md.pv_memattr) | ATTR_AP(ATTR_AP_RO) | L3_PAGE; + if ((prot & VM_PROT_EXECUTE) == 0) + pa |= ATTR_XN; /* * Now validate mapping with RO protection diff --git a/sys/arm64/include/pte.h b/sys/arm64/include/pte.h index 72d0e62e7109..50cf3d762553 100644 --- a/sys/arm64/include/pte.h +++ b/sys/arm64/include/pte.h @@ -46,6 +46,11 @@ typedef uint64_t pt_entry_t; /* page table entry */ /* Bits 58:55 are reserved for software */ #define ATTR_SW_MANAGED (1UL << 56) #define ATTR_SW_WIRED (1UL << 55) +#define ATTR_UXN (1UL << 54) +#define ATTR_PXN (1UL << 53) +#define ATTR_XN (ATTR_PXN | ATTR_UXN) +#define ATTR_CONTIGUOUS (1UL << 52) +#define ATTR_DBM (1UL << 51) #define ATTR_nG (1 << 11) #define ATTR_AF (1 << 10) #define ATTR_SH(x) ((x) << 8)