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Break out strictly credential-related portions of mac_process.c into a

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new file, mac_cred.c.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
This commit is contained in:
rwatson 2008-10-28 21:53:10 +00:00
parent 70247e7fdb
commit f29a8ec282
3 changed files with 214 additions and 141 deletions
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1
sys/conf/files
View File

@ -2175,6 +2175,7 @@ security/audit/audit_trigger.c optional audit
security/audit/audit_worker.c optional audit
security/mac/mac_atalk.c optional mac netatalk
security/mac/mac_audit.c optional mac audit
security/mac/mac_cred.c optional mac
security/mac/mac_framework.c optional mac
security/mac/mac_inet.c optional mac inet
security/mac/mac_inet6.c optional mac inet6

213
sys/security/mac/mac_cred.c Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 1999-2002, 2008 Robert N. M. Watson
* Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2005 Samy Al Bahra
* Copyright (c) 2006 SPARTA, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Apple Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the
* TrustedBSD Project.
*
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
* Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
* Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
* as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
*
* This software was enhanced by SPARTA ISSO under SPAWAR contract
* N66001-04-C-6019 ("SEFOS").
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "opt_mac.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/condvar.h>
#include <sys/imgact.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/mac.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/sbuf.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/namei.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <vm/vm.h>
#include <vm/pmap.h>
#include <vm/vm_map.h>
#include <vm/vm_object.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_internal.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_policy.h>
struct label *
mac_cred_label_alloc(void)
{
struct label *label;
label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK);
MAC_PERFORM(cred_init_label, label);
return (label);
}
void
mac_cred_init(struct ucred *cred)
{
if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_CRED)
cred->cr_label = mac_cred_label_alloc();
else
cred->cr_label = NULL;
}
void
mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label)
{
MAC_PERFORM(cred_destroy_label, label);
mac_labelzone_free(label);
}
void
mac_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred)
{
if (cred->cr_label != NULL) {
mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label);
cred->cr_label = NULL;
}
}
/*
* When a thread becomes an NFS server daemon, its credential may need to be
* updated to reflect this so that policies can recognize when file system
* operations originate from the network.
*
* At some point, it would be desirable if the credential used for each NFS
* RPC could be set based on the RPC context (i.e., source system, etc) to
* provide more fine-grained access control.
*/
void
mac_cred_associate_nfsd(struct ucred *cred)
{
MAC_PERFORM(cred_associate_nfsd, cred);
}
/*
* Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other kernel
* processes and threads are spawned.
*/
void
mac_cred_create_swapper(struct ucred *cred)
{
MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_swapper, cred);
}
/*
* Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other
* userland processes and threads are spawned.
*/
void
mac_cred_create_init(struct ucred *cred)
{
MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_init, cred);
}
int
mac_cred_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *elements,
char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen)
{
int error;
MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
return (error);
}
int
mac_cred_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *string)
{
int error;
MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string);
return (error);
}
/*
* When a new process is created, its label must be initialized. Generally,
* this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible deltas.
* This function allows that processing to take place.
*/
void
mac_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest)
{
MAC_PERFORM(cred_copy_label, src->cr_label, dest->cr_label);
}
/*
* When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege
* to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified
* buffer cache.
*/
void
mac_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
{
MAC_PERFORM(cred_relabel, cred, newlabel);
}
int
mac_cred_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
{
int error;
MAC_CHECK(cred_check_relabel, cred, newlabel);
return (error);
}
int
mac_cred_check_visible(struct ucred *cr1, struct ucred *cr2)
{
int error;
MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, cr1, cr2);
return (error);
}

141
sys/security/mac/mac_process.c
View File

@ -84,26 +84,6 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation_via_cow, CTLFLAG_RW,
static void mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(struct thread *td,
struct ucred *cred, struct vm_map *map);
struct label *
mac_cred_label_alloc(void)
{
struct label *label;
label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK);
MAC_PERFORM(cred_init_label, label);
return (label);
}
void
mac_cred_init(struct ucred *cred)
{
if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_CRED)
cred->cr_label = mac_cred_label_alloc();
else
cred->cr_label = NULL;
}
static struct label *
mac_proc_label_alloc(void)
{
@ -124,24 +104,6 @@ mac_proc_init(struct proc *p)
p->p_label = NULL;
}
void
mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label)
{
MAC_PERFORM(cred_destroy_label, label);
mac_labelzone_free(label);
}
void
mac_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred)
{
if (cred->cr_label != NULL) {
mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label);
cred->cr_label = NULL;
}
}
static void
mac_proc_label_free(struct label *label)
{
@ -160,65 +122,6 @@ mac_proc_destroy(struct proc *p)
}
}
/*
* When a thread becomes an NFS server daemon, its credential may need to be
* updated to reflect this so that policies can recognize when file system
* operations originate from the network.
*
* At some point, it would be desirable if the credential used for each NFS
* RPC could be set based on the RPC context (i.e., source system, etc) to
* provide more fine-grained access control.
*/
void
mac_cred_associate_nfsd(struct ucred *cred)
{
MAC_PERFORM(cred_associate_nfsd, cred);
}
/*
* Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other kernel
* processes and threads are spawned.
*/
void
mac_cred_create_swapper(struct ucred *cred)
{
MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_swapper, cred);
}
/*
* Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other
* userland processes and threads are spawned.
*/
void
mac_cred_create_init(struct ucred *cred)
{
MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_init, cred);
}
int
mac_cred_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *elements,
char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen)
{
int error;
MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
return (error);
}
int
mac_cred_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *string)
{
int error;
MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string);
return (error);
}
void
mac_thread_userret(struct thread *td)
{
@ -226,18 +129,6 @@ mac_thread_userret(struct thread *td)
MAC_PERFORM(thread_userret, td);
}
/*
* When a new process is created, its label must be initialized. Generally,
* this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible deltas.
* This function allows that processing to take place.
*/
void
mac_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest)
{
MAC_PERFORM(cred_copy_label, src->cr_label, dest->cr_label);
}
int
mac_execve_enter(struct image_params *imgp, struct mac *mac_p)
{
@ -484,38 +375,6 @@ mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(struct thread *td, struct ucred *cred,
vm_map_unlock_read(map);
}
/*
* When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege
* to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified
* buffer cache.
*/
void
mac_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
{
MAC_PERFORM(cred_relabel, cred, newlabel);
}
int
mac_cred_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
{
int error;
MAC_CHECK(cred_check_relabel, cred, newlabel);
return (error);
}
int
mac_cred_check_visible(struct ucred *cr1, struct ucred *cr2)
{
int error;
MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, cr1, cr2);
return (error);
}
int
mac_proc_check_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
{